Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr) Kent, S.
Internet Draft Kong, D.
Expires: March 2011 Seo, K.
Intended Status: Best Current Practice Watro, R.
BBN Technologies
October 20, 2010
Certificate Policy (CP)
for the Resource PKI (RPKI
draft-ietf-sidr-cp-15.txt
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with
the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 30, 2011.
Abstract
This document describes the certificate policy for a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) used to support attestations about Internet
resource holdings. Each organization that distributes IP addresses
or Autonomous System (AS) numbers to an organization will, in
parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this distribution. These
certificates will enable verification that the resources indicated
in the certificate have been distributed to the holder of the
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
associated private key and that this organization is the current,
unique holder of these resources.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................7
1.1. Overview..................................................8
1.2. Document name and identification..........................8
1.3. PKI participants..........................................9
1.3.1. Certification authorities............................9
1.3.2. Registration authorities.............................9
1.3.3. Subscribers..........................................9
1.3.4. Relying parties......................................9
1.3.5. Other participants..................................10
1.4. Certificate usage........................................10
1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................10
1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................10
1.5. Policy administration....................................10
1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............10
1.5.2. Contact person......................................10
1.5.4. CP approval procedures..............................11
1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................11
2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................13
2.1. Repositories.............................................13
2.2. Publication of certification information.................13
2.3. Time or frequency of publication.........................13
2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................14
3. Identification and Authentication.............................15
3.1. Naming...................................................15
3.1.1. Types of names......................................15
3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................15
3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............15
3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........15
3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................15
3.2. Initial identity validation..............................16
3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........16
3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............16
3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............16
3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................16
3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................16
3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................17
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....17
3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine
re-key.............................................17
3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key
after revocation...................................17
3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation
request.................................................17
4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............19
4.1. Certificate Application..................................19
4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............19
4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............19
4.2. Certificate application processing.......................19
4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication
functions..........................................19
4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate
applications.......................................19
4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............20
4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................20
4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............20
4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance
of certificate.....................................20
4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................20
4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........20
4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............20
4.4.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA
to other entities..................................20
4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................21
4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........21
4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......21
4.6. Certificate renewal......................................21
4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................22
4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................22
4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............22
4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to
subscriber.........................................22
4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal
certificate........................................22
4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....23
4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA
to other entities..................................23
4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................23
4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................23
4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public
key................................................23
4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........24
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to
subscriber.........................................24
4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed
certificate........................................24
4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the
CA.................................................24
4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA
to other entities..................................24
4.8. Certificate modification.................................24
4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........24
4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............24
4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........25
4.8.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to
subscriber.........................................25
4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified
certificate........................................25
4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the
CA.................................................25
4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA
to other entities..................................25
4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................25
4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................25
4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................25
4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................25
4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................26
4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation
request............................................26
4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying
parties............................................26
4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................26
4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................26
4.10. Certificate status services.............................26
5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls................28
5.1. Physical controls........................................28
5.1.1. Site location and construction......................28
5.1.2. Physical access.....................................28
5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................28
5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................28
5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................28
5.1.6. Media storage.......................................28
5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................28
5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................28
5.2. Procedural controls......................................28
5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................29
5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................29
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....29
5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................29
5.3. Personnel controls.......................................29
5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................29
5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................29
5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................29
5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................30
5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................30
5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................30
5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................30
5.6. Key changeover...........................................30
5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................30
6. Technical Security Controls...................................31
6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................31
6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................31
6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................31
6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........31
6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........31
6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................32
6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality
checking...........................................32
6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage
field).............................................32
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module
Engineering Controls....................................32
6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........32
6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......32
6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................32
6.2.4. Private key backup..................................32
6.2.5. Private key archival................................33
6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a
cryptographic module...............................33
6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........33
6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................33
6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................33
6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................33
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................33
6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................33
6.3.1. Public key archival.................................33
6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair
usage periods......................................34
6.4. Activation data..........................................34
6.5. Computer security controls...............................34
6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................34
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
6.6.1. System development controls.........................34
6.6.2. Security management controls........................34
6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................34
6.7. Network security controls................................34
6.8. Time-stamping............................................35
7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................36
8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments........................37
9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................38
9.12. Amendments..............................................38
9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................38
9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................38
9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed......38
10. Security Considerations......................................39
11. IANA Considerations..........................................39
12. Acknowledgments..............................................39
13. References...................................................40
13.1. Normative References....................................40
13.2. Informative References..................................40
Authors' Addresses:..............................................41
Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer.....................................42
Copyright Statement..............................................42
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
1. Introduction
This document describes the certificate policy for a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) used to attest to Internet number resource
holdings (INRs) (IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers). An
organization that distributes INRs to another organization MAY, in
parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this distribution. These
certificates will enable verification that the resources indicated
in the certificate have been distributed to the holder of the
associated private key and that this organization is the current
holder of these resources.
The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which
this policy was created is that it does not purport to identify an
INR holder via the subject name contained in the certificate issued
to that entity. Rather, each certificate issued under this policy is
intended to enable an entity to assert, in a verifiable fashion,
that it is the current holder of an INR based on the current records
of the entity responsible for the resources in question.
