RADIUS Working Group Bernard Aboba INTERNET-DRAFT Microsoft Category: Standards Track Glen Zorn <draft-ietf-radius-auth-clientmib-03.txt> Microsoft 2 February 1999 RADIUS Authentication Client MIB 1. Status of this Memo This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet- Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." To view the list Internet-Draft Shadow Directories, see http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as <draft-ietf- radius-auth-clientmib-03.txt>, and expires August 1, 1999. Please send comments to the authors. 2. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved. 3. Abstract This memo defines a set of extensions which instrument RADIUS authentication client functions. These extensions represent a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB) for use with network management protocols in the Internet community. Using these extensions IP-based management stations can manage RADIUS authentication clients. Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 1]
INTERNET-DRAFT RADIUS Authentication Client MIB 2 February 1999 4. Introduction This memo defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB) for use with network management protocols in the Internet community. In particular, it describes managed objects used for managing RADIUS authentication clients. Today a wide range of network devices, including routers and NASes, act as RADIUS authentication clients in order to provide authentication and authorization services. As a result, the effective management of RADIUS authentication clients is of considerable importance. 5. The SNMP Management Framework The SNMP Management Framework presently consists of five major components: o An overall architecture, described in RFC 2271 [1]. o Mechanisms for describing and naming objects and events for the purpose of management. The first version of this Structure of Management Information (SMI) is called SMIv1 and described in RFC 1155 [2], RFC 1212 [3] and RFC 1215 [4]. The second version, called SMIv2, is described in RFC 1902 [5], RFC 1903 [6] and RFC 1904 [7]. o Message protocols for transferring management information. The first version of the SNMP message protocol is called SNMPv1 and described in RFC 1157 [8]. A second version of the SNMP message protocol, which is not an Internet standards track protocol, is called SNMPv2c and described in RFC 1901 [9] and RFC 1906 [10]. The third version of the message protocol is called SNMPv3 and described in RFC 1906 [10], RFC 2272 [11] and RFC 2274 [12]. o Protocol operations for accessing management information. The first set of protocol operations and associated PDU formats is described in RFC 1157 [8]. A second set of protocol operations and associated PDU formats is described in RFC 1905 [13]. o A set of fundamental applications described in RFC 2273 [14] and the view-based access control mechanism described in RFC 2275 [15]. Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed the Management Information Base or MIB. Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the SMI. Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 2]
INTERNET-DRAFT RADIUS Authentication Client MIB 2 February 1999 This memo specifies a MIB module that is compliant to the SMIv2. A MIB conforming to the SMIv1 can be produced through the appropriate translations. The resulting translated MIB must be semantically equivalent, except where objects or events are omitted because no translation is possible (use of Counter64). Some machine readable information in SMIv2 will be converted into textual descriptions in SMIv1 during the translation process. However, this loss of machine readable information is not considered to change the semantics of the MIB. 6. Overview The RADIUS authentication protocol, described in [16], distinguishes between the client function and the server function. In RADIUS authentication, clients send Access-Requests, and servers reply with Access-Accepts, Access-Rejects, and Access-Challenges. Typically NAS devices implement the client function, and thus would be expected to implement the RADIUS authentication client MIB, while RADIUS authentication servers implement the server function, and thus would be expected to implement the RADIUS authentication server MIB. However, it is possible for a RADIUS authentication entity to perform both client and server functions. For example, a RADIUS proxy may act as a server to one or more RADIUS authentication clients, while simultaneously acting as an authentication client to one or more authentication servers. In such situations, it is expected that RADIUS entities combining client and server functionality will support both the client and server MIBs. 6.1. Selected objects This MIB module contains two scalars as well as a single table: (1) the RADIUS Authentication Server Table contains one row for each RADIUS authentication server that the client shares a secret with. Each entry in the RADIUS Authentication Server Table includes fifteen columns presenting a view of the activity of the RADIUS authentication client. 7. Definitions RADIUS-AUTH-CLIENT-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE, OBJECT-IDENTITY, Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 3]
