Network Working Group E. Ertekin
Internet-Draft R. Jasani
Intended status: Informational C. Christou
Expires: June 7, 2010 Booz Allen Hamilton
C. Bormann
Universitaet Bremen TZI
December 4, 2009
Integration of Robust Header Compression (ROHC) over IPsec Security
Associations
draft-ietf-rohc-hcoipsec-12
Abstract
IP Security (IPsec) provides various security services for IP
traffic. However, the benefits of IPsec come at the cost of
increased overhead. This document outlines a framework for
integrating Robust Header Compression (ROHC) over IPsec (ROHCoIPsec).
By compressing the inner headers of IP packets, ROHCoIPsec proposes
to reduce the amount of overhead associated with the transmission of
traffic over IPsec Security Associations (SAs).
Status of this Memo
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Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Problem Statement: IPsec Packet Overhead . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Overview of the ROHCoIPsec Framework . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. ROHCoIPsec Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.2. Summary of the ROHCoIPsec Framework . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Details of the ROHCoIPsec Framework . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. ROHC and IPsec Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.1.1. Header Compression Protocol Considerations . . . . . . . . 9
6.1.2. Initialization and Negotiation of the ROHC Channel . . . . 9
6.1.3. Encapsulation and Identification of Header Compressed
Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.1.4. Motivation for the ROHC ICV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.1.5. Path MTU Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.2. ROHCoIPsec Framework Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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1. Introduction
This document outlines a framework for integrating ROHC [ROHC] over
IPsec [IPSEC] (ROHCoIPsec). The goal of ROHCoIPsec is to reduce the
protocol overhead associated with packets traversing between IPsec SA
endpoints. This can be achieved by compressing the transport layer
header (e.g., UDP, TCP, etc.) and inner IP header of packets at the
ingress of the IPsec tunnel, and decompressing these headers at the
egress.
For ROHCoIPsec, this document assumes that ROHC will be used to
compress the inner headers of IP packets traversing an IPsec tunnel.
However, since current specifications for ROHC detail its operation
on a hop-by-hop basis, it requires extensions to enable its operation
over IPsec SAs. This document outlines a framework for extending the
usage of ROHC to operate at IPsec SA endpoints.
ROHCoIPsec targets the application of ROHC to tunnel mode SAs.
Transport mode SAs only encrypt/authenticate the payload of an IP
packet, leaving the IP header untouched. Intermediate routers
subsequently use this IP header to route the packet to a decryption
device. Therefore, if ROHC is to operate over IPsec transport-mode
SAs, (de)compression functionality can only be applied to the
transport layer headers, and not to the IP header. Because current
ROHC specifications do not include support for the compression of
transport layer headers alone, the ROHCoIPsec framework outlined by
this document describes the application of ROHC to tunnel mode SAs.
2. Audience
The authors target members of both the ROHC and IPsec communities who
may consider extending the ROHC and IPsec protocols to meet the
requirements put forth in this document. In addition, this document
is directed towards vendors developing IPsec devices that will be
deployed in bandwidth-constrained IP networks.
3. Terminology
ROHC Process
Generic reference to a ROHC instance (as defined in RFC 3759
[ROHC-TERM]), or any supporting ROHC components.
Compressed Traffic
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Traffic that is processed through the ROHC compressor and
decompressor instances. Packet headers are compressed and
decompressed using a specific header compression profile.
Uncompressed Traffic
Traffic that is not processed by the ROHC compressor instance.
Instead, this type of traffic bypasses the ROHC process.
IPsec Process
Generic reference to the Internet Protocol Security (IPsec)
process.
Next Header
Refers to the Protocol (IPv4) or Next Header (IPv6, Extension)
field.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [BRA97].
4. Problem Statement: IPsec Packet Overhead
IPsec mechanisms provide various security services for IP networks.
