RADIUS Working Group Glen Zorn
INTERNET-DRAFT Microsoft
Category: Standards Track Bernard Aboba
<draft-ietf-radius-auth-servmib-02.txt> Microsoft
11 November 1998
RADIUS Authentication Server MIB
1. Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working docu-
ments of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and
its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute work-
ing documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference mate-
rial or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.''
To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the
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Directories on ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), nic.nordu.net
(Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim).
The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as <draft-
ietf-radius-auth-servmib-02.txt>, and expires May 1, 1999. Please
send comments to the authors.
2. Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.
3. Abstract
This memo defines a set of extensions which instrument RADIUS authen-
tication server functions. These extensions represent a portion of the
Management Information Base (MIB) for use with network management pro-
tocols in the Internet community. Using these extensions IP-based
management stations can manage RADIUS authentication servers.
4. Introduction
This memo defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB)
for use with network management protocols in the Internet community.
In particular, it describes managed objects used for managing RADIUS
authentication servers.
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RADIUS authentication servers are today widely deployed by dialup
Internet Service Providers, in order to provide authentication ser-
vices. As a result, the effective management of RADIUS authentication
servers is of considerable importance.
5. The SNMP Management Framework
The SNMP Management Framework presently consists of five major compo-
nents:
o An overall architecture, described in RFC 2271 [1].
o Mechanisms for describing and naming objects and events for
the purpose of management. The first version of this Structure
of Management Information (SMI) is called SMIv1 and described
in RFC 1155 [2], RFC 1212 [3] and RFC 1215 [4]. The second
version, called SMIv2, is described in RFC 1902 [5], RFC 1903
[6] and RFC 1904 [7].
o Message protocols for transferring management information. The
first version of the SNMP message protocol is called SNMPv1
and described in RFC 1157 [8]. A second version of the SNMP
message protocol, which is not an Internet standards track
protocol, is called SNMPv2c and described in RFC 1901 [9] and
RFC 1906 [10]. The third version of the message protocol is
called SNMPv3 and described in RFC 1906 [10], RFC 2272 [11]
and RFC 2274 [12].
o Protocol operations for accessing management information. The
first set of protocol operations and associated PDU formats is
described in RFC 1157 [8]. A second set of protocol operations
and associated PDU formats is described in RFC 1905 [13].
o A set of fundamental applications described in RFC 2273 [14]
and the view-based access control mechanism described in RFC
2275 [15].
Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed
the Management Information Base or MIB. Objects in the MIB are
defined using the mechanisms defined in the SMI.
This memo specifies a MIB module that is compliant to the SMIv2. A MIB
conforming to the SMIv1 can be produced through the appropriate trans-
lations. The resulting translated MIB must be semantically equivalent,
except where objects or events are omitted because no translation is
possible (use of Counter64). Some machine readable information in
SMIv2 will be converted into textual descriptions in SMIv1 during the
translation process. However, this loss of machine readable informa-
tion is not considered to change the semantics of the MIB.
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6. Overview
The RADIUS authentication protocol, described in [16], distinguishes
between the client function and the server function. In RADIUS authen-
tication, clients send Access-Requests, and servers reply with Access-
Accepts, Access-Rejects, and Access-Challenges. Typically NAS devices
implement the client function, and thus would be expected to implement
the RADIUS authentication client MIB, while RADIUS authentication
servers implement the server function, and thus would be expected to
implement the RADIUS authentication server MIB.
However, it is possible for a RADIUS authentication entity to perform
both client and server functions. For example, a RADIUS proxy may act
as a server to one or more RADIUS authentication clients, while simul-
taneously acting as an authentication client to one or more authenti-
cation servers. In such situations, it is expected that RADIUS enti-
ties combining client and server functionality will support both the
client and server MIBs.
6.1. Selected objects
This MIB module contains fourteen scalars as well as a single table:
(1) the RADIUS Authentication Client Table contains one row for each
RADIUS authentication client that the server shares a secret with.
Each entry in the RADIUS Authentication Client Table includes twelve
columns presenting a view of the activity of the RADIUS authentication
server.
7. Definitions
RADIUS-AUTH-SERVER-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE,
OBJECT-IDENTITY, experimental,
Counter32, Gauge32, Integer32,
IpAddress FROM SNMPv2-SMI
TEXTUAL-CONVENTION, DisplayString FROM SNMPv2-TC
MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-GROUP FROM SNMPv2-CONF;
radius OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The OID assigned to RADIUS MIB work by the IANA."
::= { experimental 79 }
radiusAuthentication OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {radius 1}
radiusAuthServMIB MODULE-IDENTITY
LAST-UPDATED "9811161659Z"
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ORGANIZATION "IETF RADIUS Working Group."
