RAP Working Group R. Hess, Ed.
Internet-Draft S. Yadav
Obsoletes: 2752 R. Yavatkar
Expires January 2002 Intel
R. Pabbati
P. Ford
T. Moore
Microsoft
S. Herzog
IPHighway
July 2001
Identity Representation for RSVP
draft-ietf-rap-rsvp-better-identity-01.txt
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working documents of
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The distribution of this memo is unlimited. This memo is filed as
<draft-ietf-rap-rsvp-better-identity-01.txt> and expires January 31,
2002. Please send comments to the author.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document describes the representation of identity information in
POLICY_DATA objects [POL-EXT] for supporting policy based admission
control in RSVP [RFC 2205]. The goal of identity representation is
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to allow a process on a system to securely identify the owner and the
application of the communicating process (e.g. user id) and to convey
this information in RSVP PATH or RESV messages in a secure manner.
We describe the encoding of identities as a RSVP policy element. We
describe the processing rules to generate identity policy elements
for multicast merged flows. Subsequently, we describe
representations of user identities for Kerberos and public-key based
authentication mechanisms. In summary we describe the use of this
identity information in an operational setting.
1. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119].
2. Introduction
RSVP [RFC 2205] is a resource reservation protocol designed for an
integrated services Internet [RFC 1633]. A host uses RSVP to request
a specific quality of service (QoS) from the network for a particular
application's data flows. RSVP is also used by routers to deliver
QoS requests to all nodes along the path(s) of the flows and to
establish and maintain state in order to provide the requested
service. RSVP requests will generally result in resources being
reserved in each node along the data path. RSVP allows particular
users to obtain preferential access to network resources, under the
control of an admission control mechanism. Permission to make a
reservation is based both upon the availability of the requested
resources along the data path and upon satisfaction of policy rules.
Providing policy based admission control mechanism based on user or
application identity is one of the primary requirements of RSVP.
In order to solve these problems and implement identity based policy
control it is necessary to identify the user or application making
the RSVP request.
This document proposes a mechanism for sending identification
information in an RSVP message, thereby enabling authorization
decisions to be based on policy and identity.
We describe the authentication policy element (AUTH_DATA) contained
in a POLICY_DATA object [POL-EXT]. A user process generates an
AUTH_DATA policy element and hands it off to a policy aware RSVP
service on the originating host. The RSVP service encapsulates the
AUTH_DATA policy element into a POLICY_DATA object. It then inserts
this object into the RSVP PATH or RESV message to permit
identification of the owner (e.g. user or application) making the
request for network resources. Policy aware RSVP systems, also
referred to by this memo as Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs), forward
the policy elements to their Policy Decision Points (PDPs) [POL-FRAME].
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Each PDP along the data path authenticates the request using the
credentials present in the AUTH_DATA policy element. The PDP makes
an admission policy decision along with other policy decisions as
warranted by policy configuration. The admit or deny decision is
returned to the PEP, who either installs the necessary RSVP state or
rejects the RSVP request. Furthermore, with an admit decision, the
PDP also returns to the PEP a new policy element list in which exists
a new AUTH_DATA policy element amongst other possible policy elements.
This new AUTH_DATA contains the identity credentials of this PDP for
authentication by the next PDP in the data path. The PEP forwards
the RSVP message with the new policy elements to the next RSVP hop.
In this manner, network resources can be allocated or reserved based
on policy and identity.
3. Policy Element for Authentication Data
3.1. Policy Data Object Format
POLICY_DATA objects contain policy information and are carried by
RSVP messages. A detail description of the format of the POLICY_DATA
object can be found in "RSVP Extensions for Policy Control" [POL-
EXT].
3.2. Authentication Data Policy Element
In this section, we describe a policy element (PE) called
authentication data (AUTH_DATA). AUTH_DATA policy elements contain a
list of authentication attributes.
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| Length | P-Type = Identity Type |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| |
// Authentication Attribute List //
| |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
Length: 16 bits
The length of the policy element (including the Length and P-
Type fields) in number of octets (MUST be a multiple of 4) and
indicates the end of the authentication attribute list.
P-Type (Identity Type): 16 bits
Type of identity information contained in this Policy Element
supplied as the Policy Element Type (P-Type). The Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) acts as a registry for Policy
Element Types for identity as described in the [POL-EXT].
