Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr) Seo, K.
Internet Draft Watro, R.
Expires: May 2009 Kong, D.
Intended Status: Informational Kent, S.
BBN Technologies
November 2008
Certificate Policy (CP)
for the Resource PKI (RPKI)
draft-ietf-sidr-cp-04.txt
Status of this Memo
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Abstract
This document describes the certificate policy for a PKI used to
support improved routing security. Each organization that allocates
IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers to an organization
will, in parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this allocation.
These certificates will enable verification that the holder of the
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associated private key has been allocated the resources indicated in
the certificate, and is the current, unique holder of these
resources. The PKI in which the certificates issued under this
policy are employed, in conjunction with ancillary digitally signed
data structures, will provide critical inputs for routing security
mechanisms, e.g., generation of route filters by ISPs.
Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].
Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................9
1.1. Overview.................................................10
1.2. Document name and identification.........................11
1.3. PKI participants.........................................11
1.3.1. Certification authorities...........................12
1.3.2. Registration authorities............................12
1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................12
1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................13
1.3.5. Other participants..................................13
1.4. Certificate usage........................................13
1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................13
1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................14
1.5. Policy administration....................................14
1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............14
1.5.2. Contact person......................................15
1.5.3. Person determining CP suitability for the policy....15
1.5.4. CP approval procedures..............................15
1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................16
2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................17
2.1. Repositories.............................................17
2.2. Publication of certification information.................17
2.3. Time or frequency of publication.........................17
2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................17
3. Identification And Authentication.............................19
3.1. Naming...................................................19
3.1.1. Types of names......................................19
3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................19
3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............19
3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........19
3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................19
3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.20
3.2. Initial identity validation..............................20
3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........20
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3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............20
3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............20
3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................21
3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................21
3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................21
3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....21
3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key21
3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after
revocation.................................................21
3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.22
4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............23
4.1. Certificate Application..................................23
4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............23
4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............23
4.2. Certificate application processing.......................23
4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions
...........................................................23
4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...24
4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............24
4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................24
4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............24
4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
certificate................................................24
4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities [OMITTED].........................................24
4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................24
4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........24
4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............25
4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................25
4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........25
4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......25
4.6. Certificate renewal......................................25
4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................25
4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................26
4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............26
4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
...........................................................26
4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal
certificate................................................26
4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....26
4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities [OMITTED].........................................26
4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................26
4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................26
4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...27
4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........27
4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
...........................................................27
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4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed
certificate................................................27
4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...27
4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities [OMITTED].........................................27
4.8. Certificate modification.................................27
4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........27
4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............28
4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........28
4.8.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
...........................................................28
4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
...........................................................28
4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...28
4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities [OMITTED].........................................28
4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................28
4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................28
4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................29
4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................29
4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................29
4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation
request....................................................29
4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.29
4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................29
4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................29
4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability
[OMITTED]..................................................30
4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED].30
4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available
[OMITTED]..................................................30
4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...30
4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............30
4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............30
4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........30
4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............30
4.10. Certificate status services.............................30
4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]..............30
4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED].....................30
4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]........................30
4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]...........................30
4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED].......................30
4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
...........................................................30
4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and
practices [OMITTED]........................................30
5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls................31
5.1. Physical controls........................................31
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5.1.1. Site location and construction [OMITTED]............31
5.1.2. Physical access [OMITTED]...........................31
5.1.3. Power and air conditioning [OMITTED]................31
5.1.4. Water exposures [OMITTED]...........................31
5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection [OMITTED]............31
5.1.6. Media storage [OMITTED].............................31
5.1.7. Waste disposal [OMITTED]............................31
5.1.8. Off-site backup [OMITTED]...........................31
5.2. Procedural controls......................................31
5.2.1. Trusted roles [OMITTED].............................31
5.2.2. Number of persons required per task [OMITTED].......31
5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role
[OMITTED]..................................................31
5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties [OMITTED]......31
5.3. Personnel controls.......................................31
5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
[OMITTED]..................................................32
5.3.2. Background check procedures [OMITTED]...............32
5.3.3. Training requirements [OMITTED].....................32
5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements [OMITTED].....32
5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence [OMITTED].......32
5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions [OMITTED]........32
5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements [OMITTED].......32
5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel [OMITTED].......32
5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................32
5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................32
5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................32
5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................32
5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................33
5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................33
5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external)
[OMITTED]..................................................33
5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....33
5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................33
5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................33
5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED].................33
5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]..............33
5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED].....................33
5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED].................33
5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED].33
5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external)
[OMITTED]..................................................33
5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information
[OMITTED]..................................................33
5.6. Key changeover...........................................33
5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............34
5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]34
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5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are
corrupted [OMITTED]........................................34
5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]..34
5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster
[OMITTED]..................................................34
5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................34
6. Technical Security Controls...................................35
6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................35
6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................35
6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................35
6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........35
6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........35
6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................36
6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking36
6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)36
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls......................................................36