INTERNET-DRAFT RADIUS Authentication Client MIB 2 February 1999 Counter32, Integer32, Gauge32, IpAddress, TimeTicks FROM SNMPv2-SMI SnmpAdminString FROM SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-GROUP FROM SNMPv2-CONF mib-2 FROM RFC1213-MIB; radiusAuthClientMIB MODULE-IDENTITY LAST-UPDATED "9901290000Z" ORGANIZATION "IETF RADIUS Working Group." CONTACT-INFO " Bernard Aboba Microsoft One Microsoft Way Redmond, WA 98052 US Phone: +1 425 936 6605 EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com" DESCRIPTION "The MIB module for entities implementing the client side of the Remote Access Dialin User Service (RADIUS) authentication protocol." REVISION "9901290000Z" -- 29 Jan 1999 DESCRIPTION "Initial version as published in RFC xxxx" -- RCC xxxx to be assigned by IANA ::= { radiusAuthentication 2 } radiusMIB OBJECT-IDENTITY STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The OID assigned to RADIUS MIB work by the IANA." ::= { mib-2 xxx } -- To be assigned by IANA radiusAuthentication OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {radiusMIB 1} radiusAuthClientMIBObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthClientMIB 1 } radiusAuthClient OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthClientMIBObjects 1 } radiusAuthClientInvalidServerAddresses OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of RADIUS Access-Response packets received from unknown addresses." ::= { radiusAuthClient 1 } Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 4]
INTERNET-DRAFT RADIUS Authentication Client MIB 2 February 1999 radiusAuthClientIdentifier OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SnmpAdminString MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The NAS-Identifier of the RADIUS authentication client. This is not necessarily the same as sysName in MIB II." ::= { radiusAuthClient 2 } radiusAuthServerTable OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF RadiusAuthServerEntry MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The (conceptual) table listing the RADIUS authentication servers with which the client shares a secret." ::= { radiusAuthClient 3 } radiusAuthServerEntry OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX RadiusAuthServerEntry MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION "An entry (conceptual row) representing a RADIUS authentication server with which the client shares a secret." INDEX { radiusAuthServerIndex } ::= { radiusAuthServerTable 1 } RadiusAuthServerEntry ::= SEQUENCE { radiusAuthServerIndex Integer32, radiusAuthServerAddress IpAddress, radiusAuthClientServerPortNumber Integer32, radiusAuthClientRoundTripTime TimeTicks, radiusAuthClientAccessRequests Counter32, radiusAuthClientAccessRetransmissions Counter32, radiusAuthClientAccessAccepts Counter32, radiusAuthClientAccessRejects Counter32, radiusAuthClientAccessChallenges Counter32, radiusAuthClientMalformedAccessResponses Counter32, radiusAuthClientBadAuthenticators Counter32, radiusAuthClientPendingRequests Gauge32, radiusAuthClientTimeouts Counter32, radiusAuthClientUnknownTypes Counter32, radiusAuthClientPacketsDropped Counter32 } radiusAuthServerIndex OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Integer32 (1..MAX) Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 5]
INTERNET-DRAFT RADIUS Authentication Client MIB 2 February 1999 MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION "A number uniquely identifying each RADIUS Authentication server with which this client communicates." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 1 } radiusAuthServerAddress OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX IpAddress MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The IP address of the RADIUS authentication server referred to in this table entry." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 2 } radiusAuthClientServerPortNumber OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Integer32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The UDP port the client is using to send requests to this server." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 3 } radiusAuthClientRoundTripTime OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX TimeTicks MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The time interval (in hundredths of a second) between the most recent Access-Reply/Access-Challenge and the Access-Request that matched it from this RADIUS authentication server." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 4 } -- Request/Response statistics -- -- TotalIncomingPackets = Accepts + Rejects + Challenges + UnknownTypes -- -- TotalIncomingPackets - MalformedResponses - BadAuthenticators - -- UnknownTypes - PacketsDropped = Successfully received -- -- AccessRequests + PendingRequests + ClientTimeouts = Successfully Received -- -- Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 6]
INTERNET-DRAFT RADIUS Authentication Client MIB 2 February 1999 radiusAuthClientAccessRequests OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of RADIUS Access-Request packets sent to this server. This does not include retransmissions." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 5 } radiusAuthClientAccessRetransmissions OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of RADIUS Access-Request packets retransmitted to this RADIUS authentication server." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 6 } radiusAuthClientAccessAccepts OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of RADIUS Access-Accept packets (valid or invalid) received from this server." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 7 } radiusAuthClientAccessRejects OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of RADIUS Access-Reject packets (valid or invalid) received from this server." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 8 } radiusAuthClientAccessChallenges OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of RADIUS Access-Challenge packets (valid or invalid) received from this server." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 9 } -- "Access-Response" includes an Access-Accept, Access-Challenge -- or Access-Reject Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 7]