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Initially, the registry contains the following P-Types for
identity:
2 AUTH_USER Authentication scheme to identify users
3 AUTH_APP Authentication scheme to identify
applications
Authentication Attribute List: Variable length
Authentication attributes contain information specific to the
authentication method and the type of AUTH_DATA. The policy
element definition [POL-EXT] provides the mechanism for grouping
a collection of authentication attributes.
3.3. Authentication Attributes
Authentication attributes MUST be encoded as a multiple of 4 octets;
attributes that are not a multiple of 4 octets long MUST be padded to
a 4-octet boundary.
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| Length | A-Type | SubType |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| |
// Value //
| |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
Length: 16 bits
The length field indicates the actual length of the attribute
(including the Length and A-Type fields) in number of octets.
The length does not include any octet padding to the Value field
to make the attribute a multiple of 4 octets long.
A-Type: 8 bits
Authentication attribute type (A-Type) field is one octet. IANA
acts as a registry for A-Types as described in the section 9,
IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the
following A-Types:
1 POLICY_LOCATOR Unique string for locating the
admission policy (such as X.500 DN
described in [RFC 1779]).
2 CREDENTIAL User credential such as a Kerberos
ticket, or a digital certificate.
Application credential such as an
application ID.
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3 DIGITAL_SIGNATURE Digital signature of the
authentication data policy element.
4 POLICY_ERROR_OBJECT Detailed information on policy
failures.
SubType: 8 bits
Authentication attribute sub-type field is one octet. Value of
SubType depends on A-type.
Value: Variable length
The value field contains the attribute specific information.
3.3.1. POLICY_LOCATOR A-Type
POLICY_LOCATOR is used to locate the admission policy for the user
or application. Distinguished Name (DN) is unique for each User or
application hence a DN is used as for the policy locator.
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| Length | A-Type | SubType |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| |
// OctetSting //
| |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
Length: 16 bits
Length of the attribute, which MUST be >= 4.
A-Type: 8 bits
This field MUST contain the value POLICY_LOCATOR.
SubType: 8 bits
The following SubTypes for POLICY_LOCATOR are defined. IANA acts
As a registry for POLICY_LOCATOR SubTypes as described in Section
9, IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains
the following SubTypes for POLICY_LOCATOR:
1 ASCII_DN OctetString contains the X.500 DN as
described in the RFC 1779 as an ASCII
string.
2 UNICODE_DN OctetString contains the X.500 DN
described in the RFC 1779 as an UNICODE
string.
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3 ASCII_DN_ENCRYPT OctetString contains the encrypted X.500
DN. The Kerberos session key or digital
certificate private key is used for
encryption. For Kerberos encryption the
format is the same as returned from
gss_seal [RFC 1509].
4 UNICODE_DN_ENCRYPT OctetString contains the encrypted
UNICODE X.500 DN. The Kerberos session
key or digital certificate private key
is used for encryption. For Kerberos
encryption the format is the same as
returned from gss_seal [RFC 1509].
OctetString: Variable length
The OctetString field contains the DN.
3.3.2. CREDENTIAL A-Type
CREDENTIAL indicates the credentials of the user or application to be
authenticated. For Kerberos authentication method the CREDENTIAL
object contains the Kerberos session ticket. For public-key based
authentication this field contains a digital certificate.
A summary of the CREDENTIAL attribute format is shown below. The
fields are transmitted from left to right.
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| Length | A-Type | SubType |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| |
// OctetSting //
| |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
Length: 16 bits
Length of the attribute, which MUST be >= 4.
A-Type: 8 bits
This field MUST contain the value CREDENTIAL.
SubType: 8 bits
IANA acts as a registry for CREDENTIAL SubTypes as described in
Section 9, IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains
the following SubTypes for CREDENTIAL:
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1 ASCII_ID OctetString contains user or application
identification in a plain ASCII text string.
2 UNICODE_ID OctetString contains user or application
identification in a plain UNICODE text string.
3 KERBEROS_TKT OctetString contains a Kerberos ticket.
4 X509_V3_CERT OctetString contains a X.509 V3 digital
certificate [X.509].
5 PGP_CERT OctetString contains a PGP digital
certificate.
OctetString: Variable length
The OctetString contains the user or application credentials.
