Secure Inter-Domain Routing                                 M. Lepinski
Working Group                                                   S. Kent
Internet Draft                                         BBN Technologies
Intended status: Informational                            March 9, 2009
Expires: September 9, 2009

           An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing

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   This document describes an architecture for an infrastructure to
   support improved security of Internet routing. The foundation of this
   architecture is a public key infrastructure (PKI) that represents the
   allocation hierarchy of IP address space and Autonomous System
   Numbers; and a distributed repository system for storing and
   disseminating the data objects that comprise the PKI, as well as
   other signed objects necessary for improved routing security. As an
   initial application of this architecture, the document describes how
   a legitimate holder of IP address space can explicitly and verifiably
   authorize one or more ASes to originate routes to that address space.
   Such verifiable authorizations could be used, for example, to more
   securely construct BGP route filters.

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction...................................................3
      1.1. Terminology...............................................4
   2. PKI for Internet Number Resources..............................5
      2.1. Role in the overall architecture..........................5
      2.2. CA Certificates...........................................6
      2.3. End-Entity (EE) Certificates..............................8
      2.4. Trust Anchors.............................................8
      2.5. Representing Early-Registration Transfers (ERX)...........9
   3. Route Origination Authorizations..............................10
      3.1. Role in the overall architecture.........................11
      3.2. Syntax and semantics.....................................11
   4. Repositories..................................................13
      4.1. Role in the overall architecture.........................13
      4.2. Contents and structure...................................14
      4.3. Access protocols.........................................15
      4.4. Access control...........................................16
   5. Manifests.....................................................16
      5.1. Syntax and semantics.....................................16
   6. Local Cache Maintenance.......................................17
   7. Common Operations.............................................18
      7.1. Certificate issuance.....................................18
      7.2. ROA management...........................................19
         7.2.1. Single-homed subscribers (without portable allocations)
         7.2.2. Multi-homed subscribers (without portable allocations)20
         7.2.3. Portable allocations................................21
   8. Security Considerations.......................................21
   9. IANA Considerations...........................................21
   10. Acknowledgments..............................................22
   11. References...................................................23
      11.1. Normative References....................................23
      11.2. Informative References..................................23

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   Authors' Addresses...............................................24
   Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer.....................................24

1. Introduction

   This document describes an architecture for an infrastructure to
   support improved security for BGP routing [2] for the Internet. The
   architecture encompasses three principle elements:

     . a public key infrastructure (PKI)

     . digitally-signed routing objects to support routing security

     . a distributed repository system to hold the PKI objects and the
        signed routing objects

   The architecture described by this document enables an entity to
   verifiably assert that it is the legitimate holder of a set of IP
   addresses or a set of Autonomous System (AS) numbers. As an initial
   application of this architecture, the document describes how a
   legitimate holder of IP address space can explicitly and verifiably
   authorize one or more ASes to originate routes to that address space.
   Such verifiable authorizations could be used, for example, to more
   securely construct BGP route filters. In addition to this initial
   application, the infrastructure defined by this architecture also is
   intended to provide future support for security protocols such as S-
   BGP [11] or soBGP [12]. This architecture is applicable to the
   routing of both IPv4 and IPv6 datagrams. IPv4 and IPv6 are currently
   the only address families supported by this architecture. Thus, for
   example, use of this architecture with MPLS labels is beyond the
   scope of this document.

   In order to facilitate deployment, the architecture takes advantage
   of existing technologies and practices.  The structure of the PKI
   element of the architecture corresponds to the existing resource
   allocation structure. Thus management of this PKI is a natural
   extension of the resource-management functions of the organizations
   that are already responsible for IP address and AS number resource
   allocation. Likewise, existing resource allocation and revocation
   practices have well-defined correspondents in this architecture. Note
   that while the initial focus of this architecture is routing security
   applications, the PKI described in this document could be used to
   support other applications that make use of attestations of IP
   address or AS number resource holdings.

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   To ease implementation, existing IETF standards are used wherever
   possible; for example, extensive use is made of the X.509 certificate
   profile defined by PKIX [3] and the extensions for IP Addresses and
   AS numbers representation defined in RFC 3779 [5]. Also CMS [4] is
   used as the syntax for the newly-defined signed objects required by
   this infrastructure.

   As noted above, the architecture is comprised of three main
   components: an X.509 PKI in which certificates attest to holdings of
   IP address space and AS numbers; non-certificate/CRL signed objects
   (including route origination authorizations and manifests) used by
   the infrastructure; and a distributed repository system that makes
   all of these signed objects available for use by ISPs in making
   routing decisions.  These three basic components enable several
   security functions; this document describes how they can be used to
   improve route filter generation, and to perform several other common
   operations in such a way as to make them cryptographically

1.1. Terminology

   It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
   described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
   and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [3], and "X.509
   Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [5].

   Throughout this document we use the terms "address space holder" or
   "holder of IP address space" interchangeably to refer to a legitimate
   holder of IP address space who has received this address space
   through the standard IP address allocation hierarchy. That is, the
   address space holder has either directly received the address space
   as an allocation from a Regional Internet Registry (RIR) or IANA; or
   else the address space holder has received the address space as a
   sub-allocation from a National Internet Registry (NIR) or Local
   Internet Registry (LIR). We use the term "resource holder" to refer
   to a legitimate holder of either IP address or AS number resources.

