Internet Engineering Task Force Walter Weiss
RAP Working Group Ellacoya Networks
Expiration: October 2002 John Vollbrecht
draft-ietf-rap-access-bind-01.txt David Spence
David Rago
InterLink Networks
Cees de Laat
Leon Gommans
Univ. of Amsterdam
Freek Dijkstra
Univ. of Utrecht
Amol Kulkarni
Ravi Sahita
Intel
Kwok Ho Chan
Nortel Networks
Framework for Binding Access Control to COPS Provisioning
Last Updated: 3/1/02
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC-2119].
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Status of this Memo................................................1
Conventions used in this document..................................1
Abstract...........................................................4
1. Introduction....................................................4
2. Paradigm for the Bind PIB.......................................6
2.1 Event Handler Concepts.........................................6
2.1.1 Example - Ethernet IP Address Authorization..................9
2.2. Context Data.................................................10
2.3. Policy Distribution and Management...........................11
2.4. Interactions with DiffServ model.............................11
2.5. Interactions with RSVP model.................................12
3. Supporting various client Authentication Protocols.............14
3.1. Provisioning.................................................14
3.2. EAP Authentication...........................................15
3.2.1. EAP Message sequence.......................................15
3.2.2. AuthEapReqExt and AuthEapRespExt data structures...........17
3.3. PAP Authentication...........................................17
3.3.1. PAP Connection sequence....................................18
3.3.2. AuthPapExtEntry datastructure..............................19
3.4. CHAP Authentication..........................................20
3.4.1. CHAP Connection sequence...................................20
3.4.2. AuthChapExtEntry datastructure.............................22
3.5. HTTP Authentication..........................................23
4. Data Structures................................................24
4.1. Event class..................................................24
4.2. EventHandler class...........................................24
4.3. EventHdlrElement class.......................................25
4.4. EventHdlrEventScope class....................................26
4.5. EventHdlrHandleScope class...................................28
4.6. Behavior of the Event and Handle Scope classes...............29
4.7. EventHdlrAuthProtocol class..................................30
4.8. DatapathEventHdlr Class......................................31
4.9. ContextData class............................................31
4.10. ContextData classes.........................................32
4.10.1. CtxtL3Hdr class...........................................32
4.10.2. Ctxt802Hdr class..........................................33
4.10.3. CtxtDialupInterface class.................................34
4.10.4 CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocol class...........................35
4.10.5 CtxtDialupIfLoginService class.............................36
4.10.6 CtxtDialupIfLoginLat class.................................36
4.11. AuthExt class...............................................37
4.11.1. UserAuthExt class.........................................37
4.11.2. AuthChapExt class.........................................37
4.11.3. AuthPapExt class..........................................38
4.11.4. AuthExtResult class.......................................38
4.11.5. AuthEapReqExt class.......................................38
4.11.6. AuthEapRespExt class......................................39
5. Message Types..................................................40
5.1. Event Handler Provisioning Decisions.........................40
5.2. Provisioning Decision........................................41
5.3. PEP Event Message............................................41
5.4. PDP Provisioning Decision....................................42
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5.5. PDP fetching Event-specific ContextData......................42
5.6. Event-specific ContextData Response..........................43
5.7. Opaque Decision..............................................43
5.8. Opaque Report................................................43
6. Combining Data Structures in Messages..........................45
6.1. Combining Context Data in Event Messages.....................45
7. Access Bind Usage Examples.....................................46
7.1 Wireless LAN (802.11 Access Point) Usage Example..............46
7.1.1 Wireless LAN Access Event Handler Provisioning..............47
7.1.2 Wireless LAN Access Event Handling..........................48
7.1.3 Wireless LAN Access Event Decision..........................48
7.2 RSVP Usage Example............................................49
8. The AccessBind PIB Module......................................56
9. Security Considerations.......................................104
10. References...................................................105
11. Author Information and Acknowledgments.......................106
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Abstract
There is an ever-growing distinction between edge and core
functionality. While the core continues to focus on stability and
pure forwarding functionality, the edges increasingly need to deal
with dynamic capabilities like QoS management, VPN encapsulations,
encryption, dynamic steering and service monitoring. The dynamic
deployment of these functions is dependent on specific contextual
knowledge such as the physical location of the data stream and the
identity of the client or system generating the data.
In many environments, there is a requirement to both bind resource
consumption to an identity or account, and also to quickly and
efficiently provision the appropriate set of policies for that
client or account. It is possible to provide this capability with a
collection of currently available protocols. However, the
synchronization of account and provisioning information between
these protocols makes this approach extremely unwieldy.
This memo offers a solution in the form of a single COPS PIB capable
not only of supporting all the above requirements but also offering
a scalable means for extending the provisioning capabilities as new
technologies are standardized. Specifically, we offer a mechanism
for provisioning the criteria for initiating dynamic event
notifications from the PEP as well as a means for propagating
identity credentials received by the PEP to allow the PDP to
validate a client identity or an account as part of the event
notification process.
1. Introduction
There are two sides to access control. The one side is the
negotiation between the client and the edge device (also known as
the policy enforcement point), for example between a workstation and
an Ethernet switch supporting authentication protocols like 802.1x
and PPPoE. The other side of a typical access control model is an
interaction between the edge device (PEP) and a PDP, such that the
PDP performs the client/account validation process and notifies the
PEP of the result. This separation of access control into two parts
is necessary because invariably the PEP does not have the capacity
to store all possible identities and credentials. This information
is typically stored in a server (PDP).
In reality access control can include authentication as one piece of
a larger authorization process. As such, authorization has much in
common with RSVP. When an RSVP service request is made, the PDP
evaluates a set of criteria including what is being requested, what
the availability of specific resources are, the identity of the
requestor, and even the location of the requestor. All these
criteria are taken into consideration before determining whether the
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RSVP request should be honored. In addition, if the request is
honored, specific provisioning actions may be taken to bound or
manage the request. Similarly, the ability for a PDP to respond to a
non-RSVP service request potentially requires all the same
information of a traditional RSVP request in order to determine
whether the request should be accepted or rejected.
It is also important to note that a service request should not just
be restricted to network access. In practice, there are many
instances where a determination of access privileges requires an
explicit decision. For instance, there are scenarios where limited
network access is granted based on the specific criteria, but
subsequent authorization is required to access a premium resource
that requires incremental authentication (via HTTP for example).
Another possible scenario occurs when initial access is authorized
based on one set of credentials, but usage of a specific resource
requires an examination of an account balance. These authorizations
will be referred to as "PEP Events" to denote the fact that PEP is
generating an event indicating a request for some type of service.
In order to support the broad variety of potential PEP Events, there
must be a way of provisioning the criteria for generating the PEP
Event. In the most common case the PEP Event is generated as a
result of some type of packet oriented event such as activity on a
link, traffic of a particular type or traffic from a new, unknown IP
address.
This leads to a useful observation: PEP Events need to be defined
within the context of a network data path. In other words, the data
path mechanisms defined in the DiffServ informal model [MODEL] and
the DiffServ PIB [DSPIB] provide a means for specifying the
circumstances for generating a PEP Event by reusing elements from
the model like the qosDatapathTable table and the qosClfrTable table
in the DiffServ PIB.
Another consideration is the variety of information that can
potentially be included in a PEP Event. For instance, a PEP Event
could pass information about the client (domain), the physical port
(dial up interface), L2 headers, L3 headers, encapsulation headers
(tunnels), cookies, and additional information already negotiated
prior to generating the PEP Event. Given the amount of information
that could be sent with the PEP Event, it is reasonable to allow the
PDP to configure the PEP with the set of information the PDP would
like to have included with a specific type of PEP Event.
PEP Events provide a convenient means for the PEP to signal an event
that requires specific actions. A PDP authorization for access to
specific resources (and the potential verification of identity) is
one example of an event that not only requires a response but also
some potential provisioning work. It is interesting to note how
neatly RSVP decision support fits into this model. In the original
COPS design [COPS], the RESV request was sent in a COPS request and
a COPS response message determined whether the reservation should be
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accepted or not. The enhancements provided by this PIB not only
allow RSVP messages to generate access requests, but also explicitly
provision QoS resources, using COPS-PR [COPSPR], to support the
reservation. This generalizes COPS for RSVP and allows it to evolve
to the COPS-PR model.
There are a number of situations where Events and associated
provisioning need to be negotiated quickly. Mobile-IP applications
in particular require speedy resolution of PEP Events. This implies
that the combination of PEP Events and provisioning needs to be
completed with the minimum number of communication legs (round
trips).
2. Paradigm for the Bind PIB
There are several key aspects to this PIB. First there is the
ability to provisioning for future authorization events, known as
PEP Events. Second, there is a set of tables that used to notify the
PDP of an attempt to access managed resources. These tables can also
include credentials necessary to verify client identity. Finally,
there are tables that determine how dialogs (COPS Request Handles)
between the PEP and PDP should be grouped. In order to provide
concurrency between competing events and provisioning requests,
there must be a means for determining which PEP Events require a new
COPS Request Handle and which should use existing handles.
2.1 Event Handler Concepts
This section introduces the concept of an Event Handler. Much of
what is described in this paper is based on the Event Handler.
Event Handlers are implemented in PEPs and configured by PDPs. Event
Handlers are provisioned by standard COPS-PR protocol sequences. A
PEP will announce what Event Handlers are available in the
capabilities table of the COPS-PR Request message. The PDP will
provision the Event Handlers with Decision messages.
Once an Event Handler is provisioned it is responsible for
identifying packets that require the PDP to be notified with an
Event Message.
The general model for Event Messages requests includes a client, a
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) and a Policy Decision Point (PDP). In
this model, the PEP is the interface to the client, and the Event
Handler is the part of the PEP that is responsible for recognizing
the conditions for client authorization, generating the Event
Message to the PDP, and communicating with the Client, if necessary,
to get identity or other information.
The Event Handler takes a signal or message from the client and
translates it into an Event Message to send to the PDP. It takes the
provisioning Decision from the PDP and, in cases where the client is
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aware of the authorization process, does what is needed to
communicate the Decision to the client.
The Event Message is sent from the PEP to the PDP. The PDP uses the
Event Message to determine the appropriate provisioning steps. In
some cases identity verification may require sending some
intermediate messages to authenticate the client prior to
provisioning the PEP with the policies appropriate to the client.
The PEP then returns a Report to the PDP confirming what was
provisioned by the Decision.
| C |->Access Request->| | | |
| L | | |-Event Message---------->| |
| I | <-(optional)-> |PEP | <-(optional)-> |PDP |
| E | | |<-Provisioning Decision -| |
| N |<-Access Decision-| | | |
| T | | | --> Access Report ----->| |
Fig. 2.1 Access Control Protocol Sequence
This paper is primarily concerned with the function of the Event
Handler and the communication between the PEP and PDP. Communication
between the Client and PEP is assumed to be something like PPP or
802.1, and the capabilities described here should work with any
Client/PEP communication method.
The PEP Event Message and PDP Provisioning Decision sequence is
similar to the "classical" COPS RSVP model. The Report confirming
that the Decision was installed correctly on the PEP is an extra
message beyond what is included in the RSVP sequence. We believe
this is a good approach, but expect further discussion (It is
interesting to note that RADIUS does not send an acknowledgements of
Access Accepts/Rejects, and the DIAMETER drafts specify no
acknowledgement, but do expect a negative message if the Reply
cannot be processed correctly).
An Event Handler is a data path element in the PEP. Each Event
Handler has a "selector" that identifies packets that should cause
Event Messages (See section 4.3 - Filter Entries). The selector
essentially divides all packets into two sets, one set the Event
Handler is responsible for generating Event Messages; the other set
it just passes to the next data path element. For example, if an
Event HandlerÆs selector is "All new source IP addresses", an
incoming packetÆs Source IP address is examined and if it is old,
the packet passed on without further processing. If the source IP
address is new or unknown, an Event Message is generated.
Event Messages are grouped by COPS Request Handles. Each Event
Message may cause a new COPS Request Handle to be generated or a set
of Event Messages may all share the same COPS Request Handle (note:
see section 4.3-4.6). The distinction between selector and Event
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Handle spelled out in 4.3-4.6, and will be worked on in the next
revision of this draft). Attributes in the Access Bind PIB are
provided to identify what how Event Messages are bound to COPS
Request Handles.
Event Handlers are designed to detect conditions in the PEP that
result in the sending of Event Messages to the PDP. The Access Bind
PIB defines a class to specify the criteria for generating an event.
In some cases an event is appropriate every time the criteria is
met. In other instances an event is appropriate only on the first
occurrence. The provisioning event criteria can be difficult since
it is often the case that the PDP canÆt anticipate what the PEP will
see. For instance, when it is desirable to generate events every
time a new user or device is recognized, the PDP canÆt anticipate
which devices will be recognized or the order in which they will
occur. Filter expressions can be constructed that enable the
description of a set of packet fields that must match and a set of
packet fields that collectively represent a new, unique combination.
This expressive capability allows the PDP to indicate to the PEP
that one event should be generated the first time a Src IP address
has been seen by the PEP, but not generate events for subsequent
packets with the same Src IP address.
One interesting problem associated with event driven provisioning is
avoiding blocking of one event due to provisioning activity for a
different event. On the other hand, there are situations where
serialization or ordering of events is important. We use COPS
Request Handles to address both these needs. However, this requires
explicit provisioning to indicate when new handles should be
provisioned and which events should be processed through which
handles. The approach taken in this paper is that the scope of the
COPS Request Handle is defined by one or more Filter entries defined
in the COPS Framework PIB [FWPIB], this PIB and other PIBs. For
example, if a FilterEntry object specifies SRC IP address
(10.20.0.0) and SRC IP Mask (FF.FF.0.0) each new IP address within
the range 10.20.0.0 and 10.20.255.255 will trigger the creation of a
new Handle. The for this example, any packet with a SRC IP address
that generates a new Event Message will use the existing handle if
that handle was already defined for that specific SRC IP address.
When a packet arrives at the Event Handler, it first checks if it
meets the criteria for generating an Event (event criteria will be
discussed later). In the example above, a packet with a SRC IP
address of 10.25.12.100 would not match the range criteria and would
be passed to the next data path element. If it is selected, then a
check is made to see if it matches the criteria for an existing COPS
Request Handle.
If it does not match the criteria for an existing COPS Request
Handle, then the PEP instantiates a new Request Handle and sends an
Event Message to the PDP using the new Handle. In either case the
PDP analyzes the Event Message, possibly sending additional messages
back to the PEP to support authentication and provisioning for the
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new address. If authentication was performed, a final Authentication
Result object is sent to the PEP to indicate the authentication was
successful or not. This is needed to allow the PAP, CHAP and EAP
authentication processes to report success back to the
authenticating user.
2.1.1 Example - Ethernet IP Address Authorization
This (relatively simple) example assumes an edge device has an
Ethernet interface and wants to require each new Source IP address
arriving at one Ethernet port to be authorized before getting general
access to the network. Assume also that some clients are to get
preferred access (via DiffServ Marking).
In the example, the PEP is configured with a classifier that has
explicit entries for each source address that has already be
authenticated and a default classifier element matching all addresses
to points to an Event Handler. Since the default classifier element
is only used if none of the other classifier elements match, the
Event Handler is only invoked for new Src IP addresses that have not
yet been explicitly provisioned into the classifier. Each non-default
classifier element points to another classifier that lists the
policies uniquely for that Src IP address. The addresses of "premium"
users are assigned a high QoS while the addresses of "normal" users
are assigned best effort QoS. Since the Event Handler is not
terminating any packets, the Event Handler passes all packets through
to the Best Effort Queue.
When the PEP comes up it sends information about its Event Handlers
to the PDP in a capabilities table. After capability negotiation is
complete, the PDP provisions a set of policies that configure the
Event Handlers behind the Ethernet interfaceÆs datapath. Each Event
Handler Table will have a pointer to a (tagged) set of
EventHandlerElement Tables that provide Filter matching and COPS
Request Handle matching rules. In this case, the EventHandlerElement
table will be provisioned generate unique Request Handles and Events
the first time it matches a new "SourceIPAddresses."
Once the Event Handler is setup, it is able to process packets
arriving at the Ethernet Interface. The Event Handler looks at all
packets with Src IP addresses that have not been explicitly been
defined in the upstream Classifier and uses the event matching rules
to check if the packet contains an unknown Src IP address within the
configured range. If the packet matches an event matching rule, the
Event Handler checks what information the PDP requires from the
Client (e.g. username and credential), and collects this
information. The PEP then checks to see if it should use an existing
Request Handle or create a new one. In this example, each new
address gets a unique COPS Request Handle so that all the address-
specific (user specific) policies (and feedback information) are
managed through a single COPS dialog. A unique handle also has the
benefit of automatically removing all objects provisioned through
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the Handle when the Handle is deleted (the user ends their session).
After the Request Handle is set up, an Event Message is sent to the
PDP containing the user information including address, port, and
credential information.
The PDP checks the information passed in the Event Message,
authenticates the client (if required), and decides which policy
should apply to that IP address. It sends a Provisioning Decision,
containing the appropriate policy (assign to "premium" queue) to the
PEP using the newly created Request Handle.
Additional examples using the Access Bind PIB to support RSVP,
802.11, and other protocols are described in section 7.
2.2. Context Data
As mentioned previously, Event Messages frequently require
information beyond just the identity of the client. Information
about the physical interface, the protocols being used, and the
protocol bindings (VLANs, IP addresses, etc.) may also be required
to provide enough information to the PDP to provide proper
provisioning guidance. Therefore a mechanism is required that allows
the PDP to specify what information is needed.
With the advent of Tunnels, the same headers can be repeated
(nested) within a single client message. This makes identification
of specific attributes such as IP Addresses difficult because it is
unclear whether the PDP needs the IP Address in the innermost or
outermost header. This gets even more complicated when more than two
layers are involved (i.e. VLAN and label stacking). The ContextData
class, described in more detail below, allows the PDP to explicitly
specify the set of nested headers that it needs more details on.
This can either be specified in from the outermost header or the
innermost header, as well as all headers of a particular type.
Since the volume of information can be quite large and is very PEP
and interface specific, it is appropriate to organize the
information into manageable chunks. This approach was a compromise
between two extremes. One extreme is one large data structure with
all possible information. The other extreme is specifying each
attribute explicitly. The first extreme is not viable because it is
difficult to adapt to new types of information. The second
alternative is very configuration intensive, particularly for header
data that must distinguish inner and outer headers. The choice to
group context data into classes and request the data at the class
level is not without problems. If the PDP is only interested in a
single attribute within a given class, there is no way to specify
this. Hence the PEP has to fill in the entire class and the PDP has
to parse the entire class to find the appropriate attribute.
In order for the PDP to specify which chunks of context data it
needs, this PIB defines a table called the ContextData class that
allows the PDP to specify the tables it needs. This table is
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discussed in more detail in section 4.9. The messages used to send
ContextData are discussed in sections 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 6.1.
2.3. Policy Distribution and Management
One of the purposes of this paper is to demonstrate how
authorization and authentication can be bound to traditional COPS
provisioning. Stated somewhat differently, this paper provides the
means for seamlessly integrating outsourcing with provisioning using
only PIBs. Authorization, Authentication, and COPS/RSVP are all
forms of outsourcing because they are all triggered by events in the
PEP and depend on decision support from the PDP. Earlier sections
have gone into fair detail in describing how the PEP can generate
Event Messages. However, we have not yet discussed how these
semantics integrate with traditional COPS PR provisioning semantics.
There are two aspects to provisioning that need to be considered.
First is the provisioning of the Event Handlers themselves. Section
2.1 went into some detail describing how Event Handlers are
provisioned using policy decisions. More details on the Event
Handler tables can be found in sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. In
addition the provisioning messages used to configure Event Handlers
are also described in section 5.1.