However, the benefits of IPsec come at the cost of increased per-
packet overhead. For example, traffic flow confidentiality
(generally leveraged at security gateways) requires the tunneling of
IP packets between IPsec implementations. Although these IPsec
tunnels will effectively mask the source-destination patterns that an
intruder can ascertain, tunneling comes at the cost of increased
packet overhead. Specifically, an ESP tunnel mode SA applied to an
IPv6 flow results in at least 50 bytes of additional overhead per
packet. This additional overhead may be undesirable for many
bandwidth-constrained wireless and/or satellite communications
networks, as these types of infrastructure are not overprovisioned.
ROHC applied on a per-hop basis over bandwidth-constrained links will
also suffer from reduced performance when encryption is used on the
tunneled header, since encrypted headers cannot be compressed.
Consequently, the additional overhead incurred by an IPsec tunnel may
result in the inefficient utilization of bandwidth.
Packet overhead is particularly significant for traffic profiles
characterized by small packet payloads (e.g. various voice codecs).
If these small packets are afforded the security services of an IPsec
tunnel mode SA, the amount of per-packet overhead is increased.
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Thus, a mechanism is needed to reduce the overhead associated with
such flows.
5. Overview of the ROHCoIPsec Framework
5.1. ROHCoIPsec Assumptions
The goal of ROHCoIPsec is to provide efficient transport of IP
packets between IPsec devices without compromising the security
services offered by IPsec. The ROHCoIPsec framework has been
developed based on the following assumptions:
o ROHC will be leveraged to reduce the amount of overhead associated
with unicast IP packets traversing an IPsec SA
o ROHC will be instantiated at the IPsec SA endpoints, and will be
applied on a per-SA basis
o Once the decompression operation completes, decompressed packet
headers will be identical to the original packet headers before
compression
5.2. Summary of the ROHCoIPsec Framework
ROHC reduces packet overhead in a network by exploiting intra- and
inter-packet redundancies of network and transport-layer header
fields of a flow.
Current ROHC protocol specifications compress packet headers on a
hop-by-hop basis. However, IPsec SAs are instantiated between two
IPsec endpoints. Therefore, various extensions to both ROHC and
IPsec need to be defined to ensure the successful operation of the
ROHC protocol at IPsec SA endpoints.
The specification of ROHC over IPsec SAs is straightforward, since SA
endpoints provide source/destination pairs where (de)compression
operations can take place. Compression of the inner IP and upper
layer protocol headers in such a manner offers a reduction of packet
overhead between the two SA endpoints. Since ROHC will now operate
between IPsec endpoints (over multiple intermediate nodes which are
transparent to an IPsec SA), it is imperative to ensure that its
performance will not be severely impacted due to increased packet
reordering and/or packet loss between the compressor and
decompressor.
In addition, ROHC can no longer rely on the underlying link layer for
ROHC channel parameter configuration and packet identification. The
ROHCoIPsec framework proposes that ROHC channel parameter
configuration is accomplished by an SA management protocol (e.g.,
IKEv2 [IKEV2]), while identification of compressed header packets is
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achieved through the Next Header field of the security protocol
(e.g., AH [AH], ESP [ESP]) header.
Using the ROHCoIPsec framework proposed below, outbound and inbound
IP traffic processing at an IPsec device needs to be modified. For
an outbound packet, a ROHCoIPsec implementation will compress
appropriate packet headers, and subsequently encrypt and/or
integrity-protect the packet. For tunnel mode SAs, compression may
be applied to the transport layer and the inner IP headers. For
inbound packets, an IPsec device must first decrypt and/or integrity-
check the packet. Then decompression of the inner packet headers is
performed. After decompression, the packet is checked against the
access controls imposed on all inbound traffic associated with the SA
(as specified in RFC 4301 [IPSEC]).
Note: Compression of inner headers is independent from compression
of the security protocol (e.g., ESP) and outer IP headers. ROHC
profiles have been defined to allow for the compression of the
security protocol and the outer IP header on a hop-by-hop basis.
