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Versions: 00 01 02                                                      
    Internet Engineering Task Force                Walter Weiss
    RAP Working Group                              Ellacoya Networks
    Expiration: October 2002                       John Vollbrecht
    draft-ietf-rap-access-bind-01.txt              David Spence
                                                   David Rago
                                                   InterLink Networks
                                                   Cees de Laat
                                                   Leon Gommans
                                                   Univ. of Amsterdam
                                                   Freek Dijkstra
                                                   Univ. of Utrecht
                                                   Amol Kulkarni
                                                   Ravi Sahita
                                                   Intel
                                                   Kwok Ho Chan
                                                   Nortel Networks




         Framework for Binding Access Control to COPS Provisioning

                           Last Updated: 3/1/02



Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
   at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
   reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.


Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
   this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC-2119].



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   Status of this Memo................................................1
   Conventions used in this document..................................1
   Abstract...........................................................4
   1. Introduction....................................................4
   2. Paradigm for the Bind PIB.......................................6
   2.1 Event Handler Concepts.........................................6
   2.1.1 Example - Ethernet IP Address Authorization..................9
   2.2. Context Data.................................................10
   2.3. Policy Distribution and Management...........................11
   2.4. Interactions with DiffServ model.............................11
   2.5. Interactions with RSVP model.................................12
   3. Supporting various client Authentication Protocols.............14
   3.1. Provisioning.................................................14
   3.2. EAP Authentication...........................................15
   3.2.1. EAP Message sequence.......................................15
   3.2.2. AuthEapReqExt and AuthEapRespExt data structures...........17
   3.3. PAP Authentication...........................................17
   3.3.1. PAP Connection sequence....................................18
   3.3.2. AuthPapExtEntry datastructure..............................19
   3.4. CHAP Authentication..........................................20
   3.4.1. CHAP Connection sequence...................................20
   3.4.2. AuthChapExtEntry datastructure.............................22
   3.5. HTTP Authentication..........................................23
   4. Data Structures................................................24
   4.1. Event class..................................................24
   4.2. EventHandler class...........................................24
   4.3. EventHdlrElement class.......................................25
   4.4. EventHdlrEventScope class....................................26
   4.5. EventHdlrHandleScope class...................................28
   4.6. Behavior of the Event and Handle Scope classes...............29
   4.7. EventHdlrAuthProtocol class..................................30
   4.8. DatapathEventHdlr Class......................................31
   4.9. ContextData class............................................31
   4.10. ContextData classes.........................................32
   4.10.1. CtxtL3Hdr class...........................................32
   4.10.2. Ctxt802Hdr class..........................................33
   4.10.3. CtxtDialupInterface class.................................34
   4.10.4 CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocol class...........................35
   4.10.5 CtxtDialupIfLoginService class.............................36
   4.10.6 CtxtDialupIfLoginLat class.................................36
   4.11. AuthExt class...............................................37
   4.11.1. UserAuthExt class.........................................37
   4.11.2. AuthChapExt class.........................................37
   4.11.3. AuthPapExt class..........................................38
   4.11.4. AuthExtResult class.......................................38
   4.11.5. AuthEapReqExt class.......................................38
   4.11.6. AuthEapRespExt class......................................39
   5. Message Types..................................................40
   5.1. Event Handler Provisioning Decisions.........................40
   5.2. Provisioning Decision........................................41
   5.3. PEP Event Message............................................41
   5.4. PDP Provisioning Decision....................................42

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   5.5. PDP fetching Event-specific ContextData......................42
   5.6. Event-specific ContextData Response..........................43
   5.7. Opaque Decision..............................................43
   5.8. Opaque Report................................................43
   6. Combining Data Structures in Messages..........................45
   6.1. Combining Context Data in Event Messages.....................45
   7. Access Bind Usage Examples.....................................46
   7.1 Wireless LAN (802.11 Access Point) Usage Example..............46
   7.1.1 Wireless LAN Access Event Handler Provisioning..............47
   7.1.2 Wireless LAN Access Event Handling..........................48
   7.1.3 Wireless LAN Access Event Decision..........................48
   7.2 RSVP Usage Example............................................49
   8. The AccessBind PIB Module......................................56
   9. Security Considerations.......................................104
   10. References...................................................105
   11. Author Information and Acknowledgments.......................106






































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Abstract

   There is an ever-growing distinction between edge and core
   functionality. While the core continues to focus on stability and
   pure forwarding functionality, the edges increasingly need to deal
   with dynamic capabilities like QoS management, VPN encapsulations,
   encryption, dynamic steering and service monitoring. The dynamic
   deployment of these functions is dependent on specific contextual
   knowledge such as the physical location of the data stream and the
   identity of the client or system generating the data.

   In many environments, there is a requirement to both bind resource
   consumption to an identity or account, and also to quickly and
   efficiently provision the appropriate set of policies for that
   client or account. It is possible to provide this capability with a
   collection of currently available protocols. However, the
   synchronization of account and provisioning information between
   these protocols makes this approach extremely unwieldy.

   This memo offers a solution in the form of a single COPS PIB capable
   not only of supporting all the above requirements but also offering
   a scalable means for extending the provisioning capabilities as new
   technologies are standardized. Specifically, we offer a mechanism
   for provisioning the criteria for initiating dynamic event
   notifications from the PEP as well as a means for propagating
   identity credentials received by the PEP to allow the PDP to
   validate a client identity or an account as part of the event
   notification process.


1. Introduction

   There are two sides to access control. The one side is the
   negotiation between the client and the edge device (also known as
   the policy enforcement point), for example between a workstation and
   an Ethernet switch supporting authentication protocols like 802.1x
   and PPPoE. The other side of a typical access control model is an
   interaction between the edge device (PEP) and a PDP, such that the
   PDP performs the client/account validation process and notifies the
   PEP of the result. This separation of access control into two parts
   is necessary because invariably the PEP does not have the capacity
   to store all possible identities and credentials. This information
   is typically stored in a server (PDP).


   In reality access control can include authentication as one piece of
   a larger authorization process. As such, authorization has much in
   common with RSVP. When an RSVP service request is made, the PDP
   evaluates a set of criteria including what is being requested, what
   the availability of specific resources are, the identity of the
   requestor, and even the location of the requestor. All these
   criteria are taken into consideration before determining whether the


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   RSVP request should be honored. In addition, if the request is
   honored, specific provisioning actions may be taken to bound or
   manage the request. Similarly, the ability for a PDP to respond to a
   non-RSVP service request potentially requires all the same
   information of a traditional RSVP request in order to determine
   whether the request should be accepted or rejected.

   It is also important to note that a service request should not just
   be restricted to network access. In practice, there are many
   instances where a determination of access privileges requires an
   explicit decision. For instance, there are scenarios where limited
   network access is granted based on the specific criteria, but
   subsequent authorization is required to access a premium resource
   that requires incremental authentication (via HTTP for example).
   Another possible scenario occurs when initial access is authorized
   based on one set of credentials, but usage of a specific resource
   requires an examination of an account balance. These authorizations
   will be referred to as "PEP Events" to denote the fact that PEP is
   generating an event indicating a request for some type of service.

   In order to support the broad variety of potential PEP Events, there
   must be a way of provisioning the criteria for generating the PEP
   Event. In the most common case the PEP Event is generated as a
   result of some type of packet oriented event such as activity on a
   link, traffic of a particular type or traffic from a new, unknown IP
   address.

   This leads to a useful observation: PEP Events need to be defined
   within the context of a network data path. In other words, the data
   path mechanisms defined in the DiffServ informal model [MODEL] and
   the DiffServ PIB [DSPIB] provide a means for specifying the
   circumstances for generating a PEP Event by reusing elements from
   the model like the qosDatapathTable table and the qosClfrTable table
   in the DiffServ PIB.

   Another consideration is the variety of information that can
   potentially be included in a PEP Event. For instance, a PEP Event
   could pass information about the client (domain), the physical port
   (dial up interface), L2 headers, L3 headers, encapsulation headers
   (tunnels), cookies, and additional information already negotiated
   prior to generating the PEP Event. Given the amount of information
   that could be sent with the PEP Event, it is reasonable to allow the
   PDP to configure the PEP with the set of information the PDP would
   like to have included with a specific type of PEP Event.

   PEP Events provide a convenient means for the PEP to signal an event
   that requires specific actions. A PDP authorization for access to
   specific resources (and the potential verification of identity) is
   one example of an event that not only requires a response but also
   some potential provisioning work. It is interesting to note how
   neatly RSVP decision support fits into this model. In the original
   COPS design [COPS], the RESV request was sent in a COPS request and
   a COPS response message determined whether the reservation should be

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   accepted or not. The enhancements provided by this PIB not only
   allow RSVP messages to generate access requests, but also explicitly
   provision QoS resources, using COPS-PR [COPSPR], to support the
   reservation. This generalizes COPS for RSVP and allows it to evolve
   to the COPS-PR model.

   There are a number of situations where Events and associated
   provisioning need to be negotiated quickly. Mobile-IP applications
   in particular require speedy resolution of PEP Events. This implies
   that the combination of PEP Events and provisioning needs to be
   completed with the minimum number of communication legs (round
   trips).


2. Paradigm for the Bind PIB

   There are several key aspects to this PIB. First there is the
   ability to provisioning for future authorization events, known as
   PEP Events. Second, there is a set of tables that used to notify the
   PDP of an attempt to access managed resources. These tables can also
   include credentials necessary to verify client identity. Finally,
   there are tables that determine how dialogs (COPS Request Handles)
   between the PEP and PDP should be grouped. In order to provide
   concurrency between competing events and provisioning requests,
   there must be a means for determining which PEP Events require a new
   COPS Request Handle and which should use existing handles.

2.1 Event Handler Concepts

   This section introduces the concept of an Event Handler. Much of
   what is described in this paper is based on the Event Handler.

   Event Handlers are implemented in PEPs and configured by PDPs. Event
   Handlers are provisioned by standard COPS-PR protocol sequences. A
   PEP will announce what Event Handlers are available in the
   capabilities table of the COPS-PR Request message. The PDP will
   provision the Event Handlers with Decision messages.

   Once an Event Handler is provisioned it is responsible for
   identifying packets that require the PDP to be notified with an
   Event Message.

   The general model for Event Messages requests includes a client, a
   Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) and a Policy Decision Point (PDP). In
   this model, the PEP is the interface to the client, and the Event
   Handler is the part of the PEP that is responsible for recognizing
   the conditions for client authorization, generating the Event
   Message to the PDP, and communicating with the Client, if necessary,
   to get identity or other information.

   The Event Handler takes a signal or message from the client and
   translates it into an Event Message to send to the PDP. It takes the
   provisioning Decision from the PDP and, in cases where the client is

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   aware of the authorization process, does what is needed to
   communicate the Decision to the client.

   The Event Message is sent from the PEP to the PDP. The PDP uses the
   Event Message to determine the appropriate provisioning steps. In
   some cases identity verification may require sending some
   intermediate messages to authenticate the client prior to
   provisioning the PEP with the policies appropriate to the client.
   The PEP then returns a Report to the PDP confirming what was
   provisioned by the Decision.


   |  C |->Access Request->|    |                         |    |
   |  L |                  |    |-Event Message---------->|    |
   |  I | <-(optional)->   |PEP | <-(optional)->          |PDP |
   |  E |                  |    |<-Provisioning Decision -|    |
   |  N |<-Access Decision-|    |                         |    |
   |  T |                  |    | --> Access Report ----->|    |

                Fig. 2.1        Access Control Protocol Sequence


   This paper is primarily concerned with the function of the Event
   Handler and the communication between the PEP and PDP. Communication
   between the Client and PEP is assumed to be something like PPP or
   802.1, and the capabilities described here should work with any
   Client/PEP communication method.

   The PEP Event Message and PDP Provisioning Decision sequence is
   similar to the "classical" COPS RSVP model. The Report confirming
   that the Decision was installed correctly on the PEP is an extra
   message beyond what is included in the RSVP sequence. We believe
   this is a good approach, but expect further discussion (It is
   interesting to note that RADIUS does not send an acknowledgements of
   Access Accepts/Rejects, and the DIAMETER drafts specify no
   acknowledgement, but do expect a negative message if the Reply
   cannot be processed correctly).

   An Event Handler is a data path element in the PEP. Each Event
   Handler has a "selector" that identifies packets that should cause
   Event Messages (See section 4.3 - Filter Entries). The selector
   essentially divides all packets into two sets, one set the Event
   Handler is responsible for generating Event Messages; the other set
   it just passes to the next data path element. For example, if an
   Event HandlerÆs selector is "All new source IP addresses", an
   incoming packetÆs Source IP address is examined and if it is old,
   the packet passed on without further processing. If the source IP
   address is new or unknown, an Event Message is generated.

   Event Messages are grouped by COPS Request Handles. Each Event
   Message may cause a new COPS Request Handle to be generated or a set
   of Event Messages may all share the same COPS Request Handle (note:
   see section 4.3-4.6).  The distinction between selector and Event

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   Handle spelled out in 4.3-4.6, and will be worked on in the next
   revision of this draft). Attributes in the Access Bind PIB are
   provided to identify what how Event Messages are bound to COPS
   Request Handles.

   Event Handlers are designed to detect conditions in the PEP that
   result in the sending of Event Messages to the PDP. The Access Bind
   PIB defines a class to specify the criteria for generating an event.
   In some cases an event is appropriate every time the criteria is
   met. In other instances an event is appropriate only on the first
   occurrence. The provisioning event criteria can be difficult since
   it is often the case that the PDP canÆt anticipate what the PEP will
   see. For instance, when it is desirable to generate events every
   time a new user or device is recognized, the PDP canÆt anticipate
   which devices will be recognized or the order in which they will
   occur. Filter expressions can be constructed that enable the
   description of a set of packet fields that must match and a set of
   packet fields that collectively represent a new, unique combination.
   This expressive capability allows the PDP to indicate to the PEP
   that one event should be generated the first time a Src IP address
   has been seen by the PEP, but not generate events for subsequent
   packets with the same Src IP address.

   One interesting problem associated with event driven provisioning is
   avoiding blocking of one event due to provisioning activity for a
   different event. On the other hand, there are situations where
   serialization or ordering of events is important. We use COPS
   Request Handles to address both these needs. However, this requires
   explicit provisioning to indicate when new handles should be
   provisioned and which events should be processed through which
   handles. The approach taken in this paper is that the scope of the
   COPS Request Handle is defined by one or more Filter entries defined
   in the COPS Framework PIB [FWPIB], this PIB and other PIBs. For
   example, if a FilterEntry object specifies SRC IP address
   (10.20.0.0) and SRC IP Mask (FF.FF.0.0) each new IP address within
   the range 10.20.0.0 and 10.20.255.255 will trigger the creation of a
   new Handle. The for this example, any packet with a SRC IP address
   that generates a new Event Message will use the existing handle if
   that handle was already defined for that specific SRC IP address.

   When a packet arrives at the Event Handler, it first checks if it
   meets the criteria for generating an Event (event criteria will be
   discussed later). In the example above, a packet with a SRC IP
   address of 10.25.12.100 would not match the range criteria and would
   be passed to the next data path element. If it is selected, then a
   check is made to see if it matches the criteria for an existing COPS
   Request Handle.

   If it does not match the criteria for an existing COPS Request
   Handle, then the PEP instantiates a new Request Handle and sends an
   Event Message to the PDP using the new Handle. In either case the
   PDP analyzes the Event Message, possibly sending additional messages
   back to the PEP to support authentication and provisioning for the

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   new address. If authentication was performed, a final Authentication
   Result object is sent to the PEP to indicate the authentication was
   successful or not. This is needed to allow the PAP, CHAP and EAP
   authentication processes to report success back to the
   authenticating user.


2.1.1 Example - Ethernet IP Address Authorization

   This (relatively simple) example assumes an edge device has an
   Ethernet interface and wants to require each new Source IP address
   arriving at one Ethernet port to be authorized before getting general
   access to the network. Assume also that some clients are to get
   preferred access (via DiffServ Marking).

   In the example, the PEP is configured with a classifier that has
   explicit entries for each source address that has already be
   authenticated and a default classifier element matching all addresses
   to points to an Event Handler. Since the default classifier element
   is only used if none of the other classifier elements match, the
   Event Handler is only invoked for new Src IP addresses that have not
   yet been explicitly provisioned into the classifier. Each non-default
   classifier element points to another classifier that lists the
   policies uniquely for that Src IP address. The addresses of "premium"
   users are assigned a high QoS while the addresses of "normal" users
   are assigned best effort QoS. Since the Event Handler is not
   terminating any packets, the Event Handler passes all packets through
   to the Best Effort Queue.

   When the PEP comes up it sends information about its Event Handlers
   to the PDP in a capabilities table. After capability negotiation is
   complete, the PDP provisions a set of policies that configure the
   Event Handlers behind the Ethernet interfaceÆs datapath. Each Event
   Handler Table will have a pointer to a (tagged) set of
   EventHandlerElement Tables that provide Filter matching and COPS
   Request Handle matching rules. In this case, the EventHandlerElement
   table will be provisioned generate unique Request Handles and Events
   the first time it matches a new "SourceIPAddresses."

   Once the Event Handler is setup, it is able to process packets
   arriving at the Ethernet Interface. The Event Handler looks at all
   packets with Src IP addresses that have not been explicitly been
   defined in the upstream Classifier and uses the event matching rules
   to check if the packet contains an unknown Src IP address within the
   configured range. If the packet matches an event matching rule, the
   Event Handler checks what information the PDP requires from the
   Client (e.g. username and credential), and collects this
   information. The PEP then checks to see if it should use an existing
   Request Handle or create a new one. In this example, each new
   address gets a unique COPS Request Handle so that all the address-
   specific (user specific) policies (and feedback information) are
   managed through a single COPS dialog. A unique handle also has the
   benefit of automatically removing all objects provisioned through

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   the Handle when the Handle is deleted (the user ends their session).
   After the Request Handle is set up, an Event Message is sent to the
   PDP containing the user information including address, port, and
   credential information.

   The PDP checks the information passed in the Event Message,
   authenticates the client (if required), and decides which policy
   should apply to that IP address. It sends a Provisioning Decision,
   containing the appropriate policy (assign to "premium" queue) to the
   PEP using the newly created Request Handle.

   Additional examples using the Access Bind PIB to support RSVP,
   802.11, and other protocols are described in section 7.

2.2. Context Data

   As mentioned previously, Event Messages frequently require
   information beyond just the identity of the client. Information
   about the physical interface, the protocols being used, and the
   protocol bindings (VLANs, IP addresses, etc.) may also be required
   to provide enough information to the PDP to provide proper
   provisioning guidance. Therefore a mechanism is required that allows
   the PDP to specify what information is needed.

   With the advent of Tunnels, the same headers can be repeated
   (nested) within a single client message. This makes identification
   of specific attributes such as IP Addresses difficult because it is
   unclear whether the PDP needs the IP Address in the innermost or
   outermost header. This gets even more complicated when more than two
   layers are involved (i.e. VLAN and label stacking). The ContextData
   class, described in more detail below, allows the PDP to explicitly
   specify the set of nested headers that it needs more details on.
   This can either be specified in from the outermost header or the
   innermost header, as well as all headers of a particular type.

   Since the volume of information can be quite large and is very PEP
   and interface specific, it is appropriate to organize the
   information into manageable chunks. This approach was a compromise
   between two extremes. One extreme is one large data structure with
   all possible information. The other extreme is specifying each
   attribute explicitly. The first extreme is not viable because it is
   difficult to adapt to new types of information. The second
   alternative is very configuration intensive, particularly for header
   data that must distinguish inner and outer headers. The choice to
   group context data into classes and request the data at the class
   level is not without problems. If the PDP is only interested in a
   single attribute within a given class, there is no way to specify
   this. Hence the PEP has to fill in the entire class and the PDP has
   to parse the entire class to find the appropriate attribute.

   In order for the PDP to specify which chunks of context data it
   needs, this PIB defines a table called the ContextData class that
   allows the PDP to specify the tables it needs. This table is

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   discussed in more detail in section 4.9. The messages used to send
   ContextData are discussed in sections 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 6.1.

2.3. Policy Distribution and Management

   One of the purposes of this paper is to demonstrate how
   authorization and authentication can be bound to traditional COPS
   provisioning. Stated somewhat differently, this paper provides the
   means for seamlessly integrating outsourcing with provisioning using
   only PIBs. Authorization, Authentication, and COPS/RSVP are all
   forms of outsourcing because they are all triggered by events in the
   PEP and depend on decision support from the PDP. Earlier sections
   have gone into fair detail in describing how the PEP can generate
   Event Messages. However, we have not yet discussed how these
   semantics integrate with traditional COPS PR provisioning semantics.

   There are two aspects to provisioning that need to be considered.
   First is the provisioning of the Event Handlers themselves. Section
   2.1 went into some detail describing how Event Handlers are
   provisioned using policy decisions. More details on the Event
   Handler tables can be found in sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. In
   addition the provisioning messages used to configure Event Handlers
   are also described in section 5.1.

   The second aspect of provisioning is the use standard provisioning
   decisions to bind policies to authorized clients. The goal in
   binding events to policies was to minimize reconfiguration.
   Therefore, this PIB has been designed to provision Event Handlers as
   well as Policies once and bind them together dynamically.

   The process for this binding is as follows. An Event Handler can be
   configured to generate COPS Request Handles and trigger an Event
   Message based on specific criteria. These criteria explicitly scope
   the Request Handle. For example, if the criteria were one per unique
   source IP address, then there would be one Request Handle for each
   unique source IP address and all policies bound to through that
   Request Handle would typically operate on all traffic with that
   source IP address. Note that the criteria that scope a Request
   Handle could also be a unique protocol, unique VLAN, or each unique
   RSVP RESV message. It is also worth noting that the Request Handle
   bounding criteria could also be a unique combination of field values
   such as a VLAN and TCP Port Number.