   Throughout this document we use the terms "registry" and ISP to refer
   to an entity that has an IP address space and/or AS number allocation
   that it is permitted to sub-allocate. We use the term "subscriber" to
   refer to an entity (e.g., an enterprise) that receives an IP address
   space and/or AS number allocation, but does not sub-allocate its

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [1].

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2. PKI for Internet Number Resources

   Because the holder of a block IP address space is entitled to define
   the topological destination of IP datagrams whose destinations fall
   within that block, decisions about inter-domain routing are
   inherently based on knowledge of the allocation of the IP address
   space. Thus, a basic function of this architecture is to provide
   cryptographically verifiable attestations as to these allocations. In
   current practice, the allocation of IP addresses is hierarchic. The
   root of the hierarchy is IANA. Below IANA are five Regional Internet
   Registries (RIRs), each of which manages address and AS number
   allocation within a defined geopolitical region. In some regions the
   third tier of the hierarchy includes National Internet Registries
   (NIRs) as well as Local Internet Registries (LIRs) and subscribers
   with so-called "portable" (provider-independent) allocations. (The
   term LIR is used in some regions to refer to what other regions
   define as an ISP. Throughout the rest of this document we will use
   the term LIR/ISP to simplify references to these entities.) In other
   regions the third tier consists only of LIRs/ISPs and subscribers
   with portable allocations.

   In general, the holder of a block of IP address space may sub-
   allocate portions of that block, either to itself (e.g., to a
   particular unit of the same organization), or to another
   organization, subject to contractual constraints established by the
   registries.  Because of this structure, IP address allocations can be
   described naturally by a hierarchic public-key infrastructure, in
   which each certificate attests to an allocation of IP addresses, and
   issuance of subordinate certificates corresponds to sub-allocation of
   IP addresses.  The above reasoning holds true for AS number resources
   as well, with the difference that, by convention, AS numbers may not
   be sub-allocated except by RIRs or NIRs. Thus allocations of both IP
   addresses and AS numbers can be expressed by the same PKI.  Such a
   PKI is a central component of this architecture.

2.1. Role in the overall architecture

   Certificates in this PKI are called Resource Certificates, and
   conform to the certificate profile for such certificates [6].
   Resource certificates attest to the allocation by the (certificate)
   issuer of IP addresses or AS numbers to the subject.  They do this by
   binding the public key contained in the Resource Certificate to the
   IP addresses or AS numbers included in the certificate's IP Address
   Delegation or AS Identifier Delegation Extensions, respectively, as
   defined in RFC 3779 [5].

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   An important property of this PKI is that certificates do not attest
   to the identity of the subject. Therefore, the subject names used in
   certificates are not intended to be "descriptive." That is, this PKI
   is intended to provide authorization, but not authentication. This is
   in contrast to most PKIs where the issuer ensures that the
   descriptive subject name in a certificate is properly associated with
   the entity that holds the private key corresponding to the public key
   in the certificate. Because issuers need not verify the right of an
   entity to use a subject name in a certificate, they avoid the costs
   and liabilities of such verification. This makes it easier for these
   entities to take on the additional role of Certificate Authority

   Most of the certificates in the PKI assert the basic facts on which
   the rest of the infrastructure operates.  CA certificates within the
   PKI attest to IP address space and AS number holdings.  End-entity
   (EE) certificates are issued by resource holder CAs to delegate the
   authority attested by their allocation certificates. The primary use
   for EE certificates is the validation of Route Origination
   Authorizations (ROAs). Additionally, signed objects called manifests
   will be used to help ensure the integrity of the repository system,
   and the signature on each manifest will be verified via an EE

2.2. CA Certificates

   Any resource holder who is authorized to sub-allocate these resources
   must be able to issue Resource Certificates to correspond to these
   sub-allocations.  Thus, for example, CA certificates will be
   associated with IANA and each of the RIRs, NIRs, and LIRs/ISPs.  A CA
   certificate also is required to enable a resource holder to issue
   ROAs, because it must issue the corresponding end-entity certificate
   used to validate each ROA. Thus some entities that do not sub-
   allocate their resources also will need to have CA certificates for
   their allocations, e.g., a multi-homed subscriber with a portable
   allocation, to enable them to issue ROAs. (A subscriber who is not
   multi-homed, whose allocation comes from an LIR/ISP, and who has not
   moved to a different LIR/ISP, need not be represented in the PKI.
   Moreover, a multi-homed subscriber with an allocation from an LIR/ISP
   may or may not need to be explicitly represented, as discussed in
   Section 7.2.2)

   Unlike in most PKIs, the distinguished name of the subject in a CA
   certificate is chosen by the certificate issuer. If the subject of a
   certificate is an RIR or IANA, then the distinguished name of the
   subject will be chosen to convey the identity of the registry and
   should consist of (a subset of) the following attributes: country,

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   organization, organizational unit, and common name. For example, an
   appropriate subject name for the APNIC RIR might be:

      . Country: AU

      . Organization: Asia Pacific Network Information Centre

      . Common Name: APNIC Resource Certification Authority

   If the subject of a certificate is not an RIR or IANA, (e.g.,
   the subject is a NIR, or LIR/ISP) the distinguished name must not
   attempt to convey the identity of the subject in a descriptive
   fashion. The subject's distinguished name must be unique among all
   certificates issued by a given authority. It is RECOMMENDED that the
   distinguished name consist of two attributes: common name and serial.
   The common name should be a string that is consistent among all
   certificates issued by a given authority to a given subject (this
   allows an authority to correlate certificates issued to the same
   subject). The serial attribute should be a string that changes each
   time the certificate is re-issued (e.g. key roll-over), which
   facilitates the uniqueness of distinguished names across all
   certificates issued by a given authority.

