SAVI J. Bi
Internet-Draft J. Wu
Intended status: Standards Track G. Yao
Expires: March 15, 2013 Tsinghua Univ.
F. Baker
Cisco
September 11, 2012
SAVI Solution for DHCP
draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-15
Abstract
This document specifies the procedure for creating bindings between a
DHCPv4/DHCPv6 assigned source IP address and a binding anchor on a
SAVI (Source Address Validation Improvements) device. The bindings
can be used to filter out packets with forged source IP address in
DHCP scenario. This mechanism is proposed as a complement to ingress
filtering to provide finer granularity source IP address validation.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. SAVI-DHCP Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Binding Anchor Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. No Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. SAVI-Validation Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3. SAVI-DHCP-Trust Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.4. SAVI-SAVI Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.5. SAVI-BindRecovery Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.6. Table of Mutual Exclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.1. Binding State Table (BST) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.2. Mapping Table from Link Layer Address to Binding
Anchor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Procedure of Regular Binding Set Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.1. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.2. Binding States Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.3. Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.3.1. Timer Expiration Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.3.2. Control Message Arriving Events . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.4. State Machine of DHCP Packet Snooping . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.4.1. From NO_BIND to Other States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.4.1.1. Trigger Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.4.1.2. Following Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.4.2. From INIT_BIND to Other States . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.4.2.1. Trigger Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.4.2.2. Following Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.4.3. From BOUND to Other States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.4.3.1. Trigger Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.4.3.2. Following Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.5. Table of State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. Supplemental Binding Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8.1. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.2. Additional Binding States Description . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.3. Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.4. State Machine of Binding Recovery Process . . . . . . . . 21
8.4.1. From NO_BIND to Other States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.4.1.1. Trigger Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.4.1.2. Following Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.4.2. From DETECTION to Other States . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.4.2.1. Trigger Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.4.2.2. Following Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.4.3. From RECOVERY to Other States . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.4.3.1. Trigger Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.4.3.2. Following Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
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8.4.4. After BOUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8.4.4.1. Trigger Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8.4.4.2. Following Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9. Filtering Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9.1. Data Packet Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9.2. Control Packet Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10. State Restoration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.1. Binding Anchor Attribute Restoration . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.2. Binding State Restoration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
11. Constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
12. MLD Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
13.1. Security Problem about Binding Triggered by
EVE_DHCP_REPLY_NULL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
13.2. Binding Number Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
13.3. Risk from Link Layer Routing Dynamic . . . . . . . . . . 28
13.4. Duplicate Bindings of Same Address . . . . . . . . . . . 28
13.5. Security Problems about Binding Recovery Process . . . . 28
13.6. Compatibility with DNA (Detecting Network Attachment) . . 29
13.7. Bogus DHCP Server Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
13.8. Handle Binding Anchor Off-link Event . . . . . . . . . . 30
13.9. Authentication in DHCPv6 Leasequery . . . . . . . . . . . 30
13.10. TID Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
13.11. Residual Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
15. Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
16.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
16.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Appendix A. change log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
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1. Introduction
This document describes the procedure for creating a binding between
an address allocated to a network attachment point by DHCP and a
suitable binding anchor on a SAVI device. Binding anchor is defined
to be a link layer property of network attachment in
[savi-framework]. A list of proper binding anchors can be found in
the Section 3.2 of [savi-framework]. The bindings can be used to
filter out or identify packets with forged source IP address.
Section 9 suggests usage of these bindings to discard spoofing
traffic in common practice.
The mechanism specified in this document is designed to provide a
finer granularity source IP address validation, as a supplement to
[BCP38]. This mechanism mainly performs DHCP snooping to set up
bindings between IP addresses assigned by DHCP and corresponding
binding anchors. The binding process is inspired by the work of
[BA2007]. Besides the specifications about DHCPv4 in [BA2007], this
mechanism covers DHCPv6 and binding recovery procedure. The latter
is used to recover binding when DHCP snooping is no sufficient to set
up all the bindings.
This solution is primarily designed for a pure DHCP scenario in which
only addresses assigned through DHCP are legitimate global addresses.
And it is designed for stateful DHCP scenario [rfc2131], [rfc3315].
In stateless DHCP scenarios [rfc3736], a node must have obtained its
IPv6 addresses through some other mechanisms and so the address of
the client SHOULD be bound based on other SAVI solutions, for
example, SAVI FCFS[savi-fcfs]..
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [rfc2119].
3. Terminology
DHCP address: IP address assigned to an interface via DHCP
SAVI-DHCP: The name of this SAVI mechanism for DHCP address
SAVI device: A network device which enables this SAVI mechanism
Non-SAVI device: A network device without this SAVI mechanism
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DHCP client type message: Messages that can only originate from DHCP
client. The list of such messages contains DHCPv4 Discover, DHCPv4
Request, DHCPv4 Decline, DHCPv4 Release, DHCPv4 Inform, DHCPv6
Request, DHCPv6 Confirm, DHCPv6 Solicitation, DHCPv6 Decline, DHCPv6
Release, DHCPv6 Rebind, DHCPv6 Renew
DHCP server/relay type message: Messages that can only originate from
DHCP server or relay. The list of such messages contains DHCPv4 ACK,
DHCPv4 NAK, DHCPv4 OFFER, DHCPv6 Reply, DHCPv6 Advertise, DHCPv6
Reconfiguration, DHCPv6 Relay-forward and DHCPv6 Relay-reply
Lease time: Lease time in IPv4 [rfc2131] and valid lifetime in IPv6
[rfc3315]
Binding entry limit: The upper limit of binding entries on an binding
anchor. It is used to prevent a single node from overloading the
binding resource of SAVI device.
4. SAVI-DHCP Scenario
Figure 1 shows the main elements in a network where this mechanism is
deployed. One or more DHCP servers mediate the allocation and
distribution of IP addresses to hosts requesting them using the DHCP
protocol. A DHCP relay may be used to relay message between client
and server. Multiple SAVI devices and non-SAVI devices can co-exist
on link. A SAVI device can be connected to DHCP client, DHCP relay
(even DHCP server), SAVI device and non-SAVI device. The attribute
of a binding anchor is determined by the role to which it is
connected, as specified in Section 5.
SAVI-DHCP provides perimetrical security as SAVI-FCFS for scalability
(refer to Section 2.5 in [savi-fcfs]). SAVI devices can form a
perimeter separating untrusted area and trusted area. Each SAVI
device only need establish bindings for nodes partitioned by the edge
it forms. In this way, binding entries are distributed on devices
forming the perimeter. Then the SAVI devices can protect the inside
of the perimeter collaboratively without setting up bindings for all
the address on each device. For example, in Figure 1, protection
perimeter is formed by SAVI Device A and SAVI Device B. In this case,
SAVI device B wouldn't setup a binding for client A, and SAVI device
wouldn't setup a binding for client B. But the SAVI device B is still
protected from spoofing from client A and the SAVI device A is still
protected from spoofing from client B. There is only one difference
between the SAVI-DHCP protection perimeter and SAVI-FCFS protection
perimeter: SAVI-DHCP follows the state announced in DHCP messages,
thus there is no need to distribute state by NS/NA messages.
