Network Working Group                                   Murtaza S. Chiba
INTERNET-DRAFT                                             Gopal Dommety
Obsoletes: 3576                                              Mark Eklund
Category: Informational                              Cisco Systems, Inc.
Expires: January 25, 2008                                   David Mitton
                                                      RSA Security, Inc.
                                                           Bernard Aboba
                                                   Microsoft Corporation
                                                            31 July 2007

Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote Authentication Dial In User
                            Service (RADIUS)
                  draft-ietf-radext-rfc3576bis-09.txt

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Drafts.

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   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 25, 2008.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This document describes a currently deployed extension to the Remote
   Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) protocol, allowing
   dynamic changes to a user session, as implemented by network access
   server products.  This includes support for disconnecting users and
   changing authorizations applicable to a user session.



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Table of Contents

1.     Introduction ..........................................    3
   1.1       Applicability ...................................    3
   1.2       Requirements Language ...........................    4
   1.3       Terminology .....................................    4
2.     Overview  .............................................    5
   2.1       Disconnect Messages (DM) ........................    5
   2.2       Change-of-Authorization Messages (CoA) ..........    5
   2.3       Packet Format ...................................    6
3.     Attributes ............................................   10
   3.1       Proxy State .....................................   12
   3.2       Authorize Only ..................................   13
   3.3       State ...........................................   13
   3.4       Message-Authenticator ...........................   14
   3.5       Error-Cause .....................................   15
   3.6       Table of Attributes .............................   18
4.     Diameter Considerations ...............................   22
5.     IANA Considerations ...................................   24
6.     Security Considerations ...............................   25
   6.1       Authorization Issues ............................   25
   6.2       Impersonation ...................................   26
   6.3       IPsec Usage Guidelines ..........................   26
   6.4       Replay Protection ...............................   29
7.     Example Traces ........................................   30
8.     References ............................................   30
   8.1       Normative References ............................   30
   8.2       Informative References ..........................   31
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..............................................   32
AUTHORS' ADDRESSES ...........................................   33
Appendix A - Changes from RFC 3576 ...........................   34
Full Copyright Statement .....................................   36
Intellectual Property ........................................   36


















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1.  Introduction

   The RADIUS protocol, defined in [RFC2865], does not support
   unsolicited messages sent from the RADIUS server to the Network
   Access Server (NAS).

   However, there are many instances in which it is desirable for
   changes to be made to session characteristics, without requiring the
   NAS to initiate the exchange.  For example, it may be desirable for
   administrators to be able to terminate user session(s) in progress.
   Alternatively, if the user changes authorization level, this may
   require that authorization attributes be added/deleted from user
   session(s).

   To overcome these limitations, several vendors have implemented
   additional RADIUS commands in order to be able to support unsolicited
   messages to be sent to the NAS.  These extended commands provide
   support for Disconnect and Change-of-Authorization (CoA) packets.
   Disconnect packets cause user session(s) to be terminated
   immediately, whereas CoA packets modify session authorization
   attributes such as data filters.

1.1.  Applicability

   This protocol is being recommended for publication as an
   Informational RFC rather than as a standards-track RFC because of
   problems that cannot be fixed without creating incompatibilities with
   deployed implementations.  This includes security vulnerabilities, as
   well as semantic ambiguities resulting from the design of the Change-
   of-Authorization (CoA) commands.  While fixes are recommended, they
   cannot be made mandatory since this would be incompatible with
   existing implementations.

   Existing implementations of this protocol do not support
   authorization checks, so that an ISP sharing a NAS with another ISP
   could disconnect or change authorizations for another ISP's users.
   In order to remedy this problem, a "Reverse Path Forwarding" check is
   described; see Section 6.1. for details.

   Existing implementations utilize per-packet authentication and
   integrity protection algorithms with known weaknesses [MD5Attack].
   To provide stronger per-packet authentication and integrity
   protection, the use of IPsec is recommended.  See Section 6.3 for
   details.

   Existing implementations lack replay protection.  In order to support
   replay detection, it is recommended that an Event-Timestamp Attribute
   be added to all packets in situations where IPsec replay protection



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   is not employed.  See Section 6.4 for details.

   The approach taken with CoA commands in existing implementations
   results in a semantic ambiguity.  Existing implementations of the
   CoA-Request identify the affected session, as well as supply the
   authorization changes.  Since RADIUS Attributes included within
   existing implementations of the CoA-Request can be used for session
   identification or authorization change, it may not be clear which
   function a given attribute is serving.

   The problem does not exist within the Diameter protocol [RFC3588], in
   which server-initiated authorization change is initiated using a Re-
   Auth-Request (RAR) command identifying the session via User-Name and
   Session-Id AVPs and containing a Re-Auth-Request-Type AVP with value
   "AUTHORIZE_ONLY".  This results in initiation of a standard
   Request/Response sequence where authorization changes are supplied.
   As a result, in no command can Diameter AVPs have multiple potential
   meanings.

1.2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.3.  Terminology

   This document frequently uses the following terms:

Dynamic Authorization Client (DAC)
     The entity originating Change of Authorization (CoA) Requests or
     Disconnect-Requests.  While it is possible that the DAC is co-
     resident with a RADIUS authentication or accounting server, this
     need not necessarily be the case.

Dynamic Authorization Server (DAS)
     The entity receiving CoA-Request or Disconnect-Request packets.
     The DAS may be a NAS or a RADIUS proxy.

Network Access Server (NAS)
     The device providing access to the network.

service
     The NAS provides a service to the user, such as IEEE 802 or Point-
     to-Point Protocol (PPP).

session
     Each service provided by the NAS to a user constitutes a session,



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     with the beginning of the session defined as the point where
     service is first provided and the end of the session defined as the
     point where service is ended.  A user may have multiple sessions in
     parallel or series if the NAS supports that.

silently discard
     This means the implementation discards the packet without further
     processing.  The implementation SHOULD provide the capability of
     logging the error, including the contents of the silently discarded
     packet, and SHOULD record the event in a statistics counter.

2.  Overview

   This section describes the most commonly implemented features of
   Disconnect and Change-of-Authorization (CoA) packets.

2.1.  Disconnect Messages (DM)

   A Disconnect-Request packet is sent by the Dynamic Authorization
   Client in order to terminate user session(s) on a NAS and discard all
   associated session context.  The Disconnect-Request packet is sent to
   UDP port 3799, and identifies the NAS as well as the user session(s)
   to be terminated by inclusion of the identification attributes
   described in Section 3.

   +----------+                          +----------+
   |          |   Disconnect-Request     |          |
   |          |   <--------------------  |  Dynamic |
   |    NAS   |                          |  Authz   |
   |          |   Disconnect-Response    |  Client  |
   |          |   ---------------------> |          |
   +----------+                          +----------+

   The NAS responds to a Disconnect-Request packet sent by a Dynamic
   Authorization Client with a Disconnect-ACK if all associated session
   context is discarded and the user session(s) are no longer connected,
   or a Disconnect-NAK, if the NAS was unable to disconnect one or more
   sessions and discard all associated session context.  A Disconnect-
   ACK MAY contain the Attribute Acct-Terminate-Cause (49) [RFC2866]
   with the value set to 6 for Admin-Reset.

2.2.  Change-of-Authorization Messages (CoA)

   CoA-Request packets contain information for dynamically changing
   session authorizations.  Typically this is used to change data
   filters.  The data filters can be of either the ingress or egress
   kind, and are sent in addition to the identification attributes as
   described in section 3.  The port used, and packet format (described



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   in Section 2.3), are the same as that for Disconnect-Request packets.

   The following attributes MAY be sent in a CoA-Request:

   Filter-ID (11) -        Indicates the name of a data filter list
                           to be applied for the session(s) that the
                           identification attributes map to.

   NAS-Filter-Rule (92)  - Provides a filter list to be applied
                           for the session(s) that the identification
                           attributes map to [RFC4849].

   +----------+                          +----------+
   |          |      CoA-Request         |          |
   |          |  <--------------------   |  Dynamic |
   |   NAS    |                          |  Authz   |
   |          |     CoA-Response         |  Client  |
   |          |   ---------------------> |          |
   +----------+                          +----------+

   The NAS responds to a CoA-Request sent by a Dynamic Authorization
   Client with a CoA-ACK if the NAS is able to successfully change the
   authorizations for the user session(s), or a CoA-NAK if the CoA-
   Request is unsuccessful.  A NAS MUST respond to a CoA-Request
   including a Service-Type Attribute with an unsupported value with a
   CoA-NAK; an Error-Cause Attribute with value "Unsupported Service"
   SHOULD be included.