The applicability of ROHCoIPsec and hop-by-hop ROHC on an IPv4
ESP-processed packet [ESP] is shown below in Figure 1.
-----------------------------------------------------------
IPv4 | new IP hdr | | orig IP hdr | | | ESP | ESP|
|(any options)| ESP | (any options) |TCP|Data|Trailer| ICV|
-----------------------------------------------------------
|<-------(1)------->|<------(2)-------->|
(1) Compressed hop-by-hop by the ROHC [ROHC] ESP/IP profile
(2) Compressed end-to-end by the ROHCoIPsec [IPSEC-ROHC]
TCP/IP profile
Figure 1. Applicability of hop-by-hop ROHC and ROHCoIPsec on an
IPv4 ESP-processed packet.
If IPsec NULL encryption is applied to packets, ROHC may still be
applied to the inner headers at the IPsec SA endpoints. However,
this poses challenges for intermediary devices (within the
unprotected domain) inspecting ESP-NULL encrypted packets, since
these intermediary devices will require additional functionality to
determine the content of the ROHC packets.
6. Details of the ROHCoIPsec Framework
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6.1. ROHC and IPsec Integration
Figure 2 illustrates the components required to integrate ROHC with
the IPsec process, i.e., ROHCoIPsec.
+-------------------------------+
| ROHC Module |
| |
| |
+-----+ | +-----+ +---------+ |
| | | | | | ROHC | |
--| A |---------| B |-----| Process |------> Path 1
| | | | | | | | (ROHC-enabled SA)
+-----+ | +-----+ +---------+ |
| | | |
| | |-------------------------> Path 2
| | | (ROHC-enabled SA,
| +-------------------------------+ but no compression)
|
|
|
|
+-----------------------------------------> Path 3
(ROHC-disabled SA)
Figure 2. Integration of ROHC with IPsec.
The process illustrated in Figure 2 augments the IPsec processing
model for outbound IP traffic (protected-to-unprotected). Initial
IPsec processing is consistent with RFC 4301 [IPSEC] (Steps 1-2,
Section 5.1).
Block A: The ROHC data item (part of the SA state information)
retrieved from the "relevant SAD entry" ([IPSEC], Section 5.1,
Step3a) determines if the traffic traversing the SA is handed to the
ROHC module. Packets selected to a ROHC-disabled SA MUST follow
normal IPsec processing and MUST NOT be sent to the ROHC module
(Figure 2, Path 3). Conversely, packets selected to a ROHC-enabled
SA MUST be sent to the ROHC module.
Block B: This step determines if the packet can be compressed. If
the packet is compressed, an Integrity Algorithm MAY be used to
compute an Integrity Check Value (ICV) for the uncompressed packet
([IPSEC-ROHC], Section 4.2; [IKE-ROHC], Section 3.1). The Next
Header field of the security protocol header (e.g., ESP, AH) MUST be
populated with a "ROHC" protocol number [PROTOCOL], inner packet
headers MUST be compressed, and the computed ICV MAY be appended to
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the packet (Figure 2, Path 1). However, if it is determined that the
packet will not be compressed (e.g., due to one the reasons described
in Section 6.1.3), the Next Header field MUST be populated with the
appropriate value indicating the next level protocol (Figure 2, Path
2), and ROHC processing MUST NOT be applied to the packet.
After the ROHC process completes, IPsec processing resumes, as
described in Section 5.1, Step3a, of RFC 4301 [IPSEC].
The process illustrated in Figure 2 also augments the IPsec
processing model for inbound IP traffic (unprotected-to-protected).
For inbound packets, IPsec processing is performed ([IPSEC], Section
5.2, Steps 1-3) followed by AH or ESP processing ([IPSEC], Section
5.2, Step 4).
Block A: After AH or ESP processing, the ROHC data item retrieved
from the SAD entry will indicate if traffic traversing the SA is
processed by the ROHC module ([IPSEC], Section 5.2, Step 3a).
