Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group S. Turner
Internet-Draft sn3rd
Updates: 7935 (if approved) O. Borchert
Intended status: Standards Track NIST
Expires: October 4, 2017 April 2, 2017
BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature Formats
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-18
Abstract
This document specifies the algorithms, algorithm parameters,
asymmetric key formats, asymmetric key size and signature format used
in BGPsec (Border Gateway Protocol Security). This document updates
the Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RFC 7935).
This document also includes example BGPsec Update messages as well as
the private keys used to generate the messages and the certificates
necessary to validate those signatures.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Asymmetric Key Pair Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Public Key Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Private Key Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Signature Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Additional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix A Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.1. Topology and experiment description . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.2. Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.3. BGPsec IPv4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.4. BGPsec IPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction
This document specifies:
o the digital signature algorithm and parameters;
o the hash algorithm and parameters;
o the public and private key formats; and,
o the signature format
used by Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Certification
Authorities (CA), and BGPsec (Border Gateway Protocol Security)
speakers (i.e., routers). CAs use these algorithms when processing
requests for BGPsec Router Certificates [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles]. Examples when BGPsec routers use these algorithms include
requesting BGPsec certificates [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles], signing
BGPsec Update messages [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol], and verifying
BGPsec Update messages [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol].
This document updates [RFC7935] to add support for a) a different
algorithm for BGPsec certificate requests, which are issued only by
BGPsec speakers; b) a different Subject Public Key Info format for
BGPsec certificates, which is needed for the specified BGPsec
signature algorithm; and, c) a different signature format for BGPsec
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signatures, which is needed for the specified BGPsec signature
algorithm. The BGPsec certificate are differentiated from other RPKI
certificates by the use of the BGPsec Extended Key Usage defined in
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]. BGPsec uses a different algorithm as
compared to the rest of the RPKI to minimize the size of the protocol
exchanged between routers [RFC5480].
Appendix A contains example BGPsec Update messages as well as the
private keys used to generate the signatures and the certificates
necessary to validate those signatures.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
2. Algorithms
The algorithms used to compute signatures on CA certificates, BGPsec
Router Certificates, and CRLs are as specified in Section 2 of
[RFC7935]. This section addresses BGPsec algorithms, for example
these algorithms are used by BGPsec routers to request BGPsec
certificates, by RPKI CAs to verify BGPsec certification requests, by
BGPsec routers to generate BGPsec Update messages, and by BGPsec
routers to verify BGPsec Update message:
o The signature algorithm used MUST be the Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with curve P-256 [RFC6090][DSS].
o The hash algorithm used MUST be SHA-256 [SHS].
Hash algorithms are not identified by themselves in certificates or
BGPsec Update messages. They are represented by an OID that combines
the hash algorithm with the digital signature algorithm as follows:
o The ecdsa-with-SHA256 OID [RFC5480] MUST appear in the PKCS #10
signatureAlgorithm field [RFC2986] or in Certificate Request
Message Format (CRMF) POPOSigningKey algorithm field [RFC4211],
which location depends on the certificate request format
generated.
o In BGPsec Update messages, the ECDSA with SHA-256 Algorithm Suite
Identifier value 0x1 (see Section 7) is included in the
Signature-Block List's Algorithm Suite Identifier field.
3. Asymmetric Key Pair Formats
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The key formats used to compute signatures on CA certificates, BGPsec
Router Certificates, and CRLs are as specified in Section 3 of
[RFC7935]. This section addresses key formats found in the BGPsec
router certificate requests and in BGPsec Router Certificates.
The ECDSA private keys used to compute signatures for certificate
requests and BGPsec Update messages MUST come from the P-256 curve
[RFC5480]. The public key pair MUST use the uncompressed form.
3.1. Public Key Format
The Subject's public key is included in subjectPublicKeyInfo
[RFC5280]. It has two sub-fields: algorithm and subjectPublicKey.