   In this PKI, the certificate issuer, being an RIR, NIR, or LIR/ISP,
   is not in the business of verifying the legal right of the subject to
   assert a particular identity. Therefore, selecting a distinguished
   name that does not convey the identity of the subject in a
   descriptive fashion minimizes the opportunity for the subject to
   misuse the certificate to assert an identity, and thus minimizes the
   legal liability of the issuer. Since all CA certificates are issued
   to subjects with whom the issuer has an existing relationship, it is
   recommended that the issuer select a subject name that enables the
   issuer to easily link the certificate to existing database records
   associated with the subject. For example, an authority may use
   internal database keys or subscriber IDs as the subject common name
   in issued certificates.

   Each Resource Certificate attests to an allocation of resources to a
   resource holder, so entities that have allocations from multiple
   sources will have multiple CA certificates. A CA also may issue
   distinct certificates for each distinct allocation to the same
   entity, if the CA and the resource holder agree that such an
   arrangement will facilitate management and use of the certificates.
   For example, an LIR/ISP may have several certificates issued to it by
   one registry, each describing a distinct set of address blocks,
   because the LIR/ISP desires to treat the allocations as separate.

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2.3. End-Entity (EE) Certificates

   The private key corresponding to public key contained in an EE
   certificate is not used to sign other certificates in a PKI. The
   primary function of end-entity certificates in this PKI is the
   verification of signed objects that relate to the usage of the
   resources described in the certificate, e.g., ROAs and manifests.
   For ROAs and manifests there will be a one-to-one correspondence
   between end-entity certificates and signed objects, i.e., the private
   key corresponding to each end-entity certificate is used to sign
   exactly one object, and each object is signed with only one key.
   This property allows the PKI to be used to revoke these signed
   objects, rather than creating a new revocation mechanism. When the
   end-entity certificate used to sign an object has been revoked, the
   signature on that object (and any corresponding assertions) will be
   considered invalid, so a signed object can be effectively revoked by
   revoking the end-entity certificate used to sign it.

   A secondary advantage to this one-to-one correspondence is that the
   private key corresponding to the public key in a certificate is used
   exactly once in its lifetime, and thus can be destroyed after it has
   been used to sign its one object.  This fact should simplify key
   management, since there is no requirement to protect these private
   keys for an extended period of time.

   Although this document describes only two uses for end-entity
   certificates, additional uses will likely be defined in the future.
   For example, end-entity certificates could be used as a more general
   authorization for their subjects to act on behalf of the specified
   resource holder.  This could facilitate authentication of inter-ISP
   interactions, or authentication of interactions with the repository
   system.  These additional uses for end-entity certificates may
   require retention of the corresponding private keys, even though this
   is not required for the private keys associated with end-entity
   certificates keys used for verification of ROAs and manifests, as
   described above.

2.4. Trust Anchors

   In any PKI, each relying party (RP) chooses its own set of trust
   anchors. This general property of PKIs applies here as well. There is
   an extant IP address space and AS number allocation hierarchy, and
   thus IANA and/or the five RIRs are obvious candidates to be default
   TAs here. Nonetheless, each RP ultimately chooses the set of trust
   anchors it will use for certificate validation.

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   For example, a RP (e.g., an LIR/ISP) could create a trust anchor to
   which all address space and/or all AS numbers are assigned, and for
   which the RP knows the corresponding private key. The RP could then
   issue certificates under this trust anchor to whatever entities in
   the PKI it wishes, with the result that the certification paths
   terminating at this locally-installed trust anchor will satisfy the
   RFC 3779 validation requirements. A large ISP that uses private
   (i.e., RFC 1918) IP address space and runs BGP internally will need
   to create this sort of trust anchor to accommodate a CA to which all
   private (RFC 1918) address space is assigned. The RP could then issue
   certificates under this CA that correspond to the RP's internal use
   of private address space.

   Note that a RP who elects to create and manage its own set of trust
   anchors may fail to detect allocation errors that arise under such
   circumstances, but the resulting vulnerability is local to the RP.

   It is expected that some parties within the extant IP address space
   and AS number allocation hierarchy may wish to publish trust anchor
   material for possible use by relying parties. A standard profile for
   the publication of trust anchor material for this public key
   infrastructure can be found in [9].

2.5. Representing Early-Registration Transfers (ERX)

   Currently, IANA allocates IPv4 address space to the RIRs at the level
   of /8 prefixes. However, there exist allocations that cross these RIR
   boundaries. For example, A LACNIC customer may have an allocation
   that falls within a /8 prefix administered by ARIN. Therefore, the
   resource PKI must be able to represent such transfers from one RIR to
   another in a manner that permits the validation of certificates with
   RFC 3779 extensions.

