SASL Working Group A. Melnikov
Internet-Draft Isode
Expires: December 24, 2004 June 25, 2004
SASL GSSAPI mechanisms
draft-ietf-sasl-gssapi-01
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://
www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 24, 2004.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
The Simple Authentication and Security Layer [SASL] is a method for
adding authentication support to connection-based protocols. This
document describes the method for using the Generic Security Service
Application Program Interface [GSSAPI] in the Simple Authentication
and Security Layer [SASL].
This document replaces section 7.2 of RFC 2222 [SASL], the definition
of the "GSSAPI" SASL mechanism.
Melnikov Expires December 24, 2004 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft SASL GSSAPI mechanisms June 2004
Table of Contents
1. Conventions Used in this Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. SPNEGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Specification common to all GSSAPI mechanisms . . . . . . . . 6
4.1 Client side of authentication protocol exchange . . . . . . . 6
4.2 Server side of authentication protocol exchange . . . . . . . 7
4.3 Security layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Melnikov Expires December 24, 2004 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft SASL GSSAPI mechanisms June 2004
1. Conventions Used in this Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY"
in this document are to be interpreted as defined in "Key words for
use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [KEYWORDS].
Melnikov Expires December 24, 2004 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft SASL GSSAPI mechanisms June 2004
2. Introduction and Overview
Each and every GSSAPI mechanism used within SASL is implicitly
registered by this specification.
For backwards compatibility with existing implementations of Kerberos
V5 and SPNEGO under SASL, the SASL mechanism name for the Kerberos V5
GSSAPI mechanism [KRB5GSS] is "GSSAPI" and the SASL mechanism for the
SPNEGO GSSAPI mechanism [SPNEGO] is "GSS-SPNEGO". The SASL mechanism
name for any other GSSAPI mechanism is the concatenation of "GSS-"
and the Base32 [BASE-ENCODING] encoding of the first ten bytes of the
MD5 hash [MD5] of the ASN.1 DER encoding [ASN1] of the GSSAPI
mechanism's OID. The Base32 rules on padding characters and
characters outside of the base32 alphabet are not relevant to this
use of Base32.
SASL mechanism names starting with "GSS-" are reserved for SASL
mechanisms which conform to this document.
The specification of all SASL mechanisms conforming to this document
is in the "Specification common to all GSSAPI mechanisms" section of
this document.
The IESG is considered to be the owner of all SASL mechanisms which
conform to this document. This does NOT necessarily imply that the
IESG is considered to be the owner of the underlying GSSAPI
mechanism.
2.1 Example
The OID for the SPKM-1 mechanism [SPKM1] is 1.3.6.1.5.5.1. The ASN.1
DER encoding of this OID is 06 06 2b 06 01 05 05 01. The MD5 hash of
the ASN.1 DER encoding is 57 ee 81 82 4e ac 4d b0 e6 50 9f 60 1f 46
8a 30. The Base32 encoding of the first ten bytes of this is
"K7XIDASOVRG3BZSQ". Thus the SASL mechanism name for the SPKM-1
GSSAPI mechanism is "GSS-K7XIDASOVRG3BZSQ".
Melnikov Expires December 24, 2004 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft SASL GSSAPI mechanisms June 2004
3. SPNEGO
Use of the Simple and Protected GSS-API Negotiation Mechanism
[SPNEGO] underneath SASL introduces subtle interoperability problems
and security considerations. To address these, this section places
additional requirements on implementations which support SPNEGO
underneath SASL.
A client which supports, for example, the Kerberos V5 GSSAPI
mechanism only underneath SPNEGO underneath the "GSS-SPNEGO" SASL
mechanism will not interoperate with a server which supports the
Kerberos V5 GSSAPI mechanism only underneath the "GSSAPI" SASL
mechanism.
Since SASL is capable of negotiating amongst GSSAPI mechanisms, the
only reason for a server or client to support the "GSS-SPNEGO"
mechanism is to allow a policy of only using mechanisms below a
certain strength if those mechanism's negotiation is protected. In
such a case, a client or server would only want to negotiate those
weaker mechanisms through SPNEGO. In any case, there is no down-
negotiation security consideration with using the strongest mechanism
and set of options the implementation supports, so for
interoperability that mechanism and set of options MUST be negotiable
without using the "GSS-SPNEGO" mechanism.
If a client's policy is to first prefer GSSAPI mechanism X, then non-
GSSAPI mechanism Y, then GSSAPI mechanism Z, and if a server supports
mechanisms Y and Z but not X, then if the client attempts to
negotiate mechanism X by using the "GSS-SPNEGO" SASL mechanism, it
may end up using mechanism Z when it should have used mechanism Y.
For this reason, implementations MUST exclude from SPNEGO those
GSSAPI mechanisms which are weaker than the strongest non-GSSAPI SASL
mechanism advertised by the server.
Melnikov Expires December 24, 2004 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft SASL GSSAPI mechanisms June 2004
4. Specification common to all GSSAPI mechanisms
Each SASL mechanism which uses a GSSAPI mechanism uses the following
specification.