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Other address assignment mechanisms may be also used in such a
network. However, this solution is primarily designed for a pure
DHCP scenario, in which only the DHCP servers can assign a valid
global address.
Note that in an IPv6 environment, every interface has a link-local
address, which is not assigned by DHCP. This solution will not
validate the link-local address. It is RECOMMENDED to enable a SAVI
solution for link-local addresses, e.g. [savi-fcfs].
/------------\
+--------+ | | +--------+
|DHCP |-----| Router A | | Client |
|Server A| | | | C |
+--------+ \------------/ +--------+
......................|.......... |
. | . |
. Protection | . +--------+
. Perimeter | . |Non-SAVI|
. | . |Device |
. | . +--------+
. | . |
. +----------+ +---'------+ . |
. | SAVI | | SAVI |--.---------
-----.-| Device A|----| Device B|--.---------
| . +----|-----+ +-|------|-+ . |
| ................................. |
| | | | |
/----------\ | | | |
| | +-------+ +------+ +------+ +--------+
| Router B | | Client| |DHCP | |Client| |DHCP |
| | | A | |Relay | |B | |Server B|
\----------/ +-------+ +------+ +------+ +--------+
Figure 1: SAVI-DHCP Scenario
5. Binding Anchor Attributes
This section specifies the binding anchor attributes used by this
mechanism. Attributes are used to distinguish different types of
binding anchors. The procedure performed on each binding anchor is
determined by the attributes set on the binding anchor.
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By default, a binding anchor has no attribute. A binding anchor MAY
be configured to have one or more compatible attributes. The
attribute of each binding anchor should be manually configured before
enabling this SAVI-DHCP function.
5.1. No Attribute
Before configuration, by default, a binding anchor has no attribute.
Generally, each binding anchor is configured to have one or more
attributes after configuration.
Data packet filtering will not be performed on binding anchor with no
attribute. It is in consideration that turning on SAVI-DHCP function
will not cause a break of the network even though binding anchors are
not configured. However, if a binding anchor has no attribute, it
means SAVI-DHCP-Trust is not configured on the binding anchor; thus,
DHCP server/relay messages from the binding anchor with no attribute
will be discarded. This is designed to prevent host attaching to
unconfigured binding anchor plays as bogus DHCP server. It is
SUGGESTED configure SAVI-DHCP-Trust on necessary binding anchors
before turning on SAVI-DHCP function.
However, a binding anchor MAY have no attribute after configuration
if data packet should be let through but server/relay type message
should be discarded. For example, in Figure 1, on the binding anchor
of SAVI Device A connected to Router B, it is unreasonable to filter
out traffic from Router B, or allow forged DHCP message from Router
B. Thus, no attribute should be configured on this binding anchor.
5.2. SAVI-Validation Attribute
SAVI-Validation attribute is used on a binding anchor on which the
source address of data packet and control packet is to be validated.
The filtering process on the binding anchor with such attribute is
described in section 9. In Figure 1, the binding anchor between SAVI
Device B and Client A, and the binding anchor between SAVI Device B
and Non SAVI Device should be configured to have this attribute.
5.3. SAVI-DHCP-Trust Attribute
SAVI-DHCP-Trust Attribute is used on binding anchor on the path to a
trustable DHCP server/relay. DHCP server/relay type message coming
from binding anchor with this attribute will be forwarded. In
Figure 1, the binding anchor between SAVI Device B and DHCP Relay,
the binding anchor between SAVI Device B and DHCP Server B, and the
binding anchor between SAVI Device B and Router A should be
configured to have this attribute.
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Note that if the binding anchor is not exclusive for the valid DHCP
server, messages from a valid DHCP server and a bogus DHCP server may
arrive with the same binding anchor with this attribute. Thus, only
relying on configuring this attribute may not protect the network
from bogus DHCP servers. In deployment, it is RECOMMENDED the
binding anchor for any DHCP server should be exclusive to the DHCP
server on the protection perimeter. The security problem related
with the bogus DHCP server and deployment options are discussed in
section 14.7.
5.4. SAVI-SAVI Attribute
This attribute is used on the binding anchor from which the data
traffic is not to be checked. Binding will not be set up on binding
anchor with this attribute. All data packets will be allowed
directly. In Figure 1, the binding anchor between SAVI Device A and
SAVI Device B should be configured with this attribute. DHCP server/
relay type messages from a binding anchor with this attribute but
without SAVI-DHCP-Trust attribute will be filtered out.
Through configuring this attribute on binding anchor that joins two
or more SAVI devices, SAVI-Validation and SAVI-SAVI attributes
implement the security perimeter concept in [savi-framework]. Since
no binding entry is needed on such binding anchors, the resource
requirement can be reduced significantly.
Though there is no factual difference in packet process between a
binding anchor with no attribute and a binding anchor only with SAVI-
SAVI attribute, their connotations are different. SAVI-SAVI
attribute is configured on binding anchor between SAVI devices on the
same link inside the protection perimeter. A binding anchor can be
configured with no attribute in more general case that data packet
should be let through but server/relay type message should be
discarded.
5.5. SAVI-BindRecovery Attribute
If SAVI-Validation attribute is configured on a binding anchor, the
binding on this attribute is set up primarily based on DHCP message
snooping described in Section 7. However, in some scenarios, a DHCP
address may be used without previous DHCP exchange procedure
performed on the binding anchor, as discussed in Section 8. In such
scenarios, data-triggered binding procedure, which is described in
Section 8, is required to be performed.
This attribute is used on the binding anchor that requires data-
triggered binding recovery. It can be configured on any binding
anchor with SAVI-Validation attribute, especially when the binding
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anchor is not directly attached by client. In Figure 1, it is
suggested to configure this attribute on binding anchor between SAVI
Device B and Non SAVI Device.
5.6. Table of Mutual Exclusions
Mutually exclusive attributes MUST NOT be set on the same binding
anchor. The compatibility of different attributes is listed in
Figure 2.
+-----------+------------+------------+------------+------------+
| | SAVI- | SAVI- | SAVI- |SAVI- |
| | Validation | DHCP-Trust | SAVI |BindRecovery|
+-----------+------------+------------+------------+------------+
|SAVI- | | | mutually | |
|Validation | - | compatible | exclusive | compatible |
+-----------+------------+------------+------------+------------+
|SAVI- | | | | |
|DHCP-Trust | compatible | - | compatible | compatible |
+-----------+------------+------------+------------+------------+
|SAVI- | mutually | | | mutually |
|SAVI | exclusive | compatible | - | exclusive |
+-----------+------------+------------+------------+------------+
|SAVI- | | | | |
|Bind | | | mutually | |
|Recovery | compatible | compatible | exclusive | - |
+-----------+------------+------------+------------+------------+
Figure 2: Table of Mutual Exclusions
6. Data Structures
This section describes the data structures used in this mechanism.