The values for the structures and their sub-structures follow:
o algorithm (an AlgorithmIdentifier type): The id-ecPublicKey OID
MUST be used in the algorithm field, as specified in Section
2.1.1 of [RFC5480]. The value for the associated parameters MUST
be secp256r1, as specified in Section 2.1.1.1 of [RFC5480].
o subjectPublicKey: ECPoint MUST be used to encode the
certificate's subjectPublicKey field, as specified in Section 2.2
of [RFC5480].
3.2. Private Key Format
Local Policy determines private key format.
4. Signature Format
The structure for the certificate's and CRL's signature field MUST be
as specified in Section 4 of [RFC7935], which is the same format used
by other RPKI certificates. The structure for the certification
request's and BGPsec Update message's signature field MUST be as
specified in Section 2.2.3 of [RFC3279].
5. Additional Requirements
It is anticipated that BGPsec will require the adoption of updated
key sizes and a different set of signature and hash algorithms over
time, in order to maintain an acceptable level of cryptographic
security. This profile should be updated to specify such future
requirements, when appropriate.
The recommended procedures to implement such a transition of key
sizes and algorithms is specified in [RFC6916].
6. Security Considerations
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The Security Considerations of [RFC3279], [RFC5480], [RFC6090],
[RFC7935], and [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] apply to certificates.
The security considerations of [RFC3279], [RFC6090], [RFC7935],
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] apply to certification requests. The
security considerations of [RFC3279], [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol], and
[RFC6090] apply to BGPsec Update messages. No new security
considerations are introduced as a result of this specification.
7. IANA Considerations
The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) is requested to define
the "BGPsec Algorithm Suite Registry" in the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) group. The one-octet BGPsec Algorithm Suite
Registry identifiers assigned by IANA identifies the digest algorithm
and a signature algorithm used in the BGPsec Signature-Block List's
Algorithm Suite Identifier field.
IANA is kindly requested to also register a single algorithm suite
identifier, for the digest algorithm SHA-256 [SHS] and the signature
algorithm ECDSA on the P-256 curve [RFC6090][DSS].
BGPsec Algorithm Suites Registry
Algorithm Digest Signature Specification
Suite Algorithm Algorithm Pointer
Identifier
+------------+------------+-------------+---------------------+
| 0x0 | Reserved | Reserved | This draft |
+------------+------------+-------------+---------------------+
| 0x1 | SHA-256 | ECDSA P-256 | [SHS][DSS][RFC6090] |
+------------+------------+-------------+---------------------+
| 0x2-0xEF | Unassigned | Unassigned | This draft |
+------------+------------+-------------+---------------------+
| 0xFF | Reserved | Reserved | This draft |
+------------+------------+-------------+---------------------+
Future assignments are to be made using the Standards Action process
defined in [RFC5226]. Assignments consist of the one-octet algorithm
suite identifier value and the associated digest algorithm name and
signature algorithm name.
8. Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Geoff Huston and George Michaelson for
producing [RFC7935], which this document is entirely based on. I'd
also like to thank Roque Gagliano, David Mandelberg, Tom Petch, Sam
Weiller, and Stephen Kent for their reviews and comments. Mehmet
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Adalier, Kotikalapudi Sriram, and Doug Montgomery were instrumental
in developing the test vectors found in Appendix A.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI
10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, DOI
10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000, <http://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc2986>.
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, DOI
10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005, <http://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, DOI
10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008, <http://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.
[RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090, DOI
10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011, <http://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc6090>.
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[RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility
Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916, April
2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6916>.
[RFC7935] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, Ed., "The Profile for
Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure", RFC 7935, DOI 10.17487/RFC7935, August
2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7935>.
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinski, M., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol, work-in-
progress.
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] Reynolds, M. and S. Turner, "A Profile
for BGPSEC Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation
Lists, and Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-
pki-profiles, work-in-progress.
[DSS] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S.
Department of Commerce, "Digital Signature Standard", FIPS
Publication 186-4, July 2013.
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S.
Department of Commerce, "Secure Hash Standard", FIPS
Publication 180-4, August 2015.
9.2. Informative References
None.
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Appendix A Examples
A.1. Topology and experiment description
Topology:
AS(64496)----AS(65536)----AS(65537)
Prefix Announcement: AS(64496), 192.0.2.0/24, 2001:db8::/32
A.2. Keys
For this example, the ECDSA algorithm was provided with a static
k to make the result deterministic.