The implementation MAY set any GSSAPI flags or arguments not
mentioned in this specification as is necessary for the
implementation to enforce its security policy.
4.1 Client side of authentication protocol exchange
The client calls GSS_Init_sec_context, passing in
input_context_handle of 0 (initially), mech_type of the GSSAPI
mechanism for which this SASL mechanism is registered, chan_binding
of NULL, and targ_name equal to output_name from GSS_Import_Name
called with input_name_type of GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE and
input_name_string of "service@hostname" where "service" is the
service name specified in the protocol's profile, and "hostname" is
the fully qualified host name of the server. If the client will be
requesting a security layer, it MUST also supply to the
GSS_Init_sec_context a mutual_req_flag of TRUE, a sequence_req_flag
of TRUE, and an integ_req_flag of TRUE. If the client will be
requesting a security layer providing confidentiality protection, it
MUST also supply to the GSS_Init_sec_context a conf_req_flag of TRUE.
The client then responds with the resulting output_token. If
GSS_Init_sec_context returns GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, then the client
should expect the server to issue a token in a subsequent challenge.
The client must pass the token to another call to
GSS_Init_sec_context, repeating the actions in this paragraph.
When GSS_Init_sec_context returns GSS_S_COMPLETE, the client examines
the context to ensure that it provides a level of protection
permitted by the client's security policy. If the context is
acceptable, the client takes the following actions: If the last call
to GSS_Init_sec_context returned an output_token, then the client
responds with the output_token, otherwise the client responds with no
data. The client should then expect the server to issue a token in a
subsequent challenge. The client passes this token to GSS_Unwrap and
interprets the first octet of resulting cleartext as a bit-mask
specifying the security layers supported by the server and the second
through fourth octets as the network byte order maximum size
output_message to send to the server (if the resulting cleartext is
not 4 octets long, the client fails the negotiation). The client
then constructs data, with the first octet containing the bit-mask
specifying the selected security layer, the second through fourth
octets containing in network byte order the maximum size
output_message the client is able to receive, and the remaining
octets containing the UTF-8 [UTF8] encoded authorization identity.
Melnikov Expires December 24, 2004 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft SASL GSSAPI mechanisms June 2004
(Implementation note: the authorization identity is not terminated
with the NUL (%x00) character). The client passes the data to
GSS_Wrap with conf_flag set to FALSE, and responds with the generated
output_message. The client can then consider the server
authenticated.
4.2 Server side of authentication protocol exchange
The server passes the initial client response to
GSS_Accept_sec_context as input_token, setting input_context_handle
to 0 (initially), mech_type of the GSSAPI mechanism for which this
SASL mechanism is registered, chan_binding of NULL, and
acceptor_cred_handle equal to output_cred_handle from
GSS_Acquire_cred called with desired_name equal to output_name from
GSS_Import_name with input_name_type of GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
and input_name_string of "service@hostname" where "service" is the
service name specified in the protocol's profile, and "hostname" is
the fully qualified host name of the server. If
GSS_Accept_sec_context returns GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the server
returns the generated output_token to the client in challenge and
passes the resulting response to another call to
GSS_Accept_sec_context, repeating the actions in this paragraph.
When GSS_Accept_sec_context returns GSS_S_COMPLETE, the server
examines the context to ensure that it provides a level of protection
permitted by the server's security policy. If the context is
acceptable, the server takes the following actions: If the last call
to GSS_Accept_sec_context returned an output_token, the server
returns it to the client in a challenge and expects a reply from the
client with no data. Whether or not an output_token was returned
(and after receipt of any response from the client to such an
output_token), the server then constructs 4 octets of data, with the
first octet containing a bit-mask specifying the security layers
supported by the server and the second through fourth octets
containing in network byte order the maximum size output_token the
server is able to receive. The server must then pass the plaintext
to GSS_Wrap with conf_flag set to FALSE and issue the generated
output_message to the client in a challenge. The server must then
pass the resulting response to GSS_Unwrap and interpret the first
octet of resulting cleartext as the bit-mask for the selected
security layer, the second through fourth octets as the network byte
order maximum size output_message to send to the client, and the
remaining octets as the authorization identity. The server must
verify that the src_name is authorized to authenticate as the
authorization identity. After these verifications, the
authentication process is complete.
Melnikov Expires December 24, 2004 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft SASL GSSAPI mechanisms June 2004
4.3 Security layer
The security layers and their corresponding bit-masks are as follows:
1 No security layer
2 Integrity protection.
Sender calls GSS_Wrap with conf_flag set to FALSE
4 Confidentiality protection.
Sender calls GSS_Wrap with conf_flag set to TRUE
Other bit-masks may be defined in the future; bits which are not
understood must be negotiated off.
Note that SASL negotiates the maximum size of the output_message to
send. Implementations can use the GSS_Wrap_size_limit call to
determine the corresponding maximum size input_message.
Melnikov Expires December 24, 2004 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft SASL GSSAPI mechanisms June 2004
5. IANA Considerations
The IANA is advised that SASL mechanism names starting with "GSS-"
are reserved for SASL mechanisms which conform to this document. The
IANA is directed to place a statement to that effect in the sasl-
mechanisms registry.