6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........36
6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......36
6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................37
6.2.4. Private key backup..................................37
6.2.5. Private key archival [OMITTED]......................37
6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic
module [OMITTED]...........................................37
6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module [OMITTED]37
6.2.8. Method of activating private key [OMITTED]..........37
6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key [OMITTED]........37
6.2.10. Method of destroying private key [OMITTED].........37
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating [OMITTED]..............37
6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................37
6.3.1. Public key archival.................................37
6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
periods....................................................37
6.4. Activation data [OMITTED]................................38
6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation [OMITTED]38
6.4.2. Activation data protection [OMITTED]................38
6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data [OMITTED]..........38
6.5. Computer security controls...............................38
6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirements
[OMITTED]..................................................38
6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]..................38
6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................38
6.6.1. System development controls.........................38
6.6.2. Security management controls........................38
6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................38
6.7. Network security controls................................38
6.8. Time-stamping............................................39
7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................40
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7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]............................40
7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................40
7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]....................40
7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]..............40
7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]................................40
7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]..........................40
7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]......40
7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED].....40
7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]....40
7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate
Policies extension [OMITTED]...............................40
7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]....................................40
7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................40
7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]..............40
7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]...................................40
7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................40
7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]...........................40
8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments........................41
8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment [OMITTED].......41
8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor [OMITTED]............41
8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity [OMITTED].....41
8.4. Topics covered by assessment [OMITTED]...................41
8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency [OMITTED]........41
8.6 Communication of results [OMITTED].......................41
9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................42
9.1. Fees [OMITTED]...........................................42
9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees [OMITTED]......42
9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable) [OMITTED]...42
9.1.3. Refund policy [OMITTED].............................42
9.1.4. Fees for other services [OMITTED]...................42
9.1.5. Refund policy [OMITTED].............................42
9.2. Financial responsibility [OMITTED].......................42
9.2.1. Insurance coverage [OMITTED].......................42
9.2.2. Other assets [OMITTED]..............................42
9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities
[OMITTED]..................................................42
9.3. Confidentiality of business information [OMITTED]........42
9.3.1. Scope of confidential information [OMITTED].........42
9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
information [OMITTED]......................................42
9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information
[OMITTED]..................................................42
9.4. Privacy of personal information [OMITTED]................42
9.4.1. Privacy plan [OMITTED]..............................43
9.4.2. Information treated as private [OMITTED]............43
9.4.3. Information not deemed private [OMITTED]............43
9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information [OMITTED]
...........................................................43
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9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information [OMITTED]
...........................................................43
9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative
process [OMITTED]..........................................43
9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances [OMITTED]43
9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable) [OMITTED]...43
9.6. Representations and warranties [OMITTED].................43
9.6.1. CA representations and warranties [OMITTED].........43
9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties [OMITTED].43
9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties [OMITTED]
...........................................................43
9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants
[OMITTED]..................................................43
9.7. Disclaimers of warranties [OMITTED]......................43
9.8. Limitations of liability [OMITTED].......................43
9.9. Indemnities [OMITTED]....................................43
9.10. Term and termination [OMITTED]..........................43
9.10.1. Term [OMITTED].....................................43
9.10.2. Termination [OMITTED]..............................43
9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival [OMITTED].......43
9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants
[OMITTED].....................................................43
9.12. Amendments..............................................43
9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................43
9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................44
The NRO will provide one month's notice of a change to this
CP.........................................................44
9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed
[OMITTED]..................................................44
If the Secretary judges that the change(s) will not materially
reduce the acceptability of certificates for RPKI purposes,
then there will be no change to the CP OID. If the Secretary
judges that the change(s) will materially change the
acceptability of certificates for RPKI purposes, then there
will be a new CP OID.......................................44
9.13. Dispute resolution provisions [OMITTED].................44
9.14. Governing law [OMITTED].................................44
9.15. Compliance with applicable law [OMITTED]................44
9.16. Miscellaneous provisions [OMITTED]......................44
9.16.1. Entire agreement [OMITTED].........................44
9.16.2. Assignment [OMITTED]...............................44
9.16.3. Severability [OMITTED].............................44
9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)
[OMITTED]..................................................44
9.16.5. Force Majeure [OMITTED]............................44
9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................44
10. Security Considerations......................................45
11. IANA Considerations..........................................45
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12. Acknowledgments..............................................45
13. References...................................................45
13.1. Normative References....................................45
13.2. Informative References..................................46
Author's Addresses...............................................47
Intellectual Property Statement..................................48
Disclaimer of Validity...........................................48
Copyright Statement..............................................48
1. Introduction
This document describes the certificate policy for a PKI used to
support improved routing security. An organization that allocates IP
addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers to an organization will,
in parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this allocation. These
certificates will enable verification that the holder of the
associated private key has been allocated the resources indicated in
the certificate, and is the current, unique holder of these
resources. The PKI in which the certificates issued under this
policy are employed can be used in a number of ways, for example, in
conjunction with ancillary digitally signed data structures, it can
be used to provide critical inputs for routing security mechanisms,
e.g., generation of route filters by ISPs. This security
infrastructure is described in more detail in [ARCH].
The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which
this policy was created is that it does not purport to identify an
address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name
contained in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each
certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity
to assert, in a verifiable fashion, that it is the current holder of
an address block or an AS number, based on the current records of
the entity responsible for the resources in question. Verification
of the assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity
to digitally sign data that is verifiable using the public key
contained in the corresponding certificate, and validation of that
certificate in the context of this PKI. This PKI is designed
exclusively for use in support of validation of claims related to
address space and AS number holdings, with emphasis on support of
routing security mechanisms. Use of the certificates and CRLs
managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of this
CP, and relying parties should reject such uses.
Note: This document is based on the template specified in the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standards document RFC 3647.
A number of sections contained in the template were omitted from
this policy because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we
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have retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted
sections, in order to facilitate comparison with the section
numbering scheme employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section
headings are included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents
the relevant sections are also marked [OMITTED].
1.1. Overview
This PKI is designed to support validation of claims by current
holders of IP (v4 and v6) address space, and AS numbers, in
accordance with the (current) records of the registries and ISPs
that act as CAs in this PKI. The ability to verify such claims is
essential to ensuring the unique, unambiguous allocation of these
resources, and this, in turn, is an essential underpinning of
routing in the public Internet.
Internet routing is based on a distributed system of many routers,
which are grouped into management domains called Autonomous Systems
(ASes). Routing information is exchanged between ASes using Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP) [BGP4] UPDATE messages. BGP has proven to be
highly vulnerable to a variety of attacks [Murphy], due to the lack
of a scalable means of verifying the authenticity and legitimacy of
BGP control traffic, e.g., route originations. This PKI, and
ancillary, signed data, will support detection of bogus route
originations and facilitate routing security enhancements by network
operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers (ISPs), e.g., creation
of accurate route filters. (Bogus route origination occurs whenever
an AS advertises itself as the origin AS for a prefix, without being
authorized to do so by the legitimate holder of the prefix or where
there is no legitimate holder of the prefix.)
The proposed security infrastructure consists of three components: a
PKI, repositories, and digitally signed objects (e.g., route
origination authorizations (ROAs)). The PKI authoritatively
documents the current allocation of address blocks and AS numbers to
organizations, as recorded by the organizations that manage such
allocations. (For brevity, this document uses the term
"organization" to refer to every resource holder, even if the holder
is an individual.) A ROA is a digitally signed object by which an
address space holder explicitly authorizes one or more ASes to
originate routes to its address space. Repositories provide the
means of publishing the PKI data (certificates and CRLs) and signed
object data in a manner that makes it available to relying parties.