INTERNET-DRAFT RADIUS Authentication Client MIB 2 February 1999 radiusAuthClientMalformedAccessResponses OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-nly STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of malformed RADIUS Access-Response packets received from this server. Malformed packets include packets with an invalid length. Bad authenticators or Signature attributes or unknown types are not included as malformed access responses." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 10 } radiusAuthClientBadAuthenticators OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of RADIUS Access-Response packets containing invalid authenticators or Signature attributes received from this server." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 11 } radiusAuthClientPendingRequests OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Gauge32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of RADIUS Access-Request packets destined for this server that have not yet timed out or received a response. This variable is incremented when an Access-Request is sent and decremented due to receipt of an Acess-Accept, Access-Reject or Access-Challenge, a timeout or retransmission." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 12 } radiusAuthClientTimeouts OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of authentication timeouts to this server. After a timeout the client may retry to the same server, send to a different server, or give up. A retry to the same server is counted as a retransmit as well as a timeout. A send to a different server is counted as a Request as well as a timeout." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 13 } Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 8]
INTERNET-DRAFT RADIUS Authentication Client MIB 2 February 1999 radiusAuthClientUnknownTypes OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of RADIUS packets of unknown type which were received from this server on the authentication port." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 14 } radiusAuthClientPacketsDropped OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of RADIUS packets of which were received from this server on the authentication port and dropped for some other reason." ::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 15 } -- conformance information radiusAuthClientMIBConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthClientMIB 2 } radiusAuthClientMIBCompliances OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthClientMIBConformance 1 } radiusAuthClientMIBGroups OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthClientMIBConformance 2 } -- compliance statements radiusAuthClientMIBCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The compliance statement for authentication clients implementing the RADIUS Authentication Client MIB." MODULE -- this module MANDATORY-GROUPS { radiusAuthClientMIBGroup } ::= { radiusAuthClientMIBCompliances 1 } -- units of conformance radiusAuthClientMIBGroup OBJECT-GROUP OBJECTS { radiusAuthClientIdentifier, radiusAuthClientInvalidServerAddresses, Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 9]
INTERNET-DRAFT RADIUS Authentication Client MIB 2 February 1999 radiusAuthServerAddress, radiusAuthClientServerPortNumber, radiusAuthClientRoundTripTime, radiusAuthClientAccessRequests, radiusAuthClientAccessRetransmissions, radiusAuthClientAccessAccepts, radiusAuthClientAccessRejects, radiusAuthClientAccessChallenges, radiusAuthClientMalformedAccessResponses, radiusAuthClientBadAuthenticators, radiusAuthClientPendingRequests, radiusAuthClientTimeouts, radiusAuthClientUnknownTypes, radiusAuthClientPacketsDropped } STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The basic collection of objects providing management of RADIUS Authentication Clients." ::= { radiusAuthClientMIBGroups 1 } END 8. References [1] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An Architecture for Describing SNMP Management Frameworks", RFC 2271, Cabletron Systems, Inc., BMC Software, Inc., IBM T. J. Watson Research, January 1998. [2] Rose, M., and K. McCloghrie, "Structure and Identification of Management Information for TCP/IP-based Internets", RFC 1155, Performance Systems International, Hughes LAN Systems, May 1990. [3] Rose, M., and K. McCloghrie, "Concise MIB Definitions", RFC 1212, Performance Systems International, Hughes LAN Systems, March 1991. [4] M. Rose, "A Convention for Defining Traps for use with the SNMP", RFC 1215, Performance Systems International, March 1991. [5] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Structure of Management Information for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC 1902, SNMP Research,Inc., Cisco Systems, Inc., Dover Beach Consulting, Inc., International Network Services, January 1996. Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 10]