2.3.  Packet Format

   For either Disconnect-Request or CoA-Request packets UDP port 3799 is
   used as the destination port.  For responses, the source and
   destination ports are reversed.  Exactly one RADIUS packet is
   encapsulated in the UDP Data field.

   A summary of the data format is shown below. The fields are
   transmitted from left to right.

   The packet format consists of the fields: Code, Identifier, Length,
   Authenticator, and Attributes in Type:Length:Value (TLV) format.  All
   fields hold the same meaning as those described in RADIUS [RFC2865].
   The Authenticator field MUST be calculated in the same way as is
   specified for an Accounting-Request in [RFC2866].








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    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Code      |  Identifier   |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   |                         Authenticator                         |
   |                                                               |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Attributes ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-

   Code

      The Code field is one octet, and identifies the type of RADIUS
      packet.  Packets received with an invalid Code field MUST be
      silently discarded.  RADIUS codes (decimal) for this extension are
      assigned as follows:

      40 - Disconnect-Request [RFC3575]
      41 - Disconnect-ACK [RFC3575]
      42 - Disconnect-NAK [RFC3575]
      43 - CoA-Request [RFC3575]
      44 - CoA-ACK [RFC3575]
      45 - CoA-NAK [RFC3575]

   Identifier

      The Identifier field is one octet, and aids in matching requests
      and replies.  A Dynamic Authorization Server implementing this
      specification MUST be capable of detecting a duplicate request if
      it has the same source IP address, source UDP port and Identifier
      within a short span of time.

      The responsibility for retransmission of Disconnect-Request and
      CoA-Request packets lies with the Dynamic Authorization Client.
      If after sending these packets, the Dynamic Authorization Client
      does not receive a response, it will retransmit.

      The Identifier field MUST be changed whenever the content of the
      Attributes field changes, or whenever a valid reply has been
      received for a previous request.  For retransmissions where the
      contents are identical, the Identifier MUST remain unchanged.

      If the Dynamic Authorization Client is retransmitting a
      Disconnect-Request or CoA-Request to the same Dynamic
      Authorization Server as before, and the Attributes haven't



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      changed, the same Request Authenticator, Identifier and source
      port MUST be used.  If any Attributes have changed, a new
      Authenticator and Identifier MUST be used.

      If the Request to a primary Dynamic Authorization Server fails, a
      secondary Dynamic Authorization Server must be queried, if
      available; issues relating to failover algorithms are described in
      [RFC3539].  Since this represents a new request, a new Request
      Authenticator and Identifier MUST be used.  However, where the
      Dynamic Authorization Client is sending directly to the NAS,
      failover typically does not make sense, since CoA-Request or
      Disconnect-Request packets need to be delivered to the NAS where
      the session resides.

   Length

      The Length field is two octets.  It indicates the length of the
      packet including the Code, Identifier, Length, Authenticator and
      Attribute fields.  Octets outside the range of the Length field
      MUST be treated as padding and ignored on reception.  If the
      packet is shorter than the Length field indicates, it MUST be
      silently discarded.  The minimum length is 20 and maximum length
      is 4096.

   Authenticator

      The Authenticator field is sixteen (16) octets.  The most
      significant octet is transmitted first.  This value is used to
      authenticate packets between the Dynamic Authorization Client and
      the Dynamic Authorization Server.

      Request Authenticator

         In  Request packets, the Authenticator value is a 16 octet MD5
         [RFC1321] checksum, called the Request Authenticator.  The
         Request Authenticator is calculated the same way as for an
         Accounting-Request, specified in [RFC2866].

         Note that the Request Authenticator of a CoA-Request or
         Disconnect-Request cannot be computed the same way as the
         Request Authenticator of a RADIUS Access-Request, because there
         is no User-Password Attribute in a CoA-Request or Disconnect-
         Request.

      Response Authenticator

         The Authenticator field in a Response packet (e.g. Disconnect-
         ACK, Disconnect-NAK, CoA-ACK, or CoA-NAK) is called the



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         Response Authenticator, and contains a one-way MD5 hash
         calculated over a stream of octets consisting of the Code,
         Identifier, Length, the Request Authenticator field from the
         packet being replied to, and the response Attributes if any,
         followed by the shared secret.  The resulting 16 octet MD5 hash
         value is stored in the Authenticator field of the Response
         packet.

      Administrative note: As noted in [RFC2865] Section 3, the secret
      (password shared between the Dynamic Authorization Client and the
      Dynamic Authorization Server) SHOULD be at least as large and
      unguessable as a well-chosen password.  The Dynamic Authorization
      Server MUST use the source IP address of the RADIUS UDP packet to
      decide which shared secret to use, so that requests can be
      proxied.

   Attributes

      In CoA-Request and Disconnect-Request packets, all attributes MUST
      be treated as mandatory.  If one or more authorization changes
      specified in a CoA-Request cannot be carried out, the NAS MUST
      send a CoA-NAK.  A NAS MUST respond to a CoA-Request containing
      one or more unsupported Attributes or Attribute values with a CoA-
      NAK; an Error-Cause Attribute with value 401 (Unsupported
      Attribute) or 407 (Invalid Attribute Value) MAY be included.  A
      NAS MUST respond to a Disconnect-Request containing one or more
      unsupported Attributes or Attribute values with a Disconnect-NAK;
      an Error-Cause Attribute with value 401 (Unsupported Attribute) or
      407 (Invalid Attribute Value) MAY be included.

      State changes resulting from a CoA-Request MUST be atomic: if the
      CoA-Request is successful for all matching sessions, the NAS MUST
      send a CoA-ACK in reply, and all requested authorization changes
      MUST be made.  If the CoA-Request is unsuccessful for any matching
      sessions, the NAS MUST send as CoA-NAK in reply, and the requested
      authorization changes MUST NOT be made for any of the matching
      sessions.  Similarly, a state change MUST NOT occur as a result of
      a Disconnect-Request that is unsuccessful with respect to any of
      the matching sessions; a NAS MUST send a Disconnect-NAK in reply
      if any of the matching sessions cannot be successfully terminated.
      A NAS which does not support dynamic authorization changes
      applying to multiple sessions MUST send a CoA-NAK or Disconnect-
      NAK in reply; an Error-Cause Attribute with value 508 (Multiple
      Session Selection Unsupported) SHOULD be included.

      Within this specification attributes can be used for
      identification, authorization or other purposes.  RADIUS Attribute
      specifications created after publication of this document SHOULD



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      state whether an attribute can be included in CoA or Disconnect
      messages and if so, which messages it can be included in and
      whether it serves as an identification or authorization attribute.

      Even if a NAS implements an attribute for use with RADIUS
      authentication and accounting, it is possible that it will not
      support inclusion of that attribute within CoA-Request and
      Disconnect-Request packets, given the difference in attribute
      semantics.  This is true even for attributes specified as
      allowable within Access-Accept packets (such as those defined
      within [RFC2865], [RFC2868], [RFC2869], [RFC3162], [RFC3579],
      [RFC4372], [RFC4675], [RFC4818] and [RFC4849]).

3.  Attributes

   In Disconnect-Request and CoA-Request packets, certain attributes are
   used to uniquely identify the NAS as well as user session(s) on the
   NAS.  All NAS and session identification attributes included in a
   CoA-Request or Disconnect-Request packet MUST match at least one
   session in order for a Request to be successful; otherwise a
   Disconnect-NAK or CoA-NAK MUST be sent.  If all NAS identification
   attributes match, and more than one session matches all of the
   session identification attributes, then a CoA-Request or Disconnect-
   Request MUST apply to all matching sessions.

   Identification attributes include NAS and session identification
   attributes, as described below.

     NAS identification attributes

     Attribute             #    Reference  Description
     ---------            ---   ---------  -----------
     NAS-IP-Address        4    [RFC2865]  The IPv4 address of the NAS.
     NAS-Identifier       32    [RFC2865]  String identifying the NAS.
     NAS-IPv6-Address     95    [RFC3162]  The IPv6 address of the NAS.