The k used for all signature operations was taken from RFC 6979,
chapter A.2.5 "Signatures With SHA-256, message 'sample'".
k = A6E3C57DD01ABE90086538398355DD4C
3B17AA873382B0F24D6129493D8AAD60
Keys of AS64496:
================
ski: AB4D910F55CAE71A215EF3CAFE3ACC45B5EEC154
private key:
x = D8AA4DFBE2478F86E88A7451BF075565
709C575AC1C136D081C540254CA440B9
public key:
Ux = 7391BABB92A0CB3BE10E59B19EBFFB21
4E04A91E0CBA1B139A7D38D90F77E55A
Uy = A05B8E695678E0FA16904B55D9D4F5C0
DFC58895EE50BC4F75D205A25BD36FF5
Router Key Certificate example using OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips 11 Feb 2013
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 38655612 (0x24dd67c)
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: CN=ROUTER-0000FBF0
Validity
Not Before: Jan 1 05:00:00 2017 GMT
Not After : Jul 1 05:00:00 2018 GMT
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Subject: CN=ROUTER-0000FBF0
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:73:91:ba:bb:92:a0:cb:3b:e1:0e:59:b1:9e:bf:
fb:21:4e:04:a9:1e:0c:ba:1b:13:9a:7d:38:d9:0f:
77:e5:5a:a0:5b:8e:69:56:78:e0:fa:16:90:4b:55:
d9:d4:f5:c0:df:c5:88:95:ee:50:bc:4f:75:d2:05:
a2:5b:d3:6f:f5
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Key Usage:
Digital Signature
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
AB:4D:91:0F:55:CA:E7:1A:21:5E:
F3:CA:FE:3A:CC:45:B5:EE:C1:54
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.30
sbgp-autonomousSysNum: critical
Autonomous System Numbers:
64496
Routing Domain Identifiers:
inherit
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:44:02:20:07:b7:b4:6a:5f:a4:f1:cc:68:36:39:03:a4:83:
ec:7c:80:02:d2:f6:08:9d:46:b2:ec:2a:7b:e6:92:b3:6f:b1:
02:20:00:91:05:4a:a1:f5:b0:18:9d:27:24:e8:b4:22:fd:d1:
1c:f0:3d:b1:38:24:5d:64:29:35:28:8d:ee:0c:38:29
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Keys of AS(65636):
==================
ski: 47F23BF1AB2F8A9D26864EBBD8DF2711C74406EC
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private key:
x = 6CB2E931B112F24554BCDCAAFD9553A9
519A9AF33C023B60846A21FC95583172
public key:
Ux = 28FC5FE9AFCF5F4CAB3F5F85CB212FC1
E9D0E0DBEAEE425BD2F0D3175AA0E989
Uy = EA9B603E38F35FB329DF495641F2BA04
0F1C3AC6138307F257CBA6B8B588F41F
Router Key Certificate example using OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips 11 Feb 2013
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 3168189942 (0xbcd6bdf6)
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: CN=ROUTER-0000FFFF
Validity
Not Before: Jan 1 05:00:00 2017 GMT
Not After : Jul 1 05:00:00 2018 GMT
Subject: CN=ROUTER-0000FFFF
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:28:fc:5f:e9:af:cf:5f:4c:ab:3f:5f:85:cb:21:
2f:c1:e9:d0:e0:db:ea:ee:42:5b:d2:f0:d3:17:5a:
a0:e9:89:ea:9b:60:3e:38:f3:5f:b3:29:df:49:56:
41:f2:ba:04:0f:1c:3a:c6:13:83:07:f2:57:cb:a6:
b8:b5:88:f4:1f
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Key Usage:
Digital Signature
