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Versions: 00                                                            
RAP Working Group                                                R. Hess
Internet Draft                                                     Intel
Expires December 2001                                          June 2001

        Cryptographic Authentication for RSVP POLICY_DATA Objects


Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
   of Section 10 of RFC2026.  Internet-Drafts are working documents of
   the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its
   working groups.  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at

   The distribution of this memo is unlimited.  This memo is filed as
   <draft-ietf-rap-auth-policy-data-00.txt> and expires December 31,
   2001.  Please send comments to the author.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001).  All Rights Reserved.


   This document describes the format and use of the INTEGRITY option
   within RSVP's POLICY_DATA object to provide integrity and
   authentication of POLICY_DATA objects within RSVP messages.

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1.  Introduction

   The Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) [1] is a protocol for
   setting up distributed state in routers and hosts, and in particular
   for reserving resources to implement integrated service.  RSVP allows
   particular users to obtain preferential access to network resources,
   under the control of an admission control mechanism.  Permission to
   make a reservation will depend both upon the availability of the
   requested resources along the path of the data, and upon satisfaction
   of policy rules.

   Policy based admission control will occur at Policy Enforcement
   Points (PEPs); for the purposes of this document these nodes are
   policy aware RSVP systems.  Policy data are distributed among PEPs
   using POLICY_DATA objects in RSVP messages.  Initially, the
   enforcement of policy rules may concentrate on border nodes between
   autonomous systems.  As such, POLICY_DATA objects may traverse policy
   ignorant RSVP systems (PINs) whose capabilities are limited to
   default policy handling [2].

   To ensure the integrity of this policy based admission control
   mechanism, PEPs require the ability to protect their POLICY_DATA
   objects against corruption and spoofing.  The RSVP integrity
   mechanism [3] works hop-by-hop, which, unfortunately, is
   insufficient for our needs as it places trust with the POLICY_DATA
   object in PINs.  What is required is an integrity mechanism
   analogous to RSVP's, but one what works PEP peer to PEP peer.  This
   document defines such a mechanism.  The proposed scheme transmits an
   authenticating digest of the POLICY_DATA object, computed using a
   secret Authentication Key and a keyed-hash algorithm.  This scheme
   provides protection against forgery or object modification.  The
   INTEGRITY option of each POLICY_DATA object is tagged with a one-
   time-use sequence number.  This allows the message receiver to
   identify playbacks and hence to thwart replay attacks.  The proposed
   mechanism does not afford confidentiality, since messages stay in the
   clear; however, the mechanism is also exportable from most countries,
   which would be impossible were a privacy algorithm to be used.  Note:
   this document uses the terms "sender" and "receiver" differently from
   [3].  They are used here to refer to policy aware RSVP systems
   (a.k.a. PEPs) that face each other either across an RSVP hop or
   through one or more PINs, the "sender" being the system generating
   POLICY_DATA objects.

   The message replay prevention algorithm is quite simple.  The sender
   generates packets with monotonically increasing sequence numbers.  In
   turn, the receiver only accepts packets that have a larger sequence
   number than the previous packet.  To start this process, a receiver
   handshakes with the sender to get an initial sequence number.  This
   memo discusses ways to relax the strictness of the in-order delivery
   of messages as well as techniques to generate monotonically
   increasing sequence numbers that are robust across sender failures
   and restarts.

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   The proposed mechanism is independent of a specific cryptographic
   algorithm, but this document describes the use of Keyed-Hashing for
   Message Authentication using HMAC-MD5 [4].  As noted in [4], there
   exist stronger hashes, such as HMAC-SHA1; where warranted,
   implementations will do well to make them available.  However, in the
   general case, [4] suggests that HMAC-MD5 is adequate to the purpose
   at hand and has preferable performance characteristics.  [4] also
   offers source code and test vectors for this algorithm, a boon to
   those who would test for interoperability.  HMAC-MD5 is required as a
   baseline to be universally included in policy aware RSVP
   implementations providing cryptographic authentication, with other
   proposals optional (see Section 6 on Conformance Requirements).

1.1.  Conventions used in this Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in [5].

1.2.  Why not use the Standard IPsec Authentication Header?

   One obvious question is why, since there exists a standard
   authentication mechanism, IPsec [6,7], we would choose not to use it.
   The use of IPsec was rejected for the following reasons.

