Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr) Kong, D.
Internet Draft Seo, K.
Expires: January 2008 Kent, S.
Intended Status: Informational BBN Technologies
July 2007
Template for an Internet Service Provider's Certification Practice
Statement (CPS) for the Internet IP address and AS Number PKI
draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-01.txt
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Abstract
This document contains a template to be used for creating a
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for a Local Internet Registry
(LIR) or Internet Service Provider (ISP) that is part of the Internet
IP Address and Autonomous System (AS) Number Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI).
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Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].
Table of Contents
Preface...........................................................8
1. Introduction...................................................9
1.1. Overview.................................................10
1.2. Document name and identification.........................11
1.3. PKI participants.........................................11
1.3.1. Certification authorities...........................11
1.3.2. Registration authorities............................12
1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................12
1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................12
1.3.5. Other participants [OMITTED]........................12
1.4. Certificate usage........................................12
1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................12
1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................13
1.5. Policy administration....................................13
1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............13
1.5.2. Contact person......................................13
1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy...13
1.5.4. CPS approval procedures.............................13
1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................14
2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................15
2.1. Repositories.............................................15
2.2. Publication of certification information.................15
2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication.........................15
2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................16
3. Identification And Authentication.............................17
3.1. Naming...................................................17
3.1.1. Types of names......................................17
3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................17
3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............17
3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........17
3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................17
3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.18
3.2. Initial identity validation..............................18
3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........18
3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............18
3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............18
3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................19
3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................19
3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................19
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3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....19
3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key19
3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after
revocation.................................................19
3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.20
4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............21
4.1. Certificate Application..................................21
4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............21
4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............21
4.2. Certificate application processing.......................21
4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions21
4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...21
4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............22
4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................22
4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............22
4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
certificate................................................22
4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities [OMITTED].........................................22
4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................22
4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........22
4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............22
4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................22
4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........23
4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......23
4.6. Certificate renewal......................................23
4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................23
4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................23
4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............24
4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber24
4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate
...........................................................24
4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....24
4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities [OMITTED].........................................24
4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................24
4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................24
4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...25
4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........25
4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber25
4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed
certificate................................................25
4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...25
4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities [OMITTED].........................................26
4.8. Certificate modification.................................26
4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........26
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4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............26
4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........26
4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to
subscriber.................................................26
4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
...........................................................27
4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...27
4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities [OMITTED].........................................27
4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................27
4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................27
4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................27
4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................27
4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................28
4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request
...........................................................28
4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.28
4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................28
4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................28
4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability
[OMITTED]..................................................29
4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED].29
4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available
[OMITTED]..................................................29
4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...29
4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............29
4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............29
4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........29
4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............29
4.10. Certificate status services.............................29
4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED}..............29
4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED].....................29
4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]........................29
4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]...........................29
4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED].......................29
4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
...........................................................29
4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and
practices [OMITTED]........................................29
5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls................30
5.1. Physical controls........................................30
5.1.1. Site location and construction......................30
5.1.2. Physical access.....................................30
5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................30
5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................30
5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................30
5.1.6. Media storage.......................................30
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5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................30
5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................30
5.2. Procedural controls......................................30
5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................30
5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................30
5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....30
5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................30
5.3. Personnel controls.......................................30
5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements31
5.3.2. Background check procedures.........................31
5.3.3. Training requirements...............................31
5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements...............31
5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence.................31
5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions..................31
5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements.................31
5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel.................31
5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................31
5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................31
5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................31
5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................32
5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................32
5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................32
5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external)
[OMITTED]..................................................32
5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....32
5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................32
5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................32
5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED].................32
5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]..............32
5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED].....................32
5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED].................32
5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED].32
5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external)
[OMITTED]..................................................32
5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information
[OMITTED]..................................................32
5.6. Key changeover...........................................32
5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............33
5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]33
5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted
[OMITTED]..................................................33
5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]..33
5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster
[OMITTED]..................................................33
5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................33
6. Technical Security Controls...................................34
