Security Events Working Group A. Backman, Ed.
Internet-Draft Amazon
Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones, Ed.
Expires: April 4, 2019 Microsoft
M. Scurtescu
Google
M. Ansari
Cisco
A. Nadalin
Microsoft
October 1, 2018
Push-Based SET Token Delivery Using HTTP
draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-01
Abstract
This specification defines how a series of security event tokens
(SETs) may be delivered to a previously registered receiver using
HTTP POST over TLS initiated as a push to the receiver.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 4, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Event Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Event Delivery Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Transmitting a SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Handling a SET Transmission Request . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3.1. Success Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3.2. Failure Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3.3. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes . . . . . . 6
2.3.4. Error Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Authentication and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. TLS Support Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes . . . . . . . . 8
6.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. Other Streaming Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix C. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction and Overview
This specification defines how SETs (see [RFC8417]) can be
transmitted to a previously registered SET Receiver using HTTP
[RFC7231] over TLS. The specification defines a method to push SETs
via HTTP POST.
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1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Throughout this documents all figures may contain spaces and extra
line-wrapping for readability and space limitations.
1.2. Definitions
This specification assumes terminology defined in the Security Event
Token specification[RFC8417], as well as the terms defined below:
SET Transmitter
A service provider that delivers SETs to other providers known as
SET Receivers.
SET Receiver
A service provider that registers to receive SETs from a SET
Transmitter and provides an endpoint to receive SETs via HTTP
POST.
2. Event Delivery
2.1. Event Delivery Process
In Push-Based SET Delivery Using HTTP, SETs are delivered one at a
time using HTTP POST requests by a SET Transmitter to a SET Receiver,
as described below in Section 2.2. Upon receipt, the SET Receiver
acknowledges receipt or indicates an error via the HTTP response, as
described below in Section 2.3.
After successful (acknowledged) SET delivery, SET Transmitters SHOULD
NOT be required to maintain or record SETs for recovery. Once a SET
is acknowledged, the SET Receiver SHALL be responsible for retention
and recovery.
Transmitted SETs SHOULD be self-validating (e.g. signed) if there is
a requirement to verify they were issued by the SET Transmitter at a
later date when de-coupled from the original delivery where
authenticity could be checked via the HTTP or TLS mutual
authentication.
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Upon receiving a SET, the SET Receiver reads the SET and validates
it. The SET Receiver MUST acknowledge receipt to the SET
Transmitter, using the defined acknowledgement or error method.
The SET Receiver SHALL NOT use the Event acknowledgement mechanism to
report Event errors other than relating to the parsing and validation
of the SET.
2.2. Transmitting a SET
This method allows a SET Transmitter to use HTTP POST (Section 4.3.3
[RFC7231]) to deliver SETs to a previously registered web callback
URI supplied by the SET Receiver as part of a configuration process
(not defined by this document).
The SET to be delivered MAY be signed and/or encrypted as defined in
[RFC8417].
The HTTP Content-Type (see Section 3.1.1.5 [RFC7231]) for the HTTP
POST is "application/secevent+jwt" and the request body SHALL consist
of a single SET (see [RFC8417]). As per Section 5.3.2 [RFC7231], the
value of the "Accept" header is "application/json".
The following is a non-normative example of a SET transmission HTTP
POST request:
POST /Events HTTP/1.1
Host: notify.examplerp.com
Accept: application/json
Content-Type: application/secevent+jwt
eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0
.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.
Figure 1: Example SET Transmission Request
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2.3. Handling a SET Transmission Request
Upon receipt of the request, the SET Receiver SHALL validate the JWT
structure of the SET as defined in Section 7.2 [RFC7519]. The SET
Receiver SHALL also validate the SET information as described in
Section 2 [RFC8417].
2.3.1. Success Response
If the SET is determined to be valid, the SET Receiver SHALL
"acknowledge" successful submission by responding with HTTP Status
202 as "Accepted" (see Section 6.3.3 [RFC7231]).