The main data structure, named Binding State Table, is used to record
bindings and their states. A mapping table from the link layer
address to the binding anchor may be required, as described in
Section 13.7
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6.1. Binding State Table (BST)
This table contains the state of a binding between a source address
and a binding anchor. Entries are keyed on the binding anchor and
source IP address. Each entry has a lifetime field recording the
remaining lifetime of the entry, a state field recording the state of
the binding and a TID field recording Transaction ID (TID) [rfc2131]
[rfc3315] of DHCP message. The lifetime field counts down
automatically. Entry with 0 lifetime will be removed. The state
field changes over time to identify the current state of the binding.
States of bindings are specified in Section 7.2 and Section 8.2. The
TID field is used to keep the TID in DHCP request. The TID field can
be cleared after the state is changed to BOUND. An instance of this
table is shown in Figure 3.
+---------+----------+----------+-----------+-------+
| Anchor | Address | State | Lifetime |TID |
+---------+----------+----------+-----------+-------+
| A | IP_1 | BOUND | 65535 |TID_1 |
+---------+----------+----------+-----------+-------+
| A | IP_2 | BOUND | 10000 |TID_2 |
+---------+----------+----------+-----------+-------+
| B | IP_3 |INIT_BIND | 1 |TID_3 |
+---------+----------+----------+-----------+-------+
Figure 3: Instance of BST
6.2. Mapping Table from Link Layer Address to Binding Anchor
This table maps link layer address to binding anchor, so that the
SAVI device can determine on which binding anchor to set up a binding
only based on a DHCP Reply message. As described in Section 7.4.2.2,
whenever binding anchors must be recovered from DCHP Reply, such a
mapping table is required.
Such a table can already exist on SAVI devices. For example, if the
binding anchor is a switch port, the mapping table from MAC address
to switch port is required for switching frames. We don't require
SAVI devices to set up a different mapping table from the existing
ones.
The set up and update of this table is out of the scope of this
document.
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7. Procedure of Regular Binding Set Up
This section specifies the procedure of setting up bindings based on
DHCP message snooping. The binding procedure makes use of a state
machine. The binding procedure specified here is exclusively
designed for binding anchor with SAVI-Validation attribute.
7.1. Rationale
The rationale of this mechanism is that if a node associated with a
binding anchor is legitimate to use a DHCP address, the DHCP
procedure which assigns the address to the node must have been
performed on the same binding anchor. This basis stands when the
SAVI device is an intermedia of the DHCP server(s) and the managed
host, and the link layer routing is stable. However, arbitrary
topologies, layer-2 mobility and unstable link layer routing may
result in that data packet is received from a different binding
anchor. Such scenarios, excluding frequent link layer routing
change, can be handled (but not perfectly) by the mechanism described
in Section 8. Section 13.3 discusses the situation that the link
layer routing is naturally unstable. A solution for this issue is
outside the scope of this document.
7.2. Binding States Description
This section describes the binding states of this mechanism.
NO_BIND: The state before a binding has been set up.
INIT_BIND: A DHCP request (or a DHCPv6 Confirm, or a DHCPv6
Solicitation with Rapid Commit option) has been received from client,
and it may trigger a new binding.
BOUND: The address is authorized to the client.
7.3. Events
7.3.1. Timer Expiration Event
EVE_ENTRY_EXPIRE: The lifetime of an entry expires.
7.3.2. Control Message Arriving Events
Only if a DHCP message can pass the check in Section 9.2, the
corresponding event is a valid event. For any message that may
trigger a new binding, the binding entry limit (cf. Section 13.2, the
limit is set to prevent attacks against the binding entry resource on
SAVI device) on the corresponding binding anchor MUST NOT have not
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been reached. On receiving a DHCP message without triggering a valid
event, the state in the following section will not transit.
EVE_DHCP_REQUEST: A DHCP Request message is received from a binding
anchor with SAVI-Validation attribute.
EVE_DHCP_CONFIRM: A DHCPv6 Confirm message is received from a binding
anchor with SAVI-Validation attribute.
EVE_DHCP_REBIND: A DHCPv6 Rebind message is received from a binding
anchor with SAVI-Validation attribute.
EVE_DHCP_OPTION_RC: A DHCPv6 Solicitation message with Rapid Commit
option is received from a binding anchor with SAVI-Validation
attribute.
EVE_DHCP_REPLY_LEASE: A DHCPv4 Acknowledgement or DHCPv6 Reply
message is received, and there is an entry with matched TID in the
BST, and lease time is contained in the message.
EVE_DHCP_REPLY_NOLEASE: A DHCPv4 Acknowledgement or DHCPv6 Reply
message is received, and there is an entry with matched TID in the
BST, and no lease time is contained in the message.
EVE_DHCP_REPLY_NULL: A DHCPv4 Acknowledgement or DHCPv6 Reply message
is received, and there is no entry in the BST contains the same TID
as the message.
EVE_DHCP_DECLINE: A DHCP Decline message is received from a binding
anchor with SAVI-Validation attribute.
EVE_DHCP_RELEASE: A DHCP Release message is received from a binding
anchor with SAVI-Validation attribute.
EVE_LEASEQUERY_REPLY: A successful DHCP LEASEQUERY_REPLY is received
from a binding anchor with SAVI-DHCP-Trust attribute.
7.4. State Machine of DHCP Packet Snooping
7.4.1. From NO_BIND to Other States
7.4.1.1. Trigger Event
EVE_DHCP_REQUEST, EVE_DHCP_OPTION_RC, EVE_DHCP_CONFIRM,
EVE_DHCP_REBIND, EVE_DHCP_REPLY_NULL.
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7.4.1.2. Following Actions
If the triggering event is EVE_DHCP_REQUEST/EVE_DHCP_OPTION_RC:
The SAVI device MUST forward the message.
As illustrated in Figure 4, the SAVI device MUST generate an entry
for the binding anchor in the Binding State Table (BST) and set the
state field to INIT_BIND. The lifetime of this entry is set to be
MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME. The TID field of the triggering message MUST
be recorded in the entry.
The TID is stored because it will be used to correctly associate
message from the DHCP server with target binding anchor.
+---------+-------+---------+-----------------------+-------+
| Anchor |Address| State | Lifetime |TID |
+---------+-------+---------+-----------------------+-------+
| A | |INIT_BIND|MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME | TID |
+---------+-------+---------+-----------------------+-------+
Figure 4: Binding entry in BST on Request/Rapid Commit triggered
initialization
If the triggering event is EVE_DHCP_CONFIRM/EVE_DHCP_REBIND:
Besides forwarding the message and generating corresponding entry,
the address to confirm/rebind MUST be recorded in the entry, as
illustrated in Figure 5. The Lifetime field is set to
MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME.