6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................34
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6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................34
6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................34
6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........34
6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........34
6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................35
6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking35
6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)35
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls......................................................35
6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........35
6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......35
6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................36
6.2.4. Private key backup..................................36
6.2.5. Private key archival................................36
6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module
...........................................................36
6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........36
6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................36
6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................36
6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................36
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................37
6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................37
6.3.1. Public key archival.................................37
6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
periods....................................................37
6.4. Activation data..........................................37
6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation.........37
6.4.2. Activation data protection..........................37
6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data....................37
6.5. Computer security controls...............................37
6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement....37
6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]..................38
6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................38
6.6.1. System development controls.........................38
6.6.2. Security management controls........................38
6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................38
6.7. Network security controls................................38
6.8. Time-stamping............................................38
7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................39
7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]............................39
7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................39
7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]....................39
7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED]......39
7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED]....39
7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED]......39
7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]..............39
7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]................................39
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7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]..........................39
7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]......39
7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED].....39
7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]....39
7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate
Policies extension [OMITTED]...............................39
7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]....................................39
7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................39
7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]..............39
7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED]..............39
7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED]............39
7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED]..............40
7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]...................................40
7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................40
7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]...........................40
8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments........................41
8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment.................41
8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor......................41
8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity...............41
8.4. Topics covered by assessment.............................41
8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency..................41
8.6. Communication of results.................................41
9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................42
9.1. Fees.....................................................43
9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................43
9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............43
9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................43
9.2. Financial responsibility.................................43
9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................43
9.2.2. Other assets........................................43
9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities.....43
9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................43
9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................43
9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
information................................................43
9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..43
9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................43
9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................43
9.4.2. Information treated as private......................43
9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................43
9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......43
9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......43
9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative
process....................................................43
9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........43
9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............43
9.6. Representations and warranties...........................43
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9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................43
9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........44
9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........44
9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants
[OMITTED]..................................................44
9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................44
9.8. Limitations of liability.................................44
9.9. Indemnities..............................................44
9.10. Term and termination....................................44
9.10.1. Term...............................................44
9.10.2. Termination........................................44
9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................44
9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.44
9.12. Amendments..............................................44
9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................44
9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................44
9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED]
...........................................................44
9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................44
9.14. Governing law...........................................44
9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................44
9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................44
9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................44
9.16.2. Assignment.........................................44
9.16.3. Severability.......................................44
9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).44
9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................45
9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................45
10. Security Considerations......................................45
11. IANA Considerations..........................................45
12. Acknowledgments..............................................45
13. References...................................................46
13.1. Normative References....................................46
13.2. Informative References..................................46
Author's Addresses...............................................47
Intellectual Property Statement..................................48
Disclaimer of Validity...........................................48
Copyright Statement..............................................48
Preface
This document contains a template to be used for creating a
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for a Local Internet Registry
or an Internet Service Provider that is part of the Internet IP
Address and Autonomous System (AS) Number Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI). The user of this document should
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1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., "<Name of
LIR/ISP> Certification Practice Statement for the Internet IP
Address and AS Number Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)" with
date, author, etc.
2. leave the table of contents
3. delete this Preface
4. fill in the information indicated below by <text in angle
brackets>
5. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's
Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of
Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a
reference section with just the references in 13.2
6. update the table of contents to reflect the changes required by
steps 4 and 5 above .
Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained
section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections, in order
to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme employed
in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are included and
marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant sections are
also marked [OMITTED]. There is a note to this effect in the
Introduction below. This information should be left in the CPS as an
explanation to the user.
1. Introduction
This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <Name
of LIR/ISP>. It describes the practices employed by the <Name of
LIR/ISP> Certification Authority (CA) in the Internet IP Address and
Autonomous System (AS) Number PKI. These practices are defined in
accordance with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP, [CP])
of this PKI.
The Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI is aimed at supporting
improved routing security. The goal is that each entity that
allocates IP addresses or AS numbers to an entity will, in parallel,
issue a certificate reflecting this allocation. These certificates
will enable verification that the holder of the associated private
key has been allocated the resources indicated in the certificate,
and is the current, unique holder of these resources. The
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certificates and CRLs, in conjunction with ancillary digitally signed
data structures, will provide critical inputs for routing security
mechanisms, e.g., generation of route filters by LIRs/ISPs.
The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which
this CPS was created is that it does not purport to identify an
address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name
contained in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each
certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity
to assert in a verifiable fashion, that it is the current holder of
an address block or an AS number, based on the current records of the
entity responsible for the resources in question. Verification of the
assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity to
digitally sign data producing a signature that is verifiable using
the public key contained in the corresponding certificate, and
validation of that certificate in the context of this PKI. This PKI
is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of claims
related to address space and AS number holdings, with emphasis on
support of routing security mechanisms. Use of the certificates and
CRLs managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of
this PKI's CP, and relying parties should reject such uses.