     Session identification attributes

     Attribute              #   Reference  Description
     ---------             ---  ---------  -----------
     User-Name              1   [RFC2865]  The name of the user
                                           associated with one or
                                           more sessions.
     NAS-Port               5   [RFC2865]  The port on which a
                                           session is terminated.
     Framed-IP-Address      8   [RFC2865]  The IPv4 address associated
                                           with a session.
     Vendor-Specific       26   [RFC2865]  One or more vendor-specific



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                                           identification attributes.
     Called-Station-Id     30   [RFC2865]  The link address to which
                                           a session is connected.
     Calling-Station-Id    31   [RFC2865]  The link address from which
                                           one or more sessions are
                                           connected.
     Acct-Session-Id       44   [RFC2866]  The identifier uniquely
                                           identifying a session
                                           on the NAS.
     Acct-Multi-Session-Id 50   [RFC2866]  The identifier uniquely
                                           identifying related sessions.
     NAS-Port-Id           87   [RFC2869]  String identifying the port
                                           where a session is.
     Chargeable-User-      89   [RFC4372]  The CUI associated with one
     Identity                              or more sessions.  Needed
                                           where a privacy NAI is used,
                                           since in this case the
                                           User-Name (e.g. "anonymous")
                                           may not identify sessions
                                           belonging to a given user.
     Framed-Interface-Id   96   [RFC3162]  The IPv6 Interface Identifier
                                           associated with a session;
                                           always sent with
                                           Framed-IPv6-Prefix.
     Framed-IPv6-Prefix    97   [RFC3162]  The IPv6 prefix associated
                                           with a session, always sent
                                           with Framed-Interface-Id.

   To address security concerns described in Section 6.1, either the
   User-Name or Chargeable-User-Identity attribute SHOULD be present in
   Disconnect-Request and CoA-Request packets.

   Where a Diameter client utilizes the same Session-Id for both
   authorization and accounting, inclusion of an Acct-Session-Id
   Attribute in a Disconnect-Request or CoA-Request can assist with
   Diameter/RADIUS translation, since Diameter RAR and ASR commands
   include a Session-Id AVP.  An Acct-Session-Id Attribute SHOULD be
   included in Disconnect-Request and CoA-Request packets.

   A NAS implementing this specification SHOULD send an Acct-Session-Id
   or Acct-Multi-Session-Id Attribute within an Access-Request.  Where
   an Acct-Session-Id or Acct-Multi-Session-Id Attribute is not included
   within an Access-Request, the Dynamic Authorization Client will not
   know the Acct-Session-Id or Acct-Multi-Session-Id of the session it
   is attempting to target, unless it also has access to the accounting
   data for that session.

   Where an Acct-Session-Id or Acct-Multi-Session-Id Attribute is not



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   present in a CoA-Request or Disconnect-Request, it is possible that
   the the User-Name or Chargeable-User-Identity attributes will not be
   sufficient to uniquely identify a single session (e.g. if the same
   user has multiple sessions on the NAS, or if the privacy NAI is
   used).  In this case if it is desired to identify a single session,
   session identification MAY be performed by using one or more of the
   Framed-IP-Address, Framed-IPv6-Prefix/Framed-Interface-Id, Called-
   Station-Id, Calling-Station-Id, NAS-Port and NAS-Port-Id attributes.

   To address security concerns described in Section 6.2, one or more of
   the NAS-IP-Address or NAS-IPv6-Address Attributes SHOULD be present
   in CoA-Request and Disconnect-Request packets; the NAS-Identifier
   Attribute MAY be present.

   A Disconnect-Request MUST contain only NAS and session identification
   attributes.  If other attributes are included in a Disconnect-
   Request, implementations MUST send a Disconnect-NAK; an Error-Cause
   Attribute with value "Unsupported Attribute" MAY be included.

3.1.  Proxy State

   If there are any Proxy-State attributes in a Disconnect-Request or
   CoA-Request received from the Dynamic Authorization Client, the
   Dynamic Authorization Server MUST include those Proxy-State
   attributes in its response to the Dynamic Authorization Client.

   A forwarding proxy or NAS MUST NOT modify existing Proxy-State,
   State, or Class attributes present in the packet.  The forwarding
   proxy or NAS MUST treat any Proxy-State attributes already in the
   packet as opaque data.  Its operation MUST NOT depend on the content
   of Proxy-State attributes added by previous proxies.  The forwarding
   proxy MUST NOT modify any other Proxy-State attributes that were in
   the packet; it may choose not to forward them, but it MUST NOT change
   their contents.  If the forwarding proxy omits the Proxy-State
   attributes in the request, it MUST attach them to the response before
   sending it.

   When the proxy forwards a Disconnect or CoA-Request, it MAY add a
   Proxy-State Attribute, but it MUST NOT add more than one.  If a
   Proxy-State Attribute is added to a packet when forwarding the
   packet, the Proxy-State Attribute MUST be added after any existing
   Proxy-State attributes.  The forwarding proxy MUST NOT change the
   order of any attributes of the same type, including Proxy-State.
   Other attributes can be placed before, after or even between the
   Proxy-State attributes.

   When the proxy receives a response to a CoA-Request or Disconnect-
   Request, it MUST remove its own Proxy-State (the last Proxy- State in



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   the packet) Attribute before forwarding the response.  Since
   Disconnect and CoA responses are authenticated on the entire packet
   contents, the stripping of the Proxy-State Attribute invalidates the
   integrity check - so the proxy needs to recompute it.

3.2.  Authorize Only

   Support for a CoA-Request including a Service-Type Attribute with
   value "Authorize Only" is OPTIONAL on the NAS and Dynamic
   Authorization Client.  A Service-Type Attribute MUST NOT be included
   within a Disconnect-Request.

   A NAS MUST respond to a CoA-Request including a Service-Type
   Attribute with value "Authorize Only" with a CoA-NAK; a CoA-ACK MUST
   NOT be sent.  If the NAS does not support a Service-Type value of
   "Authorize Only" then it MUST respond with a CoA-NAK; an Error-Cause
   value of 405 (Unsupported Service) SHOULD be included.

   A CoA-Request containing a Service-Type Attribute with value
   "Authorize Only" MUST in addition contain only NAS or session
   identification attributes, as well as a State Attribute.  If other
   attributes are included in such a CoA-Request, a CoA-NAK MUST be
   sent; an Error-Cause Attribute with value 401 (Unsupported Attribute)
   SHOULD be included.

   If a CoA-Request packet including a Service-Type value of "Authorize
   Only" is successfully processed, the NAS MUST respond with a CoA-NAK
   containing a Service-Type Attribute with value "Authorize Only", and
   an Error-Cause Attribute with value 507 (Request Initiated).  The NAS
   then MUST send an Access-Request to the RADIUS server including a
   Service-Type Attribute with value "Authorize Only", along with a
   State Attribute.  This Access-Request SHOULD contain the NAS
   identification attributes from the CoA-Request, as well as the
   session identification attributes from the CoA-Request permitted in
   an Access-Request; it also MAY contain other attributes permitted in
   an Access-Request.

   As noted in [RFC2869] Section 5.19, a Message-Authenticator attribute
   SHOULD be included in an Access-Request that does not contain a User-
   Password, CHAP-Password, ARAP-Password or EAP-Message Attribute.  The
   RADIUS server then will respond to the Access-Request with an Access-
   Accept to (re-)authorize the session or an Access-Reject to refuse to
   (re-)authorize it.

3.3.  State

   The State Attribute is available to be sent by the Dynamic
   Authorization Client to the NAS in a CoA-Request packet and MUST be



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   sent unmodified from the NAS to the Dynamic Authorization Client in a
   subsequent ACK or NAK packet.

   [RFC2865] Section 5.44 states:

      An Access-Request MUST contain either a User-Password or a CHAP-
      Password or State.  An Access-Request MUST NOT contain both a
      User-Password and a CHAP-Password.  If future extensions allow
      other kinds of authentication information to be conveyed, the
      attribute for that can be used in an Access-Request instead of
      User-Password or CHAP-Password.

   In order to satisfy the requirements of [RFC2865] Section 5.44, an
   Access-Request with Service-Type="Authorize-Only" MUST contain a
   State attribute.

   In order to provide a State attribute to the NAS, a Dynamic
   Authorization Client sending a CoA-Request with a Service-Type value
   of "Authorize-Only" MUST include a State Attribute, and the NAS MUST
   send the State Attribute unmodified to the RADIUS server in the
   resulting Access-Request, if any.  A NAS receiving a CoA-Request
   containing a Service-Type value of "Authorize-Only" but lacking a
   State attribute MUST send a CoA-NAK and SHOULD include an Error-Cause
   attribute with value 402 (Missing Attribute).

   The State Attribute is also available to be sent by the Dynamic
   Authorization Client to the NAS in a CoA-Request that also includes a
   Termination-Action Attribute with the value of RADIUS-Request.  If
   the NAS performs the Termination-Action by sending a new Access-
   Request upon termination of the current session, it MUST include the
   State Attribute unchanged in that Access-Request.  In either usage,
   the Dynamic Authorization Server MUST NOT interpret the Attribute
   locally.  A CoA-Request packet MUST have only zero or one State
   Attribute.  Usage of the State Attribute is implementation dependent.

