regext J. Latour
Internet-Draft CIRA
Intended status: Standards Track O. Gudmundsson
Expires: March 16, 2018 Cloudflare, Inc.
P. Wouters
Red Hat
M. Pounsett
Rightside Group, Ltd.
September 12, 2017
Third Party DNS operator to Registrars/Registries Protocol
draft-ietf-regext-dnsoperator-to-rrr-protocol-04
Abstract
There are several problems that arise in the standard
Registrant/Registrar/Registry model when the operator of a zone is
neither the Registrant nor the Registrar for the delegation.
Historically the issues have been minor, and limited to difficulty
guiding the Registrant through the initial changes to the NS records
for the delegation. As this is usually a one time activity when the
operator first takes charge of the zone it has not been treated as a
serious issue.
When the domain uses DNSSEC it necessary to make regular (sometimes
annual) changes to the delegation, updating DS record(s) in order to
track KSK rollover. Under the current model this is prone to delays
and errors, as the Registrant must participate in updates to DS
records.
This document describes a simple protocol that allows a third party
DNS operator to: establish the initial chain of trust (bootstrap
DNSSEC) for a delegation; update DS records for a delegation; and,
remove DS records from a secure delegation. The DNS operator may do
these things in a trusted manner, without involving the Registrant
for each operation. This same protocol can be used by Registrants to
maintain their own domains if they wish.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 16, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Notional Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. RFC2119 Keywords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Process Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Identifying the Registration Entity . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Establishing a Chain of Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Maintaining the Chain of Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. Acceptance Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.5. Bootstrapping DNSSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. API Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. RESTful Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2.1. CDS resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2.2. Token resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3. Customized Error Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. IANA Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.1. regext Version 04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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A.2. regext Version 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.3. regext Version 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.4. regext Version 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.5. regext Version 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.6. Version 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.7. Version 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.8. Version 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.9. Version 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
After a domain has been registered, one of three parties will
maintain the DNS zone loaded on the "primary" DNS servers: the
Registrant, the Registrar, or a third party DNS operator. DNS
registration systems were originally designed around making
registrations easy and fast, however after registration the
complexity of making changes to the delegation differs for each of
these parties. The Registrar can make changes directly in the
Registry systems through some API (typically EPP [RFC5730]). The
Registrant is typically limited to using a web interface supplied by
the Registrar or Reseller. Typically, a third party DNS Operator
must to go through the Registrant to update any delegation
information.
Unless the responsible Registration Entity is scanning child zones
for CDS records in order to bootstrap or update DNSSEC, the operator
must contact and engage the Registrant in updating DS records for the
delegation. New information must be communicated to the Registrant,
who must submit that information to the Registrar. Typically this
involves cutting and pasting between email and a web interface, which
is error prone. Furthermore, involving Registrants in this way does
not scale for even moderately sized DNS operators. Tracking
thousands (or millions) of changes sent to customers, and following
up if those changes are not submitted to the Registrar, or are
submitted with errors, is itself expensive and error prone.
The current system does not work well, as there are many types of
failures that have been reported at all levels in the registration
model. The failures result in either the inability to use DNSSEC or
in validation failures that cause the domain to become unavailable to
users behind validating resolvers.
The goal of this document is to create a protocol for establishing a
secure chain of trust that involves parties not in the traditional
Registrant/Registrar/Registry (RRR) model, and to reduce the friction
in maintaining DNSSEC secured delegations in these cases. It
describes a REST-based [RFC6690] protocol which can be used to
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establish DNSSEC initial trust (to enable or bootstrap DNSSEC), and
to trigger maintenance of DS records.
2. Notional Conventions
2.1. Definitions
For the purposes of this draft, a third-party DNS Operator is any DNS
Operator responsible for a zone, where the operator is neither the
Registrant nor the Registrar of record for the delegation.
Uses of "child" and "parent" refer to the relationship between DNS
zone operators (see [RFC7719] and [I-D.ietf-dnsop-terminology-bis]).
In this document, unless otherwise noted, the child is the third-
party DNS operator and the parent is the Registry.
Use of the term "Registration Entity" in this document may refer to
any party that engages directly in registration activities with the
Registrant. Typically this will be a Reseller or Registrar, but in
some cases, such as when a Registry directly sells registrations to
the public, may apply to the Registry. Even in cases where a
Registrar is involved, this term may still apply to a Registry if
that Registry normally accepts DS/DNSKEY updates directly from
Registrants.
The CDS and CDNSKEY DNS resource records, having substantially the
same function but for different record types, are used interchangably
in this document. Unless otherwise noted, any use of "CDS" or
"CDNSKEY" can be assumed to also refer to the other.