Packets traversing a ROHC-disabled SA MUST follow normal IPsec
processing and MUST NOT be sent to the ROHC module. Conversely,
packets traversing a ROHC-enabled SA MUST be sent to the ROHC module.
Block B: The decision at Block B is determined by the value of the
Next Header field of the security protocol header. If the Next
Header field does not indicate a ROHC header, the decompressor MUST
NOT attempt decompression (Figure 2, Path 2). If the Next Header
field indicates a ROHC header, decompression is applied. After
decompression, the signaled ROHCoIPsec Integrity Algorithm, MAY be
used to compute an ICV value for the decompressed packet. This ICV,
if present, is compared to the ICV that was calculated at the
compressor: if the ICVs match, the packet is forwarded by the ROHC
module (Figure 2, Path 1); otherwise, the packet MUST be dropped.
Once the ROHC module completes processing, IPsec processing resumes,
as described in Section 5.2, Step 4 of RFC 4301 [IPSEC].
When there is a single SA between a compressor and decompressor, ROHC
MUST operate in unidirectional mode, as described in Section 5 of RFC
3759 [ROHC-TERM]. When there is a pair of SAs instantiated between
ROHCoIPsec implementations, ROHC MAY operate in bidirectional mode,
where an SA pair represents a bidirectional ROHC channel (as
described in Section 6.1 and 6.2 of RFC 3759[ROHC-TERM]).
Note that to further reduce the size of an IPsec-protected packet,
ROHCoIPsec and IPcomp [IPCOMP] can be implemented in a nested
fashion. This process is detailed in [IPSEC-ROHC], Section 4.4.
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6.1.1. Header Compression Protocol Considerations
ROHCv2 [ROHCV2] profiles include various mechanisms that provide
increased robustness over reordering channels. These mechanisms
SHOULD be adopted for ROHC to operate efficiently over IPsec SAs.
A ROHC decompressor implemented within IPsec architecture MAY
leverage additional mechanisms to improve performance over reordering
channels (either due to random events, or to an attacker
intentionally reordering packets). Specifically, IPsec's sequence
number MAY be used by the decompressor to identify a packet as
"sequentially late". This knowledge will increase the likelihood of
successful decompression of a reordered packet.
Additionally, ROHCoIPsec implementations SHOULD minimize the amount
of feedback sent from the decompressor to the compressor. If a ROHC
feedback channel is not used sparingly, the overall gains from
ROHCoIPsec can be significantly reduced. More specifically, any
feedback sent from the decompressor to the compressor MUST be
processed by IPsec, and tunneled back to the compressor (as
designated by the SA associated with FEEDBACK_FOR). As such, some
implementation alternatives can be considered, including the
following:
o Eliminate feedback traffic altogether by operating only in ROHC
Unidirectional mode (U-mode)
o Piggyback ROHC feedback messages within the feedback element
(i.e., on ROHC traffic that normally traverses the SA designated
by FEEDBACK_FOR).
6.1.2. Initialization and Negotiation of the ROHC Channel
Hop-by-hop ROHC typically uses the underlying link layer (e.g., PPP)
to negotiate ROHC channel parameters. In the case of ROHCoIPsec,
channel parameters can be set manually (i.e., administratively
configured for manual SAs), or negotiated by IKEv2. The extensions
required for IKEv2 to support ROHC channel parameter negotiation are
detailed in [IKE-ROHC].
If the ROHC protocol requires bidirectional communications, two SAs
MUST be instantiated between the IPsec implementations. One of the
two SAs is used for carrying ROHC-traffic from the compressor to the
decompressor, while the other is used to communicate ROHC-feedback
from the decompressor to the compressor. Note that the requirement
for two SAs aligns with the operation of IKE, which creates SAs in
pairs by default. However, IPsec implementations will dictate how
decompressor feedback received on one SA is associated with a
compressor on the other SA. An IPsec implementation MUST relay the
feedback received by the decompressor on an inbound SA to the
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compressor associated with the corresponding outbound SA.