3.4.  Message-Authenticator

   The Message-Authenticator Attribute MAY be used to authenticate and
   integrity-protect CoA-Request, CoA-ACK, CoA-NAK, Disconnect-Request,
   Disconnect-ACK and Disconnect-NAK packets order to prevent spoofing.

   A Dynamic Authorization Server receiving a CoA-Request or Disconnect-
   Request with a Message-Authenticator Attribute present MUST calculate
   the correct value of the Message-Authenticator and silently discard
   the packet if it does not match the value sent.  A Dynamic
   Authorization Client receiving a CoA/Disconnect-ACK or
   CoA/Disconnect-NAK with a Message-Authenticator Attribute present
   MUST calculate the correct value of the Message-Authenticator and



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   silently discard the packet if it does not match the value sent.

   When a Message-Authenticator Attribute is included within a CoA-
   Request or Disconnect-Request, it is calculated as follows:

      Message-Authenticator = HMAC-MD5 (Type, Identifier, Length,
      Request Authenticator, Attributes)

      When the HMAC-MD5 message integrity check is calculated the
      Request Authenticator field and Message-Authenticator Attribute
      should be considered to be sixteen octets of zero.  The Message-
      Authenticator Attribute is calculated and inserted in the packet
      before the Request Authenticator is calculated.

      When a Message-Authenticator Attribute is included within a CoA-
      ACK, CoA-NAK, Disconnect-ACK or Disconnect-NAK, it is calculated
      as follows:

         Message-Authenticator = HMAC-MD5 (Type, Identifier, Length,
         Request Authenticator, Attributes)

      When the HMAC-MD5 message integrity check is calculated the
      Message-Authenticator Attribute should be considered to be sixteen
      octets of zero.  The Request Authenticator is taken from the
      corresponding CoA/Disconnect-Request.  The Message-Authenticator
      is calculated and inserted in the packet before the Response
      Authenticator is calculated.

3.5.  Error-Cause

   Description

      It is possible that a Dynamic Authorization Server cannot honor
      Disconnect-Request or CoA-Request packets for some reason.  The
      Error-Cause Attribute provides more detail on the cause of the
      problem.  It MAY be included within CoA-NAK and Disconnect-NAK
      packets.

      A summary of the Error-Cause Attribute format is shown below.  The
      fields are transmitted from left to right.

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     Type      |    Length     |             Value
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                 Value (cont)         |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+



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   Type

      101 for Error-Cause

   Length

      6

   Value

      The Value field is four octets, containing an integer specifying
      the cause of the error. Values 0-199 and 300-399 are reserved.
      Values 200-299 represent successful completion, so that these
      values may only be sent within CoA-ACK or Disconnect-ACK packets
      and MUST NOT be sent within a CoA-NAK or Disconnect-NAK packet.
      Values 400-499 represent fatal errors committed by the Dynamic
      Authorization Client, so that they MAY be sent within CoA-NAK or
      Disconnect-NAK packets, and MUST NOT be sent within CoA-ACK or
      Disconnect-ACK packets.  Values 500-599 represent fatal errors
      occurring on a Dynamic Authorization Server, so that they MAY be
      sent within CoA-NAK and Disconnect-NAK packets, and MUST NOT be
      sent within CoA-ACK or Disconnect-ACK packets.  Error-Cause values
      SHOULD be logged by the Dynamic Authorization Client.  Error-Code
      values (expressed in decimal) include:

       #     Value
      ---    -----
      201    Residual Session Context Removed
      202    Invalid EAP Packet (Ignored)
      401    Unsupported Attribute
      402    Missing Attribute
      403    NAS Identification Mismatch
      404    Invalid Request
      405    Unsupported Service
      406    Unsupported Extension
      407    Invalid Attribute Value
      501    Administratively Prohibited
      502    Request Not Routable (Proxy)
      503    Session Context Not Found
      504    Session Context Not Removable
      505    Other Proxy Processing Error
      506    Resources Unavailable
      507    Request Initiated
      508    Multiple Session Selection Unsupported

      "Residual Session Context Removed" is sent in response to a
      Disconnect-Request if one or more user session(s) are no longer
      active, but residual session context was found and successfully



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      removed.  This value is only sent within a Disconnect-ACK and MUST
      NOT be sent within a CoA-ACK, Disconnect-NAK or CoA-NAK.

      "Invalid EAP Packet (Ignored)" is a non-fatal error that MUST NOT
      be sent by implementations of this specification.

      "Unsupported Attribute" is a fatal error sent if a Request
      contains an attribute (such as a Vendor-Specific or EAP-Message
      Attribute) that is not supported.

      "Missing Attribute" is a fatal error sent if critical attributes
      (such as NAS or session identification attributes) are missing
      from a Request.

      "NAS Identification Mismatch" is a fatal error sent if one or more
      NAS identification attributes (see Section 3) do not match the
      identity of the NAS receiving the Request.

      "Invalid Request" is a fatal error sent if some other aspect of
      the Request is invalid, such as if one or more attributes (such as
      EAP- Message Attribute(s)) are not formatted properly.

      "Unsupported Service" is a fatal error sent if a Service-Type
      Attribute included with the Request is sent with an invalid or
      unsupported value.  This error cannot be sent in response to a
      Disconnect-Request.

      "Unsupported Extension" is a fatal error sent due to lack of
      support for an extension such as Disconnect and/or CoA packets.
      This will typically be sent by a proxy receiving an ICMP port
      unreachable message after attempting to forward a CoA-Request or
      Disconnect-Request to the NAS.

      "Invalid Attribute Value" is a fatal error sent if a CoA-Request
      or Disconnect-Request contains an attribute with an unsupported
      value.

      "Administratively Prohibited" is a fatal error sent if the NAS is
      configured to prohibit honoring of CoA-Request or Disconnect-
      Request packets for the specified session.

      "Request Not Routable" is a fatal error which MAY be sent by a
      proxy and MUST NOT be sent by a NAS.  It indicates that the proxy
      was unable to determine how to route a CoA-Request or Disconnect-
      Request to the NAS.  For example, this can occur if the required
      entries are not present in the proxy's realm routing table.

      "Session Context Not Found" is a fatal error sent if the session



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      context identified in the CoA-Request or Disconnect-Request does
      not exist on the NAS.

      "Session Context Not Removable" is a fatal error sent in response
      to a Disconnect-Request if the NAS was able to locate the session
      context, but could not remove it for some reason.  It MUST NOT be
      sent within a CoA-ACK, CoA-NAK or Disconnect-ACK, only within a
      Disconnect-NAK.

      "Other Proxy Processing Error" is a fatal error sent in response
      to a CoA or Disconnect-Request that could not be processed by a
      proxy, for reasons other than routing.

      "Resources Unavailable" is a fatal error sent when a CoA or
      Disconnect-Request could not be honored due to lack of available
      NAS resources (memory, non- volatile storage, etc.).

      "Request Initiated" is a fatal error sent by a NAS in response to
      a CoA-Request including a Service-Type Attribute with a value of
      "Authorize Only".  It indicates that the CoA-Request has not been
      honored, but that the NAS is sending one or more RADIUS Access-
      Request(s) including a Service-Type Attribute with value
      "Authorize Only" to the RADIUS server.

      "Multiple Session Selection Unsupported" is a fatal error sent by
      a NAS in response to a CoA-Request or Disconnect-Request whose
      session identification attributes match multiple sessions, where
      the NAS does not support Requests applying to multiple sessions.

3.6.  Table of Attributes

   The following table provides a guide to which attributes may be found
   in which packets, and in what quantity.