   With the scope of a Handle specified, the Event Handler can
   instantiate new Handles in conjunction with the Event Message.

2.4. Interactions with DiffServ model

   The DiffServ model [MODEL] and PIB [DSPIB] allow for flexible
   addition of new Data Path Functional Elements. The Event Handler is
   one such new Data Path Functional Element.  Previous sections have
   already described how this PIB extends the existing DiffServ
   Informal Model and the DiffServ PIB. However, it is worth describing

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   how this PIB enhances the basic DiffServ model. First and foremost,
   this new PIB provides a means for scaling the basic DiffServ model
   to the edges of the network that can have many interfaces and many
   specialized services. Previous PIBs only supported the static
   configuration of data paths. This meant that dynamic events such as
   binding of new clients to existing or new services were difficult to
   support because there was no way to anticipate new clients and
   because most provisioning was managing classifiers on a per client
   per service basis did not scale well.

   This PIB addresses this problem by preserving the basic data path
   semantics but separating the creation of dynamic (event driven)
   policies into a new data path component. This provides a stable data
   path for the generation of authorizations while also supporting a
   stable data path for the services that various clients may make use
   of. The linchpin of this PIB is the Event Handler that provides a
   new type of demultiplexor that separates streams of traffic into
   individually grouped triggers that in turn support dynamic
   authorization. The policy provisioning that results from these
   events can be bound back to pre-defined policies to minimize the
   changes required to support new clients. As a result, with this PIB,
   modifications to service policies can be added or removed at the
   session level rather than the raw data path level.

   So far we have only discussed the value of authorizing a client when
   the link notices new IP address. However, it is worth noting that
   because the Event Handler is part of the data path definition, it is
   far more flexible. For instance, the Event Handler can be placed
   behind a Classifier to explicitly authorize access to a specific
   part of the network or specific services. The Event Handler can also
   be the FailNext element behind a meter resulting in an authorization
   for the use of out-of-profile traffic. Bandwidth Brokers can use
   this approach or an Event Handler trapping RSVP RESV messages to
   support dynamic bandwidth allocation decisions.

   The integration of Event Handler as a Data Path Functional Element
   allows seamless integration with DiffServ provisioning.
   DiffServ network device mechanism policy control continues to be
   supported with the use of DiffServ PIB [DSPIB] with added
   functionality at the edge of the network with usage of the Event
   Handler.  This can now be totally controlled via the use of COPS-PR.

   The Policy Server level interaction with DiffServ comes naturally
   with the integration of Event Handler as a Data Path Functional
   Element when the network data model is common and scoped
   appropriately in the schema level, with the Event Handler becoming
   stimuli for DiffServ provisioning.

2.5. Interactions with RSVP model

   The Event Handler model provides a means for detecting RSVP RESV
   messages. This means that the traditional COPS outsourcing model
   could eventually be phased out in favor of the provisioning model

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   and the use of this PIB. This is discussed in more detail in section
   7.2.




















































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3. Supporting various client Authentication Protocols

   In the operational model for this PIB, the Authentication Server is
   a specific function of the PDP. The main purpose of the
   authentication portions of this PIB is to verify the validity of
   client credentials by an Authentication Server. The verification
   process itself may do this whilst ensuring some level of
   authenticity, confidentiality and integrity. Messages exchanged
   between a Client and Authentication Server (PDP) may remain
   confidential to PEP's and Proxy Servers. The message integrity may
   be ensured by some hashing algorithm so PEP's and Proxy's may
   inspect but not modify the content of authentication messages.
   Clients, PEP's, Proxy's and PDP's will always need some security
   method to ensure message authenticity.

   Some authentication protocols explicitly consider proxies by
   allowing the payload to be carried over a variety of transports.
   Others depend on the termination point of the connection to
   explicitly proxy the authentication, when that is necessary. In
   order to demonstrate the general utility of this model, a variety of
   client authentication protocols will be considered in this document.
   For each protocol, the negotiation mechanism will be described and
   the mapping to this framework will be detailed.

3.1. Provisioning

   The PEP will not start an authentication sequence with the client if
   it hasnÆt been told to do that. It will only do so when a specific
   event occurs. The PDP tells the PEP exactly when this event should
   be triggered. This process is called provisioning.

   The provisioning starts with the initial Provisioning Request, which
   is typically sent at boot time. The PEP sends up capability PRCÆs
   indicating the types of authentication it can handle. The PDP will
   reply by setting the following Access Bind PRCÆs:
     a. dpeventHandler (datapathEventHandler)
     b. dpEventhdlrAuthProtocol
     c. eventHdlrElement
     d. eventHdlrEventScope
     e. eventHdlrHandleScope
     f. contextData
   and an additional PRC instance referred to by the
   eventhdlrEventScopeFilter in the eventhdlrEventScope table,
   indicating how the signaling trigger is recognized.

   In case the PDP wants the PEP to perform an authentication when an
   event is triggered, it should set dpeventhdlrRequestAuth in the
   dpEventHdlr to true and optionally let the dpEventHdlrAuthProtocol
   field point to a dpEventHdlrAuthProtocol to indicate which
   authentication protocol should be used for the authentication.




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   As soon as the PDP has provisioned the PEP to watch for certain
   traffic that triggers an event, the PEP is ready to start an
   authentication.

3.2. EAP Authentication

   The most significant aspect distinguishing EAP [EAP] from other
   authentication protocols is that EAP assumes the negotiation is
   between the client and the authentication server. In anticipation of
   the fact that the terminating point of a connection such as PPP or
   L2TP is not necessarily the same as the agent managing client
   authentication, EAP encapsulates itÆs negotiation process in a
   separate header that can be forwarded in entirety to the server.
   This mechanism provides extra security by preventing intermediate
   proxies from monitoring or managing authentication credentials.

   EAP supports a number of different authentication mechanisms
   including MD5, TLS, and One-Time-Password authentication.

   The terminology used in [EAP] differs from the terminology used in
   this document. In particular, the peer, as defined in section 1.2 of
   [EAP], is referred to as "Client" in this document. Similarly, the
   "authenticator" is called a PEP in this document and "back-end
   server" is called the Authentication Server function of the PDP (or
   just PDP) in this document.

3.2.1. EAP Message sequence

   The generic sequence of transmissions between the PEP and PDP has
   already been described in section 2. In particular, figure 2.1 gives
   an overview of the messages involved between the Client workstation,
   PEP and PDP. EAP messages are embedded in PPP packets in the
   communication between the Client and the PEP. In the communication
   between the PEP and PDP, the EAP messages are embedded in COPS
   Request, COPS Decision and COPS Report messages. Figure 3.1 shows
   how EAP may be used to retrieve credentials from the client
   workstation by the PDP.

















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   time
    |   +---+                     +---+                          +---+
    |   |   |                     |   |-- COPS-PRC exchange ---->|   |
    |   |   |                     |   |<- COPS-Dec eventHandler -|   |
    |   |   |-- PPP traffic ----->|   |                          |   |
    |   |   |<- PPP LCP Req-EAP --|   |                          |   |
    |   | U |-- PPP LCP ACK-EAP ->| P |                          | P |
    |   | s |<- PPP EAP Req Id ---| E |                          | D |
    |   | e |-- PPP EAP Res Id -->| P |                          | P |
    |   | r |                     |   |-- COPS-Req Ses-EAP  ---->|   |
    |   |   |                     |   |<- COPS-Dec EAP Req Chal -|   |
    |   |   |<- PPP EAP Req Chal -|   |                          |   |
    |   |   |- PPP EAP Res Chal ->|   |                          |   |
    |   |   |                     |   |- COPS-Rep EAP Res Chal ->|   |
    |   |   |                     |   |                          |   |
    |   |   |                     |   |<- COPS-Dec EAP Success --|   |
    |   |   |<- PPP EAP success --|   |                          |   |
    V   +---+                     +---+                          +---+

   Fig 3.1: Embedding of EAP messages between the Client workstation
   and the PEP, and between the PEP and PDP. The EAP messages may be
   opaque to the PEP.


   Typically, when the PEP boots up, it sends itÆs capabilities to the
   PDP in a COPS message and is than configured by the PDP with one or
   more datapathEventHandlers specifying the criteria for generating
   PEP Event Messages. The first message after this provisioning
   process from the PEP to the PDP is a new Event Message. The PEP
   sends a COPS request to the PDP containing a new instance of the
   Event table. The eventEventHdlr attribute in the Event table entry
   is a ReferenceId that points to a dpeventHandler entry indicating
   (by means of the dpEventHdlrAuthProtocol) that EAP is a valid
   protocol to use for this Event. Also, the eventCause attribute in
   the Event table entry is a ReferenceId that points to an
   eventhdlrElement indication of which Filter (by means of the
   eventhdlrEventScope) triggered the event.

   All EAP messages necessary to complete the authentication process
   will be forwarded to the PDP. All of the negotiation occurs between
   the Client and the PDP and should, except for the EAP message code
   field, not be examined by the PEP. In order to support multiple EAP
   protocols, this PIB supports a generic EAP request class and EAP
   response class. Each class has a single string attribute
   (authEapReqExtSpecific and authEapRespExtSpecific, respectively)
   within which the entire EAP message is passed.

   Although figure 3.1 shows two EAP messages going from the PDP to the
   Client and two EAP messages being returned from the client to the
   PDP, the actual number of messages exchanged can be any amount. The
   PDP may continue to retrieve additional credentials from the client
   for as long as it wishes. As soon as the PDP has all the necessary


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   credentials from the client, the PDP may continue to provision the
   PEP with policies. This is action is not shown in figure 3.1.

   The PDP should end the EAP negotiation with an EAP Success or an EAP
   Failure message. If the PDP sends a EAP Success, the PEP must from
   then on use the matchNext Prid to determine the next processing
   filter for data defined by the values described using the
   eventhdlrEventScope.

3.2.2. AuthEapReqExt and AuthEapRespExt data structures

   The EAP messages are embedded in COPS by sending an instance of the
   authEapReqExt or authEapRespExt table, which each have an attribute
   (Specific) to encapsulate the appropriate EAP messages necessary for
   the authentication mechanism. The authEapReqExt table is owned and
   managed by the PEP, while the authEapReqExt table is owned and
   managed by the PDP. Put another way, the PDP generates authEapReqExt
   instances that it sends in Decision messages and the PEP generates
   authEapRespExt instances that it sends in Report messages. Since
   neither the PEP nor the PDP needs to maintain the messages
   permanently, the same instance of each class is used when more than
   one exchange is required in each direction.

   Since both AuthEapReqExt and AuthEapRespExt are extensions of the
   AuthExt class, they both inherit the attributes of AuthExt.

       AuthEapReXXExt table attributes     Attribute type
       -------------------------------     --------------
       authExtId                           InstanceId
       authExtEvent                        ReferenceId
       authEapReXXExtSpecific              OCTET STRING

   Fig 3.2: Data elements in AuthEapReqExt and AuthEapRespExt tables


   The AuthEapReXXExt class contains three attributes. The instanceId
   is used to uniquely define the instance in the table. However, since
   EAP messages are meant to be opaque, they should not be referenced.
   Because the purpose of the classes is to carry EAP messages and each
   message is transient instances of these tables are temporary and
   should not be referred to. The Event attribute points to the Event
   table entry for which EAP is being negotiated. The format of EAP
   packages being passed by the AuthEapReXXExt classes is described in
   [EAP].

3.3. PAP Authentication

   PAP (Password Authentication Protocol), as described in section 2 of
   [AUTH] is a very simple authentication mechanism used over PPP. It
   is not considered to be a secure mechanism, since it sends passwords
   over the wire in clear text format. However, where one-time
   passwords are used, this security concern is mitigated. It is
   described here nonetheless for illustration purposes and because it

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   may still be used among ISPs, or in situations where another layer
   already performs encryption for security.

   The terminology used in [AUTH] differs from the terminology used in
   this document. In particular, the peer as defined in section 1.2 of
   [AUTH] is referred to as "Client" in this document. Similar, the
   "authenticator" is called PEP in this document.

3.3.1. PAP Connection sequence

   Figure 3.3 shows how PAP may be used to retrieve credentials from
   the client workstation by the PDP.


   time
    |   +---+                     +---+                          +---+
    |   |   |                     |   |-- COPS-PRC exchange ---->|   |
    |   |   |                     |   |<- COPS-Dec eventHandler -|   |
    |   |   |-- PPP traffic ----->|   |                          |   |
    |   |   |<- PPP LCP Req-PAP --|   |                          |   |
    |   | U |-- PPP LCP ACK-PAP ->| P |                          | P |
    |   | s |-- PPP PAP Id, Pwd ->| E |                          | D |
    |   | e |                     | P |-- COPS-Req event,     -->| P |
    |   | r |                     |   |--          userPapExt -->|   |
    |   |   |                     |   |                          |   |
    |   |   |                     |   |<- COPS-Dec eventElement -|   |
    |   |   |                     |   |<- COPS-Dec authResult ---|   |
    |   |   |<- PPP PAP ack ------|   |                          |   |
    V   +---+                     +---+                          +---+

   Fig 3.3: Embedding of PAP messages between the Client workstation
   and the PEP, and between the PEP and PDP.


   When the dpEventHandler has been configured to require
   authentication, a PEP Event message will not be generated until
   after a minimal set of credentials have been negotiated with the
   client. For PAP, this means that a PEP Event Message will not be
   generated until after the authRealm and authUsername have been
   determined. This means that that the PEP must receive a PAP Identity
   message before it can send the PEP Event Message.

   The Client will send the Identity and Password to the PEP. The PEP
   will embed the password into the userPapExt datastructure and send
   this to the PDP. Since this datastructure inherits the fields of the
   userAuthExt data structure and the extAuth data structure, it will
   also contain the PAP identity attribute inserted into the
   authUsername attribute of this Instance.

   The first connection from the PEP to the PDP is an alert that an
   event was triggered. The PEP sends an Event Message over COPS to the
   PDP containing a new instance of the Event table. The eventEventHdlr
   attribute in the Event table entry is a ReferenceId that points to a

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   dpeventHandler entry indicating (by means of the
   dpEventHdlrAuthProtocol) that PAP is a valid protocol to use for
   this Event. Also, the eventCause attribute in the Event table entry
   is a ReferenceId that points to an eventhdlrElement indication which
   Filter (by means of the eventhdlrEventScope) did trigger the event.
   Along with this new instance of the Event table, the PEP must also
   send an instance of the AuthPapExt table.

   Besides these required instances, the PEP might have been configured
   by the PDP to sent additional information about the client to the
   PDP. For example in the case of a dialup connection between the
   Client and the PEP, the PDP might specify using a contextData
   instance that the PEP should also sent an instance of a
   ctxtDialupInterface.

   The PDP performs the PAP authentication. When the authentication is
   complete and the PDP is ready to authorize the event, the PDP
   optionally provisions the PEP with policies. This sequence of
   messages should terminate with a PDP Provisioning Decision (a COPS-
   PR Decision message). The PDP Provisioning Decision contains an
   instance of the AuthExtResult table with the authExtAuthSuccess set
   to either TRUE or FALSE. The PEP must upon receipt of this COPS
   Decision message, send PAP ACK or NACK message to the client. Also,
   if the authExtAuthSuccess attribute was true, then the PEP should
   keep track of this particular data, defined by the unique values of
   the fields specified using the eventhdlrEventScope.

3.3.2. AuthPapExtEntry datastructure

   The PAP information is embedded in the PEP Event Message by sending
   an instance of the authPapExt table. Since the authPapExt table is
   an extension of the userAuthExt table, which is an extension of the
   authExt table, the authPapExt inherits the attributes of these
   tables.


   AuthPapExt table attributes         Attribute type
       ---------------------------         --------------
       authExtId                           InstanceId
       authExtEvent                        ReferenceId
       authRealm                           OCTET STRING
       authUsername                        OCTET STRING
       authPapExtPwd                       OCTET STRING

   Fig 3.4: Attributes of the AuthPapExt table.


   The AuthPapExt contains five attributes. The instanceId is used to
   uniquely define the instance in the table. However, since the PAP
   password is sent to the PDP once and is needed by neither the PDP
   nor the PEP after the client is authenticated, the instance should
   not be referenced after it is used the first time. The Event


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   attribute points to the Event table entry for which PAP is being
   negotiated.

   The result of the authentication for PAP is sent in the
   AuthExtResult table. Since the authExtResult table is an extension
   of the AuthExt table, it inherits the attributes of AuthExt.


       AuthExtResult table attributes      Attribute type
       ------------------------------      --------------
       authExtId                           InstanceId
       authExtEvent                        ReferenceId
       authExtAuthSuccess                  Truth Value

   Fig 3.5: Attributes of the AuthExtResult table.


   The AuthExtResult is sent by the PDP to the PEP. If the
   authentication was successful and the PEP should from now on use the
   matchNext Prid to determine the next processing filter (the next
   component down the internal datapath in the PEP) for all traffic
   defined by the values of the parameters as set in the
   eventhdlrHandlerScope.

3.4. CHAP Authentication

   CHAP (Challenge Authentication Protocol) [CHAP] is a strong
   authentication mechanism, which eliminates the need to send
   passwords in the clear, like PAP does. With CHAP, the Authenticator
   generates a challenge key, sends it to the Peer (Client) and the
   client responds with a cryptographically hashed response that
   depends upon the Challenge and a secret key. The PDP checks the
   secret key by performing the same encryption and comparing the
   results.

   The terminology used in [CHAP] differs from the terminology used in
   this document. In particular, the peer as defined in section 1.2 of
   [CHAP] is referred to as "Client" in this document. Similar, the
   "authenticator" is called PEP in this document.

3.4.1. CHAP Connection sequence

   Figure 3.6 shows how CHAP may be used to retrieve credentials from
   the client workstation by the PDP.










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   time
    |   +---+                     +---+                          +---+
    |   |   |                     |   |-- COPS-PRC exchange ---->|   |
    |   |   |                     |   |<- COPS-Dec eventHandler -|   |
    |   |   |-- PPP traffic ----->|   |                          |   |
    |   |   |<- PPP LCP Req-CHAP -|   |                          |   |
    |   | U |- PPP LCP ACK-CHAP ->| P |                          | P |
    |   | s |<- PPP CHAP Chal ----| E |                          | D |
    |   | e |-- PPP CHAP Ident, ->| P |                          | P |
    |   | r |--        Id, Resp ->|   |                          |   |
    |   |   |                     |   |-- COPS-Req event-CHAP -->|   |
    |   |   |                     |   |-- COPS-Rep CHAP Resp, -->|   |
    |   |   |                     |   |--                Chal -->|   |
    |   |   |                     |   |                          |   |
    |   |   |                     |   |<- COPS-Dec eventElement -|   |
    |   |   |                     |   |<- COPS-Dec authResult ---|   |
    |   |   |<- PPP CHAP ack -----|   |                          |   |
    V   +---+                     +---+                          +---+

   Fig 3.6: Embedding of CHAP messages between the Client workstation
   and the PEP, and between the PEP and PDP.


   As soon as the PEP finished negotiating CHAP as the Authentication
   protocol, it generates a challenge itself, and sends this to the
   Client. The client will respond to this authentication request by
   sending his or her identity, an identifier and the response. The
   response is a cryptographically encrypted hash based on the
   challenge and secret key (password).

   The identifier is only used to keep track of CHAP messages, and
   needs to be used by the PEP to recover the associated challenge.

   The first connection from the PEP to the PDP is a notice of a new
   Event. The PEP sends an Event Message to the PDP containing a new
   instance of the Event Table. The eventEventHdlr attribute in the
   Event table entry is a ReferenceId that points to a dpeventHandler
   entry indicating (by means of the dpEventHdlrAuthProtocol) that CHAP
   is a valid protocol to use for this Event. Also, the eventCause
   attribute in the Event table entry is a ReferenceId that points to
   an eventhdlrElement indication of which Filter (by means of the
   eventhdlrEventScope) did trigger the event. Along with this new
   instance of the Event table, the PEP must also send an instance of
   the AuthChapExt table.

   Note that having the PEP issue the challenge allows the PEP to
   perpetrate fraud by issuing a replayed request (assuming that the
   PEP and PDP are in different domains). The only guard against this
   is for the PDP to check that multiple authentication requests for
   the same client have unique challenges. This may be slow. PDP and
   Authentication server developers who feel this is a security issue
   may want to use EAP-MD5 authentication rather then CHAP


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   authentication, since EAP-MD5 addresses this problem by letting the
   PDP generate the challenge.

   Besides these required instances, the PEP might have been configured
   by the PDP to send additional information about the client to the
   PDP. For example in the case of a dialup connection between the
   Client and the PEP, the PDP might specify using a contextData
   instance that the PEP should also sent an instance of a
   ctxtDialupInterface.

   The PDP performs the CHAP authentication. When the authentication is
   complete and the PDP is ready to authorize the client, the PDP may
   choose to provision the PEP with policies for this client, which was
   probably the intention of starting this authentication process in
   the first place. This sequence of messages should terminate with a
   PDP Provisioning Decision (a COPS-PR Decision message). The PDP
   Provisioning Decision contains an instance of the AuthExtResult
   table with the authExtAuthSuccess set to either TRUE or FALSE. The
   PEP must upon receipt of this COPS Decision message, send PAP ACK or
   NACK message to the client. Also, if the authExtAuthSuccess
   attribute was true, then the PEP should keep track of this
   particular data, defined by the unique values of the fields
   specified using the eventhdlrEventScope.