2.2. RFC2119 Keywords
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Process Overview
3.1. Identifying the Registration Entity
As of publication of this document, there has never been a
standardized or widely deployed method for easily and scalably
identifying the Registration Entity for a particular registration.
At this time, WHOIS [RFC3912] is the only widely deployed protocol to
carry such information, but WHOIS responses are unstructured text,
and each implementor can lay out its text responses differently. In
addition, Registries may include referrals in this unstructured text
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to the WHOIS interfaces of their Registrars, and those Registrar
WHOIS interface in turn have their own layouts. This presents a text
parsing problem which is infeasible to solve.
RDAP, the successor to WHOIS, described in [RFC7480], solves the
problems of unstructured responses, and a consistently implemented
referral system, however at this time RDAP has yet to be deployed at
most Registries.
With no current mechanism in place to scalably discover the Registrar
for a particular registration, the problem of automatic discovery of
the base URL of the API is considered out of scope of this document.
The authors recommend standardization of an RDAP extension to obtain
this information from the Registry.
3.2. Establishing a Chain of Trust
After signing the zone, the child DNS Operator needs to upload the DS
record(s) to the parent. The child can signal its desire to have
DNSSEC validation enabled by publishing one of the special DNS
records CDS and/or CDNSKEY as defined in [RFC7344] and [RFC8078].
Registration Entities MAY regularly scan the child name servers of
unsecured delegations for CDS records in order to bootstrap DNSSEC,
and are advised to do so. At the time of publication, some ccTLD
Registries are already doing this. A Registration Entity that
regularly scans all child zones under its responsibility (both
secured and unsecured) for CDS will not require the API described in
this document. However, such a Registration Entity should follow the
guidelines discussed in Section 3.5 below when using CDS to bootstrap
DNSSEC on a previously unsecured delegation.
In the case where the Registration Entity is not normally scanning
child zones for CDS records, the Registration Entity SHOULD implement
the API from this document, allowing child operators to notify the
Registration Entity to begin such a scan.
Once the Registration Entity finds CDS records in a child zone it is
responsible for, or receives a signal via this API, it SHOULD start
acceptance processing as described below.
3.3. Maintaining the Chain of Trust
Once the secure chain of trust is established, the Registration
Entity SHOULD regularly scan the child zone for CDS record changes.
If the Registration Entity implements the protocol described in this
document, then it SHOULD also accept signals via this protocol to
immediately check the child zone for CDS records.
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Server implementations of this protocol MAY include rate limiting to
protect their systems and the systems of child operators from abuse.
Each parent operator and Registration Entity is responsible for
developing, implementing, and communicating their DNSSEC maintenance
policies.
3.4. Acceptance Processing
The Registration Entity, upon receiving a signal or detecting through
polling that the child desires to have its delegation updated, SHOULD
run a series of tests to ensure that updating the parent zone will
not create or exacerbate any problems with the child zone. The basic
tests SHOULD include:
o checks that the child zone is is properly signed as per the
Registration Entity and parent DNSSEC policies
o if updating the DS record, a check to ensure the child CDS RRset
references a KSK which is present in the child DNSKEY RRset and
signs the CDS RRset
o ensuring all name servers in the apex NS RRset of the child zone
agree on the apex NS RRset and CDS RRset contents
The Registration Entity SHOULD NOT make any changes to the DS RRset
if the child name servers do not agree on the CDS content.
3.5. Bootstrapping DNSSEC
Registration Entities SHOULD require compliance with additional tests
in the case of establishing a new chain of trust.
o The Registration Entity SHOULD check that all child name servers
respond with a consistent CDS RRset for a number of queries over
an extended period of time. Any change in DS response or
inconsistency between child responses in that time might indicate
an attempted Man in the Middle (MITM) attack, and SHOULD reset the
test. This minimizes the possibility of an attacker spoofing
responses. An example of such a policy might be to scan all child
name servers in the delegation NS RRset every two hours for a
week.
o The Registration Entity SHOULD require all of the child name
servers in the delegation NS RRset to send the same response to a
CDS query whether sent over TCP or UDP.
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o The Registration Entity MAY require the child zone to implement
zone delegation best practices as described in
[I-D.wallstrom-dnsop-dns-delegation-requirements].
o The Registration Entity MAY require the child operator to prove
they can add data to the zone, for example by publishing a
particular token. See Section 4.2.2 below.
4. API Definition
This protocol is partially synchronous, meaning the server can elect
to hold connections open until operations have completed, or it can
return a status code indicating that it has received a request, and
close the connection. It is up to the child to monitor the parent
for completion of the operation, and issue possible follow-up calls
to the Registration Entity.
Clients may be denied access to change the DS records for domains
that are Registry Locked (HTTP Status code 401). Registry Lock is a
mechanism provided by certain Registries or Registrars that prevents
domain hijacking by ensuring no attributes of the domain are
changeable, and no transfer or deletion transactions can be processed
against the domain name without manual intervention.