The intent is for each network operator to upload its new or updated
PKI and signed objectROA data periodically to its publication
repository, e.g., daily. On a similar schedule, each network
operator also is expected to download new or updated data that has
been published by others. From this locally cached data, operators
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extract authenticated address block origination data, which can be
used to validate routing requests or to construct route filters or
to support similar measures that can make use of validated IP
address and AS number data in a routing context.
This PKI parallels the existing IP address and AS number allocation
hierarchy. These resources are allocated by the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA) to the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs -
- AFRINIC (Africa), APNIC (Asia-Pacific), ARIN (North America),
LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and RIPE NCC (Europe) and by
the RIRs to other organizations. Together IANA and the RIRs act as
default trust anchors for the PKI. In some regions, National
Internet Registries (NIRs) form a tier of the hierarchy below the
RIRs for address allocation. ISPs and network subscribers form
additional tiers below registries. (ISPs who acquire allocations
from RIRs or NIRs, and who sub-allocate address space are referred
to as Local Internet Registries (LIRs)).
This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see IETF
document draft-ietf-sidr-arch-xx [ARCH] for more details):
. CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks
and/or AS numbers, and for each address space (AS number) holder
. End entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use in verifying
ROAs and other (non-certificate/CRL) signed objects
. In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in
support of access control for the repository system
1.2. Document name and identification
The name of this document is "Certificate Policy (CP) for the
Resource PKI (RPKI)".
This policy has been assigned the following OID:
id-cp-ipAddr-asNumber
OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
cp(14) 2 }
1.3. PKI participants
Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or
organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The
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term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
service from an ISP. Thus, in this PKI, the term "subscriber" can
refer both to ISPs, which can be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs, and
LIRs, and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but which are
subscribers of ISPs in the networking sense of the term. Also note
that, for brevity, this document always refers to subscribers as
organizations, even though some subscribers are individuals. When
necessary, the phrase "network subscriber" is used to refer to an
organization that receives network services from an ISP.
1.3.1. Certification authorities
The organizations that allocate IP addresses (IANA, RIRs, NIRs,
LIRs/ISPs) and AS numbers (IANA, RIRs and NIRs) act as CAs in this
PKI.
Organizations that hold address space and create and sign objects
such as ROAs and manifests also act as CAs in this PKI. Such
organizations will include internet number registries, LIRs/ISPs,
provider-independent subscribers and some dual-homed subscribers.
For each signed object an organization creates, it will issue a
corresponding EE certificate that will be used to validate the
digital signature on the signed object. (Organizations may issue
other types of EE certificates in the future). See [ARCH] for more
details.
1.3.2. Registration authorities
This function will be provided by the CAs listed in Section 1.3.1.
The RIRs (and NIRs where applicable) already perform this function
and assume responsibility for allocating and tracking the current
allocation of address space and AS numbers. LIRs do the same for
sub-allocation of address space that they hold. With regard to
allocation of IP address and AS numbers, RIRs et al. establish a
formal relationship with an organization and allocate these
resources to that organization.
1.3.3. Subscribers
These are the organizations receiving allocations of IP addresses
and AS numbers - RIRs, NIRs, LIRs, ISPs, and other organizations.
See [ARCH] for more details.
Note that any of these organizations may have received allocations
from more than one source, over time. This is true even for RIRs,
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which participate in inter-registry exchanges of address space. This
PKI accommodates such relationships.
1.3.4. Relying parties
Entities that need to validate claims of address space and/or AS
number current holdings are relying parties. Thus, for example,
entities that make use of address and AS number allocation
certificates in support of improved routing security are relying
parties. This includes ISPs, multi-homed organizations exchanging
BGP traffic with ISPs, and subscribers who have received an
allocation of address space from ISP A but want to authorize ISP B
to originate routes to this space.
To the extent that repositories make use of certificates for access
control -- checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL,
and ROA update packages -- they too act as relying parties.
1.3.5. Other participants
Every organization that undertakes a role as a CA in this PKI is
responsible for populating the RPKI distributed repository system
with the certificates, CRLs, and other signed objects that it
issues. The organization can operate its own publication point or
outsource this function (See sections 2.1 and 2.2.)
1.4. Certificate usage
1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses
The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization
in support of validation of claims of current holdings of address
space and/or AS numbers, e.g., for routing security. With regard to
routing security, an initial goal of this PKI is to allow the holder
of a set of address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure
fashion, the AS number of each entity that is authorized to
originate a route to these addresses, including the case of ISP
proxy aggregation. Additional uses of the PKI, consistent with the
basic goal cited above, are also permitted under this policy.
Some of the certificates that may be issued under this hierarchy
could be used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g.,
access control for the repository system. Such uses also are
permitted under this policy.
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1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses
Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited
under this policy.
1.5. Policy administration
1.5.1. Organization administering the document
This CP is co-administered by IANA and the five Regional Internet
Registries (RIRs), which act as default trust anchors for the PKI:
AfriNIC (Africa)
03B3, 3rd Floor, Ebene Cyber Tower
Cyber City,
Ebene,
Mauritius
APNIC (Asia-Pacific)
Level 1,
33 Park Road,
Milton,
Brisbane,
Australia
ARIN (North America and Caribbean)
3635 Concorde Pkwy, Suite 200
Chantilly, VA 20151-1130
USA
IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority)
4676 Admiralty Way, Suite 330
Marina del Rey, CA 90292-6601
USA
LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean)
Rambla Republica de Mexico 6125
Montevideo, 11400
Uruguay
RIPE NCC (Europe)
Singel 258
1016 AB Amsterdam
The Netherlands
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1.5.2. Contact person
The contact information for this CP is:
AfriNIC (Africa)
e-mail: contact@afrinic.net
phone: +230 466 6616
APNIC (Asia-Pacific)
e-mail: helpdesk@apnic.net
phone: +61 7 3858 3188
ARIN (North America and Caribbean)
e-mail: hostmaster@arin.net
phone: +1 703 227 0660
IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority)
e-mail: iana@iana.org
phone:
LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean)
e-mail: comunicaciones@lacnic.net
phone: +598 2 6042222
RIPE NCC (Europe)
e-mail: ncc@ripe.net
phone: +31 20 535 444
1.5.3. Person determining CP suitability for the policy
Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS
numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the
public key in the certificate. These are the same organizations that
perform the allocation hence they are authoritative with respect to
the accuracy of this binding.