   Change-of-Authorization Messages

   Request   ACK      NAK   #   Attribute
   0-1       0        0     1   User-Name [Note 1]
   0-1       0        0     4   NAS-IP-Address [Note 1]
   0-1       0        0     5   NAS-Port [Note 1]
   0-1       0        0-1   6   Service-Type
   0-1       0        0     7   Framed-Protocol [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0     8   Framed-IP-Address [Notes 1,6]
   0-1       0        0     9   Framed-IP-Netmask [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0    10   Framed-Routing [Note 3]
   0+        0        0    11   Filter-ID [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0    12   Framed-MTU [Note 3]
   Request   ACK      NAK   #   Attribute



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   Request   ACK      NAK   #   Attribute
   0+        0        0    13   Framed-Compression [Note 3]
   0+        0        0    14   Login-IP-Host [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0    15   Login-Service [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0    16   Login-TCP-Port [Note 3]
   0+        0        0    18   Reply-Message [Note 2]
   0-1       0        0    19   Callback-Number [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0    20   Callback-Id [Note 3]
   0+        0        0    22   Framed-Route [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0    23   Framed-IPX-Network [Note 3]
   0-1       0-1      0-1  24   State
   0+        0        0    25   Class [Note 3]
   0+        0        0    26   Vendor-Specific [Note 7]
   0-1       0        0    27   Session-Timeout [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0    28   Idle-Timeout [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0    29   Termination-Action [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0    30   Called-Station-Id [Note 1]
   0-1       0        0    31   Calling-Station-Id [Note 1]
   0-1       0        0    32   NAS-Identifier [Note 1]
   0+        0+       0+   33   Proxy-State
   0-1       0        0    34   Login-LAT-Service [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0    35   Login-LAT-Node [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0    36   Login-LAT-Group [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0    37   Framed-AppleTalk-Link [Note 3]
   0+        0        0    38   Framed-AppleTalk-Network [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0    39   Framed-AppleTalk-Zone [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0    44   Acct-Session-Id [Note 1]
   0-1       0        0    50   Acct-Multi-Session-Id [Note 1]
   0-1       0-1      0-1  55   Event-Timestamp
   0+        0        0    56   Egress-VLANID [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0    57   Ingress-Filters [Note 3]
   0+        0        0    58   Egress-VLAN-Name [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0    59   User-Priority-Table [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0    61   NAS-Port-Type [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0    62   Port-Limit [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0    63   Login-LAT-Port [Note 3]
   0+        0        0    64   Tunnel-Type [Note 5]
   0+        0        0    65   Tunnel-Medium-Type [Note 5]
   0+        0        0    66   Tunnel-Client-Endpoint [Note 5]
   0+        0        0    67   Tunnel-Server-Endpoint [Note 5]
   0+        0        0    69   Tunnel-Password [Note 5]
   0-1       0        0    71   ARAP-Features [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0    72   ARAP-Zone-Access [Note 3]
   0+        0        0    78   Configuration-Token [Note 3]
   Request   ACK      NAK   #   Attribute






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   Request   ACK      NAK   #   Attribute
   0+        0-1      0    79   EAP-Message [Note 2]
   0-1       0-1      0-1  80   Message-Authenticator
   0+        0        0    81   Tunnel-Private-Group-ID [Note 5]
   0+        0        0    82   Tunnel-Assignment-ID [Note 5]
   0+        0        0    83   Tunnel-Preference [Note 5]
   0-1       0        0    85   Acct-Interim-Interval [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0    87   NAS-Port-Id [Note 1]
   0-1       0        0    88   Framed-Pool [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0    89   Chargeable-User-Identity [Note 1]
   0+        0        0    90   Tunnel-Client-Auth-ID [Note 5]
   0+        0        0    91   Tunnel-Server-Auth-ID [Note 5]
   0-1       0        0    92   NAS-Filter-Rule [Note 3]
   0         0        0    94   Originating-Line-Info
   0-1       0        0    95   NAS-IPv6-Address [Note 1]
   0-1       0        0    96   Framed-Interface-Id [Notes 1,6]
   0+        0        0    97   Framed-IPv6-Prefix [Notes 1,6]
   0+        0        0    98   Login-IPv6-Host [Note 3]
   0+        0        0    99   Framed-IPv6-Route [Note 3]
   0-1       0        0   100   Framed-IPv6-Pool [Note 3]
   0         0        0+  101   Error-Cause
   0+        0        0   123   Delegated-IPv6-Prefix [Note 3]
   Request   ACK      NAK   #   Attribute

   Disconnect Messages

   Request   ACK      NAK   #   Attribute
   0-1       0        0     1   User-Name [Note 1]
   0-1       0        0     4   NAS-IP-Address [Note 1]
   0-1       0        0     5   NAS-Port [Note 1]
   0         0        0     6   Service-Type
   0         0        0     8   Framed-IP-Address [Note 1]
   0+        0        0    18   Reply-Message [Note 2]
   0         0        0    24   State
   0+        0        0    25   Class [Note 4]
   0+        0        0    26   Vendor-Specific [Note 1]
   0-1       0        0    30   Called-Station-Id [Note 1]
   0-1       0        0    31   Calling-Station-Id [Note 1]
   0-1       0        0    32   NAS-Identifier [Note 1]
   0+        0+       0+   33   Proxy-State
   0-1       0        0    44   Acct-Session-Id [Note 1]
   0-1       0-1      0    49   Acct-Terminate-Cause
   0-1       0        0    50   Acct-Multi-Session-Id [Note 1]
   0-1       0-1      0-1  55   Event-Timestamp
   0         0        0    61   NAS-Port-Type
   0+        0-1      0    79   EAP-Message [Note 2]
   Request   ACK      NAK   #   Attribute




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   Request   ACK      NAK   #   Attribute
   0-1       0-1      0-1  80   Message-Authenticator
   0-1       0        0    87   NAS-Port-Id [Note 1]
   0-1       0        0    89   Chargeable-User-Identity [Note 1]
   0-1       0        0    95   NAS-IPv6-Address [Note 1]
   0         0        0    96   Framed-Interface-Id [Note 1]
   0         0        0    97   Framed-IPv6-Prefix [Note 1]
   0         0        0+  101   Error-Cause
   Request   ACK      NAK   #   Attribute

   The following table defines the meaning of the above table entries.

0     This attribute MUST NOT be present in packet.
0+    Zero or more instances of this attribute MAY be present in packet.
0-1   Zero or one instance of this attribute MAY be present in packet.
1     Exactly one instance of this attribute MUST be present in packet.

   [Note 1] Where NAS or session identification attributes are included
   in Disconnect-Request or CoA-Request packets, they are used for
   identification purposes only.  These attributes MUST NOT be used for
   purposes other than identification (e.g. within CoA-Request packets
   to request authorization changes).

   [Note 2] The Reply-Message Attribute is used to present a displayable
   message to the user.  The message is only displayed as a result of a
   successful Disconnect-Request or CoA-Request (where a Disconnect-ACK
   or CoA-ACK is subsequently sent).  Where EAP is used for
   authentication, an EAP-Message/Notification-Request Attribute is sent
   instead, and Disconnect-ACK or CoA-ACK packets contain an EAP-
   Message/Notification-Response Attribute.

   [Note 3] When included within a CoA-Request, these attributes
   represent an authorization change request.  When one of these
   attributes is omitted from a CoA-Request, the NAS assumes that the
   attribute value is to remain unchanged.  Attributes included in a
   CoA-Request replace all existing value(s) of the same attribute(s).

   [Note 4] When included within a successful Disconnect-Request (where
   a Disconnect-ACK is subsequently sent), the Class Attribute SHOULD be
   sent unmodified by the NAS to the RADIUS accounting server in the
   Accounting Stop packet.  If the Disconnect-Request is unsuccessful,
   then the Class Attribute is not processed.

   [Note 5] When included within a CoA-Request, these attributes
   represent an authorization change request.  Where tunnel attribute(s)
   are included within a successful CoA-Request, all existing tunnel
   attributes are removed and replaced by the new attribute(s).




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   [Note 6] Since the Framed-IP-Address, Framed-IPv6-Prefix and Framed-
   Interface-Id attributes are used for session identification,
   renumbering cannot be accomplished by including values of these
   attributes within a CoA-Request.  Instead, a CoA-Request including a
   Service-Type Attribute with a value of "Authorize Only" is sent; new
   values can be supplied in an Access-Accept sent in response to the
   ensuing Access-Request.  Note that renumbering will not be possible
   in all situations.  For example, in order to change an IP address,
   IPCP or IPv6CP re-negotiation could be required, which is not
   supported by all PPP implementations.

   [Note 7] Within CoA-Request packets, Vendor-Specific Attributes
   (VSAs) MAY be used for either session identification or authorization
   change.  However, the same Attribute MUST NOT be used for both
   purposes simultaneously.

4.  Diameter Considerations

   Due to differences in handling change-of-authorization requests in
   RADIUS and Diameter, it may be difficult or impossible for a
   Diameter/RADIUS gateway to successfully translate a Diameter Re-Auth-
   Request (RAR) to a CoA-Request and vice versa.  For example, since a
   CoA-Request only initiates an authorization change but does not
   initiate re-authentication, a RAR command containing a Re-Auth-
   Request-Type AVP with value "AUTHORIZE_AUTHENTICATE" cannot be
   directly translated to a CoA-Request.  A Diameter/RADIUS gateway
   receiving a CoA-Request containing authorization changes will need to
   translate this into two Diameter exchanges.  First, the
   Diameter/RADIUS gateway will issue a RAR command including a Session-
   Id AVP and a Re-Auth-Request-Type AVP with value "AUTHORIZE ONLY".
   Then the Diameter/RADIUS gateway will respond to the ensuing access
   request with a response including the authorization attributes
   gleaned from the CoA-Request.  To enable translation, the CoA-Request
   SHOULD include a Acct-Session-Id Attribute.  If the  Diameter client
   uses the same Session-Id for both authorization and accounting, then
   the Diameter/RADIUS gateway can copy the contents of the Acct-
   Session-Id Attribute into the Session-Id AVP;  otherwise, it will
   need to map the Acct-Session-Id value to an equivalent Session-Id for
   use within a RAR command.