In order to maintain compatibility with other methods of
transmission, the SET Receiver SHOULD NOT include an HTTP response
body representation of the submitted SET or what the SET's pending
status is when acknowledging success. In the case of an error (e.g.
HTTP Status 400), the purpose of the HTTP response body is to
indicate any SET parsing, validation, or cryptographic errors.
The following is a non-normative example of a successful receipt of a
SET.
HTTP/1.1 202 Accepted
Figure 2: Example Successful Delivery Response
Note that the purpose of the "acknowledgement" response is to let the
SET Transmitter know that a SET has been delivered and the
information no longer needs to be retained by the SET Transmitter.
Before acknowledgement, SET Receivers SHOULD ensure they have
validated received SETs and retained them in a manner appropriate to
information retention requirements appropriate to the SET event types
signaled. The level and method of retention of SETs by SET Receivers
is out-of-scope of this specification.
2.3.2. Failure Response
In the Event of a general HTTP error condition, the SET Receiver MAY
respond with an appropriate HTTP Status code as defined in Section 6
[RFC7231].
When the SET Receiver detects an error parsing or validating a
received SET (as defined by [RFC8417]), the SET Receiver SHALL
indicate an HTTP Status 400 error with an error response as described
in Section 2.3.4.
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The following is an example non-normative error response.
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
{
"err":"dup",
"description":"SET already received. Ignored."
}
Figure 3: Example Error Response
2.3.3. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes
Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes are strings that identify a
specific type of error that may occur when parsing or validating a
SET. Every Security Event Token Delivery Error Code MUST have a
unique name registered in the IANA "Security Event Token Delivery
Error Codes" registry established by Section 6.1.
The following table presents the initial set of Error Codes that are
registered in the IANA "Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes"
registry:
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| Error | Description |
| Code | |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| json | Invalid JSON object. |
| jwtParse | Invalid or unparsable JWT or JSON structure. |
| jwtHdr | In invalid JWT header was detected. |
| jwtCrypto | Unable to parse due to unsupported algorithm. |
| jws | Signature was not validated. |
| jwe | Unable to decrypt JWE encoded data. |
| jwtAud | Invalid audience value. |
| jwtIss | Issuer not recognized. |
| setType | An unexpected Event type was received. |
| setParse | Invalid structure was encountered such as an |
| | inability to parse or an incomplete set of Event |
| | claims. |
| setData | SET event claims incomplete or invalid. |
| dup | A duplicate SET was received and has been ignored. |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
Table 1: SET Delivery Error Codes
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2.3.4. Error Responses
An error response SHALL include a JSON object which provides details
about the error. The JSON object includes the JSON attributes:
err
A value which is a keyword that describes the error (see Table 1).
description
A human-readable text that provides additional diagnostic
information.
When included as part of an HTTP Status 400 response, the above JSON
is the HTTP response body (see Figure 3).
3. Authentication and Authorization
The SET delivery method described in this specification is based upon
HTTP and depends on the use of TLS and/or standard HTTP
authentication and authorization schemes as per [RFC7235].
Because SET Delivery describes a simple function, authorization for
the ability to pick-up or deliver SETs can be derived by considering
the identity of the SET issuer, or via other employed authentication
methods. Because SETs are not commands (see ), SET Receivers are
free to ignore SETs that are not of interest.
4. Security Considerations
4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs
In scenarios where HTTP authorization or TLS mutual authentication
are not used or are considered weak, JWS signed SETs SHOULD be used
(see [RFC7515] and Security Considerations [RFC8417]). This enables
the SET Receiver to validate that the SET issuer is authorized to
deliver SETs.
4.2. TLS Support Considerations
SETs contain sensitive information that is considered PII (e.g.
subject claims). Therefore, SET Transmitters and SET Receivers MUST
require the use of a transport-layer security mechanism. Event
delivery endpoints MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and MAY support
additional transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security
requirements. When using TLS, the client MUST perform a TLS/SSL
server certificate check, per [RFC6125]. Implementation security
considerations for TLS can be found in "Recommendations for Secure
Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525].