1.5.4. CP approval procedures
Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS
numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the
public key in the certificate. The issuing organization is the same
organization as the one that performs the allocation.
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1.6. Definitions and acronyms
BGP - Border Gateway Protocol. This is the protocol used in the
Internet for propagating the connectivity information used as a
basis for inter-domain routing. [BGP4]
CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
in issuing certificates.
IANA - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible for
global coordination of the Internet Protocol addressing systems
and Autonomous System (AS) numbers used for routing internet
traffic. IANA allocates IP addresses and AS numbers to Regional
Internet Registries (RIRs).
ISP - Internet Service Provider. This is an organization managing and
selling Internet services to other organizations.
LIR - Local Internet Registry. This is an organization, typically a
network service provider, that sub-allocates the assignment of
IP addresses for a portion of the area covered by a Regional (or
National) Registry.
NIR - National Internet Registry. This is an organization that manages
the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a portion of the
geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry. NIRs form an
optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage IP
address and AS number allocation.
NRO - Number Resource Organization. This organization was formed by
the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) for the purpose of
undertaking joint activities of the five RIRs, including joint
technical projects, liaison activities, and policy coordination.
RIR - Regional Internet Registry. This is an organization that
manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a
geopolitical area. At present, there are five RIRs: AFRINIC
(Africa), APNIC (Asia-Pacific), ARIN (North America), LACNIC
(Latin America and Caribbean), and RIPE NCC (Europe).
ROA - Route Origination Authorization. This is a digitally signed
object that identifies a network operator, identified by an AS
that is authorized to originate routes to a specified set of
address blocks.
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2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities
2.1. Repositories
Certificates, CRLs, and ROAs must be made available for downloading
by all network operators, to enable them to validate this data for
use in support of routing security. This motivates use of a robust,
distributed repository system. Each CA is responsible for publishing
its signed products (certificates, CRLs, manifests, ROAs and other
signed objects) at a dedicated publication point. The RPKI
distributed repository system is the collection of these dedicated
publication points. An organization may choose to outsource the
publication of PKI data. (See [REPOS] for further details.)
2.2. Publication of certification information
All CAs will publish certificates via the repository system.
Each CA will publish the CRL(s) that it issues by uploading to the
repository system.
ROAs and other signed objects will be uploaded to the repository
system by address space holders, e.g., network subscribers and
ISPs/LIRs.
An organization may choose to outsource publication of RPKI data -
certificates, CRLs, ROAs, and other signed objects. (See [REPOS] for
further details.).
2.3. Time or frequency of publication
A certificate will be published within 24 hours after the CA issues
the certificate.
Each CA will publish its CRL prior to the nextScheduledUpdate value
in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA. Within 12 hours of
effecting revocation, a CA will publish a CRL with an entry for the
revoked certificate.
A new ROA will be published before a predecessor ROA has expired, or
within 24 hours after an address space holder has changed the set of
ASes that is authorized to advertise the address blocks it holds.
2.4. Access controls on repositories
Access to the repository system, for modification of entries,
must be controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data
(certificates, CRLs and ROAs) uploaded to a repository are digitally
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signed. Updates to the repository system must be validated to ensure
that the data being added or replaced is authorized. This document
does not define the means by which updates are verified, but use of
the PKI itself to validate updates is anticipated.
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3. Identification And Authentication
3.1. Naming
3.1.1. Types of names
Names for IANA and RIRs will be directory distinguished names, using
a subset of the following attributes: C, O, OU, and CN. Names for
NIRs, LIRs/ISPs and subscribers will consist of a single CN
attribute with a value generated by the issuer.
3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful
The Subject name in each certificate must be unique relative to all
Subject names certified by an Issuer, but the name does not need to
be meaningful. There is no requirement, and no guarantee, that
subject names are globally unique in this PKI. The certificates
issued under this PKI are used for authorization in support of
routing security, not for identification. The intent is to allow the
holder of a set of address blocks to be able to announce to the
Internet, in a secure fashion, the AS number of each entity that is
authorized to originate a route to these addresses. The PKI binds a
public key to each address block or AS number. The name of the
holder of the address block or AS number need not be "meaningful" or
even accurate. For purposes of routing security, the issuer and
subject name in each certificate are not relevant, other than the
usual PKI requirements for contextual uniqueness in support of
unambiguous certificate path chaining.
3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers
Although Subject (and Issuer) names need not be meaningful, and may
appear "random," anonymity is not a function of this PKI, and thus
no explicit support for this feature is provided.
3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms
None
3.1.5. Uniqueness of names
Each CA certifies Subject names that must be unique among the
certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate
certificate path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor
enforced through technical means.
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3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks
Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there
is no provision to recognize or authenticate trademarks, service
marks, etc.
3.2. Initial identity validation
3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key
Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will require each
Subject to demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to issuing
the certificate. The means by which PoP is achieved is determined by
each CA and will be declared in the CPS of that CA.
3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity
Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
procedures to ensure that each certificate it issues accurately
reflects its records with regard to the organization to which the CA
has allocated (or sub-allocated) the address space identified in the
certificate. The same requirement is imposed on the binding of one
or more AS numbers in a certificate to the organization represented
by the Subject. The specific procedures employed for this purpose
may vary among CAs. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ
procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry
or ISP, in the maintenance of address (and AS number) allocation.
3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity
Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
procedures to identify at least one individual as a representative
of each organization that is an address space (AS number) holder.
This is done in support of issuance, renewal, and revocation of the
certificate issued to the organization. The specific means by which
each CA authenticates individuals as representatives for an
organization may vary, and will be specified in the CPS of the CA.
Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate
with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in
authenticating individuals as representatives for address space (AS
number) holders. Moreover, this authentication is solely for use by
each CA in dealing with the organizations to which it allocates (or
sub-allocates) address space (or AS numbers), and thus must not be
relied upon outside of this CA-subscriber relationship.
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3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information
No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued
under this certificate policy.
3.2.5. Validation of authority
Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
procedures to verify that an individual claiming to represent an
organization to which a certificate is issued, is authorized to
represent that organization in this context. Relying parties can
expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it
already employs as a registry or ISP, in authenticating individuals
as representatives for address space (AS number) holders.
3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation
This PKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
other PKI.