Family of SASL mechanisms: YES
Prefix: GSS-
Security considerations: RFC [THIS-DOC]
Published Specification: RFC [THIS-DOC]
Person & email address to contact for further information: Alexey
Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com>
Intended usage: COMMON
Owner/Change controller: iesg@ietf.org
The IANA is directed to modify the existing registration for "GSSAPI"
as follows:
Family of SASL mechanisms: NO
SASL mechanism name: GSSAPI
Security considerations: ?
Published Specification: RFC [THIS-DOC]
Person & email address to contact for further information: Alexey
Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com>
Intended usage: COMMON
Owner/Change controller: iesg@ietf.org
Additional Information: This mechanism is for the Kerberos V5
mechanism of GSSAPI. Other GSSAPI mechanisms use other SASL
mechanism names, as described in this mechanism's published
specification.
The IANA is directed to modify the existing registration for "GSS-
Melnikov Expires December 24, 2004 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft SASL GSSAPI mechanisms June 2004
SPNEGO" as follows:
Family of SASL mechanisms: NO
SASL mechanism name: GSS-SPNEGO
Security considerations: See the "SPNEGO" section of RFC [THIS-DOC].
Published Specification: RFC [THIS-DOC]
Person & email address to contact for further information: Alexey
Melnikov <Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com>
Intended usage: LIMITED USE
Owner/Change controller: iesg@ietf.org
Melnikov Expires December 24, 2004 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft SASL GSSAPI mechanisms June 2004
6. Security Considerations
Security issues are discussed throughout this memo.
When a server or client supports multiple authentication mechanisms,
each of which has a different security strength, it is possible for
an active attacker to cause a party to use the least secure mechanism
supported. To protect against this sort of attack, a client or
server which supports mechanisms of different strengths should have a
configurable minimum strength that it will use. It is not sufficient
for this minimum strength check to only be on the server, since an
active attacker can change which mechanisms the client sees as being
supported, causing the client to send authentication credentials for
its weakest supported mechanism.
The client's selection of a SASL mechanism is done in the clear and
may be modified by an active attacker. It is important for any new
SASL mechanisms to be designed such that an active attacker cannot
obtain an authentication with weaker security properties by modifying
the SASL mechanism name and/or the challenges and responses.
[SPNEGO] has protection against many of these down-negotiation
attacks, SASL does not itself have such protection. The section
titled "SPNEGO" mentions considerations of choosing negotiation
through SASL versus SPNEGO.
The integrity protection provided by the security layer is useless to
the client unless the client also requests mutual authentication.
Therefore, a client wishing to benefit from the integrity protection
of a security layer MUST pass to the GSS_Init_sec_context call a
mutual_req_flag of TRUE.
When constructing the input_name_string, the client should not
canonicalize the server's fully qualified domain name using an
insecure or untrusted directory service.
Additional security considerations are in the [SASL] and [GSSAPI]
specifications. Additional security considerations for the GSSAPI
mechanism can be found in [KRB5GSS].
Melnikov Expires December 24, 2004 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft SASL GSSAPI mechanisms June 2004
7. Acknowledgements
This document is a revision of RFC 2222 written by John G. Myers.
He also contributed significantly to this revision.
Thank you to Lawrence Greenfield for converting text of this draft to
XML format.
Contributions of many members of the SASL mailing list are gratefully
acknowledged.
Melnikov Expires December 24, 2004 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft SASL GSSAPI mechanisms June 2004
Normative References
[ASN1] International Organization for Standardization,
"Information Processing Systems - Open Systems
Interconnection - Specification of Abstract Syntax
Notation One (ASN.1)", ISO Standard 8824, December
1990.
[BASE-ENCODING] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 3548, July 2003.
[GSSAPI] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application
Program Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743,
January 2000.
[KEYWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[KRB5GSS] Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API
Mechanism", RFC 1964, June 1996.
[MD5] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC
1321, April 1992.
[SASL] Myers, J., "Simple Authentication and Security Layer
(SASL)", RFC 2222, October 1997.
[SASL[2]] Melnikov, A., "Simple Authentication and Security
Layer (SASL)", draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis (work in
progress), June 2004.
[SPNEGO] Baize, E. and D. Pinkas, "The Simple and Protected
GSS-API Negotiation Mechanism", RFC 2478, December
1998.
[UTF8] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", RFC 2279, January 1998.
Melnikov Expires December 24, 2004 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft SASL GSSAPI mechanisms June 2004
Informative References
[SPKM1] Adams, C., "The Simple Public-Key GSS-API Mechanism (SPKM)",
RFC 2025, October 1996.
Author's Address
Alexey Melnikov (Ed.)
Isode Limited
5 Castle Business Village
36 Station Road
Hampton, Middlesex TW12 2BX
UK
EMail: Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com
URI: http://www.melnikov.ca/
Melnikov Expires December 24, 2004 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft SASL GSSAPI mechanisms June 2004
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
Melnikov Expires December 24, 2004 [Page 15]