Verification of the assertion is based on two criteria: the ability
of the entity to digitally sign data that is verifiable using the
public key contained in the corresponding certificate, and
validation of that certificate in the context of this PKI.
This PKI is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of
claims related to current INR holdings. This includes any
certificates issued in support of operation of this infrastructure,
e.g., for integrity or access control of the repository system
described in section 2.4. Such transitive uses of certificates also
are permitted under this policy. Use of the certificates and
certificate revocation lists (CRLs) managed under this PKI for any
other purpose is a violation of this CP, and relying parties (RPs)
SHOULD reject certificates presented for such uses.
Note: This document is based on the template specified in the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standards document RFC 3647
[RFC3647]. In the interest of keeping the document as short as
reasonable, a number of sections contained in the template are
omitted from this policy because they did not apply to this PKI.
However, we have retained the section numbering scheme employed in
the RFC to facilitate comparison with the outline in Section 6 of
the RFC. Each of these omitted sections should be read as "No
stipulation" in CP/CPS parlance.
Conventions used in this document
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].
1.1. Overview
This PKI is designed to support validation of claims by current
holders of INRs, in accordance with the records of the organizations
that act as Certification Authorities (CAs) in this PKI. The ability
to verify such claims is essential to ensuring the unambiguous
distribution of these resources.
The structure of the RPKI is modeled on the existing organizational
structure that is already responsible for IP address and AS number
resource allocation. In this allocation hierarchy, IANA allocates
resources to five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), each of which
manages address and AS number allocation within a defined
geopolitical region. The RIRs in turn allocate resources to Internet
Service Providers, to subscribers with so-called provider-
independent ("portable") allocations, and in some regions, to
National Internet Registries (NIRs). (The term LIR is used in some
regions to refer to what other regions define as an ISP. Throughout
the rest of this document we will use the term ISP to simplify
references to these entities.)
This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see IETF
document draft-ietf-sidr-arch-xx [ARCH] for more details):
. CA certificates for each organization distributing INRs, and for
INR holder
. End-entity (EE) certificates for organizations to validate digital
signatures on RPKI-signed objects
1.2. Document name and identification
The name of this document is "Certificate Policy (CP) for the
Resource PKI (RPKI)".
This policy has been assigned the following OID:
id-cp-ipAddr-asNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) cp(14) 2 }
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
1.3. PKI participants
Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or
organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The
term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
service from an ISP. In such cases the term "network subscriber"
will be used. Also note that, for brevity, this document always
refers to PKI participants as organizations or entities, even though
some of them are individuals.
1.3.1. Certification authorities
The organizations that distribute IP addresses and AS numbers (IANA,
RIRs, NIRs, ISPs) act as CAs in this PKI.
Organizations that do not distribute INRs, but hold such resources
also act as CAs when they create EE certificates.
1.3.2. Registration authorities
This PKI does not require establishment or use of a separate
registration authority (RA) in conjunction with the CA function. The
RA function MUST be provided by the same entity operating as a CA,
e.g., entities listed in Section 1.4.1. An entity acting as a CA in
this PKI already has a formal relationship with each organization to
which it distributes INRs. These organizations already perform the
RA function implicitly since they already assume responsibility for
distributing INRs.
1.3.3. Subscribers
These are the organizations receiving distributions of INRs - RIRs,
NIRs, ISPs, and other organizations.
Note that any of these organizations may have received distributions
from more than one source, over time. This is true even for RIRs,
which participate in inter-registry exchanges of address space. This
PKI accommodates such relationships.
1.3.4. Relying parties
Entities or individuals that act in reliance on certificates or
RPKI-signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties.
Relying parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI. (See
section 1.7 for the definition of an RPKI-signed object.)
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
1.3.5. Other participants
Every organization that undertakes a role as a CA in this PKI is
responsible for populating the RPKI distributed repository system
with the certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects that it issues.
The organization MAY operate its own publication point or it MAY
outsource this function (See sections 2.1 and 2.2.)
1.4. Certificate usage
1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses
The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization
in support of validation of claims of current holdings of INRs.
Additional uses of the certificates, consistent with the basic goal
cited above, also are permitted under this policy. For example,
certificates may be issued in support of integrity and access
control for the repository system described in 2.4. Such transitive
uses are permitted under this policy.
Some of the certificates that may be issued under this PKI could be
used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access
control for the repository system as described in 2.4. Such uses
also are permitted under this policy.
1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses
Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited
under this policy.
1.5. Policy administration
1.5.1. Organization administering the document
This CP is administered by
Internet Engineering Steering Group
c/o Internet Society
1775 Wiehle Avenue, Suite 201
Reston, VA 20190-5108
U.S.A.
1.5.2. Contact person
The contact information is
iesg@ietf.org
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
+1-703-439-2120 (Internet Society)
1.5.4. CP approval procedures
The IESG MUST approve a replacement BCP that either updates or
obsoletes this BCP, following the procedures of the IETF Standards
Process as defined in RFC 2026 [RFC2026].
1.6. Definitions and acronyms
CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
in issuing certificates in this PKI.