3.3.3. DIGITAL_SIGNATURE A-Type
The DIGITAL_SIGNATURE attribute MUST be the last attribute in the
attribute list and contains the digital signature of the AUTH_DATA
policy element. The digital signature signs all data in the
AUTH_DATA policy element up to, but not including, the
DIGITAL_SIGNATURE. The algorithm used to compute the digital
signature depends on the authentication method specified by the
CREDENTIAL SubType field.
A summary of DIGITAL_SIGNATURE attribute format is described below.
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| Length | A-Type | SubType |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| |
// OctetSting //
| |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
Length: 16 bits
Length of the attribute, which MUST be >= 4.
A-Type: 8 bits
This field MUST contain the value DIGITAL_SIGNATURE.
SubType: 8 bits
No SubTypes for DIGITAL_SIGNATURE are currently defined. This
field MUST be set to 0.
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OctetString: Variable length
OctetString contains the digital signature of the AUTH_DATA.
3.3.4. POLICY_ERROR_CODE A-Type
This attribute is used to carry any specific policy control errors
generated by a node when processing/validating an Authentication Data
Policy Element. When a RSVP policy node (local policy decision point
or remote PDP) encounters a request that fails policy control due to
its Authentication Policy Element, it SHOULD add a POLICY_ERROR_CODE
containing additional information about the reason the failure
occurred into the policy element. This will then cause an appropriate
PATH_ERROR or RESV_ERROR message to be generated with the policy
element and appropriate RSVP error code in the message, which is
returned to the request's source.
The AUTH_DATA policy element in a PATH or RSVP message SHOULD NOT
contain the POLICY_ERROR_OBJECT attribute. These are only inserted
into PATH_ERROR and RESV_ERROR messages when generated by policy
aware intermediate nodes.
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| Length | A-Type | SubType |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| Reserved (0) | ErrorValue |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| |
// OctetSting //
| |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
Length: 16 bits
Length of the attribute, which MUST be >= 8.
A-Type: 8 bits
This field MUST contain the value POLICY_ERROR_CODE
SubType: 8 bits
No SubTypes for POLICY_ERROR_CODE are currently defined. This
field MUST be set to 0.
Reserved: 16 bits
This field MUST be set to 0.
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ErrorValue: 16 bits
A 16-bit code containing the reason that the Policy Decision
Point failed to process the policy element. IANA acts as a
registry for ErrorValues as described in Section 9, IANA
Considerations. The following values have been defined.
1 ERROR_NO_MORE_INFO No information is available.
2 UNSUPPORTED_CREDENTIAL_TYPE This type of credentials is
not supported.
3 INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGES The credentials do not have
sufficient privilege.
4 EXPIRED_CREDENTIAL The credential has expired.
5 IDENTITY_CHANGED Identity has changed.
OctetString: Variable length
The OctetString field contains information from the Policy
Decision Point that MAY contain additional information about the
policy failure. For example, it may include a human readable
message in the ASCII text.
4. Authentication Data Formats
Authentication attributes are grouped together in a policy element to
represent the identity credentials.
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4.1. Simple User Authentication
In the simple user authentication method, the user's login ID, in
either plain ASCII or UNICODE text, is encoded as a CREDENTIAL
attribute. A summary of the simple user AUTH_DATA policy element is
shown below.
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Length | P-Type = AUTH_USER |
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Length |POLICY_LOCATOR| SubType |
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| |
// OctetSting (User's Distinguished Name) //
| |
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Length | CREDENTIAL | ASCII_ID |
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| |
// OctetSting (User's login ID) //
| |
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
4.2. Kerberos User Authentication
Kerberos [RFC 1510] authentication utilizes a trusted third party,
the Kerberos Distribution Center (KDC), to provide for authentication
of the user to a policy aware network element. For this method of
authentication to work, a KDC must be present, and both the host and
the policy aware network element (re: PDP) implement the Kerberos
authentication protocol.
An example of a user Kerberos AUTH_DATA policy element is shown
below.