+---------+--------+---------+-----------------------+-------+
| Anchor | Address| State | Lifetime |TID |
+---------+--------+---------+-----------------------+-------+
| A | Addr |INIT_BIND|MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME | TID |
+---------+--------+---------+-----------------------+-------+
Figure 5: Binding entry in BST on Confirm/Rebind triggered
initialization
If the triggering event is EVE_DHCP_REPLY_NULL:
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If the binding anchor is not a link layer address and there is not a
mapping table from the link layer address to the binding anchor, the
message SHOULD be delivered, but no entry will be set up. This
situation may happen when this mechanism is enabled after the client
sends the DHCP Request. The binding can be recovered based on the
binding recovery process described in Section 8.
Else:
The SAVI device MUST generate as many new entries in BST as the
number of IADDR found in the message. If the binding anchor type
inside the BST is not a link layer address, the binding anchor for an
entry is recovered from the mapping table from the link layer address
to the binding anchor (cf. Section 6.2) based on the destination link
layer address inside the DHCP message.
As illustrated in Figure 6, the states of the corresponding entries
are set to be BOUND. The lifetimes of the entries are set to be the
lease time in the message.
The binding entry limit can be exceeded when setting up bindings for
all addresses in a REPLY message. If there is enough binding entry
resource left in the shared pool, corresponding new entries MUST be
generated even when the binding number limit is exceeded. In case
that there is not enough resources left in the shared pool, the
message MUST be discarded.
If the binding anchor is a switch port, there can be a vulnerability
in this process which is discussed in Section 13.1. Similar problems
can happen with other binding anchors.
+---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
| Anchor | Address | State | Lifetime |TID |
+---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
| A | Addr1 | BOUND | Lease time 1 |TID |
+---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
| A | Addr2 | BOUND | Lease time 2 |TID |
+---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
Figure 6: Binding entry in BST on Reply triggered initialization
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7.4.2. From INIT_BIND to Other States
7.4.2.1. Trigger Event
EVE_DHCP_REPLY_LEASE, EVE_LEASEQUERY_REPLY, EVE_ENTRY_EXPIRE.
7.4.2.2. Following Actions
If the trigger event is EVE_DHCP_REPLY_LEASE:
As illustrated in Figure 7, If the Address field is null, the
lifetime field of the entry with matched TID is set to the sum of the
lease time in Reply message and MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME. The state of
the entry is changed to be BOUND. If more than one IADDR is found in
the message and there is enough binding entry resources,
corresponding new entries MUST be generated even when the binding
number limit is exceeded. If there is not enough resources left, the
message MUST be discarded.
+---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
| Anchor | Address | State | Lifetime |TID |
+---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
| A | Addr | BOUND |Lease time+ |TID |
| | | |MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME | |
+---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
Figure 7: From INIT_BIND to BOUND with Lease Time
If the trigger event is EVE_DHCP_REPLY_NOLEASE:
The triggering message is in response to a Confirm message. If the
message doesn't contain Status Code Success, discard the message. If
the message is of Status Code Success, the state of the entry is
changed to be BOUND. Because no lease time will be contained in the
REPLY from DHCP server, the SAVI device MUST lookup in BST to
determine whether there is an entry with the same address and TID.
If there is such an entry and the corresponding binding anchor is
off-link, it can be a local movement and the lifetime can be
recovered from the entry. In this case, set the Lifetime to be the
remaining value of Lifetime field of the existing entry, and remove
the existing entry. If there is no such an entry, the SAVI device
MUST send a LEASEQUERY [rfc5007] message querying by IP address to
All_DHCP_Relay_Agents_and_Servers multicast address [rfc3315] or a
configured server address. In this case, set the Lifetime of
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corresponding entry to MAX_LEASEQUERY_DELAY, as illustrated in
Figure 8.
+---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
| Anchor | Address | State | Lifetime |TID |
+---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
| A | Addr | BOUND | MAX_LEASEQUERY_DELAY |TID |
+---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
Figure 8: From INIT_BIND to BOUND without Lease Time
If the trigger event is EVE_ENTRY_EXPIRE:
The entry MUST be deleted from BST.
7.4.3. From BOUND to Other States
7.4.3.1. Trigger Event
EVE_ENTRY_EXPIRE, EVE_DHCP_RELEASE, EVE_DHCP_DECLINE,
EVE_DHCP_REPLY_LEASE, EVE_LEASEQUERY_REPLY.
7.4.3.2. Following Actions
If the trigger event is EVE_ENTRY_EXPIRE:
Remove the corresponding entry in BST.
If the trigger event is EVE_DHCP_RELEASE/EVE_DHCP_DECLINE:
Remove the corresponding entry in BST. The Release or Decline
message MUST be forwarded.
If the trigger event is EVE_DHCP_REPLY_LEASE:
Set the lifetime of the entry with the corresponding address and TID
to be the sum of the new lease time and MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME.
If the trigger event is EVE_LEASEQUERY_REPLY:
The Lifetime field of entry with corresponding IP address MUST be set
to the sum of the lease time in the LEASEQUERY_REPLY and
MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME.
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7.5. Table of State Machine
The main state transits are listed as follows.
State Event Action Next State
NO_BIND REQ/RC/RB/CFM Generate entry INIT_BIND
*NO_BIND RPL_NULL Generate entry with lease BOUND
INIT_BIND RPLL Record lease time BOUND
INIT_BIND RPLN Send Leasequery/set LQ_DLY BOUND
INIT_BIND Timeout Remove entry NO_BIND
BOUND RLS/DCL Remove entry NO_BIND
BOUND Timeout Remove entry NO_BIND
BOUND RPLL Set new lifetime BOUND
BOUND LQR Record lease time BOUND
Figure 9: Table of Transit
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+-------------+
| |
/----------| NO_BIND |<-----------\
| ------->| |----------\ |
| | +-------------+ | |
EVE_DHCP_REQUEST | | | |DHCP RELEASE
EVE_DHCP_CONFIRM | | TIMEOUT EVE_DHCP REPLY_NULL| |DHCP DECLINE
EVE_DHCP_OPTION_RC| | | |TIMEOUT
EVE_DHCP_REBIND | | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
v | EVE_DHCP REPLY_LEASE v |
+-------------+ EVE_DHCP REPLY_NOLEASE +-------------+
| | | |
| INIT_BIND ------------------------>| BOUND |<--\
| | | | |
+-------------+ +-------------+ |
| |
| |
| |
| |
\----------/
EVE_DHCP REPLY_LEASE
EVE_LEASEQUERY_REPLY
Figure 10: Diagram of Transit
*: optional but NOT RECOMMENDED.