Distribution of INRs - A process of distribution of the INRs along the
respective number hierarchy. IANA distributes blocks of IP
addresses and AS Numbers to the five Regional Internet
Registries (RIRs). RIRs distribute smaller address blocks and AS
Numbers to organizations within their service regions, who in
turn distribute IP addresses to their customers.
IANA - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible for
global coordination of the IP addressing systems and AS numbers
used for routing internet traffic. IANA distributes INRs to
Regional Internet Registries (RIRs).
INRs - Internet Number Resources. INRs are number values for three
protocol parameter sets, namely:
. IP Version 4 addresses,
. IP version 6 addresses, and
. Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing, currently
Border Gateway Protocol-4 AS numbers.
ISP - Internet Service Provider. This is an organization managing and
selling Internet services to other organizations.
LIR - In some regions, the term Local Internet Registry (LIR) is used
to refer to what is called an ISP in other regions.
NIR - National Internet Registry. This is an organization that manages
the distribution of INRs for a portion of the geopolitical area
covered by a Regional Registry. NIRs form an optional second
tier in the tree scheme used to manage INRs.
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
RIR - Regional Internet Registry. This is an organization that
manages the distribution of INRs for a geopolitical area.
RPKI-signed object - An RPKI-signed object is a digitally signed data
object (other than a certificate or CRL) declared to be such by
a standards track RFC, and that can be validated using
certificates issued under this PKI. The content and format of
these data constructs depend on the context in which validation
of claims of current holdings of INRs takes place. Examples of
these objects are repository manifests and CRLs.
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities
2.1. Repositories
Certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects (intended for public
consumption) MUST be made available for downloading by all relying
parties, to enable them to validate this data. This motivates use of
a robust, distributed repository system. Each CA MUST maintain a
publicly accessible online repository and publish all RPKI-signed
objects (intended for public consumption) via this repository in a
manner that conforms with RFCwwww [RFCwwww] (This function MAY be
outsourced, as noted in Section 2.2 below.) The collection of
repositories forms the RPKI distributed repository system.
2.2. Publication of certification information
Each CA MUST publish the certificates (intended for public
consumption) that it issues via the repository system.
Each CA MUST publish the CRLs (intended for public consumption) that
it issues via the repository system.
Each CA MUST publish its RPKI-signed objects (intended for public
consumption) via the repository system.
Each CA that issues certificates to entities outside of its
administrative domain SHOULD create and publish a CPS that meets the
requirements set forth in this CP. Publication means that the
entities to which the CA issues certificates MUST be able to acquire
a copy of the CPS, and MUST be able to ascertain when the CPS
changes. (An organization that does not allocate or assign INRs does
not need to create or publish a CPS.)
An organization MAY choose to outsource publication of RPKI data -
certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI-signed objects.
The CP will be published as an IETF RFC and will be available from
the IETF RFC repository.
2.3. Time or frequency of publication
The CPS for each CA MUST specify the following information:
The period of time within which a certificate will be published
after the CA issues the certificate.
The period of time within which a CA will publish a CRL with an
entry for a revoked certificate after it revokes that certificate.
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
Expired and revoked certificates SHOULD be removed from the RPKI
repository system, upon expiration or revocation, respectively.
Also, please note that each CA MUST publish its CRL prior to the
nextUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA.
2.4. Access controls on repositories
Each CA or repository operator MUST implement access controls to
prevent unauthorized persons from adding, modifying or deleting
repository entries. A CA or repository operator MUST NOT
intentionally use technical means of limiting read access to its
CPS, certificates, CRLs or RPKI-signed objects. This data is
supposed to be accessible to the public.
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
3. Identification and Authentication
3.1. Naming
3.1.1. Types of names
The distinguished name for every CA and end-entity consists of a
single Common Name (CN) attribute with a value generated by the
issuer of the certificate. Optionally, the serialNumber attribute
MAY be included along with the common name (to form a terminal
relative distinguished name set), to distinguish among successive
instances of certificates associated with the same entity.
3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful
The Subject name in each certificate SHOULD NOT be "meaningful",
i.e., the name is NOT intended to convey the identity of the Subject
to relying parties. The rationale here is that certificates issued
under this PKI are used for authorization in support of applications
that make use of attestations of INR holdings. They are not used to
identify Subjects.
3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers
Although Subject (and Issuer) names need not be meaningful, and may
appear "random," anonymity is not a function of this PKI, and thus
no explicit support for this feature is provided.
3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms
None
3.1.5. Uniqueness of names
There is no guarantee that subject names are globally unique in this
PKI. Each CA certifies Subject names that MUST be unique among the
certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, name uniqueness within
the RPKI cannot be guaranteed.
However, Subject names in certificates SHOULD be constructed in a
way that minimizes the chances that two entities in the RPKI will be
assigned the same name. The RPKI certificate profile [RFCwwww]
provides an example of how to generate (meaningless) subject names
in a way that minimizes the likelihood of collisions.
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
3.2. Initial identity validation
3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key
Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST require each
Subject to demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to issuing
the certificate. The means by which PoP is achieved is determined by
each CA and MUST be declared in the CPS of that CA.