4.1. Authentication
The API does not impose any unique server authentication
requirements. The server authentication provided by TLS fully
addresses the needs of this protocol. The API MUST be provided over
TLS-protected transport (e.g., HTTPS) or VPN.
Client authentication is considered out of scope of this document.
The publication of CDS records in the child zone is an indication
that the child operator intends to perform DS-record-updating
activities (add/delete) in the parent zone. Since this protocol is
simply a signal to the Registration Entity that they should examine
the child zone for such intentions, additional authentication of the
client making the request is considered unnecessary.
Registration Entities MAY implement their own policy to protect
access to the API, such as with IP white listing, client TLS
certificates, etc.. Registration Entities SHOULD take steps to
ensure that a lack of additional authentication does not open up a
denial of service mechanism against the systems of the Registration
Entity, the Registry, or the child operator.
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4.2. RESTful Resources
In the following text, "{domain}" is the child zone to be operated
on.
4.2.1. CDS resource
Path: /domains/{domain}/cds
4.2.1.1. Establishing Initial Trust (Enabling DNSSEC)
4.2.1.1.1. Request
Syntax: POST /domains/{domain}/cds
Request that an initial set of DS records based on the CDS record in
the child zone be inserted into the Registry and the parent zone upon
the successful completion of the request. If there are multiple CDS
records in the CDS RRset, multiple DS records will be added.
The body of the POST SHOULD be empty, however server implementations
SHOULD NOT reject nonempty requests.
4.2.1.1.2. Response
o HTTP Status code 201 indicates a success.
o HTTP Status code 400 indicates a failure due to validation.
o HTTP Status code 401 indicates an unauthorized resource access.
o HTTP Status code 403 indicates a failure due to an invalid
challenge token.
o HTTP Status code 404 indicates the domain does not exist.
o HTTP Status code 409 indicates the delegation already has a DS
RRset.
o HTTP Status code 429 indicates the client has been rate-limited.
o HTTP Status code 500 indicates a failure due to unforeseeable
reasons.
This request is for setting up initial trust in the delegation. The
Registration Entity SHOULD return a status code 409 if it already has
a DS RRset for the child zone.
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Upon receipt of a 403 response the child operator SHOULD issue a POST
for the "token" resource to fetch a challenge token to insert into
the zone.
4.2.1.2. Removing DS Records
4.2.1.2.1. Request
Syntax: DELETE /domains/{domain}/cds
Request that the Registration Entity check for a null CDS or CDNSKEY
record in the child zone, indicating a request that the entire DS
RRset be removed. This will make the delegation insecure.
4.2.1.2.2. Response
o HTTP Status code 200 indicates a success.
o HTTP Status code 400 indicates a failure due to validation.
o HTTP Status code 401 indicates an unauthorized resource access.
o HTTP Status code 404 indicates the domain does not exist.
o HTTP Status code 412 indicates the parent does not have a DS RRset
o HTTP Status code 429 indicates the client has been rate-limited.
o HTTP Status code 500 indicates a failure due to unforeseeable
reasons.
4.2.1.3. Modifying DS Records
4.2.1.3.1. Request
Syntax: PUT /domains/{domain}/cds
Request that the Registration Entity modify the DS RRset based on the
CDS/CDNSKEY available in the child zone. As a result of this request
the Registration Entity SHOULD add or delete DS or DNSKEY records as
indicated by the CDS/CDNSKEY RRset, but MUST NOT delete the entire DS
RRset.
4.2.1.3.2. Response
o HTTP Status code 200 indicates a success.
o HTTP Status code 400 indicates a failure due to validation.
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o HTTP Status code 401 indicates an unauthorized resource access.
o HTTP Status code 404 indicates the domain does not exist.
o HTTP Status code 412 indicates the parent does not have a DS RRset
o HTTP Status code 429 indicates the client has been rate-limited.
o HTTP Status code 500 indicates a failure due to unforeseeable
reasons.
4.2.2. Token resource
Path: /domains/{domain}/token
4.2.2.1. Establish Initial Trust with Challenge
4.2.2.1.1. Request
Syntax: GET /domains/{domain}/token
The DNSSEC policy of the Registration Entity may require proof that
the DNS Operator is in control of the domain. The token API call
returns a random token to be included as a TXT record for the
_delegate.@ domain name (where @ is the apex of the child zone) prior
establishing the DNSSEC initial trust. This is an additional trust
control mechanism to establish the initial chain of trust.
Once the child operator has received a token, it SHOULD be inserted
in the zone and the operator SHOULD proceed with a POST of the cds
resource.