3.4.2. AuthChapExtEntry datastructure

   The CHAP information is embedded in the Event Message by sending an
   instance of the authChapExt table. Since the authChapExt table is an
   extension of the userAuthExt table, which is an extension of the
   authExt table, the authChapExt table inherits the attributes of
   these tables.


       AuthChapExt table attributes        Attribute type
       ----------------------------        --------------
       authExtId                           InstanceId
       authExtEvent                        ReferenceId
       authRealm                           OCTET STRING
       authUsername                        OCTET STRING
       authChapExtId                       Unsigned32
       authChapExtChal                     OCTET STRING
       authChapExtResp                     OCTET STRING

   Fig 3.7: Data elements of the AuthChapExtEntry datastructure.


   The AuthChapExtEntry contains seven attributes. The instanceId is
   used to uniquely define the instance in the table. However, since
   the CHAP information is sent to the PDP once and is needed by
   neither the PDP nor the PEP after the client is authenticated, the
   instance should not be referenced after it is used the first time.
   The Event attribute points to the Event table entry for which PAP is
   being negotiated.

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   The authChapExtChal attribute is the challenge generated by the PEP.
   The PDP may check the challenge to see if it is different from
   challenges used earlier. This provides an increased level of
   security. The Response and the Id is taken from the CHAP message
   sent by the client and put into the AuthChapExtEntry by the PEP.

3.5. HTTP Authentication

   This section will be added in a subsequent version of this draft.












































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4. Data Structures

   The data classes defined formally in the Authentication PIB module
   (section 7) are introduced and discussed here.

4.1. Event class

   Instances of this table represent events that occurred at the PEP.
   The events reference the event handler instance and the specific
   event handler element that the event was caught by.


   The attributes of this class are:

        eventId (InstanceId)
           Identifies this object

        eventEventHdlr (ReferenceId)
           This attribute allows a PEP to indicate to the PDP that this
           event was generated due to the referenced Event Handler.
           This attribute references an event handler via the
           indirection PRC frwkReference, since the event handler and
           event could potentially belong to a different PIB contexts.

        eventCause (ReferenceId)
           This attribute references the specific instance in a group
           of event Handler elements belonging to an event Handler that
           resulted in this event. This attribute references a specific
           event handler element via the indirection PRC frwkReference,
           since the event handler element and event could potentially
           belong to a different PIB contexts.

4.2. EventHandler class


   Instances of this PRC are provisioned by the PDP on the PEP to catch
   specific events. The Event Handlers reference a group of
   eventHdlrElement PRIs that contain the scope of the event and
   specify the context data to send to the PDP when an event is caught.

   The attributes of the EventHandler Class are as follows:

        eventHandlerId (InstanceId)
           identifies an instance of this class

        eventHandlerElements (TagReferenceId)
           A reference to a group of eventHdlrElement instances, each
           of which determines the scope (criteria for generating a new
           request) and what context information to send in a request.

        eventHandlerNonMatchNext (Prid)
           The data path for "out of scope" traffic that is not matched
           by one of the eventHdlrElementÆs filter clauses.

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4.3. EventHdlrElement class

   The purpose of the EventHdlrElement is to specify the
   characteristics of the EventHandler. The attributes in the
   EventHdlrElement provide maximal reuse by allowing multiple
   instances of an EventHandler to reuse the same EventHdlrElement
   instance. Each Instance of this PRC belongs to a group of
   eventHdlrElement PRIs. The group is identified by the
   eventHdlrElementGrpId attribute. These are provisioned by the PDP on
   the PEP to catch specific events. This PRC contains the scope of the
   event and specifies the context data type to send to the PDP when an
   event is caught.

   Each EventHdlrElement constitutes a unique event semantic. Since the
   Event Scope, Handle Scope and Context Data are all bound to the
   EventHdlrElement, different EventHdlrElements can have different
   Event Scope (matching rules), Handle Scope (Handle generation
   rules), and Context Data (event specific data passed with the Event
   Message). This is why Event objects generated by the PEP reference
   both the Event Handler and the Event Handler Element that generated
   the event.

   One key aspect of the EventHdlrElement is the Event Criteria
   attribute. This attribute is used to describe whether unique events
   are one time events or repeatable events. For instance, every RSVP
   message may need to result in a Event Message. However, an Event
   Message may only be appropriate the first time a new Src IP address
   is seen. After that no events should be generated for that address.
   However other new addresses should still generate Event Messages.
   The Event Criteria attribute defines the frequency with which events
   should be generated. If the Event Criteria is set to One_Time, only
   one event will ever be generated for that EventHdlrElement when the
   first match occurs, irrespective of the number of subsequent
   matches. If the Event Criteria is set to Every_Time, each match will
   result in an Event Message. A hybrid case is defined called
   On_Change. This option allows a subset of the filter attributes to
   be required for matching and a different set of attributes that must
   from a unique n-tuple in order to generate an Event Message. See
   Section 4.6 for more details of the behavior of the On_Change
   attribute.

   The EventHdlrHandleScope is optional. If it is not specified, itÆs
   behavioral rules are taken from the EventHdlrEventScope objects
   associated with the relevant EventHdlrElement. In other words, the
   criteria for generating Request Handles will be identical to the
   criteria for generating Event Messages when the EventHdlrHandleScope
   is not explicitly specified.

   The attributes of the EventHdlrElement class are:

        eventHdlrElementId (InstanceId)
           identifies the object

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        eventHdlrElementEventCriteria (Unsigned32)
           Indicates when an event is generated. Valid options are
           one_time, every_time and on_change. This attribute allows
           event Handlers to distinguish one time events (ignore after
           the first match) from recurring events (generate an event
           every time a match occurs).  An enum type is also define to
           specify that a new event should be generated when a specific
           set of fields change. This is important for protocols like
           RSVP because messages are sent both to demonstrate that the
           reservation is active and to notify hops of changes to
           reservations. Since only changes need to propagate to the
           PDP, the on_change option indicates that that events should
           be generated selectively.



        eventHdlrElementGrpId (TagId)
           Group identifier. All instances with the same group
           identifier belong to one group and can be referenced
           collectively from an eventHandler instance.

        eventHdlrElementEventScope (TagReferenceId)
           Identifies a group of eventHdlrEventScope entries associated
           with this eventHdlrElement instance.

        eventHdlrElementHandleScope TagReferenceId)
           Identifies a group of eventHdlrHandleScope entries
           associated with this eventHdlrElement instance. This is an
           optional attribute.

        eventHdlrElementContext (TagReferenceId)
           Identifies a list of ContextDataTable entries associated
           with this eventHdlrElement instance.

        eventHdlrElementMatchNext (Prid)
           The data path for traffic in scope.

4.4. EventHdlrEventScope class

   This PRC defines the scope of an event handler element using
   references to filters defined in the Framework PIB or in some other
   PIBs. These filters may describe specific protocol properties for
   which events need to be generated. These filter references are
   grouped using a TagId, and this group is then referenced from the
   eventHdlrElement PRC.

   Whenever traffic arrives at the EventHandler for which an Event
   Message has not already been generated, it is compared against the
   FilterEntry objects of the EventHdlrEventScope objects referenced by
   the EventHdlrElement. If it matches the criteria specified in all of
   the FilterEntry objects, a new Event Message is generated and sent
   to the PDP. The value of EventHdlrElementÆs EventCriteria attribute

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   in conjunction with the value of the Event Scope classÆs ChangeFlag
   attribute determine whether an Event Message will be generated.

   For example, if a FilterEntry object specifies SRC IP address
   (10.20.0.0) and SRC IP Mask (FF.FF.0.0) and the EventCriteria is set
   to One_Time, the first address in the range of 10.20.0.0 and
   10.20.255.255 will generate an event and no events will follow. If
   the EventCriteria is set to Every_Time for the same attribute
   settings, each time a packet contains an IP address within the range
   an Event Message will be generated. If the EventCriteria is set to
   On_Change and the eventHdlrEventScopeChangeFlag is set to True, each
   new IP address within the range 10.20.0.0 and 10.20.255.255 will
   trigger a new Event Message. However, as soon as a specific Src IP
   address like 10.20.15.109 has generated an Event Message, that
   specific address will no longer generate an event. If the
   EventCriteria is set to On_Change and the
   eventHdlrEventScopeChangeFlag is set to False for the example
   address range, than the eventHdlrEventScope instance with the
   ChangeFlag set to True will determine uniqueness. In this scenario,
   the address range is acting as a strict filter that must be met
   without regard to which address in the range is responsible or
   whether that address has been seen previously.

   When multiple fields are specified for the filter and the ChangeFlag
   is set to true, each unique combination of field values generates an
   event. For example, if the SRC IP is assigned a range of
   10.10.10.224 to 10.10.10.255 and DST Ports 80 to 90 then
   10.10.10.240+80, 10.10.10.240+81, and 10.10.10.250+80 would all
   generate separate events. The combination of supporting multiple
   filters and being able to control precedence allows for the
   construction of both lists (10.10.x.x and 10.15.x.x) and
   combinations of disjoint headers in a single match criteria (any
   combination of 10.10.x.x and VLANs 100 to 120). See Section 4.6 for
   a detailed example of filter construction.

   The attributes of this class are:

        eventHdlrEventScopeId (InstanceId)
           Identifies this object

        eventHdlrEventScopeGroup (TagId)
           Contains the tag by which the EventHdlrElement references
           this object. This is the means by which a list of filters
           can be associated with an EventHandler.

        eventHdlrEventScopeFilter (PRID)
           Points to a FilterEntry object (as defined in the Framework
           PIB) that specifies the filter for this EventHdlrEventScope
           object

        eventHdlrEventScopePrecedence (Integer)
           Represents the precedence of this criterion with respect to
           other criteria within the same group. When the precedence is

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           unique, the instance represents an alternative criterion (an
           OR function). When the precedence for two or more instances
           of the eventHdlrEventScope class is the same, the attributes
           within all the instances are treated collectively as a
           single filter criteria.

        eventHdlrEventScopeChangeFlag (TruthValue)
           Boolean value, if set to "True" indicates that a new event
           should be generated if any of the assigned fields in the
           associated filter change.

4.5. EventHdlrHandleScope class

   This PRC defines the scope of Request Handles generated by the PEP
   due to events caught by the Event Handler Element. Each instance of
   this PRC references filters defined in the Framework PIB or some
   other signaling-protocol specific filter PRCs. These filters may
   describe specific protocol properties to which this Event Handler is
   sensitive. Essentially this table defines when a new COPS Request
   Handles must be created by the PEP based on protocol properties. The
   Event Handler may be set up to be sensitive to specific field values
   and/or the uniqueness of a set of values considered together. This
   accommodates various behaviors of signaling protocols. These filter
   references are grouped using a TagId, and this group is then
   referenced from the eventHdlrElement PRC via the
   eventHdlrElementHandleScope TagReference.

   The behavior of the EventHdlrHandleScope class is identical to the
   behavior of the EventHdlrEventScope. The only difference is the
   EventHdlrEventScope determines when new Events are created and the
   EventHdlrHandleScope determines when new COPS Request Handles are
   created. It is important to note that the attributes determining
   when a new Handle is created MUST be a subset of the filter
   attributes and filter values specified for the EventHdlrEventScope.
   The reason for this is that an Event Message MUST use one of the
   available Request Handles to notify the PDP of an Event. If the
   attributes and values used in the EventHdlrEventScope are not a
   superset of the attributes and values EventHdlrHandleScope, then
   there may be no valid Handle over which the Event Message can be
   sent to the PDP.

   The EventHdlrHandleScope is optional. If it is not specified, itÆs
   behavioral rules are taken from the EventHdlrEventScope objects
   associated with the relevant EventHdlrElement. In other words, the
   criteria for generating Request Handles will be identical to the
   criteria for generating Event Messages when the EventHdlrHandleScope
   is not explicitly specified.

   See Sections 4.3 and 4.6 for more details on the operational
   behavior of this class.

        eventHdlrHandleScopeId (InstanceId)


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   An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an instance of
   the eventHdlrHandleScopeTable class.

        eventHdlrHandleScopeGroup (TagId)
   Represents the binding between the eventHdlrElementEntry and the
   eventHdlrHandleScope entries. A group of eventHdlrHandleScope
   entries constitutes the criteria for defining the scope of the
   Handles generated.

        eventHdlrHandleScopeFilter (Prid)
   Pointer to a filter to be used as the criteria.

        eventHdlrHandleScopePrecedence (INTEGER)
   Represents the precedence of this criterion with respect to other
   criteria within the same group. When the precedence is unique, the
   instance represents an alternative criteria (an ORing function).
   When the precedence for two or more instances of the
   eventHdlrHandleScope class is the same, the attributes within all
   the instances are treated collectively as a single filter criteria.

        eventHdlrHandleScopeChangeFlag (TruthValue)
   Boolean value, if set to "True" indicates that a new Handle should
   be generated if any of the assigned fields in the associated filter
   change.


   The PDP installs EventHandlerElements as part of constructing the
   event handler. EventHandlerElements describe when events will be
   generated and which COPS request handles will be used to send the
   requests.

4.6. Behavior of the Event and Handle Scope classes

   The rules for interpreting Handle Scope and Event Scope are the
   same. One is applied to Handles and the other is applied to Events.

   Each scope class (Event Scope or Handle Scope) instance has a
   precedence value associated with it. When two or more scope class
   instances of the same type (event vs handle) have the same
   precedence number, they are considered part of the same rule. For
   example, the table below lists a set of Event Scope class instances,
   their precedence values and the filter field names and values
   associated with each instance: (FName is the field name)

   Instance   Precedence   FName/Val   FName/Val   FName/Val
   --------   ----------   ---------   ---------   ---------
       1*         2        W/20        X/2-4
       2*         1        A/5-6       B/15        C/10-11
       3          2        W/14                    Y/500-550
       4          2        Q/4-9       R/92




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   This example would result in events being generated when one of the
   two expressions below are matched:
   1. (A=5 or A=6) and (B=15) and (C=10 or C=11 or C=12)
   2. (W=20 or W=14) and (X=2-4) and (Y=500-550) and (Q=4-9) and (R=92)

   If the EventCriteria was set to "OneTime", then if either 1 or 2 is
   matched, one event will be generated and this particular Event
   Handler Element will generate no further events. Note that if
   matches occur but the "OneTime" event has already been generated,
   the Event Hander Element's MatchNext attribute may still determine
   what the next forwarding action is for the packet event thought no
   event is generated.

   If the EventCriteria was set to "EveryTime", then every matching
   packet will cause an event. If the EventCriteria was set to
   "OnChange", then events will be generated the first time a unique
   combination of attributes is seen. Setting the ChangeFlag in the
   EventScope class (denoted by the asterisks in the previous example),
   identifies the set of attributes for which unique combinations of
   values generated new events.

   Continuing the example above the following table shows a stream of
   packets and whether an event will be generated.

   1. A=5, B=19, C=10                   No Event (B did not match)
   2. A=5, B=15, C=10                   Event (Unique pairing of A & C)
   3. A=6, B=15, C=11                   Event (Unique pairing of A & C)
   4. W=20, X=2, Y=500, Q=4, R=92       Event (Unique pairing of W & X)
   5. W=20, X=2, Y=505, Q=9, R=92       No Event (Already have a
                                                   matched for W & X)
   6. A=5, B=15, C=11                   Event (Unique pairing of A & C)
   7. A=5, B=15, C=10                   No Event (Already have a
                                        matched for A & C)

4.7. EventHdlrAuthProtocol class

   This
   class allows a PDP to configure the set of authentication mechanisms
   that are allowed for users or devices that must authenticate in
   order to have access policies assigned to them.

   The attributes of this class are:

        EventHdlrAuthProtocolId (InstanceId)
           Identifies this object

        EventHdlrAuthProtocolGroup (TagId)
           Represents a binding between an datapathEventHdlrTable
           instance and a list of eventHdlrAuthProtocolTable instances.

        EventHdlrAuthProtocolAuthMechanism (Enum)
           Specifies an authentication mechanism to be used in Event
           Messages triggered by the EventHandler referencing this

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           EventHdlrAuthProtocol object. The value is from an
           enumerated list initially consisting of (PAP, CHAP, EAP-MD5,
           and EAP-TLS)

4.8. DatapathEventHdlr Class
   This PRC is an extension of the EventHandler PRC. This extension
   illustrates the use of the EventHandler PRC concept for
   authentication usage. Instances of this PRC are provisioned by the
   PDP on the PEP to catch specific events that require authentication
   processing. This PRC references a group of eventHdlrAuthProtocol
   instances that define a set of Authentication mechanisms to use if
   an access event is caught by this event Handler. From its base class
   (Event Handler) this PRC also references a group of eventHdlrElement
   PRIs that contain the scope of the access event and specify the
   context data to send to the PDP when an access event is caught.

   The attributes of this class are:
        datapathEventHdlrRequestAuth (TruthValue)
           Boolean flag, if set to "True" requires authentication data
           to be sent in the Event Message sent to the PDP.

        datapathEventHdlrAuthProtocol (TagReferenceId)
           References a group of eventHdlrAuthProtocol instances, each
           of which specifies an authentication mechanism.

4.9. ContextData class

   This PRC specifies the context information to send to the PDP when
   an event is caught. The context information to send is described in
   terms of the PRC data types to include in the request, the level of
   encapsulated data and the interface information for that request.

   The attributes of this class are:

        ContextDataId (InstanceId)
           Identifies this object

        ContextDataGroup (TagId)
           Defines the grouping of contextData instances that are
           applicable to a given eventHdlrElement.

        ContextDataIfElement (PrcIdentifier)
           The OID of a class whose instance is to be included with
           the PEP request or event-specific ContextData Response.

        ContextDataEncapsulation (Integer)
           This attribute allows one to distinguish between inner and
           outer headers when there are multiple encapsulated headers
           of the same type in a packet.

               A value of:
               0 means all headers,


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               positive number 'n' means the 'n'th header starting
               from the outermost,
               negative number 'n' means the 'n'th header starting from
               the innermost.



4.10. ContextData classes

   This section contains examples of classes that might be referenced
   by the ContextData class as classes that must be included in the
   Event Message for various types of eventHdlrElements.

   There are two kinds of ContextData classes depending on the type of
   PEP. Some PEPs receive traffic from many users over a shared port
   such as an Ethernet port.  They recognize new users based on
   information in the headers of incoming packets.  For them, the
   ContextData will come from packet headers.  The L3HeaderData class
   is an example of this kind of ContextData class.  Other PEPs receive
   traffic from one user per interface.  For them, the context data
   will be information about the interface.  The
   CtxtDialupInterfaceFramedProtocol class is an example of this kind
   of ContextData class.

4.10.1. CtxtL3Hdr class

   This class specifies level three header data. This class is used to
   inform the PDP of the details of the IP header that caused the PEP
   Event Message to be generated.

   The attributes of this class are:

        CtxtL3HdrId (InstanceId)
           identifies this object

        CtxtL3HdrSrcAddrType (Enum)
           specifies the type of the packetÆs layer 3 source address

        CtxtL3HdrSrcAddr
           the packetÆs layer 3 source address

        CtxtL3HdrDstAddrType (Enum)
           specifies the type of the packetÆs layer 3 destination
           address

        CtxtL3HdrDstAddr
           the packetÆs layer 3 destination address

        CtxtL3HdrProtocol
           the packetÆs protocol field

        CtxtL3HdrSrcPort
           the packetÆs source port field

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        CtxtL3HdrDstPort
           the packetÆs destination port field

        CtxtL3HdrDscp
           the packetÆs Type of Service (Diffserv Code Point)field

        CtxtL3HdrEcn (boolean)
           Indicates whether this packet is ECN capable (True) or not
           (False)

        CtxtL3HdrIpOpt
           IP Options

        CtxtL3HdrEncap
           The Encap allows the PEP to indicate where this header is in
           relation to other IP headers found in the packet (with
           tunnels). This value can be either positive or negative
           depending on how the EventHandler (or the Session-specific
           Context Data request) was specified using negative or
           positive numbers.

           A negative n means return the nth layer from the innermost
           header. A positive n means return the nth layer from the
           outermost header.

4.10.2. Ctxt802Hdr class

   This class specifies IEEE 802.1 header data. This class is used to
   inform the PDP of the details of the 802 header that caused the PEP
   Event Message to be generated.

   The attributes of this class are:

        Ctxt802HdrId (InstanceId)
           identifies this object

        Ctxt802HdrSrcAddr
           the frameÆs source MAC address

        Ctxt802HdrDstAddr
           the frameÆs destination MAC address

        Ctxt802HdrProtocol
           the layer 2 frameÆs protocol field

        Ctxt802HdrPriority
           the layer 2 frameÆs priority field (only used if the frame
           is using the 802.q header extension)

        Ctxt802HdrVlan
           the layer 2 frameÆs VLAN field  (only used if the frame is
           using the 802.q header extension)

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        Ctxt802HdrEncap
           The Encap allows the PEP to indicate where this header is in
           relation to other IP headers found in the packet (with
           tunnels). This value can be either positive or negative
           depending on how the Event Handler (or the explicitly
           requested PDP Context Data request) was specified using
           negative or positive numbers.

           A negative n means return the nth layer from the innermost
           header. A positive n means return the nth layer from the
           outermost header.

4.10.3. CtxtDialupInterface class

   The CtxtDialupInterface class specifies data to be included in Event
   Messages sent by Event Handlers providing dialin services.

   The attributes of this class are:

        CtxtDialupInterfaceId
           identifies this object

        CtxtDialupInterfaceNASPort
           This attribute indicates the physical port number of
           the NAS which is authenticating the user. Note that this is
           using 'port' in its sense of a physical connection on the
           NAS, not in the sense of a TCP or UDP port number.  Either
           CtxtDialupInterfaceNasPort or CtxtDialupInterfaceNasPortType
           or both SHOULD be specified in a CtxtDialupInterface object,
           if the NAS differentiates among its ports.