6.1.3. Encapsulation and Identification of Header Compressed Packets
As indicated in Section 6.1, new state information (i.e., a new ROHC
data item) is defined for each SA. The ROHC data item MUST be used
by the IPsec process to determine whether it sends all traffic
traversing a given SA to the ROHC module (ROHC-enabled) or bypasses
the ROHC module and sends the traffic through regular IPsec
processing (ROHC- disabled).
The Next Header field of the IPsec security protocol (e.g., AH or
ESP) header MUST be used to demultiplex header-compressed traffic
from uncompressed traffic traversing an ROHC-enabled SA. This
functionality is needed in situations where packets traversing a
ROHC-enabled SA contain uncompressed headers. Such situations may
occur when, for example, a compressor supports strictly n compressed
flows and cannot compress the n+1 flow that arrives. Another example
is when traffic is selected to a ROHC-enabled SA, but cannot be
compressed by the ROHC process because the appropriate ROHC Profile
has not been signaled for use. As a result, the decompressor MUST be
able to identify packets with uncompressed headers and MUST NOT
attempt to decompress them. The Next Header field is used to
demultiplex these header-compressed and uncompressed packets where
the ROHC protocol number will indicate that the packet contains
compressed headers. To accomplish this, an official IANA allocation
from the Protocol ID registry [PROTOCOL] is required.
The ROHC Data Item, IANA Protocol ID allocation, and other IPsec
extensions to support ROHCoIPsec, are specified in [IPSEC-ROHC].
6.1.4. Motivation for the ROHC ICV
Although ROHC was designed to tolerate packet loss and reordering,
the algorithm does not guarantee that packets reconstructed at the
decompressor are identical to the original packet. As stated in
Section 5.2 of RFC 4224 [REORDR], the consequences of packet
reordering between ROHC peers may include undetected decompression
failures, where erroneous packets are constructed and forwarded to
upper layers.
When using IPsec integrity protection, a packet received at the
egress of an IPsec tunnel is identical to the packet that was
processed at the ingress (given that the key is not compromised,
etc.).
When ROHC is integrated into the IPsec processing framework, the ROHC
processed packet is protected by the AH/ESP ICV. However, bits in
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the original IP header are not protected by this ICV. Therefore,
under certain circumstances, erroneous packets may be constructed and
forwarded into the protected domain.
To ensure the integrity of the original IP header within the
ROHCoIPsec-processing model, an additional integrity check MAY be
applied before the packet is compressed. This integrity check will
ensure that erroneous packets are not forwarded into the protected
domain. The specifics of this integrity check are documented in
Section 4.2 of [IPSEC-ROHC].
6.1.5. Path MTU Considerations
By encapsulating IP packets with AH/ESP and tunneling IP headers,
IPsec increases the size of IP packets. This increase may result in
Path MTU issues in the unprotected domain. Several approaches to
resolving these path MTU issues are documented in Section 8 of RFC
4301[IPSEC]; approaches include fragmenting the packet before or
after IPsec processing (if the packet's DF bit is clear), or possibly
discarding packets (if the packet's DF bit is set).
The addition of ROHC within the IPsec processing model may result in
a similar path MTU challenges. For example, under certain
circumstances, ROHC headers are larger than the original uncompressed
headers. In addition, if an integrity algorithm is used to validate
packet headers, the resulting ICV will increase the size of packets.
Both of these properties of ROHCoIPsec increase the size of packets,
and therefore may result in additional challenges associated with
path MTU.
Approaches to addressing these path MTU issues are specified in
Section 4.3 of [IPSEC-ROHC].