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                       |                               |
                       |      LACNIC Administrative    |
                       |             Boundary          |
                       |                               |
        +--------+     |           +--------+          |      +--------+
        |  ARIN  |     |           | LACNIC |          |      |  RIPE  |
        |  ROOT  |     |           |  ROOT  |          |      |  ROOT  |
        +--------+     |           +--------+          |      +--------+
                \      |                               |       /
                 ------------                      ------------
                       |     \                    /    |
                       |   +--------+     +--------+   |
                       |   | LACNIC |     | LACNIC |   |
                       |   |   CA   |     |   CA   |   |
                       |   +--------+     +--------+   |
                       |                               |

                          FIGURE 1: Representing EXR

   To represent such transfers, RIRs will need to manage multiple CA
   certificates, each with distinct public (and corresponding private)
   keys. Each RIR will have a single "root" certificate (e.g., a self-
   signed certificate or a certificate signed by IANA, see Section 2.5),
   plus one additional CA certificate for each RIR from which it
   receives a transfer. Each of these additional CA certificates will be
   issued under the "root" certificate of the RIR from which the
   transfer is received. This means that although the certificate is
   bound to the RIR that receives the transfer, for the purposes of
   certificate path construction and validation, it does not appear
   under that RIR's "root" certificate (see Figure 1).

3. Route Origination Authorizations

   The information on IP address allocation provided by the PKI is not,
   in itself, sufficient to guide routing decisions.  In particular, BGP
   is based on the assumption that the AS that originates routes for a
   particular prefix is authorized to do so by the holder of that prefix
   (or an address block encompassing the prefix); the PKI contains no
   information about these authorizations.  A Route Origination
   Authorization (ROA) makes such authorization explicit, allowing a
   holder of IP address space to create an object that explicitly and
   verifiably asserts that an AS is authorized originate routes to a
   given set of prefixes.

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3.1. Role in the overall architecture

   A ROA is an attestation that the holder of a set of prefixes has
   authorized an autonomous system to originate routes for those
   prefixes.  A ROA is structured according to the format described in
   [7].  The validity of this authorization depends on the signer of the
   ROA being the holder of the prefix(es) in the ROA; this fact is
   asserted by an end-entity certificate from the PKI, whose
   corresponding private key is used to sign the ROA.

   ROAs may be used by relying parties to verify that the AS that
   originates a route for a given IP address prefix is authorized by the
   holder of that prefix to originate such a route. For example, an ISP
   might use validated ROAs as inputs to route filter construction for
   use by its BGP routers. (See [14] for information on the use of ROAs
   to validate the origination of BGP routes.)

   Initially, the repository system will be the primary mechanism for
   disseminating ROAs, since these repositories will hold the
   certificates and CRLs needed to verify ROAs.  In addition, ROAs also
   could be distributed in BGP UPDATE messages or via other
   communication paths, if needed to meet timeliness requirements.

3.2. Syntax and semantics

   A ROA constitutes an explicit authorization for a single AS to
   originate routes to one or more prefixes, and is signed by the holder
   of those prefixes. A detailed specification of the ROA syntax can be
   found in [7] but, at a high level, a ROA consists of (1) an AS
   number; (2) a list of IP address prefixes; and, optionally, (3) for
   each prefix, the maximum length of more specific (longer) prefixes
   that the AS is also authorized to advertise. (This last element
   facilitates a compact authorization to advertise, for example, any
   prefixes of length 20 to 24 contained within a given length 20

   Note that a ROA contains only a single AS number. Thus, if an ISP has
   multiple AS numbers that will be authorized to originate routes to
   the prefix(es) in the ROA, an address space holder will need to issue
   multiple ROAs to authorize the ISP to originate routes from any of
   these ASes.

   A ROA is signed using the private key corresponding to the public key
   in an end-entity certificate in the PKI. In order for a ROA to be
   valid, its corresponding end-entity (EE) certificate must be valid
   and the IP address prefixes of the ROA must exactly match the IP
   address prefix(es) specified in the EE certificate's RFC 3779

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   extension. Therefore, the validity interval of the ROA is implicitly
   the validity interval of its corresponding certificate. A ROA is
   revoked by revoking the corresponding EE certificate. There is no
   independent method of invoking a ROA. One might worry that this
   revocation model could lead to long CRLs for the CA certification
   that is signing the EE certificates. However, routing announcements
   on the public internet are generally quite long lived. Therefore, as
   long as the EE certificates used to verify a ROA are given a validity
   interval of several months, the likelihood that many ROAs would need
   to revoked within that time is quite low.

             ---------                ---------
             |  RIR  |                |  NIR  |
             |  CA   |                |  CA   |
             ---------                ---------
                 |                        |
                 |                        |
                 |                        |
             ---------                ---------
             |  ISP  |                |  ISP  |
             |  CA 1 |                |  CA 2 |
             ---------                ---------
              |     \                      |
              |      -----                 |
              |           \                |
          ----------    ----------      ----------
          |  ISP   |    |  ISP   |      |  ISP   |
          |  EE 1a |    |  EE 1b |      |  EE 2  |
          ----------    ----------      ----------
              |             |               |
              |             |               |
              |             |               |
          ----------    ----------      ----------
          | ROA 1a |    | ROA 1b |      | ROA 2  |
          ----------    ----------      ----------

   FIGURE 2: This figure illustrates an ISP with allocations from two
   sources (and RIR and an NIR). It needs two CA certificates due to RFC
   3779 rules.