CONTACT-INFO
" Glen Zorn
Microsoft
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
US
Phone: +1 425 703 1559
EMail: glennz@microsoft.com"
DESCRIPTION
"The MIB module for entities impleenting the server
side of the Remote Access Dialin User Service (RADIUS)
authentication protocol."
::= { radiusAuthentication 1 }
radiusAuthServMIBObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthServMIB 1 }
radiusAuthServ OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthServMIBObjects 1 }
-- Textual conventions
RadiusTime ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
DISPLAY-HINT "4d"
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"RadiusTime values are 32-bit unsigned integers which
measure time in seconds."
SYNTAX Gauge32
radiusAuthServIdent OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX DisplayString
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The implementation identification string for the
RADIUS authentication server software in use on the
system, for example; `FNS-2.1'"
::= {radiusAuthServ 1}
radiusAuthServUpTime OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX RadiusTime
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"If the server has a persistent state (e.g., a process),
this value will be the time elapsed since it started.
For software without persistent state, this value will
be zero."
::= {radiusAuthServ 2}
radiusAuthServResetTime OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX RadiusTime
MAX-ACCESS read-only
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STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"If the server has a persistent state (e.g., a process)
and supports a `reset' operation (e.g., can be told to
re-read configuration files), this value will be the
time elapsed since the last time the name server was
`reset.' For software that does not have persistence or
does not support a `reset' operation, this value will be
zero."
::= {radiusAuthServ 3}
radiusAuthServConfigReset OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX INTEGER { other(1),
reset(2),
initializing(3),
running(4)}
MAX-ACCESS read-write
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Status/action object to reinitialize any persistent
server state. When set to reset(2), any persistent
server state (such as a process) is reinitialized as if
the server had just been started. This value will
never be returned by a read operation. When read, one of
the following values will be returned:
other(1) - server in some unknown state;
initializing(3) - server (re)initializing;
running(4) - server currently running."
::= {radiusAuthServ 4}
-- New Stats proposed by Dale E. Reed Jr (daler@iea-software.com)
radiusAuthServTotalAccessRequests OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of packets received on the
authentication port since server start-up."
::= { radiusAuthServ 5}
radiusAuthServTotalInvalidRequests OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of RADIUS Access-Request packets
received from unknown addresses since server start-up."
::= { radiusAuthServ 6 }
radiusAuthServTotalDupAccessRequests OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
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DESCRIPTION
"The total number of duplicate RADIUS Access-Request
packets received since server start-up."
::= { radiusAuthServ 7 }
radiusAuthServTotalAccessAccepts OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of RADIUS Access-Accept packets
sent since server start-up."
::= { radiusAuthServ 8 }
radiusAuthServTotalAccessRejects OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of RADIUS Access-Reject packets
sent since server start-up."
::= { radiusAuthServ 9 }
radiusAuthServTotalAccessChallenges OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of RADIUS Access-Challenge packets
sent since server start-up."
::= { radiusAuthServ 10 }
radiusAuthServTotalMalformedAccessRequests OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of malformed RADIUS Access-Request
packets received since server start-up. Bad authenticators
and unknown types are not included as
malformed Access-Requests."
::= { radiusAuthServ 11 }
radiusAuthServTotalBadAuthenticators OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of RADIUS Authentication-Request packets
which contained invalid Signature attributes received
since server start-up."
::= { radiusAuthServ 12 }
radiusAuthServTotalPacketsDropped OBJECT-TYPE
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SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of incoming packets
silently discarded for some reason other
than malformed, bad authenticators or
unknown types."
::= { radiusAuthServ 13 }
radiusAuthServTotalUnknownTypes OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of RADIUS packets of unknown type which
were received since server start-up."
::= { radiusAuthServ 14 }
-- End of new
radiusAuthClientTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF RadiusAuthClientEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The (conceptual) table listing the RADIUS authentication
clients with which the server shares a secret."
::= { radiusAuthServ 15 }
radiusAuthClientEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX RadiusAuthClientEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An entry (conceptual row) representing a RADIUS
authentication client with which the server shares a secret."