The second aspect of provisioning is the use standard provisioning
decisions to bind policies to authorized clients. The goal in
binding events to policies was to minimize reconfiguration.
Therefore, this PIB has been designed to provision Event Handlers as
well as Policies once and bind them together dynamically.
The process for this binding is as follows. An Event Handler can be
configured to generate COPS Request Handles and trigger an Event
Message based on specific criteria. These criteria explicitly scope
the Request Handle. For example, if the criteria were one per unique
source IP address, then there would be one Request Handle for each
unique source IP address and all policies bound to through that
Request Handle would typically operate on all traffic with that
source IP address. Note that the criteria that scope a Request
Handle could also be a unique protocol, unique VLAN, or each unique
RSVP RESV message. It is also worth noting that the Request Handle
bounding criteria could also be a unique combination of field values
such as a VLAN and TCP Port Number.
With the scope of a Handle specified, the Event Handler can
instantiate new Handles in conjunction with the Event Message.
2.4. Interactions with DiffServ model
The DiffServ model [MODEL] and PIB [DSPIB] allow for flexible
addition of new Data Path Functional Elements. The Event Handler is
one such new Data Path Functional Element. Previous sections have
already described how this PIB extends the existing DiffServ
Informal Model and the DiffServ PIB. However, it is worth describing
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how this PIB enhances the basic DiffServ model. First and foremost,
this new PIB provides a means for scaling the basic DiffServ model
to the edges of the network that can have many interfaces and many
specialized services. Previous PIBs only supported the static
configuration of data paths. This meant that dynamic events such as
binding of new clients to existing or new services were difficult to
support because there was no way to anticipate new clients and
because most provisioning was managing classifiers on a per client
per service basis did not scale well.
This PIB addresses this problem by preserving the basic data path
semantics but separating the creation of dynamic (event driven)
policies into a new data path component. This provides a stable data
path for the generation of authorizations while also supporting a
stable data path for the services that various clients may make use
of. The linchpin of this PIB is the Event Handler that provides a
new type of demultiplexor that separates streams of traffic into
individually grouped triggers that in turn support dynamic
authorization. The policy provisioning that results from these
events can be bound back to pre-defined policies to minimize the
changes required to support new clients. As a result, with this PIB,
modifications to service policies can be added or removed at the
session level rather than the raw data path level.
So far we have only discussed the value of authorizing a client when
the link notices new IP address. However, it is worth noting that
because the Event Handler is part of the data path definition, it is
far more flexible. For instance, the Event Handler can be placed
behind a Classifier to explicitly authorize access to a specific
part of the network or specific services. The Event Handler can also
be the FailNext element behind a meter resulting in an authorization
for the use of out-of-profile traffic. Bandwidth Brokers can use
this approach or an Event Handler trapping RSVP RESV messages to
support dynamic bandwidth allocation decisions.
The integration of Event Handler as a Data Path Functional Element
allows seamless integration with DiffServ provisioning.
DiffServ network device mechanism policy control continues to be
supported with the use of DiffServ PIB [DSPIB] with added
functionality at the edge of the network with usage of the Event
Handler. This can now be totally controlled via the use of COPS-PR.
The Policy Server level interaction with DiffServ comes naturally
with the integration of Event Handler as a Data Path Functional
Element when the network data model is common and scoped
appropriately in the schema level, with the Event Handler becoming
stimuli for DiffServ provisioning.
2.5. Interactions with RSVP model
The Event Handler model provides a means for detecting RSVP RESV
messages. This means that the traditional COPS outsourcing model
could eventually be phased out in favor of the provisioning model
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and the use of this PIB. This is discussed in more detail in section
7.2.
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3. Supporting various client Authentication Protocols
In the operational model for this PIB, the Authentication Server is
a specific function of the PDP. The main purpose of the
authentication portions of this PIB is to verify the validity of
client credentials by an Authentication Server. The verification
process itself may do this whilst ensuring some level of
authenticity, confidentiality and integrity. Messages exchanged
between a Client and Authentication Server (PDP) may remain
confidential to PEP's and Proxy Servers. The message integrity may
be ensured by some hashing algorithm so PEP's and Proxy's may
inspect but not modify the content of authentication messages.
Clients, PEP's, Proxy's and PDP's will always need some security
method to ensure message authenticity.
Some authentication protocols explicitly consider proxies by
allowing the payload to be carried over a variety of transports.
Others depend on the termination point of the connection to
explicitly proxy the authentication, when that is necessary. In
order to demonstrate the general utility of this model, a variety of
client authentication protocols will be considered in this document.
For each protocol, the negotiation mechanism will be described and
the mapping to this framework will be detailed.
3.1. Provisioning
The PEP will not start an authentication sequence with the client if
it hasnÆt been told to do that. It will only do so when a specific
event occurs. The PDP tells the PEP exactly when this event should
be triggered. This process is called provisioning.
The provisioning starts with the initial Provisioning Request, which
is typically sent at boot time. The PEP sends up capability PRCÆs
indicating the types of authentication it can handle. The PDP will
reply by setting the following Access Bind PRCÆs:
a. dpeventHandler (datapathEventHandler)
b. dpEventhdlrAuthProtocol
c. eventHdlrElement
d. eventHdlrEventScope
e. eventHdlrHandleScope
f. contextData
and an additional PRC instance referred to by the
eventhdlrEventScopeFilter in the eventhdlrEventScope table,
indicating how the signaling trigger is recognized.
In case the PDP wants the PEP to perform an authentication when an
event is triggered, it should set dpeventhdlrRequestAuth in the
dpEventHdlr to true and optionally let the dpEventHdlrAuthProtocol
field point to a dpEventHdlrAuthProtocol to indicate which
authentication protocol should be used for the authentication.
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As soon as the PDP has provisioned the PEP to watch for certain
traffic that triggers an event, the PEP is ready to start an
authentication.
3.2. EAP Authentication
The most significant aspect distinguishing EAP [EAP] from other
authentication protocols is that EAP assumes the negotiation is
between the client and the authentication server. In anticipation of
the fact that the terminating point of a connection such as PPP or
L2TP is not necessarily the same as the agent managing client
authentication, EAP encapsulates itÆs negotiation process in a
separate header that can be forwarded in entirety to the server.
This mechanism provides extra security by preventing intermediate
proxies from monitoring or managing authentication credentials.
EAP supports a number of different authentication mechanisms
including MD5, TLS, and One-Time-Password authentication.
The terminology used in [EAP] differs from the terminology used in
this document. In particular, the peer, as defined in section 1.2 of
[EAP], is referred to as "Client" in this document. Similarly, the
"authenticator" is called a PEP in this document and "back-end
server" is called the Authentication Server function of the PDP (or
just PDP) in this document.
3.2.1. EAP Message sequence
The generic sequence of transmissions between the PEP and PDP has
already been described in section 2. In particular, figure 2.1 gives
an overview of the messages involved between the Client workstation,
PEP and PDP. EAP messages are embedded in PPP packets in the
communication between the Client and the PEP. In the communication
between the PEP and PDP, the EAP messages are embedded in COPS
Request, COPS Decision and COPS Report messages. Figure 3.1 shows
how EAP may be used to retrieve credentials from the client
workstation by the PDP.
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time
| +---+ +---+ +---+
| | | | |-- COPS-PRC exchange ---->| |
| | | | |<- COPS-Dec eventHandler -| |
| | |-- PPP traffic ----->| | | |
| | |<- PPP LCP Req-EAP --| | | |
| | U |-- PPP LCP ACK-EAP ->| P | | P |
| | s |<- PPP EAP Req Id ---| E | | D |
| | e |-- PPP EAP Res Id -->| P | | P |
| | r | | |-- COPS-Req Ses-EAP ---->| |
| | | | |<- COPS-Dec EAP Req Chal -| |
| | |<- PPP EAP Req Chal -| | | |
| | |- PPP EAP Res Chal ->| | | |
| | | | |- COPS-Rep EAP Res Chal ->| |
| | | | | | |
| | | | |<- COPS-Dec EAP Success --| |
| | |<- PPP EAP success --| | | |
V +---+ +---+ +---+
Fig 3.1: Embedding of EAP messages between the Client workstation
and the PEP, and between the PEP and PDP. The EAP messages may be
opaque to the PEP.
Typically, when the PEP boots up, it sends itÆs capabilities to the
PDP in a COPS message and is than configured by the PDP with one or
more datapathEventHandlers specifying the criteria for generating
PEP Event Messages. The first message after this provisioning
process from the PEP to the PDP is a new Event Message. The PEP
sends a COPS request to the PDP containing a new instance of the
Event table. The eventEventHdlr attribute in the Event table entry
is a ReferenceId that points to a dpeventHandler entry indicating
(by means of the dpEventHdlrAuthProtocol) that EAP is a valid
protocol to use for this Event. Also, the eventCause attribute in
the Event table entry is a ReferenceId that points to an
eventhdlrElement indication of which Filter (by means of the
eventhdlrEventScope) triggered the event.
All EAP messages necessary to complete the authentication process
will be forwarded to the PDP. All of the negotiation occurs between
the Client and the PDP and should, except for the EAP message code
field, not be examined by the PEP. In order to support multiple EAP
protocols, this PIB supports a generic EAP request class and EAP
response class. Each class has a single string attribute
(authEapReqExtSpecific and authEapRespExtSpecific, respectively)
within which the entire EAP message is passed.
Although figure 3.1 shows two EAP messages going from the PDP to the
Client and two EAP messages being returned from the client to the
PDP, the actual number of messages exchanged can be any amount. The
PDP may continue to retrieve additional credentials from the client
for as long as it wishes. As soon as the PDP has all the necessary
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credentials from the client, the PDP may continue to provision the
PEP with policies. This is action is not shown in figure 3.1.
The PDP should end the EAP negotiation with an EAP Success or an EAP
Failure message. If the PDP sends a EAP Success, the PEP must from
then on use the matchNext Prid to determine the next processing
filter for data defined by the values described using the
eventhdlrEventScope.
3.2.2. AuthEapReqExt and AuthEapRespExt data structures
The EAP messages are embedded in COPS by sending an instance of the
authEapReqExt or authEapRespExt table, which each have an attribute
(Specific) to encapsulate the appropriate EAP messages necessary for
the authentication mechanism. The authEapReqExt table is owned and
managed by the PEP, while the authEapReqExt table is owned and
managed by the PDP. Put another way, the PDP generates authEapReqExt
instances that it sends in Decision messages and the PEP generates
authEapRespExt instances that it sends in Report messages. Since
neither the PEP nor the PDP needs to maintain the messages
permanently, the same instance of each class is used when more than
one exchange is required in each direction.
Since both AuthEapReqExt and AuthEapRespExt are extensions of the
AuthExt class, they both inherit the attributes of AuthExt.
AuthEapReXXExt table attributes Attribute type
------------------------------- --------------
authExtId InstanceId
authExtEvent ReferenceId
authEapReXXExtSpecific OCTET STRING
Fig 3.2: Data elements in AuthEapReqExt and AuthEapRespExt tables
The AuthEapReXXExt class contains three attributes. The instanceId
is used to uniquely define the instance in the table. However, since
EAP messages are meant to be opaque, they should not be referenced.
Because the purpose of the classes is to carry EAP messages and each
message is transient instances of these tables are temporary and
should not be referred to. The Event attribute points to the Event
table entry for which EAP is being negotiated. The format of EAP
packages being passed by the AuthEapReXXExt classes is described in
[EAP].
3.3. PAP Authentication
PAP (Password Authentication Protocol), as described in section 2 of
[AUTH] is a very simple authentication mechanism used over PPP. It
is not considered to be a secure mechanism, since it sends passwords
over the wire in clear text format. However, where one-time
passwords are used, this security concern is mitigated. It is
described here nonetheless for illustration purposes and because it
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may still be used among ISPs, or in situations where another layer
already performs encryption for security.
The terminology used in [AUTH] differs from the terminology used in
this document. In particular, the peer as defined in section 1.2 of
[AUTH] is referred to as "Client" in this document. Similar, the
"authenticator" is called PEP in this document.
3.3.1. PAP Connection sequence
Figure 3.3 shows how PAP may be used to retrieve credentials from
the client workstation by the PDP.
time
| +---+ +---+ +---+
| | | | |-- COPS-PRC exchange ---->| |
| | | | |<- COPS-Dec eventHandler -| |
| | |-- PPP traffic ----->| | | |
| | |<- PPP LCP Req-PAP --| | | |
| | U |-- PPP LCP ACK-PAP ->| P | | P |
| | s |-- PPP PAP Id, Pwd ->| E | | D |
| | e | | P |-- COPS-Req event, -->| P |
| | r | | |-- userPapExt -->| |
| | | | | | |
| | | | |<- COPS-Dec eventElement -| |
| | | | |<- COPS-Dec authResult ---| |
| | |<- PPP PAP ack ------| | | |
V +---+ +---+ +---+
Fig 3.3: Embedding of PAP messages between the Client workstation
and the PEP, and between the PEP and PDP.
When the dpEventHandler has been configured to require
authentication, a PEP Event message will not be generated until
after a minimal set of credentials have been negotiated with the
client. For PAP, this means that a PEP Event Message will not be
generated until after the authRealm and authUsername have been
determined. This means that that the PEP must receive a PAP Identity
message before it can send the PEP Event Message.
The Client will send the Identity and Password to the PEP. The PEP
will embed the password into the userPapExt datastructure and send
this to the PDP. Since this datastructure inherits the fields of the
userAuthExt data structure and the extAuth data structure, it will
also contain the PAP identity attribute inserted into the
authUsername attribute of this Instance.
The first connection from the PEP to the PDP is an alert that an
event was triggered. The PEP sends an Event Message over COPS to the
PDP containing a new instance of the Event table. The eventEventHdlr
attribute in the Event table entry is a ReferenceId that points to a
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dpeventHandler entry indicating (by means of the
dpEventHdlrAuthProtocol) that PAP is a valid protocol to use for
this Event. Also, the eventCause attribute in the Event table entry
is a ReferenceId that points to an eventhdlrElement indication which
Filter (by means of the eventhdlrEventScope) did trigger the event.
Along with this new instance of the Event table, the PEP must also
send an instance of the AuthPapExt table.
Besides these required instances, the PEP might have been configured
by the PDP to sent additional information about the client to the
PDP. For example in the case of a dialup connection between the
Client and the PEP, the PDP might specify using a contextData
instance that the PEP should also sent an instance of a
ctxtDialupInterface.
The PDP performs the PAP authentication. When the authentication is
complete and the PDP is ready to authorize the event, the PDP
optionally provisions the PEP with policies. This sequence of
messages should terminate with a PDP Provisioning Decision (a COPS-
PR Decision message). The PDP Provisioning Decision contains an
instance of the AuthExtResult table with the authExtAuthSuccess set
to either TRUE or FALSE. The PEP must upon receipt of this COPS
Decision message, send PAP ACK or NACK message to the client. Also,
if the authExtAuthSuccess attribute was true, then the PEP should
keep track of this particular data, defined by the unique values of
the fields specified using the eventhdlrEventScope.
3.3.2. AuthPapExtEntry datastructure
The PAP information is embedded in the PEP Event Message by sending
an instance of the authPapExt table. Since the authPapExt table is
an extension of the userAuthExt table, which is an extension of the
authExt table, the authPapExt inherits the attributes of these
tables.
AuthPapExt table attributes Attribute type
--------------------------- --------------
authExtId InstanceId
authExtEvent ReferenceId
authRealm OCTET STRING
authUsername OCTET STRING
authPapExtPwd OCTET STRING
Fig 3.4: Attributes of the AuthPapExt table.
The AuthPapExt contains five attributes. The instanceId is used to
uniquely define the instance in the table. However, since the PAP
password is sent to the PDP once and is needed by neither the PDP
nor the PEP after the client is authenticated, the instance should
not be referenced after it is used the first time. The Event
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attribute points to the Event table entry for which PAP is being
negotiated.
The result of the authentication for PAP is sent in the
AuthExtResult table. Since the authExtResult table is an extension
of the AuthExt table, it inherits the attributes of AuthExt.
AuthExtResult table attributes Attribute type
------------------------------ --------------
authExtId InstanceId
authExtEvent ReferenceId
authExtAuthSuccess Truth Value
Fig 3.5: Attributes of the AuthExtResult table.
The AuthExtResult is sent by the PDP to the PEP. If the
authentication was successful and the PEP should from now on use the
matchNext Prid to determine the next processing filter (the next
component down the internal datapath in the PEP) for all traffic
defined by the values of the parameters as set in the
eventhdlrHandlerScope.
3.4. CHAP Authentication
CHAP (Challenge Authentication Protocol) [CHAP] is a strong
authentication mechanism, which eliminates the need to send
passwords in the clear, like PAP does. With CHAP, the Authenticator
generates a challenge key, sends it to the Peer (Client) and the
client responds with a cryptographically hashed response that
depends upon the Challenge and a secret key. The PDP checks the
secret key by performing the same encryption and comparing the
results.
The terminology used in [CHAP] differs from the terminology used in
this document. In particular, the peer as defined in section 1.2 of
[CHAP] is referred to as "Client" in this document. Similar, the
"authenticator" is called PEP in this document.
3.4.1. CHAP Connection sequence
Figure 3.6 shows how CHAP may be used to retrieve credentials from
the client workstation by the PDP.
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time
| +---+ +---+ +---+
| | | | |-- COPS-PRC exchange ---->| |
| | | | |<- COPS-Dec eventHandler -| |
| | |-- PPP traffic ----->| | | |
| | |<- PPP LCP Req-CHAP -| | | |
| | U |- PPP LCP ACK-CHAP ->| P | | P |
| | s |<- PPP CHAP Chal ----| E | | D |
| | e |-- PPP CHAP Ident, ->| P | | P |
| | r |-- Id, Resp ->| | | |
| | | | |-- COPS-Req event-CHAP -->| |
| | | | |-- COPS-Rep CHAP Resp, -->| |
| | | | |-- Chal -->| |
| | | | | | |
| | | | |<- COPS-Dec eventElement -| |
| | | | |<- COPS-Dec authResult ---| |
| | |<- PPP CHAP ack -----| | | |
V +---+ +---+ +---+
Fig 3.6: Embedding of CHAP messages between the Client workstation
and the PEP, and between the PEP and PDP.
As soon as the PEP finished negotiating CHAP as the Authentication
protocol, it generates a challenge itself, and sends this to the
Client. The client will respond to this authentication request by
sending his or her identity, an identifier and the response. The
response is a cryptographically encrypted hash based on the
challenge and secret key (password).
The identifier is only used to keep track of CHAP messages, and
needs to be used by the PEP to recover the associated challenge.
The first connection from the PEP to the PDP is a notice of a new
Event. The PEP sends an Event Message to the PDP containing a new
instance of the Event Table. The eventEventHdlr attribute in the
Event table entry is a ReferenceId that points to a dpeventHandler
entry indicating (by means of the dpEventHdlrAuthProtocol) that CHAP
is a valid protocol to use for this Event. Also, the eventCause
attribute in the Event table entry is a ReferenceId that points to
an eventhdlrElement indication of which Filter (by means of the
eventhdlrEventScope) did trigger the event. Along with this new
instance of the Event table, the PEP must also send an instance of
the AuthChapExt table.
Note that having the PEP issue the challenge allows the PEP to
perpetrate fraud by issuing a replayed request (assuming that the
PEP and PDP are in different domains). The only guard against this
is for the PDP to check that multiple authentication requests for
the same client have unique challenges. This may be slow. PDP and
Authentication server developers who feel this is a security issue
may want to use EAP-MD5 authentication rather then CHAP
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authentication, since EAP-MD5 addresses this problem by letting the
PDP generate the challenge.