3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests
3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key
Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key is the
legitimate holder of the certificate (and associated address space
and AS numbers) to be re-keyed and will require PoP of the private
key corresponding to the new public key. The specific procedures
employed for these purposes may vary among CAs. The means by which
PoP is achieved is up to each CA and will be declared in the CPS of
that CA. With respect to authentication of the holder of the
address space and AS numbers, relying parties can expect each CA to
employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a
registry or ISP, in the maintenance of address (and AS number)
allocation.
Note: An issuer may choose to require periodic re-keying consistent
with contractual agreements with the recipient.
3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation
Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key after
revocation is the legitimate holder of the certificate (and
associated address space and AS numbers) to be re-keyed and will
require PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key.
The specific procedures employed for these purposes may vary among
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CAs. The means by which PoP is achieved is up to each CA and will be
declared in the certification practice statement of that CA. With
respect to authentication of the holder of the address space and AS
numbers, relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures
commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in
the maintenance of address (and AS number) allocation. Note that
there may be different procedures for the case where the legitimate
subject still possesses the original private key as opposed to the
case when it no longer has access to that key.
3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request
Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
procedures to ensure that an organization requesting revocation is
the legitimate holder of the certificate (and associated address
space and AS numbers) to be revoked. The specific procedures
employed for these purposes may vary among CAs. Relying parties can
expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it
already employs as a registry or ISP, in the maintenance of address
(and AS number) allocation.
Note: If new IP addresses or AS numbers are being added to an
organization's existing allocation, the old certificate need not be
revoked. Instead, a new certificate may issued with both the old and
the new resources and the old key. If IP addresses or AS numbers
are being removed or if there has been a key compromise, then the
old certificate must be revoked (and a re-key must be performed in
the event of key compromise).
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4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements
4.1. Certificate Application
4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application
The Resource PKI issues several types of certificates. Any entity
that assigns Internet IP address space or AS numbers should acquire
a certificate. This includes registries and ISPs. Additionally,
entities that hold AS numbers or that have address space assignments
from a registry, or that are multi-homed, should acquire a
certificate under this PKI, even if they do not exchange BGP UPDATEs
with ISPs. The (CA) certificates issued to these entities will
include one or both of the extensions defined by RFC 3779, X.509
Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers, as appropriate.
Most of the certificates in this PKI are issued as part of registry
and ISP normal business practices, as an adjunct to address space
and AS number allocation, and thus a separate specific application
to request a certificate usually will not be necessary.
4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities
The enrollment process and procedures are based on the individual
polices of RIRs, NIRs, and LIRs/ISPs. An entity that desires one or
more certificates should contact the authorized registry for its
geopolitical area, or contact its LIR/ISP if it receives address
allocations from an LIR/ISP. During the initial deployment of this
PKI, registries and ISPs should contact their existing network
subscribers about obtaining appropriate credentials.
4.2. Certificate application processing
CAs should make use of existing standards for certificate
application processing. Relevant standards include RFC 4210,
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management
Protocol (CMP), RFC 2797, Certificate Management Messages over CMS,
and RSA Labs standards PKCS #7 and PKCS #10. Each CA will define
the certificate request/response standards that it employs, via its
CPS.
4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions
Existing practices employed by registries and ISPs to identify and
authenticate organizations form the basis for issuance of
certificates to these subscribers. It is important to note that the
Resource PKI is never used to authenticate the identity of an
organization, but rather to bind subscribers to the address blocks
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and AS numbers they hold. Because identity is not being vouched for
by this PKI, certificate application procedures need not verify
legal organization names, etc.
4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications
Certificate applications will be approved based on the normal
business practices of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's
records of address space and AS number holders. Each CA will verify
that the requester holds the corresponding private key for the
public key that will be bound to the certificate the CA issues to
the requestor.
4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications
No stipulation. Each CA may declare its expected time frame for
processing certificate applications as part of its CPS.
4.3. Certificate issuance
4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance
If a CA determines that the request is acceptable, it will issue the
corresponding certificate and publish it in the RPKI distributed
repository system via publication of the certificate at the CA's
repository publication point.
4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate
The CA will notify the subscriber when the certificate is published.
The means by which a subscriber is notified is defined by each CA in
its CPS.
4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]
4.4. Certificate acceptance
4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance
Within 24 hours of issuance, the CA will place the certificate in
the repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without
subscriber review and acceptance. Each CA shall state in its CPS
the procedures it follows for publishing of the certificate and
notification to the subscriber.
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4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA
Certificates will be published in the RPKI distributed repository
system via publication of the certificate at the CA's repository
publication point as per the conduct described in 4.4.1. The
procedures for publication are defined by each CA in its CPS.
4.5. Key pair and certificate usage
A summary of the use model for the Resource PKI is provided below.
4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage
Each holder of an address space or AS number allocation will be
issued an X.509 certificate using RFC 3779 extensions. When the
subjects of these certificates are LIRs/ISPs or network subscribers,
they also shall issue EE certificates to themselves for use in
verifying ROAs. Subjects also will issue subordinate, end-entity
certificates to their personnel for repository maintenance.
4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage
The primary relying parties in this PKI are LIRs/ISPs, who will use
certificates to verify ROAs and other related signed objects in
support of generating route filters and validating assertions about
IP addresses and AS numbers and their intended use. Repositories
use certificates to verify the authorization of entities to engage
in repository maintenance activities, and thus represent a secondary
type of relying party.
4.6. Certificate renewal
4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal
A certificate should be processed for renewal based on its
expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate Subject.
If the issuing CA initiates the renewal process based on the
certificate expiration date, then that CA shall notify the holder in
advance of the renewal process. The validity interval of the new
(renewed) certificate should overlap that of the previous
certificate, to ensure uninterrupted coverage.
Certificate renewal should incorporate the same public key as the
previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
compromised. If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
Section 4.7 will apply.
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4.6.2. Who may request renewal
The certificate holder or the issuing CA may initiate the renewal
process. For example, a certificate holder may request an early
renewal if it wishes to change the public key, or if it expects to
be unavailable to support the renewal process at the normal
expiration cycle.
4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests
Renewal processing must verify that the certificate in question has
not been revoked.
4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.3.2.
4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate
No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.1.
4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA
No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.2.