        CtxtDialupInterfaceNASPortId
           This attribute contains a text string which identifies the
           port of the NAS which is authenticating the user.  Note that
           this is using 'port' in its sense of a physical connection
           on the NAS, not in the sense of a TCP or UDP port number.
           Either CtxtDialupInterfaceNasPort or
           CtxtDialupInterfaceNasPortId SHOULD be specified in a
           CtxtDialupInterface object, if the NAS differentiates among
           its ports.  CtxtDialupInterfaceNasPortId is intended for use
           by NASes which cannot conveniently number their ports.

        CtxtDialupInterfaceNASPortType (Enum)
           This attribute indicates the type of the physical port
           of the NAS which is authenticating the user.  It can be
           used instead of or in addition to the
           CtxtDialupInterfaceNasPort attribute.

        CtxtDialupInterfaceCalledStationId
           This attribute allows the NAS to send the phone number that
           the user called, using Dialed Number Identification (DNIS)


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           or similar technology.  Note that this may be different from
           the phone number the call comes in on.

        CtxtDialupInterfaceCallingStationId
           This attribute allows the NAS to send the phone number that
           the call came from, using Automatic Number Identification
           (ANI) or similar technology.

        CtxtDialupInterfaceConnectInfo
           This attribute is sent from the NAS to indicate the
           nature of the user's connection.

   This is a notify-only class.  These attributes are not write-able by
   the PDP.

   Three additional notify/install classes can be defined.  These
   classes can be included in an Event Message as information to the
   PDP.  The PDP may change the values of these attributes, however, in
   subsequent provisioning messages.

4.10.4 CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocol class

   The CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocol class is an optional class that may
   be sent if a framed protocol is being used. This class MAY be
   specified in the ContextData PRC by the PDP in a decision message if
   the PDP needs this context information (if it was not already setup
   to be sent in the eventHandler). It MUST be sent up to the PDP in a
   request message if it is specified via the ContextData PRC in an
   eventHandler.
   The attributes of this class are:

        CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocolId
           identifies this object

        CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocolProt
           This attribute indicates the framing to be used for
           framed access.

        CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocolMTU
           This attribute indicates the Maximum Transmission Unit to be
           configured for the user, when it is not negotiated by some
           other means (such as PPP).

        CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocolCompression (Enum)
           This attribute indicates a compression protocol to be used
           for the link.

        CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocolPortLimit
           This attribute sets the maximum number of ports to be
           provided to the user by the NAS.  It is intended for use in
           conjunction with Multilink PPP or similar uses.



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        CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocolIpAddress
           This attribute indicates the address to be configured for
           the user.  It MAY be used in constructing policies for the
           user.

        CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocolIpNetmask
           This attribute indicates the IP netmask to be
           configured for the user when the user is a router to a
           network.

4.10.5 CtxtDialupIfLoginService class

   The CtxtDialupIfLoginService class is an optional class that may be
   sent if a Login service is being provided. This class MAY be
   specified in the ContextData PRC by the PDP in a decision message if
   the PDP needs this context information (if it was not already setup
   to be sent in the eventHandler). It MUST be sent up to the PDP in a
   request message if it is specified via the ContextData PRC in an
   eventHandler.


   This class contains a single attribute:

        CtxtDialupIfLoginIpHost
           This attribute indicates the system with which to connect he
           user.

4.10.6 CtxtDialupIfLoginLat class
   This class MAY be specified in the ContextData PRC by the PDP in a
   decision message if the PDP needs this context information (if it
   was not already setup to be sent in the eventHandler). It MUST be
   sent up to the PDP in a request message if it is specified via the
   ContextData PRC in an eventHandler.

   The CtxtDialupIfLoginLat class extends the
   CtxtDialupInterfaceLoginService class.  Its attributes are:

        CtxtDialupIfLoginLatService
           This attribute indicates the system with which the user
           is to be connected by LAT.

        CtxtDialupIfLoginLatNode
           This attribute indicates the Node with which the user is to
           be automatically connected by LAT.

        CtxtDialupIfLoginLatGroup
           This attribute contains a string identifying the LAT group
           codes which this user is authorized to use.

           LAT supports 256 different group codes, which LAT uses as a
           form of access rights.  LAT encodes the group codes as a 256
           bit bitmap.


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           Administrators can assign one or more of the group code bits
           at the LAT service provider; it will only accept LAT
           connections that have these group codes set in the bit map.
           The administrators assign a bitmap of authorized group codes
           to each user; LAT gets these from the operating system, and
           uses these in its requests to the service providers.

        CtxtDialupIfLoginLatPort
           This attribute indicates the Port with which the user is to
           be connected by LAT.

4.11. AuthExt class

   This is an abstract PRC. This PRC can be extended by authentication
   PRCs that contain attributes specific to that authentication
   protocol. An instance of the extended class is created by the PEP
   and sent to the PDP. The PDP may send information back to the PEP or
   may use the information to authenticate the PEP's Event Message.
   This PRC itself should not be instantiated.


   The data in this class is passed between the PDP and the client with
   little or no involvement of the PEP except to forward it in the
   appropriate AuthExt class instance. The PEP is not meant to store
   AuthExt objects. As such, this class, along with all its extending
   classes, is meant to be 'transient'. Its instances are temporary and
   are deleted by the PEP after a certain time or event. The PDP, in
   its decisions, must not refer to instances of this class that are
   sent by the PEP in its requests. Likewise, the PEP must not refer to
   instances sent by the PDP. Also, since instances are deleted, it is
   possible for InstanceIds to be reused.

   The AuthExt class is extended for each authentication mechanism
   supported. As a base class, it is never instantiated.

   The attributes of this class are:

        AuthExtId (InstanceId)
           identifies this object


4.11.1. UserAuthExt class
   This is a concrete PRC used to contain user authentication fields.
   This PRC extends the base PRC authExtEntry.

   The attributes of this class are:
        userAuthExtRealm (OCTET STRING)
           The user realm octet string.

        userAuthExtUsername (OCTET STRING)
           The Username octet string.

4.11.2. AuthChapExt class

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   The AuthChapExt class extends the UserAuthExt class. It contains the
   attributes of the CHAP protocol [CHAP]. (See section 3.3.)

   The attributes that this class adds to the base class are:

        AuthChapExtId (Unsigned32)
           The AuthChapExtId is generated by the PEP. The ID value is
           sent to the client. When the client endpoint (Peer)
           generates a CHAP response it includes the same ID, and the
           ID is then included in this attribute when it is sent to the
           PDP.

        AuthChapExtChal (Octet String)
           The AuthChapExtChal is generated by the PEP. The Challenge
           value is sent to the client, along with the ID. When the
           client generates a CHAP response containing the ID and
           Response (key), the Challenge associated with the ID is
           included in this attribute when it is sent to the PDP.

        AuthChapExtResp (Octet String)
           The Response is calculated by the client and forwarded by
           the PEP to the PDP.

4.11.3. AuthPapExt class

   The AuthPapExt class extends the UserAuthExt class. It contains the
   PAP Password. (See sec. 3.2.)

   The attributes that this class adds to the base class are:

        AuthPapExtPwd (Octet String)
           A one-time password used to authenticate the client

4.11.4. AuthExtResult class

   The AuthExtResult class extends the AuthExt class. It contains the
   Authentication result Boolean flag.

   The attributes that this class adds to the base class are:

        AuthExtSuccessful (TruthValue)
           A Boolean flag set to true if the authentication (via CHAP
           or PAP) was successful.

4.11.5. AuthEapReqExt class

   The AuthEapReqExt class extends the AuthExt class. It contains an
   EAP message. (See sec. 3.1.) Instances of this class are sent by the
   PDP to the PEP.

   The attributes that this class adds to the base class are:


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        AuthEapReqExtSpecific (Octet String)
           An EAP message [EAP] passed from the PDP to the client via
           the PEP in a COPS-PR Decision message.

4.11.6. AuthEapRespExt class

   The AuthEapRespExt class extends the AuthExt class. It contains an
   EAP message. (See sec. 3.1.) Instances of this class are sent by the
   PEP to the PDP.

   The attributes that this class adds to the base class are:

        AuthEapRespExtSpecific (Octet String)
           An EAP message [EAP] passed from the client to the PDP via
           the PEP in a COPS-PR Report message.







































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5. Message Types

   All PIB messages have some form of transactional semantics. Most all
   transactions consist of requests and responses. Typical provisioning
   PIBs have the PDP sending a provisioning decision to the PEP and the
   PEP responding with a success or fail. This PIB uses this paradigm
   in some cases, but it also uses a paradigm where the PEP initiates
   an event and the PDP responds with a success or fail. The specific
   use of this paradigm is with the PEP Access Event Message, which is
   triggered by a PEP event and requires authentication success or
   failure semantics as part of the Provisioning Decision. This section
   discusses both paradigms and how the various classes defined in
   Section 4 are combined to form the various message interactions
   described in sections 2 and 3.

   Each message description in this section will include the purpose of
   the message, the COPS-PR message type, the direction of the message,
   and the class instances typically found in the message.

5.1. Event Handler Provisioning Decisions

   The Event Handler Provisioning Decision message is a COPS-PR
   Decision message used by the PDP to provision each Event Handler in
   the PEP. It is likely to be a piece of a larger Decision message
   that provisions other data path components that occur either before
   or after the Event Handler in the data path. However, it could also
   be sent as a part of unrelated data path or other provisioning
   components. Event Handler provisioning typically includes the
   EventHandler class, the EventHdlrElement class, the
   EventHdlrEventScope class, often the EventHdlrHandleScope class and
   the ContextData class. An optional set of EventHdlrAuthProtocol
   class instances may be sent if a DataPathEventHandler is set up for
   Access Event Messages.

   Because the EventHdlrElement, ContextData, EventHdlrEventScope, and
   the EventHdlrHandleScope classes all describe configuration details
   of the EventHandler, any of these class instances may be shared by
   multiple EventHandler instances. Therefore, in many cases, an
   EventHandler Provisioning Decision will contain only an EventHandler
   that references instances of the other classes defined in previous
   Provisioning Decisions. In addition, these classes can also be
   provisioned individually in anticipation of being applied to an
   EventHandler. However, because there is a relationship between the
   EventHandler and EventHdlrElement classes, there is an order
   dependency between the classes. For instance, an EventHdlrEventScope
   must be provisioned at the same time or before an EventHdlrElement
   making use of the EventHdlrEventScope. EventHdlrElement,ContextData
   and data path class instances referenced by an EventHandler must be
   provisioned at the same time or before the EventHandler is
   provisioned.




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   When the PEP receives an EventHandler Provisioning Decision, it must
   always respond with a Provisioning Report indicating success or
   failure.

   Note that additional EventHdlrElements can simply be added to an
   existing EventHandler by using the TagId (group identifier) for the
   EventHandler to which the element is to be added. Additional
   EventHdlrEventScope or EventHdlrHandleScope instances can be added
   similarly by adding PRIs with the TagId value of the group these
   instances are to be added to. This allows incremental updates to be
   made to the Event Handlers.

5.2. Provisioning Decision

   A report must follow all provisioning decisions described in section
   5.1. This report may not have any class instances in it. However, it
   explicitly notifies the PDP that the provisioning was successful or
   whether it failed. If many structures were simultaneously
   provisioned in the Provisioning Decision and a failure occurred,
   none of the class instances will be accepted by the PEP. Hence it is
   possible that subsequent Provisioning Decisions occur with a smaller
   subset of the class instances or an alternative set of class
   instances that can satisfy the service policies defined in the PDP.

5.3. PEP Event Message

   A PEP Event Message is generated by the PEP to indicate that a new
   class of traffic has been identified by the Event Handler. This
   Event Message possibly uses a new COPS Request Handle. The decision
   to use a new COPS Request Handle or reuse an existing Handle is
   based on the EventHdlrHandleScope information configured in the
   Event Handler. The Handle Scope information is a set of criteria
   that is protocol specific, and specifies the set of fields in the
   protocol that the Event Handler is sensitive towards. The PEP Event
   Message is essentially a COPS-PR Request message. The PEP Event
   Message will always include an instance of the Event class. This
   Event instance references which EventHandlerElement instance and
   EventHandler instance caught the event. This tells the PDP what
   events belong to which Event Handler. Other Classes that may be a
   part of a PEP Event Message include one or more instances of
   protocol specific Header Context Data and Interface data classes and
   optionally an instance of one of the Authentication Extension
   classes (for example, if the Event is an access event).

   When authentication protocols such as PAP or CHAP are in use, the
   PIB assumes that the UserId, Challenge, and Password will all be
   determined by the PEP prior to generating the PEP Access Event
   Message. EAP is an exception to this rule because EAP assumes a
   direct negotiation between the Endpoint and the Authentication
   server. For EAP, it is assumed that the Endpoint generates a
   response to the EAP Identity Request message before the PEP sends
   the Access Event Message. This allows the PEP to fill in the
   Username and Realm in the UserAuthExt table. However, for this

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   scenario, it is also assumed that the PEP Access Event Message will
   include the EAP Identity Response in the authEapRespExtSpecific
   attribute of the AuthEapRespExtEntry class. Subsequent EAP
   negotiation will be performed with the Opaque Decision and Opaque
   Report message types. When the negotiation is complete the PDP send
   a Provisioning Decision message (that includes an instance of the
   AuthExtResult class specifying success or failure). Note that all
   interactions resulting from a given Event Message (including
   authentication negotiation) is performed within the context of a
   single COPS Request Handle. The COPS Request Handle provides an
   independent dialog between the PDP and the PEP to fully process an
   Access Event Message in a synchronous way.

5.4. PDP Provisioning Decision

   When the PDP has all the necessary information to determine what
   policies to provision for the event that was generated by the PEP,
   and it has completed any intermediate data path provisioning that
   the event may be dependent on, the PDP will generate a PDP
   Provisioning Decision message. The PDP Provisioning Decision message
   only contains the instances of the classes the PDP wants to
   configure as a result of the event. In addition to this message the
   PDP may also send unsolicited Provisioning responses on other COPS
   handles to add policies that may be shared across events.

   The PEP is the only entity that knows when traffic is no longer
   flowing through a particular session (either because of a timer
   expiring or because of a physical link termination). Therefore
   lifetime of a COPS Request handle is always controlled by the PEP.
   The PDP may advise the PEP that the Handle is no longer valid via a
   provisioning update. However, the ultimate dispensation of the
   Request Handle and the associated tables are always determined by
   the PEP. The PDP can also indicate that a traffic flow may no longer
   have access to resources by changing the data path to drop packets
   arriving for that traffic flow. Since the PDP can modify the data
   path such that all packets for the flow will be dropped, both
   alternatives achieve the same semantics. The PEP can delete the COPS
   Request Handle simply by notifying the PDP via a Delete Request
   Message that the provisioned policies for that Handle are no longer
   valid. Since a COPS-PR Provisioning Decision is used, the PEP must
   send a report back to the PDP to confirm that there are no problems
   with the data path change requested by the PDP.

   When a COPS Request Handle is removed all contained class instances
   must be removed as well. Typically these will include header and
   authentication table instances.

5.5. PDP fetching Event-specific ContextData

   The ContextData class can be specified either during the
   configuration of the EventHandler to indicate what context data
   should be sent with each PEP Event Message or it can be used by the
   PDP to get additional context data for an event after it receives a

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   Event Message. In the latter case, the PDP may send a solicited
   response that specifies ContextData for the last Event Message
   received on the same Request Handle. The ContextData message
   contains PRC names to retrieve the specific information needed to
   either authorize a pending event, monitor a set of policies bound to
   the handle or get more context information regarding the event.
   Since each ContextData class only retrieves a specific subset of the
   information regarding the event within the context of a Request
   Handle, a single request message can contain multiple instances of
   the ContextData class, thereby supporting the retrieval of as much
   event-specific information as needed in a single message.

   The COPS-PR message type used to fetch Event-specific ContextData is
   a Provisioning Decision message. The ContextData class instances are
   sent in an updated Event-specific ContextData Request on the same
   COPS Request Handle. Since the TagId in the ContextData class is
   only used when the ContextData class is configured with an
   EventHandler, the TagId attribute should not be set when the class
   is used in an Event-specific ContextData Fetch. When the PEP
   receives a message from the PDP asking for Event-specific
   ContextData, it will send an Event-specific ContextData message in a
   COPS Request message back to the PDP.

   The updated Event-specific ContextData Request from the PEP will
   contain a set of Header and Interface context data class instances.
   Since the updated request uses the same Request Handle the PDP knows
   which event is being updated by more context data. Using PDP Fetched
   ContextData messages precludes the PDP from provisioning the PEP to
   allow multiple simultaneous Event Messages outstanding on the same
   Handle.

5.6. Event-specific ContextData Response

   The Event-specific ContextData Response message is used to report
   specific interface and/or packet header information back to the PDP.
   This message is implemented as a COPS-PR Report message. A Report
   message may include any number of Interface or Header table
   instances. However, because Reference Identifiers to the Event table
   are not specified in the header or interface data tables, a Report
   message may contain header and interface data for one and only one
   Event or the most recent Event Message received on that specific
   COPS Request Handle.

5.7. Opaque Decision

   An Opaque Decision message is used to send specialized
   authentication messages from the PDP to the PEP. Specifically, this
   type of COPS-PR Decision message is used to pass EAP request
   messages. The class used in this message is used to send
   authEapReqExt table instances.

5.8. Opaque Report


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   An Opaque Report message is used to send specialized authentication
   messages from the PEP to the PDP. Specifically, this type of COPS-PR
   Report message is used to pass EAP response messages. The class used
   in this message is used to send authEapRespExt table instances.


















































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6. Combining Data Structures in Messages

   In the most degenerate case, the PDP provisions the EventHandler to
   only send the Event object when an event occurs. The PDP then
   requests Event-specific Context Data that the PEP will respond to
   with Report Message. In addition, if EAP authentication is required,
   a sequence of Opaque Decisions and Opaque Reports are also required.
   Finally, if new data paths need to be provisioned (including
   specialized EventHandlers), normal Provisioning Decision and Report
   messages must also be exchanged. Note that these provisioning
   decisions may be on separate COPS Request Handles.

   In some environments, for example authorization, it is essential to
   complete the transaction as quickly as possible. The way to
   accelerate this process is to combine as many messages into a single
   message as possible. This section describes which messages can be
   collapsed, and what the rules are for collapsing the messages.

6.1. Combining Context Data in Event Messages

   Previous sections have discussed at length how Event Handlers can be
   pre-provisioned to generate specific Event Messages with ContextData
   (Interface and Header data) in the PEP Event Message. When the
   choice of what context data is entirely dependent on information
   found in the PEP when a packet causing the Event Message, pre-
   provisioned Event Handlers is the preferred approach.




























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7. Access Bind Usage Examples

   Following examples on how the Access Bind PIB PRCs are used provide
   some additional clarifications on the PRC definitions.  But they by
   no means indicate all the PRCs needed for the application given by
   the example.  And providing these examples here does not indicate
   where the application specific PRCs should be defined.  These
   examples are provided only to assist better and easier understanding
   of the Access Bind PIB.


7.1 Wireless LAN (802.11 Access Point) Usage Example

   A wireless LAN Access Point (AP) is pictured in Figure 7.1 below.
   This is based roughly on 802.11/802.1x concepts.  The following is
   meant to give an indication of how the Access Bind PIB could be
   included in such an AP.  Note that this is an exercise to see if the
   concepts fit together, not a proposal for exactly how they would
   fit.

   The AP shown below includes a æService ManagerÆ (SM), which
   interfaces with the wireless data interface.  For incoming wireless
   data it separates management frames and level 2 frames.  In the
   following we will deal particularly with Associate and ReAssociate
   Management Frames.

   The SM  (as interpreted here) takes Associate and Reassociate
   management frames and creates a temporary Port Access Entity PAE for
   the association.  The PAE must then be authenticated and provisioned
   by an external Authentication Server (AS).  Communication with the
   AS is assumed in this model to be mediated by a Policy Enforcement
   Point (PEP, which is part of the AP).  The AS acts as a Policy
   Decision Point (PDP).





