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Length | P-Type = AUTH_USER |
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Length |POLICY_LOCATOR| SubType |
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| |
// OctetSting (User's Distinguished Name) //
| |
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Length | CREDENTIAL | KERBEROS_TKT|
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| |
// OctetSting (Kerberos Session Ticket) //
| |
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
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4.2.1. Operational Setting using Kerberos Identities
A policy aware RSVP enabled host is configured to construct and
insert AUTH_DATA policy objects into RSVP messages that designate use
of the Kerberos authentication method (KERBEROS_TKT). Upon a RSVP
session initialization, the initiating application, be it a user
and/or an application, contacts the KDC to obtain a Kerberos ticket
for the next policy aware RSVP system or its PDP on the data path.
The identity of the next hop may have been statically configured,
learned via DHCP or maintained in a directory service. Once the
ticket is acquired, the host constructs a Kerberos AUTH_DATA policy
object, encapsulates it into a RSVP message, and sends it to the next
hop RSVP system. Once received by the PDP, the Kerberos ticket is
used to authenticate the user and/or application initiating the RSVP
session.
4.3. Public-Key Based User Authentication
In the public-key based user authentication method, the digital
certificate is encoded as the user's and/or application's
credentials. The digital signature is used for authenticating the
user and/or application.
An example of a user public-key AUTH_DATA policy element is show
below.
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Length | P-Type = AUTH_USER |
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Length |POLICY_LOCATOR| SubType |
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| |
// OctetSting (User's Distinguished Name) //
| |
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Length | CREDENTIAL | PGP_CERT |
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| |
// OctetSting (User's digital certificate) //
| |
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Length |DIGITAL_SIGN. | 0 |
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| |
// OctetSting (Digital signature) //
| |
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
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4.3.1. Operational Setting for Public-Key Based Authentication
Public-key based authentication assumes the following:
- RSVP service requestors have a pair of keys, one private and
one public.
- The private key is secured with the user.
- Public keys are stored in digital certificates. A trusted
third party, the certificate authority (CA), issues these
digital certificates upon request.
- The PDP has the ability to verify digital certificates.
A policy aware RSVP enabled host is configured to construct and
insert AUTH_DATA policy objects into RSVP messages that designate use
of a public-key authentication method. When constructing the
AUTH_DATA policy element, the host uses the user's private key to
generate the digital signature. The host then encapsulates the
AUTH_DATA policy object into a RSVP message and sends it to the next
hop RSVP system. Once received by the PDP, authentication of the
user is accomplished by verifying the digital signature using the
user's public key stored in the digital certificate.
4.4. Simple Application Authentication
The application authentication method encodes the application
identification such as an executable filename as plain ASCII or
UNICODE text.
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Length | P-Type = AUTH_APP |
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Length |POLICY_LOCATOR| SubType |
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| |
// OctetSting (Application's identity attributes in //
| the form of a Distinguished Name) |
| |
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| Length | CREDENTIAL | ASCII_ID |
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
| |
// OctetSting (Application ID, e.g. vic.exe) //
| |
+-------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+
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5. AUTH_DATA Construction at Intermediary PDP Nodes
As described in Section 2, each PDP along the data path constructs a
new AUTH_DATA for the next PDP. More specifically, generation of the
user AUTH_DATA policy element follows these rules:
1. For unicast RSVP sessions, the user policy locator is copied from
the previous hop. For authentication credentials, the PDP uses
its own instead of the previous hop's.
2. For multicast messages, the PDP discards data from the previous
hop and uses its own policy locator and authentication
credentials instead.
For application AUTH_DATA policy elements, the PDP follows these
rules:
1. For unicast sessions, the application AUTH_DATA is copied from
the previous hop.
2. For multicast messages the application AUTH_DATA is either the
first application AUTH_DATA in the message or chosen by the PDP.
6. Message Processing Rules
6.1. Message Generation
A RSVP message is created by a policy aware RSVP host as specified in
[RFC 2205] and [POL-EXT] with the following modifications.
1. A RSVP message MAY contain multiple AUTH_DATA policy elements in
one or more POLICY_DATA objects.
2. When an AUTH_DATA PE is created, the P-Type field is set to
indicate the identity type, e.g. user. The DN is inserted as a
POLICY_LOCATOR attribute. Authentication credentials such as a
Kerberos ticket or a digital certificate are inserted as a
CREDENTIAL attribute.
3. The AUTH_DATA PE is encapsulated into a POLICY_DATA object as
described in [POL-EXT]. The INTEGRITY option of a POLICY_DATA
object SHOULD be included if protection against corruption and
replay attacks is desired [POLICY-MD5].