REQ: EVE_DHCP_REQUEST
CFM: EVE_DHCP_CONFIRM
RC: EVE_DHCP_OPTION_RC
RB: EVE_DHCP_REBIND
RPLL: EVE_DHCP REPLY_LEASE
RPLN: EVE_DHCP REPLY_NOLEASE
RPL_NULL: EVE_DHCP REPLY_NULL
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DCL: DHCP DECLINE
RLS: DHCP RELEASE
LQR: EVE_LEASEQUERY_REPLY
Timeout: EVE_ENTRY_EXPIRE
LQ_DLY: MAX_LEASEQUERY_DELAY
8. Supplemental Binding Process
Supplemental binding process is designed to cover scenarios where a
packet is sent by a node but no previous DHCP exchanges have occurred
to correctly update the SAVI device's BST. Several senarios that
issues are listed:
(1) Arbitrary topologes: the SAVI device may not be able to snoop
DHCP messages exchanged between nodes and DHCP servers in case
of arbiraty topologies.
(2) Link topology change: when the link topology changes after the
binding has been set up, and then the node will send packets
through a different port rather than the bound port.
(3) Local link movement: a node moves on the local link without
performing re-configuration process.
The binding recovery process is designed to avoid permanently
blocking legitimate traffic. This process is performed on binding
anchor with both SAVI-Validation and SAVI-BindRecovery attributes.
It is not supposed to set up a binding whenever a data packet with an
unbound source address is received. Generally, longer time and more
packets are needed to trigger supplemental binding processes.
Considering the overhead of this procedure, the implementation of
binding recovery process is a conditional SHOULD. This function
SHOULD be implemented unless the implementation is known to be
directly attached to the host. If an implementation is directly
attached to host, change in link topology will not affect the
bindings, and host will always start the re-configuration process
after the interface is re-connected. Thus, there is no need to use
additional processes to recovery bindings. If the mechanism is not
implemented and managed hosts are not directly attached, legitimate
traffic will be blocked until the node is reconfigured.
The security issues about this process is discussed is Section 13.5.
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8.1. Rationale
If a DHCP address is allocated on the link, and the address is not
used by another node in the network, the address can be bound with
the binding anchor on which a message is received.
8.2. Additional Binding States Description
In addition to Section 7.2, new states used in this process are
required here:
DETECTION The address is under local detection.
RECOVERY The address is in binding recovery process.
8.3. Events
Additional events in this process are described here. Also, if an
event will trigger to set up a new binding entry, the binding entry
limit on the binding anchor MUST NOT have not been reached.
EVE_BR_UNMATCH A data packet without matched binding of BOUND state
in BST is received on a binding anchor with both SAVI-Validation and
SAVI-BindRecovery attributes.
EVE_BR_CONFLICT Response against an address in DETECTION state is
received.
EVE_BR_LEASEQUERY IPv4: a DHCPLEASEACTIVE message with IP Address
Lease Time option is received from a binding anchor with SAVI-DHCP-
Trust attribute; IPv6: a successful LEASEQUERY-REPLY is received.
8.4. State Machine of Binding Recovery Process
Through using additional states, the state machine of this process
doesn't conflict the regular process described in Section 7. Thus,
it can be implemented separately without changing the state machine
in Section 7.
8.4.1. From NO_BIND to Other States
8.4.1.1. Trigger Event
EVE_BR_UNMATCH.
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8.4.1.2. Following Action
Determine whether to process this event with a probability. The
probability can be configured or calculated based on the state of the
SAVI device. This probability should be low enough to mitigate the
damage from DoS attack against this process. How to generate this
probability is out of the scope of this document.
If there is a corresponding binding in BST on another binding anchor
with the same source address, and the binding anchor is not off-link,
the packet SHOULD be dropped, and no further actions will not be
taken.
Check if the time since the last EVE_BR_UNMATCH on the same binding
anchor is larger than BIND_RECOVERY_INTERVAL. No further actions
will be taken if the last EVE_BR_UNMATCH on the same binding anchor
in the last BIND_RECOVERY_INTERVAL.
Create a new entry in the BST. Set the Binding Anchor field to the
corresponding binding anchor. Set the Address field to be source
address of the packet. Set the state field to DETECTION. Set the
lifetime of the created entry to 2*DAD_TIMEOUT.
Check if the address has a local conflict (it violates an address
being used by another node) through:
(1) IPv4 address: sending a Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)
Request [rfc826]or a ARP probe [rfc5227] on the address; if
there is no response message after DAD_TIMEOUT, send another ARP
Request or ARP probe;
(2) IPv6 address: performing Duplicate Address Detection (DAD)
[rfc4862] on the address; if there is no response message after
DAD_TIMEOUT, perform another DAD procedure.
Because the delivery of detection message is unreliable, the
detection message is of a certain possibility of not reaching the
targeting node. If the targeting node doesn't get the detection
message, the address may be bound with a wrong binding anchor in the
futher stages. This fault may introduce attack against this
mechanism. Thus, the detection is performed again if there is no
response after the first detection.
The messages MUST NOT be sent to the link with the binding anchor of
the triggering packet.
The packet which triggers this event SHOULD be discarded.
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8.4.2. From DETECTION to Other States
8.4.2.1. Trigger Event
EVE_ENTRY_EXPIRE, EVE_BR_CONFLICT.
8.4.2.2. Following Action
If the trigger event is EVE_ENTRY_EXPIRE:
(1) IPv4 address: Send a DHCPLEASEQUERY [rfc4388] message querying
by IP address to all DHCPv4 servers with IP Address Lease Time
option (option 51). The server addresses can be found through
DHCPv4 Discovery or from configuration. Change the state of the
corresponding entry to RECOVERY. Change the lifetime of the
entry to be MAX_LEASEQUERY_DELAY.
(2) IPv6 address: Send a LEASEQUERY [rfc5007] message querying by IP
address to All_DHCP_Relay_Agents_and_Servers multicast address
or a configured server address.
Change the state of the corresponding entry to RECOVERY. Change the
lifetime of the entry to be MAX_LEASEQUERY_DELAY.
If the trigger event is EVE_BR_CONFLICT:
Remove the entry.
8.4.3. From RECOVERY to Other States
8.4.3.1. Trigger Event
EVE_ENTRY_EXPIRE, EVE_BR_LEASEQUERY.
8.4.3.2. Following Action
If the trigger event is EVE_BR_LEASEQUERY:
(1) IPv4 address: Change the state of the corresponding binding to
BOUND. Set life time to the sum of the value encoded in IP
Address Lease Time option of the DHCPLEASEACTIVE message and
MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME.
(2) IPv6 address: Change the state of the corresponding binding to
BOUND. Set the lifetime to the sum of the valid lifetime
extracted from OPTION_CLIENT_DATA option in the LEASEQUERY-REPLY
message and MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME.
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If multiple addresses are specified in the LEASEQUERY-REPLY message,
new entries MUST also be created correspondingly on the same binding
anchor.
If the trigger event is EVE_ENTRY_EXPIRE:
Remove the entry.
8.4.4. After BOUND
Note that the TID field contains no value after the binding state
changes to BOUND. Because TID is used to associate entry with
message from server, attaching node will be prevented from renewing
the bound address. Thus, the TID field is recovered from snooping
DHCP Renew message.
8.4.4.1. Trigger Event
EVE_DHCP_RENEW.