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
47:F2:3B:F1:AB:2F:8A:9D:26:86:
4E:BB:D8:DF:27:11:C7:44:06:EC
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.30
sbgp-autonomousSysNum: critical
Autonomous System Numbers:
65535
Routing Domain Identifiers:
inherit
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
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30:45:02:21:00:df:04:c5:17:04:d0:f2:b9:fa:f3:d9:6e:3f:
6f:a1:58:d8:fe:6c:18:e4:37:ca:19:7c:c8:75:40:57:6e:7e:
9d:02:20:12:45:e8:a8:58:6b:00:7b:e6:a9:0e:f2:b6:62:50:
4b:1c:01:6f:3b:41:11:69:88:30:73:9f:d7:02:9e:64:4f
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
A.3. BGPsec IPv4
BGPSec IPv4 Update from AS(65536) to AS(65537):
===============================================
Binary Form of BGPSec Update (TCP-DUMP):
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
01 03 02 00 00 00 EC 40 01 01 02 80 04 04 00 00
00 00 80 0E 0D 00 01 01 04 C6 33 64 64 00 18 C0
00 02 90 1E 00 CD 00 0E 01 00 00 01 00 00 01 00
00 00 FB F0 00 BF 01 47 F2 3B F1 AB 2F 8A 9D 26
86 4E BB D8 DF 27 11 C7 44 06 EC 00 48 30 46 02
21 00 EF D4 8B 2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD 9C D4 5E
81 D6 9D 2C 87 7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E A8 4E AF
37 16 02 21 00 90 F2 C1 29 AB B2 F3 9B 6A 07 96
3B D5 55 A8 7A B2 B7 33 3B 7B 91 F1 66 8F D8 61
8C 83 FA C3 F1 AB 4D 91 0F 55 CA E7 1A 21 5E F3
CA FE 3A CC 45 B5 EE C1 54 00 48 30 46 02 21 00
EF D4 8B 2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD 9C D4 5E 81 D6
9D 2C 87 7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E A8 4E AF 37 16
02 21 00 8E 21 F6 0E 44 C6 06 6C 8B 8A 95 A3 C0
9D 3A D4 37 95 85 A2 D7 28 EE AD 07 A1 7E D7 AA
05 5E CA
Signature From AS(64496) to AS(65536):
--------------------------------------
Digest: 21 33 E5 CA A0 26 BE 07 3D 9C 1B 4E FE B9 B9 77
9F 20 F8 F5 DE 29 FA 98 40 00 9F 60 47 D0 81 54
Signature: 30 46 02 21 00 EF D4 8B 2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD
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9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D 2C 87 7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E
A8 4E AF 37 16 02 21 00 8E 21 F6 0E 44 C6 06 6C
8B 8A 95 A3 C0 9D 3A D4 37 95 85 A2 D7 28 EE AD
07 A1 7E D7 AA 05 5E CA
Signature From AS(65536) to AS(65537):
--------------------------------------
Digest: 01 4F 24 DA E2 A5 21 90 B0 80 5C 60 5D B0 63 54
22 3E 93 BA 41 1D 3D 82 A3 EC 26 36 52 0C 5F 84
Signature: 30 46 02 21 00 EF D4 8B 2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD
9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D 2C 87 7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E
A8 4E AF 37 16 02 21 00 90 F2 C1 29 AB B2 F3 9B
6A 07 96 3B D5 55 A8 7A B2 B7 33 3B 7B 91 F1 66
8F D8 61 8C 83 FA C3 F1
The human readable output is produced using bgpsec-io, a bgpsec
traffic generator that uses a wireshark like printout.