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4.3. Denial of Service
The SET Receiver may be vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack
where a malicious party makes a high volume of requests containing
invalid SETs, causing the endpoint to expend significant resources on
cryptographic operations that are bound to fail. This may be
mitigated by authenticating SET Transmitters with a mechanism with
low runtime overhead, such as mutual TLS or statically assigned
bearer tokens.
5. Privacy Considerations
If a SET needs to be retained for audit purposes, JWS MAY be used to
provide verification of its authenticity.
When sharing personally identifiable information or information that
is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET
Transmitters and Receivers MUST have the appropriate legal agreements
and user consent or terms of service in place.
The propagation of subject identifiers can be perceived as personally
identifiable information. Where possible, SET Transmitters and
Receivers SHOULD devise approaches that prevent propagation -- for
example, the passing of a hash value that requires the subscriber to
already know the subject.
6. IANA Considerations
6.1. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes
This document defines Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes, for
which IANA is asked to create and maintain a new registry titled
"Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes". Initial values for the
Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes registry are given in
Table 1. Future assignments are to be made through the Expert Review
registration policy ([RFC8126]) and shall follow the template
presented in Section 6.1.1.
6.1.1. Registration Template
Error Code
The name of the Security Event Token Delivery Error Code, as
described in Section 2.3.3. The name MUST be a case-sensitive
ASCII string consisting only of upper-case letters ("A" - "Z"),
lower-case letters ("a" - "z"), and digits ("0" - "9").
Description
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A brief human-readable description of the Security Event Token
Delivery Error Code.
Change Controller
For error codes registered by the IETF or its working groups, list
"IETF Secevent Working Group". For all other error codes, list
the name of the party responsible for the registration. Contact
information such as mailing address, email address, or phone
number may also be provided.
Defining Document(s)
A reference to the document or documents that define the Security
Event Token Delivery Error Code. The definition MUST specify the
name and description of the error code, and explain under what
circumstances the error code may be used. URIs that can be used
to retrieve copies of each document at no cost SHOULD be included.
6.1.2. Initial Registry Contents
o
Error Code
json
Description
Invalid JSON object.
Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document.
o
Error Code
jwtParse
Description
Invalid or unparsable JWT or JSON structure.
Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document.
o
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Error Code
jwtHdr
Description
An invalid JWT header was detected.
Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document.
o
Error Code
jwtCrypto
Description
Unable to parse due to unsupported algorithm.
Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document.
o
Error Code
jws
Description
Signature was not validated.
Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document.
o
Error Code
jwe
Description
Unable to decrypt JWE encoded data.
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Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document.
o
Error Code
jwtAud
Description
Invalid audience value.
Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document.
o
Error Code
jwtIss
Description
Issuer not recognized.
Change Controller
Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document.
o
Error Code
setType
Description
An unexpected Event type was received.
Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document.
o
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Error Code
setParse
Description
Invalid structure was encountered such as an inability to parse
or an incomplete set of Event claims.
Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document.
o
Error Code
setData
Description
SET event claims incomplete or invalid.
Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document.
o
Error Code
dup
Description
A duplicate SET was received and has been ignored.
Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5988] Nottingham, M., "Web Linking", RFC 5988,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5988, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5988>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
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[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8417] Hunt, P., Ed., Jones, M., Denniss, W., and M. Ansari,
"Security Event Token (SET)", RFC 8417,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8417, July 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8417>.
7.2. Informative References
[openid-connect-core]
NRI, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", Nov 2014.
[RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
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[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[RFC7521] Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland,
"Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication
and Authorization Grants", RFC 7521, DOI 10.17487/RFC7521,
May 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7521>.
[RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme",
RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>.
[saml-core-2.0]
Internet2, "Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", March
2005.
Appendix A. Other Streaming Specifications
[[EDITORS NOTE: This section to be removed prior to publication]]
The following pub/sub, queuing, streaming systems were reviewed as
possible solutions or as input to the current draft:
XMPP Events
The WG considered the XMPP events ands its ability to provide a
single messaging solution without the need for both polling and push
modes. The feeling was the size and methodology of XMPP was to far
apart from the current capabilities of the SECEVENTs community which
focuses in on HTTP based service delivery and authorization.