   The security associations in IPsec are based on destination address.
   It is not clear that POLICY_DATA objects are well defined for either
   source or destination based security associations, as a router must
   forward PATH and PATH TEAR messages using the same source address as
   the sender listed in the SENDER TEMPLATE.  RSVP traffic may otherwise
   not follow exactly the same path as data traffic.  Using either
   source or destination based associations would require opening a new
   security association among the routers for which a reservation

   In addition, it was noted that neighbor relationships between PEPs
   are not limited to those that face one another across a communication
   channel.  POLICY_DATA objects may traverse PINs, which are not
   necessarily visible to the sending system.  These arguments suggest
   the use of a key management strategy based on PEP to PEP associations
   instead of IPsec.

2.  Data Structures

2.1.  INTEGRITY Option Format

   The Options List of a POLICY_DATA object consists of a sequence of
   "objects," which are type-length-value encoded fields having specific
   purposes.  The information required for PEP peer to PEP peer
   integrity checking is carried in an INTEGRITY option.  The same
   INTEGRITY option type is used for both IPv4 and IPv6.

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   The INTEGRITY Option format is defined to be identical to RSVP's
   INTEGRITY object as defined in [8], Section 2.1.  For clarity, the
   format is reproduced below.

   o   Keyed Message Digest INTEGRITY Option: Class = 4, C-Type = 1

       |          Length           |      4      |      1      |
       |    Flags    | 0 (Reserved)|                           |
       +-------------+-------------+                           +
       |                    Key Identifier                     |
       |                                                       |
       |                    Sequence Number                    |
       |                                                       |
       //                 Keyed Message Digest                //
       |                                                       |

       Length: 16 bits

           The total length of the INTEGRITY Option in octets.  Must
           always be a multiple of 4.

       Flags: An 8-bit field with the following format:


                          0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7
                        | H |                           |
                        | F |             0             |

          Currently only one flag (HF) is defined.  The remaining flags
          are reserved for future use and MUST be set to 0.

          o    Bit 0: Handshake Flag (HF) concerns the integrity
               handshake mechanism (Section 4.3).  POLICY_DATA object
               senders willing to respond to integrity handshake
               messages SHOULD set this flag to 1 whereas those that
               will reject integrity handshake messages SHOULD set this
               to 0.

       Reserved: 8 bits

           Unused at this time.  This field MUST be set to 0.

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       Key Identifier: 48 bits

          An unsigned 48-bit number that MUST be unique for a given
          sender.  Locally unique Key Identifiers can be generated using
          some combination of the address (IP or MAC or LIH) of the
          sending interface and the key number.  The combination of the
          Key Identifier and the sending system's IP address uniquely
          identifies the security association (Section 2.2).

       Sequence Number: 64 bits

          An unsigned monotonically increasing, unique sequence number.

          Sequence Number values may be any monotonically increasing
          sequence that provides the INTEGRITY option (of each
          POLICY_DATA object) with a tag that is unique for the
          associated key's lifetime.  Details on sequence number
          generation are presented in Section 3.

       Keyed Message Digest: Variable length

          The digest MUST be a multiple of 4 octets long.  For HMAC-MD5,
          it will be 16 octets long.

2.2.  Security Association

   The sending and receiving systems maintain a security association for
   each authentication key that they share.  This security association
   includes the following parameters:

     o    Authentication algorithm and algorithm mode being used.

     o    Key used with the authentication algorithm.

     o    Lifetime of the key.

     o    Associated sending interface and other security association
          selection criteria [REQUIRED at Sending System].

     o    Source Address of the sending system [REQUIRED at Receiving

     o    Latest sending sequence number used with this key identifier
          [REQUIRED at Sending System].

     o    List of last N sequence numbers received with this key
          identifier [REQUIRED at Receiving System].

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3.  Generating Sequence Numbers

   In this section we describe methods that could be chosen to generate
   the sequence numbers used in the INTEGRITY option of a POLICY_DATA
   object in a RSVP message.  As previous stated, there are two
   important properties that MUST be satisfied by the generation
   procedure.  The first property is that the sequence numbers are
   unique, or one-time, for the lifetime of the integrity key that is in
   current use.  A receiver can use this property to unambiguously
   distinguish between a new or a replayed object.  The second property
   is that the sequence numbers are generated in monotonically
   increasing order, modulo 2^64.  This is required to greatly reduce
   the amount of saved state, since a receiver only needs to save the
   value of the highest sequence number seen to avoid a replay attack.
   Since the starting sequence number might be arbitrarily large, the
   modulo operation is required to accommodate sequence number roll-over
   within some key's lifetime.  This solution draws from TCP's approach

   The sequence number field is chosen to be a 64-bit unsigned quantity.
   This is large enough to avoid exhaustion over the key lifetime.  For
   example, if a key lifetime was conservatively defined as one year,
   there would be enough sequence number values to send POLICY_DATA
   objects at an average rate of about 585 gigaObjects per second.  A
   32-bit sequence number would limit this average rate to about 136
   objects per second.