3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity
Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
procedures to ensure that each certificate it issues accurately
reflects its records with regard to the organization to which the CA
has distributed the INRs identified in the certificate. The specific
procedures employed for this purpose MUST bedescribed by the CPS for
each CA. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures
commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in
the management of the INRs. This authentication is solely for use by
each CA in dealing with the organizations to which it distributes
INRs, and thus should not be relied upon outside of this CA-
subscriber relationship.
3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity
Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
procedures to identify at least one individual as a representative
of each organization that is an INR holder. The specific means by
which each CA authenticates individuals as representatives for an
organization MUST be described by the CPS for each CA. Relying
parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with
those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in authenticating
individuals as representatives for INR holders.
3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information
A CA MUST NOT include any non-verified subscriber data in
certificates issued under this certificate policy except for SIA
extensions.
3.2.5. Validation of authority
Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
procedures to verify that an individual claiming to represent an
organization to which a certificate is issued, is authorized to
represent that organization in this context. The procedures MUST be
described by the CPS for the CA. Relying parties can expect each CA
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a
registry or ISP, in authenticating individuals as representatives
for INR holders.
3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation
This PKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
other PKI.
3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests
3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key
Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key is the
legitimate holder of the certificate to be re-keyed and associated
INRs and MUST require PoP of the private key corresponding to the
new public key. The procedures employed for these purposes MUST be
described in the CPS for the CA. With respect to authentication of
the holder of the INRs, relying parties can expect each CA to employ
procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry
or ISP, in the management of INRs.
Note: An issuer MAY choose to require periodic re-keying consistent
with contractual agreements with the recipient. If so, this MUST be
described by the CPS for the CA.
3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation
Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key after
revocation is the same entity to which the revoked certificate was
issued and is the legitimate holder of the associated INR. The CA
MUST require PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public
key. The specific procedures employed for these purposes MUST be
described by the CPS for the CA. With respect to authentication of
the holder of the INRs, relying parties can expect each CA to employ
procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry
or ISP, in the management of INRs. Note that there MAY be different
procedures for the case where the legitimate subject still possesses
the original private key as opposed to the case when it no longer
has access to that key.
3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request
Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
procedures to ensure that:
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
. an organization requesting revocation is the legitimate holder
of the certificate to be revoked.
. each certificate it revokes accurately reflects its records
with regard to the organization to which the CA has distributed
the INRs identified in the certificate.
. an individual claiming to represent an organization for which
a certificate is to be revoked, is authorized to represent that
organization in this context.
The specific procedures employed for these purposes MUST be
described by the CPS for the CA. Relying parties can expect each CA
to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a
registry or ISP, in the management of INRs.
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements
4.1. Certificate Application
4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application
Any entity that distributes INRs SHOULD acquire a certificate. This
includes Internet Registries and ISPs. Additionally, entities that
hold INRs from an Internet Registry, or that are multi-homed, MAY
acquire a certificate under this PKI. The (CA) certificates issued
to these entities MUST include one or both of the extensions defined
by RFC 3779 [RFC3779], X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS
Identifiers, as appropriate.
The application procedure MUST be described in the CPS for each CA.
4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities
The enrollment process and procedures MUST be described by the CPS
for each CA. An entity that desires one or more certificates should
contact the organization from which it receives its INRs.
4.2. Certificate application processing
CAs SHOULD make use of existing standards for certificate
application processing. Section 6 of the resource certificate
profile [RFCyyyy] defines the standard certificate request formats
that MUST be supported
Each CA MUST define the certificate request/response standards that
it employs, via its CPS.
4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions
Existing practices employed by registries and ISPs to identify and
authenticate organizations that receive INRs form the basis for
issuance of certificates to these subscribers. It is important to
note that the Resource PKI SHOULD never be used to authenticate the
identity of an organization, but rather to bind subscribers to the
INRs they hold. Because identity is not being vouched for by this
PKI, certificate application procedures need not verify legal
organization names, etc.
4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications
Certificate applications MUST be approved based on the normal
business practices of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's
records of INR holders. Each CA MUST follow the procedures specified
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
in 3.2.1 to verify that the requester holds the private key
corresponding to the public key that will be bound to the
certificate the CA issues to the requestor. The details of how
certificate applications are approved MUST be described in the CPS
for the CA in question.
4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications
No stipulation. Each CA MUST declare its expected time frame to
process (approve, issue and publish) a certificate application as
part of its CPS.
4.3. Certificate issuance
4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance
If a CA determines that the request is acceptable, it MUST issue the
corresponding certificate and publish it in the RPKI distributed
repository system via publication of the certificate at the CA's
repository publication point.
4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate
The CA MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate is published.
The means by which a subscriber is notified is defined by each CA in
its CPS.
4.4. Certificate acceptance
4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance
Within the timeframe specified in its CPS, the CA MUST place the
certificate in the repository and notify the subscriber. This MAY
be done without subscriber review and acceptance. Each CA MUST state
in its CPS the procedures it follows for publishing of the
certificate and notification to the subscriber.
4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA
Certificates MUST be published in the RPKI distributed repository
system via publication of the certificate at the CA's repository
publication point as per the conduct described in 4.4.1. The
procedures for publication MUST be defined by each CA in its CPS.
4.4.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
The CPS of each CA MUST indicate whether any other entities will be
notified when a certificate is issued.