   Where an Acct-Session-Id attribute is not present in a CoA-Request or
   Disconnect-Request, a Diameter/RADIUS gateway will either need to
   determine the appropriate Acct-Session-Id, or if it cannot do so, it
   can send a CoA-NAK or Disconnect-NAK in reply, possibly including an
   Error-Cause Attribute with value 508 (Multiple Session Identification
   Unsupported).

   To simplify translation between RADIUS and Diameter, Dynamic



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   Authorization Clients can include a Service-Type Attribute with value
   "Authorize Only" within a CoA-Request, as described in Section 3.2.
   A Diameter/RADIUS gateway receiving a CoA-Request containing a
   Service-Type with value "Authorize Only" translates this to a RAR
   with Re-Auth-Request-Type AVP with value "AUTHORIZE ONLY".  The
   received RAA is then translated to a CoA-NAK with a Service-Type
   value of "Authorize Only".   If the Result-Code AVP in the RAA has a
   value in the success category, then an Error-Cause Attribute with
   value "Request Initiated" is included in the CoA-NAK.   If the
   Result-Code AVP in the RAA has a value indicating a Protocol Error or
   a Transient or Permanent Failure, then an alternate Error-Cause
   Attribute is returned as suggested below.

   Within Diameter, a server can request that a session be aborted by
   sending an Abort-Session-Request (ASR), identifying the session to be
   terminated using Session-ID and User-Name AVPs.  The ASR command is
   translated to a Disconnect-Request containing Acct-Session-Id and
   User-Name attributes.  If the Diameter client utilizes the same
   Session-Id in both authorization and accounting, then the value of
   the Session-ID AVP may be placed in the Acct-Session-Id attribute;
   otherwise the value of the Session-ID AVP will need to be mapped to
   an appropriate Acct-Session-Id value.   To enable translation of a
   Disconnect-Request to an ASR, an Acct-Session-Id attribute SHOULD be
   present.

   If the Diameter client utilizes the same Session-Id in both
   authorization and accounting, then the value of the Acct-Session-Id
   may be placed into the Session-ID AVP within the ASR;  otherwise the
   value of the Acct-Session-Id will need to be mapped to an appropriate
   Session-ID value.

   An Abort-Session-Answer (ASA) command is sent in response to an ASR
   in order to indicate the disposition of the request.  A
   Diameter/RADIUS gateway receiving a Disconnect-ACK translates this to
   an ASA command with a Result-Code AVP of "DIAMETER_SUCCESS".  A
   Disconnect-NAK received from the NAS is translated to an ASA command
   with a Result-Code AVP which depends on the value of the Error-Cause
   Attribute.  Suggested translations between Error-Cause Attribute
   values and Result-Code AVP values are included below:












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    #    Error-Cause Attribute Value   Result-Code AVP
   ---   ---------------------------  ------------------------
   201   Residual Session Context     DIAMETER_SUCCESS
         Removed
   202   Invalid EAP Packet           DIAMETER_LIMITED_SUCCESS
         (Ignored)
   401   Unsupported Attribute        DIAMETER_AVP_UNSUPPORTED
   402   Missing Attribute            DIAMETER_MISSING_AVP
   403   NAS Identification           DIAMETER_REALM_NOT_SERVED
         Mismatch
   404   Invalid Request              DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY
   405   Unsupported Service          DIAMETER_COMMAND_UNSUPPORTED
   406   Unsupported Extension        DIAMETER_APPLICATION_UNSUPPORTED
   407   Invalid Attribute Value      DIAMETER_INVALID_AVP_VALUE
   501   Administratively             DIAMETER_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED
         Prohibited
   502   Request Not Routable (Proxy) DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER
   503   Session Context Not Found    DIAMETER_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID
   504   Session Context Not          DIAMETER_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED
         Removable
   505   Other Proxy Processing       DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY
         Error
   506   Resources Unavailable        DIAMETER_RESOURCES_EXCEEDED
   507   Request Initiated            DIAMETER_SUCCESS

   Since both the ASR/ASA and Disconnect-Request/Disconnect-
   NAK/Disconnect-ACK exchanges involve just a request and response,
   inclusion of an "Authorize Only" Service-Type within a Disconnect-
   Request is not needed to assist in Diameter/RADIUS translation, and
   may make translation more difficult.  As a result, as noted in
   Section 3.2, the Service-Type Attribute MUST NOT be used within a
   Disconnect-Request.

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document uses the RADIUS [RFC2865] namespace, see
   <http://www.iana.org/assignments/radius-types>.  In addition to the
   allocations already made in [RFC3575] and [RFC3576], this
   specification requests allocation of additional values of the Error-
   Cause Attribute (101):

    #    Value
   ---   -----
   407   Invalid Attribute Value
   508   Multiple Session Selection Unsupported






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6.  Security Considerations

6.1.  Authorization Issues

   Where a NAS is shared by multiple providers, it is undesirable for
   one provider to be able to send Disconnect-Request or CoA-Requests
   affecting the sessions of another provider.

   A Dynamic Authorization Server MUST silently discard Disconnect-
   Request or CoA-Request packets from untrusted sources.  In situations
   where the Dynamic Authorization Client is co-resident with a RADIUS
   authentication or accounting server, a proxy MAY perform a "reverse
   path forwarding" (RPF) check to verify that a Disconnect-Request or
   CoA-Request originates from an authorized Dynamic Authorization
   Client.  In addition, it SHOULD be possible to explicitly authorize
   additional sources of Disconnect-Request or CoA-Request packets
   relating to certain classes of sessions.  For example, a particular
   source can be explicitly authorized to send CoA-Request packets
   relating to users within a set of realms.

   To perform the RPF check, the Dynamic Authorization Server uses the
   session identification attributes included in Disconnect-Request or
   CoA-Request packets, in order to determine the RADIUS server(s) to
   which an equivalent Access-Request could be routed.  If the source
   address of the Disconnect-Request or CoA-Request is within this set,
   then the CoA-Request or Disconnect-Request is forwarded; otherwise it
   MUST be silently discarded.

   Typically the Dynamic Authorization Server will extract the realm
   from the Network Access Identifier [RFC4282] included within the
   User-Name or Chargeable-User-Identity Attribute, and determine the
   corresponding RADIUS servers in the realm routing tables.  If the
   Dynamic Authorization Server maintains long-term session state, it
   MAY perform the authorization check based on the session
   identification attributes in the CoA-Request.  The session
   identification attributes can be used to tie a session to a
   particular proxy or set of proxies, as with the NAI realm.

   Where no proxy is present, the RPF check can only be performed by the
   NAS if it maintains its own a realm routing table.  If the NAS does
   not maintain a realm routing table (e.g. it selects forwarding
   proxies based on primary/secondary configuration and/or liveness
   checks), then an RPF check cannot be performed.

   Since authorization to send a Disconnect-Request or CoA-Request is
   determined based on the source address and the corresponding shared
   secret, the Dynamic Authorization Server SHOULD configure a different
   shared secret for each Dynamic Authorization Client.



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6.2.  Impersonation

   [RFC2865] Section 3 states:

      A RADIUS server MUST use the source IP address of the RADIUS
      UDP packet to decide which shared secret to use, so that
      RADIUS requests can be proxied.

   When RADIUS Access-Requests are forwarded by a proxy, the NAS-IP-
   Address or NAS-IPv6-Address Attributes will typically not match the
   source address observed by the RADIUS server.  Since the NAS-
   Identifier Attribute need not contain an FQDN, this Attribute may not
   be resolvable to the source address observed by the RADIUS server,
   even when no proxy is present.

   As a result, the authenticity check performed by a RADIUS server or
   proxy does not verify the correctness of NAS identification
   attributes.  This makes it possible for a rogue NAS to forge NAS-IP-
   Address, NAS-IPv6-Address or NAS-Identifier Attributes within a
   RADIUS Access-Request in order to impersonate another NAS.  It is
   also possible for a rogue NAS to forge attributes such as the Called-
   Station-Id, Calling-Station-Id, or Originating-Line-Info [RFC4005].
   This could fool the Dynamic Authorization Client into sending CoA-
   Request or Disconnect-Request packets containing forged session
   identification attributes to a NAS targeted by an attacker.