   The ability to generate unique monotonically increasing sequence
   numbers across a failure and restart implies some form of stable
   storage, either local to the device or remotely over the network.
   Three sequence number generation procedures are described below.

3.1.  Simple Sequence Numbers

   The most straightforward approach is to generate a unique sequence
   number using an object counter.  Each time a POLICY_DATA object is
   transmitted for a given key, the sequence number counter is
   incremented.  The current value of this counter is continually or
   periodically saved to stable storage.  After a restart, the counter
   is recovered using this stable storage.  If the counter was saved
   periodically to stable storage, the count should be recovered by
   increasing the saved value to be larger than any possible value of
   the counter at the time of the failure.  This can be computed,
   knowing the interval at which the counter was saved to stable
   storage and incrementing the stored value by that amount.

3.2.  Sequence Numbers Based on a Real Time Clock

   Most devices will probably not have the capability to save sequence
   number counters to stable storage for each key.  A more universal
   solution is to base sequence numbers on the stable storage of a real
   time clock.  Many computing devices have a real time clock module

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   that includes stable storage of the clock.  These modules generally
   include some form of nonvolatile memory to retain clock information
   in the event of a power failure.

   In this approach, we could use an NTP based timestamp value as the
   sequence number.  The roll-over period of a NTP timestamp is about
   136 years, much longer than any reasonable lifetime of a key.  In
   addition, the granularity of the NTP timestamp is fine enough to
   allow the generation of a POLICY_DATA object every 200 picoseconds
   for a given key.  Many real time clock modules do not have the
   resolution of an NTP timestamp.  In these cases, the least
   significant bits of the timestamp can be generated using an object
   counter, which is reset every clock tick.  For example, when the real
   time clock provides a resolution of 1 second, the 32 least
   significant bits of the sequence number can be generated using an
   object counter.  The remaining 32 bits are filled with the 32 least
   significant bits of the timestamp.  Assuming that the recovery time
   after failure takes longer than one tick of the real time clock, the
   object counter for the low order bits can be safely reset to zero
   after a restart.

3.3.  Sequence Numbers Based on a Network Recovered Clock

   If the device does not contain any stable storage of sequence number
   counters or of a real time clock, it could recover the real time
   clock from the network using NTP.  Once the clock has been recovered
   following a restart, the sequence number generation procedure would
   be identical to the procedure described above.

4.  POLICY_DATA Object Processing

   Implementations SHOULD allow specification of interfaces that are to
   be secured, for either sending objects, or receiving them, or both.
   The sender must ensure that all POLICY_DATA objects sent on secured
   sending interfaces include an INTEGRITY option, generated using the
   appropriate Key.  Receivers verify whether POLICY_DATA objects,
   except of the type "Integrity Challenge" (Section 4.3), arriving on a
   secured receiving interface contain the INTEGRITY option.  If the
   INTEGRITY option is absent, the receiver discards the object.

   Security associations are simplex - the keys that a sending system
   uses to sign its objects may be different from the keys that its
   receivers use to sign theirs.  Hence, each association is associated
   with a unique sending system and (possibly) multiple receiving

   Each sender SHOULD have distinct security associations (and keys) per
   secured sending interface (or LIH).  While administrators may
   configure all the routers and hosts on a subnet (or for that matter,
   in their network) using a single security association,
   implementations MUST assume that each sender may send using a
   distinct security association on each secured interface.  At the

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   sender, security association selection is based on the interface
   through which the object is sent.  This selection MAY include
   additional criteria, such as the destination address (when sending
   the object unicast, over a broadcast LAN with a large number of
   hosts) or user identities at the sender or receivers [10].  Finally,
   all intended object recipients should participate in this security
   association.  Route flaps in a non RSVP cloud might cause objects for
   the same receiver to be sent on different interfaces at different
   times.  In such cases, the receivers should participate in all
   possible security associations that may be selected for the
   interfaces through which the object might be sent.

   Receivers select keys based on the Key Identifier and the sending
   system's IP address.  The Key Identifier is included in the INTEGRITY
   option.  The sending system's address can be obtained from the
   Originating RSVP_HOP option.  Since the Key Identifier is unique for
   a sender, this method uniquely identifies the key.