INDEX { radiusAuthClientIndex }
::= { radiusAuthClientTable 1 }
RadiusAuthClientEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
radiusAuthClientIndex Integer32,
radiusAuthClientAddress IpAddress,
radiusAuthClientID DisplayString,
radiusAuthServAccessRequests Counter32,
radiusAuthServDupAccessRequests Counter32,
radiusAuthServAccessAccepts Counter32,
radiusAuthServAccessRejects Counter32,
radiusAuthServAccessChallenges Counter32,
radiusAuthServMalformedAccessRequests Counter32,
radiusAuthServBadAuthenticators Counter32,
radiusAuthServPacketsDropped Counter32,
radiusAuthServUnknownTypes Counter32
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}
radiusAuthClientIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32 (0..MAX)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A number uniquely identifying each RADIUS
authentication client with which this server
communicates."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 1 }
radiusAuthClientAddress OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX IpAddress
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The NAS-IP-Address of the RADIUS authentication client
referred to in this table entry."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 2 }
radiusAuthClientID OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX DisplayString
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The NAS-Identifier of the RADIUS authentication client
referred to in this table entry. This is not necessarily
the same as sysName in MIB II."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 3 }
-- Server Counters
--
-- Responses = AccessAccepts + AccessRejects + AccessChallenges
--
-- Requests - DupRequests - BadAuthenticators - MalformedRequests -
-- UnknownTypes - PacketsDropped - Responses = Pending
--
-- Requests - DupRequests - BadAuthenticators - MalformedRequests -
-- UnknownTypes - PacketsDropped = entries logged
radiusAuthServAccessRequests OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of packets received on the authentication
port from this client since server start-up."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 4 }
radiusAuthServDupAccessRequests OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
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DESCRIPTION
"The total number of duplicate RADIUS Access-Request
packets received from this client since server start-up."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 5 }
radiusAuthServAccessAccepts OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of RADIUS Access-Accept packets
sent to this client since server start-up."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 6 }
radiusAuthServAccessRejects OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of RADIUS Access-Reject packets
sent to this client since server start-up."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 7 }
radiusAuthServAccessChallenges OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of RADIUS Access-Challenge packets
sent to this client since server start-up."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 8 }
radiusAuthServMalformedAccessRequests OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of malformed RADIUS Access-Request
packets received from this client since server start-up.
Bad authenticators and unknown types are not included as
malformed Access-Requests."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 9 }
radiusAuthServBadAuthenticators OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of RADIUS Authentication-Request packets
which contained invalid Signature attributes received
from this client since server start-up."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 10 }
radiusAuthServPacketsDropped OBJECT-TYPE
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SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of incoming packets from this
client silently discarded for some reason other
than malformed, bad authenticators or
unknown types."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 11 }
radiusAuthServUnknownTypes OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of RADIUS packets of unknown type which
were received from this client since authentication server
start-up."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 12 }
-- conformance information
radiusAuthServMIBConformance
OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthServMIB 2 }
radiusAuthServMIBCompliances
OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthServMIBConformance 1 }
radiusAuthServMIBGroups
OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthServMIBConformance 2 }
-- compliance statements
radiusAuthServMIBCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The compliance statement for authentication servers
implementing the RADIUS Authentication Server MIB."
MODULE -- this module
MANDATORY-GROUPS { radiusAuthServMIBGroup }
::= { radiusAuthServMIBCompliances 1 }
-- units of conformance
radiusAuthServMIBGroup OBJECT-GROUP
OBJECTS {radiusAuthServIdent,
radiusAuthServUpTime,
radiusAuthServResetTime,
radiusAuthServConfigReset,
radiusAuthServTotalAccessRequests,
radiusAuthServTotalInvalidRequests,
radiusAuthServTotalDupAccessRequests,
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radiusAuthServTotalAccessAccepts,
radiusAuthServTotalAccessRejects,
radiusAuthServTotalAccessChallenges,
radiusAuthServTotalMalformedAccessRequests,
radiusAuthServTotalBadAuthenticators,
radiusAuthServTotalPacketsDropped,
radiusAuthServTotalUnknownTypes,
radiusAuthClientAddress,
radiusAuthClientID,
radiusAuthServAccessRequests,
radiusAuthServDupAccessRequests,
radiusAuthServAccessAccepts,
radiusAuthServAccessRejects,
radiusAuthServAccessChallenges,
radiusAuthServMalformedAccessRequests,
radiusAuthServBadAuthenticators,
radiusAuthServPacketsDropped,
radiusAuthServUnknownTypes
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The collection of objects providing management of
a RADIUS Authentication Server."
::= { radiusAuthServMIBGroups 1 }
END
8. References
[1] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An Architecture for
Describing SNMP Management Frameworks", RFC 2271, Cabletron Sys-
tems, Inc., BMC Software, Inc., IBM T. J. Watson Research, Jan-
uary 1998.
[2] Rose, M., and K. McCloghrie, "Structure and Identification of
Management Information for TCP/IP-based Internets", RFC 1155,
Performance Systems International, Hughes LAN Systems, May 1990.
[3] Rose, M., and K. McCloghrie, "Concise MIB Definitions", RFC 1212,
Performance Systems International, Hughes LAN Systems, March
1991.
[4] M. Rose, "A Convention for Defining Traps for use with the SNMP",
RFC 1215, Performance Systems International, March 1991.
[5] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Structure
of Management Information for Version 2 of the Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC 1902, SNMP Research,Inc.,
Cisco Systems, Inc., Dover Beach Consulting, Inc., International
Network Services, January 1996.