   To address these vulnerabilities RADIUS proxies one hop from the NAS
   SHOULD check whether NAS identification attributes (see Section 3)
   match the packet source address.  Where one or more attributes do not
   match, Access-Request packets SHOULD be silently discarded.

   Such a check may not always be possible.  Since the NAS-Identifier
   Attribute need not correspond to an FQDN, it may not be resolvable to
   an IP address to be matched against the source address.  Also, where
   a NAT exists between the RADIUS client and proxy, checking the NAS-
   IP-Address or NAS-IPv6-Address Attributes may not be feasible.

6.3.  IPsec Usage Guidelines

   In addition to security vulnerabilities unique to Disconnect or CoA
   packets, the protocol exchanges described in this document are
   susceptible to the same vulnerabilities as RADIUS [RFC2865].  It is
   RECOMMENDED that IPsec be employed to afford better security.

   Implementations of this specification SHOULD support IPsec [RFC4301]
   along with IKEv1 [RFC2409] for key management.  IPsec ESP [RFC4303]
   with non-null transform SHOULD be supported, and IPsec ESP with a
   non-null encryption transform and authentication support SHOULD be



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   used to provide per-packet confidentiality, authentication, integrity
   and replay protection.  IKE SHOULD be used for key management.

   Within RADIUS [RFC2865], a shared secret is used for hiding of
   Attributes such as User-Password, as well as in computation of the
   Response Authenticator.  In RADIUS accounting [RFC2866], the shared
   secret is used in computation of both the Request Authenticator and
   the Response Authenticator.

   Since in RADIUS a shared secret is used to provide confidentiality as
   well as integrity protection and authentication, only use of IPsec
   ESP with a non-null transform can provide security services
   sufficient to substitute for RADIUS application-layer security.
   Therefore, where IPsec AH or ESP null is used, it will typically
   still be necessary to configure a RADIUS shared secret.

   Where RADIUS is run over IPsec ESP with a non-null transform, the
   secret shared between the Dynamic Authorization Server and the
   Dynamic Authorization Client MAY NOT be configured.  In this case, a
   shared secret of zero length MUST be assumed.  However, a Dynamic
   Authorization Client that cannot know whether incoming traffic is
   IPsec-protected MUST be configured with a non-null RADIUS shared
   secret.

   When IPsec ESP is used with RADIUS, per-packet authentication,
   integrity and replay protection MUST be used.  3DES-CBC MUST be
   supported as an encryption transform and AES-CBC SHOULD be supported.
   AES-CBC SHOULD be offered as a preferred encryption transform if
   supported.  HMAC-SHA1-96 MUST be supported as an authentication
   transform.  DES-CBC SHOULD NOT be used as the encryption transform.

   A typical IPsec policy for an IPsec-capable RADIUS client is
   "Initiate IPsec, from me to any destination port UDP 1812".  This
   IPsec policy causes an IPsec SA to be set up by the RADIUS client
   prior to sending a RADIUS Access-Request to a RADIUS server.  If some
   RADIUS servers contacted by the RADIUS client do not support IPsec,
   then a more granular policy will be required: "Initiate IPsec, from
   me to IPsec-Capable-RADIUS-Server, destination port UDP 1812."

   For a Dynamic Authorization Server implementing this specification
   the policy would be "Accept IPsec, from any to me, destination port
   UDP 3799".  This causes the Dynamic Authorization Server to accept
   (but not require) use of IPsec.  It may not be appropriate to require
   IPsec for all Dynamic Authorization Clients connecting to an IPsec-
   enabled Dynamic Authorization Server, since some Dynamic
   Authorization Clients may not support IPsec.

   For an IPsec-capable RADIUS server, a typical IPsec policy is "Accept



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   IPsec, from any to me, destination port 1812".  This causes the
   RADIUS server to accept (but not require) use of IPsec.  It may not
   be appropriate to require IPsec for all RADIUS clients connecting to
   an IPsec-enabled RADIUS server, since some RADIUS clients may not
   support IPsec.

   For Dynamic Authorization Clients implementing this specification,
   the policy would be "Initiate IPsec, from me to any, destination port
   UDP 3799".  This causes the Dynamic Authorization Client to initiate
   IPsec when sending Dynamic Authorization traffic to any Dynamic
   Authorization Server.  If some Dynamic Authorization Servers
   contacted by the Dynamic Authorization Client do not support IPsec,
   then a more granular policy will be required, such as "Initiate
   IPsec, from me to IPsec-capable-Dynamic-Authorization-Server,
   destination port UDP 3799".

   Where IPsec is used for security, and no RADIUS shared secret is
   configured, it is important that the Dynamic Authorization Server and
   Dynamic Authorization Client perform an authorization check.  Before
   enabling a host to act as a Dynamic Authorization Server, the Dynamic
   Authorization Client SHOULD check whether the host is authorized to
   act in that role.  Similarly, before enabling a host to act as a
   Dynamic Authorization Client, the Dynamic Authorization Server SHOULD
   check whether the host is authorized for that role.

   Dynamic Authorization Clients can be configured with the IP addresses
   (for IKEv1 Aggressive Mode with pre-shared keys) or FQDNs (for
   certificate authentication) of Dynamic Authorization Servers.
   Alternatively, if a separate Certification Authority (CA) exists for
   Dynamic Authorization Servers, then the Dynamic Authorization Client
   can configure this CA as a trust anchor [RFC3280] for use with IKEv1.

   Similarly, Dynamic Authorization Servers can be configured with the
   IP addresses (for IKEv1 Aggressive Mode with pre-shared keys) or
   FQDNs (for certificate authentication) of Dynamic Authorization
   Clients.  Alternatively, if a separate CA exists for Dynamic
   Authorization Clients, then the Dynamic Authorization Server can
   configure this CA as a trust anchor for use with IKEv1.

   Since unlike SSL/TLS, IKEv1 does not permit certificate policies to
   be set on a per-port basis, certificate policies need to apply to all
   uses of IKEv1 on Dynamic Authorization Servers and Dynamic
   Authorization Clients.  In a deployment supporting only certificate
   authentication, a management station initiating an IPsec-protected
   telnet session to the Dynamic Authorization Client would need to
   obtain a certificate chaining to the Dynamic Authorization Server CA.
   Issuing such a certificate might not be appropriate if the management
   station was not authorized as a Dynamic Authorization Server.



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   Where Dynamic Authorization Servers obtain their IP address
   dynamically (such as an Access Point supporting DHCP), IKEv1 Main
   Mode with pre-shared keys [RFC2409] SHOULD NOT be used, since this
   requires use of a group pre-shared key; instead, Aggressive Mode
   SHOULD be used.  Where Dynamic Authorization Server addresses are
   statically assigned either IKEv1 Aggressive Mode or Main Mode MAY be
   used.  With certificate authentication, IKEv1 Main Mode SHOULD be
   used.

   Care needs to be taken with IKEv1 Phase 1 Identity Payload selection
   in order to enable mapping of identities to pre-shared keys even with
   Aggressive Mode.  Where the ID_IPV4_ADDR or ID_IPV6_ADDR Identity
   Payloads are used and addresses are dynamically assigned, mapping of
   identities to keys is not possible, so that group pre-shared keys are
   still a practical necessity.  As a result, the ID_FQDN identity
   payload SHOULD be employed in situations where Aggressive mode is
   utilized along with pre-shared keys and IP addresses are dynamically
   assigned.  This approach also has other advantages, since it allows
   the Dynamic Authorization Client and Dynamic Authorization Server to
   configure themselves based on the fully qualified domain name of
   their peers.

   Note that with IPsec, security services are negotiated at the
   granularity of an IPsec SA, so that exchanges requiring a set of
   security services different from those negotiated with existing IPsec
   SAs will need to negotiate a new IPsec SA.  Separate IPsec SAs are
   also advisable where quality of service considerations dictate
   different handling RADIUS conversations.  Attempting to apply
   different quality of service to connections handled by the same IPsec
   SA can result in reordering, and falling outside the replay window.
   For a discussion of the issues, see [RFC2983].

6.4.  Replay Protection

   Where IPsec replay protection is not used, an Event-Timestamp (55)
   [RFC2869] Attribute SHOULD be included within CoA-Request and
   Disconnect-Request packets, and MAY be included within CoA-ACK, CoA-
   NAK, Disconnect-ACK and Disconnect-NAK packets.

   When the Event-Timestamp attribute is present, both the Dynamic
   Authorization Server and the Dynamic Authorization Client MUST check
   that the Event-Timestamp Attribute is current within an acceptable
   time window.  If the Event-Timestamp Attribute is not current, then
   the packet MUST be silently discarded.  This implies the need for
   loose time synchronization within the network, which can be achieved
   by a variety of means, including SNTP, as described in [RFC4330].
   Implementations SHOULD be configurable to discard CoA-Request or
   Disconnect-Request packets not containing an Event-Timestamp



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   attribute.