4. The policy object is inserted into the RSVP message at the
appropriate place.
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6.2. Message Reception
RSVP messages are processed as specified by [RFC 2205] with the
following modifications.
1. If a RSVP system is policy unaware, it MUST ignore any policy data
objects it finds in a RSVP message [POL-EXT]. Processing of the
RSVP message occurs normally as specified in [RFC 2205] and
[POL-EXT].
If a RSVP system is policy aware, that is, it is also a policy
enforcement point (PEP), then it SHOULD send the policy elements
from the POLICY_DATA objects to its PDP (or LDP, as appropriate)
and wait for a response.
2. Reject the RSVP message if the response from the PDP is negative.
Otherwise, continue processing the RSVP message.
6.3. Authentication
1. The PDP retrieves the AUTH_DATA PE from the list of policy
elements. Check the P-Type field and return an error if the
identity type is unsupported (see Section 7).
2. Verify user credentials. If the authentication method is
unsupported, return an error as described in Section 7.
- For simple authentication, this means validating the user ID or
executable name.
- For the Kerberos method, use the enclosed Kerberos ticket to
validate the user.
- For the public-key method, first, validate the digital
certificate that should have been issued by a trusted
certificate authority. Then, retrieve the user's public key
from the certificate, and verify the digital signature.
7. Error Signaling
If the PDP fails to verify the AUTH_DATA policy element, then it MUST
return a policy control failure (Error Code = 02) to the PEP. The
error values are described in [RFC 2205] and [POL-EXT]. Furthermore,
the PDP SHOULD supply a policy data object containing an AUTH_DATA PE
with a POLICY_ERROR_CODE attribute containing more details on the
policy control failure (see Section 3.3.4). The PEP will include
this policy data object in the outgoing RSVP Error message.
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8. IANA Considerations
Following the policies outlined in [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS], Standard
RSVP Policy Elements (P-type values) are assigned by IETF Consensus
action as described in [POL-EXT].
P-Type AUTH_USER is assigned the value 2. P-Type AUTH_APP is assigned
the value 3.
Following the policies outlined in [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS],
authentication attribute types (A-Type) in the range 0-127 are
allocated through an IETF Consensus action, A-Type values between
128-255 are reserved for Private Use and are not assigned by IANA.
A-Type POLICY_LOCATOR is assigned the value 1. A-Type CREDENTIAL is
assigned the value 2. A-Type DIGITAL_SIGNATURE is assigned the value
3. A-Type POLICY_ERROR_OBJECT is assigned the value 4.
Following the policies outlined in [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS],
POLICY_LOCATOR SubType values in the range 0-127 are allocated
through an IETF Consensus action, POLICY_LOCATOR SubType values
between 128-255 are reserved for Private Use and are not assigned by
IANA.
POLICY_LOCATOR SubType ASCII_DN is assigned the value 1, SubType
UNICODE_DN is assigned the value 2, SubType ASCII_DN_ENCRYPT is
assigned the value 3 and SubType UNICODE_DN_ENCRYPT is assigned the
value 4.
Following the policies outlined in [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS], ErrorValue
assignments for the POLICY_ERROR_CODE attribute are assigned by IETF
Consensus action.
The ErrorValue ERROR_NO_MORE_INFO is assigned the value 1,
UNSUPPORTED_CREDENTIAL_TYPE is assigned the value 2,
INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGES is assigned the value 3, EXPIRED_CREDENTIAL
is assigned the value 4, and the ErrorValue IDENTITY_CHANGED is
assigned the value 5.
Following the policies outlined in [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS], CREDENTIAL
SubType values in the range 0-127 are allocated through an IETF
Consensus action, CREDENTIAL SubType values between 128-255 are
reserved for Private Use and are not assigned by IANA.
CREDENTIAL SubType ASCII_ID is assigned the value 1, SubType
UNICODE_ID is assigned the value 2, SubType KERBEROS_TKT is assigned
the value 3, SubType X509_V3_CERT is assigned the value 4, SubType
PGP_CERT is assigned the value 5.