Besides these required instances, the PEP might have been configured
by the PDP to send additional information about the client to the
PDP. For example in the case of a dialup connection between the
Client and the PEP, the PDP might specify using a contextData
instance that the PEP should also sent an instance of a
ctxtDialupInterface.
The PDP performs the CHAP authentication. When the authentication is
complete and the PDP is ready to authorize the client, the PDP may
choose to provision the PEP with policies for this client, which was
probably the intention of starting this authentication process in
the first place. This sequence of messages should terminate with a
PDP Provisioning Decision (a COPS-PR Decision message). The PDP
Provisioning Decision contains an instance of the AuthExtResult
table with the authExtAuthSuccess set to either TRUE or FALSE. The
PEP must upon receipt of this COPS Decision message, send PAP ACK or
NACK message to the client. Also, if the authExtAuthSuccess
attribute was true, then the PEP should keep track of this
particular data, defined by the unique values of the fields
specified using the eventhdlrEventScope.
3.4.2. AuthChapExtEntry datastructure
The CHAP information is embedded in the Event Message by sending an
instance of the authChapExt table. Since the authChapExt table is an
extension of the userAuthExt table, which is an extension of the
authExt table, the authChapExt table inherits the attributes of
these tables.
AuthChapExt table attributes Attribute type
---------------------------- --------------
authExtId InstanceId
authExtEvent ReferenceId
authRealm OCTET STRING
authUsername OCTET STRING
authChapExtId Unsigned32
authChapExtChal OCTET STRING
authChapExtResp OCTET STRING
Fig 3.7: Data elements of the AuthChapExtEntry datastructure.
The AuthChapExtEntry contains seven attributes. The instanceId is
used to uniquely define the instance in the table. However, since
the CHAP information is sent to the PDP once and is needed by
neither the PDP nor the PEP after the client is authenticated, the
instance should not be referenced after it is used the first time.
The Event attribute points to the Event table entry for which PAP is
being negotiated.
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The authChapExtChal attribute is the challenge generated by the PEP.
The PDP may check the challenge to see if it is different from
challenges used earlier. This provides an increased level of
security. The Response and the Id is taken from the CHAP message
sent by the client and put into the AuthChapExtEntry by the PEP.
3.5. HTTP Authentication
This section will be added in a subsequent version of this draft.
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4. Data Structures
The data classes defined formally in the Authentication PIB module
(section 7) are introduced and discussed here.
4.1. Event class
Instances of this table represent events that occurred at the PEP.
The events reference the event handler instance and the specific
event handler element that the event was caught by.
The attributes of this class are:
eventId (InstanceId)
Identifies this object
eventEventHdlr (ReferenceId)
This attribute allows a PEP to indicate to the PDP that this
event was generated due to the referenced Event Handler.
This attribute references an event handler via the
indirection PRC frwkReference, since the event handler and
event could potentially belong to a different PIB contexts.
eventCause (ReferenceId)
This attribute references the specific instance in a group
of event Handler elements belonging to an event Handler that
resulted in this event. This attribute references a specific
event handler element via the indirection PRC frwkReference,
since the event handler element and event could potentially
belong to a different PIB contexts.
4.2. EventHandler class
Instances of this PRC are provisioned by the PDP on the PEP to catch
specific events. The Event Handlers reference a group of
eventHdlrElement PRIs that contain the scope of the event and
specify the context data to send to the PDP when an event is caught.
The attributes of the EventHandler Class are as follows:
eventHandlerId (InstanceId)
identifies an instance of this class
eventHandlerElements (TagReferenceId)
A reference to a group of eventHdlrElement instances, each
of which determines the scope (criteria for generating a new
request) and what context information to send in a request.
eventHandlerNonMatchNext (Prid)
The data path for "out of scope" traffic that is not matched
by one of the eventHdlrElementÆs filter clauses.
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4.3. EventHdlrElement class
The purpose of the EventHdlrElement is to specify the
characteristics of the EventHandler. The attributes in the
EventHdlrElement provide maximal reuse by allowing multiple
instances of an EventHandler to reuse the same EventHdlrElement
instance. Each Instance of this PRC belongs to a group of
eventHdlrElement PRIs. The group is identified by the
eventHdlrElementGrpId attribute. These are provisioned by the PDP on
the PEP to catch specific events. This PRC contains the scope of the
event and specifies the context data type to send to the PDP when an
event is caught.
Each EventHdlrElement constitutes a unique event semantic. Since the
Event Scope, Handle Scope and Context Data are all bound to the
EventHdlrElement, different EventHdlrElements can have different
Event Scope (matching rules), Handle Scope (Handle generation
rules), and Context Data (event specific data passed with the Event
Message). This is why Event objects generated by the PEP reference
both the Event Handler and the Event Handler Element that generated
the event.
One key aspect of the EventHdlrElement is the Event Criteria
attribute. This attribute is used to describe whether unique events
are one time events or repeatable events. For instance, every RSVP
message may need to result in a Event Message. However, an Event
Message may only be appropriate the first time a new Src IP address
is seen. After that no events should be generated for that address.
However other new addresses should still generate Event Messages.
The Event Criteria attribute defines the frequency with which events
should be generated. If the Event Criteria is set to One_Time, only
one event will ever be generated for that EventHdlrElement when the
first match occurs, irrespective of the number of subsequent
matches. If the Event Criteria is set to Every_Time, each match will
result in an Event Message. A hybrid case is defined called
On_Change. This option allows a subset of the filter attributes to
be required for matching and a different set of attributes that must
from a unique n-tuple in order to generate an Event Message. See
Section 4.6 for more details of the behavior of the On_Change
attribute.
The EventHdlrHandleScope is optional. If it is not specified, itÆs
behavioral rules are taken from the EventHdlrEventScope objects
associated with the relevant EventHdlrElement. In other words, the
criteria for generating Request Handles will be identical to the
criteria for generating Event Messages when the EventHdlrHandleScope
is not explicitly specified.
The attributes of the EventHdlrElement class are:
eventHdlrElementId (InstanceId)
identifies the object
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eventHdlrElementEventCriteria (Unsigned32)
Indicates when an event is generated. Valid options are
one_time, every_time and on_change. This attribute allows
event Handlers to distinguish one time events (ignore after
the first match) from recurring events (generate an event
every time a match occurs). An enum type is also define to
specify that a new event should be generated when a specific
set of fields change. This is important for protocols like
RSVP because messages are sent both to demonstrate that the
reservation is active and to notify hops of changes to
reservations. Since only changes need to propagate to the
PDP, the on_change option indicates that that events should
be generated selectively.
eventHdlrElementGrpId (TagId)
Group identifier. All instances with the same group
identifier belong to one group and can be referenced
collectively from an eventHandler instance.
eventHdlrElementEventScope (TagReferenceId)
Identifies a group of eventHdlrEventScope entries associated
with this eventHdlrElement instance.
eventHdlrElementHandleScope TagReferenceId)
Identifies a group of eventHdlrHandleScope entries
associated with this eventHdlrElement instance. This is an
optional attribute.
eventHdlrElementContext (TagReferenceId)
Identifies a list of ContextDataTable entries associated
with this eventHdlrElement instance.
eventHdlrElementMatchNext (Prid)
The data path for traffic in scope.
4.4. EventHdlrEventScope class
This PRC defines the scope of an event handler element using
references to filters defined in the Framework PIB or in some other
PIBs. These filters may describe specific protocol properties for
which events need to be generated. These filter references are
grouped using a TagId, and this group is then referenced from the
eventHdlrElement PRC.
Whenever traffic arrives at the EventHandler for which an Event
Message has not already been generated, it is compared against the
FilterEntry objects of the EventHdlrEventScope objects referenced by
the EventHdlrElement. If it matches the criteria specified in all of
the FilterEntry objects, a new Event Message is generated and sent
to the PDP. The value of EventHdlrElementÆs EventCriteria attribute
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in conjunction with the value of the Event Scope classÆs ChangeFlag
attribute determine whether an Event Message will be generated.
For example, if a FilterEntry object specifies SRC IP address
(10.20.0.0) and SRC IP Mask (FF.FF.0.0) and the EventCriteria is set
to One_Time, the first address in the range of 10.20.0.0 and
10.20.255.255 will generate an event and no events will follow. If
the EventCriteria is set to Every_Time for the same attribute
settings, each time a packet contains an IP address within the range
an Event Message will be generated. If the EventCriteria is set to
On_Change and the eventHdlrEventScopeChangeFlag is set to True, each
new IP address within the range 10.20.0.0 and 10.20.255.255 will
trigger a new Event Message. However, as soon as a specific Src IP
address like 10.20.15.109 has generated an Event Message, that
specific address will no longer generate an event. If the
EventCriteria is set to On_Change and the
eventHdlrEventScopeChangeFlag is set to False for the example
address range, than the eventHdlrEventScope instance with the
ChangeFlag set to True will determine uniqueness. In this scenario,
the address range is acting as a strict filter that must be met
without regard to which address in the range is responsible or
whether that address has been seen previously.
When multiple fields are specified for the filter and the ChangeFlag
is set to true, each unique combination of field values generates an
event. For example, if the SRC IP is assigned a range of
10.10.10.224 to 10.10.10.255 and DST Ports 80 to 90 then
10.10.10.240+80, 10.10.10.240+81, and 10.10.10.250+80 would all
generate separate events. The combination of supporting multiple
filters and being able to control precedence allows for the
construction of both lists (10.10.x.x and 10.15.x.x) and
combinations of disjoint headers in a single match criteria (any
combination of 10.10.x.x and VLANs 100 to 120). See Section 4.6 for
a detailed example of filter construction.
The attributes of this class are:
eventHdlrEventScopeId (InstanceId)
Identifies this object
eventHdlrEventScopeGroup (TagId)
Contains the tag by which the EventHdlrElement references
this object. This is the means by which a list of filters
can be associated with an EventHandler.
eventHdlrEventScopeFilter (PRID)
Points to a FilterEntry object (as defined in the Framework
PIB) that specifies the filter for this EventHdlrEventScope
object
eventHdlrEventScopePrecedence (Integer)
Represents the precedence of this criterion with respect to
other criteria within the same group. When the precedence is
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unique, the instance represents an alternative criterion (an
OR function). When the precedence for two or more instances
of the eventHdlrEventScope class is the same, the attributes
within all the instances are treated collectively as a
single filter criteria.
eventHdlrEventScopeChangeFlag (TruthValue)
Boolean value, if set to "True" indicates that a new event
should be generated if any of the assigned fields in the
associated filter change.
4.5. EventHdlrHandleScope class
This PRC defines the scope of Request Handles generated by the PEP
due to events caught by the Event Handler Element. Each instance of
this PRC references filters defined in the Framework PIB or some
other signaling-protocol specific filter PRCs. These filters may
describe specific protocol properties to which this Event Handler is
sensitive. Essentially this table defines when a new COPS Request
Handles must be created by the PEP based on protocol properties. The
Event Handler may be set up to be sensitive to specific field values
and/or the uniqueness of a set of values considered together. This
accommodates various behaviors of signaling protocols. These filter
references are grouped using a TagId, and this group is then
referenced from the eventHdlrElement PRC via the
eventHdlrElementHandleScope TagReference.
The behavior of the EventHdlrHandleScope class is identical to the
behavior of the EventHdlrEventScope. The only difference is the
EventHdlrEventScope determines when new Events are created and the
EventHdlrHandleScope determines when new COPS Request Handles are
created. It is important to note that the attributes determining
when a new Handle is created MUST be a subset of the filter
attributes and filter values specified for the EventHdlrEventScope.
The reason for this is that an Event Message MUST use one of the
available Request Handles to notify the PDP of an Event. If the
attributes and values used in the EventHdlrEventScope are not a
superset of the attributes and values EventHdlrHandleScope, then
there may be no valid Handle over which the Event Message can be
sent to the PDP.
The EventHdlrHandleScope is optional. If it is not specified, itÆs
behavioral rules are taken from the EventHdlrEventScope objects
associated with the relevant EventHdlrElement. In other words, the
criteria for generating Request Handles will be identical to the
criteria for generating Event Messages when the EventHdlrHandleScope
is not explicitly specified.
See Sections 4.3 and 4.6 for more details on the operational
behavior of this class.
eventHdlrHandleScopeId (InstanceId)
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An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an instance of
the eventHdlrHandleScopeTable class.
eventHdlrHandleScopeGroup (TagId)
Represents the binding between the eventHdlrElementEntry and the
eventHdlrHandleScope entries. A group of eventHdlrHandleScope
entries constitutes the criteria for defining the scope of the
Handles generated.
eventHdlrHandleScopeFilter (Prid)
Pointer to a filter to be used as the criteria.
eventHdlrHandleScopePrecedence (INTEGER)
Represents the precedence of this criterion with respect to other
criteria within the same group. When the precedence is unique, the
instance represents an alternative criteria (an ORing function).
When the precedence for two or more instances of the
eventHdlrHandleScope class is the same, the attributes within all
the instances are treated collectively as a single filter criteria.
eventHdlrHandleScopeChangeFlag (TruthValue)
Boolean value, if set to "True" indicates that a new Handle should
be generated if any of the assigned fields in the associated filter
change.
The PDP installs EventHandlerElements as part of constructing the
event handler. EventHandlerElements describe when events will be
generated and which COPS request handles will be used to send the
requests.
4.6. Behavior of the Event and Handle Scope classes
The rules for interpreting Handle Scope and Event Scope are the
same. One is applied to Handles and the other is applied to Events.
Each scope class (Event Scope or Handle Scope) instance has a
precedence value associated with it. When two or more scope class
instances of the same type (event vs handle) have the same
precedence number, they are considered part of the same rule. For
example, the table below lists a set of Event Scope class instances,
their precedence values and the filter field names and values
associated with each instance: (FName is the field name)
Instance Precedence FName/Val FName/Val FName/Val
-------- ---------- --------- --------- ---------
1* 2 W/20 X/2-4
2* 1 A/5-6 B/15 C/10-11
3 2 W/14 Y/500-550
4 2 Q/4-9 R/92
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This example would result in events being generated when one of the
two expressions below are matched:
1. (A=5 or A=6) and (B=15) and (C=10 or C=11 or C=12)
2. (W=20 or W=14) and (X=2-4) and (Y=500-550) and (Q=4-9) and (R=92)
If the EventCriteria was set to "OneTime", then if either 1 or 2 is
matched, one event will be generated and this particular Event
Handler Element will generate no further events. Note that if
matches occur but the "OneTime" event has already been generated,
the Event Hander Element's MatchNext attribute may still determine
what the next forwarding action is for the packet event thought no
event is generated.
If the EventCriteria was set to "EveryTime", then every matching
packet will cause an event. If the EventCriteria was set to
"OnChange", then events will be generated the first time a unique
combination of attributes is seen. Setting the ChangeFlag in the
EventScope class (denoted by the asterisks in the previous example),
identifies the set of attributes for which unique combinations of
values generated new events.
Continuing the example above the following table shows a stream of
packets and whether an event will be generated.
1. A=5, B=19, C=10 No Event (B did not match)
2. A=5, B=15, C=10 Event (Unique pairing of A & C)
3. A=6, B=15, C=11 Event (Unique pairing of A & C)
4. W=20, X=2, Y=500, Q=4, R=92 Event (Unique pairing of W & X)
5. W=20, X=2, Y=505, Q=9, R=92 No Event (Already have a
matched for W & X)
6. A=5, B=15, C=11 Event (Unique pairing of A & C)
7. A=5, B=15, C=10 No Event (Already have a
matched for A & C)
4.7. EventHdlrAuthProtocol class
This
class allows a PDP to configure the set of authentication mechanisms
that are allowed for users or devices that must authenticate in
order to have access policies assigned to them.
The attributes of this class are:
EventHdlrAuthProtocolId (InstanceId)
Identifies this object
EventHdlrAuthProtocolGroup (TagId)
Represents a binding between an datapathEventHdlrTable
instance and a list of eventHdlrAuthProtocolTable instances.
EventHdlrAuthProtocolAuthMechanism (Enum)
Specifies an authentication mechanism to be used in Event
Messages triggered by the EventHandler referencing this
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EventHdlrAuthProtocol object. The value is from an
enumerated list initially consisting of (PAP, CHAP, EAP-MD5,
and EAP-TLS)
4.8. DatapathEventHdlr Class
This PRC is an extension of the EventHandler PRC. This extension
illustrates the use of the EventHandler PRC concept for
authentication usage. Instances of this PRC are provisioned by the
PDP on the PEP to catch specific events that require authentication
processing. This PRC references a group of eventHdlrAuthProtocol
instances that define a set of Authentication mechanisms to use if
an access event is caught by this event Handler. From its base class
(Event Handler) this PRC also references a group of eventHdlrElement
PRIs that contain the scope of the access event and specify the
context data to send to the PDP when an access event is caught.
The attributes of this class are:
datapathEventHdlrRequestAuth (TruthValue)
Boolean flag, if set to "True" requires authentication data
to be sent in the Event Message sent to the PDP.
datapathEventHdlrAuthProtocol (TagReferenceId)
References a group of eventHdlrAuthProtocol instances, each
of which specifies an authentication mechanism.
4.9. ContextData class
This PRC specifies the context information to send to the PDP when
an event is caught. The context information to send is described in
terms of the PRC data types to include in the request, the level of
encapsulated data and the interface information for that request.
The attributes of this class are:
ContextDataId (InstanceId)
Identifies this object
ContextDataGroup (TagId)
Defines the grouping of contextData instances that are
applicable to a given eventHdlrElement.
ContextDataIfElement (PrcIdentifier)
The OID of a class whose instance is to be included with
the PEP request or event-specific ContextData Response.
ContextDataEncapsulation (Integer)
This attribute allows one to distinguish between inner and
outer headers when there are multiple encapsulated headers
of the same type in a packet.
A value of:
0 means all headers,
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positive number 'n' means the 'n'th header starting
from the outermost,
negative number 'n' means the 'n'th header starting from
the innermost.
4.10. ContextData classes
This section contains examples of classes that might be referenced
by the ContextData class as classes that must be included in the
Event Message for various types of eventHdlrElements.
There are two kinds of ContextData classes depending on the type of
PEP. Some PEPs receive traffic from many users over a shared port
such as an Ethernet port. They recognize new users based on
information in the headers of incoming packets. For them, the
ContextData will come from packet headers. The L3HeaderData class
is an example of this kind of ContextData class. Other PEPs receive
traffic from one user per interface. For them, the context data
will be information about the interface. The
CtxtDialupInterfaceFramedProtocol class is an example of this kind
of ContextData class.
4.10.1. CtxtL3Hdr class
This class specifies level three header data. This class is used to
inform the PDP of the details of the IP header that caused the PEP
Event Message to be generated.
The attributes of this class are:
CtxtL3HdrId (InstanceId)
identifies this object
CtxtL3HdrSrcAddrType (Enum)
specifies the type of the packetÆs layer 3 source address
CtxtL3HdrSrcAddr
the packetÆs layer 3 source address
CtxtL3HdrDstAddrType (Enum)
specifies the type of the packetÆs layer 3 destination
address
CtxtL3HdrDstAddr
the packetÆs layer 3 destination address
CtxtL3HdrProtocol
the packetÆs protocol field
CtxtL3HdrSrcPort
the packetÆs source port field
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CtxtL3HdrDstPort
the packetÆs destination port field
CtxtL3HdrDscp
the packetÆs Type of Service (Diffserv Code Point)field
CtxtL3HdrEcn (boolean)
Indicates whether this packet is ECN capable (True) or not
(False)
CtxtL3HdrIpOpt
IP Options
CtxtL3HdrEncap
The Encap allows the PEP to indicate where this header is in
relation to other IP headers found in the packet (with
tunnels). This value can be either positive or negative
depending on how the EventHandler (or the Session-specific
Context Data request) was specified using negative or
positive numbers.