6.2. ROHCoIPsec Framework Summary
To summarize, the following items are needed to achieve ROHCoIPsec:
o IKEv2 Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec
o IPsec Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec
7. Security Considerations
A malfunctioning ROHC compressor (i.e., the compressor located at the
ingress of the IPsec tunnel) has the ability to send packets to the
decompressor (i.e., the decompressor located at the egress of the
IPsec tunnel) that do not match the original packets emitted from the
end-hosts. Such a scenario will result in decreased efficiency
between compressor and decompressor. Furthermore, this may result in
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Denial of Service, as the decompression of a significant number of
invalid packets may drain the resources of an IPsec device.
8. IANA Considerations
None.
9. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Mr. Sean O'Keeffe, Mr. James Kohler,
and Ms. Linda Noone of the Department of Defense, and well as Mr.
Rich Espy of OPnet for their contributions and support in the
development of this document.
The authors would also like to thank Mr. Yoav Nir, and Mr. Robert A
Stangarone Jr.: both served as committed document reviewers for this
specification.
In addition, the authors would like to thank the following for their
numerous reviews and comments to this document:
o Mr. Magnus Westerlund
o Dr. Stephen Kent
o Mr. Pasi Eronen
o Dr. Joseph Touch
o Mr. Tero Kivinen
o Dr. Jonah Pezeshki
o Mr. Lars-Erik Jonsson
o Mr. Jan Vilhuber
o Mr. Dan Wing
o Mr. Kristopher Sandlund
o Mr. Ghyslain Pelletier
Finally, the authors would also like to thank Mr. Tom Conkle, Ms.
Renee Esposito, Mr. Etzel Brower, and Ms. Michele Casey of Booz Allen
Hamilton for their assistance in completing this work.
10. Informative References
[ROHC] Jonsson, L-E., Pelletier, G., and K. Sandlund, "The RObust
Header Compression (ROHC) Framework", RFC 4995, July 2007.
[IPSEC] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
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[ROHC-TERM]
Jonsson, L-E., "Robust Header Compression (ROHC):
Terminology and Channel Mapping Examples", RFC 3759,
April 2004.
[BRA97] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.
[IKEV2] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
RFC 4306, December 2005.
[ESP] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, December 2005.
[AH] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
December 2005.
[IPSEC-ROHC]
Ertekin, E., Christou, C., and C. Bormann, "IPsec
Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec", work in progress ,
December 2009.
[IKE-ROHC]
Ertekin, E., Christou, C., Jasani, R., Kivinen, T., and C.
Bormann, "IKEv2 Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec", work in
progress , December 2009.
[PROTOCOL]
IANA, "Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers, IANA registry
at: http://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers",
June 2009.
[IPCOMP] Shacham, A., Monsour, R., Pereira, and Thomas, "IP Payload
Compression Protocol (IPComp)", RFC 3173, September 2001.
[ROHCV2] Pelletier, G. and K. Sandlund, "RObust Header Compression
Version 2 (ROHCv2): Profiles for RTP, UDP, IP, ESP and UDP
Lite", RFC 5225, April 2008.
[REORDR] Pelletier, G., Jonsson, L-E., and K. Sandlund, "Robust
Header Compression (ROHC): ROHC over Channels That Can
Reorder Packets", RFC 4224, January 2006.
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Authors' Addresses
Emre Ertekin
Booz Allen Hamilton
5220 Pacific Concourse Drive, Suite 200
Los Angeles, CA 90045
US
Email: ertekin_emre@bah.com
Rohan Jasani
Booz Allen Hamilton
13200 Woodland Park Dr.
Herndon, VA 20171
US
Email: ro@breakcheck.com
Chris Christou
Booz Allen Hamilton
13200 Woodland Park Dr.
Herndon, VA 20171
US
Email: christou_chris@bah.com
Carsten Bormann
Universitaet Bremen TZI
Postfach 330440
Bremen D-28334
Germany
Email: cabo@tzi.org
Ertekin, et al. Expires June 7, 2010 [Page 15]