   The integrity mechanism slightly modifies the processing rules for
   POLICY_DATA objects, both when including the INTEGRITY option in a
   policy object sent over a secured sending interface and when
   accepting a policy object received on a secured receiving interface.
   These modifications are detailed below.

4.1.  INTEGRITY Generation

   For a POLICY_DATA object sent over a secured sending interface, the
   object is created as follows:

     (1)  The INTEGRITY option is inserted in the appropriate place, and
          its location in the POLICY_DATA object is remembered for later

     (2)  The sending interface and other appropriate criteria (as
          mentioned above) are used to determine the Authentication Key
          and the hash algorithm to be used.

     (3)  The unused flags and the reserved field in the INTEGRITY
          option MUST be set to 0.  The Handshake Flag (HF) should be
          set according to rules specified in Section 2.1.

     (4)  The sending sequence number MUST be updated to ensure a
          unique, monotonically increasing number.  It is then placed in
          the Sequence Number field of the INTEGRITY option.

     (5)  The Keyed Message Digest field is set to zero.

     (6)  The Key Identifier is placed into the INTEGRITY option.

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4.2.  INTEGRITY Reception

     (7)  A copy of the RSVP SESSION object is temporarily appended to
          the end of the POLICY_DATA object (for computational purposes
          only, without changing the length of the POLICY_DATA object).
          The flags field of the SESSION object is set to 0.  This
          concatenation is considered as the message for which a digest
          is to be computed.

     (8)  An authenticating digest of the object is computed using the
          Authentication Key in conjunction with the keyed-hash
          algorithm.  When the HMAC-MD5 algorithm is used, the hash
          calculation is described in [4].  Note: When the computation
          is complete, the SESSION object is ignored and is not part of
          the POLICY_DATA object.

     (9)  The digest is written into the Cryptographic Digest field of
          the INTEGRITY option.

   When the policy object is received on a secured receiving interface,
   and is not of the type "Integrity Challenge", it is processed in the
   following manner:

     (1)  The Cryptographic Digest field of the INTEGRITY option is
          saved and the field is subsequently set to zero.

     (2)  A copy of the RSVP SESSION object is temporarily appended to
          the end of the POLICY_DATA object (for computational purposes
          only, without changing the length of the POLICY_DATA object).
          The flags field of the SESSION object is set to 0.  This
          concatenation is considered as the message for which a digest
          is to be computed.

     (3)  The Key Identifier field and the sending system address are
          used to uniquely determine the Authentication Key and the hash
          algorithm to be used.  Processing of this packet might be
          delayed when the Key Management System (Appendix 1) is queried
          for this information.

     (4)  A new keyed-digest is calculated using the indicated algorithm
          and the Authentication Key.  Note: When the computation is
          complete, the SESSION object is ignored and is not part of the
          POLICY_DATA object.

     (5)  If the calculated digest does not match the received digest,
          the policy object is discarded without further processing.

     (6)  If the policy object is of type "Integrity Response", verify
          that the CHALLENGE option identically matches the originated
          challenge.  If it matches, save the sequence number in the

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          INTEGRITY option as the largest sequence number received to

          Otherwise, for all other policy objects, the sequence number
          is validated to prevent replay attacks, and messages with
          invalid sequence numbers are ignored by the receiver.

          When a policy object is accepted, the sequence number of that
          object could update a stored value corresponding to the
          largest sequence number received to date.  Each subsequent
          object must then have a larger (modulo 2^64) sequence number
          to be accepted.  This simple processing rule prevents message
          replay attacks, but it must be modified to tolerate limited
          out-of-order message delivery.  For example, if several
          messages were sent in a burst (in a periodic refresh generated
          by a router, or as a result of a tear down function), they
          might get reordered and then the sequence numbers would not be
          received in an increasing order.

          An implementation SHOULD allow administrative configuration
          that sets the receiver's tolerance to out-of-order message
          delivery.  A simple approach would allow administrators to
          specify a message window corresponding to the worst case
          reordering behavior.  For example, one might specify that
          packets reordered within a 32 message window would be
          accepted.  If no reordering can occur, the window is set to

          The receiver must store a list of all sequence numbers seen
          within the reordering window.  A received sequence number is
          valid if (a) it is greater than the maximum sequence number
          received or (b) it is a past sequence number lying within the
          reordering window and not recorded in the list.  Acceptance of
          a sequence number implies adding it to the list and removing a
          number from the lower end of the list.  Policy objects
          received with sequence numbers lying below the lower end of
          the list or marked seen in the list are discarded.