INTERNET-DRAFT RADIUS Authentication Client MIB 2 February 1999 [6] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Textual Conventions for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC 1903, SNMP Research, Inc., Cisco Systems, Inc., Dover Beach Consulting, Inc., International Network Services, January 1996. [7] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Conformance Statements for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC 1904, SNMP Research, Inc., Cisco Systems, Inc., Dover Beach Consulting, Inc., International Network Services, January 1996. [8] Case, J., Fedor, M., Schoffstall, M., and J. Davin, "Simple Network Management Protocol", RFC 1157, SNMP Research, Performance Systems International, Performance Systems International, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, May 1990. [9] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Introduction to Community-based SNMPv2", RFC 1901, SNMP Research, Inc., Cisco Systems, Inc., Dover Beach Consulting, Inc., International Network Services, January 1996. [10] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Transport Mappings for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC 1906, SNMP Research, Inc., Cisco Systems, Inc., Dover Beach Consulting, Inc., International Network Services, January 1996. [11] Case, J., Harrington D., Presuhn R., and B. Wijnen, "Message Processing and Dispatching for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 2272, SNMP Research, Inc., Cabletron Systems, Inc., BMC Software, Inc., IBM T. J. Watson Research, January 1998. [12] Blumenthal, U., and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv3)", RFC 2274, IBM T. J. Watson Research, January 1998. [13] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Protocol Operations for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC 1905, SNMP Research, Inc., Cisco Systems, Inc., Dover Beach Consulting, Inc., International Network Services, January 196. [14] Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B. Stewart, "SNMPv3 Applications", RFC 2273, SNMP Research, Inc., Secure Computing Corporation, Cisco Systems, January 1998 Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 11]
INTERNET-DRAFT RADIUS Authentication Client MIB 2 February 1999 [15] Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R., and K. McCloghrie, "View-based Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 2275, IBM T. J. Watson Research, BMC Software, Inc., Cisco Systems, Inc., January 1998 [16] Rigney, C., Rubens, A., Simpson W., and S. Willens, "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2138, April 1997. 9. Security considerations There are no management objects defined in this MIB that have a MAX- ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create. So, if this MIB is implemented correctly, then there is no risk that an intruder can alter or create any management objects of this MIB via direct SNMP SET operations. There are a number of managed objects in this MIB that may contain sensitive information. These are: radiusAuthServerAddress This can be used to determine the address of the RADIUS authentication server with which the client is communicating. This information could be useful in mounting an attack on the authentication server. radiusAuthClientServerPortNumber This can be used to determine the port number on which the RADIUS authentication client is sending. This information could be useful in impersonating the client in order to send data to the authentication server. It is thus important to control even GET access to these objects and possibly to even encrypt the values of these object when sending them over the network via SNMP. Not all versions of SNMP provide features for such a secure environment. SNMPv1 by itself is not a secure environment. Even if the network itself is secure (for example by using IPSec), there is no control as to who on the secure network is allowed to access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects in this MIB. It is recommended that the implementers consider the security features as provided by the SNMPv3 framework. Specifically, the use of the User- based Security Model RFC 2274 [12] and the View-based Access Control Model RFC 2275 [15] is recommended. Using these security features, customer/users can give access to the objects only to those principals Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 12]
INTERNET-DRAFT RADIUS Authentication Client MIB 2 February 1999 (users) that have legitimate rights to GET or SET (change/create/delete) them. 10. Acknowledgments Thanks to Narendra Gidwani of Microsoft, Allan C. Rubens of MERIT, Carl Rigney of Livingston and Peter Heitman of American Internet Corporation for useful discussions of this problem space. 11. Authors' Addresses Bernard Aboba Microsoft Corporation One Microsoft Wy Redmond, WA 98052 Phone: 425-936-6605 EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com Glen Zorn Microsoft Corporation One Microsoft Way Redmond, WA 98052 Phone: 425-703-1559 EMail: glennz@microsoft.com 12. Intellectural Property Statement The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and standards- related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF Secretariat. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 13]
INTERNET-DRAFT RADIUS Authentication Client MIB 2 February 1999 which may cover technology that may be required to practice this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive Director. 13. Full Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved. This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its implmentation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than English. The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 14. Expiration Date This memo is filed as <draft-ietf-radius-auth-clientmib-03.txt>, and expires August 1, 1999. Aboba & Zorn Standards Track [Page 14]