The Registration Entity MAY expire the token after a reasonable
period. The Registration Entity SHOULD document an explanation of
whether and when tokens are expired in their DNSSEC policy.
Note that the _delegate TXT record is publicly available and not a
secret token.
4.2.2.1.2. Response
o HTTP Status code 200 indicates a success. A token is included in
the body of the response, as a valid TXT record
o HTTP Status code 404 indicates the domain does not exist.
o HTTP Status code 500 indicates a failure due to unforeseeable
reasons.
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4.3. Customized Error Messages
Registration Entities MAY provide a customized error message in the
response body in addition to the HTTP status code defined in the
previous section. This response MAY include an identifying number/
string that can be used to track the request.
5. Security considerations
When zones are properly provisioned, and delegations follow standards
and best practices (e.g.
[I-D.wallstrom-dnsop-dns-delegation-requirements]), the Registration
Entity or Registry can trust the DNS information it receives from
multiple child name servers, over time, and/or over TCP to establish
the initial chain of trust.
In addition, the Registration Entity or Registry can require the DNS
Operator to prove they control the zone by requiring the child
operator to navigate additional hurdles, such as adding a challenge
token to the zone.
This protocol should increase the adoption of DNSSEC, enabling more
zones to become validated thus overall the security gain outweighs
the possible drawbacks.
Registrants and DNS Operators always have the option to establish the
chain of trust in band via the standard Registrant/Registrar/Registry
model.
6. IANA Actions
This document has no actions for IANA
7. Internationalization Considerations
This protocol is designed for machine to machine communications.
Clients and servers SHOULD use punycode [RFC3492] when operating on
internationalized domain names.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC3492] Costello, A., "Punycode: A Bootstring encoding of Unicode
for Internationalized Domain Names in Applications
(IDNA)", RFC 3492, DOI 10.17487/RFC3492, March 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3492>.
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[RFC6690] Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link
Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6690>.
[RFC7344] Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating
DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7344, September 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7344>.
[RFC8078] Gudmundsson, O. and P. Wouters, "Managing DS Records from
the Parent via CDS/CDNSKEY", RFC 8078,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8078, March 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8078>.
8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-dnsop-terminology-bis]
Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
Terminology", draft-ietf-dnsop-terminology-bis-06 (work in
progress), July 2017.
[I-D.wallstrom-dnsop-dns-delegation-requirements]
Wallstrom, P. and J. Schlyter, "DNS Delegation
Requirements", draft-wallstrom-dnsop-dns-delegation-
requirements-03 (work in progress), October 2016.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3912, September 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3912>.
[RFC5730] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)",
STD 69, RFC 5730, DOI 10.17487/RFC5730, August 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5730>.
[RFC7480] Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP Usage in the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7480,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7480, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7480>.
[RFC7719] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
Terminology", RFC 7719, DOI 10.17487/RFC7719, December
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7719>.
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Appendix A. Document History
A.1. regext Version 04
o changed uses of Registrar to Registration Entity and updated
definitions to improve clarity
o adding note about CDS/CDNSKEY interchangability in this document
o added advice to scan all delegations (including insecure
delegations) for CDS in order to bootstrap or update DNSSEC
o removed "Other Delegation Maintenance" section, since we decided a
while ago not to use this to update NS
A.2. regext Version 03
o simplify abstract
o move all justification text to Intro
o added HTTP response codes for rate limiting (429), missing DS
RRsets (412)
o expanded on Internationalization Considerations
o corrected informative/normative document references
o clarify parent/Registrar references in the draft
o general spelling/grammar/style cleanup
o removed references to NS and glue maintenance
o clarify content of POST body for 'cds' resource
o change verb for obtaining a 'token' to GET
o Updated reference to RFC8078
A.3. regext Version 02
o Clarified based on comments and questions from early implementors
(JL)
o Text edits and clarifications.
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A.4. regext Version 01
o Rewrote Abstract and Into (MP)
o Introduced code 401 when changes are not allowed
o Text edits and clarifications.
A.5. regext Version 00
o Working group document same as 03, just track changed to standard
A.6. Version 03
o Clarified based on comments and questions from early implementors
A.7. Version 02
o Reflected comments on mailing lists
A.8. Version 01
o This version adds a full REST definition this is based on
suggestions from Jakob Schlyter.
A.9. Version 00
o First rough version
Authors' Addresses
Jacques Latour
CIRA
Ottawa, ON
Email: jacques.latour@cira.ca
Olafur Gudmundsson
Cloudflare, Inc.
San Francisco, CA
Email: olafur+ietf@cloudflare.com
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Paul Wouters
Red Hat
Toronto, ON
Email: paul@nohats.ca
Matthew Pounsett
Rightside Group, Ltd.
Toronto, ON
Email: matt@conundrum.com
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