   When an "Integrity Challenge" policy object is received on a secured
   sending interface it is processed in the following manner:

     (1)  An "Integrity Response" policy object is formed using the
          Challenge option received in the challenge policy object.

     (2)  The response object is sent back to the receiver, based on the
          source IP address of the challenge policy object, using the
          "INTEGRITY Generation" steps outlined above.  The selection of
          the Authentication Key and the hash algorithm to be used is
          determined by the key identifier supplied in the challenge
          policy object.

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4.3.  Integrity Handshake at Restart or Initialization of the Receiver

   To obtain the starting sequence number for a live Authentication Key,
   the receiver MAY initiate an integrity handshake with the sender.
   This handshake consists of a receiver's Challenge and the sender's
   Response, and may be either initiated during restart or postponed
   until a message signed with that key arrives.

   Once the receiver has decided to initiate an integrity handshake for
   a particular Authentication Key, it identifies the sender using the
   sending system's address configured in the corresponding security
   association.  The receiver then sends an Integrity Challenge, that
   is, a POLICY_DATA object with a CHALLENGE Option to the sender.  This
   option contains the Key Identifier to identify the sender's key and
   MUST have a unique challenge cookie that is based on a local secret
   to prevent guessing (see Section 2.5.3 of [11]).  It is suggested
   that the cookie be an MD5 hash of a local secret and a timestamp to
   provide uniqueness (see Section 9).

   A CHALLENGE Option format is defined to be identical to RSVP's
   CHALLENGE object as defined in [8], Section 4.3.  For clarity, the
   format is reproduced below.

   o   CHALLENGE option: Class = 64, C-Type = 1

       |          Length           |      64     |      1      |
       |        0 (Reserved)       |                           |
       +-------------+-------------+                           +
       |                    Key Identifier                     |
       |                                                       |
       //                  Challenge Cookie                   //
       |                                                       |

       Length: 16 bits

           The total length of the CHALLENGE Option in octets.  Must
           always be a multiple of 4.

       Reserved: 16 bits

           Unused at this time.  This field MUST be set to 0.

       Key Identifier: 48 bits

       Challenge Cookie: Variable length

           The cookie MUST be a multiple of 4 octets long.

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   The sender accepts the "Integrity Challenge" without doing an
   integrity check.  It returns an "Integrity Response," that is, a
   POLICY_DATA object that contains the original CHALLENGE option.  It
   also includes an INTEGRITY option, signed with the key specified by
   the Key Identifier included in the "Integrity Challenge".

   The "Integrity Response" message is accepted by the receiver
   (challenger) only if the returned CHALLENGE option matches the one
   sent in the "Integrity Challenge" message.  This prevents replay of
   old "Integrity Response" messages.  If the match is successful, the
   receiver saves the Sequence Number from the INTEGRITY option as the
   latest sequence number received with the key identifier included in

   If a response is not received within a given period of time, the
   challenge is repeated.  When the integrity handshake successfully
   completes, the receiver begins accepting normal POLICY_DATA objects
   from that sender and ignores any other "Integrity Response" messages.

   The Handshake Flag (HF) is used to allow implementations the
   flexibility of not including the integrity handshake mechanism.  By
   setting this flag to 1, message senders that implement the integrity
   handshake distinguish themselves from those that do not.  Receivers
   SHOULD NOT attempt to handshake with senders whose INTEGRITY option
   has HF = 0.

   An integrity handshake may not be necessary in all environments.  A
   common use of POLICY_DATA integrity will be between peering PEPs,
   which are likely to be processing a steady stream of policy objects
   due to aggregation effects.  When a PEP restarts after a crash, valid
   policy objects from peering senders will probably arrive within a
   short time.  Assuming that replay objects are injected into the
   stream of valid policy objects, there may be only a small window of
   opportunity for a replay attack before a valid object is processed.
   This valid object will set the largest sequence number seen to a
   value greater than any number that had been stored prior to the
   crash, preventing any further replays.

   On the other hand, not using an integrity handshake could allow
   exposure to replay attacks if there is a long period of silence from
   a given sender following a restart of a receiver.  Hence, it SHOULD
   be an administrative decision whether or not the receiver performs an
   integrity handshake with senders that are willing to respond to
   "Integrity Challenge" messages, and whether it accepts any messages
   from senders that refuse to do so.  These decisions will be based on
   assumptions related to a particular network environment.