Send Update Message
+--marker: FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
+--length: 259
+--type: 2 (UPDATE)
+--withdrawn_routes_length: 0
+--total_path_attr_length: 236
+--ORIGIN: INCOMPLETE (4 bytes)
| +--Flags: 0x40 (Well-Known, Transitive, Complete)
| +--Type Code: ORIGIN (1)
| +--Length: 1 byte
| +--Origin: INCOMPLETE (1)
+--MULTI_EXIT_DISC (7 bytes)
| +--Flags: 0x80 (Optional, Complete)
| +--Type Code: MULTI_EXIT_DISC (4)
| +--Length: 4 bytes
| +--data: 00 00 00 00
+--MP_REACH_NLRI (16 bytes)
| +--Flags: 0x80 (Optional, Complete)
| +--Type Code: MP_REACH_NLRI (14)
| +--Length: 13 bytes
| +--Address family: IPv4 (1)
| +--Subsequent address family identifier: Unicast (1)
| +--Next hop network address: (4 bytes)
| | +--Next hop: 198.51.100.100
| +--Subnetwork points of attachment: 0
| +--Network layer reachability information: (4 bytes)
| +--192.0.2.0/24
| +--MP Reach NLRI prefix length: 24
| +--MP Reach NLRI IPv4 prefix: 192.0.2.0
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+--BGPSEC Path Attribute (209 bytes)
+--Flags: 0x90 (Optional, Complete, Extended Length)
+--Type Code: BGPSEC Path Attribute (30)
+--Length: 205 bytes
+--Secure Path (14 bytes)
| +--Length: 14 bytes
| +--Secure Path Segment: (6 bytes)
| | +--pCount: 1
| | +--Flags: 0
| | +--AS number: 65536 (1.0)
| +--Secure Path Segment: (6 bytes)
| +--pCount: 1
| +--Flags: 0
| +--AS number: 64496 (0.64496)
+--Signature Block (191 bytes)
+--Length: 191 bytes
+--Algo ID: 1
+--Signature Segment: (94 bytes)
| +--SKI: 47F23BF1AB2F8A9D26864EBBD8DF2711C74406EC
| +--Length: 72 bytes
| +--Signature: 3046022100EFD48B 2AACB6A8FD1140DD
| 9CD45E81D69D2C87 7B56AAF991C34D0E
| A84EAF3716022100 90F2C129ABB2F39B
| 6A07963BD555A87A B2B7333B7B91F166
| 8FD8618C83FAC3F1
+--Signature Segment: (94 bytes)
+--SKI: AB4D910F55CAE71A215EF3CAFE3ACC45B5EEC154
+--Length: 72 bytes
+--Signature: 3046022100EFD48B 2AACB6A8FD1140DD
9CD45E81D69D2C87 7B56AAF991C34D0E
A84EAF3716022100 8E21F60E44C6066C
8B8A95A3C09D3AD4 379585A2D728EEAD
07A17ED7AA055ECA
A.4. BGPsec IPv6
BGPSec IPv6 Update from AS(65536) to AS(65537):
===============================================
Binary Form of BGP/BGPsec Update (TCP-DUMP):
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
01 10 02 00 00 00 F9 40 01 01 02 80 04 04 00 00
00 00 80 0E 1A 00 02 01 10 20 01 00 10 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 C6 33 64 64 00 20 20 01 0D B8 90
1E 00 CD 00 0E 01 00 00 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 FB
F0 00 BF 01 47 F2 3B F1 AB 2F 8A 9D 26 86 4E BB
D8 DF 27 11 C7 44 06 EC 00 48 30 46 02 21 00 EF
D4 8B 2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD 9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D
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2C 87 7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E A8 4E AF 37 16 02
21 00 D1 B9 4F 62 51 04 6D 21 36 A1 05 B0 F4 72
7C C5 BC D6 74 D9 7D 28 E6 1B 8F 43 BD DE 91 C3
06 26 AB 4D 91 0F 55 CA E7 1A 21 5E F3 CA FE 3A
CC 45 B5 EE C1 54 00 48 30 46 02 21 00 EF D4 8B
2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD 9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D 2C 87
7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E A8 4E AF 37 16 02 21 00
E2 A0 2C 68 FE 53 CB 96 93 4C 78 1F 5A 14 A2 97
19 79 20 0C 91 56 ED F8 55 05 8E 80 53 F4 AC D3
Signature From AS(64496) to AS(65536):
--------------------------------------
Digest: 8A 0C D3 E9 8E 55 10 45 82 1D 80 46 01 D6 55 FC
52 11 89 DF 4D B0 28 7D 84 AC FC 77 55 6D 06 C7
Signature: 30 46 02 21 00 EF D4 8B 2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD
9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D 2C 87 7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E
A8 4E AF 37 16 02 21 00 E2 A0 2C 68 FE 53 CB 96
93 4C 78 1F 5A 14 A2 97 19 79 20 0C 91 56 ED F8
55 05 8E 80 53 F4 AC D3
Signature From AS(65536) to AS(65537):
--------------------------------------
Digest: 44 49 EC 70 8D EC 5C 85 00 C2 17 8C 72 FE 4C 79
FF A9 3C 95 31 61 01 2D EE 7E EE 05 46 AF 5F D0
Signature: 30 46 02 21 00 EF D4 8B 2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD
9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D 2C 87 7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E
A8 4E AF 37 16 02 21 00 D1 B9 4F 62 51 04 6D 21
36 A1 05 B0 F4 72 7C C5 BC D6 74 D9 7D 28 E6 1B
8F 43 BD DE 91 C3 06 26
The human readable output is produced using bgpsec-io, a bgpsec
traffic generator that uses a wireshark like printout.