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INTERNET-DRAFT RADIUS Authentication Server MIB 11 November 1998
[6] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Textual
Conventions for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Proto-
col (SNMPv2)", RFC 1903, SNMP Research, Inc., Cisco Systems,
Inc., Dover Beach Consulting, Inc., International Network Ser-
vices, January 1996.
[7] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Confor-
mance Statements for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC 1904, SNMP Research, Inc., Cisco Systems,
Inc., Dover Beach Consulting, Inc., International Network Ser-
vices, January 1996.
[8] Case, J., Fedor, M., Schoffstall, M., and J. Davin, "Simple Net-
work Management Protocol", RFC 1157, SNMP Research, Performance
Systems International, Performance Systems International, MIT
Laboratory for Computer Science, May 1990.
[9] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Introduc-
tion to Community-based SNMPv2", RFC 1901, SNMP Research, Inc.,
Cisco Systems, Inc., Dover Beach Consulting, Inc., International
Network Services, January 1996.
[10] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Transport
Mappings for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol
(SNMPv2)", RFC 1906, SNMP Research, Inc., Cisco Systems, Inc.,
Dover Beach Consulting, Inc., International Network Services,
January 1996.
[11] Case, J., Harrington D., Presuhn R., and B. Wijnen, "Message Pro-
cessing and Dispatching for the Simple Network Management Proto-
col (SNMP)", RFC 2272, SNMP Research, Inc., Cabletron Systems,
Inc., BMC Software, Inc., IBM T. J. Watson Research, January
1998.
[12] Blumenthal, U., and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model (USM)
for version 3 of the Simple Network Management Protocol
(SNMPv3)", RFC 2274, IBM T. J. Watson Research, January 1998.
[13] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Protocol
Operations for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Proto-
col (SNMPv2)", RFC 1905, SNMP Research, Inc., Cisco Systems,
Inc., Dover Beach Consulting, Inc., International Network Ser-
vices, January 196.
[14] Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B. Stewart, "SNMPv3 Applications", RFC
2273, SNMP Research, Inc., Secure Computing Corporation, Cisco
Systems, January 1998
[15] Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R., and K. McCloghrie, "View-based Access
Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network Management Protocol
(SNMP)", RFC 2275, IBM T. J. Watson Research, BMC Software, Inc.,
Cisco Systems, Inc., January 1998
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[16] Rigney, C., Rubens, A., Simpson W., and S. Willens, "Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2138, April
1997.
[17] "Information processing systems - Open Systems Interconnection -
Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)", Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization, International Standard
8824, December 1987.
9. Security considerations
There are a number of management objects defined in this MIB that have
a MAX-ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create. Such objects
may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environ-
ments. The support for SET operations in a non-secure environment
without proper protection can have a negative effect on network opera-
tions.
There are a number of managed objects in this MIB that may contain
sensitive information. These are:
radiusAuthClientAddress
This can be used to determine the address of the RADIUS
authentication client with which the server is communicat-
ing. This information could be useful in impersonating the
client.
radiusAuthClientID
This can be used to determine the client ID of the authenti-
cation client with which the server is communicating. This
information could be useful in impersonating the client.
It is thus important to control even GET access to these objects and
possibly to even encrypt the values of these object when sending them
over the network via SNMP. Not all versions of SNMP provide features
for such a secure environment.
SNMPv1 by itself is not a secure environment. Even if the network
itself is secure (for example by using IPSec), there is no control as
to who on the secure network is allowed to access and GET/SET
(read/change/create/delete) the objects in this MIB.
It is recommended that the implementers consider the security features
as provided by the SNMPv3 framework. Specifically, the use of the
User-based Security Model RFC 2274 [12] and the View-based Access Con-
trol Model RFC 2275 [15] is recommended. Using these security fea-
tures, customer/users can give access to the objects only to those
principals (users) that have legitimate rights to GET or SET
(change/create/delete) them.
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10. Acknowledgments
Thanks to Narendra Gidwani of Microsoft, Allan C. Rubens of MERIT,
Carl Rigney of Livingston and Peter Heitman of American Internet Cor-
poration for useful discussions of this problem space.
11. Authors' Addresses
Bernard Aboba
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
Phone: 425-936-6605
EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com
Glen Zorn
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
Phone: 425-703-1559
EMail: glennz@microsoft.com
12. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1997). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implmentation may be prepared, copied, published and
distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind,
provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this docu-
ment itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the
copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other Inter-
net organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing
Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined
in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required to
translate it into languages other than English. The limited permis-
sions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the
Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This document and the
information contained herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE
INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL
WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WAR-
RANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY
RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE."
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13. Expiration Date
This memo is filed as <draft-ietf-radius-auth-servermib-02.txt>, and
expires May 1, 1999.
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