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   oooooooooo  Ethernet Port
            o
   +--------o-------------------------------------+
   |        o        Service Manager              |
   |        o                            +-----+  |    (1)     +------+
   | +------o------+                     | PEP |  |Capabilities|      |
   | |QoS policies |                     |     +--+----------->| Auth |
   | |     for     |                     |     |  |            |Server|
   | | previously  |                     |     |  |    (2)     |(PDP) |
   | |authenticated|                     |     |  |Service Mgr |      |
   | |    PAEs     |                     |     |  |Provisioning|      |
   | |      o      |<-+---------+--------+-----+--+------------+      |
   | +------o------+  |         |        |     |  |            |      |
   |        o    ^    |         V        |     |  |            |      |
   |        o    |    | +-------------+  |     |  |    (3)     |      |
   |        o    |    | |Authenticator|  |     |  | Event Msg  |      |
   |        o    |    | |   (Event    +--+-----+--+----------->|      |
   |        o    |    | |   Handler)  |  |     |  |            |      |
   |        o    |    | |             |  |     |  |    (4)     |      |
   |        o    |    | |             |  |     |  |EAP exchange|      |
   |        o    |    | |             |<-+-----+--+------------+      |
   |        o    |    | |             |--+-----+--+----------->|      |
   |        o    |    | +-----o-------+  |     |  |            |      |
   |        o    |    |       o          |     |  |    (5)     |      |
   |        o    |    |       o          |     |  | Decision   |      |
   |        o    +-----------------------+-----+--+------------+      |
   |        o    |    |       o          |     |  |            |      |
   |        o    V    V       o          |     |  |    (6)     |      |
   |    +---o-----------------o---+      |     |  |Success Rpt |      |
   |    |   o   Classifier    o   |      |     +--+----------->|      |
   |    |   o                 o   |      +-----+  |            +------+
   |    |Controlled   Uncontrolled|               |
   |    |   Port           Port   |               |
   |    |   ooooo         ooooo   |               |
   |    |       ooooo ooooo       |               |
   |    +------------o------------+               |
   |                 o                            |
   +-----------------o----------------------------+
                     o
           ooooooooooooooooooooo
           o                   o
   +-------o--------+  +-------o--------+
   |Wireless Station|  |Wireless Station|
   +----------------+  +----------------+

   Figure 7.1: Wireless LAN AP Architecture


7.1.1 Wireless LAN Access Event Handler Provisioning

   In an Access Bind PIB implementation, figure 7.1 shows the SM
   sending a REQ at boot time to tell the AS that it is up and what
   capabilities it has.  The PDP returns a configuration to support the

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   SM.  In particular, this configuration includes provisioning
   information for how to instantiate a PAE and what trigger
   information should be sent by the instantiated PAE to the PDP.
   The provisioning of the Event Handler is supported by the Access
   Bind PIB by using the following PRCs in the decision (DEC) message:
   - eventHandler
   - eventhdlrElement
   - eventhdlrEventScope

   With eventhdlrEventScopeFilter indicating how the signaling protocol
   is recognized.


7.1.2 Wireless LAN Access Event Handling

   When an event (here a Associate or ReAssociate) is detected the
   SM/event handler instantiates and initializes a PAE.  The initial
   PAE instance includes an access port which splits internally into a
   controlled and uncontrolled port.

   The controlled port is what is used to pass data from the access
   port to the external Ethernet.  It is controlled in that there is a
   switch that must be turned on by the authenticator before data can
   flow.  It may also have QoS parameters that can be controlled by the
   AS.  In its initial state the controlled port drops all incoming
   frames.

   The uncontrolled port connects to an internal authenticator.  The
   authenticator creates the initial trigger.  In some cases it may
   need to send an EAP frame back to the Station prior to sending the
   initial trigger, and other times it may have enough information from
   the initial Associate or ReAssociate to create the trigger
   immediately.

   The Event handling is supported by the Access Bind PIB.

   The PEP creates an instance of event PRC, with eventEventhdlr
   referencing the eventHandler, and eventCause referencing
   eventhdlrElement provisioned in Access Event Handler Provisioning
   above.

   This event PRI will be sent by the PEP to the PDP in a REQ using a
   new COPS Request Handle.  This REQ message may contain additional
   PRIs as dictated by how a specific signaling protocol should be
   handled.


7.1.3 Wireless LAN Access Event Decision

   The AS/PDP decides whether the trigger contains enough information
   to make an authentication decision.  If not, it may initiate an EAP
   dialog through the authenticator to the STATION.


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   Once it has enough information the PDP makes a decision and sends a
   Provisioning message to the AP that sets QoS parameters and æclosesÆ
   the switch on the controlled port. Since the controlled and
   uncontrolled port is easily modeled with a DiffServ Classifier, the
   closing of the switch is simply a matter of a installing a Decision
   in the classifier indicating that subsequent traffic matching the
   specific PAEÆs criteria should be bound to the set of pre-existing
   policies that are appropriate for that authenticated PAE.

   The decision (DEC) message sent by the PDP to the PEP will be using
   the same COPS Request Handle created as a result of the first in
   Access Event.  The content (PRCs) carried by the DEC message will
   depend on the functionality need to be provided.  It may be command
   to æcloseÆ the switch on the controlled port, it may contain QoS
   parameters.


7.2 RSVP Usage Example
   RSVP is a signaling protocol used for a variety of purposes
   including some call setup applications and MPLS label distribution
   for traffic engineering. RSVP uses a number of message types to
   negotiate both the hop-by-hop path and the service requirements
   between a sender and one or more receivers.

   Some RSVP messages contain information that helps determine whether
   the reservation should be accepted or not. However, the router may
   not equipped with sufficient context to take advantage of the
   information in determining whether to accept or reject an RSVP
   message. COPS was designed to pass specific RSVP messages to a PDP
   (Policy Server). The PDP could then analyze the RSVP message and
   usually determine whether to accept or reject the reservation.

   With the advent of COPS-PR, it became possible to construct more
   sophisticated policies beyond simple accept or reject messages.
   However, these more sophisticated policies were targeted for
   DiffServ rather than RSVP. With the definition of the AccessBind
   PIB, it becomes possible to provision a router not only to specify
   which RSVP messages should be sent to the PDP, but also to use
   existing PIBs to specify how the QoS requirements in a RSVP
   reservation should be supported in a specific router implementation.

   Two types RSVP specific structures are added to AccessBind to
   support RSVP. In order to provision the EventHandler class to detect
   RSVP messages, a number of filter classes must be defined. These
   filter classes are general purpose and could be used both by
   EventHandlers and by Classifiers although the semantics of the
   filter class are somewhat different for each. The other group of
   classes is the Context Data classes that pass some or all parts of
   the RSVP message to the PDP when the EventHandler generates an
   event.

   Because COPS assumes that all RSVP message objects are sent to the
   PDP, each well known RSVP object will be assigned a unique Context

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   Data PRC identifier and the rest of the RSVP objectÆs attributes
   will be part of the PIB class in the same order and format as in the
   original RSVP object. The actual PRC mappings for these objects can
   be found in the PIB definition. For details on the operation of
   these objects refer to [RSVP] and [INTSERV]. In addition, a PIB
   class is also defined to support unrecognized RSVP objects.

   A Context Data PIB class is also specified to describe the relevant
   RSVP common header attributes. The attributes in the common header
   that will be specified are:
      1. The RSVP MsgType attribute, which distinguishes a PATH message
         from a RESV or PATHerr message.
      2. The RSVP Flags attribute is used to indicate whether Refresh
         Reduction is possible or not.
      3. The Send TTL (Time To Live) attribute, provides a easy
         mechanism for determining whether non-RSVP hops have been
         traversed by comparing this field with the IP TTL field.
      4. The In Interface (if known)
      5. The Out Interface (if known)

   A special context data class, called AllRSVPMsgObjects, is defined
   to simplify the process of specifying the set of RSVP objects to be
   included with a COPS-PR Event message. Rather than explicitly
   specifying every context data class that should be included with the
   Event message, this class (when referenced by PRC through the
   ContextDataIfElement attribute of the ContextData class) indicates
   that all RSVP objects, including the common header class described
   above, should be encapsulated and propagated to the PDP. All Refresh
   Reduction related RSVP objects (MESSAGE_ID, MESSAGE_ID_ACK, and
   MESSAGE_ID_NACK) are explicitly excluded from being sent to the PDP
   when the AllRSVPMessageObjects attribute is set to True. These
   objects are specifically for purpose of synchronizing state between
   RSVP hops and bears no value in the policy decision process.
   However, a context data PIB object is defined for each of these
   classes in the event that a PDP determines that it needs these
   objects.

   The EventScope classes have been specified to roughly follow the
   same mappings as the Context Data PIB classes. However, since the
   typical criteria for outsourcing a RSVP message are usually rather
   simple, only a subset of the RSVP objects require mappings to COPS-
   PR filter classes. If some implementations require support for
   filtering additional objects, it is trivial to extend the filters.
   Note that the filters bound to EventHandlers determine whether a
   matching packet should generate an Event or not.

   The RSVP objects that will be mapped to filters in this
   specification will include the RSVP common header, the RSVP Dclass
   object, the RSVP session object, and the RSVP style object. The last
   three are used to describe various characteristics of the data
   traffic for which the reservation is being performed. Since the
   filters can describe both AND and OR semantics, the challenge is in
   organizing the fields of the objects to simplify filter expressions

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   as much as possible. Since this is the primary goal the appropriate
   attributes of each object have been combined into a single PIB
   class. The RSVP filter PIB class contains the following attributes.
   The fields marked with asterisks will be represented as masked
   values (for IP addresses) and ranges (for UDP/TCP ports) to add
   flexibility.

        RSVP MsgType
        RSVP Flags
        Send TTL
        DCLASS DSCP
        Session Dest IP*
        Session Protocol
        Session Dest Port*
        Filter Src IP*
        Filter Src Port*
        Style value

   This paper does not address reservation specification (TSPEC and
   FLOWSPEC) modifications that depend on the RSVP refresh model. RSVP
   refresh reduction [REFRESH] is assumed as a simplifying assumption
   for this application of the Access Bind PIB. However, if support for
   traditional RSVP refresh is desirable, it can be supported in this
   model by adding explicit filters for the RSVP FlowSpec and RSVP
   Tspec objects as specified in [IntServ].

   In order to support RSVP outsourcing with the AccessBind PIB the
   Event Handler must be provisioned with the appropriate settings to
   recognize specific RSVP messages, create new request handles, and
   generate events (outsourcing requests). After we have described how
   this is accomplished, we will show the actual message flows involved
   in the RSVP outsourcing process.

   The specific PIB classes that need to be provisioned are the
   EventHandler, EventhdlrElemenet, ContextData, EventhdlrHandleScope,
   and EventhdlrEventScope. The EventHandler provides a termination
   point for processing RSVP messages. As RSVP messages arrive, they
   are directed to the EventHandler by a classifier. In this scenario
   the EventHandler as behaving as a termination point for all RSVP
   messages. Hence, the EventHandler class is provisioned with no data
   path elements following the EventHandler. Therefore, the attribute
   eventhdlrNonMatchNext is left unassigned.

   Alternatively, the EventHandler can also be provisioned such that
   RSVP and non-RSVP packets alike pass through the EventHandler, but
   only RSVP messages invoke events. In this case, the attribute
   eventhdlrNonMatchNext would specify the next data path element that
   should process any packets not matching the EventHandlerÆs criteria
   (non RSVP packets).

   The EventhdlrElement class identifies a specific category of events.
   Suppose one wanted to generate different Events for PATH messages
   and RESV messages. This could be done by configuring one

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   EventhdlrElement to only match PATH messages and another
   EventhdlrElement to only match RESV messages. Event messages contain
   a reference to the EventhdlrElement that generated the event.
   Therefore, it is possible to generate different events from the same
   EventHandler.

   The EventhdlrElement contains two main semantics. First, it
   specifies the criteria for creating new Request Handles. Each
   Request Handle constitutes a unique dialog between the PEP and PDP.
   The second semantic is the criteria for generating events. In some
   situations, it is desirable to generate a one-time event and not
   generate events when similar messages are seen later. A good example
   of this is RSVP Refresh messages. When RSVP Refresh messages are
   used to indicate that the reservation is still active, generating
   events for each message is inappropriate. In contrast, when Refresh
   Reduction [Refresh] is active, only reservation changes are
   propagated as full RSVP messages. In this situation, every message
   may constitute an Event.

   With RSVP it is usually appropriate to assign a unique COPS-PR
   Request Handle for every new RSVP session. Since EventHandlers are
   typically bound to an interface data path, the RSVP Path message and
   the Resv message will be processed on different data paths.
   Therefore, unique events and unique COPS-PR Request Handles will
   typically be assigned for each message type. However, this is not
   significant since the provisioning objectives for Path messages are
   different from the provisioning objectives for Resv messages. For
   RSVP, the EventhdlrElement will use the Tag Reference
   EventhdlrElementHandleScope to describe the criteria for creating a
   unique handle. Each EventhdlrHandleScope object will contain
   pointers to the RSVP filter objects mentioned earlier to describe
   the various fields whose combination of values constitute a unique
   handle.

   Typically, the Filter class used is the RSVP filter class. For this
   class, the session attributes (SessionDestIP, SessionDestPort, and
   SessionProtocol) will be assigned wildcard values and all other
   attributes assigned to NULL to indicate that any combination of
   these attributes constitutes a unique handle. When various messages
   arrive that require the generation of an event and that have a newly
   unique combination of the filter attribute values, a new request
   handle will be assigned. When a message arrives for which a previous
   message has already generated a handle, that handle is used to pass
   the appropriate event to the PDP.

   The other class pointed to by the EventhdlrElement is the
   EventhdlrEventScope. This class describes the criteria for
   generating an event. Typically, the MsgType attribute in conjunction
   with the session attributes will be wildcarded and the other fields
   assigned to NULL to indicate that all RSVP messages should be sent
   to the PDP. This describes the criteria for an event: Every time a
   unique combination of all these attributes occurs, generate a new
   event.

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   In many cases it may make sense to assign the filter attributes
   (SessionDestIP and SessionDestPort) to the EventhdlrEventScope
   and/or EventhdlrHandleScope class. This would be done when it is
   desirable to notify of the PDP of the need to allocate additional
   resources to a set of reserved flows going to the same destination
   but originating from different sources.

   A new COPS-PR Request Handle MUST only be created when a valid event
   occurs. If a packet matches the criteria described by
   EventhdlrHandleScope but does not match any EventhdlrEventScope
   criteria, a COPS-PR Request Handle must not be generated.

   This version of the paper only describes how RSVP can be supported
   when Refresh Reduction [REFRESH] is being used. The complexity of
   addressing the distinction between RSVP refresh messages and
   reservation update messages is too great to be addressed in this
   version. Any RSVP message containing bundle messages (MsgType 12)
   MUST be decomposed and each message in the bundle must be
   iteratively processed through the EventHandler as if individual RSVP
   messages were generated from the RSVP neighbor. Whether
   EventhdlrMatchNext applies to the individual sub-messages or the
   bundled message is beyond the scope of this paper.

   Irrespective of whether Refresh Reduction is in use or not, the RSVP
   daemon is responsible for aging out reservations that are no longer
   valid. As with traditional COPS, when a reservation is aged out, the
   RSVP daemon or other entity responsible for aging out reservations
   MUST take responsibility for deleting COPS Request Handles. This
   allows the PDP to clean up state associated with the reservation and
   ensures the proper removal of any policies in the PEP specifically
   assigned through the COPS Request Handle.

   Figure 7.2 shows how the various Event Handler objects would be
   provisioned in a router to ensure that an event is generated for
   every RSVP message.


















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   +-------------------+
   |EventHandler       |
   | Id=EH1            |
   | NonMatchNext=<NUL>|
   | ElementRef=(Elem1)|
   +-------------+-----+
                 |
                 V
   +------------------+    +-----------------+
   |EH_Element        |    |ContextData      |
   | Id=Elem1         |    | Id=CD1          |
   | MatchNext=<NUL>  |    | DataGroup=RSVP  |
   | Criteria=AllMatch|    | IfElement=(PRC)-+--AllRSVPMsgObjects
   | Context=(RSVP)---+--->| DataEncap=0     |
   | EventScope=(MSG)-+--+ +-----------------+
   | HandleScope=(HD) |  |
   +-------------+----+  +-------------------+
                 |       |                   |
                 |       |  +-------------+  |   +-------------+
                 |       +->|EventScope   |  +-->|EventScope   |
                 |          | Id=Ev1      |      | Id=Ev2      |
                 |          | Group=MSG   |      | Group=MSG   |
                 |          | Filter=(F1)-+--+   | Filter=(R1)-+--+
                 |          | Precedence=1|  |   | Precedence=1|  |
                 |          | ChangeFlag=?|  |   | ChangeFlag=?|  |
                 |          +-------------+  |   +-------------+  |
                 |                           |                    |
                 |  +-------------+          V                    V
                 |  |HandleScope  |     +-------------+  +------------+
                 +->| Id=Hd1      |  +->|IpFilter     |  |RsvpFilter  |
                 |  | Group=HD    |  |  | Id=F1       |  | Id=R1      |
                 |  | Filter=(F1)-+--+  | Protocol=46 |  | DestIP=*   |
                 |  | Precedence=1|     +-------------+  | Protocol=* |
                 |  +-------------+                      | DestPort=* |
                 |                      +------------+   | SrcIP=*    |
                 |  +-------------+  +->|RsvpFilter  |   | SrcPort=*
                 |  |HandleScope  |  |  | Id=R2      |   +------------+
                 +->| Id=Hd2      |  |  | DestIP=*   |
                    | Group=HD    |  |  | Protocol=* |
                    | Filter=(R2)-+--+  | DestPort=* |
                    | Precedence=1|     +------------+
                    +-------------+
   Fig 7.2: Representation of an Event Handler for RSVP

   Figure 7.2 represents the set of PIB classes that would be
   provisioned in order to indicate to the PEP that RSVP messages
   should generate unique events for any combination of filters or
   sessions. However, all messages using the same unique session will
   share the same COPS Request Handle.

   When an RSVP message arrives at the PEP with an new combination of
   session attribute values, the PEP will create a new COPS Request
   Handle. Following this, an Event message will be generated

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   containing an Event object with references to EventHandler EH1 and
   EventhdlrElement Elem1. These two pieces of information allow the
   PDP to determine which provisioned EventHandler and which specific
   event type generated the event. In addition the Event message also
   contains a set of Context Data objects. Since the AllRSVPMsgObjects
   class was specified in the ContextData class, all RSVP objects are
   encapsulated in COPS-PR PIB classes and sent to the PDP in the Event
   message.

   When the PDP receives the Event message, it determines what policies
   to provision in the PEP. Suppose the RSVP message was a reservation
   request for a controlled load service with a bandwidth allocation of
   1 Mbps and session object contained (SessionDestIP = 1.2.3.4,
   SessionProtocol=UDP, SessionDestPort=7788). If the routerÆs
   implementation only supported 4 queues with respective bandwidth
   allocations of 20Mb, 40Mb, 30Mb, and 10Mb, the PDP may decide that
   allocating the reservation to queue 3 can satisfy the reservation
   request. Hence, a PDP might generate a provisioning policy as a
   result of the PEPÆs Event message that creates a new Classifier
   Element and Filter that matches all 1.2.3.4:7788 traffic and directs
   it to queue 3.

































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8. The AccessBind PIB Module

         ACCESSBIND-PIB PIB-DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN

         IMPORTS
             Unsigned32, Integer32, MODULE-IDENTITY,
             MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-TYPE, OBJECT-GROUP, pib
                     FROM COPS-PR-SPPI
             InstanceId, Prid
                     FROM COPS-PR-SPPI-TC
             RoleCombination, PrcIdentifier
                     FROM FRAMEWORK-TC-PIB
             InetAddress, InetAddressType
                     FROM INET-ADDRESS-MIB
             TruthValue, PhysAddress
                     FROM SNMPv2-TC;

         accessBindPib  MODULE-IDENTITY
             SUBJECT-CATEGORIES { all }
             LAST-UPDATED "200202202002Z"
             ORGANIZATION "IETF RAP WG"
             CONTACT-INFO "
                           Walter Weiss
                           Ellacoya Networks
                           7 Henry Clay Drive
                           Merrimack, NH 03054
                           Phone: 603-879-7364
                           E-mail: wweiss@ellacoya.com
                         "
             DESCRIPTION
                   "A PIB module containing the set of classes to
                   configure generic event handlers, and outsource
                   events as they occur. One application of this PIB is
                   to bind authorization and authentication to COPS
                   Provisioning."

             ::= { pib xxx }    -- xxx to be assigned by IANA


         --
         -- The branch OIDs in the AccessBind PIB
         --

         capabilityClasses OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { accessBindPib 1 }
         eventClasses OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { accessBindPib 2 }
         eventHdlrClasses OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { accessBindPib 3 }
         contextClasses OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { accessBindPib 4 }
         authClasses OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { accessBindPib 5 }
         filterClasses OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { accessBindPib 6 }



         --

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         -- Event Table
         --
         -- Instances of this table represent events that occurred at
         -- the PEP. The events reference the event handler instance
         -- and the specific event handler element that the event was
         -- caught by.

         eventTable OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         SEQUENCE OF EventEntry
             PIB-ACCESS     notify
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
              "An instance of this class is created by the PEP and sent
              to the PDP. As a result of this event, The PDP may send
              additional unsolicited decisions to the PEP after
              sending the mandatory solicited decision for the event."

             ::= { eventClasses 1 }

         eventEntry OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         EventEntry
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "An instance of the eventTable PRC."

             PIB-INDEX { eventId }
             UNIQUENESS { }

             ::= { eventTable 1 }

         EventEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
                 eventId                  InstanceId,
                 eventEventHdlr           ReferenceId,
                 eventCause               ReferenceId
         }

         eventId  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         InstanceId
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "An index to uniquely identify this event."

             ::= { eventEntry 1 }

         eventEventHdlr  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         ReferenceId
             PIB-REFERENCES {  frwkReferenceEntry }
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
              "This attribute allows a PEP to indicate to the PDP that
              this event was generated due to the referenced Event
              Handler. This attribute references an event handler via
              the indirection PRC frwkReference, since the event

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              handler and event could potentially belong to a different
              PIB contexts."


             ::= { eventEntry 2 }


         eventCause OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         ReferenceId
             PIB-REFERENCES { frwkReferenceEntry }
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
              "This attribute references the specific instance in a
              group of event Handler elements belonging to an event
              Handler that resulted in this event. This attribute
              references a specific event handler element via the
              indirection PRC frwkReference, since the event handler
              element and event could potentially belong to a different
              PIB contexts."