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
4.5. Key pair and certificate usage
A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below.
4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage
Each holder of an INR is eligible to request an X.509 CA certificate
containing appropriate RFC 3779 extensions. Holders of CA resource
certificates also MAY issue EE certificates to themselves to enable
verification of RPKI-signed objects that they generate.
4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage
Reliance on a certificate must be reasonable under the
circumstances. If the circumstances indicate a need for additional
assurances, the relying party must obtain such assurances in order
for such reliance to be deemed reasonable.
Before any act of reliance, relying parties MUST independently (1)
verify that the certificate will be used for an appropriate purpose
that is not prohibited or otherwise restricted by this CP (see
section 1.5), and (2) assess the status of the certificate and all
the CAs in the chain (terminating at a TA accepted by the RP) that
issued the certificates relevant to the certificate in question. If
any of the certificates in the certificate chain have been revoked,
the relying party is solely responsible to determine whether
reliance on a digital signature to be verified by the certificate in
question is acceptable. Any such reliance is made solely at the risk
of the relying party.
If a relying party determines that use of the certificate is
appropriate, the relying party must utilize appropriate software
and/or hardware to perform digital signature verification as a
condition of relying on the certificate. Moreover the relying party
MUST validate the certificate in a manner consistent with the RPKI
certificate profile [RFCyyyy], which specifies the extended
validation algorithm for RPKI certificates.
4.6. Certificate renewal
This section describes the procedures for certificate renewal.
Certificate renewal is the issuance of a new certificate to replace
an old one prior to its expiration. Only the validity dates and the
serial number are changed. The public key and all other information
remain the same.
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal
A certificate MUST be processed for renewal based on its expiration
date or a renewal request from the subscriber. Prior to the
expiration of an existing subscriber's certificate, it is the
responsibility of the subscriber to renew the certificate to
maintain continuity of certificate usage. If the issuing CA
initiates the renewal process based on the certificate expiration
date, then that CA MUST notify the holder in advance of the renewal
process. The validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate
SHOULD overlap that of the previous certificate, to ensure
continuity of certificate usage. It is RECOMMENDED that the renewed
certificate be issued and published at least 1 week prior to the
expiration of the certificate it replaces.
Certificate renewal SHOULD incorporate the same public key as the
previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
compromised. If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
Section 4.7 apply.
4.6.2. Who may request renewal
Only the certificate holder or the issuing CA may initiate the
renewal process. The certificate holder MAY request an early
renewal, for example, if it wishes to change the public key, or if
it expects to be unavailable to support the renewal process during
the normal expiration period. An issuing CA MAY initiate the renewal
process based on the certificate expiration date.
4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests
Renewal procedures MUST ensure that the person or organization
seeking to renew a certificate is in fact the subscriber (or
authorized by the subscriber) of the certificate and the legitimate
holder of the INR associated with the renewed certificate. Renewal
processing MUST verify that the certificate in question has not been
revoked.
4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.3.2.
4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate
No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.1.
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA
No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.2.
4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.3.3.
4.7. Certificate re-key
This section describes the procedures for certificate re-key.
Certificate re-key is the issuance of a new certificate to replace
an old one because the key needs to be replaced. Unlike with
certificate renewal, the public key is changed.
4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key
Re-key of a certificate SHOULD be performed only when required,
based on:
1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
private key, or
2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated
key pair
A CA re-key operation has dramatic consequences, requiring the re-
issuance of all certificates issued by the re-keyed entity. So it
should be performed only when necessary and in a way that preserves
the ability of relying parties to validate certificates whose
validation path includes the re-keyed entity. CA key rollover MUST
follow the procedures defined in RFCxxxx [RFCxxxx].
Note that if a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779
extensions, the replacement certificate MUST incorporate the same
public key rather than a new key. This applies to when one is
adding INRs (revocation not required) and to when one is removing
INRs (revocation required (see Section 4.8.1).
If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
certificate MUST be revoked.
4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key
The holder of the certificate may request a re-key. In addition,
the CA that issued the certificate MAY chose to initiate a rekey
based on a verified compromise report.
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests
The re-key process follows the general procedures of certificate
generation as defined in section 4.3.
4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.3.2.
4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate
No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.1.
4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA
No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.2.
4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.3.3.
4.8. Certificate modification
4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification
Modification of a certificate occurs to implement changes to
selected attribute values in a certificate. In the context of the
RPKI, the only changes that are accommodated by certificate
modification are changes to the INR holdings described by the RFC
3779 extension and changes to the SIA extension.
When a certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is
issued. If no INR holdings are removed from the certificate, the new
certificate MUST contain the same public key and the same expiration
date as the original certificate, (but with the SIA extension and/or
the INR set expanded). In this case, revocation of the previous
certificate is not required.
When previously distributed INRs are removed from a certificate,
then the old certificate MUST be revoked and a new certificate MUST
be issued, reflecting the changed INR holdings. (The SIA extension
in the new certificate will be unchanged, unless the affected INR
holder supplies a new SIA value.)
4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification
Either the certificate holder or the issuer may initiate the
certificate modification process.