8.4.4.2. Following Action
Set the TID field of the corresponding entry to the TID in the
trigger message.
9. Filtering Specification
This section specifies how to use bindings to filter out spoofing
packets.
Filtering policies are different for data packet and control packet.
DHCP and NDP (Neighbor Discovery Protocol) [rfc4861] messages that
may cause state transit are classified into control packet. Neighbor
Advertisement (NA) and ARP Response are also included in control
packet, because the Target Address of NA and ARP Response should be
checked to prevent spoofing. All other packets are considered to be
data packets.
9.1. Data Packet Filtering
Data packets with a binding anchor which has attribute SAVI-
Validation MUST be checked.
Packet whose source IP address is a link-local address SHOULD be
forwarded.
If the source IP address of a packet is not a link-local address, but
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the address is not bound with the corresponding binding anchor, this
packet MUST be discarded.
The SAVI device MAY record any violation.
9.2. Control Packet Filtering
For binding anchors with SAVI-Validation attribute:
Discard DHCPv4 REQUEST message whose source IP address is neither all
zeros nor a bound address in BST.
Discard DHCPv6 Request message whose source is neither a link-local
address nor bound with the corresponding binding anchor in BST.
Discard NDP messages whose source address is neither a link-local
address nor bound with the corresponding binding anchor. In
addition, discard NA message whose target address is neither a link-
local address nor bound with the corresponding binding anchor.
Discard ARP messages whose protocol is IP and sender protocol address
is neither all zeros address nor bound with the corresponding binding
anchor. In addition, discard ARP Reply messages whose target address
is not bound with the corresponding binding anchor.
For other binding anchors:
Discard DHCP server/relay type message not from binding anchor with
the SAVI-DHCP-Trust attribute or SAVI-SAVI attribute.
The SAVI device SHOULD record any violation of the previous rules.
10. State Restoration
If a SAVI device reboots accidentally or designedly, the information
kept in volatile memory will be lost. This section specifies the
restoration of binding anchor attribute and binding state.
10.1. Binding Anchor Attribute Restoration
The configuration of binding anchor attribute is critical to this
mechanism. If this configuration is lost, DHCPv4 Acknowledgement/
DHCPv6 Reply will be discarded. Though legitimate packet will not be
discarded, host will be prevented from getting new DHCP address or
renewing existing address.
To avoid the loss of binding anchor attribute configuration, the
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configuration MUST be able to be stored in non-volatile storage.
After the reboot of SAVI device, if the configuration of binding
anchor attribute can be found in non-volatile storage, the
configuration MUST be used.
10.2. Binding State Restoration
The loss of binding state will cause legitimate traffic from host
indirectly attached to the SAVI device to be blocked until binding
recovery. Purely using the Binding Recovery Process to recover a
large number of bindings is of heavy overhead and results
considerable delay. Thus, recovery from non-volatile storage, as
specified below, is RECOMMENDED.
If this function is supported by hardware, binding entries MAY be
saved into non-volatile storage whenever a new binding entry changes
to BOUND state. If a binding with BOUND state is removed, the saved
entry MUST be removed correspondingly.
Immediately after reboot, the SAVI device SHOULD restore binding
states from the non-volatile storage. The system time of save
process MUST be stored. After rebooting, the SAVI device MUST check
whether each entry has been obsolete through comparing the saved
lifetime and the difference between the current system time and saved
system time.
11. Constants
MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME 120s
BIND_RECOVERY_INTERVAL 60s and configurable
MAX_LEASEQUERY_DELAY 10s
OFFLINK_DELAY 30s
DAD_TIMEOUT 0.5s
12. MLD Consideration
To perform the binding recovery procedure in Section 8, the SAVI
device MUST join the Solicited Node Multicast group of the source
address of triggering IPv6 data packet whenever performing duplicate
detection.
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13. Security Considerations
13.1. Security Problem about Binding Triggered by EVE_DHCP_REPLY_NULL
When the binding anchor is a switch port, binding based on
EVE_DHCP_REPLY_NULL can result in security threats. The assigned
address could be bound to a wrong switch port if an attacker can
maliciously pollute the table mapping a link layer address to switch
port (cf. Section 6.2).
For example, host A requests address from port 1. When a SAVI switch
receives a DHCP REPLY with assigned address IP_A and destination link
layer address MAC_A, it will check its MAC/port table to find the
right binding port. But MAC/port table might be polluted by an
attacker host B attached to port 2. Then the SAVI switch will find
the MAC_A is at port 2 from the polluted MAC/port table and it will
result in a wrong binding which binds IP_A and port 2.
Protection from this attack can be ensured by making sure that one of
the following conditions is satisfied:
(1) DHCP Option 82 is used to keep binding anchor in DHCP Request
and Reply. DHCP Option 82 can be used to keep the circuit
information of the client and returned by the DHCP server. Thus
the binding anchor can be determined from the circuit
information in the Option. It can be used whenever an
implementation doesn't want to create an entry on the DHCP
Request message.
(2) Unspoofable MAC is used as binding anchor (802.11i, 802.1ae/af).
(3) The mapping table from MAC to binding anchor is secure.
If the binding anchor is a link layer address, or there are
mechanisms preventing the corruption of the table mapping the link
layer to a switch port, mapping link layer address to binding anchor
may be considered as secure.
It is NOT RECOMMENDED to initialize a binding based on DHCP Reply,
unless a mechanism protecting the mapping table from corruption is
also implemented. Similar problem may happen with binding anchors
not based on link layer addresses.
13.2. Binding Number Limitation
In general case, a binding entry will cost a certain resource and a
SAVI device can only afford a limited number of binding entries. In
order to prevent a single node from overloading the binding table
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entries on the SAVI device, binding entry limit is set. The binding
entry limit is the upper bound of binding number for each binding
anchor with SAVI-Validation. Besides, a SAVI device SHOULD reserve a
shared pool of binding resources to handle the scenario that the
number of adversed addresses exceeds the binding entry limit on the
corresponding binding anchor as specified in Section 7.4.1.2.
13.3. Risk from Link Layer Routing Dynamic
An implicit assumption of this solution is that data packet must
arrive at the same binding anchor with the binding anchor that the
control packets have arrived at. If this assumption is not valid,
this control packet based solution will fail or at least discard a
number of legitimate packets. Unfortunately, the link layer routing
between host and SAVI device can be inconsistent from time to time.
Time consistency of the link layer routing is not assured by the link
layer routing protocol. For example, TRILL, a recent link layer
routing protocol, is flexible and multiple link layer paths are
allowed.
To make the basic assumption stand, the best way is enforcing that
there should be only one topology path from downstream host to the
SAVI device. For example, SAVI device is directly attached by hosts.
If the assumption doesn't stand, a better solution is requiring
inter-operation between SAVI protocol and the link layer routing
protocol to make SAVI protocol sensitive to the link layer routing
change. This solution is above the scope of this document.