4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]
4.7. Certificate re-key
4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key
Re-key of a certificate should be performed only when required,
based on:
1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
private key, or
2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated
key pair
The re-key operation can have dramatic consequences, requiring the
re-issuance of all certificates issued by a re-keyed entity, so it
should be performed only when necessary. In particular, if a
certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the
replacement certificate can and should incorporate the same public
key rather than a new key.
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If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
certificate must be revoked.
Section 5.6 below notes that when a CA signs a certificate, the
signing key should have a validity period that exceeds the validity
period of the certificate. This places additional constraints on
when a CA should request a re-key.
4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key
The holder of the certificate may request a re-key. In addition,
the CA that issued the certificate may initiate a re-key based on a
verified compromise report. Note that care must be taken to verify
the authorization of a subscriber to request a re-key when the
private key has been reported as compromised.
4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests
The re-key process follows the general procedures of certificate
generation as defined in section 4.3.
4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
No stipulation beyond the notification process for any new
certificate (see section 4.3.2)
4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate
No stipulation beyond the acceptance process for any new certificate
(see section 4.4.1)
4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA
No stipulation beyond the publication process for any new
certificate (see section 4.4.2)
4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]
4.8. Certificate modification
4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification
Modification of a certificate occurs to implement changes to
selected attribute values in a certificate. In the context of this
PKI, the only changes that are accommodated by certificate
modification are additions to the address space and/or AS number
holdings described by the RFC 3779 extension.
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When previously allocated address space or AS numbers are removed
from a certificate, then the old certificate is revoked and a new
certificate is issued.
When a certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is
issued. The new certificate will contain the same public key and
the same expiration date as the original certificate, but with the
incidental information corrected and/or the address space and AS
allocations expanded. Revocation of the previous certificate is not
required.
4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification
The certificate holder or issuer may initiate the certificate
modification process.
4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests
The CA must determine that the requested modification is appropriate
and the procedures for the issuance of a new certificate are
followed.
4.8.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
No stipulation beyond the notification process for any new
certificate (see section 4.3.2)
4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
No stipulation beyond the acceptance process for any new certificate
(see section 4.4.1).
4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA
No stipulation beyond the publication process for any new
certificate (see section 4.4.2).
4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]
4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension
4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation
Certificates can be revoked for several reasons. Either the issuer
or subject may choose to end the relationship expressed in the
certificate, thus creating cause to revoke the certificate. A
certificate also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the
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private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate.
Finally, a certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data
signed by that certificate. For example, if the private key
associated with an EE certificate has been used to sign a ROA, then
that EE certificate can be revoked to effect revocation of the ROA.
4.9.2. Who can request revocation
The certificate holder or issuer may request a revocation.
4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request
A certificate holder must submit a request to the certificate issuer
for a revocation. A certificate issuer must notify the certificate
holder when revoking a certificate, however this notification
requirement is satisfied by publication of a CRL by the issuer.
4.9.4. Revocation request grace period
A subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the
need for revocation has been identified. There is no specified
grace period for the subscriber in this process.
4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request
No stipulation. Each CA is free to specify its expected revocation
processing time in its CPS.
4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties
A relying party is responsible for acquiring and checking the most
recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the certificate, whenever
the relying party validates a certificate.
4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency
As indicated in section 2.3, it is expected that CAs will publish
CRLs approximately every 24 hours, although the specific CRL
issuance frequency is determine by each CA. Each CRL carries a
nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL must be published at or
before that time. A CA must set the nextScheduledUpdate value when
it issues a CRL, to signal when the next scheduled CRL will be
issued.
4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs
It is expected that a CRL will be posted to the repository system
with minimal delay after generation.
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4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]
4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED]
4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED]
4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]
4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED]
4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]
4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED]
4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]
4.10. Certificate status services
This PKI does not make use of OCSP or SCVP, because it is
anticipated that the primary relying parties (ISPs) will acquire and
validate certificates for all participating resource holders on a
daily basis. These protocols are not designed for such large-scale,
bulk certificate status checking. Instead, retrieval of all changed
or new certificates and CRLs on a daily basis is the anticipated
mode of certificate status verification.
4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]
4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED]
4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]
4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]
4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED]
4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices
[OMITTED]
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5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls
5.1. Physical controls
Each CA will maintain physical security controls for its operation
that are commensurate with those already employed by the
organization in the management of address space and AS number
allocation. The details for each CA will be specified in the
relevant CPS.
5.1.1. Site location and construction [OMITTED]
5.1.2. Physical access [OMITTED]
5.1.3. Power and air conditioning [OMITTED]
5.1.4. Water exposures [OMITTED]
5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection [OMITTED]
5.1.6. Media storage [OMITTED]
5.1.7. Waste disposal [OMITTED]
5.1.8. Off-site backup [OMITTED]
5.2. Procedural controls
Each CA will maintain procedural security controls that are
commensurate with those already employed by the organization in the
management of address space and AS number allocation. The details
for each CA will be specified in the relevant CPS.
5.2.1. Trusted roles [OMITTED]
5.2.2. Number of persons required per task [OMITTED]
5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role [OMITTED]
5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties [OMITTED]
5.3. Personnel controls
Each CA will maintain personnel security controls that are
commensurate with those already employed by the organization in the
management of address space and AS number allocation. The details
for each CA will be specified in the relevant CPS.
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5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements [OMITTED]
5.3.2. Background check procedures [OMITTED]
5.3.3. Training requirements [OMITTED]
5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements [OMITTED]
5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence [OMITTED]
5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions [OMITTED]
5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements [OMITTED]
5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel [OMITTED]
5.4. Audit logging procedures
5.4.1. Types of events recorded
Audit records should be generated for the basic operations of the
certification authority computing equipment. Audit records should
include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
content data relating to the event. Auditable events include
. Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)
. Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate
requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise
notifications)
. Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions
. Posting of any material to a repository
. Any attempts to change or delete audit data
5.4.2. Frequency of processing log
Each CA will establish its own procedures for review of audit logs.
5.4.3. Retention period for audit log
Each CA will establish its own polices for retention of audit logs.
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5.4.4. Protection of audit log
The audit log should be protected based on current industry
standards.
5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures
The audit log should be backed up based on current industry
standards.
5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]
5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED]
5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments
The PKI subsystems of a registry or ISP should participate in any
vulnerability assessments that these organizations run as part of
their normal business practice.