5.  Key Management

   It is likely that the IETF will define a standard key management
   protocol.  It is strongly desirable to use that key management
   protocol to distribute POLICY_DATA Authentication Keys among

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   communicating policy aware RSVP implementations.  Such a protocol
   would provide scalability and significantly reduce the human
   administrative burden.  The Key Identifier can be used as a hook
   between PEPs and such a future protocol.  Key management protocols
   have a long history of subtle flaws that are often discovered long
   after the protocol was first described in public.  To avoid having to
   change all PEP implementations should such a flaw be discovered,
   integrated key management protocol techniques were deliberately
   omitted from this specification.

5.1.  Key Management Procedures

   Each key has a lifetime associated with it that is recorded in all
   systems (sender and receivers) configured with that key.  The concept
   of a "key lifetime" merely requires that the earliest (KeyStartValid)
   and latest (KeyEndValid) times that the key is valid be programmable
   in a way the system understands.  Certain key generation mechanisms,
   such as Kerberos or some public key schemes, may directly produce
   ephemeral keys.  In this case, the lifetime of the key is implicitly
   defined as part of the key.

   In general, no key is ever used outside its lifetime (but see Section
   5.3).  Possible mechanisms for managing key lifetime include the
   Network Time Protocol and hardware time-of-day clocks.

   To maintain security, it is advisable to change the POLICY_DATA
   Authentication Key on a regular basis.  It should be possible to
   switch the POLICY_DATA Authentication Key without loss of RSVP state
   or denial of reservation service, and without requiring people to
   change all the keys at once.  This requires a PEP implementation to
   support the storage and use of more than one active POLICY_DATA
   Authentication Key at the same time.  Hence both the sender and
   receivers might have multiple active keys for a given security

   Since keys are shared between a sender and (possibly) multiple
   receivers, there is a region of uncertainty around the time of key
   switch-over during which some systems may still be using the old key
   and others might have switched to the new key.  The size of this
   uncertainty region is related to clock synchrony of the systems.
   Administrators should configure the overlap between the expiration
   time of the old key (KeyEndValid) and the validity of the new key
   (KeyStartValid) to be at least twice the size of this uncertainty
   interval.  This will allow the sender to make the key switch-over at
   the midpoint of this interval and be confident that all receivers are
   now accepting the new key.  For the duration of the overlap in key
   lifetimes, a receiver must be prepared to authenticate messages using
   either key.

   During a key switch-over, it will be necessary for each receiver to
   handshake with the sender using the new key.  As stated before, a
   receiver has the choice of initiating a handshake during the

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   switchover or postponing the handshake until the receipt of a message
   using that key.

5.2.  Key Management Requirements

   Requirements on an implementation are as follows:

     o    It is strongly desirable that a hypothetical security breach
          in one Internet protocol not automatically compromise other
          Internet protocols.  The Authentication Key of this
          specification SHOULD NOT be stored using protocols or
          algorithms that have known flaws.

     o    An implementation MUST support the storage and use of more
          than one key at the same time, for both sending and receiving

     o    An implementation MUST associate a specific lifetime (i.e.,
          KeyStartValid and KeyEndValid) with each key and the
          corresponding Key Identifier.

     o    An implementation MUST support manual key distribution (e.g.,
          the privileged user manually typing in the key, key lifetime,
          and key identifier on the console).  The lifetime may be

     o    If more than one algorithm is supported, then the
          implementation MUST require that the algorithm be specified
          for each key at the time the other key information is entered.

     o    Keys that are out of date MAY be automatically deleted by the

     o    Manual deletion of active keys MUST also be supported.

     o    Key storage SHOULD persist across a system restart, warm or
          cold, to ease operational usage.

5.3.  Pathological Case

   It is possible that the last key for a given security association has
   expired.  When this happens, it is unacceptable to revert to an
   unauthenticated condition, and not advisable to disrupt current
   reservations.  Therefore, the system should send a "last
   authentication key expiration" notification to the network manager
   and treat the key as having an infinite lifetime until the lifetime
   is extended, the key is deleted by network management, or a new key
   is configured.

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6.  Conformance Requirements

   To conform to this specification, an implementation MUST support all
   of its aspects.  The HMAC-MD5 authentication algorithm defined in [4]
   MUST be implemented by all conforming implementations.  A conforming
   implementation MAY also support other authentication algorithms such
   as NIST's Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA).  Manual key distribution as
   described above MUST be supported by all conforming implementations.
   All implementations MUST support the smooth key roll over described
   under "Key Management Procedures."

   Implementations SHOULD support a standard key management protocol for
   secure distribution of POLICY_DATA Authentication Keys once such a
   key management protocol is standardized by the IETF.