A negative n means return the nth layer from the innermost
header. A positive n means return the nth layer from the
outermost header.
4.10.2. Ctxt802Hdr class
This class specifies IEEE 802.1 header data. This class is used to
inform the PDP of the details of the 802 header that caused the PEP
Event Message to be generated.
The attributes of this class are:
Ctxt802HdrId (InstanceId)
identifies this object
Ctxt802HdrSrcAddr
the frameÆs source MAC address
Ctxt802HdrDstAddr
the frameÆs destination MAC address
Ctxt802HdrProtocol
the layer 2 frameÆs protocol field
Ctxt802HdrPriority
the layer 2 frameÆs priority field (only used if the frame
is using the 802.q header extension)
Ctxt802HdrVlan
the layer 2 frameÆs VLAN field (only used if the frame is
using the 802.q header extension)
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Ctxt802HdrEncap
The Encap allows the PEP to indicate where this header is in
relation to other IP headers found in the packet (with
tunnels). This value can be either positive or negative
depending on how the Event Handler (or the explicitly
requested PDP Context Data request) was specified using
negative or positive numbers.
A negative n means return the nth layer from the innermost
header. A positive n means return the nth layer from the
outermost header.
4.10.3. CtxtDialupInterface class
The CtxtDialupInterface class specifies data to be included in Event
Messages sent by Event Handlers providing dialin services.
The attributes of this class are:
CtxtDialupInterfaceId
identifies this object
CtxtDialupInterfaceNASPort
This attribute indicates the physical port number of
the NAS which is authenticating the user. Note that this is
using 'port' in its sense of a physical connection on the
NAS, not in the sense of a TCP or UDP port number. Either
CtxtDialupInterfaceNasPort or CtxtDialupInterfaceNasPortType
or both SHOULD be specified in a CtxtDialupInterface object,
if the NAS differentiates among its ports.
CtxtDialupInterfaceNASPortId
This attribute contains a text string which identifies the
port of the NAS which is authenticating the user. Note that
this is using 'port' in its sense of a physical connection
on the NAS, not in the sense of a TCP or UDP port number.
Either CtxtDialupInterfaceNasPort or
CtxtDialupInterfaceNasPortId SHOULD be specified in a
CtxtDialupInterface object, if the NAS differentiates among
its ports. CtxtDialupInterfaceNasPortId is intended for use
by NASes which cannot conveniently number their ports.
CtxtDialupInterfaceNASPortType (Enum)
This attribute indicates the type of the physical port
of the NAS which is authenticating the user. It can be
used instead of or in addition to the
CtxtDialupInterfaceNasPort attribute.
CtxtDialupInterfaceCalledStationId
This attribute allows the NAS to send the phone number that
the user called, using Dialed Number Identification (DNIS)
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or similar technology. Note that this may be different from
the phone number the call comes in on.
CtxtDialupInterfaceCallingStationId
This attribute allows the NAS to send the phone number that
the call came from, using Automatic Number Identification
(ANI) or similar technology.
CtxtDialupInterfaceConnectInfo
This attribute is sent from the NAS to indicate the
nature of the user's connection.
This is a notify-only class. These attributes are not write-able by
the PDP.
Three additional notify/install classes can be defined. These
classes can be included in an Event Message as information to the
PDP. The PDP may change the values of these attributes, however, in
subsequent provisioning messages.
4.10.4 CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocol class
The CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocol class is an optional class that may
be sent if a framed protocol is being used. This class MAY be
specified in the ContextData PRC by the PDP in a decision message if
the PDP needs this context information (if it was not already setup
to be sent in the eventHandler). It MUST be sent up to the PDP in a
request message if it is specified via the ContextData PRC in an
eventHandler.
The attributes of this class are:
CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocolId
identifies this object
CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocolProt
This attribute indicates the framing to be used for
framed access.
CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocolMTU
This attribute indicates the Maximum Transmission Unit to be
configured for the user, when it is not negotiated by some
other means (such as PPP).
CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocolCompression (Enum)
This attribute indicates a compression protocol to be used
for the link.
CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocolPortLimit
This attribute sets the maximum number of ports to be
provided to the user by the NAS. It is intended for use in
conjunction with Multilink PPP or similar uses.
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CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocolIpAddress
This attribute indicates the address to be configured for
the user. It MAY be used in constructing policies for the
user.
CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocolIpNetmask
This attribute indicates the IP netmask to be
configured for the user when the user is a router to a
network.
4.10.5 CtxtDialupIfLoginService class
The CtxtDialupIfLoginService class is an optional class that may be
sent if a Login service is being provided. This class MAY be
specified in the ContextData PRC by the PDP in a decision message if
the PDP needs this context information (if it was not already setup
to be sent in the eventHandler). It MUST be sent up to the PDP in a
request message if it is specified via the ContextData PRC in an
eventHandler.
This class contains a single attribute:
CtxtDialupIfLoginIpHost
This attribute indicates the system with which to connect he
user.
4.10.6 CtxtDialupIfLoginLat class
This class MAY be specified in the ContextData PRC by the PDP in a
decision message if the PDP needs this context information (if it
was not already setup to be sent in the eventHandler). It MUST be
sent up to the PDP in a request message if it is specified via the
ContextData PRC in an eventHandler.
The CtxtDialupIfLoginLat class extends the
CtxtDialupInterfaceLoginService class. Its attributes are:
CtxtDialupIfLoginLatService
This attribute indicates the system with which the user
is to be connected by LAT.
CtxtDialupIfLoginLatNode
This attribute indicates the Node with which the user is to
be automatically connected by LAT.
CtxtDialupIfLoginLatGroup
This attribute contains a string identifying the LAT group
codes which this user is authorized to use.
LAT supports 256 different group codes, which LAT uses as a
form of access rights. LAT encodes the group codes as a 256
bit bitmap.
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Administrators can assign one or more of the group code bits
at the LAT service provider; it will only accept LAT
connections that have these group codes set in the bit map.
The administrators assign a bitmap of authorized group codes
to each user; LAT gets these from the operating system, and
uses these in its requests to the service providers.
CtxtDialupIfLoginLatPort
This attribute indicates the Port with which the user is to
be connected by LAT.
4.11. AuthExt class
This is an abstract PRC. This PRC can be extended by authentication
PRCs that contain attributes specific to that authentication
protocol. An instance of the extended class is created by the PEP
and sent to the PDP. The PDP may send information back to the PEP or
may use the information to authenticate the PEP's Event Message.
This PRC itself should not be instantiated.
The data in this class is passed between the PDP and the client with
little or no involvement of the PEP except to forward it in the
appropriate AuthExt class instance. The PEP is not meant to store
AuthExt objects. As such, this class, along with all its extending
classes, is meant to be 'transient'. Its instances are temporary and
are deleted by the PEP after a certain time or event. The PDP, in
its decisions, must not refer to instances of this class that are
sent by the PEP in its requests. Likewise, the PEP must not refer to
instances sent by the PDP. Also, since instances are deleted, it is
possible for InstanceIds to be reused.
The AuthExt class is extended for each authentication mechanism
supported. As a base class, it is never instantiated.
The attributes of this class are:
AuthExtId (InstanceId)
identifies this object
4.11.1. UserAuthExt class
This is a concrete PRC used to contain user authentication fields.
This PRC extends the base PRC authExtEntry.
The attributes of this class are:
userAuthExtRealm (OCTET STRING)
The user realm octet string.
userAuthExtUsername (OCTET STRING)
The Username octet string.
4.11.2. AuthChapExt class
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The AuthChapExt class extends the UserAuthExt class. It contains the
attributes of the CHAP protocol [CHAP]. (See section 3.3.)
The attributes that this class adds to the base class are:
AuthChapExtId (Unsigned32)
The AuthChapExtId is generated by the PEP. The ID value is
sent to the client. When the client endpoint (Peer)
generates a CHAP response it includes the same ID, and the
ID is then included in this attribute when it is sent to the
PDP.
AuthChapExtChal (Octet String)
The AuthChapExtChal is generated by the PEP. The Challenge
value is sent to the client, along with the ID. When the
client generates a CHAP response containing the ID and
Response (key), the Challenge associated with the ID is
included in this attribute when it is sent to the PDP.
AuthChapExtResp (Octet String)
The Response is calculated by the client and forwarded by
the PEP to the PDP.
4.11.3. AuthPapExt class
The AuthPapExt class extends the UserAuthExt class. It contains the
PAP Password. (See sec. 3.2.)
The attributes that this class adds to the base class are:
AuthPapExtPwd (Octet String)
A one-time password used to authenticate the client
4.11.4. AuthExtResult class
The AuthExtResult class extends the AuthExt class. It contains the
Authentication result Boolean flag.
The attributes that this class adds to the base class are:
AuthExtSuccessful (TruthValue)
A Boolean flag set to true if the authentication (via CHAP
or PAP) was successful.
4.11.5. AuthEapReqExt class
The AuthEapReqExt class extends the AuthExt class. It contains an
EAP message. (See sec. 3.1.) Instances of this class are sent by the
PDP to the PEP.
The attributes that this class adds to the base class are:
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AuthEapReqExtSpecific (Octet String)
An EAP message [EAP] passed from the PDP to the client via
the PEP in a COPS-PR Decision message.
4.11.6. AuthEapRespExt class
The AuthEapRespExt class extends the AuthExt class. It contains an
EAP message. (See sec. 3.1.) Instances of this class are sent by the
PEP to the PDP.
The attributes that this class adds to the base class are:
AuthEapRespExtSpecific (Octet String)
An EAP message [EAP] passed from the client to the PDP via
the PEP in a COPS-PR Report message.
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5. Message Types
All PIB messages have some form of transactional semantics. Most all
transactions consist of requests and responses. Typical provisioning
PIBs have the PDP sending a provisioning decision to the PEP and the
PEP responding with a success or fail. This PIB uses this paradigm
in some cases, but it also uses a paradigm where the PEP initiates
an event and the PDP responds with a success or fail. The specific
use of this paradigm is with the PEP Access Event Message, which is
triggered by a PEP event and requires authentication success or
failure semantics as part of the Provisioning Decision. This section
discusses both paradigms and how the various classes defined in
Section 4 are combined to form the various message interactions
described in sections 2 and 3.
Each message description in this section will include the purpose of
the message, the COPS-PR message type, the direction of the message,
and the class instances typically found in the message.
5.1. Event Handler Provisioning Decisions
The Event Handler Provisioning Decision message is a COPS-PR
Decision message used by the PDP to provision each Event Handler in
the PEP. It is likely to be a piece of a larger Decision message
that provisions other data path components that occur either before
or after the Event Handler in the data path. However, it could also
be sent as a part of unrelated data path or other provisioning
components. Event Handler provisioning typically includes the
EventHandler class, the EventHdlrElement class, the
EventHdlrEventScope class, often the EventHdlrHandleScope class and
the ContextData class. An optional set of EventHdlrAuthProtocol
class instances may be sent if a DataPathEventHandler is set up for
Access Event Messages.
Because the EventHdlrElement, ContextData, EventHdlrEventScope, and
the EventHdlrHandleScope classes all describe configuration details
of the EventHandler, any of these class instances may be shared by
multiple EventHandler instances. Therefore, in many cases, an
EventHandler Provisioning Decision will contain only an EventHandler
that references instances of the other classes defined in previous
Provisioning Decisions. In addition, these classes can also be
provisioned individually in anticipation of being applied to an
EventHandler. However, because there is a relationship between the
EventHandler and EventHdlrElement classes, there is an order
dependency between the classes. For instance, an EventHdlrEventScope
must be provisioned at the same time or before an EventHdlrElement
making use of the EventHdlrEventScope. EventHdlrElement,ContextData
and data path class instances referenced by an EventHandler must be
provisioned at the same time or before the EventHandler is
provisioned.
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When the PEP receives an EventHandler Provisioning Decision, it must
always respond with a Provisioning Report indicating success or
failure.
Note that additional EventHdlrElements can simply be added to an
existing EventHandler by using the TagId (group identifier) for the
EventHandler to which the element is to be added. Additional
EventHdlrEventScope or EventHdlrHandleScope instances can be added
similarly by adding PRIs with the TagId value of the group these
instances are to be added to. This allows incremental updates to be
made to the Event Handlers.
5.2. Provisioning Decision
A report must follow all provisioning decisions described in section
5.1. This report may not have any class instances in it. However, it
explicitly notifies the PDP that the provisioning was successful or
whether it failed. If many structures were simultaneously
provisioned in the Provisioning Decision and a failure occurred,
none of the class instances will be accepted by the PEP. Hence it is
possible that subsequent Provisioning Decisions occur with a smaller
subset of the class instances or an alternative set of class
instances that can satisfy the service policies defined in the PDP.
5.3. PEP Event Message
A PEP Event Message is generated by the PEP to indicate that a new
class of traffic has been identified by the Event Handler. This
Event Message possibly uses a new COPS Request Handle. The decision
to use a new COPS Request Handle or reuse an existing Handle is
based on the EventHdlrHandleScope information configured in the
Event Handler. The Handle Scope information is a set of criteria
that is protocol specific, and specifies the set of fields in the
protocol that the Event Handler is sensitive towards. The PEP Event
Message is essentially a COPS-PR Request message. The PEP Event
Message will always include an instance of the Event class. This
Event instance references which EventHandlerElement instance and
EventHandler instance caught the event. This tells the PDP what
events belong to which Event Handler. Other Classes that may be a
part of a PEP Event Message include one or more instances of
protocol specific Header Context Data and Interface data classes and
optionally an instance of one of the Authentication Extension
classes (for example, if the Event is an access event).
When authentication protocols such as PAP or CHAP are in use, the
PIB assumes that the UserId, Challenge, and Password will all be
determined by the PEP prior to generating the PEP Access Event
Message. EAP is an exception to this rule because EAP assumes a
direct negotiation between the Endpoint and the Authentication
server. For EAP, it is assumed that the Endpoint generates a
response to the EAP Identity Request message before the PEP sends
the Access Event Message. This allows the PEP to fill in the
Username and Realm in the UserAuthExt table. However, for this
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scenario, it is also assumed that the PEP Access Event Message will
include the EAP Identity Response in the authEapRespExtSpecific
attribute of the AuthEapRespExtEntry class. Subsequent EAP
negotiation will be performed with the Opaque Decision and Opaque
Report message types. When the negotiation is complete the PDP send
a Provisioning Decision message (that includes an instance of the
AuthExtResult class specifying success or failure). Note that all
interactions resulting from a given Event Message (including
authentication negotiation) is performed within the context of a
single COPS Request Handle. The COPS Request Handle provides an
independent dialog between the PDP and the PEP to fully process an
Access Event Message in a synchronous way.
5.4. PDP Provisioning Decision
When the PDP has all the necessary information to determine what
policies to provision for the event that was generated by the PEP,
and it has completed any intermediate data path provisioning that
the event may be dependent on, the PDP will generate a PDP
Provisioning Decision message. The PDP Provisioning Decision message
only contains the instances of the classes the PDP wants to
configure as a result of the event. In addition to this message the
PDP may also send unsolicited Provisioning responses on other COPS
handles to add policies that may be shared across events.
The PEP is the only entity that knows when traffic is no longer
flowing through a particular session (either because of a timer
expiring or because of a physical link termination). Therefore
lifetime of a COPS Request handle is always controlled by the PEP.
The PDP may advise the PEP that the Handle is no longer valid via a
provisioning update. However, the ultimate dispensation of the
Request Handle and the associated tables are always determined by
the PEP. The PDP can also indicate that a traffic flow may no longer
have access to resources by changing the data path to drop packets
arriving for that traffic flow. Since the PDP can modify the data
path such that all packets for the flow will be dropped, both
alternatives achieve the same semantics. The PEP can delete the COPS
Request Handle simply by notifying the PDP via a Delete Request
Message that the provisioned policies for that Handle are no longer
valid. Since a COPS-PR Provisioning Decision is used, the PEP must
send a report back to the PDP to confirm that there are no problems
with the data path change requested by the PDP.
When a COPS Request Handle is removed all contained class instances
must be removed as well. Typically these will include header and
authentication table instances.
5.5. PDP fetching Event-specific ContextData
The ContextData class can be specified either during the
configuration of the EventHandler to indicate what context data
should be sent with each PEP Event Message or it can be used by the
PDP to get additional context data for an event after it receives a
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Event Message. In the latter case, the PDP may send a solicited
response that specifies ContextData for the last Event Message
received on the same Request Handle. The ContextData message
contains PRC names to retrieve the specific information needed to
either authorize a pending event, monitor a set of policies bound to
the handle or get more context information regarding the event.
Since each ContextData class only retrieves a specific subset of the
information regarding the event within the context of a Request
Handle, a single request message can contain multiple instances of
the ContextData class, thereby supporting the retrieval of as much
event-specific information as needed in a single message.
The COPS-PR message type used to fetch Event-specific ContextData is
a Provisioning Decision message. The ContextData class instances are
sent in an updated Event-specific ContextData Request on the same
COPS Request Handle. Since the TagId in the ContextData class is
only used when the ContextData class is configured with an
EventHandler, the TagId attribute should not be set when the class
is used in an Event-specific ContextData Fetch. When the PEP
receives a message from the PDP asking for Event-specific
ContextData, it will send an Event-specific ContextData message in a
COPS Request message back to the PDP.
The updated Event-specific ContextData Request from the PEP will
contain a set of Header and Interface context data class instances.
Since the updated request uses the same Request Handle the PDP knows
which event is being updated by more context data. Using PDP Fetched
ContextData messages precludes the PDP from provisioning the PEP to
allow multiple simultaneous Event Messages outstanding on the same
Handle.
5.6. Event-specific ContextData Response
The Event-specific ContextData Response message is used to report
specific interface and/or packet header information back to the PDP.
This message is implemented as a COPS-PR Report message. A Report
message may include any number of Interface or Header table
instances. However, because Reference Identifiers to the Event table
are not specified in the header or interface data tables, a Report
message may contain header and interface data for one and only one
Event or the most recent Event Message received on that specific
COPS Request Handle.
5.7. Opaque Decision
An Opaque Decision message is used to send specialized
authentication messages from the PDP to the PEP. Specifically, this
type of COPS-PR Decision message is used to pass EAP request
messages. The class used in this message is used to send
authEapReqExt table instances.
5.8. Opaque Report
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An Opaque Report message is used to send specialized authentication
messages from the PEP to the PDP. Specifically, this type of COPS-PR
Report message is used to pass EAP response messages. The class used
in this message is used to send authEapRespExt table instances.
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6. Combining Data Structures in Messages
In the most degenerate case, the PDP provisions the EventHandler to
only send the Event object when an event occurs. The PDP then
requests Event-specific Context Data that the PEP will respond to
with Report Message. In addition, if EAP authentication is required,
a sequence of Opaque Decisions and Opaque Reports are also required.
Finally, if new data paths need to be provisioned (including
specialized EventHandlers), normal Provisioning Decision and Report
messages must also be exchanged. Note that these provisioning
decisions may be on separate COPS Request Handles.
In some environments, for example authorization, it is essential to
complete the transaction as quickly as possible. The way to
accelerate this process is to combine as many messages into a single
message as possible. This section describes which messages can be
collapsed, and what the rules are for collapsing the messages.
6.1. Combining Context Data in Event Messages
Previous sections have discussed at length how Event Handlers can be
pre-provisioned to generate specific Event Messages with ContextData
(Interface and Header data) in the PEP Event Message. When the
choice of what context data is entirely dependent on information
found in the PEP when a packet causing the Event Message, pre-
provisioned Event Handlers is the preferred approach.