   Because each ROA is associated with a single end-entity certificate,
   the set of IP prefixes contained in a ROA must be drawn from an
   allocation by a single source, i.e., a ROA cannot combine allocations
   from multiple sources. Address space holders who have allocations
   from multiple sources, and who wish to authorize an AS to originate
   routes for these allocations, must issue multiple ROAs to the AS.

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4. Repositories

   Initially, an LIR/ISP will make use of the resource PKI by acquiring
   and validating every ROA, to create a table of the prefixes for which
   each AS is authorized to originate routes. To validate all ROAs, an
   LIR/ISP needs to acquire all the certificates and CRLs. The primary
   function of the distributed repository system described here is to
   store these signed objects and to make them available for download by
   LIRs/ISPs. Note that this repository system provides a mechanism by
   which relying parties can pull fresh data at whatever frequency they
   deem appropriate. However, it does not provide a mechanism for
   pushing fresh data to relying parties (e.g. by including resource PKI
   objects in BGP or other protocol messages) and such a mechanism is
   beyond the scope of the current document.

   The digital signatures on all objects in the repository ensure that
   unauthorized modification of valid objects is detectable by relying
   parties. Additionally, the repository system uses manifests (see
   Section 5) to ensure that relying parties can detect the deletion of
   valid objects and the insertion of out of date, valid signed objects.

   The repository system is also a point of enforcement for access
   controls for the signed objects stored in it, e.g., ensuring that
   records related to an allocation of resources can be manipulated only
   by authorized parties. The use of access controls prevents denial of
   service attacks based on deletion of or tampering to repository
   objects. Indeed, although relying parties can detect tampering with
   objects in the repository, it is preferable that the repository
   system prevent such unauthorized modifications to the greatest extent

4.1. Role in the overall architecture

   The repository system is the central clearing-house for all signed
   objects that must be globally accessible to relying parties.  When
   certificates and CRLs are created, they are uploaded to this
   repository, and then downloaded for use by relying parties (primarily
   LIRs/ISPs). ROAs and manifests are additional examples of such
   objects, but other types of signed objects may be added to this
   architecture in the future. This document briefly describes the way
   signed objects (certificates, CRLs, ROAs and manifests) are managed
   in the repository system. As other types of signed objects are added
   to the repository system it will be necessary to modify the
   description, but it is anticipated that most of the design principles
   will still apply. The repository system is described in detail in

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4.2. Contents and structure

   Although there is a single repository system that is accessed by
   relying parties, it is comprised of multiple databases. These
   databases will be distributed among registries (RIRs, NIRs,
   LIRs/ISPs). At a minimum, the database operated by each registry will
   contain all CA and EE certificates, CRLs, and manifests signed by the
   CA(s) associated with that registry. Repositories operated by
   LIRs/ISPs also will contain ROAs. Registries are encouraged to
   maintain copies of repository data from their customers, and their
   customer's customers (etc.), to facilitate retrieval of the whole
   repository contents by relying parties. Ideally, each RIR will hold
   PKI data from all entities within its geopolitical scope.

   For every certificate in the PKI, there will be a corresponding file
   system directory in the repository that is the authoritative
   publication point for all objects (certificates, CRLs, ROAs and
   manifests) verifiable via this certificate. A certificate's Subject
   Information Authority (SIA) extension provides a URI that references
   this directory. Additionally, a certificate's Authority Information
   Authority (AIA) extension contains a URI that references the
   authoritative location for the CA certificate under which the given
   certificate was issued. That is, if certificate A is used to verify
   certificate B, then the AIA extension of certificate B points to
   certificate A, and the SIA extension of certificate A points to a
   directory containing certificate B (see Figure 2).

        +--------->| Cert A |<----+
        |          | CRLDP  |     |        +---------+
        |          |  AIA   |     |    +-->| A's CRL |<-+
        |  +--------- SIA   |     |    |   +---------+  |
        |  |       +--------+     |    |                |
        |  |                      |    |                |
        |  |                  +---+----+                |
        |  |                  |   |                     |
        |  |  +---------------|---|-----------------+   |
        |  |  |               |   |                 |   |
        |  +->|   +--------+  |   |   +--------+    |   |
        |     |   | Cert B |  |   |   | Cert C |    |   |
        |     |   | CRLDP ----+   |   | CRLDP -+--------+
        +----------- AIA   |      +----- AIA   |    |
              |   |  SIA   |          |  SIA   |    |
              |   +--------+          +--------+    |
              |                                     |

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   FIGURE 3: In this example, certificates B and C are issued under
   certificate A. Therefore, the AIA extensions of certificates B and C
   point to A, and the SIA extension of certificate A points to the
   directory containing certificates B and C.

   If a CA certificate is reissued with the same public key, it should
   not be necessary to reissue (with an updated AIA URI) all
   certificates signed by the certificate being reissued. Therefore, a
   certification authority SHOULD use a persistent URI naming scheme for
   issued certificates. That is, reissued certificates should use the
   same publication point as previously issued certificates having the
   same subject and public key, and should overwrite such certificates.