7.  Kerberos Generation of POLICY_DATA Authentication Keys

   Kerberos [12] MAY be used to generate the POLICY_DATA Authentication
   key used in generating a signature in the Integrity Option sent from
   a PEP sender to a receiver.   Kerberos key generation avoids the use
   of shared keys between PEP senders and receivers such as hosts and
   routers.  Kerberos allows for the use of trusted third party keying
   relationships between security principals (PEP sender and receivers)
   where the Kerberos key distribution center (KDC) establishes an
   ephemeral session key that is subsequently shared between PEP sender
   and receivers.  In the multicast case all receivers of a multicast
   POLICY_DATA object MUST share a single key with the KDC (e.g. the
   receivers are in effect the same security principal with respect to

   The Key information determined by the sender MAY specify the use of
   Kerberos in place of configured shared keys as the mechanism for
   establishing a key between the sender and receiver.  The Kerberos
   identity of the receiver is established as part of the sender's
   interface configuration or it can be established through other
   mechanisms.  When generating the first Integrity Option for a
   specific key identifier the sender requests a Kerberos service ticket
   and gets back an ephemeral session key and a Kerberos ticket from the
   KDC.  The sender encapsulates the ticket and the identity of the
   sender in an Identity Option of the POLICY_DATA object [10].  The
   session key is then used by the sender as the POLICY_DATA
   Authentication key in section 4.1 step (2) and is stored as Key
   information associated with the key identifier.

   Upon policy object reception, the receiver retrieves the Kerberos
   Ticket from the Identity Option, decrypts the ticket and retrieves
   the session key from the ticket.  The session key is the same key as
   used by the sender and is used as the key in section 4.2 step (3).
   The receiver stores the key for use in processing subsequent policy

   Kerberos tickets have lifetimes and the sender MUST NOT use tickets

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   that have expired.  A new ticket MUST be requested and used by the
   sender for the receiver prior to the ticket expiring.

7.1.  Optimization when using Kerberos Based Authentication

   Kerberos tickets are relatively long (> 500 bytes) and it is not
   necessary to send a ticket in every POLICY_DATA object.  The ephemeral
   session key can be cached by the sender and receiver and can be used
   for the lifetime of the Kerberos ticket.  In this case, the sender
   only needs to include the Kerberos ticket in the first POLICY_DATA
   object generated.  Subsequent messages use the key identifier to
   retrieve the cached key (and optionally other identity information)
   instead of passing tickets from sender to receiver in each
   POLICY_DATA object.

   A receiver may not have cached key state with an associated Key
   Identifier due to reboot or route changes.  If the receiver's policy
   indicates the use of Kerberos keys for integrity checking, the
   receiver can send an integrity Challenge message back to the sender.
   Upon receiving an integrity Challenge message a sender MUST send an
   Identity option that includes the Kerberos ticket in the integrity
   Response message, thereby allowing the receiver to retrieve and store
   the session key from the Kerberos ticket for subsequent Integrity

8.  Acknowledgements

   This document is derived directly from similar work done for RSVP by
   Fred Baker, Bob Lindell and Mohit Talwar in [8].

9.  References

   [1]  Braden, R., Zhang, L., Berson, S., Herzog, S. and S. Jamin,
        "Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) -- Version 1 Functional
        Specification", RFC 2205, September 1997.

   [2]  Hess, R., Ed., Herzog, S., "RSVP Extensions for Policy Control",
        work in progress, draft-ietf-rap-new-rsvp-ext-00.txt, June 2001.

   [3]  Baker, F., Lindell, B. and Talwar, M., "RSVP Cryptographic
        Authentication", RFC 2747, January 2000.

   [4]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
        for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, March 1996.

   [5]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
        Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [6]  Atkinson, R. and S. Kent, "Security Architecture for the
        Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.

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   [7]  Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header", RFC 2402,
        November 1998.

   [8]  Baker, F., Lindell, B. and Talwar, M., "RSVP Cryptographic
        Authentication", RFC 2747, January 2000.

   [9]  Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, RFC 793,
        September 1981.

   [10] Yadav, S., et al., "Identity Representation for RSVP", RFC 2752,
        January 2000.

   [11] Maughan, D., Schertler, M., Schneider, M. and J. Turner,
        "Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol
        (ISAKMP)", RFC 2408, November 1998.

   [12] Kohl, J. and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network Authentication
        Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993.

   [13] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security Payload
        (ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.

10.  Security Considerations

   This entire memo describes and specifies an authentication mechanism
   for RSVP POLICY_DATA objects that is believed to be secure against
   active and passive attacks.