Send Update Message
+--marker: FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
+--length: 272
+--type: 2 (UPDATE)
+--withdrawn_routes_length: 0
+--total_path_attr_length: 249
+--ORIGIN: INCOMPLETE (4 bytes)
| +--Flags: 0x40 (Well-Known, Transitive, Complete)
| +--Type Code: ORIGIN (1)
| +--Length: 1 byte
| +--Origin: INCOMPLETE (1)
+--MULTI_EXIT_DISC (7 bytes)
| +--Flags: 0x80 (Optional, Complete)
| +--Type Code: MULTI_EXIT_DISC (4)
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| +--Length: 4 bytes
| +--data: 00 00 00 00
+--MP_REACH_NLRI (29 bytes)
| +--Flags: 0x80 (Optional, Complete)
| +--Type Code: MP_REACH_NLRI (14)
| +--Length: 26 bytes
| +--Address family: IPv6 (2)
| +--Subsequent address family identifier: Unicast (1)
| +--Next hop network address: (16 bytes)
| | +--Next hop: 2001:0010:0000:0000:0000:0000:c633:6464
| +--Subnetwork points of attachment: 0
| +--Network layer reachability information: (5 bytes)
| +--2001:db8::/32
| +--MP Reach NLRI prefix length: 32
| +--MP Reach NLRI IPv6 prefix: 2001:db8::
+--BGPSEC Path Attribute (209 bytes)
+--Flags: 0x90 (Optional, Complete, Extended Length)
+--Type Code: BGPSEC Path Attribute (30)
+--Length: 205 bytes
+--Secure Path (14 bytes)
| +--Length: 14 bytes
| +--Secure Path Segment: (6 bytes)
| | +--pCount: 1
| | +--Flags: 0
| | +--AS number: 65536 (1.0)
| +--Secure Path Segment: (6 bytes)
| +--pCount: 1
| +--Flags: 0
| +--AS number: 64496 (0.64496)
+--Signature Block (191 bytes)
+--Length: 191 bytes
+--Algo ID: 1
+--Signature Segment: (94 bytes)
| +--SKI: 47F23BF1AB2F8A9D26864EBBD8DF2711C74406EC
| +--Length: 72 bytes
| +--Signature: 3046022100EFD48B 2AACB6A8FD1140DD
| 9CD45E81D69D2C87 7B56AAF991C34D0E
| A84EAF3716022100 D1B94F6251046D21
| 36A105B0F4727CC5 BCD674D97D28E61B
| 8F43BDDE91C30626
+--Signature Segment: (94 bytes)
+--SKI: AB4D910F55CAE71A215EF3CAFE3ACC45B5EEC154
+--Length: 72 bytes
+--Signature: 3046022100EFD48B 2AACB6A8FD1140DD
9CD45E81D69D2C87 7B56AAF991C34D0E
A84EAF3716022100 E2A02C68FE53CB96
934C781F5A14A297 1979200C9156EDF8
55058E8053F4ACD3
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Authors' Addresses
Sean Turner
sn3rd
EMail: sean@sn3rd.com
Oliver Borchert
NIST
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg MD 20899
USA
Email: oliver.borchert@nist.gov
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