4.3. Access protocols

   Repository operators will choose one or more access protocols that
   relying parties can use to access the repository system.  These
   protocols will be used by numerous participants in the infrastructure
   (e.g., all registries, ISPs, and multi-homed subscribers) to maintain
   their respective portions of it.  In order to support these
   activities, certain basic functionality is required of the suite of
   access protocols, as described below.  No single access protocol need
   implement all of these functions (although this may be the case), but
   each function must be implemented by at least one access protocol.

   Download: Access protocols MUST support the bulk download of
   repository contents and subsequent download of changes to the
   downloaded contents, since this will be the most common way in which
   relying parties interact with the repository system.  Other types of
   download interactions (e.g., download of a single object) MAY also be

   Upload/change/delete: Access protocols MUST also support mechanisms
   for the issuers of certificates, CRLs, and other signed objects to
   add them to the repository, and to remove them.  Mechanisms for
   modifying objects in the repository MAY also be provided.  All access
   protocols that allow modification to the repository (through
   addition, deletion, or modification of its contents) MUST support
   verification of the authorization of the entity performing the
   modification, so that appropriate access controls can be applied (see
   Section 4.4).

   Current efforts to implement a repository system use RSYNC [13] as
   the single access protocol.  RSYNC, as used in this implementation,
   provides all of the above functionality. A document specifying the
   conventions for use of RSYNC in the PKI will be prepared.

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4.4. Access control

   In order to maintain the integrity of information in the repository,
   controls must be put in place to prevent addition, deletion, or
   modification of objects in the repository by unauthorized parties.
   The identities of parties attempting to make such changes can be
   authenticated through the relevant access protocols.  Although
   specific access control policies are subject to the local control of
   repository operators, it is recommended that repositories allow only
   the issuers of signed objects to add, delete, or modify them.
   Alternatively, it may be advantageous in the future to define a
   formal delegation mechanism to allow resource holders to authorize
   other parties to act on their behalf, as suggested in Section 2.3

5. Manifests

   A manifest is a signed object listing of all of the signed objects
   issued by an authority responsible for a publication in the
   repository system. For each certificate, CRL, or ROA issued by the
   authority, the manifest contains both the name of the file containing
   the object, and a hash of the file content.

   As with ROAs, a manifest is signed by a private key, for which the
   corresponding public key appears in an end-entity certificate. This
   EE certificate, in turn, is signed by the CA in question. The EE
   certificate private key may be used to issue one for more manifests.
   If the private key is used to sign only a single manifest, then the
   manifest can be revoked by revoking the EE certificate. In such a
   case, to avoid needless CRL growth, the EE certificate used to
   validate a manifest SHOULD expire at the same time that the manifest
   expires. If an EE certificate is used to issue multiple (sequential)
   manifests for the CA in question, then there is no revocation
   mechanism for these individual manifests.

   Manifests may be used by relying parties when constructing a local
   cache (see Section 6) to mitigate the risk of an attacker who deletes
   files from a repository or replaces current signed objects with stale
   versions of the same object. Such protection is needed because
   although all objects in the repository system are signed, the
   repository system itself is untrusted.

5.1. Syntax and semantics

   A manifest constitutes a list of (the hashes of) all the files in a
   repository point at a particular point in time. A detailed
   specification of manifest syntax is provided in [8] but, at a high

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   level, a manifest consists of (1) a manifest number; (2) the time the
   manifest was issued; (3) the time of the next planned update; and (4)
   a list of filename and hash value pairs.

   The manifest number is a sequence number that is incremented each
   time a manifest is issued by the authority. An authority is required
   to issue a new manifest any time it alters any of its items in the
   repository, or when the specified time of the next update is reached.
   A manifest is thus valid until the specified time of the next update
   or until a manifest is issued with a greater manifest number,
   whichever comes first. (Note that when an EE certificate is used to
   sign only a single manifest, whenever the authority issues the new
   manifest, the CA MUST also issue a new CRL which includes the EE
   certificate corresponding to the old manifest. The revoked EE
   certificate for the old manifest will be removed from the CRL when it
   expires, thus this procedure ought not to result in significant CRLs

6. Local Cache Maintenance

   In order to utilize signed objects issued under this PKI, a relying
   party must first obtain a local copy of the valid EE certificates for
   the PKI. To do so, the relying party performs the following steps:

     1. Query the registry system to obtain a copy of all certificates,
        manifests and CRLs issued under the PKI.

     2. For each CA certificate in the PKI, verify the signature on the
        corresponding manifest. Additionally, verify that the current
        time is earlier than the time indicated in the nextUpdate field
        of the manifest.

     3. For each manifest, verify that certificates and CRLs issued
        under the corresponding CA certificate match the hash values
        contained in the manifest. Additionally, verify that no
        certificate or manifest listed on the manifest is missing from
        the repository. If the hash values do not match, or if any
        certificate or CRL is missing, notify the appropriate repository
        administrator that the repository data has been corrupted.

     4. Validate each EE certificate by constructing and verifying a
        certification path for the certificate (including checking
        relevant CRLs) to the locally configured set of TAs. (See [6]
        for more details.)