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7. Access Bind Usage Examples
Following examples on how the Access Bind PIB PRCs are used provide
some additional clarifications on the PRC definitions. But they by
no means indicate all the PRCs needed for the application given by
the example. And providing these examples here does not indicate
where the application specific PRCs should be defined. These
examples are provided only to assist better and easier understanding
of the Access Bind PIB.
7.1 Wireless LAN (802.11 Access Point) Usage Example
A wireless LAN Access Point (AP) is pictured in Figure 7.1 below.
This is based roughly on 802.11/802.1x concepts. The following is
meant to give an indication of how the Access Bind PIB could be
included in such an AP. Note that this is an exercise to see if the
concepts fit together, not a proposal for exactly how they would
fit.
The AP shown below includes a æService ManagerÆ (SM), which
interfaces with the wireless data interface. For incoming wireless
data it separates management frames and level 2 frames. In the
following we will deal particularly with Associate and ReAssociate
Management Frames.
The SM (as interpreted here) takes Associate and Reassociate
management frames and creates a temporary Port Access Entity PAE for
the association. The PAE must then be authenticated and provisioned
by an external Authentication Server (AS). Communication with the
AS is assumed in this model to be mediated by a Policy Enforcement
Point (PEP, which is part of the AP). The AS acts as a Policy
Decision Point (PDP).
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oooooooooo Ethernet Port
o
+--------o-------------------------------------+
| o Service Manager |
| o +-----+ | (1) +------+
| +------o------+ | PEP | |Capabilities| |
| |QoS policies | | +--+----------->| Auth |
| | for | | | | |Server|
| | previously | | | | (2) |(PDP) |
| |authenticated| | | |Service Mgr | |
| | PAEs | | | |Provisioning| |
| | o |<-+---------+--------+-----+--+------------+ |
| +------o------+ | | | | | | |
| o ^ | V | | | | |
| o | | +-------------+ | | | (3) | |
| o | | |Authenticator| | | | Event Msg | |
| o | | | (Event +--+-----+--+----------->| |
| o | | | Handler) | | | | | |
| o | | | | | | | (4) | |
| o | | | | | | |EAP exchange| |
| o | | | |<-+-----+--+------------+ |
| o | | | |--+-----+--+----------->| |
| o | | +-----o-------+ | | | | |
| o | | o | | | (5) | |
| o | | o | | | Decision | |
| o +-----------------------+-----+--+------------+ |
| o | | o | | | | |
| o V V o | | | (6) | |
| +---o-----------------o---+ | | |Success Rpt | |
| | o Classifier o | | +--+----------->| |
| | o o | +-----+ | +------+
| |Controlled Uncontrolled| |
| | Port Port | |
| | ooooo ooooo | |
| | ooooo ooooo | |
| +------------o------------+ |
| o |
+-----------------o----------------------------+
o
ooooooooooooooooooooo
o o
+-------o--------+ +-------o--------+
|Wireless Station| |Wireless Station|
+----------------+ +----------------+
Figure 7.1: Wireless LAN AP Architecture
7.1.1 Wireless LAN Access Event Handler Provisioning
In an Access Bind PIB implementation, figure 7.1 shows the SM
sending a REQ at boot time to tell the AS that it is up and what
capabilities it has. The PDP returns a configuration to support the
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SM. In particular, this configuration includes provisioning
information for how to instantiate a PAE and what trigger
information should be sent by the instantiated PAE to the PDP.
The provisioning of the Event Handler is supported by the Access
Bind PIB by using the following PRCs in the decision (DEC) message:
- eventHandler
- eventhdlrElement
- eventhdlrEventScope
With eventhdlrEventScopeFilter indicating how the signaling protocol
is recognized.
7.1.2 Wireless LAN Access Event Handling
When an event (here a Associate or ReAssociate) is detected the
SM/event handler instantiates and initializes a PAE. The initial
PAE instance includes an access port which splits internally into a
controlled and uncontrolled port.
The controlled port is what is used to pass data from the access
port to the external Ethernet. It is controlled in that there is a
switch that must be turned on by the authenticator before data can
flow. It may also have QoS parameters that can be controlled by the
AS. In its initial state the controlled port drops all incoming
frames.
The uncontrolled port connects to an internal authenticator. The
authenticator creates the initial trigger. In some cases it may
need to send an EAP frame back to the Station prior to sending the
initial trigger, and other times it may have enough information from
the initial Associate or ReAssociate to create the trigger
immediately.
The Event handling is supported by the Access Bind PIB.
The PEP creates an instance of event PRC, with eventEventhdlr
referencing the eventHandler, and eventCause referencing
eventhdlrElement provisioned in Access Event Handler Provisioning
above.
This event PRI will be sent by the PEP to the PDP in a REQ using a
new COPS Request Handle. This REQ message may contain additional
PRIs as dictated by how a specific signaling protocol should be
handled.
7.1.3 Wireless LAN Access Event Decision
The AS/PDP decides whether the trigger contains enough information
to make an authentication decision. If not, it may initiate an EAP
dialog through the authenticator to the STATION.
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Once it has enough information the PDP makes a decision and sends a
Provisioning message to the AP that sets QoS parameters and æclosesÆ
the switch on the controlled port. Since the controlled and
uncontrolled port is easily modeled with a DiffServ Classifier, the
closing of the switch is simply a matter of a installing a Decision
in the classifier indicating that subsequent traffic matching the
specific PAEÆs criteria should be bound to the set of pre-existing
policies that are appropriate for that authenticated PAE.
The decision (DEC) message sent by the PDP to the PEP will be using
the same COPS Request Handle created as a result of the first in
Access Event. The content (PRCs) carried by the DEC message will
depend on the functionality need to be provided. It may be command
to æcloseÆ the switch on the controlled port, it may contain QoS
parameters.
7.2 RSVP Usage Example
RSVP is a signaling protocol used for a variety of purposes
including some call setup applications and MPLS label distribution
for traffic engineering. RSVP uses a number of message types to
negotiate both the hop-by-hop path and the service requirements
between a sender and one or more receivers.
Some RSVP messages contain information that helps determine whether
the reservation should be accepted or not. However, the router may
not equipped with sufficient context to take advantage of the
information in determining whether to accept or reject an RSVP
message. COPS was designed to pass specific RSVP messages to a PDP
(Policy Server). The PDP could then analyze the RSVP message and
usually determine whether to accept or reject the reservation.
With the advent of COPS-PR, it became possible to construct more
sophisticated policies beyond simple accept or reject messages.
However, these more sophisticated policies were targeted for
DiffServ rather than RSVP. With the definition of the AccessBind
PIB, it becomes possible to provision a router not only to specify
which RSVP messages should be sent to the PDP, but also to use
existing PIBs to specify how the QoS requirements in a RSVP
reservation should be supported in a specific router implementation.
Two types RSVP specific structures are added to AccessBind to
support RSVP. In order to provision the EventHandler class to detect
RSVP messages, a number of filter classes must be defined. These
filter classes are general purpose and could be used both by
EventHandlers and by Classifiers although the semantics of the
filter class are somewhat different for each. The other group of
classes is the Context Data classes that pass some or all parts of
the RSVP message to the PDP when the EventHandler generates an
event.
Because COPS assumes that all RSVP message objects are sent to the
PDP, each well known RSVP object will be assigned a unique Context
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Data PRC identifier and the rest of the RSVP objectÆs attributes
will be part of the PIB class in the same order and format as in the
original RSVP object. The actual PRC mappings for these objects can
be found in the PIB definition. For details on the operation of
these objects refer to [RSVP] and [INTSERV]. In addition, a PIB
class is also defined to support unrecognized RSVP objects.
A Context Data PIB class is also specified to describe the relevant
RSVP common header attributes. The attributes in the common header
that will be specified are:
1. The RSVP MsgType attribute, which distinguishes a PATH message
from a RESV or PATHerr message.
2. The RSVP Flags attribute is used to indicate whether Refresh
Reduction is possible or not.
3. The Send TTL (Time To Live) attribute, provides a easy
mechanism for determining whether non-RSVP hops have been
traversed by comparing this field with the IP TTL field.
4. The In Interface (if known)
5. The Out Interface (if known)
A special context data class, called AllRSVPMsgObjects, is defined
to simplify the process of specifying the set of RSVP objects to be
included with a COPS-PR Event message. Rather than explicitly
specifying every context data class that should be included with the
Event message, this class (when referenced by PRC through the
ContextDataIfElement attribute of the ContextData class) indicates
that all RSVP objects, including the common header class described
above, should be encapsulated and propagated to the PDP. All Refresh
Reduction related RSVP objects (MESSAGE_ID, MESSAGE_ID_ACK, and
MESSAGE_ID_NACK) are explicitly excluded from being sent to the PDP
when the AllRSVPMessageObjects attribute is set to True. These
objects are specifically for purpose of synchronizing state between
RSVP hops and bears no value in the policy decision process.
However, a context data PIB object is defined for each of these
classes in the event that a PDP determines that it needs these
objects.
The EventScope classes have been specified to roughly follow the
same mappings as the Context Data PIB classes. However, since the
typical criteria for outsourcing a RSVP message are usually rather
simple, only a subset of the RSVP objects require mappings to COPS-
PR filter classes. If some implementations require support for
filtering additional objects, it is trivial to extend the filters.
Note that the filters bound to EventHandlers determine whether a
matching packet should generate an Event or not.
The RSVP objects that will be mapped to filters in this
specification will include the RSVP common header, the RSVP Dclass
object, the RSVP session object, and the RSVP style object. The last
three are used to describe various characteristics of the data
traffic for which the reservation is being performed. Since the
filters can describe both AND and OR semantics, the challenge is in
organizing the fields of the objects to simplify filter expressions
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as much as possible. Since this is the primary goal the appropriate
attributes of each object have been combined into a single PIB
class. The RSVP filter PIB class contains the following attributes.
The fields marked with asterisks will be represented as masked
values (for IP addresses) and ranges (for UDP/TCP ports) to add
flexibility.
RSVP MsgType
RSVP Flags
Send TTL
DCLASS DSCP
Session Dest IP*
Session Protocol
Session Dest Port*
Filter Src IP*
Filter Src Port*
Style value
This paper does not address reservation specification (TSPEC and
FLOWSPEC) modifications that depend on the RSVP refresh model. RSVP
refresh reduction [REFRESH] is assumed as a simplifying assumption
for this application of the Access Bind PIB. However, if support for
traditional RSVP refresh is desirable, it can be supported in this
model by adding explicit filters for the RSVP FlowSpec and RSVP
Tspec objects as specified in [IntServ].
In order to support RSVP outsourcing with the AccessBind PIB the
Event Handler must be provisioned with the appropriate settings to
recognize specific RSVP messages, create new request handles, and
generate events (outsourcing requests). After we have described how
this is accomplished, we will show the actual message flows involved
in the RSVP outsourcing process.
The specific PIB classes that need to be provisioned are the
EventHandler, EventhdlrElemenet, ContextData, EventhdlrHandleScope,
and EventhdlrEventScope. The EventHandler provides a termination
point for processing RSVP messages. As RSVP messages arrive, they
are directed to the EventHandler by a classifier. In this scenario
the EventHandler as behaving as a termination point for all RSVP
messages. Hence, the EventHandler class is provisioned with no data
path elements following the EventHandler. Therefore, the attribute
eventhdlrNonMatchNext is left unassigned.
Alternatively, the EventHandler can also be provisioned such that
RSVP and non-RSVP packets alike pass through the EventHandler, but
only RSVP messages invoke events. In this case, the attribute
eventhdlrNonMatchNext would specify the next data path element that
should process any packets not matching the EventHandlerÆs criteria
(non RSVP packets).
The EventhdlrElement class identifies a specific category of events.
Suppose one wanted to generate different Events for PATH messages
and RESV messages. This could be done by configuring one
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EventhdlrElement to only match PATH messages and another
EventhdlrElement to only match RESV messages. Event messages contain
a reference to the EventhdlrElement that generated the event.
Therefore, it is possible to generate different events from the same
EventHandler.
The EventhdlrElement contains two main semantics. First, it
specifies the criteria for creating new Request Handles. Each
Request Handle constitutes a unique dialog between the PEP and PDP.
The second semantic is the criteria for generating events. In some
situations, it is desirable to generate a one-time event and not
generate events when similar messages are seen later. A good example
of this is RSVP Refresh messages. When RSVP Refresh messages are
used to indicate that the reservation is still active, generating
events for each message is inappropriate. In contrast, when Refresh
Reduction [Refresh] is active, only reservation changes are
propagated as full RSVP messages. In this situation, every message
may constitute an Event.
With RSVP it is usually appropriate to assign a unique COPS-PR
Request Handle for every new RSVP session. Since EventHandlers are
typically bound to an interface data path, the RSVP Path message and
the Resv message will be processed on different data paths.
Therefore, unique events and unique COPS-PR Request Handles will
typically be assigned for each message type. However, this is not
significant since the provisioning objectives for Path messages are
different from the provisioning objectives for Resv messages. For
RSVP, the EventhdlrElement will use the Tag Reference
EventhdlrElementHandleScope to describe the criteria for creating a
unique handle. Each EventhdlrHandleScope object will contain
pointers to the RSVP filter objects mentioned earlier to describe
the various fields whose combination of values constitute a unique
handle.
Typically, the Filter class used is the RSVP filter class. For this
class, the session attributes (SessionDestIP, SessionDestPort, and
SessionProtocol) will be assigned wildcard values and all other
attributes assigned to NULL to indicate that any combination of
these attributes constitutes a unique handle. When various messages
arrive that require the generation of an event and that have a newly
unique combination of the filter attribute values, a new request
handle will be assigned. When a message arrives for which a previous
message has already generated a handle, that handle is used to pass
the appropriate event to the PDP.
The other class pointed to by the EventhdlrElement is the
EventhdlrEventScope. This class describes the criteria for
generating an event. Typically, the MsgType attribute in conjunction
with the session attributes will be wildcarded and the other fields
assigned to NULL to indicate that all RSVP messages should be sent
to the PDP. This describes the criteria for an event: Every time a
unique combination of all these attributes occurs, generate a new
event.
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In many cases it may make sense to assign the filter attributes
(SessionDestIP and SessionDestPort) to the EventhdlrEventScope
and/or EventhdlrHandleScope class. This would be done when it is
desirable to notify of the PDP of the need to allocate additional
resources to a set of reserved flows going to the same destination
but originating from different sources.
A new COPS-PR Request Handle MUST only be created when a valid event
occurs. If a packet matches the criteria described by
EventhdlrHandleScope but does not match any EventhdlrEventScope
criteria, a COPS-PR Request Handle must not be generated.
This version of the paper only describes how RSVP can be supported
when Refresh Reduction [REFRESH] is being used. The complexity of
addressing the distinction between RSVP refresh messages and
reservation update messages is too great to be addressed in this
version. Any RSVP message containing bundle messages (MsgType 12)
MUST be decomposed and each message in the bundle must be
iteratively processed through the EventHandler as if individual RSVP
messages were generated from the RSVP neighbor. Whether
EventhdlrMatchNext applies to the individual sub-messages or the
bundled message is beyond the scope of this paper.
Irrespective of whether Refresh Reduction is in use or not, the RSVP
daemon is responsible for aging out reservations that are no longer
valid. As with traditional COPS, when a reservation is aged out, the
RSVP daemon or other entity responsible for aging out reservations
MUST take responsibility for deleting COPS Request Handles. This
allows the PDP to clean up state associated with the reservation and
ensures the proper removal of any policies in the PEP specifically
assigned through the COPS Request Handle.
Figure 7.2 shows how the various Event Handler objects would be
provisioned in a router to ensure that an event is generated for
every RSVP message.
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+-------------------+
|EventHandler |
| Id=EH1 |
| NonMatchNext=<NUL>|
| ElementRef=(Elem1)|
+-------------+-----+
|
V
+------------------+ +-----------------+
|EH_Element | |ContextData |
| Id=Elem1 | | Id=CD1 |
| MatchNext=<NUL> | | DataGroup=RSVP |
| Criteria=AllMatch| | IfElement=(PRC)-+--AllRSVPMsgObjects
| Context=(RSVP)---+--->| DataEncap=0 |
| EventScope=(MSG)-+--+ +-----------------+
| HandleScope=(HD) | |
+-------------+----+ +-------------------+
| | |
| | +-------------+ | +-------------+
| +->|EventScope | +-->|EventScope |
| | Id=Ev1 | | Id=Ev2 |
| | Group=MSG | | Group=MSG |
| | Filter=(F1)-+--+ | Filter=(R1)-+--+
| | Precedence=1| | | Precedence=1| |
| | ChangeFlag=?| | | ChangeFlag=?| |
| +-------------+ | +-------------+ |
| | |
| +-------------+ V V
| |HandleScope | +-------------+ +------------+
+->| Id=Hd1 | +->|IpFilter | |RsvpFilter |
| | Group=HD | | | Id=F1 | | Id=R1 |
| | Filter=(F1)-+--+ | Protocol=46 | | DestIP=* |
| | Precedence=1| +-------------+ | Protocol=* |
| +-------------+ | DestPort=* |
| +------------+ | SrcIP=* |
| +-------------+ +->|RsvpFilter | | SrcPort=*
| |HandleScope | | | Id=R2 | +------------+
+->| Id=Hd2 | | | DestIP=* |
| Group=HD | | | Protocol=* |
| Filter=(R2)-+--+ | DestPort=* |
| Precedence=1| +------------+
+-------------+
Fig 7.2: Representation of an Event Handler for RSVP
Figure 7.2 represents the set of PIB classes that would be
provisioned in order to indicate to the PEP that RSVP messages
should generate unique events for any combination of filters or
sessions. However, all messages using the same unique session will
share the same COPS Request Handle.
When an RSVP message arrives at the PEP with an new combination of
session attribute values, the PEP will create a new COPS Request
Handle. Following this, an Event message will be generated
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containing an Event object with references to EventHandler EH1 and
EventhdlrElement Elem1. These two pieces of information allow the
PDP to determine which provisioned EventHandler and which specific
event type generated the event. In addition the Event message also
contains a set of Context Data objects. Since the AllRSVPMsgObjects
class was specified in the ContextData class, all RSVP objects are
encapsulated in COPS-PR PIB classes and sent to the PDP in the Event
message.
When the PDP receives the Event message, it determines what policies
to provision in the PEP. Suppose the RSVP message was a reservation
request for a controlled load service with a bandwidth allocation of
1 Mbps and session object contained (SessionDestIP = 1.2.3.4,
SessionProtocol=UDP, SessionDestPort=7788). If the routerÆs
implementation only supported 4 queues with respective bandwidth
allocations of 20Mb, 40Mb, 30Mb, and 10Mb, the PDP may decide that
allocating the reservation to queue 3 can satisfy the reservation
request. Hence, a PDP might generate a provisioning policy as a
result of the PEPÆs Event message that creates a new Classifier
Element and Filter that matches all 1.2.3.4:7788 traffic and directs
it to queue 3.
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8. The AccessBind PIB Module
ACCESSBIND-PIB PIB-DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
Unsigned32, Integer32, MODULE-IDENTITY,
MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-TYPE, OBJECT-GROUP, pib
FROM COPS-PR-SPPI
InstanceId, Prid
FROM COPS-PR-SPPI-TC
RoleCombination, PrcIdentifier
FROM FRAMEWORK-TC-PIB
InetAddress, InetAddressType
FROM INET-ADDRESS-MIB
TruthValue, PhysAddress
FROM SNMPv2-TC;
accessBindPib MODULE-IDENTITY
SUBJECT-CATEGORIES { all }
LAST-UPDATED "200202202002Z"
ORGANIZATION "IETF RAP WG"
CONTACT-INFO "
Walter Weiss
Ellacoya Networks
7 Henry Clay Drive
Merrimack, NH 03054
Phone: 603-879-7364
E-mail: wweiss@ellacoya.com
"
DESCRIPTION
"A PIB module containing the set of classes to
configure generic event handlers, and outsource
events as they occur. One application of this PIB is
to bind authorization and authentication to COPS
Provisioning."