   If the Event-Timestamp Attribute is included, it represents the time
   at which the original packet was sent, and therefore it SHOULD NOT be
   updated when the packet is retransmitted.  If the Event-Timestamp
   attribute is not updated, this implies that the Identifier is not
   changed in retransmitted packets.  As a result, the ability to detect
   replay within the time window is dependent on support for duplicate
   detection within that same window.  As noted in Section 2.3,
   duplicate detection is REQUIRED for Dynamic Authorization Servers
   implementing this specification.

   The time window used for duplicate detection MUST be the same as the
   window used to detect stale Event-Timestamp Attributes.  Since the
   RADIUS Identifier cannot be repeated within the selected time window,
   no more than 256 Requests can be accepted within the time window.  As
   a result, the chosen time window will depend on the expected maximum
   volume of CoA/Disconnect-Requests, so that unnecessary discards can
   be avoided.  A default time window of 300 seconds should be adequate
   in many circumstances.

7.  Example Traces

   Disconnect Request with User-Name:

      0: xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx 2801 001c 1b23    .B.....$.-(....#
     16: 624c 3543 ceba 55f1 be55 a714 ca5e 0108    bL5C..U..U...^..
     32: 6d63 6869 6261

   Disconnect Request with Acct-Session-ID:

      0: xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx 2801 001e ad0d    .B..... ~.(.....
     16: 8e53 55b6 bd02 a0cb ace6 4e38 77bd 2c0a    .SU.......N8w.,.
     32: 3930 3233 3435 3637                        90234567

   Disconnect Request with Framed-IP-Address:

      0: xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx 2801 001a 0bda    .B....."2.(.....
     16: 33fe 765b 05f0 fd9c c32a 2f6b 5182 0806    3.v[.....*/kQ...
     32: 0a00 0203

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

[RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
          April 1992.




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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
          Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC2409] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
          RFC 2409, November 1998.

[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Rubens, A., Simpson, W. and S. Willens,  "Remote
          Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, June
          2000.

[RFC2866] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000.

[RFC2869] Rigney, C., Willats W. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS Extensions",
          RFC 2869, June 2000.

[RFC3162] Aboba, B., Zorn, G. and D. Mitton, "RADIUS and IPv6", RFC
          3162, August 2001.

[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W. and D. Solo, "Internet X.509
          Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
          Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, April 2002.

[RFC3575] Aboba, B., "IANA Considerations for RADIUS", RFC 3575, July
          2003.

[RFC3579] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS Support for Extensible
          Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.

[RFC4282] Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J. and P. Eronen,  "The Network
          Access Identifier", RFC 4282, December 2005.

[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the Internet
          Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 4303,
          December 2005.

8.2.  Informative References

[MD5Attack]
          Dobbertin, H., "The Status of MD5 After a Recent Attack",
          CryptoBytes Vol.2 No.2, Summer 1996.

[RFC2868] Zorn, G., Leifer, D., Rubens, A., Shriver, J., Holdrege, M.
          and I. Goyret, "RADIUS Attributes for Tunnel Protocol
          Support", RFC 2868, June 2000.





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[RFC2983] Black, D. "Differentiated Services and Tunnels", RFC 2983,
          October 2000.

[RFC3539] Aboba,  B. and J. Wood, "Authentication, Authorization and
          Accounting Transport Profile", RFC 3539, June 2003.

[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J.,  Guttman, E., Zorn, G. and J.
          Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.

[RFC3576] Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D. and B. Aboba,
          "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote Authentication
          Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 3576, July 2003.

[RFC4005] Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D. and D. Mitton, "Diameter
          Network Access Server Application", RFC 4005, August 2005.

[RFC4330] Mills, D., "Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) Version 4 for
          IPv4, IPv6 and OSI", RFC 4330, January 2006.

[RFC4372] Adrangi, F., Lior, A., Korhonen, J. and J. Loughney,
          "Chargeable User Identity", RFC 4372, January 2006.

[RFC4675] Congdon, P., Sanchez, M. and B. Aboba, "RADIUS Attributes for
          Virtual LAN and Priority Support", RFC 4675, September 2006.

[RFC4818] Salowey, J. and R. Droms, "RADIUS Delegated-IPv6-Prefix
          Attribute", RFC 4818, April 2007.

[RFC4849] Congdon, P., Sanchez, M. and B. Aboba, "RADIUS Filter Rule
          Attribute", RFC 4849, April 2007.

Acknowledgments

   This protocol was first developed and distributed by Ascend
   Communications.  Example code was distributed in their free server
   kit.

   The authors would like to acknowledge valuable suggestions and
   feedback from Avi Lior, Randy Bush, Steve Bellovin, Glen Zorn, Mark
   Jones, Claudio Lapidus, Anurag Batta, Kuntal Chowdhury, Tim Moore,
   Russ Housley, Joe Salowey, Alan DeKok and David Nelson.










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Authors' Addresses

   Murtaza Chiba
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   170 West Tasman Dr.
   San Jose CA, 95134

   EMail: mchiba@cisco.com
   Phone: +1 408 525 7198

   Gopal Dommety
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   170 West Tasman Dr.
   San Jose, CA 95134

   EMail: gdommety@cisco.com
   Phone: +1 408 525 1404

   Mark Eklund
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   170 West Tasman Dr.
   San Jose, CA 95134

   EMail: meklund@cisco.com
   Phone: +1 865 671 6255

   David Mitton
   RSA Security, Inc.
   174 Middlesex Turnpike
   Bedford, MA 01730

   EMail: dmitton@circularnetworks.com

   Bernard Aboba
   Microsoft Corporation
   One Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA 98052

   EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com
   Phone: +1 425 706 6605
   Fax:   +1 425 936 7329










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Appendix A - Changes from RFC 3576

   This Appendix lists the major changes between [RFC3576] and this
   document.  Minor changes, including style, grammar, spelling, and
   editorial changes are not mentioned here.

   o The term "Dynamic Authorization Client" is used instead of RADIUS
   server where it applies to the originator of CoA and Disconnect-
   Request packets.  The term "Dynamic Authorization Server" is used
   instead of NAS where it applies to the receiver of CoA and
   Disconnect-Request packets.  Definitions of these terms have been
   added (Section 1.3).

   o Added requirement for duplicate detection on the Dynamic
   Authorization Server (Section 2.3).

   o Clarified expected behavior when session identification attributes
   match more than one session (Sections 2.3, 3, 3.5, 4).

   o Added Chargeable-User-Identity as a session identification
   attribute.  Removed NAS-Port-Type as a session identification
   attribute (Section 3).

   o Added recommendation that an Acct-Session-Id or Acct-Mult-Session-
   Id Attribute be included in an Access-Request (Section 3).

   o Added details relating to handling of the Proxy-State Attribute
   (Section 3.1).

   o Added clarification that support for a Service-Type Attribute with
   value "Authorize Only" is optional on both the NAS and Dynamic
   Authorization Client (Section 3.2).  Use of the Service-Type
   Attribute within a Disconnect-Request is prohibited (Sections 3.2,
   3.6).

   o Added requirement for inclusion of the State Attribute in CoA-
   Request packets including a Service-Type Attribute with a value of
   "Authorize Only" (Section 3.3).

   o Added clarification on the calculation of the Message-Authenticator
   Attribute (Section 3.4).

   o Additional Error-Cause Attribute values are allocated for Invalid
   Attribute Value (407) and Multiple Session Identification Unsupported
   (508) (Sections 3.5, 4).

   o Updated the CoA-Request Attribute Table to include Filter-Rule,
   Delegated-IPv6-Prefix, Egress-VLANID, Ingress-Filters, Egress-VLAN-



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   Name and User-Priority attributes (Section 3.6).

   o Added the Chargeable-User-Identity Attribute to both the CoA-
   Request and Disconnect-Request Attribute table (Section 3.6).

   o Use of Vendor-Specific Attributes (VSAs) for session identification
   and authorization change has been clarified (Section 3.6).

   o Added Note 6 on the use of the CoA-Request for renumbering (Section
   3.6).

   o Added Diameter Considerations (Section 4).

   o Event-Timestamp Attribute should not be recalculated on
   retransmission.  The implications for replay and duplicate detection
   are discussed (Section 6.4).

   o Operation of the Reverse Path Forwarding (RPF) check has been
   clarified.  Use of the RPF check is optional rather than recommended
   by default (Section 6.1).































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Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
   THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
   OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
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   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

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   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
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   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
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Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).







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Open issues

   Open issues relating to this specification are tracked on the
   following web site:

   http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/RADEXT/













































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