   Note that when a relying party performs these operations regularly,
   it is more efficient for the relying party to request from the

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   repository system only those objects that have changed since the
   relying party last updated its local cache. A relying party may
   choose any frequency it desires for downloading and validating
   updates from the repository. However, a typical ISP might reasonably
   choose to perform these operations on a daily schedule.  Note also
   that by checking all issued objects against the appropriate manifest,
   the relying party can be certain that it is not missing an updated
   version of any object.

7. Common Operations

   Creating and maintaining the infrastructure described above will
   entail additional operations as "side effects" of normal resource
   allocation and routing authorization procedures.  For example, a
   subscriber with "portable" address space who enters a relationship
   with an ISP will need to issue one or more ROAs identifying that ISP,
   in addition to conducting any other necessary technical or business
   procedures.  The current primary use of this infrastructure is for
   route filter construction; using ROAs, route filters can be
   constructed in an automated fashion with high assurance that the
   holder of the advertised prefix has authorized the origin AS to
   originate an advertised route.

7.1. Certificate issuance

   There are several operational scenarios that require certificates to
   be issued.  Any allocation that may be sub-allocated requires a CA
   certificate, e.g., so that certificates can be issued as necessary
   for the sub-allocations. Holders of "portable" IP address space
   allocations also must have certificates, so that a ROA can be issued
   to each ISP that is authorized to originate a route to the allocation
   (since the allocation does not come from any ISP). Additionally,
   multi-homed subscribers may require certificates for their
   allocations if they intend to issue the ROAs for their allocations
   (see Section 7.2.2). Other resource holders need not be issued CA
   certificates within the PKI.

   In the long run, a resource holder will not request resource
   certificates, but rather receive a certificate as a side effect of
   the allocation process for the resource. However, initial deployment
   of the RPKI will entail issuance of certificates to existing resource
   holders as an explicit event. Note that in all cases, the authority
   issuing a CA certificate will be the entity who allocates resources
   to the subject. This differs from most PKIs in which a subject can
   request a certificate from any certification authority.

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   If a resource holder receives multiple allocations over time, it may
   accrue a collection of resource certificates to attest to them.  If a
   resource holder receives multiple allocations from the same source,
   the set of resource certificates may be combined into a single
   resource certificate, if both the issuer and the resource holder
   agree. This is accomplished by consolidating the IP Address
   Delegation and AS Identifier Delegation Extensions into a single
   extension (of each type) in a new certificate.  However, if the
   certificates for these allocations contain different validity
   intervals, creating a certificate that combines them might create
   problems, and thus is NOT RECOMMENDED.

   If a resource holder's allocations come from different sources, they
   will be signed by different CAs, and cannot be combined.  When a set
   of resources is no longer allocated to a resource holder, any
   certificates attesting to such an allocation MUST be revoked. A
   resource holder SHOULD NOT use the same public key in multiple CA
   certificates that are issued by the same or differing authorities, as
   reuse of a key pair complicates path construction. Note that since
   the subject's distinguished name is chosen by the issuer, a subject
   who receives allocations from two sources generally will receive
   certificates with different subject names.

7.2. ROA management

   Whenever a holder of IP address space wants to authorize an AS to
   originate routes for a prefix within his holdings, he MUST issue an
   end-entity certificate containing that prefix in an IP Address
   Delegation extension. He then uses the corresponding private key to
   sign a ROA containing the designated prefix and the AS number for the
   AS.  The resource holder MAY include more than one prefix in the EE
   certificate and corresponding ROA if desired. As a prerequisite,
   then, any address space holder that issues ROAs for a prefix must
   have a resource certificate for an allocation containing that prefix.
   The standard procedure for issuing a ROA is as follows:

     1. Create an end-entity certificate containing the prefix(es) to be
        authorized in the ROA.

     2. Construct the payload of the ROA, including the prefixes in the
        end-entity certificate and the AS number to be authorized.

     3. Sign the ROA using the private key corresponding to the end-
        entity certificate (the ROA is comprised of the payload
        encapsulated in a CMS signed message [7]).

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     4. Upload the end-entity certificate and the ROA to the repository

   The standard procedure for revoking a ROA is to revoke the
   corresponding end-entity certificate by creating an appropriate CRL
   and uploading it to the repository system.  The revoked ROA and end-
   entity certificate SHOULD BE removed from the repository system.

7.2.1. Single-homed subscribers (without portable allocations)

   In BGP, a single-homed subscriber with a non-portable allocation does
   not need to explicitly authorize routes to be originated for the
   prefix(es) it is using, since its ISP will already advertise a more
   general prefix and route traffic for the subscriber's prefix as an
   internal function.  Since no routes are originated specifically for
   prefixes held by these subscribers, no ROAs need to be issued under
   their allocations; rather, the subscriber's ISP will issue any
   necessary ROAs for its more general prefixes under resource
   certificates from its own allocation. Thus, a single-homed subscriber
   with a non-portable allocation is not included in the RPKI, i.e., it
   does not receive a CA certificate, nor issue EE certificates or ROAs.