5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]
5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED]
5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]
5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED]
5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED]
5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED]
5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED]
5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED]
5.6. Key changeover
When a CA wishes to change keys, it must acquire a new certificate
containing the public key of the pair, well in advance of the
scheduled change of the current signature key pair.
Ideally, the private key that a CA uses to sign a certificate or CRL
should have a validity period that is at least as long as that of
any certificate being signed. However, since a certificate issued
under this PKI will have a validity period that reflects the
contractual relationship between the issuer and subject, this may
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lead to situations where an issued certificate has a validity period
longer than that of the key used to sign the certificate.
5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]
5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]
5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted
[OMITTED]
5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]
5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED]
5.8. CA or RA termination
In this PKI, each CA is authoritative for a specified range of IP
addresses and a specified set of AS numbers. If an organization
acting as a CA in this PKI terminates operation without identifying
a replacement, then the effective control of the IP addresses and AS
numbers revert back to the issuing organization, and address space
and AS number allocations that have been previously validated via
that CA are invalidated as of revocation of the CA's certificate.
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6. Technical Security Controls
The organizations that allocate IP addresses and AS numbers to
subscribers are authoritative for these allocations. This PKI is
designed to enable LIRs/ISPs and network subscribers to demonstrate
that they are the holders of the resources that have been allocated
to them. Accordingly, the security controls used by CAs and
subscribers for this PKI need only to be as secure as those that
apply to the procedures for administering the allocation of IP
address space and AS number data by the extant organizations.
Details of each CA's security controls are described in the CPS
issued by the CA.
6.1. Key pair generation and installation
6.1.1. Key pair generation
In most instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the
subject, i.e., the organization receiving the allocation of address
space or AS numbers. However, some CAs may offer to generate key
pairs on behalf of their subjects at the request of the subjects,
e.g., to accommodate subscribers who do not have the ability to
perform key generation in a secure fashion. Since the keys used in
this PKI are not for non-repudiation purposes, generation of key
pairs by CAs does not inherently undermine the security of the PKI.
Each CA will describe its key pair generation procedures in its CPS.
6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber
If a CA provides key pair generation services for subscribers, its
CPS will describe the means by which private keys are delivered to
subscribers in a secure fashion.
6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer
Each CA operating within the context of this PKI defines procedures
whereby a subscriber requests IP address space (and/or AS numbers),
authenticates itself, pays for the resources, etc. The CPS of each
CA will describe how these procedures are extended to support
certificate issuance. The security of the procedures used by a
subject to deliver its public key to a CA need only be commensurate
with the security of the procedures already employed for management
of the IP address space and AS numbers.
6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties
CA public keys for all entities other than IANA and RIRs are
contained in certificates issued by other CAs. These certificates
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plus certificates used to represent inter-RIR transfers of address
space or AS numbers will be published in the RPKI distributed
repository system. Relying parties will download these certificates
from the repositories. Public key values and associated data for the
default trust anchors will be distributed out of band, e.g.,
embedded in path validation software that will be made available to
the Internet community.
6.1.5. Key sizes
For RIR certificates, the RSA key size will be 2048 bits. For NIR,
LIR/ISP, and non-ISP subscriber certificates, the RSA keys will be
either 2048 or 1024 bits.
6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking
The RSA algorithm [RSA] is used in this PKI with the public exponent
(e) F4 (65,537). Each subscriber is responsible for performing
checks on the quality of its key pair. CAs are not responsible for
performing such checks for subscribers.
6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)
The Key usage extension bit values shall be consistent with RFC
3280. For CA certificates, the keyCertSign and cRLSign bits shall be
set TRUE. All other bits (including digitalSignature) shall be set
FALSE, and the extension shall be marked critical. End entity
certificates in this PKI may include this extension, with
appropriate bit values, as per RFC 3280, but such inclusion is not
required.
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls
6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls
The cryptographic module standards and controls employed by each CA
will be described in the CPS issued by that CA.
6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control
Some CAs, e.g., registry CAs, may employ multi-person controls to
constrain access to their private keys, but this is not a
requirement for all CAs in the PKI. The CPS for a CA will describe
any multi-person controls it employs.
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6.2.3. Private key escrow
No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI.
6.2.4. Private key backup
Because of the adverse operational implications associated with the
loss of use of a CA private key in the PKI, each CA should employ a
secure means to backup its private keys. The details of the
procedures for backing up a CA's private key will be described in
the CPS issued by the CA.
6.2.5. Private key archival [OMITTED]
6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module
[OMITTED]
6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module [OMITTED]
6.2.8. Method of activating private key [OMITTED]
6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key [OMITTED]
6.2.10. Method of destroying private key [OMITTED]
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating [OMITTED]
6.3. Other aspects of key pair management
6.3.1. Public key archival
Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
to archive public keys.
6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods
IANA holds all IP address and AS number space, i.e., all the
resources which form the base of the RPKI hierarchy, Because a self-
signed IANA certificate represents this base, it should have a very
long life time.
Because RIRs and NIRs receive periodic new allocations, it is
appropriate for their key pairs and certificates to have lifetimes
that match the periodicity of these allocations. However, to
minimize disruption, the key pairs should be maintained across
certificate changes.
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LIR/ISP and subscriber certificates typically will have validity
periods commensurate with the duration of service agreements. The
validity periods will be chosen by the issuing CA and described in
its CPS.
6.4. Activation data [OMITTED]
6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation [OMITTED]
6.4.2. Activation data protection [OMITTED]
6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data [OMITTED]
6.5. Computer security controls
Each CA will document the technical security requirements it employs
for CA computer operation in its CPS.
6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirements [OMITTED]
6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]
6.6. Life cycle technical controls
6.6.1. System development controls
The CPS for each CA will document any system development controls
required by that CA, if applicable.
6.6.2. Security management controls
The security for the software and equipment used for this PKI shall
be commensurate with that used for the systems used by the CAs for
managing and allocating IP address and AS number resources.
6.6.3. Life cycle security controls
Equipment (hardware and software) used for this PKI shall be
procured, installed, maintained, and updated in a fashion
commensurate with the way in which equipment for the management and
allocation of IP address space and AS numbers is handled.
6.7. Network security controls
Each CA shall employ network security controls for CA operation
commensurate with the protection it employs for the computers used
for managing allocation of IP addresses and AS numbers.
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6.8. Time-stamping
The PKI in question does not make use of time stamping.