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9. Security Considerations
The purpose of this memo is to describe a mechanism to authenticate
RSVP requests based on user identity in a secure manner. The
INTEGRITY Option of a RSVP POLICY_DATA object can be used to protect
the policy object containing user identity information from
corruption or replay attacks [POLICY-MD5]. Combining a policy
object containing the AUTH_DATA policy element and an INTEGRITY
option with an RSVP's INTEGRITY Object can result in a secure
admission control mechanism that enforces authentication based on
both the identity of the user and the identity of the originating
node.
Simple authentication does not contain credentials that can be
securely authenticated and is inherently less secured.
The Kerberos authentication mechanism is reasonably well secured.
User authentication using a public-key certificate is known to
provide the strongest security.
10. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Andrew Smith, Bob Lindell and many others for
their valuable comments on this memo.
11. References
[ASCII] Coded Character Set -- 7-Bit American Standard
Code for Information Interchange, ANSI X3.4-
1986.
[IANA-CONSIDERATIONS] Alvestrand, H. and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in
RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October 1998.
[POL-EXT] Hess, R., Ed., and Herzog, S., "RSVP Extensions
for Policy Control", work in progress, draft-
ietf-rap-new-rsvp-ext-00.txt, June 2001.
[POL-FRAME] Yavatkar, R., Pendarakis, D. and R. Guerin, "A
Framework for Policy-based Admission Control
RSVP", RFC 2753, January 2000.
[POLICY-MD5] Hess, R., "Cryptographic Authentication for
RSVP POLICY_DATA Objects", work in progress,
draft-ietf-rap-auth-policy-data-01.txt,
July 2001.
[RFC 1510] Kohl, J. and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network
Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510,
September 1993.
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[RFC 1704] Haller, N. and R. Atkinson, "On Internet
Authentication", RFC 1704, October 1994.
[RFC 1779] Killie, S., "A String Representation of
Distinguished Names", RFC 1779, March 1995.
[RFC 2205] Braden, R., Zhang, L., Berson, S., Herzog, S.
and S. Jamin, "Resource ReSerVation Protocol
(RSVP) - Version 1 Functional Specification",
RFC 2205, September 1997.
[RFC 2209] Braden, R. and L. Zhang, "Resource ReSerVation
Protocol (RSVP) - Version 1 Message Processing
Rules", RFC 2209, September 1997.
[RFC 2119] Bradner, S., "Key Words for use in RFCs to
Indicate Requirement Levels," RFC 2119, March
1997.
[UNICODE] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard,
Version 2.0", Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA,
1996.
[X.509] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W. and D. Solo,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 2459, January
1999.
[X.509-ITU] ITU-T (formerly CCITT) Information technology -
Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory:
Authentication Framework Recommendation X.509
ISO/IEC 9594-8
12. Author Information
Rodney Hess
Intel, BD1
28 Crosby Drive
Bedford, MA 01730
EMail: rodney.hess@intel.com
Satyendra Yadav
Intel, JF3-206
2111 NE 25th Avenue
Hillsboro, OR 97124
EMail: Satyendra.Yadav@intel.com
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Raj Yavatkar
Intel, JF3-206
2111 NE 25th Avenue
Hillsboro, OR 97124
Email: Raj.Yavatkar@intel.com
Ramesh Pabbati
Microsoft
1 Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98054
Email: rameshpa@microsoft.com
Peter Ford
Microsoft
1 Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98054
Email: peterf@microsoft.com
Tim Moore
Microsoft
1 Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98054
Email: timmoore@microsoft.com
Shai Herzog
IPHighway, Inc.
55 New York Avenue
Framingham, MA 01701
Email: herzog@iphighway.com
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Appendix A: Revision History
Revision 01
1. Corrected an error in the processing of Kerberos credentials in
AUTH_DATA policy objects by the PDP (Section 4.2.1 and Section
6.3).
2. Corrected the length of the ErrorValue field for a
POLICY_ERROR_OBJECT attribute (Section 3.3.4).
3. Specified the IANA considerations for ErrorValue in Section
3.3.4 and Section 9.
4. Expanded Section 2, Introduction.
5. Rewrote the text for Section 5 to better follow Section 2.
6. Updated Step 3 in Section 6.1 to correctly reflect how security
issues are addressed.
Revision 00
1. Updated the Security Considerations Section to correctly
reflect how various security issues are addressed.
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Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
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