::= { pib xxx } -- xxx to be assigned by IANA
--
-- The branch OIDs in the AccessBind PIB
--
capabilityClasses OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { accessBindPib 1 }
eventClasses OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { accessBindPib 2 }
eventHdlrClasses OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { accessBindPib 3 }
contextClasses OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { accessBindPib 4 }
authClasses OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { accessBindPib 5 }
filterClasses OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { accessBindPib 6 }
--
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-- Event Table
--
-- Instances of this table represent events that occurred at
-- the PEP. The events reference the event handler instance
-- and the specific event handler element that the event was
-- caught by.
eventTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF EventEntry
PIB-ACCESS notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An instance of this class is created by the PEP and sent
to the PDP. As a result of this event, The PDP may send
additional unsolicited decisions to the PEP after
sending the mandatory solicited decision for the event."
::= { eventClasses 1 }
eventEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX EventEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An instance of the eventTable PRC."
PIB-INDEX { eventId }
UNIQUENESS { }
::= { eventTable 1 }
EventEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
eventId InstanceId,
eventEventHdlr ReferenceId,
eventCause ReferenceId
}
eventId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InstanceId
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An index to uniquely identify this event."
::= { eventEntry 1 }
eventEventHdlr OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX ReferenceId
PIB-REFERENCES { frwkReferenceEntry }
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This attribute allows a PEP to indicate to the PDP that
this event was generated due to the referenced Event
Handler. This attribute references an event handler via
the indirection PRC frwkReference, since the event
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handler and event could potentially belong to a different
PIB contexts."
::= { eventEntry 2 }
eventCause OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX ReferenceId
PIB-REFERENCES { frwkReferenceEntry }
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This attribute references the specific instance in a
group of event Handler elements belonging to an event
Handler that resulted in this event. This attribute
references a specific event handler element via the
indirection PRC frwkReference, since the event handler
element and event could potentially belong to a different
PIB contexts."
::= { eventEntry 3 }
--
-- EventHandler Table
--
-- Instances of this PRC are provisioned by the PDP on the PEP
-- to catch specific events. The Event Handlers reference a
-- group of eventHdlrElement PRIs that contain the scope of
-- the event and specify the context data to send to the PDP
-- when an event is caught.
eventHandlerTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF EventHandlerEntry
PIB-ACCESS install
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The eventHandlerTable specifies for what events the PEP
should send a request to the PDP. As a result of this
request, the PEP may send configuration changes to the
PEP. An instance of this class defines the circumstances
for generating a request, and provides the means for
specifying the contents of the PEP Request. Hence, the
eventHandlerTable can be said to create eventTable
entries. "
::= { eventHdlrClasses 1 }
eventHandlerEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX EventHandlerEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
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"eventTable entry."
PIB-INDEX { eventHandlerId }
UNIQUENESS { eventHandlerElements,
eventHandlerNonMatchNext
}
::= { eventHandlerTable 1}
EventHandlerEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
eventHandlerId InstanceId,
eventHandlerElements TagReferenceId,
eventHandlerNonMatchNext Prid
}
eventHandlerId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InstanceId
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies
an instance of the eventHandlerTable class."
::= { eventHandlerEntry 1}
eventHandlerElements OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TagReferenceId
PIB-TAG { eventHdlrElementGrpId }
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A reference to a group of eventHdlrElement instances,
each of which determines the scope (criteria for
generating a new request) and what context information to
send in a request."
::= { eventHandlerEntry 2}
eventHandlerNonMatchNext OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Prid
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The data path for 'out of scope' traffic."
::= { eventHandlerEntry 3}
--
-- EventHdlrElement Table
--
-- Each Instance of this PRC belongs to a group of
-- eventHdlrElement PRIs. The group is identified by the
-- eventHdlrElementGrpId attribute. These are provisioned by
-- the PDP on the PEP to catch specific events. This PRC
-- contain the scope of the event and specify the context data
-- type to send to the PDP when an event is caught.
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eventHdlrElementTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF EventHdlrElementEntry
PIB-ACCESS install
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The eventHdlrElementTable specifies a single eventHdlr
element's scope via a reference to a group of filters and
the context data type and encapsulation meta-information
that the PEP needs to send an event notification to the
PDP."
::= { eventHdlrClasses 2 }
eventHdlrElementEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX EventHdlrElementEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"eventTable entry."
PIB-INDEX { eventHdlrElementId }
UNIQUENESS { eventHdlrElementEventCriteria,
eventHdlrElementGrpId,
eventHdlrElementEventScope,
eventHdlrElementHandleScope,
eventHdlrElementContext,
eventHdlrElementMatchNext
}
::= { eventHdlrElementTable 1}
EventHdlrElementEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
eventHdlrElementId InstanceId,
eventHdlrElementEventCriteria Unsigned32,
eventHdlrElementGrpId TagId,
eventHdlrElementEventScope TagReferenceId,
eventHdlrElementHandleScope TagReferenceId,
eventHdlrElementContext TagReferenceId,
eventHdlrElementMatchNext Prid
}
eventHdlrElementId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InstanceId
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies
an instance of the eventHdlrElementTable class."
::= { eventHdlrElementEntry 1}
eventHdlrElementEventCriteria OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 {
one_time(1),
every_time(2),
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on_change(3)
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Indicates when an event is generated. Valid options are
one_time, every_time and on_change. This attribute allows
event Handlers to distinguish one time events (ignore
after the first match) from recurring events (generate an
event every time a match occurs). A enum type was also
define to specify that a new event should be generated
when a specific set of fields change. This is important
for protocols like RSVP because messages are sent both to
demonstrate that the reservation is active and to notify
hops of changes to reservations. Since only changes need
to propagate to the PDP, the on_change option indicates
that that events should be generated selectively.
This criteria controls behavior of both, the EventScope
and the HandleScope."
::= { eventHdlrElementEntry 2}
eventHdlrElementGrpId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TagId -- corresponding Tag Reference in
-- eventHandlerEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Group identifier. All instances with the same group
identifier belong to one group and can be referenced
collectively from an eventHandler instance."
::= { eventHdlrElementEntry 3}
eventHdlrElementEventScope OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TagReferenceId
PIB-TAG { eventHdlrEventScopeGroup }
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Identifies a group of eventHdlrEventScope entries
associated with this eventHdlrElement instance."
::= { eventHdlrElementEntry 4}
eventHdlrElementHandleScope OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TagReferenceId
PIB-TAG { eventHdlrHandleScopeGroup }
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Identifies a group of eventHdlrHandleScope entries
associated with this eventHdlrElement instance. This is
an optional attribute. If it is not present the
semantics of the Handle processing is interpreted as
identical to the Event Scope handling specified in the
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EventScope objects"
::= { eventHdlrElementEntry 5}
eventHdlrElementContext OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TagReferenceId
PIB-TAG { contextDataGroup }
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Identifies a list of ContextDataTable entries
associated with this eventHdlrElement instance."
::= { eventHdlrElementEntry 6}
eventHdlrElementMatchNext OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Prid
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The data path for traffic in scope."
::= { eventHdlrElementEntry 7}
--
-- EventHdlrEventScope Table
--
-- This PRC defines the scope of an event handler element using
-- references to filters defined in the Framework PIB or in some
-- other PIBs. These filters may describe specific protocol
-- properties for which events need to be generated. These filter
-- references are grouped using a TagId, and this group is then
-- referenced from the eventHdlrElement PRC.
eventHdlrEventScopeTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF EventHdlrEventScopeEntry
PIB-ACCESS install
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This class defines the criteria to be used for
partitioning various portions of traffic."
::= { eventHdlrClasses 3 }
eventHdlrEventScopeEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX EventHdlrEventScopeEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An instance of this class defines an individual criterion
to be used towards generating an event."
PIB-INDEX { eventHdlrEventScopeId }
UNIQUENESS { eventHdlrEventScopeGroup,
eventHdlrEventScopeFilter
}
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::= { eventHdlrEventScopeTable 1}
EventHdlrEventScopeEntry::= SEQUENCE {
eventHdlrEventScopeId InstanceId,
eventHdlrEventScopeGroup TagId,
eventHdlrEventScopeFilter Prid,
eventHdlrEventScopePrecedence INTEGER,
eventHdlrEventScopeChangeFlag TruthValue
}
eventHdlrEventScopeId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InstanceId
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an
instance of the eventHdlrEventScopeTable class."
::= { eventHdlrEventScopeEntry 1}
eventHdlrEventScopeGroup OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TagId -- corresponding TagReference
-- defined in eventHdlrElementEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Represents the binding between the eventHdlrElementEntry
and the eventHdlrEventScope entries. A group of
eventHdlrEventScope entries constitutes the criteria for
partitioning various portions of traffic."
::= { eventHdlrEventScopeEntry 2}
eventHdlrEventScopeFilter OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Prid
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Pointer to a filter to be used as the criteria."
::= { eventHdlrEventScopeEntry 3}
eventHdlrEventScopePrecedence OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX INTEGER
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Represents the precedence of this criterion with respect
to other criteria within the same group. When the
precedence is unique, the instance represents an
alternative criteria (an ORing function). When the
precedence for two or more instances of the
eventHdlrEventScope class is the same, the attributes
within all the instances are treated collectively as a
single filter criteria with the following rules:
1. If the filters are not of the same type, the filters
are ANDÆed as a whole eg (RSVP and IP)
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2. If the filter types are the same, the attribute values
are ORÆed and the attributes themselves are ANDÆed,
for example, two IP filters with src protocol values
56 and 57 respectively and dst protocol values 20 and
25 , would be treated as the condition (src port (56
or 57) AND dst port (20 or 25)."
::= { eventHdlrEventScopeEntry 4}
eventHdlrEventScopeChangeFlag OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TruthValue
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Boolean value, if set to 'true' indicates that a new
event should be generated if any of the assigned fields in
the associated filter change."
::= { eventHdlrEventScopeEntry 5}
--
-- EventHdlrHandleScope Table
--
-- This PRC defines the scope of request handles generated by the
-- PEP due to events caught by the event handler element. Each
-- instance of this PRC references filters defined in the
-- Framework PIB or some other signaling-protocol specific filter
-- PRCs. These filters may describe specific protocol properties
-- to which this event handler is sensitive. Essentially this
-- table defines when a new COPS RequestHandle must be created by
-- the PEP based on protocol properties. The event handler may be
-- set up to be sensitive to specific field values and/or the
-- uniqueness of a set of values considered together. This
-- accommodates various behaviors of signaling protocols. These
-- filters references are grouped using a TagId, and this group
-- is then referenced from the eventHdlrElement PRC via the
-- eventHdlrElementHandleScope TagReference.
eventHdlrHandleScopeTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF EventHdlrHandleScopeEntry
PIB-ACCESS install
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This class defines the criteria to be used for
deciding whether to create a new COPS RequestHandle for
an event or to use an existing Handle."
::= { eventHdlrClasses 4 }
eventHdlrHandleScopeEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX EventHdlrHandleScopeEntry
STATUS current
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DESCRIPTION
"An instance of this class defines an individual criterion
to be used towards deciding when to create a new Handle."
PIB-INDEX { eventHdlrHandleScopeId }
UNIQUENESS { eventHdlrHandleScopeGroup,
eventHdlrHandleScopeFilter
}
::= { eventHdlrHandleScopeTable 1}
EventHdlrHandleScopeEntry::= SEQUENCE {
eventHdlrHandleScopeId InstanceId,
eventHdlrHandleScopeGroup TagId,
eventHdlrHandleScopeFilter Prid,
eventHdlrHandleScopePrecedence INTEGER,
eventHdlrHandleScopeChangeFlag TruthValue
}
eventHdlrHandleScopeId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InstanceId
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an
instance of the eventHdlrHandleScopeTable class."
::= { eventHdlrHandleScopeEntry 1}
eventHdlrHandleScopeGroup OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TagId -- corresponding TagReference
-- defined in eventHdlrElementEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Represents the binding between the eventHdlrElementEntry
and the eventHdlrHandleScope entries. A group of
eventHdlrHandleScope entries constitutes the criteria for
defining the scope of the Handles generated."
::= { eventHdlrHandleScopeEntry 2}
eventHdlrHandleScopeFilter OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Prid
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Pointer to a filter to be used as the criteria."
::= { eventHdlrHandleScopeEntry 3}
eventHdlrHandleScopePrecedence OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX INTEGER
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Represents the precedence of this criterion with respect
to other criteria within the same group. When the
precedence is unique, the instance represents an
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alternative criteria (an ORing function). When the
precedence for two or more instances of the
eventHdlrHandleScope class is the same, the attributes
within all the instances are treated collectively as a
single filter criteria."
::= { eventHdlrHandleScopeEntry 4}
eventHdlrHandleScopeChangeFlag OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TruthValue
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Boolean value, if set to 'true' indicates that a new
Handle should be generated to send the event request if
any of the assigned fields in the associated filter
change."
::= { eventHdlrHandleScopeEntry 5}
--
-- EventHdlrAuthProtocol Table
--
-- This PRC specifies the Auth Mechanism to use in the Access
-- request when a data path Event Handler is configured to
-- catch access events.
eventHdlrAuthProtocolTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF EventHdlrAuthProtocolEntry
PIB-ACCESS install
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This class lists the authentication protocols that can
be used for an access request."
::= { eventHdlrClasses 5 }
eventHdlrAuthProtocolEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX EventHdlrAuthProtocolEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An instance of this class describes an authentication
protocol that may be used for an access request. Instances
of this class that share the same TagId value collectively
constitute a list of authentication protocols that may be
used for a given access request"
PIB-INDEX { eventHdlrAuthProtocolId }
UNIQUENESS { eventHdlrAuthProtocolGroup,
eventHdlrAuthProtocolAuthMechanism
}
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::= { eventHdlrAuthProtocolTable 1}
EventHdlrAuthProtocolEntry::= SEQUENCE {
eventHdlrAuthProtocolId InstanceId,
eventHdlrAuthProtocolGroup TagId,
eventHdlrAuthProtocolAuthMechanism INTEGER
}
eventHdlrAuthProtocolId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InstanceId
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an
instance of the ContextDataTable class."
::= { eventHdlrAuthProtocolEntry 1}
eventHdlrAuthProtocolGroup OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TagId -- corresponding TagReference
-- in datapathEventHdlrEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Represents a binding between an datapathEventHdlrTable
instance and a list of eventHdlrAuthProtocolTable
instances."
::= { eventHdlrAuthProtocolEntry 2}
eventHdlrAuthProtocolAuthMechanism OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX INTEGER {
PAP (0),
CHAP (1),
EAP_MD5(2),
EAP_TLS(3)
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The authentication protocol that may be used for an
access request."
::= { eventHdlrAuthProtocolEntry 3}
--
-- DataPath Event Handler Table
--
-- This PRC is an extension of the EventHandler PRC. This
-- extension illustrates the use of the EventHandler PRC
-- concept for authentication usage. Instances of this PRC are
-- provisioned by the PDP on the PEP to catch specific access
-- events. This PRC references a group of
-- eventHdlrAuthProtocol instances which define a set of
-- Authentication mechanisms to use if an access event is
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-- caught by this event Handler. From its base class (Event
-- Handler) this PRC also references a group of
-- eventHdlrElement PRIs that contain the scope of the
-- access event and specify the context data to send to the
-- PDP when an access event is caught.
datapathEventHdlrTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF DatapathEventHdlrEntry
PIB-ACCESS install
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The datapathEventHdlrTable specifies for what access
events the PEP should send an access request to the PDP.
As a result of this access request, the PEP may send
configuration changes to the PEP or specific policies for
specific users. An instance of this class defines the
circumstances for generating an access request, and
provides the means for specifying the authentication
mechanisms and contents of the PEP Request. Hence, the
datapathEventHdlrTable can be said to create eventTable
entries for user access. "
::= { eventHdlrClasses 6 }
datapathEventHdlrEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX DatapathEventHdlrEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"dataPathEventHdlrTable entry."
EXTENDS { EventHandlerEntry }
UNIQUENESS { eventHandlerElements,
eventHandlerNonMatchNext,
datapathEventHdlrRequestAuth
}
::= { datapathEventHdlrTable 1}
DatapathEventHdlrEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
datapathEventHdlrRequestAuth TruthValue,
datapathEventHdlrAuthProtocol TagReferenceId
}
datapathEventHdlrRequestAuth OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TruthValue
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Boolean flag, if set to 'true' requires authentication
data to be sent in the request sent to the PDP with the
access event."
::= { datapathEventHdlrEntry 1}
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datapathEventHdlrAuthProtocol OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TagReferenceId
PIB-TAG { eventHdlrAuthProtocolGroup }
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"References a group of eventHdlrAuthProtocol instances,
each of which specifies an authentication mechanism."
::= { datapathEventHdlrEntry 2}
--
-- ContextData Table
--
-- This PRC specifies the context information to send to the PDP
-- when an event is caught. The context information to send is
-- described in terms of the PRC data types to include in the
-- request, the level of encapsulated data and the interface
-- information for that request.
contextDataTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF ContextDataEntry
PIB-ACCESS install
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This class points to the context information to be
included with a request."
::= { contextClasses 1 }
contextDataEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX ContextDataEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An instance of this class contains the type description
(the assigned OID) of the class which needs to be filled
in by the PEP and included with a PEP request."
PIB-INDEX { contextDataId }
UNIQUENESS { }
::= { contextDataTable 1}
ContextDataEntry::= SEQUENCE {
contextDataId InstanceId,
contextDataGroup TagId,
contextDataIfElement PrcIdentifier,
contextDataEncapsulation INTEGER
}
contextDataId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InstanceId
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STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an
instance of the contextDataTable class."
::= { contextDataEntry 1}
contextDataGroup OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TagId --corresponding TagReference
--defined in eventHdlrElement
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Defines the grouping of contextData instances
that are applicable to a given eventHdlrElement. When
instances of this PRC are sent to the PEP without the
event Handler information, this attribute is unused."
::= { contextDataEntry 2}
contextDataIfElement OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX PrcIdentifier
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The OID of a class whose instance is to be included with
the PEP request or event-specific ContextData Response."
::= { contextDataEntry 3}
contextDataEncapsulation OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX INTEGER
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This attribute allows one to distinguish between inner
and outer headers when there are multiple encapsulated
headers of the same type in a packet.
A value of:
0 means all headers,
positive number 'n' means the 'n'th header starting
from the outermost,
negative number 'n' means the 'n'th header starting from
the innermost."
::= { contextDataEntry 4}
--
-- Layer 3 Header Data PRC
--
ctxtL3HdrTable OBJECT-TYPE
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SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF ctxtL3HdrEntry
PIB-ACCESS notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An instance of this class is created by the PEP and
sent to the PDP to provide the PDP with information it
requested in the ContextData PRC. The PDP uses
this PRC to make Authentication/Provisioning
decisions."
::= { contextClasses 2 }
ctxtL3HdrEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX CtxtL3HdrEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An instance of the ctxtL3HdrTable PRC."