7.2.2. Multi-homed subscribers (without portable allocations)

   Here we consider a subscriber who receives IP address space from a
   primary ISP (i.e., the IP addresses used by the subscriber are a
   subset of ISP A's IP address space allocation) and receives redundant
   upstream connectivity from the primary ISP, as well as one or more
   secondary ISPs. The preferred option for such a multi-homed
   subscribers is for the subscriber to obtain an AS number (from an RIR
   or NIR) and run BGP with each of its upstream providers. In such a
   case, there are two ways for ROA management to be handled. The first
   is that the primary ISP issues a CA certificate to the subscriber,
   and the subscriber issues a ROA to containing the subscriber's AS
   number and the subscriber's IP address prefixes. The second
   possibility is that the primary ISP does not issue a ROA to the
   subscriber, and instead issues a ROA on the subscriber's behalf that
   contains the subscriber's AS number and the subscriber's IP address

   If the subscriber is unable or unwilling to obtain an AS number and
   run BGP, the other option is that the multi-homed subscriber can
   request that the primary ISP create a ROA for each secondary ISP that
   authorizes the secondary ISP to originate routes to the subscriber's
   prefixes. The primary ISP will also create a ROA containing its own
   AS number and the subscriber's prefixes, as it is likely in such a
   case that the primary ISP wishes to advertise precisely the

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   subscriber's prefixes and not an encompassing aggregate. Note that
   this approach results in inconsistent origin AS numbers for the
   subscribers prefixes which are considered undesirable on the public
   Internet; thus this approach is NOT RECOMMENDED.

7.2.3. Portable allocations

   A resource holder is said to have a portable (provider independent)
   allocation if the resource holder received its allocation from a RIR
   or NIR.  Because the prefixes represented in such allocations are not
   taken from an allocation held by an ISP, there is no ISP that holds
   and advertises a more general prefix. A holder of a portable IP
   address space allocation MUST authorize one or more ASes to originate
   routes to these prefixes. Thus the resource holder MUST generate one
   or more EE certificates and associated ROAs to enable the AS(es) to
   originate routes for the prefix(es) in question. This ROA is required
   because none of the ISP's existing ROAs authorize it to originate
   routes to that portable allocation.

8. Security Considerations

   The focus of this document is security; hence security considerations
   permeate this specification.

   The security mechanisms provided by and enabled by this architecture
   depend on the integrity and availability of the infrastructure it
   describes.  The integrity of objects within the infrastructure is
   ensured by appropriate controls on the repository system, as
   described in Section 4.4. Likewise, because the repository system is
   structured as a distributed database, it should be inherently
   resistant to denial of service attacks; nonetheless, appropriate
   precautions should also be taken, both through replication and backup
   of the constituent databases and through the physical security of
   database servers.

9. IANA Considerations

   This document requests that the IANA issue RPKI Certificates for the
   resources for which it is authoritative, i.e., reserved IPv4
   addresses, IPv6 ULAs, and address space not yet allocated by IANA to
   the RIRs. IANA SHOULD make available trust anchor material in the
   format defined in [10] in support of these functions.

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10. Acknowledgments

   The architecture described in this draft is derived from the
   collective ideas and work of a large group of individuals. This work
   would not have been possible without the intellectual contributions
   of George Michaelson, Robert Loomans, Sanjaya and Geoff Huston of
   APNIC, Robert Kisteleki and Henk Uijterwaal of the RIPE NCC, Tim
   Christensen and Cathy Murphy of ARIN, Rob Austein of ISC and Randy
   Bush of IIJ.

   Although we are indebted to everyone who has contributed to this
   architecture, we would like to especially thank Rob Austein for the
   concept of a manifest, Geoff Huston for the concept of managing
   object validity through single-use EE certificate key pairs, and
   Richard Barnes for help in preparing an early version of this

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11. References

11.1. Normative References

   [1]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
         Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [2]   Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway Protocol 4
         (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006

   [3]   Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley,
         R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
         Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC
         5280, May 2008.

   [4]   Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 3852, July

   [5]   Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
         Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.

   [6]   Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and Loomans, R., "A Profile for
         X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-
         16, February 2009.

   [7]   Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and Kong, D., "A Profile for Route
         Origin Authorizations (ROA)", draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-04,
         November 2008.

   [8]   Austein, R., et al., "Manifests for the Resource Public Key
         Infrastructure", draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-manifests-04, October

   [9]   Michaelson, G., Kent, S., and Huston, G., "A Profile for Trust
         Anchor Material for the Resource Certificate PKI", draft-ietf-
         sidr-ta-00, February 2009.

11.2. Informative References

   [10]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and Loomans, R., "A Profile for
         Resource Certificate Repository Structure", draft-ietf-sidr-
         repos-struct-01, October 2008.

   [11]  Kent, S., Lynn, C., and Seo, K., "Secure Border Gateway
         Protocol (Secure-BGP)", IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in
         Communications Vol. 18, No. 4, April 2000.

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   [12]  White, R., "soBGP", May 2005, <ftp://ftp->

   [13]   Tridgell, A., "rsync", April 2006,

   [14]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., "Validation of Route Origination in
         BGP using the Resource Certificate PKI", draft-ietf-sidr-roa-
         validation-01, October 2008.

Authors' Addresses

   Matt Lepinski
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton St.
   Cambridge, MA 02138


   Stephen Kent
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton St.
   Cambridge, MA 02138


Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer

   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November
   10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
   outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
   than English.

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