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7. Certificate and CRL Profiles
Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy].
7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]
7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]
7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]
7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED]
7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED]
7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED]
7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]
7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]
7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]
7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]
7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED]
7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]
7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies
extension [OMITTED]
7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]
7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]
7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]
7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED]
7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED]
7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED]
7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]
7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]
7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]
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8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments
The Certificate Policy for a typical PKI defines the criteria
against which prospective CAs are evaluated and establishes
requirements that they must meet. In this PKI, the CAs are already
authoritative for the management of IP address space and AS numbers,
and the PKI simply supports verification of the allocation if these
resources to subscribers. Accordingly, whatever audit and other
assessments are already used to ensure the security of the
administration of IP addresses and AS numbers is sufficient for this
PKI.
8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment [OMITTED]
8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor [OMITTED]
8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity [OMITTED]
8.4. Topics covered by assessment [OMITTED]
8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency [OMITTED]
8.6 Communication of results [OMITTED]
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9. Other Business And Legal Matters
As noted throughout this certificate policy, the organizations
managing the allocation of IP addresses and AS numbers are
authoritative in their roles as managers of this data. They will
operate this PKI to allow the holders of address space and AS number
allocations to generate digitally signed data that attests to these
allocations, and to the authorization of LIRs/ISPs to originate
routes for address blocks (via ROAs). Therefore, the manner in which
the organizations in question manage their business and legal
matters for this PKI should be commensurate with the way in which
they already manage business and legal matters in their existing
roles. Since there is no single set of responses to this section
that would apply to all organizations, the topics listed below
should be covered in the CPS issued by each CA, although not every
CA may choose to address all of these topics.
9.1. Fees [OMITTED]
9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees [OMITTED]
9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable) [OMITTED]
9.1.3. Refund policy [OMITTED]
9.1.4. Fees for other services [OMITTED]
9.1.5. Refund policy [OMITTED]
9.2. Financial responsibility [OMITTED]
9.2.1. Insurance coverage [OMITTED]
9.2.2. Other assets [OMITTED]
9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities [OMITTED]
9.3. Confidentiality of business information [OMITTED]
9.3.1. Scope of confidential information [OMITTED]
9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information
[OMITTED]
9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information [OMITTED]
9.4. Privacy of personal information [OMITTED]
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9.4.1. Privacy plan [OMITTED]
9.4.2. Information treated as private [OMITTED]
9.4.3. Information not deemed private [OMITTED]
9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information [OMITTED]
9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information [OMITTED]
9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process
[OMITTED]
9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances [OMITTED]
9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable) [OMITTED]
9.6. Representations and warranties [OMITTED]
9.6.1. CA representations and warranties [OMITTED]
9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties [OMITTED]
9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties [OMITTED]
9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED]
9.7. Disclaimers of warranties [OMITTED]
9.8. Limitations of liability [OMITTED]
9.9. Indemnities [OMITTED]
9.10. Term and termination [OMITTED]
9.10.1. Term [OMITTED]
9.10.2. Termination [OMITTED]
9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival [OMITTED]
9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants [OMITTED]
9.12. Amendments
9.12.1. Procedure for amendment
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The procedure for amendments to this CP is via written notice from
the Secretary of the NRO.
9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period
The NRO will provide one month's notice of a change to this CP.
9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED]
If the Secretary judges that the change(s) will not materially
reduce the acceptability of certificates for RPKI purposes, then
there will be no change to the CP OID. If the Secretary judges that
the change(s) will materially change the acceptability of
certificates for RPKI purposes, then there will be a new CP OID.
9.13. Dispute resolution provisions [OMITTED]
9.14. Governing law [OMITTED]
9.15. Compliance with applicable law [OMITTED]
9.16. Miscellaneous provisions [OMITTED]
9.16.1. Entire agreement [OMITTED]
9.16.2. Assignment [OMITTED]
9.16.3. Severability [OMITTED]
9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights) [OMITTED]
9.16.5. Force Majeure [OMITTED]
9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]
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10. Security Considerations
According to X.509, a certificate policy (CP) is "a named set of
rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a
particular community and/or class of applications with common
security requirements." A CP may be used by a relying party to help
in deciding whether a certificate, and the binding therein, are
sufficiently trustworthy and otherwise appropriate for a particular
application. This document describes the CP for the Internet Address
and AS Number PKI. There are separate documents (Certification
Practice Statements (CPS's) that cover the factors that determine
the degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied
in a certificate. The degree to which such a binding can be trusted
depends on several factors, e.g., the practices followed by the
certification authority (CA) in authenticating the subject; the CA's
operating policy, procedures, and technical security controls,
including the scope of the subscriber's responsibilities (for
example, in protecting the private key), and the stated
responsibilities and liability terms and conditions of the CA (for
example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and limitations of
liability).
11. IANA Considerations
None.
12. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston, Randy Bush and other
members of the rescert community for reviewing this document and
Matt Lepinski for his help with the formatting.
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFCyyyy] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", work in progress.
[ARCH] Lepinski M., Kent S., Barnes R., "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing," work in progress.
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13.2. Informative References
[BGP4] Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors), A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-
4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995.
[Murphy] Murphy, S., BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis, draft-ietf-
idr-bgp-vuln-01.txt, October 2004 (work in progress).
[REPOS] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and Michaelson, G., A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure, draft-huston-sidr-
repos-struct-01.txt, work in progress.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFCyyyy] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", work in progress.
[RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method for
obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems.
Communications ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126.
[S-BGP] Kent, S., Lynn, C., and Seo, K. Secure Border Gateway Protocol
(S-BGP). IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, v.18,
n. 4, Apr. 2000, pages 582-592.
[soBGP] Russ White, Securing BGP Through Secure Origin BGP, The Internet
Protocl Journal, Volume 6, Number 3, September 2003, pages 15-
22.
[SPV] Hu, Y.-C., Perrig, A., and Sirbu, M., SPV: Secure Path Vector
Routing for Securing BGP. In Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM 2004,
pages 179-192.
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Author's Addresses
Stephen Kent
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
Email: skent@bbn.com
Derrick Kong
BBN Technologies
Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA
Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
Email: dkong@bbn.com
Karen Seo
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
Email: kseo@bbn.com
Ronald Watro
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA
Phone: +1 (617) 873-2551
Email: rwatro@bbn.com
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