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests
The CA MUST determine that the requested modification is appropriate
and that the procedures for the issuance of a new certificate are
followed (see Section 4.3).
4.8.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.3.2.
4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.1.
4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA
No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.2.
4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.3.3.
4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension
4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation
A certificate MUST be revoked (and published on a CRL) if there is
reason to believe that there has been a compromise of a subscriber's
private key. A certificate also MAY be revoked to invalidate a data
object signed by the private key associated with that certificate.
Other circumstances that justify revocation of a certificate MAY be
specified in a CA's CPS.
Note: If new INRs are being added to an organization's existing
distribution, the old certificate need not be revoked. Instead, a
new certificate MAY be issued with both the old and the new
resources and the old key. If INRs are being removed or if there has
been a key compromise, then the old certificate MUST be revoked (and
a re-key MUST be performed in the event of key compromise).
4.9.2. Who can request revocation
This MUST be defined in the CPS of the relevant organization.
4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request
A subscriber MAY submit a request to the certificate issuer for a
revocation. This request MUST identify the certificate to be revoked
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
and MUST be authenticated. The procedures for making the request
MUST be described in the CPS for each CA. The RPKI provisioning
document [PROV] describes a protocol that MAY be used to make
revocation requests.
A certificate issuer MUST notify the subscriber when revoking a
certificate. The notification requirement is satisfied by CRL
publication. The CPS for a CA MUST indicate the means by which the
CA will inform a subscriber of certificate revocation.
4.9.4. Revocation request grace period
A subscriber SHOULD request revocation as soon as possible after the
need for revocation has been identified. There is no specified grace
period for the subscriber in this process.
4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request
No stipulation. Each CA SHOULD specify its expected revocation
processing time in its CPS.
4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties
A relying party MUST acquire and check the most recent, scheduled
CRL from the issuer of the certificate, whenever the relying party
validates a certificate.
4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency
The CRL issuance frequency MUST be determined by each CA and stated
in its CPS. Each CRL carries a nextScheduledUpdate value and a new
CRL MUST be published at or before that time. A CA MUST set the
nextUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the next
scheduled CRL will be issued.
4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs
The CPS for each CA MUST specify the maximum latency associated with
posting its CRL to the repository system.
4.10. Certificate status services
This PKI does not make provision for use of OCSP or SCVP, because it
is anticipated that the primary RPs (ISPs) will acquire and validate
certificates for all participating resource holders. These protocols
are not designed for such large-scale, bulk certificate status
checking. RPs MUST check for new CRLs at least daily. It is
RECOMMENDED that RPs perform this check several times per day, but
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
no more than 8-12 times per day (to avoid excessive repository
accesses).
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 27]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls
5.1. Physical controls
Each CA MUST maintain physical security controls for its operation
that are commensurate with those employed by the organization in the
management of INR distribution. The physical controls employed for
CA operation MUST be specified in its CPS. Possible topics to be
covered in the CPS are shown below. (These sections are taken from
[RFC3647].)
5.1.1. Site location and construction
5.1.2. Physical access
5.1.3. Power and air conditioning
5.1.4. Water exposures
5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection
5.1.6. Media storage
5.1.7. Waste disposal
5.1.8. Off-site backup
5.2. Procedural controls
Each CA MUST maintain procedural security controls that are
commensurate with those employed by the organization in the
management of INR distribution. The procedural security controls
employed for CA operation MUST be specified in its CPS. Possible
topics to be covered in the CPS are shown below. (These sections are
taken from [RFC3647].)
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
5.2.1. Trusted roles
5.2.2. Number of persons required per task
5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role
5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties
5.3. Personnel controls
Each CA MUST maintain personnel security controls that are
commensurate with those employed by the organization in the
management of INR distribution. The details for each CA MUST be
specified in its CPS.
5.4. Audit logging procedures
Details of how a CA implements the audit logging described in this
section (5.4.1 to 5.4.8) MUST be addressed in its CPS.
5.4.1. Types of events recorded
Audit records MUST be generated for the basic operations of the
certification authority computing equipment. Audit records MUST
include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
content data relating to the event. Auditable events include:
. Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)
. Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate
requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise
notifications)
. Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions
. Posting of any material to a repository
. Any attempts to change or delete audit data
. Key generation
. Software and/or configuration updates to the CA
. Clock adjustments
5.4.2. Frequency of processing log
Each CA MUST establish its own procedures for review of audit logs.
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 29]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
5.4.3. Retention period for audit log
Each CA MUST establish its own polices for retention of audit logs.
5.4.4. Protection of audit log
The audit log SHOULD be protected based on current industry
standards.
5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures
The audit log SHOULD be backed up based on current industry
standards.
5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments
The RPKI subsystems of a registry or ISP SHOULD participate in any
vulnerability assessments that these organizations run as part of
their normal business practice.
5.6. Key changeover
When a CA wishes to change keys, it MUST acquire a new certificate
containing its new public key. See [RFCxxxx] for a description of
how key changeover is effected in the RPKI.
5.8. CA or RA termination
In the RPKI, each subscriber acts as a CA authoritative for the
specified INRs that were distributed to that entity. Procedures
associated with the termination of a CA MUST be described in the CPS
for that CA. These procedures MUST include a provision to notify
each entity that issued a certificate to the organization that is
operating the CA that is terminating.