PIB-INDEX { ctxtL3HdrId }
UNIQUENESS { }
::= { ctxtL3HdrTable 1 }
CtxtL3HdrEntry::= SEQUENCE {
ctxtL3HdrId InstanceId,
ctxtL3HdrSrcAddrType InetAddressType,
ctxtL3HdrSrcAddr InetAddress,
ctxtL3HdrDstAddrType InetAddressType,
ctxtL3HdrDstAddr InetAddress,
ctxtL3HdrProtocol Unsigned32,
ctxtL3HdrSrcPort Unsigned32,
ctxtL3HdrDstPort Unsigned32,
ctxtL3HdrDscp Unsigned32,
ctxtL3HdrEcn TruthValue,
ctxtL3HdrIpOpt OCTET STRING,
ctxtL3HdrEncap Integer32
}
ctxtL3HdrId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InstanceId
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An index to uniquely identify an instance of this
provisioning class."
::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 1 }
ctxtL3HdrSrcAddrType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddressType
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The address type enumeration value [INETADDR] to specify
the type of the packet's source L3 address)."
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::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 2 }
ctxtL3HdrSrcAddr OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddress
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" The packet's source L3 address."
::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 3 }
ctxtL3HdrDstAddrType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddressType
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The address type enumeration value [INETADDR] to specify
the type of the packet's destination L3 address."
::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 4 }
ctxtL3HdrDstAddr OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddress
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The packet's destination L3 address."
::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 5 }
ctxtL3HdrProtocol OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The packet's protocol field."
::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 6 }
ctxtL3HdrSrcPort OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This attribute binds an existing upstream session to
this session instance."
::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 7 }
ctxtL3HdrDstPort OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This attribute binds an existing upstream session to
this session instance."
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::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 8 }
ctxtL3HdrDscp OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"DiffServ CodePoint."
::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 9 }
ctxtL3HdrEcn OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TruthValue
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"PEP sets this attribute to true(1) if ECN capable."
::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 10 }
ctxtL3HdrIpOpt OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"IP Options field in the packet."
::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 11 }
ctxtL3HdrEncap OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This attribute specifies which encapsulated header is
being described. The sign on this value will be the same
as the value specified in the ContextData
instance that requested this header. If the original
ContextData instance specified a
ContextDataEncapsulation value of zero (meaning
return all headers), then all instances of this attribute
MUST be expressed as positive numbers.
A value of:
positive number 'n' means the 'n'th header starting
from the outermost,
negative number 'n' means the 'n'th header starting from
the innermost."
::= { ctxtL3HdrEntry 12 }
--
-- 802.1 Header Data PRC
--
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ctxt802HdrTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF Ctxt802HdrEntry
PIB-ACCESS notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An instance of this class is created by the PEP and sent
to the PDP to provide the PDP with information it
requested in the ContextData PRC. The PDP uses this PRC
to make Authorization/Provisioning decisions."
::= { contextClasses 3 }
ctxt802HdrEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Ctxt802HdrEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An instance of the ctxt802HdrTable PRC."
PIB-INDEX { ctxt802HdrId }
UNIQUENESS { }
::= { ctxt802HdrTable 1 }
Ctxt802HdrEntry::= SEQUENCE {
ctxt802HdrId InstanceId,
ctxt802HdrSrcAddr PhysAddress,
ctxt802HdrDstAddr PhysAddress,
ctxt802HdrProtocol Unsigned32,
ctxt802HdrPriority Unsigned32,
ctxt802HdrVlan Unsigned32,
ctxt802HdrEncap Integer32
}
ctxt802HdrId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InstanceId
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An index to uniquely identify an instance of this
provisioning class."
::= { ctxt802HdrEntry 1 }
ctxt802HdrSrcAddr OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX PhysAddress
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" The packet's source MAC address."
::= { ctxt802HdrEntry 2 }
ctxt802HdrDstAddr OBJECT-TYPE
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SYNTAX PhysAddress
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The packet's destination MAC address."
::= { ctxt802HdrEntry 3 }
ctxt802HdrProtocol OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..'ffff'h)
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The L2 packet's protocol field."
::= { ctxt802HdrEntry 4 }
ctxt802HdrPriority OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..7)
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The L2 packet's priority field. This attribute is only
valid for packets using the 802.1q header extension."
::= { ctxt802HdrEntry 5 }
ctxt802HdrVlan OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..4094)
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The L2 packet's VLAN field. This attribute is only valid
for packets using the 802.1q header extension."
::= { ctxt802HdrEntry 6 }
ctxt802HdrEncap OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This attribute specifies which encapsulated header is
being described. The sign on this value will be the same
as the value specified in the ContextData
instance that requested this header. If the original
ContextData instance specified an
ContextDataEncapsulation value of zero (meaning
return all headers), then all instances of this attribute
MUST be expressed as positive numbers.
A value of:
positive number 'n' means the 'n'th header starting
from the outermost,
negative number 'n' means the 'n'th header starting from
the innermost."
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::= { ctxt802HdrEntry 7 }
--
-- CtxtDialupInterface Table
--
ctxtDialupInterfaceTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF CtxtDialupInterfaceEntry
PIB-ACCESS notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Dialup Interface context data."
::= { contextClasses 4 }
ctxtDialupInterfaceEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX CtxtDialupInterfaceEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Entry oid of the ctxtDialupInterfaceTable PRC."
PIB-INDEX { ctxtDialupInterfaceId }
UNIQUENESS { }
::= { ctxtDialupInterfaceTable 1 }
CtxtDialupInterfaceEntry::= SEQUENCE {
ctxtDialupInterfaceId InstanceId,
ctxtDialupInterfaceNASPort Integer32,
ctxtDialupInterfaceNASPortId OCTET STRING,
ctxtDialupInterfaceNASPortType INTEGER,
ctxtDialupInterfaceCalledStationId OCTET STRING,
ctxtDialupInterfaceCallingStationId OCTET STRING,
ctxtDialupInterfaceConnectInfo OCTET STRING
}
ctxtDialupInterfaceId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InstanceId
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An index to uniquely identify an instance of this
provisioning class."
::= { ctxtDialupInterfaceEntry 1 }
ctxtDialupInterfaceNASPort OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This Attribute indicates the physical port number of the
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NAS which is authenticating the user. It is only used in
Access-Request packets. Note that this is using 'port'
in its sense of a physical connection on the NAS, not in
the sense of a TCP or UDP port number."
::= { ctxtDialupInterfaceEntry 2 }
ctxtDialupInterfaceNASPortId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This Attribute contains a text string which identifies
the port of the NAS which is authenticating the user. It
is only used in Access-Request and Accounting-Request
packets. Note that this is using 'port' in its sense of
a physical connection on the NAS, not in the sense of a
TCP or UDP port number. "
::= { ctxtDialupInterfaceEntry 3 }
ctxtDialupInterfaceNASPortType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX INTEGER {
radAsync(0),
radSync(1),
radIsdnSync(2),
radIsdnAsyncV120(3),
radIsdnAsyncV110(4),
radVirtual(5),
radPIAFS(6),
radHdlcClearChannel(7),
radX25(8),
radX75(9),
radG3Fax(10),
radSDSL(11),
radAdslCAP(12),
radAdslDMT(13),
radIdsl(14),
radEthernet(15),
radXdsl(16),
radCable(17),
radWirelessOther(18),
radWirelessIEEE80211(19)
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This Attribute indicates the type of the physical port
of the NAS which is authenticating the user. It can be
used instead of or in addition to the radNasPort (5)
attribute. It is only used in Access-Request packets.
Either radNasPort (5) or radNasPortType or both SHOULD be
present in an Access-Request packet, if the NAS
differentiates among its ports.
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A value of 'radAsync(0)' indicates Async.
A value of 'radSync(1)' indicates Sync.
A value of 'radIsdnSync(2)' indicates ISDN Sync.
A value of 'radIsdnAsyncV120(3)' indicates ISDN
Async V.120.
A value of 'radIsdnAsyncV110(4)' indicates ISDN
Async V.110.
A value of 'radVirtual(5)' indicates Virtual.
Virtual refers to a connection to the NAS via some
transport protocol, instead of through a physical
port. For example, if a user telnetted into a NAS to
authenticate himself as an Outbound-User, the
Access-Request might include radNasPortType =
Virtual as a hint to the RADIUS server that the user
was not on a physical port.
A value of 'radPIAFS(6)' indicates PIAFS. PIAFS is a
form of wireless ISDN commonly used in Japan, and
stands for PHS (Personal Handyphone System) Internet
Access Forum Standard (PIAFS).
A value of 'radHdlcClearChannel(7)' indicates HDLC
Clear Channel.
A value of 'radX25(8)' indicates X.25.
A value of 'radX75(9)' indicates X.75.
A value of 'radG3Fax(10)' indicates G.3 Fax.
A value of 'radSDSL(11)' indicates SDSL " Symmetric
DSL.
A value of 'radAdslCAP(12)' indicates ADSL-CAP -
Asymmetric DSL, Carrierless Amplitude Phase
Modulation.
A value of 'radAdslDMT(13)' indicates ADSL-DMT -
Asymmetric DSL, Discrete Multi-Tone.
A value of 'radIdsl(14)' indicates IDSL " ISDN
Digital Subscriber Line.
A value of 'radEthernet(15)' indicates Ethernet.
A value of 'radXdsl(16)' indicates xDSL - Digital
Subscriber Line of unknown type.
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A value of 'radCable(17)' indicates Cable.
A value of 'radWirelessOther(18)' indicates Wireless
- Other.
A value of 'radWirelessIEEE80211(19)' indicates
Wireless - IEEE 802.11."
::= { ctxtDialupInterfaceEntry 4 }
ctxtDialupInterfaceCalledStationId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This Attribute allows the NAS to send in the Access-
Request packet the phone number that the user called,
using Dialed Number Identification (DNIS) or similar
technology. Note that this may be different from the
phone number the call comes in on. It is only used in
Access-Request packets. "
::= { ctxtDialupInterfaceEntry 5 }
ctxtDialupInterfaceCallingStationId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This Attribute allows the NAS to send in the Access-
Request packet the phone number that the user is calling
from, using Dialed Number Identification (DNIS) or
similar technology. Note that this may be different from
the phone number called. It is only used in
Access-Request packets. "
::= { ctxtDialupInterfaceEntry 6 }
ctxtDialupInterfaceConnectInfo OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This Attribute allows the NAS to send in the Access-
Request packet the phone number that the call came from,
using Automatic Number Identification (ANI) or similar
technology. It is only used in Access-Request packets."
::= { ctxtDialupInterfaceEntry 7 }
---
--- CtxtDialupInterfaceFramedProtocol Table
---
ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolTable OBJECT-TYPE
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SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocolEntry
PIB-ACCESS notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"."
::= { contextClasses 5 }
ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocolEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Entry oid of the ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolTable PRC."
PIB-INDEX { ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolId }
UNIQUENESS { }
::= { ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolTable 1 }
CtxtDialupIfFramedProtocolEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolId InstanceId,
ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolProt INTEGER,
ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolMTU Integer32,
ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolCompression INTEGER,
ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolPortLimit Unsigned32,
ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolIpAddress InetAddress,
ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolIpNetmask InetAddress
}
ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InstanceId
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An index to uniquely identify an instance of this
provisioning class."
::= { ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolEntry 1 }
ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolProt OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX INTEGER {
radPPP(1),
radSLIP(2),
radARAP(3),
radGandalf(4),
radXylogics(5),
radX75Synchronous(6)
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This Attribute indicates the framing to be used for
framed access. It MAY be used in both Access-Request and
Access-Accept packets.
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A value of 'radPPP(1)' represents PPP.
A value of 'radSLIP(2)' represents SLIP.
A value of 'radARAP(3)' represents AppleTalk Remote
Access Protocol (ARAP).
A value of 'radGandalf(4)' represents Gandalf
proprietary SingleLink/MultiLink protocol.
A value of 'radXylogics(5)' represents Xylogics
proprietary IPX/SLIP.
A value of 'radX75Synchronous(6)' represents X.75
Synchronous."
::= { ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolEntry 2 }
ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolMTU OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This Attribute indicates the Maximum Transmission Unit
to be configured for the user, when it is not negotiated
by some other means (such as PPP). It MAY be used in
Access-Accept packets. It MAY be used in an Access-
Request packet as a hint by the NAS to the server that it
would prefer that value, but the server is not required
to honor the hint."
::= { ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolEntry 3 }
ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolCompression OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX INTEGER {
radNone(0),
radVJ(1),
radIPXheader(2),
radStacLZS(3)
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This Attribute indicates a compression protocol to be
used for the link. It MAY be used in Access-Accept
packets. It MAY be used in an Access-Request packet as a
hint to the server that the NAS would prefer to use that
compression, but the server is not required to honor the
hint.
More than one compression protocol Attribute MAY be sent.
It is the responsibility of the NAS to apply the proper
compression protocol to appropriate link traffic.
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A value of 'radNone(0)' indicates None.
A value of 'radVJ(1)' indicates VJ TCP/IP header
compression.
A value of 'radIPXheader(2)' indicates IPX header
compression.
A value of 'radStacLZS(3)' indicates Stac-LZS
compression."
::= { ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolEntry 4 }
ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolPortLimit OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This Attribute sets the maximum number of ports to be
provided to the user by the NAS. This Attribute MAY be
sent by the server to the client in an Access-Accept
packet. It is intended for use in conjunction with
Multilink PPP [10] or similar uses. It MAY also be sent
by the NAS to the server as a hint that that many ports
are desired for use, but the server is not required to
honor the hint."
::= { ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolEntry 5 }
ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolIpAddress OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddress
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This Attribute indicates the address to be configured
for the user. It MAY be used in Access-Accept packets.
It MAY be used in an Access-Request packet as a hint by
the NAS to the server that it would prefer that address,
but the server is not required to honor the hint."
::= { ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolEntry 6 }
ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolIpNetmask OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddress
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This Attribute indicates the IP netmask to be configured
for the user when the user is a router to a network. It
MAY be used in Access-Accept packets. It MAY be used in
an Access-Request packet as a hint by the NAS to the
server that it would prefer that netmask, but the server
is not required to honor the hint."
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::= { ctxtDialupIfFramedProtocolEntry 7 }
---
--- CtxtDialupIfLoginService Table
---
ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF CtxtDialupIfLoginServiceEntry
PIB-ACCESS notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Base class."
::= { contextClasses 6 }
ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX CtxtDialupIfLoginServiceEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Entry oid of the ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceTable PRC."
PIB-INDEX { ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceId }
UNIQUENESS { }
::= { ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceTable 1 }
CtxtDialupIfLoginServiceEntry::= SEQUENCE {
ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceId InstanceId,
ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceIpHost InetAddress
}
ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InstanceId
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An index to uniquely identify an instance of this
provisioning class."
::= { ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceEntry 1 }
ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceIpHost OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddress
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"."
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::= { ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceEntry 2 }
---
--- CtxtDialupIfLoginLat Table (Extends
--- CtxtDialupIfLoginService)
---
ctxtDialupIfLoginLatTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF CtxtDialupIfLoginLatEntry
PIB-ACCESS notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Extended class."
::= { contextClasses 7 }
ctxtDialupIfLoginLatEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX CtxtDialupIfLoginLatEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Entry oid of the ctxtDialupIfLoginLatTable PRC."
EXTENDS { ctxtDialupIfLoginServiceEntry }
UNIQUENESS { }
::= { ctxtDialupIfLoginLatTable 1 }
CtxtDialupIfLoginLatEntry::= SEQUENCE {
ctxtDialupIfLoginLatService OCTET STRING,
ctxtDialupIfLoginLatNode OCTET STRING,
ctxtDialupIfLoginLatGroup OCTET STRING,
ctxtDialupIfLoginLatPort OCTET STRING
}
ctxtDialupIfLoginLatService OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"."
::= { ctxtDialupIfLoginLatEntry 1 }
ctxtDialupIfLoginLatNode OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"."
::= { ctxtDialupIfLoginLatEntry 2 }
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ctxtDialupIfLoginLatGroup OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"."
::= { ctxtDialupIfLoginLatEntry 3 }
ctxtDialupIfLoginLatPort OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"."
::= { ctxtDialupIfLoginLatEntry 4 }
--
-- The RSVP Filter table
--
rsvpFilterTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF RsvpFilterEntry
PIB-ACCESS install
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"RSVP specific filter table."
::= { filterClasses 1 }
rsvpFilterEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX RsvpFilterEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" RSVP specific filter table entry."
PIB-INDEX { rsvpFilterId }
UNIQUENESS { }
::= { rsvpFilterTable 1 }
RsvpFilterEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
rsvpFilterId InstanceId,
rsvpFilterFlags OCTET STRING,
rsvpFilterSendTTL Unsigned32,
rsvpFilterDClassDscp Integer32,
rsvpFilterSessionDestAddrType InetAddressType,
rsvpFilterSessionDestAddr InetAddress,
rsvpFilterSessionDestAddrMask Unsigned32,
rsvpFilterSessionProtocol Integer32,
rsvpFilterSessionDestPort Unsigned32,
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rsvpFilterSessionSrcAddrType InetAddressType,
rsvpFilterSessionSrcAddr InetAddress,
rsvpFilterSessionSrcAddrMask Unsigned32,
rsvpFilterSessionSrcPort Unsigned32,
rsvpFilterStyleValue OCTET STRING
}
rsvpFilterId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InstanceId
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an
instance of the class."
::= { rsvpFilterEntry 1 }
rsvpFilterFlags OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The Flags carried in the RSVP header. Currently all these
flags should be set to zero."
::= { rsvpFilterEntry 2 }
rsvpFilterSendTTL OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..255)
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The IP TTL value with which the message was sent."
::= { rsvpFilterEntry 3 }
rsvpFilterDClassDscp OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32 (-1| 0..63)
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The DClass dscp value."
::= { rsvpFilterEntry 4 }
rsvpFilterSessionDestAddrType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddressType
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The address type enumeration value [INETADDR] to specify the
type of the destination IP address."
::= { rsvpFilterEntry 5 }
rsvpFilterSessionDestAddr OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddress
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The destination IP address."
::= { rsvpFilterEntry 6 }
rsvpFilterSessionDestAddrMask OBJECT-TYPE
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SYNTAX Unsigned32
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The length of a mask for the matching of the destination IP
address.."
::= { rsvpFilterEntry 7 }
rsvpFilterSessionProtocol OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32 (-1 | 0..255)
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The IP protocol to match against the packet's protocol. A
value of -1 means match all."
::= { rsvpFilterEntry 8 }
rsvpFilterSessionDestPort OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..65535)
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The packet's Layer 4 destination port."
::= { rsvpFilterEntry 9 }
rsvpFilterSessionSrcAddrType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddressType
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The address type enumeration value [INETADDR] to specify the
type of the source IP address."
::= { rsvpFilterEntry 10 }
rsvpFilterSessionSrcAddr OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddress
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The source IP address."
::= { rsvpFilterEntry 11 }
rsvpFilterSessionSrcAddrMask OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The length of a mask for the matching of the source IP
address."
::= { rsvpFilterEntry 12 }
rsvpFilterSessionSrcPort OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..65535)
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The packet's Layer 4 source port."
::= { rsvpFilterEntry 13 }
rsvpFilterStyleValue OBJECT-TYPE
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SYNTAX OCTET STRING
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The RSVP packet's Style value."
::= { rsvpFilterEntry 14 }
--
-- RSVP Common Context Data
--
ctxtRsvpTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF CtxtRsvpEntry
PIB-ACCESS notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
""
::= { contextClasses 8 }
ctxtRsvpEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX CtxtRsvpEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
""
PIB-INDEX { ctxtRsvpId }
UNIQUENESS { }
::= { ctxtRsvpTable 1 }
CtxtRsvpEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
ctxtRsvpId InstanceId,
ctxtRsvpMsgType INTEGER,
ctxtRsvpFlags OCTET STRING,
ctxtRsvpSendTTL Unsigned32,
ctxtRsvpInIntfId Unsigned32,
ctxtRsvpInIntfAddrType InetAddressType,
ctxtRsvpInIntfAddr InetAddress,
ctxtRsvpOutIntfId Unsigned32,
ctxtRsvpOutIntfAddrType InetAddressType,
ctxtRsvpOutIntfAddr InetAddress
}
ctxtRsvpId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InstanceId
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an
instance of the class."