   The quality of the security provided by this mechanism depends on the
   strength of the implemented authentication algorithms, the strength
   of the key being used, and the correct implementation of the security
   mechanism in all communicating policy aware RSVP implementations.
   This mechanism also depends on the POLICY_DATA Authentication Keys
   being kept confidential by all parties.  If any of these assumptions
   are incorrect or procedures are insufficiently secure, then no real
   security will be provided to the users of this mechanism.

   While the handshake "Integrity Response" message is integrity-
   checked, the handshake "Integrity Challenge" message is not.  This
   was done intentionally to avoid the case when both peering routers do
   not have a starting sequence number for each other's key.
   Consequently, they will each keep sending handshake "Integrity
   Challenge" messages that will be dropped by the other end.  Moreover,
   requiring only the response to be integrity-checked eliminates a
   dependency on an security association in the opposite direction.

   This, however, lets an intruder generate fake handshaking challenges
   with a certain challenge cookie.  It could then save the response and
   attempt to play it against a receiver that is in recovery.  If it was
   lucky enough to have guessed the challenge cookie used by the
   receiver at recovery time it could use the saved response.  This
   response would be accepted, since it is properly signed, and would

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   have a smaller sequence number for the sender because it was an old
   message.  This opens the receiver up to replays.  Still, it seems
   very difficult to exploit.  It requires not only guessing the
   challenge cookie (which is based on a locally known secret) in
   advance, but also being able to masquerade as the receiver to
   generate a handshake "Integrity Challenge" with the proper IP address
   and not being caught.

   Confidentiality is not provided by this mechanism.  If
   confidentiality is required, IPsec ESP [13] may be the best approach,
   although it is subject to the same criticisms as IPsec
   Authentication, and therefore would be applicable only in specific
   environments.  Protection against traffic analysis is also not
   provided.  Mechanisms such as bulk link encryption might be used when
   protection against traffic analysis is required.

11.  Author's Address

   Rodney Hess
   Intel Corp, BD1
   28 Crosby Dr
   Bedford, MA 01730

   EMail: rodney.hess@intel.com

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Appendix A: Key Management Interface

   This appendix describes a generic interface to Key Management.  This
   description is at an abstract level realizing that implementations
   may need to introduce small variations to the actual interface.

   At the start of execution, a policy aware RSVP system would use this
   interface to obtain the current set of relevant keys for sending and
   receiving POLICY_DATA objects.  During execution, it can query for
   specific keys given a Key Identifier and Source Address, discover
   newly created keys, and be informed of those keys that have been
   deleted.  The interface provides both a polling and asynchronous
   upcall style for wider applicability.

A.1.  Data Structures

   Information about keys is returned using the following KeyInfo data

     KeyInfo {
             Key Type (Send or Receive)
             Authentication Algorithm Type and Mode
             Status (Active or Deleted)
             Outgoing Interface (for Send only)
             Other Outgoing Security Association Selection Criteria
                     (for Send only, optional)
             Sending System Address (for Receive Only)

A.2.  Default Key Table

   This function returns a list of KeyInfo data structures corresponding
   to all of the keys that are configured for sending and receiving
   POLICY_DATA objects and have an Active Status.  This function is
   usually called at the start of execution but there is no limit on the
   number of times that it may be called.

     KM_DefaultKeyTable() -> KeyInfoList

A.3.  Querying for Unknown Receive Keys

   When a message arrives with an unknown Key Identifier and Sending
   System Address pair, PEP can use this function to query the Key
   Management System for the appropriate key.  The status of the element
   returned, if any, must be Active.

     KM_GetRecvKey( INTEGRITY Object, SrcAddress ) -> KeyInfo

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A.4.  Polling for Updates

   This function returns a list of KeyInfo data structures corresponding
   to any incremental changes that have been made to the default key
   table or requested keys since the last call to either
   KM_KeyTablePoll, KM_DefaultKeyTable, or KM_GetRecvKey.  The status of
   some elements in the returned list may be set to Deleted.

      KM_KeyTablePoll() -> KeyInfoList

A.5.  Asynchronous Upcall Interface

   Rather than repeatedly calling the KM_KeyTablePoll(), an
   implementation may choose to use an asynchronous event model.  This
   function registers interest to key changes for a given Key Identifier
   or for all keys if no Key Identifier is specified.  The upcall
   function is called each time a change is made to a key.

     KM_KeyUpdate ( Function [, KeyIdentifier ] )

   where the upcall function is parameterized as follows:

     Function ( KeyInfo )

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