             ::= { eventEntry 3 }


         --
         -- EventHandler Table
         --
         -- Instances of this PRC are provisioned by the PDP on the PEP
         -- to catch specific events. The Event Handlers reference a
         -- group of eventHdlrElement PRIs that contain the scope of
         -- the event and specify the context data to send to the PDP
         -- when an event is caught.

         eventHandlerTable OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX          SEQUENCE OF EventHandlerEntry
           PIB-ACCESS      install
           STATUS          current
           DESCRIPTION
               "The eventHandlerTable specifies for what events the PEP
               should send a request to the PDP. As a  result of this
               request, the PEP may send configuration changes to the
               PEP. An instance of this class defines the circumstances
               for generating a request, and provides the means for
               specifying the contents of the PEP Request. Hence, the
               eventHandlerTable can be said to create eventTable
               entries. "

           ::= {  eventHdlrClasses 1 }

         eventHandlerEntry OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX  EventHandlerEntry
           STATUS  current
           DESCRIPTION

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                "eventTable entry."
           PIB-INDEX { eventHandlerId }
           UNIQUENESS {    eventHandlerElements,
                           eventHandlerNonMatchNext
                      }

           ::= { eventHandlerTable 1}

         EventHandlerEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
           eventHandlerId                   InstanceId,
           eventHandlerElements             TagReferenceId,
           eventHandlerNonMatchNext         Prid
         }

         eventHandlerId OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX    InstanceId
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
                "An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies
                an instance of the eventHandlerTable class."

            ::= { eventHandlerEntry 1}

          eventHandlerElements OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        TagReferenceId
           PIB-TAG       { eventHdlrElementGrpId }
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
             "A reference to a group of eventHdlrElement instances,
             each of which  determines the scope (criteria for
             generating a new  request) and what context information to
             send in a request."

              ::= { eventHandlerEntry 2}

          eventHandlerNonMatchNext  OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX       Prid
           STATUS       current
           DESCRIPTION
                "The data path for 'out of scope' traffic."

              ::= { eventHandlerEntry 3}


         --
         -- EventHdlrElement Table
         --
         -- Each Instance of this PRC belongs to a group of
         -- eventHdlrElement PRIs. The group is identified by the
         -- eventHdlrElementGrpId attribute. These are provisioned by
         -- the PDP on the PEP to catch specific events. This PRC
         -- contain the scope of the event and specify the context data
         -- type to send to the PDP when an event is caught.

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         eventHdlrElementTable OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX          SEQUENCE OF EventHdlrElementEntry
           PIB-ACCESS      install
           STATUS          current
           DESCRIPTION
              "The eventHdlrElementTable specifies a single eventHdlr
              element's scope via a reference to a group of filters and
              the context data type and encapsulation meta-information
              that the PEP needs to send an event notification to the
              PDP."

           ::= { eventHdlrClasses 2 }

         eventHdlrElementEntry OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX  EventHdlrElementEntry
           STATUS  current
           DESCRIPTION
                "eventTable entry."
           PIB-INDEX { eventHdlrElementId }
           UNIQUENESS {    eventHdlrElementEventCriteria,
                           eventHdlrElementGrpId,
                           eventHdlrElementEventScope,
                           eventHdlrElementHandleScope,
                           eventHdlrElementContext,
                           eventHdlrElementMatchNext
                      }

           ::= { eventHdlrElementTable 1}

         EventHdlrElementEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
           eventHdlrElementId                      InstanceId,
           eventHdlrElementEventCriteria           Unsigned32,
           eventHdlrElementGrpId                   TagId,
           eventHdlrElementEventScope              TagReferenceId,
           eventHdlrElementHandleScope             TagReferenceId,
           eventHdlrElementContext                 TagReferenceId,
           eventHdlrElementMatchNext               Prid
         }

         eventHdlrElementId OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX    InstanceId
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
                "An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies
                an instance of the eventHdlrElementTable class."

            ::= { eventHdlrElementEntry 1}

         eventHdlrElementEventCriteria  OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        Unsigned32 {
                                       one_time(1),
                                       every_time(2),

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                                       on_change(3)
                                    }
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
              "Indicates when an event is generated. Valid options are
              one_time, every_time and on_change. This attribute allows
              event Handlers to distinguish one time events (ignore
              after the first match) from recurring events (generate an
              event every time a match occurs).  A enum type was also
              define to specify that a new event should be generated
              when a specific set of fields change. This is important
              for protocols like RSVP because messages are sent both to
              demonstrate that the reservation is active and to notify
              hops of changes to reservations. Since only changes need
              to propagate to the PDP, the on_change option indicates
              that that events should be generated selectively.

              This criteria controls behavior of both, the EventScope
              and the HandleScope."

              ::= { eventHdlrElementEntry 2}

         eventHdlrElementGrpId OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        TagId        -- corresponding Tag Reference in
                                      -- eventHandlerEntry
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
                "Group identifier. All instances with the same group
                identifier belong to one group and can be referenced
                collectively from an eventHandler instance."

              ::= { eventHdlrElementEntry 3}

         eventHdlrElementEventScope OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        TagReferenceId
           PIB-TAG       { eventHdlrEventScopeGroup }
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
                "Identifies a group of eventHdlrEventScope entries
                associated with this eventHdlrElement instance."

              ::= { eventHdlrElementEntry 4}

         eventHdlrElementHandleScope OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        TagReferenceId
           PIB-TAG       { eventHdlrHandleScopeGroup }
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
                "Identifies a group of eventHdlrHandleScope entries
                associated with this eventHdlrElement instance. This is
                an optional attribute. If it is not present the
                semantics of the Handle processing is interpreted as
                identical to the Event Scope handling specified in the

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                EventScope objects"

              ::= { eventHdlrElementEntry 5}

         eventHdlrElementContext OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX       TagReferenceId
           PIB-TAG       { contextDataGroup }
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
                "Identifies a list of ContextDataTable entries
                associated with this eventHdlrElement instance."

              ::= { eventHdlrElementEntry 6}

         eventHdlrElementMatchNext OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        Prid
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
                "The data path for traffic in scope."

             ::= { eventHdlrElementEntry 7}


      --
      -- EventHdlrEventScope Table
      --
      -- This PRC defines the scope of an event handler element using
      -- references to filters defined in the Framework PIB or in some
      -- other PIBs. These filters may describe specific protocol
      -- properties for which events need to be generated. These filter
      -- references are grouped using a TagId, and this group is then
      -- referenced from the eventHdlrElement PRC.

         eventHdlrEventScopeTable OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX          SEQUENCE OF EventHdlrEventScopeEntry
           PIB-ACCESS      install
           STATUS          current
           DESCRIPTION
                 "This class defines the criteria to be used for
                 partitioning various portions of traffic."

           ::= { eventHdlrClasses 3 }

         eventHdlrEventScopeEntry OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX  EventHdlrEventScopeEntry
           STATUS  current
           DESCRIPTION
             "An instance of this class defines an individual criterion
             to be used towards generating an event."
           PIB-INDEX { eventHdlrEventScopeId }
           UNIQUENESS { eventHdlrEventScopeGroup,
                        eventHdlrEventScopeFilter
                      }

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           ::= { eventHdlrEventScopeTable 1}

         EventHdlrEventScopeEntry::= SEQUENCE {
           eventHdlrEventScopeId         InstanceId,
           eventHdlrEventScopeGroup      TagId,
           eventHdlrEventScopeFilter     Prid,
           eventHdlrEventScopePrecedence INTEGER,
           eventHdlrEventScopeChangeFlag TruthValue
         }

         eventHdlrEventScopeId    OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        InstanceId
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
                "An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an
                instance of the eventHdlrEventScopeTable class."

              ::= { eventHdlrEventScopeEntry 1}

         eventHdlrEventScopeGroup  OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        TagId   -- corresponding TagReference
                                 -- defined in eventHdlrElementEntry
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
              "Represents the binding between the eventHdlrElementEntry
              and the eventHdlrEventScope entries. A group of
              eventHdlrEventScope entries constitutes the criteria for
              partitioning various portions of traffic."

              ::= { eventHdlrEventScopeEntry 2}

         eventHdlrEventScopeFilter   OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        Prid
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
                "Pointer to a filter to be used as the criteria."
              ::= { eventHdlrEventScopeEntry 3}

         eventHdlrEventScopePrecedence OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        INTEGER
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
              "Represents the precedence of this criterion with respect
              to other criteria within the same group. When the
              precedence is unique, the instance represents an
              alternative criteria (an ORing function). When the
              precedence for two or more instances of the
              eventHdlrEventScope class is the same, the attributes
              within all the instances are treated collectively as a
              single filter criteria with the following rules:
              1. If the filters are not of the same type, the filters
                 are ANDÆed as a whole eg (RSVP and IP)

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              2. If the filter types are the same, the attribute values
                 are ORÆed and the attributes themselves are ANDÆed,
                 for example, two IP filters with src protocol values
                 56 and 57 respectively and dst protocol values 20 and
                 25 , would be treated as the condition (src port (56
                 or 57) AND dst port (20 or 25)."

              ::= { eventHdlrEventScopeEntry 4}

         eventHdlrEventScopeChangeFlag OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        TruthValue
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
             "Boolean value, if set to 'true' indicates that a new
             event should be generated if any of the assigned fields in
             the associated filter change."

              ::= { eventHdlrEventScopeEntry 5}



      --
      -- EventHdlrHandleScope Table
      --
      -- This PRC defines the scope of request handles generated by the
      -- PEP due to events caught by the event handler element. Each
      -- instance of this PRC references filters defined in the
      -- Framework PIB or some other signaling-protocol specific filter
      -- PRCs. These filters may describe specific protocol properties
      -- to which this event handler is sensitive. Essentially this
      -- table defines when a new COPS RequestHandle must be created by
      -- the PEP based on protocol properties. The event handler may be
      -- set up to be sensitive to specific field values and/or the
      -- uniqueness of a set of values considered together. This
      -- accommodates various behaviors of signaling protocols. These
      -- filters references are grouped using a TagId, and this group
      -- is then referenced from the eventHdlrElement PRC via the
      -- eventHdlrElementHandleScope TagReference.

         eventHdlrHandleScopeTable OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX          SEQUENCE OF EventHdlrHandleScopeEntry
           PIB-ACCESS      install
           STATUS          current
           DESCRIPTION
               "This class defines the criteria to be used for
               deciding whether to create a new COPS RequestHandle for
               an event or to use an existing Handle."

           ::= { eventHdlrClasses 4 }

         eventHdlrHandleScopeEntry OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX  EventHdlrHandleScopeEntry
           STATUS  current

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           DESCRIPTION
             "An instance of this class defines an individual criterion
             to be used towards deciding when to create a new Handle."
           PIB-INDEX { eventHdlrHandleScopeId }
           UNIQUENESS { eventHdlrHandleScopeGroup,
                        eventHdlrHandleScopeFilter
                      }

           ::= { eventHdlrHandleScopeTable 1}

         EventHdlrHandleScopeEntry::= SEQUENCE {
           eventHdlrHandleScopeId         InstanceId,
           eventHdlrHandleScopeGroup      TagId,
           eventHdlrHandleScopeFilter     Prid,
           eventHdlrHandleScopePrecedence INTEGER,
           eventHdlrHandleScopeChangeFlag TruthValue
         }

         eventHdlrHandleScopeId    OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        InstanceId
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
                "An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an
                instance of the eventHdlrHandleScopeTable class."

              ::= { eventHdlrHandleScopeEntry 1}

         eventHdlrHandleScopeGroup  OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        TagId   -- corresponding TagReference
                                 -- defined in eventHdlrElementEntry
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
              "Represents the binding between the eventHdlrElementEntry
              and the eventHdlrHandleScope entries. A group of
              eventHdlrHandleScope entries constitutes the criteria for
              defining the scope of the Handles generated."

              ::= { eventHdlrHandleScopeEntry 2}

         eventHdlrHandleScopeFilter   OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        Prid
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
                "Pointer to a filter to be used as the criteria."
              ::= { eventHdlrHandleScopeEntry 3}

         eventHdlrHandleScopePrecedence OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        INTEGER
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
              "Represents the precedence of this criterion with respect
              to other criteria within the same group. When the
              precedence is unique, the instance represents an

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              alternative criteria (an ORing function). When the
              precedence for two or more instances of the
              eventHdlrHandleScope class is the same, the attributes
              within all the instances are treated collectively as a
              single filter criteria."

              ::= { eventHdlrHandleScopeEntry 4}


         eventHdlrHandleScopeChangeFlag OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        TruthValue
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
             "Boolean value, if set to 'true' indicates that a new
             Handle should be generated to send the event request if
             any of the assigned fields in the associated filter
             change."

              ::= { eventHdlrHandleScopeEntry 5}



         --
         -- EventHdlrAuthProtocol Table
         --
         -- This PRC specifies the Auth Mechanism to use in the Access
         -- request when a data path Event Handler is configured to
         -- catch access events.


         eventHdlrAuthProtocolTable OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX          SEQUENCE OF EventHdlrAuthProtocolEntry
           PIB-ACCESS      install
           STATUS          current
           DESCRIPTION
               "This class lists the authentication protocols that can
               be used for an access request."

           ::= { eventHdlrClasses 5 }

         eventHdlrAuthProtocolEntry OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX  EventHdlrAuthProtocolEntry
           STATUS  current
           DESCRIPTION
             "An instance of this class describes an authentication
             protocol that may be used for an access request. Instances
             of this class that share the same TagId value collectively
             constitute a list of authentication protocols that may be
             used for a given access request"
           PIB-INDEX { eventHdlrAuthProtocolId }
           UNIQUENESS { eventHdlrAuthProtocolGroup,
                        eventHdlrAuthProtocolAuthMechanism
                      }

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           ::= { eventHdlrAuthProtocolTable 1}

         EventHdlrAuthProtocolEntry::= SEQUENCE {
           eventHdlrAuthProtocolId             InstanceId,
           eventHdlrAuthProtocolGroup          TagId,
           eventHdlrAuthProtocolAuthMechanism  INTEGER
         }

         eventHdlrAuthProtocolId    OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        InstanceId
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
                "An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an
                instance of the ContextDataTable class."

           ::= { eventHdlrAuthProtocolEntry 1}

         eventHdlrAuthProtocolGroup OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        TagId  -- corresponding TagReference
                                -- in datapathEventHdlrEntry
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
                "Represents a binding between an datapathEventHdlrTable
                instance and a list of eventHdlrAuthProtocolTable
                instances."

           ::= { eventHdlrAuthProtocolEntry 2}

         eventHdlrAuthProtocolAuthMechanism OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        INTEGER {
                                     PAP (0),
                                     CHAP (1),
                                     EAP_MD5(2),
                                     EAP_TLS(3)
                                   }
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
                "The authentication protocol that may be used for an
                access request."
              ::= { eventHdlrAuthProtocolEntry 3}


         --
         -- DataPath Event Handler Table
         --
         -- This PRC is an extension of the EventHandler PRC. This
         -- extension illustrates the use of the EventHandler PRC
         -- concept for authentication usage. Instances of this PRC are
         -- provisioned by the PDP on the PEP to catch specific access
         -- events. This PRC references a group of
         -- eventHdlrAuthProtocol instances which define a set of
         -- Authentication mechanisms to use if an access event is

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         -- caught by this event Handler. From its base class (Event
         -- Handler) this PRC also references a group of
         -- eventHdlrElement PRIs that contain the scope of the
         -- access event and specify the context data to send to the
         -- PDP when an access event is caught.

         datapathEventHdlrTable OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX          SEQUENCE OF DatapathEventHdlrEntry
           PIB-ACCESS      install
           STATUS          current
           DESCRIPTION
              "The datapathEventHdlrTable specifies for what access
              events the PEP should send an access request to the PDP.
              As a result of this access request, the PEP may send
              configuration changes to the PEP or specific policies for
              specific users. An instance of this class defines the
              circumstances for generating an access request, and
              provides the means for specifying the authentication
              mechanisms and contents of the PEP Request. Hence, the
              datapathEventHdlrTable can be said to create eventTable
              entries for user access. "

           ::= {  eventHdlrClasses 6 }

         datapathEventHdlrEntry OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX  DatapathEventHdlrEntry
           STATUS  current
           DESCRIPTION
                "dataPathEventHdlrTable entry."
           EXTENDS { EventHandlerEntry }
           UNIQUENESS {    eventHandlerElements,
                           eventHandlerNonMatchNext,
                           datapathEventHdlrRequestAuth
                      }

           ::= { datapathEventHdlrTable 1}

         DatapathEventHdlrEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
           datapathEventHdlrRequestAuth    TruthValue,
           datapathEventHdlrAuthProtocol   TagReferenceId
         }

         datapathEventHdlrRequestAuth    OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        TruthValue
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
                "Boolean flag, if set to 'true' requires authentication
                data to be sent in the request sent to the PDP with the
                access event."

            ::= { datapathEventHdlrEntry 1}



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         datapathEventHdlrAuthProtocol    OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        TagReferenceId
           PIB-TAG       { eventHdlrAuthProtocolGroup }
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
                "References a group of eventHdlrAuthProtocol instances,
                 each of which specifies an authentication mechanism."

            ::= { datapathEventHdlrEntry 2}



     --
     -- ContextData Table
     --
     -- This PRC specifies the context information to send to the PDP
     -- when an event is caught. The context information to send is
     -- described in terms of the PRC data types to include in the
     -- request, the level of encapsulated data and the interface
     -- information for that request.


        contextDataTable OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX          SEQUENCE OF ContextDataEntry
           PIB-ACCESS      install
           STATUS          current
           DESCRIPTION
                 "This class points to the context information to be
                 included with a request."

           ::= { contextClasses 1 }

        contextDataEntry OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX  ContextDataEntry
           STATUS  current
           DESCRIPTION
               "An instance of this class contains the type description
               (the assigned OID) of the class which needs to be filled
               in by the PEP and included with a PEP request."
           PIB-INDEX { contextDataId }
           UNIQUENESS { }

           ::= { contextDataTable 1}

         ContextDataEntry::= SEQUENCE {
           contextDataId            InstanceId,
           contextDataGroup         TagId,
           contextDataIfElement     PrcIdentifier,
           contextDataEncapsulation INTEGER
         }

         contextDataId   OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        InstanceId

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           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
                "An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an
                instance of the contextDataTable class."

              ::= { contextDataEntry 1}

         contextDataGroup  OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        TagId   --corresponding TagReference
                                 --defined in eventHdlrElement
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
                "Defines the grouping of contextData instances
                that are applicable to a given eventHdlrElement. When
                instances of this PRC are sent to the PEP without the
                event Handler information, this attribute is unused."

              ::= { contextDataEntry 2}


         contextDataIfElement      OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        PrcIdentifier
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
              "The OID of a class whose instance is to be included with
              the PEP request or event-specific ContextData Response."

              ::= { contextDataEntry 3}

         contextDataEncapsulation OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX        INTEGER
           STATUS        current
           DESCRIPTION
              "This attribute allows one to distinguish between inner
               and outer headers when there are multiple encapsulated
               headers of the same type in a packet.

               A value of:
               0 means all headers,
               positive number 'n' means the 'n'th header starting
               from the outermost,
               negative number 'n' means the 'n'th header starting from
               the innermost."

              ::= { contextDataEntry 4}



         --
         -- Layer 3 Header Data PRC
         --

         ctxtL3HdrTable OBJECT-TYPE

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             SYNTAX         SEQUENCE OF ctxtL3HdrEntry
             PIB-ACCESS     notify
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                "An instance of this class is created by the PEP and
                sent to the PDP to provide the PDP with information it
                requested in the ContextData PRC. The PDP uses
                this PRC to make Authentication/Provisioning
                decisions."

             ::= { contextClasses 2 }

         ctxtL3HdrEntry OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         CtxtL3HdrEntry
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "An instance of the ctxtL3HdrTable PRC."

             PIB-INDEX { ctxtL3HdrId }
             UNIQUENESS { }

             ::= { ctxtL3HdrTable 1 }

         CtxtL3HdrEntry::= SEQUENCE {
                 ctxtL3HdrId               InstanceId,
                 ctxtL3HdrSrcAddrType        InetAddressType,
                 ctxtL3HdrSrcAddr            InetAddress,
                 ctxtL3HdrDstAddrType        InetAddressType,
                 ctxtL3HdrDstAddr            InetAddress,
                 ctxtL3HdrProtocol           Unsigned32,
                 ctxtL3HdrSrcPort            Unsigned32,
                 ctxtL3HdrDstPort            Unsigned32,
                 ctxtL3HdrDscp               Unsigned32,
                 ctxtL3HdrEcn                TruthValue,
                 ctxtL3HdrIpOpt              OCTET STRING,
                 ctxtL3HdrEncap              Integer32
         }

         ctxtL3HdrId  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         InstanceId
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "An index to uniquely identify an instance of this
                 provisioning class."

             ::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 1 }

         ctxtL3HdrSrcAddrType OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         InetAddressType
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
              "The address type enumeration value [INETADDR] to specify
               the type of the packet's source L3 address)."

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             ::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 2 }

         ctxtL3HdrSrcAddr OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         InetAddress
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 " The packet's source L3 address."

             ::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 3 }

         ctxtL3HdrDstAddrType OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         InetAddressType
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
              "The address type enumeration value [INETADDR] to specify
               the type of the packet's destination L3 address."

             ::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 4 }


         ctxtL3HdrDstAddr OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         InetAddress
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "The packet's destination L3 address."

             ::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 5 }


         ctxtL3HdrProtocol OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         Unsigned32
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "The packet's protocol field."

             ::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 6 }

         ctxtL3HdrSrcPort  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         Unsigned32
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "This attribute binds an existing upstream session to
                 this session instance."

             ::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 7 }

         ctxtL3HdrDstPort  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         Unsigned32
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "This attribute binds an existing upstream session to
                 this session instance."

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             ::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 8 }

         ctxtL3HdrDscp  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         Unsigned32
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "DiffServ CodePoint."

             ::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 9 }

         ctxtL3HdrEcn  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         TruthValue
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "PEP sets this attribute to true(1) if ECN capable."