Since the RA function MUST be provided by the same entity operating
as the CA (see Section 1.4.2), there are no separate stipulations
for RAs.
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 30]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
6. Technical Security Controls
The organizations that distribute INRs to network subscribers are
authoritative for these distributions. This PKI is designed to
enable ISPs and network subscribers to demonstrate that they are the
holders of the INRs that have been distributed to them. Accordingly,
the security controls used by CAs and subscribers for this PKI need
only to be as secure as those that apply to the procedures for
administering the distribution of INR data by the extant
organizations. Details of each CA's security controls MUST be
described in the CPS issued by the CA.
6.1. Key pair generation and installation
6.1.1. Key pair generation
In most instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the
subject, i.e., the organization receiving the distribution of INRs.
However, some CAs MAY offer to generate key pairs on behalf of their
subjects at the request of the subjects, e.g., to accommodate
subscribers who do not have the ability to perform key generation in
a secure fashion. (The CA has to check the quality of the keys only
if it generates them (see 6.1.6)). Since the keys used in this PKI
are not for non-repudiation purposes, generation of key pairs by CAs
does not inherently undermine the security of the PKI. Each CA MUST
describe its key pair generation procedures in its CPS.
6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber
If a CA provides key pair generation services for subscribers, its
CPS MUST describe the means by which private keys are delivered to
subscribers in a secure fashion.
6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer
When a public key is transferred to the issuing CA to be certified,
it MUST be delivered through a mechanism ensuring that the public
key has not been altered during transit and that the subscriber
possesses the private key corresponding to the transferred public
key.
6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties
CA public keys for all entities (other than trust anchors) are
contained in certificates issued by other CAs. These certificates
MUST be published in the RPKI distributed repository system. Relying
parties download these certificates from the repositories. Public
key values and associated data for (putative) trust anchors are
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 31]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
distributed out of band and accepted by relying parties on the basis
of locally-defined criteria.
6.1.5. Key sizes
The algorithms and key sizes used in the RPKI are specified in RFC
ZZZZ [RFCzzzz].
6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking
The public key parameters used in the RPKI are specified in RFC ZZZZ
[RFCzzzz]. Each subscriber is responsible for performing checks on
the quality of its key pair. A CA is not responsible for performing
such checks for subscribers except in the case where the CA
generates the key pair on behalf of the subscriber.
6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)
The Key usage extension bit values used in the RPKI are specified in
RFC YYYY [RFCyyyy].
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls
6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls
The cryptographic module standards and controls employed by each CA
MUST be described in the CPS issued by that CA.
6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control
CAs MAY employ multi-person controls to constrain access to their
private keys, but this is not a requirement for all CAs in the PKI.
The CPS for each CA MUST describe which, if any, multi-person
controls it employs.
6.2.3. Private key escrow
No private key escrow procedures are required for the RPKI.
6.2.4. Private key backup
Because of the adverse operational implications associated with the
loss of use of a CA private key in the PKI, each CA MUST employ a
secure means to backup its private keys. The details of the
procedures for backing up a CA's private key MUST be described in
the CPS issued by the CA.
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 32]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
6.2.5. Private key archival
The details of the process and procedures used to archive the CA's
private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.
6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module
The details of the process and procedures used to transfer the CA's
private key into or from a cryptographic module MUST be described in
the CPS issued by the CA.
6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module
The details of the process and procedures used to store the CA's
private key on a cryptographic module and protect it from
unauthorized use MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.
6.2.8. Method of activating private key
The details of the process and procedures used to activate the CA's
private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.
6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key
The details of the process and procedures used to deactivate the
CA's private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.
6.2.10. Method of destroying private key
The details of the process and procedures used to destroy the CA's
private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating
The security rating of the cryptographic module MUST be described in
the CPS issued by the CA.
6.3. Other aspects of key pair management
6.3.1. Public key archival
Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
to archive public keys.
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 33]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods
The INRs held by a CA may periodically change when it receives new
distributions. To minimize disruption, the CA key pair MUST NOT
change when INRs are added to its certificate.
If ISP and network subscriber certificates are tied to the duration
of service agreements, these certificates should have validity
periods commensurate with the duration of these agreements. In any
case, the validity period for certificates MUST be chosen by the
issuing CA and described in its CPS.
6.4. Activation data
Each CA MUST document in its CPS how it will generate, install and
protect its activation data.
6.5. Computer security controls
Each CA MUST document the technical security requirements it employs
for CA computer operation in its CPS.
6.6. Life cycle technical controls
6.6.1. System development controls
The CPS for each CA MUST document any system development controls
required by that CA, if applicable.
6.6.2. Security management controls
The CPS for each CA MUST document the security controls applied to
the software and equipment used for this PKI. These controls MUST be
commensurate with those used for the systems used by the CAs for
managing the INRs.
6.6.3. Life cycle security controls
The CPS for each CA MUST document how the equipment (hardware and
software) used for this PKI will be procured, installed, maintained,
and updated. This MUST be done in a fashion commensurate with the
way in which equipment for the management and distribution of INRs
is handled.