13.4. Duplicate Bindings of Same Address
The same address may be bound with multiple binding anchors, only if
the binding processes are finished on each binding anchor
successfully. This mechanism is designed in consideration that a
node may move on the local link, and a node may have multiple binding
anchors. However, the traceability of address is reduced.
Note that the local link movement scenario is not handled perfectly.
The former binding may not be removed, unless the node is directly
attached to SAVI device. The nodes sharing the same former binding
anchor of the moving node have the ability to use its address.
13.5. Security Problems about Binding Recovery Process
The Binding Recovery Process (cf. Section 8) MUST be rate limited to
avoid Denial of Services attack against the SAVI device itself. A
constant BIND_RECOVERY_INTERVAL is used to control the frequency.
Two data-triggered recovery processes on one binding anchor MUST have
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a minimum interval time BIND_RECOVERY_INTERVAL. This constant SHOULD
be configured prudently to avoid Denial of Service attacks.
This process is not strictly secure. The node attached with a SAVI-
BindRecovery binding anchor has the ability to use the address of an
inactive node, which doesn't reply to the detection probes.
13.6. Compatibility with DNA (Detecting Network Attachment)
DNA [rfc4436] [rfc6059] is designed to decrease the handover latency
after re-attachment to the same network. DNA mainly relies on
performing reachability test through sending unicast Neighbor
Solicitation/Router Solicitation/ARP Request message to determine
whether a previously configured address is still valid. Though DNA
provides optimization for host, it doesn't provide sufficient
information for this mechanism to migrate or establish a binding. If
a binding is set up only through snooping the reachability test
message, the binding can be invalid. For example, an attacker can
perform reachability test with address bound to another host. If
binding is migrated to the attacker, the attacker can successful
obtain the binding from the victim. Because this mechanism wouldn't
set up a binding based on snooping the DNA procedure, it cannot
achieve perfect compatibility with DNA. However, it only means the
re-configuration of the interface is slowed but not prevented.
Details are discussed as follows.
In Simple DNAv6 [rfc6059], the probe is sent with source address set
to link-local address, and such messages will not be discarded by the
policy specified in section Section 9.2. If an interface is re-
attached to a previous network, the detection will be complete and
the address will be regarded as valid by host. The candidate address
is not contained in the probe. Thus, the binding cannot be recovered
through snooping the probe. The binding can only be recovered from
the DHCP snooping procedure. The DHCP REQUEST messages wouldn't be
filtered out by this solution as their source address is link-local
address. Before the DHCP procedure is completed, packets will be
filtered out by SAVI device. In another word, in SAVI scenarios,
Simple DNAv6 will not help reduce the handover latency. If SAVI-
BindRecovery attribute is configured on the new binding anchor, data
triggered procedure may reduce the latency.
In DNAv4 [rfc4436], the ARP probe will be discarded because unbound
address is used as sender protocol address. As a result, the
detection will not complete and false negative is caused. The DHCP
REQUEST message sent by the node will not be discarded, because the
source IP address field should be all zero as required by [rfc2131].
Thus, if the address is still valid, the binding will be recovered
from the DHCP snooping procedure.
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13.7. Bogus DHCP Server Threat
SAVI-DHCP-Trust attribute is designed to prevent attacks from bogus
DHCP server. However, the security is not strict because messages
from valid DHCP server and bogus DHCP server may arrive at the SAVI
device with the same binding anchor. As a result, the SAVI device
cannot recognize valid messages from bogus messages. Because the
bindings are set up primarily based on DHCP message from DHCP server,
the results can be quite serious. For example, invalid addresses are
assigned to hosts and bindings of the addresses are set up. There
can be a lot of other attacks in such a scenario.
Considering the restraint that no new protocol can be introduced, the
countermeasure is quite limited. If placing the DHCP server inside
the protection perimeter, or making the path from each valid DHCP
servers to the SAVI perimeter exclusive for DHCP servers, or
filtering out DHCP server/relay type messages that may get into the
path from each DHCP server to the protection perimeter, messages from
bogus DHCP server cannot share the same binding anchor with messages
from valid DHCP server, and such attack can be prevented. If none of
the above deployment requirements can be satisfied, the network
administrator should be aware of the above limitation and deploy this
mechanism prudently.
13.8. Handle Binding Anchor Off-link Event
Port DOWN event MUST be handled if the switch port is used as the
binding anchor. In a more general case, if a binding anchor turns
off-link, this event MUST be handled.
Whenever a binding anchor with attribute SAVI-Validation turns down,
a timer of OFFLINK_DELAY is set. Until the timer becomes zero, the
bindings with the binding anchor SHOULD be kept. As an exception to
handle node movements, if receiving DAD Neighbor Solicitation/
Gratuitous ARP request targeting at the address during OFFLINK_DELAY,
the entry MAY be removed.
If the binding anchor turns on-link during OFFLINK_DELAY, turn off
the timer and keep corresponding bindings.
13.9. Authentication in DHCPv6 Leasequery
As required in section 5 of RFC5007, DHCPv6 Leasequery should use
IPsec-based authentication specified in the section 21.1 of RFC3315.
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13.10. TID Spoofing
A malicious node can make use of TID of another node through snooping
or blind attack. With this mechanism, DHCP message from client with
source address not bound on the corresponding binding anchor will be
discarded;thus, if an attacker sends DHCP message with source address
and TID not bound with its binding anchor, the message will be
discarded. However, an attacker can make use of source address and
TID bound with the same binding anchor.This mechanism cannot identify
forged DHCP client message if the attacker and the victim share the
same binding anchor. As a result, dedicated attacks can be
introduced. For example, an attacker can send forged DHCP Release to
remove binding of another node sharing the same binding anchor.
There is no easy way to avoid this weakness in this snooping based
mechanism, though DHCP has authentication mechanisms designed. For
DHCPv4, client doesn't expect a Reply from server after sending
Decline/Release message. Thus, this mechanism cannot rely on
authentication mechanism of the server to mitigate the TID spoofing
threat. For DHCPv6, because the client expects a Reply after sending
Decline/Release, an attacker has to compromise the authentication
mechanism enforced by DHCP server to make the server return a valid
message. However, it is hard to distinguish the Reply message is in
response to a Decline or a Release or a Confirm. As a result, it is
hard to design a state machine that can decide the correct state
transition solely based on the Reply message.
Thus, it is SUGGESTED using exclusive binding anchor to avoid TID
spoofing. But even the binding anchor is shared, the attacker can be
located within a small scope.
If a bogus DHCP server shared the same binding anchor with the valid
DHCP server, the TID in DHCP server message can be forged. Then this
mechanism can suffer TID spoofing attack. The bogus DHCP server
problem is discussed in Section 13.7.