::= { ctxtRsvpEntry 1 }
ctxtRsvpMsgType OBJECT-TYPE
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SYNTAX INTEGER {
Path (1),
PathErr (2),
Resv (3),
ResvErr (4)
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The RSVP message type."
::= { ctxtRsvpEntry 2 }
ctxtRsvpFlags OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The RSVP flags contained in the message header. They are
currently undefined and should be set to zero."
::= { ctxtRsvpEntry 3 }
ctxtRsvpSendTTL OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..255)
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The IP TTL value."
::= { ctxtRsvpEntry 4 }
ctxtRsvpInIntfId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The Interface Id."
::= { ctxtRsvpEntry 5 }
ctxtRsvpInIntfAddrType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddressType
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The address type enumeration value [INETADDR] to specify the
type of the In Interface IP address."
::= { ctxtRsvpEntry 6 }
ctxtRsvpInIntfAddr OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddress
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The In Interface IP address."
::= { ctxtRsvpEntry 7 }
ctxtRsvpOutIntfId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The Out Interface Id."
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::= { ctxtRsvpEntry 8 }
ctxtRsvpOutIntfAddrType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddressType
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The address type enumeration value [INETADDR] to specify the
type of the Out Interface IP address."
::= { ctxtRsvpEntry 9 }
ctxtRsvpOutIntfAddr OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddress
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The Out Interface IP address."
::= { ctxtRsvpEntry 10 }
--
-- RSVP Path Context Data
--
ctxtRsvpPathTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF CtxtRsvpPathEntry
PIB-ACCESS notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
""
::= { contextClasses 9 }
ctxtRsvpPathEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX CtxtRsvpPathEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
""
PIB-INDEX { ctxtRsvpPathId }
UNIQUENESS { }
::= { ctxtRsvpPathTable 1 }
CtxtRsvpPathEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
ctxtRsvpPathId InstanceId,
ctxtRsvpPathTokenRate Unsigned32
}
ctxtRsvpPathId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InstanceId
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an
instance of the class."
::= { ctxtRsvpPathEntry 1 }
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ctxtRsvpPathTokenRate OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The token bucket rate for the TSPEC."
::= { ctxtRsvpPathEntry 2 }
--
-- RSVP PathErr Context Data
--
ctxtRsvpPathErrTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF CtxtRsvpPathErrEntry
PIB-ACCESS notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
""
::= { contextClasses 10 }
ctxtRsvpPathErrEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX CtxtRsvpPathErrEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
""
PIB-INDEX { ctxtRsvpPathErrId }
UNIQUENESS { }
::= { ctxtRsvpPathErrTable 1 }
CtxtRsvpPathErrEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
ctxtRsvpPathErrId InstanceId,
ctxtRsvpPathErrTokenRate Unsigned32,
ctxtRsvpPathErrErrorAddrType InetAddressType,
ctxtRsvpPathErrErrorAddr InetAddress,
ctxtRsvpPathErrErrorCode Unsigned32,
ctxtRsvpPathErrErrorValue Unsigned32
}
ctxtRsvpPathErrId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InstanceId
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an
instance of the class."
::= { ctxtRsvpPathErrEntry 1 }
ctxtRsvpPathErrTokenRate OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
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"The token bucket rate for the TSPEC."
::= { ctxtRsvpPathErrEntry 2 }
ctxtRsvpPathErrErrorAddrType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddressType
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The address type IP address in error."
::= { ctxtRsvpPathErrEntry 3 }
ctxtRsvpPathErrErrorAddr OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddress
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The Error IP address."
::= { ctxtRsvpPathErrEntry 4 }
ctxtRsvpPathErrErrorCode OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The RSVP error code."
::= { ctxtRsvpPathErrEntry 5 }
ctxtRsvpPathErrErrorValue OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The RSVP error value."
::= { ctxtRsvpPathErrEntry 6 }
--
-- RSVP Resv Context Data
--
ctxtRsvpResvTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF CtxtRsvpResvEntry
PIB-ACCESS notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
""
::= { contextClasses 11 }
ctxtRsvpResvEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX CtxtRsvpResvEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
""
PIB-INDEX { ctxtRsvpResvId }
UNIQUENESS { }
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::= { ctxtRsvpResvTable 1 }
CtxtRsvpResvEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
ctxtRsvpResvId InstanceId,
ctxtRsvpResvFSpecGrp TagReferenceId,
ctxtRsvpResvSvcType INTEGER,
ctxtRsvpResvTokenRate Unsigned32
}
ctxtRsvpResvId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InstanceId
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an
instance of the class."
::= { ctxtRsvpResvEntry 1 }
ctxtRsvpResvFSpecGrp OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TagReferenceId
PIB-TAG { ctxtRsvpFilterSpecTagId }
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Identifies a group of Filter Spec entries."
::= { ctxtRsvpResvEntry 2 }
ctxtRsvpResvSvcType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX INTEGER {
Controlled_Load(1),
Guaranteed(2)
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An enum describing the type of service."
::= { ctxtRsvpResvEntry 3 }
ctxtRsvpResvTokenRate OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The token bucket rate for the TSPEC."
::= { ctxtRsvpResvEntry 4 }
--
-- RSVP ResvErr Context Data
--
ctxtRsvpResvErrTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF CtxtRsvpResvErrEntry
PIB-ACCESS notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
""
::= { contextClasses 12 }
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ctxtRsvpResvErrEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX CtxtRsvpResvErrEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
""
PIB-INDEX { ctxtRsvpResvErrId }
UNIQUENESS { }
::= { ctxtRsvpResvErrTable 1 }
CtxtRsvpResvErrEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
ctxtRsvpResvErrId InstanceId,
ctxtRsvpResvErrFSpecGrp TagReferenceId,
ctxtRsvpResvErrSvcType INTEGER,
ctxtRsvpResvErrTokenRate Unsigned32,
ctxtRsvpResvErrErrorAddrType InetAddressType,
ctxtRsvpResvErrErrorAddr InetAddress,
ctxtRsvpResvErrErrorCode Unsigned32,
ctxtRsvpResvErrErrorValue Unsigned32
}
ctxtRsvpResvErrId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InstanceId
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an
instance of the class."
::= { ctxtRsvpResvErrEntry 1 }
ctxtRsvpResvErrFSpecGrp OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TagReferenceId
PIB-TAG { ctxtRsvpFilterSpecTagId }
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Identifies a group of Filter Spec entries."
::= { ctxtRsvpResvErrEntry 2 }
ctxtRsvpResvErrSvcType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX INTEGER {
Controlled_Load(1),
Guaranteed(2)
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An enum describing the type of service."
::= { ctxtRsvpResvErrEntry 3 }
ctxtRsvpResvErrTokenRate OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
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"The token bucket rate for the TSPEC."
::= { ctxtRsvpResvErrEntry 4 }
ctxtRsvpResvErrErrorAddrType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddressType
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The address type IP address in error."
::= { ctxtRsvpResvErrEntry 5 }
ctxtRsvpResvErrErrorAddr OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddress
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The Error IP address."
::= { ctxtRsvpResvErrEntry 6 }
ctxtRsvpResvErrErrorCode OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The RSVP error code."
::= { ctxtRsvpResvErrEntry 7 }
ctxtRsvpResvErrErrorValue OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The RSVP error value."
::= { ctxtRsvpResvErrEntry 8 }
--
-- RSVP Filter Spec Context Data
--
ctxtRsvpFilterSpecTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF CtxtRsvpFilterSpecEntry
PIB-ACCESS notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
""
::= { contextClasses 13 }
ctxtRsvpFilterSpecEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX CtxtRsvpFilterSpecEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
""
PIB-INDEX { ctxtRsvpFilterSpecId }
UNIQUENESS { }
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::= { ctxtRsvpFilterSpecTable 1 }
CtxtRsvpFilterSpecEntry::= SEQUENCE {
ctxtRsvpFilterSpecId InstanceId,
ctxtRsvpFilterSpecTagId TagId,
ctxtRsvpFilterSpecAddrType InetAddressType,
ctxtRsvpFilterSpecAddr InetAddress,
ctxtRsvpFilterSpecPort Unsigned32
}
ctxtRsvpFilterSpecId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InstanceId
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An arbitrary integer index that uniquely identifies an
instance of the class."
::= { ctxtRsvpFilterSpecEntry 1 }
ctxtRsvpFilterSpecTagId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TagId
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Identifies the group of Filter Spec PRIs that this PRI
belongs to."
::= { ctxtRsvpFilterSpecEntry 2 }
ctxtRsvpFilterSpecAddrType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddressType
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The address type enumeration value [INETADDR] to specify the
type of the IP address."
::= { ctxtRsvpFilterSpecEntry 3 }
ctxtRsvpFilterSpecAddr OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddress
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The Filter Spec IP address."
::= { ctxtRsvpFilterSpecEntry 4 }
ctxtRsvpFilterSpecPort OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..65535)
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The packet's Layer 4 destination port."
::= { ctxtRsvpFilterSpecEntry 5 }
--
-- Authentication Extension Tables
--
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--
-- AuthExtensions Base Table
--
authExtTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF AuthExtEntry
PIB-ACCESS install-notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This is an abstract PRC. This PRC can be extended by
authentication PRCs that contain attributes specific to
that authentication protocol. An instance of the extended
class is created by the PEP and sent to the PDP. The PDP
may send information back to the PEP or may uses the
information to authenticate the PEP's access request.
This PRC itself should not be instantiated.
This is a 'transient' class. Its instances are temporary
and are deleted by the PEP after a certain time/event.
Thus it must not be referred to by the server."
::= { authClasses 1 }
authExtEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX AuthExtEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Entry oid for the AuthExtTable PRC."
PIB-INDEX { authExtId }
UNIQUENESS { }
::= { authExtTable 1 }
AuthExtEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
authExtId InstanceId
}
authExtId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InstanceId
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An index to uniquely identify an instance of the
entended provisioning class."
::= { authExtEntry 1 }
--
-- UserAuthExt Table
--
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userAuthExtTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF UserAuthExtEntry
PIB-ACCESS notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This is a concrete PRC used to contain user
authentication fields. This PRC extends the base PRC
authExtEntry."
::= { authClasses 2 }
userAuthExtEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX UserAuthExtEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Entry for the UserAuthExtTable PRC. InstanceId's for
this extended PRC are assigned by the base PRC AuthExt
[SPPI]."
EXTENDS { authExtEntry }
UNIQUENESS { }
::= { userAuthExtTable 1 }
UserAuthExtEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
userAuthExtRealm OCTET STRING,
userAuthExtUsername OCTET STRING
}
userAuthExtRealm OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"user realm octet string."
::= { userAuthExtEntry 1 }
userAuthExtUsername OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Username octet string."
::= { userAuthExtEntry 2 }
--
-- AuthChapExt Table
--
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authChapExtTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF AuthChapExtEntry
PIB-ACCESS notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This is a concrete PRC used to contain CHAP
authentication fields. This PRC extends the PRC
userAuthExtEntry."
::= { authClasses 3 }
authChapExtEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX AuthChapExtEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Entry oid for the AuthChapExtTable PRC. InstanceId's for
this extended PRC are assigned by the base PRC [SPPI]."
EXTENDS { userAuthExtEntry }
UNIQUENESS { }
::= { authChapExtTable 1 }
AuthChapExtEntry::= SEQUENCE {
authChapExtId Unsigned32,
authChapExtChal OCTET STRING,
authChapExtResp OCTET STRING
}
authChapExtId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"CHAP Id field."
::= { authChapExtEntry 1 }
authChapExtChal OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"CHAP Challenge octet string. The challenge is generated
by the PEP."
::= { authChapExtEntry 2 }
authChapExtResp OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"CHAP Challenge Response octet string. The challenge
response is sent to the PDP along with the challenge."
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::= { authChapExtEntry 3 }
--
-- AuthPapExt Table
--
authPapExtTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF AuthPapExtEntry
PIB-ACCESS notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This is a concrete PRC used to contain PAP
authentication fields. This PRC extends the PRC
userAuthExtEntry."
::= { authClasses 4 }
authPapExtEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX AuthPapExtEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Entry oid for the AuthPapExtTable PRC. InstanceId's for
this extended PRC are assigned by the base PRC [SPPI]."
EXTENDS { userAuthExtEntry }
UNIQUENESS { }
::= { authPapExtTable 1 }
AuthPapExtEntry::= SEQUENCE {
authPapExtPwd OCTET STRING
}
authPapExtPwd OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"PAP password octet string."
::= { authPapExtEntry 1 }
--
-- AuthExtResult Table
--
authExtResultTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF AuthExtResultEntry
PIB-ACCESS install
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STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This is a concrete PRC used to contain authentication
results. This PRC extends the base PRC authExtEntry."
::= { authClasses 5 }
authExtResultEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX AuthExtResultEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Entry for the authExtResultTable PRC. InstanceId's for
this extended PRC are assigned by the base PRC AuthExt
[SPPI]."
EXTENDS { authExtEntry }
UNIQUENESS { }
::= { authExtResultTable 1 }
AuthExtResultEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
authExtResultSuccess TruthValue
}
authExtResultSuccess OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TruthValue
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Set to 'true' if authentication was successful, else
false."
::= { authExtResultEntry 1 }
--
-- AuthEapReqExt Table
--
authEapReqExtTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF AuthEapReqExtEntry
PIB-ACCESS notify
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This is a concrete PRC used to contain EAP
authentication fields. This PRC extends the base PRC
authExtEntry. The PEP uses this PRC to send EAP messages
to the PDP."
::= { authClasses 6 }
authEapReqExtEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX AuthEapReqExtEntry
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STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Entry oid for the authEapReqExtTable PRC. InstanceId's
for this extended PRC are assigned by the base PRC
[SPPI]."
EXTENDS { authExtEntry }
UNIQUENESS { }
::= { authEapReqExtTable 1 }
AuthEapReqExtEntry::= SEQUENCE {
authEapReqExtSpecific OCTET STRING
}
authEapReqExtSpecific OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Opaque EAP Request octet string."
::= { authEapReqExtEntry 1 }
--
-- AuthEapRespExt Table
--
authEapRespExtTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF AuthEapRespExtEntry
PIB-ACCESS install
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This is a concrete PRC used to contain EAP
authentication fields. This PRC extends the base PRC
authExtEntry. The PDP responds using this PRC for EAP
exchanges."
::= { authClasses 7 }
authEapRespExtEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX AuthEapRespExtEntry
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Entry oid for the authEapRespExtTable PRC. InstanceId's
for this extended PRC are assigned by the base PRC
[SPPI]."
EXTENDS { authExtEntry }
UNIQUENESS { }
::= { authEapRespExtTable 1 }
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AuthEapRespExtEntry::= SEQUENCE {
authEapRespExtSpecific OCTET STRING
}
authEapRespExtSpecific OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Opaque EAP Response octet string."
::= { authEapRespExtEntry 1 }
--
-- conformance section tbd
--
END
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9. Security Considerations
A COPS client-type implemented within the framework outlined in this
document necessarily transmits sensitive authentication credentials
between the PEP and the PDP. The COPS protocol provides optional
message level security for authentication, replay protection, and
message integrity for communications occurring between the PEP and
the PDP by the use of the COPS Message Integrity Object [COPS].
Additionally, COPS optionally reuses existing protocols for security
such as IPSEC [IPSEC] or TLS to authenticate and secure COPS
communications. Careful consideration should be given to using these
mechanisms to reduce the probability of compromising authentication
credentials. Furthermore, using these mechanisms cannot protect
communication between an external authentication server and the PDP.
So, when the PDP acts a proxy for an authentication server,
consideration must be given to securing communications between the
PDP and the authentication server as well. A discussion of
applicable security techniques would be specific to any given
authentication protocol and is outside the scope of this document.
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10. References
[MODEL] Y. Bernet, S. Blake, A. Smith, D. Grossman, "An Informal
Management Model for Diffserv Routers,"
draft-ietf-diffserv-model-06.txt, February 2001.
[DSPIB] M. Fine, K. McCloghrie, J. Seligson, K. Chan, S. Hahn, C.
Bell, A. Smith, F. Reichmeyer, "Differentiated
Services Quality of Service Policy Information Base,"
draft-ietf-diffserv-pib-05.txt, December 2001.
[FWPIB] M. Fine, K. McCloghrie, J. Seligson, K. Chan, S. Hahn, R.
Sahita, A. Smith, F. Reichmeyer, "Framework Policy
Information Base,"
draft-ietf-rap-frameworkpib-07.txt, January 2002.
[AUTH] B. Lloyd, W. Simpson, "PPP Authentication Protocols,"
RFC 1334, October 1992.
[CHAP] W. Simpson, "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication
Protocol (CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996.
[EAP] L. Blunk, J. Vollbrecht, "PPP Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP)", RFC 2284, March 1998.
[NAI] B. Aboba, M. Beadles, "The Network Access Identifier,"
RFC 2486, January 1999.
[IPSEC] R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the Internet
Protocol", RFC 2401, August 1995.
[COPS] D. Durham, et al., "The COPS (Common Open Policy Service)
Protocol", RFC 2748, January 2000.
[COPSPR] K. Chan, et al., "COPS Usage for Policy Provisioning
(COPS-PR)", RFC 3084, March 2001.
[SPPI] K. McCloghrie, M. Fine, J. Seligson, K. Chan, S. Hahn,
R. Sahita, A. Smith, F. Reichmeyer, "Structure of Policy
Provisioning Information", RFC 3159,August 2001.
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11. Author Information and Acknowledgments
Walter Weiss
Ellacoya Networks
7 Henry Clay Drive
Merrimack, NH 03054
Phone: +1 603 879 7364
E-mail: wweiss@ellacoya.com
John Vollbrecht
Interlink Networks, Inc.
775 Technology Drive, Suite 200
Ann Arbor, MI 48108
Phone: +1 734 821 1205
E-Mail: jrv@interlinknetworks.com
David Spence
Interlink Networks, Inc.
775 Technology Drive, Suite 200
Ann Arbor, MI 48108
Phone: +1 734 821 1203
E-Mail: dspence@interlinknetworks.com
David Rago
Interlink Networks, Inc.
775 Technology Drive, Suite 200
Ann Arbor, MI 48108
Phone: +1 734 821 1241
E-Mail: drago@interlinknetworks.com
Freek Dijkstra
Physics and Astronomy Department
Utrecht University
Princetonplein 5
3584 CC Utrecht
The Netherlands
Phone: +31 30 2537724
Email: F.Dijkstra@phys.uu.nl
Cees de Laat
Faculty of Science, Informatics Institute,
University of Amsterdam
Kruislaan 403
1098 SJ Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Phone: +31 20 5257590
E-Mail: delaat@science.uva.nl
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Leon Gommans
Faculty of Science, Informatics Institute,
University of Amsterdam
Kruislaan 403
1098 SJ Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Phone: +31 20 5257586
E-Mail: lgommans@science.uva.nl
Amol Kulkarni
Intel
2111 NE 25th Avenue
Hillsboro, OR 97124
Phone: 503.712.1168
E-Mail: Amol.Kulkarni@intel.com
Ravi Sahita
Intel
2111 NE 25th Avenue
Hillsboro, OR 97124
Phone: 503.712.1554
E-Mail: Ravi.Sahita@intel.com
Kwok Ho Chan
Nortel Networks, Inc.
600 Technology Park Drive
Billerica, MA 01821 USA
Phone: +1 978 288 8175
E-Mail: khchan@nortelnetworks.com
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