6.7. Network security controls
The CPS for each CA MUST document the network security controls
employed for CA operation. These MUST be commensurate with the
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 34]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
protection it employs for the computers used for managing
distribution of INRs.
6.8. Time-stamping
The RPKI does not make use of time stamping.
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 35]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
7. Certificate and CRL Profiles
Please refer to the RPKI Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy].
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 36]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments
The Certificate Policy for a typical PKI defines the criteria
against which prospective CAs are evaluated and establishes
requirements that they must meet. In this PKI, the CAs are already
authoritative for the management of INRs, and the PKI simply
supports verification of the distribution of these resources to
network subscribers. Accordingly, whatever audit and other
assessments are already used to ensure the security of the
management of INRs is sufficient for this PKI. The CPS for each CA
MUST describe what audits and other assessments are used.
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 37]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
9. Other Business And Legal Matters
As noted throughout this certificate policy, the organizations
managing the distribution of INRs are authoritative in their roles
as managers of this data. They MUST operate this PKI to allow the
holders of INRs to generate digitally signed data that attest to
these distributions. Therefore, the manner in which the
organizations in question manage their business and legal matters
for this PKI MUST be commensurate with the way in which they already
manage business and legal matters in their existing roles. Since
there is no single set of responses to this section that would apply
to all organizations, the topics listed in sections 4.9.1 to 4.9.11
and 4.9.13 to 4.9.17 of RFC 3647 SHOULD be covered in the CPS issued
by each CA, although not every CA may choose to address all of these
topics.
9.12. Amendments
9.12.1. Procedure for amendment
The procedure for amending this CP is via written notice from the
IESG in the form of a new (BCP) RFC that updates or obsoletes this
document.
9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period
Successive versions of the CP will be published with the statement
"This CP takes effect on MM/DD/YYYY." MM/DD/YYYY MUST be a minimum
of 6 months from the date of publication.
9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed
If the IESG judges that changes to the CP do not materially reduce
the acceptability of certificates issued for RPKI purposes, there
will be no change to the CP OID. If the IESG judges that changes to
the CP do materially change the acceptability of certificates for
RPKI purposes, then there will be a new CP OID.
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 38]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
10. Security Considerations
According to X.509, a certificate policy (CP) is "a named set of
rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a
particular community and/or class of applications with common
security requirements." A CP may be used by a relying party to help
in deciding whether a certificate, and the binding therein, are
sufficiently trustworthy and otherwise appropriate for a particular
application. This document describes the CP for the Resource Public
Key Infrastructure (RPKI). There are separate documents
(Certification Practice Statements (CPS's)) that cover the factors
that determine the degree to which a relying party can trust the
binding embodied in a certificate. The degree to which such a
binding can be trusted depends on several factors, e.g., the
practices followed by the certification authority (CA) in
authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy, procedures,
and technical security controls, including the scope of the
subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the
private key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms
and conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of
warranties, and limitations of liability).
Since name uniqueness within the RPKI cannot be guaranteed, there is
a risk that two or more CAs in the RPKI will issue certificates and
CRLs under the same Issuer name. Path validation implementations
that conform to the resource certification path validation algorithm
[see RFCyyyy] verify that the same key was used to sign both the
target (the resource certificate) and the corresponding CRL. So a
name collision will not change the result. Use of the basic X.509
path validation algorithm, which assumes name uniqueness, could
result in a revoked certificate being accepted as valid or a valid
certificate being rejected as revoked. Relying parties must ensure
that the software they use to validate certificates issued under
this policy verifies that the same key was used to sign both the
certificate and the corresponding CRL, as specified in [RFCyyyy].
11. IANA Considerations
None.
12. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston, Randy Bush, Andrei
Robachevsky and other members of the RPKI community for reviewing
this document and Matt Lepinski for his help with the formatting.
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 39]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[ARCH] Lepinski M., Kent S., "An Infrastructure to Support Secure
Internet Routing," work in progress.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels," BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process - Revision 3,"
BCP 9, RFC 2026, October 1996.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., Seo, K., "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers," RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFCwwww] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and Michaelson, G., "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure," work in progress.
[RFCxxxx] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., Kent, S., "CA Key Rollover in
the RPKI," work in progress.
[RFCyyyy] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., Loomans, R., "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates," work in progress.
[RFCzzzz] Huston, G., "A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for use
in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure," work in progress.
13.2. Informative References
[PROV] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Ellacott, B., Austein, R., "A Protocol
for Provisioning Resource Certificates," work in progress.
[RFC3647] Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., Wu, S.,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and
Certification Practices Framework," RFC 3647, November 2003.
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 40]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
Authors' Addresses:
Stephen Kent
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
Email: skent@bbn.com
Derrick Kong
BBN Technologies
Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA
Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
Email: dkong@bbn.com
Karen Seo
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
Email: kseo@bbn.com
Ronald Watro
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA
Phone: +1 (617) 873-2551
Email: rwatro@bbn.com
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 41]
Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI October 2010
Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer
This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
Contributions published or made publicly available before November
10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
than English.
Copyright Statement
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with
respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this
document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in
Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without
warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Kent, Kong, Seo & Watro Expires April 2011 [Page 42]