13.11. Residual Threats
As described in [savi-framework], this solution cannot strictly
prevent spoofing. There are two scenarios in which spoofing can
still happen:
(1) The binding anchor is spoofable. If the binding anchor is
spoofable, e.g., plain MAC address, an attacker can use forged
binding anchor to send packet which will not be regarded as
spoofing by SAVI device. Indeed, using binding anchor that can
be easily spoofed is dangerous. An attacker can use the binding
anchor of another host to perform a lot of DHCP procedures, and
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the SAVI device will refuse to set up new binding for the host
whenever the binding number limitation has been reached. Thus,
it is RECOMMENDED to use strong enough binding anchor, e.g.,
switch port, secure association in 802.11ae/af and 802.11i.
(2) The binding anchor is shared by more than one host. If the
binding anchor is shared by more than one host, they can spoof
the addresses of each other. For example, a number of hosts can
attach to the same switch port of a SAVI device through a hub.
The SAVI device cannot distinguish packets from different hosts
and thus the spoofing between them will not be detected. This
problem can be solved by not sharing binding anchor between
hosts.
14. IANA Considerations
This memo asks the IANA for no new parameters.
Note to RFC Editor: This section will have served its purpose if it
correctly tells IANA that no new assignments or registries are
required, or if those assignments or registries are created during
the RFC publication process. From the authors' perspective, it may
therefore be removed upon publication as an RFC at the RFC Editor's
discretion.
15. Acknowledgment
Special thanks to Jean-Michel Combes, Christian Vogt, Joel M.
Halpern, Eric Levy-Abegnoli, Marcelo Bagnulo Braun, Jari Arkko, Elwyn
Davies, Barry Leiba and Alberto Garcia for careful review and
valuation comments on the state machine and text.
Thanks to Mark Williams, Erik Nordmark, Mikael Abrahamsson, David
Harrington, Pekka Savola, Xing Li, Lixia Zhang, Robert Raszuk, Greg
Daley, John Kaippallimalil and Tao Lin for their valuable
contributions.
This document was generated using the xml2rfc tool.
16. References
16.1. Informative References
[BA2007] Baker, F., "Cisco IP Version 4 Source Guard", IETF
Internet draft (work in progress), November 2007.
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[BCP38] Paul, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
Address Spoofing", RFC 2827, BCP 38, May 2000.
[rfc3736] Droms, R., "Stateless Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
(DHCP) Service for IPv6", RFC 3736, April 2004.
16.2. Normative References
[rfc2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, Match 1997.
[rfc2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
RFC 2131, March 1997.
[rfc3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.,
and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.
[rfc4388] Woundy, R. and K. Kinnear, "Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol (DHCP) Leasequery", RFC 4388, February 2006.
[rfc4436] Aboba, B., Carlson, J., and S. Cheshire, "Detecting
Network Attachment in IPv4 (DNAv4)", RFC 4436, March 2006.
[rfc4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
September 2007.
[rfc4862] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, September 2007.
[rfc5007] Brzozowski, J., Kinnear, K., Volz, B., and S. Zeng,
"DHCPv6 Leasequery", RFC 5007, September 2007.
[rfc5227] Cheshire, S., "IPv4 Address Conflict Detection", RFC 5227,
July 2008.
[rfc6059] Krishnan, S. and G. Daley, "Simple Procedures for
Detecting Network Attachment in IPv6", RFC 6059,
November 2010.
[rfc826] Plummer, D., "Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol: Or
converting network protocol addresses to 48.bit Ethernet
address for transmission on Ethernet hardware", RFC 826,
November 1982.
[savi-fcfs]
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Nordmark, E., Bagnulo, M., and E. Levy-Abegnoli, "FCFS-
SAVI: First-Come First-Serve Source-Address Validation for
Locally Assigned Addresses", RFC 6620, May 2012.
[savi-framework]
Wu, J., Bi, J., Bagnulo, M., Baker, F., and C. Vogt, Ed.,
"Source Address Validation Improvement Framework",
draft-ietf-savi-framework-06 (work in progress),
December 2011.
Appendix A. change log
Main changes from 02 to 03:
(1) Section 12, data trigger and counter trigger are combined to
binding recovery process. The expression "one of MUST" is
changed to "conditional MUST. Conditions related with the
implementation are specified. Related constants are changed in
section 26."
Main changes from 03 to 04:
(1) Section "Prefix configuration" is removed.
(2) Section "Supplemental binding process" is modified in
requirement level.
(3) Sub-section 9.1 "Rationale" is added.
(4) Section "Filtering during Detection" is removed.
(5) Section "Handling layer 2 path change" is changed to
"Consideration on Link layer routing complexity"
(6) Section "Background and related protocols" is removed.
Main changes from 04 to 05:
(1) Trigger events are listed explicitly in section 8.
(2) Detection and Live states are deleted, together with
corresponding sections.
Main change from 05 to 06:
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(1) Section 8.1: reference to section 20 is changed to section 15.
Main changes from 06 to 07:
(1) So many changes in this modification. We suggest to track
http://www.ietf.org/mailarchive/web/savi/current/msg01543.ht ml.
Changes are made according to the comments.
Main changes from 07 to 08,09:
(1) The modifications are made according to the comments from Jean-
Michel Combes.
Main changes from 09 to 11:
(1) DNA issues raised by Jari Arkko
Main changes from 11 to 12:
(1) The modifications are made according to the comments from Eric,
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi/current/msg01778.html.
Main changes from 12 to 13:
(1) Main modifications are made based on comments from Elwyn Davies.
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/gen-art/current/
msg07297.html.
(2) Other modifications are made based on comments from Barry Leiba.
Main changes from 13 to 14:
(1) A symbol error is corrected.
Main changes from 14 to 15:
(1) In corresponding to "1. Does section 8 describe the mechanism
that a SAVI device must perform if it has been unable to snoop
the DHCP traffic between a host and a DHCP server? It appears
that way in the document, but it would be good to explicitly
state that early in the document when the discussion of
topologies is being carried out. This becomes important when
arbitrary topologies do not provide a means for the SAVI device
to eavesdrop on the DHCP traffic." We specified in s7.1 p1 that
arbitrary topologies may result in the regular process cannot
set up correct bindings. This is also specified in the
beginning of s8.
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(2) In corresponding to "2. Section 12 refers to the "tentative
address multicast group". Do you really mean the Solicited Node
Multicast address that is generated from the configured IPv6
unicast address?" Yes. We have changed s12 to "the SAVI device
MUST join the Solicited Node Multicast group of the source
address of triggering IPv6 data packet whenever performing
duplicate detection."
(3) Other modifications are made according to the gen-art review.
Refer to http://netarchlab.tsinghua.edu.cn/~yaog/review.txt.
Authors' Addresses
Jun Bi
Tsinghua University
Network Research Center, Tsinghua University
Beijing 100084
China
Email: junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn
Jianping Wu
Tsinghua University
Computer Science, Tsinghua University
Beijing 100084
China
Email: jianping@cernet.edu.cn
Guang Yao
Tsinghua University
Network Research Center, Tsinghua University
Beijing 100084
China
Email: yaoguang@cernet.edu.cn
Fred Baker
Cisco Systems
Santa Barbara, CA 93117
United States
Email: fred@cisco.com
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