             ::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 10 }

         ctxtL3HdrIpOpt  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         OCTET STRING
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "IP Options field in the packet."

             ::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 11 }

         ctxtL3HdrEncap  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         Integer32
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
              "This attribute specifies which encapsulated header is
              being described. The sign on this value will be the same
              as the value specified in the ContextData
              instance that requested this header. If the original
              ContextData instance specified a
              ContextDataEncapsulation value of zero (meaning
              return all headers), then all instances of this attribute
              MUST be expressed as positive numbers.

              A value of:

              positive number 'n' means the 'n'th header starting
              from the outermost,
              negative number 'n' means the 'n'th header starting from
              the innermost."

             ::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 12 }


      --
      -- 802.1 Header Data PRC
      --

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         ctxt802HdrTable OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         SEQUENCE OF Ctxt802HdrEntry
             PIB-ACCESS     notify
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
              "An instance of this class is created by the PEP and sent
               to the PDP to provide the PDP with information it
               requested in the ContextData PRC. The PDP uses this PRC
               to make Authorization/Provisioning decisions."

             ::= { contextClasses 3 }

         ctxt802HdrEntry OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         Ctxt802HdrEntry
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "An instance of the ctxt802HdrTable PRC."

             PIB-INDEX { ctxt802HdrId }
             UNIQUENESS { }

             ::= { ctxt802HdrTable 1 }

         Ctxt802HdrEntry::= SEQUENCE {
                 ctxt802HdrId               InstanceId,
                 ctxt802HdrSrcAddr          PhysAddress,
                 ctxt802HdrDstAddr          PhysAddress,
                 ctxt802HdrProtocol         Unsigned32,
                 ctxt802HdrPriority         Unsigned32,
                 ctxt802HdrVlan             Unsigned32,
                 ctxt802HdrEncap            Integer32
         }

         ctxt802HdrId  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         InstanceId
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "An index to uniquely identify an instance of this
                 provisioning class."

             ::= { ctxt802HdrEntry 1 }


         ctxt802HdrSrcAddr OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         PhysAddress
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 " The packet's source MAC address."

             ::= { ctxt802HdrEntry 2 }

         ctxt802HdrDstAddr OBJECT-TYPE

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             SYNTAX         PhysAddress
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "The packet's destination MAC address."

             ::= { ctxt802HdrEntry 3 }


         ctxt802HdrProtocol OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         Unsigned32 (0..'ffff'h)
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "The L2 packet's protocol field."

             ::= { ctxt802HdrEntry 4 }


         ctxt802HdrPriority OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         Unsigned32 (0..7)
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                "The L2 packet's priority field. This attribute is only
                valid for packets using the 802.1q header extension."

             ::= { ctxt802HdrEntry 5 }

         ctxt802HdrVlan OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         Unsigned32 (1..4094)
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
              "The L2 packet's VLAN field. This attribute is only valid
               for packets using the 802.1q header extension."

             ::= { ctxt802HdrEntry 6 }

         ctxt802HdrEncap OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         Integer32
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
              "This attribute specifies which encapsulated header is
              being described. The sign on this value will be the same
              as the value specified in the ContextData
              instance that requested this header. If the original
              ContextData instance specified an
              ContextDataEncapsulation value of zero (meaning
              return all headers), then all instances of this attribute
              MUST be expressed as positive numbers.

              A value of:
              positive number 'n' means the 'n'th header starting
              from the outermost,
              negative number 'n' means the 'n'th header starting from
              the innermost."

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             ::= { ctxt802HdrEntry 7 }


         --
         -- CtxtDialupInterface Table
         --

         ctxtDialupInterfaceTable OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         SEQUENCE OF CtxtDialupInterfaceEntry
             PIB-ACCESS     notify
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "Dialup Interface context data."

             ::= { contextClasses 4 }

         ctxtDialupInterfaceEntry OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         CtxtDialupInterfaceEntry
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "Entry oid of the ctxtDialupInterfaceTable PRC."

             PIB-INDEX { ctxtDialupInterfaceId }
             UNIQUENESS { }

             ::= { ctxtDialupInterfaceTable 1 }

         CtxtDialupInterfaceEntry::= SEQUENCE {
                 ctxtDialupInterfaceId                InstanceId,
                 ctxtDialupInterfaceNASPort           Integer32,
                 ctxtDialupInterfaceNASPortId         OCTET STRING,
                 ctxtDialupInterfaceNASPortType       INTEGER,
                 ctxtDialupInterfaceCalledStationId   OCTET STRING,
                 ctxtDialupInterfaceCallingStationId  OCTET STRING,
                 ctxtDialupInterfaceConnectInfo       OCTET STRING
         }

         ctxtDialupInterfaceId  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         InstanceId
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "An index to uniquely identify an instance of this
                 provisioning class."

             ::= { ctxtDialupInterfaceEntry 1 }


         ctxtDialupInterfaceNASPort  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         Integer32
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
              "This Attribute indicates the physical port number of the

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              NAS which is authenticating the user.  It is only used in
              Access-Request packets.  Note that this is using 'port'
              in its sense of a physical connection on the NAS, not in
              the sense of a TCP or UDP port number."

             ::= { ctxtDialupInterfaceEntry 2 }


         ctxtDialupInterfaceNASPortId  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         OCTET STRING
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
               "This Attribute contains a text string which identifies
               the port of the NAS which is authenticating the user. It
               is only used in Access-Request and Accounting-Request
               packets.  Note that this is using 'port' in its sense of
               a physical connection on the NAS, not in the sense of a
               TCP or UDP port number. "

             ::= { ctxtDialupInterfaceEntry 3 }

         ctxtDialupInterfaceNASPortType  OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX  INTEGER {
                              radAsync(0),
                              radSync(1),
                              radIsdnSync(2),
                              radIsdnAsyncV120(3),
                              radIsdnAsyncV110(4),
                              radVirtual(5),
                              radPIAFS(6),
                              radHdlcClearChannel(7),
                              radX25(8),
                              radX75(9),
                              radG3Fax(10),
                              radSDSL(11),
                              radAdslCAP(12),
                              radAdslDMT(13),
                              radIdsl(14),
                              radEthernet(15),
                              radXdsl(16),
                              radCable(17),
                              radWirelessOther(18),
                              radWirelessIEEE80211(19)
                      }
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
              "This Attribute indicates the type of the physical port
              of the NAS which is authenticating the user.  It can be
              used instead of or in addition to the radNasPort (5)
              attribute.  It is only used in Access-Request packets.
              Either radNasPort (5) or radNasPortType or both SHOULD be
              present in an Access-Request packet, if the NAS
              differentiates among its ports.

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                   A value of 'radAsync(0)' indicates Async.

                   A value of 'radSync(1)' indicates Sync.

                   A value of 'radIsdnSync(2)' indicates ISDN Sync.

                   A value of 'radIsdnAsyncV120(3)' indicates ISDN
                   Async V.120.

                   A value of 'radIsdnAsyncV110(4)' indicates ISDN
                   Async V.110.

                   A value of 'radVirtual(5)' indicates Virtual.
                   Virtual refers to a connection to the NAS via some
                   transport protocol, instead of through a physical
                   port. For example, if a user telnetted into a NAS to
                   authenticate himself as an Outbound-User, the
                   Access-Request might include radNasPortType =
                   Virtual as a hint to the RADIUS server that the user
                   was not on a physical port.

                   A value of 'radPIAFS(6)' indicates PIAFS. PIAFS is a
                   form of wireless ISDN commonly used in Japan, and
                   stands for PHS (Personal Handyphone System) Internet
                   Access Forum Standard (PIAFS).

                   A value of 'radHdlcClearChannel(7)' indicates HDLC
                   Clear Channel.

                   A value of 'radX25(8)' indicates X.25.

                   A value of 'radX75(9)' indicates X.75.

                   A value of 'radG3Fax(10)' indicates G.3 Fax.

                   A value of 'radSDSL(11)' indicates SDSL " Symmetric
                   DSL.

                   A value of 'radAdslCAP(12)' indicates ADSL-CAP -
                   Asymmetric DSL, Carrierless Amplitude Phase
                   Modulation.

                   A value of 'radAdslDMT(13)' indicates ADSL-DMT -
                   Asymmetric DSL, Discrete Multi-Tone.

                   A value of 'radIdsl(14)' indicates IDSL " ISDN
                   Digital Subscriber Line.

                   A value of 'radEthernet(15)' indicates Ethernet.

                   A value of 'radXdsl(16)' indicates xDSL - Digital
                   Subscriber Line of unknown type.

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                   A value of 'radCable(17)' indicates Cable.

                   A value of 'radWirelessOther(18)' indicates Wireless
                   - Other.

                   A value of 'radWirelessIEEE80211(19)' indicates
                   Wireless - IEEE 802.11."
             ::= { ctxtDialupInterfaceEntry 4 }


         ctxtDialupInterfaceCalledStationId  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         OCTET STRING
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "This Attribute allows the NAS to send in the Access-
                 Request packet the phone number that the user called,
                 using Dialed Number Identification (DNIS) or similar
                 technology.  Note that this may be different from the
                 phone number the call comes in on.  It is only used in
                 Access-Request packets. "
             ::= { ctxtDialupInterfaceEntry 5 }

         ctxtDialupInterfaceCallingStationId  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         OCTET STRING
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
              "This Attribute allows the NAS to send in the Access-
              Request packet the phone number that the user is calling
              from, using Dialed Number Identification (DNIS) or
              similar technology.  Note that this may be different from
              the phone number called.  It is only used in
              Access-Request packets. "
             ::= { ctxtDialupInterfaceEntry 6 }

         ctxtDialupInterfaceConnectInfo  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         OCTET STRING
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
               "This Attribute allows the NAS to send in the Access-
               Request packet the phone number that the call came from,
               using Automatic Number Identification (ANI) or similar
               technology.  It is only used in Access-Request packets."
             ::= { ctxtDialupInterfaceEntry 7 }




         ---
         --- CtxtDialupInterfaceFramedProtocol Table
         ---

         ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolTable OBJECT-TYPE

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             SYNTAX         SEQUENCE OF CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocolEntry
             PIB-ACCESS     notify
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "."

             ::= { contextClasses 5 }

         ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolEntry OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocolEntry
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                "Entry oid of the ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolTable PRC."

             PIB-INDEX { ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolId }
             UNIQUENESS { }

             ::= { ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolTable 1 }

         CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocolEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
                 ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolId           InstanceId,
                 ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolProt         INTEGER,
                 ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolMTU          Integer32,
                 ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolCompression  INTEGER,
                 ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolPortLimit    Unsigned32,
                 ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolIpAddress    InetAddress,
                 ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolIpNetmask    InetAddress
         }

         ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolId OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         InstanceId
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "An index to uniquely identify an instance of this
                 provisioning class."

             ::= { ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolEntry 1 }


         ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolProt  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX  INTEGER {
                              radPPP(1),
                              radSLIP(2),
                              radARAP(3),
                              radGandalf(4),
                              radXylogics(5),
                              radX75Synchronous(6)
                      }
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
               "This Attribute indicates the framing to be used for
               framed access. It MAY be used in both Access-Request and
               Access-Accept packets.

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                    A value of 'radPPP(1)' represents PPP.

                    A value of 'radSLIP(2)' represents SLIP.

                    A value of 'radARAP(3)' represents AppleTalk Remote
                    Access Protocol (ARAP).

                    A value of 'radGandalf(4)' represents Gandalf
                    proprietary SingleLink/MultiLink protocol.

                    A value of 'radXylogics(5)' represents Xylogics
                    proprietary IPX/SLIP.

                    A value of 'radX75Synchronous(6)' represents X.75
                    Synchronous."

             ::= { ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolEntry 2 }


         ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolMTU  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         Integer32
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
              "This Attribute indicates the Maximum Transmission Unit
              to be configured for the user, when it is not negotiated
              by some other means (such as PPP).  It MAY be used in
              Access-Accept packets.  It MAY be used in an Access-
              Request packet as a hint by the NAS to the server that it
              would prefer that value, but the server is not required
              to honor the hint."

             ::= { ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolEntry 3 }

         ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolCompression  OBJECT-TYPE
              SYNTAX  INTEGER {
                              radNone(0),
                              radVJ(1),
                              radIPXheader(2),
                              radStacLZS(3)
                      }
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
              "This Attribute indicates a compression protocol to be
              used for the link.  It MAY be used in Access-Accept
              packets.  It MAY be used in an Access-Request packet as a
              hint to the server that the NAS would prefer to use that
              compression, but the server is not required to honor the
              hint.

              More than one compression protocol Attribute MAY be sent.
              It is the responsibility of the NAS to apply the proper
              compression protocol to appropriate link traffic.

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                      A value of 'radNone(0)' indicates None.

                      A value of 'radVJ(1)' indicates VJ TCP/IP header
                      compression.

                      A value of 'radIPXheader(2)' indicates IPX header
                      compression.

                      A value of 'radStacLZS(3)' indicates Stac-LZS
                      compression."

             ::= { ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolEntry 4 }


         ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolPortLimit  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         Unsigned32
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
               "This Attribute sets the maximum number of ports to be
               provided to the user by the NAS.  This Attribute MAY be
               sent by the server to the client in an Access-Accept
               packet.  It is intended for use in conjunction with
               Multilink PPP [10] or similar uses.  It MAY also be sent
               by the NAS to the server as a hint that that many ports
               are desired for use, but the server is not required to
               honor the hint."

             ::= { ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolEntry 5 }

         ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolIpAddress  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         InetAddress
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
               "This Attribute indicates the address to be configured
               for the user.  It MAY be used in Access-Accept packets.
               It MAY be used in an Access-Request packet as a hint by
               the NAS to the server that it would prefer that address,
               but the server is not required to honor the hint."

             ::= { ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolEntry 6 }


         ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolIpNetmask  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         InetAddress
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
              "This Attribute indicates the IP netmask to be configured
              for the user when the user is a router to a network.  It
              MAY be used in Access-Accept packets.  It MAY be used in
              an Access-Request packet as a hint by the NAS to the
              server that it would prefer that netmask, but the server
              is not required to honor the hint."

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             ::= { ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolEntry 7 }




         ---
         --- CtxtDialupIfLoginService Table
         ---

         ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceTable OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         SEQUENCE OF CtxtDialupIfLoginServiceEntry
             PIB-ACCESS     notify
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "Base class."

             ::= { contextClasses 6 }

         ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceEntry OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         CtxtDialupIfLoginServiceEntry
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "Entry oid of the ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceTable PRC."

             PIB-INDEX { ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceId }
             UNIQUENESS { }

             ::= { ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceTable 1 }



         CtxtDialupIfLoginServiceEntry::= SEQUENCE {
                 ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceId       InstanceId,
                 ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceIpHost   InetAddress
         }

         ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceId OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         InstanceId
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "An index to uniquely identify an instance of this
                 provisioning class."

             ::= { ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceEntry 1 }


         ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceIpHost OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         InetAddress
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "."


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             ::= { ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceEntry 2 }



         ---
         --- CtxtDialupIfLoginLat Table (Extends
         --- CtxtDialupIfLoginService)
         ---

         ctxtDialupIfLoginLatTable OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         SEQUENCE OF CtxtDialupIfLoginLatEntry
             PIB-ACCESS     notify
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "Extended class."

             ::= { contextClasses 7 }

         ctxtDialupIfLoginLatEntry OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         CtxtDialupIfLoginLatEntry
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "Entry oid of the ctxtDialupIfLoginLatTable PRC."
                EXTENDS { ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceEntry }
             UNIQUENESS { }

             ::= { ctxtDialupIfLoginLatTable 1 }


         CtxtDialupIfLoginLatEntry::= SEQUENCE {
                 ctxtDialupIfLoginLatService   OCTET STRING,
                 ctxtDialupIfLoginLatNode      OCTET STRING,
                 ctxtDialupIfLoginLatGroup     OCTET STRING,
                 ctxtDialupIfLoginLatPort      OCTET STRING
         }


         ctxtDialupIfLoginLatService  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         OCTET STRING
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "."

             ::= { ctxtDialupIfLoginLatEntry 1 }

         ctxtDialupIfLoginLatNode  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         OCTET STRING
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "."

             ::= { ctxtDialupIfLoginLatEntry 2 }


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         ctxtDialupIfLoginLatGroup  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         OCTET STRING
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "."

             ::= { ctxtDialupIfLoginLatEntry 3 }

         ctxtDialupIfLoginLatPort  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         OCTET STRING
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "."

             ::= { ctxtDialupIfLoginLatEntry 4 }




       --
       -- The RSVP Filter table
       --
       rsvpFilterTable OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX  SEQUENCE OF RsvpFilterEntry
           PIB-ACCESS      install
           STATUS               current
           DESCRIPTION
                   "RSVP specific filter table."

           ::= { filterClasses 1 }

       rsvpFilterEntry OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX  RsvpFilterEntry
           STATUS  current
           DESCRIPTION
                   " RSVP specific filter table entry."

           PIB-INDEX { rsvpFilterId }
           UNIQUENESS { }

           ::= { rsvpFilterTable 1 }


   RsvpFilterEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
           rsvpFilterId                         InstanceId,
           rsvpFilterFlags                      OCTET STRING,
           rsvpFilterSendTTL                    Unsigned32,
           rsvpFilterDClassDscp                 Integer32,
           rsvpFilterSessionDestAddrType        InetAddressType,
           rsvpFilterSessionDestAddr            InetAddress,
           rsvpFilterSessionDestAddrMask        Unsigned32,
           rsvpFilterSessionProtocol            Integer32,
           rsvpFilterSessionDestPort            Unsigned32,

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           rsvpFilterSessionSrcAddrType         InetAddressType,
           rsvpFilterSessionSrcAddr             InetAddress,
           rsvpFilterSessionSrcAddrMask         Unsigned32,
           rsvpFilterSessionSrcPort             Unsigned32,
           rsvpFilterStyleValue                 OCTET STRING
      }

   rsvpFilterId OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       InstanceId
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an
          instance of the class."
       ::= { rsvpFilterEntry 1 }

   rsvpFilterFlags OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       OCTET STRING
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The Flags carried in the RSVP header. Currently all these
          flags should be set to zero."
       ::= { rsvpFilterEntry 2 }

   rsvpFilterSendTTL OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Unsigned32 (0..255)
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The IP TTL value with which the message was sent."
       ::= { rsvpFilterEntry 3 }

   rsvpFilterDClassDscp OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Integer32 (-1| 0..63)
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The DClass dscp value."
       ::= { rsvpFilterEntry 4 }

   rsvpFilterSessionDestAddrType OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       InetAddressType
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The address type enumeration value [INETADDR] to specify the
          type of the destination IP address."
       ::= { rsvpFilterEntry 5 }

   rsvpFilterSessionDestAddr OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       InetAddress
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The destination IP address."
       ::= { rsvpFilterEntry 6 }

   rsvpFilterSessionDestAddrMask OBJECT-TYPE

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       SYNTAX       Unsigned32
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The length of a mask for the matching of the destination IP
          address.."
       ::= { rsvpFilterEntry 7 }

   rsvpFilterSessionProtocol OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Integer32 (-1 | 0..255)
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The IP protocol to match against the packet's protocol. A
          value of -1 means match all."
       ::= { rsvpFilterEntry 8 }

   rsvpFilterSessionDestPort OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Unsigned32 (0..65535)
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The packet's Layer 4 destination port."
       ::= { rsvpFilterEntry 9 }

   rsvpFilterSessionSrcAddrType OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       InetAddressType
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The address type enumeration value [INETADDR] to specify the
          type of the source IP address."
       ::= { rsvpFilterEntry 10 }

   rsvpFilterSessionSrcAddr OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       InetAddress
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The source IP address."
       ::= { rsvpFilterEntry 11 }

   rsvpFilterSessionSrcAddrMask OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Unsigned32
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The length of a mask for the matching of the source IP
          address."
       ::= { rsvpFilterEntry 12 }

   rsvpFilterSessionSrcPort OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Unsigned32 (0..65535)
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The packet's Layer 4 source port."
       ::= { rsvpFilterEntry 13 }

   rsvpFilterStyleValue OBJECT-TYPE

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       SYNTAX       OCTET STRING
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The RSVP packet's Style value."
       ::= { rsvpFilterEntry 14 }


   --
   -- RSVP Common Context Data
   --

   ctxtRsvpTable OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX  SEQUENCE OF CtxtRsvpEntry
           PIB-ACCESS      notify
           STATUS               current
           DESCRIPTION
                   ""

           ::= { contextClasses 8 }

   ctxtRsvpEntry OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX  CtxtRsvpEntry
           STATUS  current
           DESCRIPTION
                   ""

           PIB-INDEX { ctxtRsvpId }
           UNIQUENESS { }

           ::= { ctxtRsvpTable 1 }

   CtxtRsvpEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
          ctxtRsvpId            InstanceId,
          ctxtRsvpMsgType               INTEGER,
          ctxtRsvpFlags                 OCTET STRING,
          ctxtRsvpSendTTL               Unsigned32,
          ctxtRsvpInIntfId              Unsigned32,
          ctxtRsvpInIntfAddrType        InetAddressType,
          ctxtRsvpInIntfAddr            InetAddress,
          ctxtRsvpOutIntfId             Unsigned32,
          ctxtRsvpOutIntfAddrType       InetAddressType,
          ctxtRsvpOutIntfAddr           InetAddress
   }

   ctxtRsvpId OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       InstanceId
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an
          instance of the class."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpEntry 1 }

   ctxtRsvpMsgType OBJECT-TYPE

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       SYNTAX       INTEGER {
                                        Path (1),
                                        PathErr (2),
                                        Resv (3),
                                        ResvErr (4)
                       }
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The RSVP message type."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpEntry 2 }

   ctxtRsvpFlags OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       OCTET STRING
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The RSVP flags contained in the message header. They are
          currently undefined and should be set to zero."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpEntry 3 }

   ctxtRsvpSendTTL OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Unsigned32 (0..255)
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The IP TTL value."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpEntry 4 }

   ctxtRsvpInIntfId OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Unsigned32
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The Interface Id."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpEntry 5 }

   ctxtRsvpInIntfAddrType OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       InetAddressType
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The address type enumeration value [INETADDR] to specify the
          type of the In Interface IP address."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpEntry 6 }

   ctxtRsvpInIntfAddr OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       InetAddress
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The In Interface IP address."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpEntry 7 }

   ctxtRsvpOutIntfId OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Unsigned32
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The Out Interface Id."