Amazon Simple Notification Service
Simple Notification Service, is a pub/sub messaging product from AWS.
SNS supports a variety of subscriber types: HTTP/HTTPS endpoints, AWS
Lambda functions, email addresses (as JSON or plain text), phone
numbers (via SMS), and AWS SQS standard queues. It doesn't directly
support pull, but subscribers can get the pull model by creating an
SQS queue and subscribing it to the topic. Note that this puts the
cost of pull support back onto the subscriber, just as it is in the
push model. It is not clear that one way is strictly better than the
other; larger, sophisticated developers may be happy to own message
persistence so they can have their own internal delivery guarantees.
The long tail of OIDC clients may not care about that, or may fail to
get it right. Regardless, I think we can learn something from the
Delivery Policies supported by SNS, as well as the delivery controls
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that SQS offers (e.g. Visibility Timeout, Dead-Letter Queues). I'm
not suggesting that we need all of these things in the spec, but they
give an idea of what features people have found useful.
Other information:
o API Reference:
http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSSimpleQueueService/latest/
APIReference/Welcome.html
o Visibility Timeouts:
http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSSimpleQueueService/latest/
SQSDeveloperGuide/sqs-visibility-timeout.html
Apache Kafka
Apache Kafka is an Apache open source project based upon TCP for
distributed streaming. It prescribes some interesting general
purpose features that seem to extend far beyond the simpler streaming
model SECEVENTs is after. A comment from MS has been that Kafka does
an acknowledge with poll combination event which seems to be a
performance advantage. See: https://kafka.apache.org/intro
Google Pub/Sub
Google Pub Sub system favours a model whereby polling and
acknowledgement of events is done as separate endpoints as separate
functions.
Information:
o Cloud Overview - https://cloud.google.com/pubsub/
o Subscriber Overview - https://cloud.google.com/pubsub/docs/
subscriber
o Subscriber Pull(poll) - https://cloud.google.com/pubsub/docs/pull
Appendix B. Acknowledgments
The editors would like to thanks the members of the SCIM WG which
began discussions of provisioning events starting with: draft-hunt-
scim-notify-00 in 2015.
The editors would like to thank Phil Hunt and the other authors of
draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02, on which this draft is based.
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The editor would like to thank the participants in the the SECEVENTS
working group for their support of this specification.
Appendix C. Change Log
Draft 00 - AB - Based on draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02 with the
following changes:
o Renamed to "Push-Based SET Token Delivery Using HTTP"
o Removed references to the HTTP Polling delivery method.
o Removed informative reference to RFC6202.
Draft 01 - AB:
o Fixed area and workgroup to match secevent.
o Removed unused definitions and definitions already covered by SET.
o Renamed Event Transmitter and Event Receiver to SET Transmitter
and SET Receiver, respectively.
o Added IANA registry for SET Delivery Error Codes.
o Removed enumeration of HTTP authentication methods.
o Removed generally applicable guidance for HTTP, authorization
tokens, and bearer tokens.
o Moved guidance for using authentication methods as DoS protection
to Security Considerations.
o Removed redundant instruction to use WWW-Authenticate header.
o Removed further generally applicable guidance for authorization
tokens.
o Removed bearer token from example delivery request, and text
referencing it.
o Broke delivery method description into separate request/response
sections.
o Added missing empty line between headers and body in example
request.
o Removed unapplicable notes about example formatting.
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o Removed text about SET creation and handling.
o Removed duplication in protocol description.
o Added "non-normative example" text to example transmission
request.
o Fixed inconsistencies in use of Error Code term.
Authors' Addresses
Annabelle Backman (editor)
Amazon
Email: richanna@amazon.com
Michael B. Jones (editor)
Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com
URI: http://self-issued.info/
Marius Scurtescu
Google
Email: mscurtescu@google.com
Morteza Ansari
Cisco
Email: morteza.ansari@cisco.com
Anthony Nadalin
Microsoft
Email: tonynad@microsoft.com
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