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       ::= { ctxtRsvpEntry 8 }

   ctxtRsvpOutIntfAddrType OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       InetAddressType
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The address type enumeration value [INETADDR] to specify the
          type of the Out Interface IP address."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpEntry 9 }

   ctxtRsvpOutIntfAddr OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       InetAddress
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The Out Interface IP address."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpEntry 10 }


   --
   -- RSVP Path Context Data
   --
   ctxtRsvpPathTable OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX  SEQUENCE OF CtxtRsvpPathEntry
           PIB-ACCESS      notify
           STATUS               current
           DESCRIPTION
                   ""

           ::= { contextClasses 9 }

   ctxtRsvpPathEntry OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX  CtxtRsvpPathEntry
           STATUS  current
           DESCRIPTION
                   ""

           PIB-INDEX { ctxtRsvpPathId }
           UNIQUENESS { }

           ::= { ctxtRsvpPathTable 1 }

   CtxtRsvpPathEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
                 ctxtRsvpPathId         InstanceId,
                 ctxtRsvpPathTokenRate  Unsigned32
   }

   ctxtRsvpPathId OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       InstanceId
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an
          instance of the class."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpPathEntry 1 }

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   ctxtRsvpPathTokenRate OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Unsigned32
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The token bucket rate for the TSPEC."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpPathEntry 2 }

   --
   -- RSVP PathErr Context Data
   --

   ctxtRsvpPathErrTable OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX  SEQUENCE OF CtxtRsvpPathErrEntry
           PIB-ACCESS      notify
           STATUS               current
           DESCRIPTION
                   ""

           ::= { contextClasses 10 }

   ctxtRsvpPathErrEntry OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX  CtxtRsvpPathErrEntry
           STATUS  current
           DESCRIPTION
                   ""

           PIB-INDEX { ctxtRsvpPathErrId }
           UNIQUENESS { }

           ::= { ctxtRsvpPathErrTable 1 }

   CtxtRsvpPathErrEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
                ctxtRsvpPathErrId               InstanceId,
                ctxtRsvpPathErrTokenRate        Unsigned32,
                ctxtRsvpPathErrErrorAddrType    InetAddressType,
                ctxtRsvpPathErrErrorAddr        InetAddress,
                ctxtRsvpPathErrErrorCode        Unsigned32,
                ctxtRsvpPathErrErrorValue       Unsigned32
   }

   ctxtRsvpPathErrId OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       InstanceId
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an
          instance of the class."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpPathErrEntry 1 }

   ctxtRsvpPathErrTokenRate OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Unsigned32
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION

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          "The token bucket rate for the TSPEC."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpPathErrEntry 2 }

   ctxtRsvpPathErrErrorAddrType OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       InetAddressType
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The address type IP address in error."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpPathErrEntry 3 }

   ctxtRsvpPathErrErrorAddr OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       InetAddress
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The Error IP address."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpPathErrEntry 4 }

   ctxtRsvpPathErrErrorCode OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Unsigned32
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The RSVP error code."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpPathErrEntry 5 }

   ctxtRsvpPathErrErrorValue OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Unsigned32
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The RSVP error value."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpPathErrEntry 6 }

   --
   -- RSVP Resv Context Data
   --

   ctxtRsvpResvTable OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX  SEQUENCE OF CtxtRsvpResvEntry
           PIB-ACCESS      notify
           STATUS               current
           DESCRIPTION
                   ""

           ::= { contextClasses 11 }

   ctxtRsvpResvEntry OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX  CtxtRsvpResvEntry
           STATUS  current
           DESCRIPTION
                   ""

           PIB-INDEX { ctxtRsvpResvId }
           UNIQUENESS { }


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           ::= { ctxtRsvpResvTable 1 }

   CtxtRsvpResvEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
                 ctxtRsvpResvId         InstanceId,
                 ctxtRsvpResvFSpecGrp   TagReferenceId,
                 ctxtRsvpResvSvcType    INTEGER,
                 ctxtRsvpResvTokenRate  Unsigned32
   }

   ctxtRsvpResvId OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       InstanceId
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an
          instance of the class."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpResvEntry 1 }

   ctxtRsvpResvFSpecGrp OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       TagReferenceId
       PIB-TAG { ctxtRsvpFilterSpecTagId }
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "Identifies a group of Filter Spec entries."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpResvEntry 2 }

   ctxtRsvpResvSvcType OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       INTEGER {
                                        Controlled_Load(1),
                                        Guaranteed(2)
                                }
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "An enum describing the type of service."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpResvEntry 3 }

   ctxtRsvpResvTokenRate OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Unsigned32
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The token bucket rate for the TSPEC."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpResvEntry 4 }

   --
   -- RSVP ResvErr Context Data
   --
   ctxtRsvpResvErrTable OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX  SEQUENCE OF CtxtRsvpResvErrEntry
           PIB-ACCESS      notify
           STATUS               current
           DESCRIPTION
                   ""

           ::= { contextClasses 12 }

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   ctxtRsvpResvErrEntry OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX  CtxtRsvpResvErrEntry
           STATUS  current
           DESCRIPTION
                   ""

           PIB-INDEX { ctxtRsvpResvErrId }
           UNIQUENESS { }

           ::= { ctxtRsvpResvErrTable 1 }

   CtxtRsvpResvErrEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
                ctxtRsvpResvErrId               InstanceId,
                ctxtRsvpResvErrFSpecGrp         TagReferenceId,
                ctxtRsvpResvErrSvcType          INTEGER,
                ctxtRsvpResvErrTokenRate        Unsigned32,
                ctxtRsvpResvErrErrorAddrType    InetAddressType,
                ctxtRsvpResvErrErrorAddr        InetAddress,
                ctxtRsvpResvErrErrorCode        Unsigned32,
                ctxtRsvpResvErrErrorValue       Unsigned32
   }

   ctxtRsvpResvErrId OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       InstanceId
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an
          instance of the class."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpResvErrEntry 1 }

   ctxtRsvpResvErrFSpecGrp OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       TagReferenceId
       PIB-TAG { ctxtRsvpFilterSpecTagId }
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "Identifies a group of Filter Spec entries."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpResvErrEntry 2 }

   ctxtRsvpResvErrSvcType OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       INTEGER {
                                        Controlled_Load(1),
                                        Guaranteed(2)
                                }
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "An enum describing the type of service."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpResvErrEntry 3 }

   ctxtRsvpResvErrTokenRate OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Unsigned32
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION

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          "The token bucket rate for the TSPEC."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpResvErrEntry 4 }

   ctxtRsvpResvErrErrorAddrType OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       InetAddressType
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The address type IP address in error."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpResvErrEntry 5 }

   ctxtRsvpResvErrErrorAddr OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       InetAddress
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The Error IP address."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpResvErrEntry 6 }

   ctxtRsvpResvErrErrorCode OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Unsigned32
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The RSVP error code."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpResvErrEntry 7 }

   ctxtRsvpResvErrErrorValue OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Unsigned32
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The RSVP error value."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpResvErrEntry 8 }

   --
   -- RSVP Filter Spec Context Data
   --

   ctxtRsvpFilterSpecTable OBJECT-TYPE
         SYNTAX  SEQUENCE OF CtxtRsvpFilterSpecEntry
           PIB-ACCESS      notify
           STATUS               current
           DESCRIPTION
                   ""

           ::= { contextClasses 13 }

   ctxtRsvpFilterSpecEntry OBJECT-TYPE
           SYNTAX  CtxtRsvpFilterSpecEntry
           STATUS  current
           DESCRIPTION
                   ""

           PIB-INDEX { ctxtRsvpFilterSpecId }
           UNIQUENESS { }


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           ::= { ctxtRsvpFilterSpecTable 1 }

   CtxtRsvpFilterSpecEntry::= SEQUENCE {
                ctxtRsvpFilterSpecId            InstanceId,
                ctxtRsvpFilterSpecTagId         TagId,
                ctxtRsvpFilterSpecAddrType      InetAddressType,
                ctxtRsvpFilterSpecAddr          InetAddress,
                ctxtRsvpFilterSpecPort          Unsigned32
   }

   ctxtRsvpFilterSpecId OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       InstanceId
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an
          instance of the class."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpFilterSpecEntry 1 }

   ctxtRsvpFilterSpecTagId OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       TagId
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "Identifies the group of Filter Spec PRIs that this PRI
          belongs to."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpFilterSpecEntry 2 }

   ctxtRsvpFilterSpecAddrType OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       InetAddressType
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The address type enumeration value [INETADDR] to specify the
          type of the IP address."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpFilterSpecEntry 3 }

   ctxtRsvpFilterSpecAddr OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       InetAddress
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The Filter Spec IP address."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpFilterSpecEntry 4 }

   ctxtRsvpFilterSpecPort OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX       Unsigned32 (0..65535)
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The packet's Layer 4 destination port."
       ::= { ctxtRsvpFilterSpecEntry 5 }


         --
         -- Authentication Extension Tables
         --


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         --
         -- AuthExtensions Base Table
         --

         authExtTable OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         SEQUENCE OF AuthExtEntry
             PIB-ACCESS     install-notify
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
              "This is an abstract PRC. This PRC can be extended by
              authentication PRCs that contain attributes specific to
              that authentication protocol. An instance of the extended
              class is created by the PEP and sent to the PDP. The PDP
              may send information back to the PEP or may uses the
              information to authenticate the PEP's access request.
              This  PRC itself should not be instantiated.

              This is a 'transient' class. Its instances are temporary
              and are deleted by the PEP after a certain time/event.
              Thus it must not be referred to by the server."

             ::= { authClasses 1 }

         authExtEntry OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         AuthExtEntry
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "Entry oid for the AuthExtTable PRC."

             PIB-INDEX { authExtId }
             UNIQUENESS { }

             ::= { authExtTable 1 }

         AuthExtEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
                 authExtId                InstanceId
         }

         authExtId  OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         InstanceId
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "An index to uniquely identify an instance of the
                  entended provisioning class."

             ::= { authExtEntry 1 }



         --
         -- UserAuthExt Table
         --


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         userAuthExtTable OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         SEQUENCE OF UserAuthExtEntry
             PIB-ACCESS     notify
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "This is a concrete PRC used to contain user
                 authentication fields. This PRC extends the base PRC
                 authExtEntry."

             ::= { authClasses 2 }

         userAuthExtEntry OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         UserAuthExtEntry
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
               "Entry for the UserAuthExtTable PRC. InstanceId's for
                this extended PRC are assigned by the base PRC AuthExt
                [SPPI]."

             EXTENDS { authExtEntry }
             UNIQUENESS { }

             ::= { userAuthExtTable 1 }

         UserAuthExtEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
                 userAuthExtRealm      OCTET STRING,
                 userAuthExtUsername   OCTET STRING
         }


         userAuthExtRealm OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         OCTET STRING
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "user realm octet string."

             ::= { userAuthExtEntry 1 }

         userAuthExtUsername OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         OCTET STRING
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "Username octet string."

             ::= { userAuthExtEntry 2 }




         --
         -- AuthChapExt Table
         --


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         authChapExtTable OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         SEQUENCE OF AuthChapExtEntry
             PIB-ACCESS     notify
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
               "This is a concrete PRC used to contain CHAP
               authentication fields. This PRC extends the PRC
               userAuthExtEntry."

             ::= { authClasses 3 }

         authChapExtEntry OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         AuthChapExtEntry
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
              "Entry oid for the AuthChapExtTable PRC. InstanceId's for
               this extended PRC are assigned by the base PRC [SPPI]."

             EXTENDS { userAuthExtEntry }
             UNIQUENESS { }

             ::= { authChapExtTable 1 }

         AuthChapExtEntry::= SEQUENCE {
                 authChapExtId        Unsigned32,
                 authChapExtChal      OCTET STRING,
                 authChapExtResp      OCTET STRING
         }

         authChapExtId OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         Unsigned32
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "CHAP Id field."

             ::= { authChapExtEntry 1 }

         authChapExtChal OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         OCTET STRING
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
               "CHAP Challenge octet string. The challenge is generated
               by the PEP."

             ::= { authChapExtEntry 2 }

         authChapExtResp OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         OCTET STRING
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "CHAP Challenge Response octet string. The challenge
                 response is sent to the PDP along with the challenge."


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             ::= { authChapExtEntry 3 }


         --
         -- AuthPapExt Table
         --

         authPapExtTable OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         SEQUENCE OF AuthPapExtEntry
             PIB-ACCESS     notify
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "This is a concrete PRC used to contain PAP
                 authentication fields. This PRC extends the PRC
                 userAuthExtEntry."

             ::= { authClasses 4 }

         authPapExtEntry OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         AuthPapExtEntry
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
               "Entry oid for the AuthPapExtTable PRC. InstanceId's for
                this extended PRC are assigned by the base PRC [SPPI]."

             EXTENDS { userAuthExtEntry }
             UNIQUENESS { }

             ::= { authPapExtTable 1 }

         AuthPapExtEntry::= SEQUENCE {
                 authPapExtPwd      OCTET STRING
         }

         authPapExtPwd OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         OCTET STRING
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "PAP password octet string."

           ::= { authPapExtEntry 1 }





         --
         -- AuthExtResult Table
         --

         authExtResultTable OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         SEQUENCE OF AuthExtResultEntry
             PIB-ACCESS     install

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             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "This is a concrete PRC used to contain authentication
                 results. This PRC extends the base PRC authExtEntry."

             ::= { authClasses 5 }

         authExtResultEntry OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         AuthExtResultEntry
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
               "Entry for the authExtResultTable PRC. InstanceId's for
                this extended PRC are assigned by the base PRC AuthExt
                [SPPI]."

             EXTENDS { authExtEntry }
             UNIQUENESS { }

             ::= { authExtResultTable 1 }

         AuthExtResultEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
                 authExtResultSuccess           TruthValue
         }


         authExtResultSuccess OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         TruthValue
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                "Set to 'true' if authentication was successful, else
                false."

             ::= { authExtResultEntry 1 }


         --
         -- AuthEapReqExt Table
         --

         authEapReqExtTable OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         SEQUENCE OF AuthEapReqExtEntry
             PIB-ACCESS     notify
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
               "This is a concrete PRC used to contain EAP
               authentication fields. This PRC extends the base PRC
               authExtEntry. The PEP uses this PRC to send EAP messages
               to the PDP."

             ::= { authClasses 6 }

         authEapReqExtEntry OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         AuthEapReqExtEntry

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             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                "Entry oid for the authEapReqExtTable PRC. InstanceId's
                for this extended PRC are assigned by the base PRC
                [SPPI]."

             EXTENDS { authExtEntry }
             UNIQUENESS { }

             ::= { authEapReqExtTable 1 }

         AuthEapReqExtEntry::= SEQUENCE {
                 authEapReqExtSpecific    OCTET STRING
         }

         authEapReqExtSpecific OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         OCTET STRING
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "Opaque EAP Request octet string."

             ::= { authEapReqExtEntry 1 }


         --
         -- AuthEapRespExt Table
         --

         authEapRespExtTable OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         SEQUENCE OF AuthEapRespExtEntry
             PIB-ACCESS     install
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "This is a concrete PRC used to contain EAP
                 authentication fields. This PRC extends the base PRC
                 authExtEntry. The PDP responds using this PRC for EAP
                 exchanges."

             ::= { authClasses 7 }

         authEapRespExtEntry OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         AuthEapRespExtEntry
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
               "Entry oid for the authEapRespExtTable PRC. InstanceId's
               for this extended PRC are assigned by the base PRC
               [SPPI]."

             EXTENDS { authExtEntry }
             UNIQUENESS { }

             ::= { authEapRespExtTable 1 }


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         AuthEapRespExtEntry::= SEQUENCE {
                 authEapRespExtSpecific    OCTET STRING
         }

         authEapRespExtSpecific OBJECT-TYPE
             SYNTAX         OCTET STRING
             STATUS         current
             DESCRIPTION
                 "Opaque EAP Response octet string."

             ::= { authEapRespExtEntry 1 }


      --
      -- conformance section tbd
      --

      END




































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9. Security Considerations

   A COPS client-type implemented within the framework outlined in this
   document necessarily transmits sensitive authentication credentials
   between the PEP and the PDP. The COPS protocol provides optional
   message level security for authentication, replay protection, and
   message integrity for communications occurring between the PEP and
   the PDP by the use of the COPS Message Integrity Object [COPS].
   Additionally, COPS optionally reuses existing protocols for security
   such as IPSEC [IPSEC] or TLS to authenticate and secure COPS
   communications. Careful consideration should be given to using these
   mechanisms to reduce the probability of compromising authentication
   credentials. Furthermore, using these mechanisms cannot protect
   communication between an external authentication server and the PDP.
   So, when the PDP acts a proxy for an authentication server,
   consideration must be given to securing communications between the
   PDP and the authentication server as well. A discussion of
   applicable security techniques would be specific to any given
   authentication protocol and is outside the scope of this document.



































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10. References

   [MODEL]  Y. Bernet, S. Blake, A. Smith, D. Grossman, "An Informal
            Management Model for Diffserv Routers,"
            draft-ietf-diffserv-model-06.txt, February 2001.

   [DSPIB]  M. Fine, K. McCloghrie, J. Seligson, K. Chan, S. Hahn, C.
            Bell, A. Smith, F. Reichmeyer, "Differentiated
            Services Quality of Service Policy Information Base,"
            draft-ietf-diffserv-pib-05.txt, December 2001.

   [FWPIB]  M. Fine, K. McCloghrie, J. Seligson, K. Chan, S. Hahn, R.
            Sahita, A. Smith, F. Reichmeyer, "Framework Policy
            Information Base,"
            draft-ietf-rap-frameworkpib-07.txt, January 2002.

   [AUTH]   B. Lloyd, W. Simpson, "PPP Authentication Protocols,"
            RFC 1334, October 1992.

   [CHAP]   W. Simpson, "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication
            Protocol (CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996.

   [EAP]    L. Blunk, J. Vollbrecht, "PPP Extensible Authentication
            Protocol (EAP)", RFC 2284, March 1998.

   [NAI]    B. Aboba, M. Beadles, "The Network Access Identifier,"
            RFC 2486, January 1999.

   [IPSEC]  R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the Internet
            Protocol", RFC 2401, August 1995.

   [COPS]   D. Durham, et al., "The COPS (Common Open Policy Service)
            Protocol", RFC 2748, January 2000.

   [COPSPR] K. Chan, et al., "COPS Usage for Policy Provisioning
            (COPS-PR)", RFC 3084, March 2001.

   [SPPI]   K. McCloghrie, M. Fine, J. Seligson, K. Chan, S. Hahn,
            R. Sahita, A. Smith, F. Reichmeyer, "Structure of Policy
            Provisioning Information", RFC 3159,August 2001.














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11. Author Information and Acknowledgments

   Walter Weiss
       Ellacoya Networks
       7 Henry Clay Drive
       Merrimack, NH 03054
       Phone: +1 603 879 7364
       E-mail: wweiss@ellacoya.com

   John Vollbrecht
       Interlink Networks, Inc.
       775 Technology Drive, Suite 200
       Ann Arbor, MI  48108
       Phone: +1 734 821 1205
       E-Mail: jrv@interlinknetworks.com

   David Spence
       Interlink Networks, Inc.
       775 Technology Drive, Suite 200
       Ann Arbor, MI  48108
       Phone: +1 734 821 1203
       E-Mail: dspence@interlinknetworks.com

   David Rago
       Interlink Networks, Inc.
       775 Technology Drive, Suite 200
       Ann Arbor, MI  48108
       Phone: +1 734 821 1241
       E-Mail: drago@interlinknetworks.com

   Freek Dijkstra
       Physics and Astronomy Department
       Utrecht University
       Princetonplein 5
       3584 CC Utrecht
       The Netherlands
       Phone: +31 30 2537724
       Email: F.Dijkstra@phys.uu.nl

   Cees de Laat
       Faculty of Science, Informatics Institute,
       University of Amsterdam
       Kruislaan 403
       1098 SJ Amsterdam
       The Netherlands
       Phone: +31 20 5257590
       E-Mail: delaat@science.uva.nl







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   Leon Gommans
       Faculty of Science, Informatics Institute,
       University of Amsterdam
       Kruislaan 403
       1098 SJ Amsterdam
       The Netherlands
       Phone: +31 20 5257586
       E-Mail: lgommans@science.uva.nl

   Amol Kulkarni
       Intel
       2111 NE 25th Avenue
       Hillsboro, OR 97124
       Phone:  503.712.1168
       E-Mail: Amol.Kulkarni@intel.com

   Ravi Sahita
       Intel
       2111 NE 25th Avenue
       Hillsboro, OR 97124
       Phone:  503.712.1554
       E-Mail: Ravi.Sahita@intel.com

   Kwok Ho Chan
       Nortel Networks, Inc.
       600 Technology Park Drive
       Billerica, MA 01821 USA
       Phone: +1 978 288 8175
       E-Mail: khchan@nortelnetworks.com

























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