For this particular CPS, it should be noted that LIRs/ISPs do not
allocate AS numbers to their subscribers; instead subscribers receive
AS numbers from the RIR for their region. Thus, the certificates
issued by <Name of LIR/ISP> cover only IP address allocations.
However, in places in this document, text applying to the overall PKI
may refer to both IP address space and AS numbers.
Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained
section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections, in order
to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme employed
in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are included and
marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant sections are
also marked [OMITTED].
1.1. Overview
This CPS describes:
o Participants
o Distribution of the certificates and CRLs
o How certificates are issued, managed, and revoked
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o Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.)
o Key management
o Audit procedures
o Business and legal issues
The PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see appendix in
the CP for more details):
o CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks
and/or AS numbers, and for each address space (AS number) holder
o End entity ("shadow") certificates for organizations to use in
verifying Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs) and other (non-
certificate/CRL) signed objects
o In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in
support of access control for the repository system
1.2. Document name and identification
The name of this document is "<Name of LIR/ISP>'s Certification
Practice Statement for the Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI".
1.3. PKI participants
Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or
organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The
term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
service from an ISP. Thus, in this PKI, the term "subscriber" can
refer both to ISPs, which can be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs, and LIRs,
and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but which are
subscribers of LIRs/ISPs in the networking sense of the term. Also
note that, for brevity, this document always refers to subscribers as
organizations, even though some subscribers are individuals. When
necessary, the phrase "network subscriber" is used to refer to an
organization that receives network services from an LIR/ISP.
1.3.1. Certification authorities
<Name of LIR/ISP> will operate a CA, the primary function of which is
the issuance of certificates to organizations to which address space
is allocated by <Name of LIR/ISP>. This CA will also issue end entity
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("shadow") certificates for use in verifying signatures of ROAs. In
the future, this CA may also issue other types of end entity (EE)
certificates, e.g., EE certificates to operations personnel in
support of repository maintenance.
1.3.2. Registration authorities
For the certificates issued by this LIR/ISP under this PKI, this
function is provided by the LIR/ISP per se. The LIR/ISP already
performs this function -- establishing a formal relationship with
each subscriber and assuming responsibility for allocating and
tracking the current allocation of address space. Since the LIR/ISP
operates the CA, there is no distinct RA.
1.3.3. Subscribers
The primary types of organizations that receive allocations of IP
addresses from this CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense are
network subscribers. <If appropriate, add "Additionally, this LIR
issues address space to ISPs, who are thus also subscribers.">
1.3.4. Relying parties
Entities that need to validate claims of address space current
holdings are relying parties. Thus, for example, entities that make
use of address certificates in support of improved routing security
are relying parties. This includes LIRs/ISPs, multi-homed
organizations exchanging BGP [BGP4] traffic with LIRs/ISPs, and
subscribers who have received an allocation of address space from one
ISP or from a registry, but want to authorize an (or another) LIR/ISP
to originate routes to this space.
To the extent that repositories make use of certificates for access
control - checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL, and
ROA updates -- they too act as relying parties.
1.3.5. Other participants [OMITTED]
1.4. Certificate usage
1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses
The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in
support of validation of claims of current holdings of address space
and/or AS numbers, e.g., for routing security. With regard to routing
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security, an initial goal of this PKI is to allow the holder of a set
of address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure fashion, the AS
number of each entity that is authorized to originate a route to
these addresses, including the context of ISP proxy aggregation.
Additional uses of the PKI, consistent with the basic goal cited
above, are also permitted under this policy.
Some of the certificates that may be issued under this hierarchy
could be used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g.,
access control for the repository system. Such uses also are
permitted under this policy.
1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses
Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited.
1.5. Policy administration
1.5.1. Organization administering the document
This CPS is administered by <Name of LIR/ISP>
1.5.2. Contact person
<Insert ISP contact info here>
1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy
Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS
numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public
key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the same
organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence they are
authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.
1.5.4. CPS approval procedures
Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS
numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public
key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the same
organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence they are
authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.
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1.6. Definitions and acronyms
CP- Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that indicates
the applicability of a certificate to a particular
community and/or class of applications with common security
requirements.
CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
in issuing certificates.
ISP - Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing
and selling Internet services to other organizations.
LIR - Local Internet Registry. This is an organization, typically a
network service provider, that sub allocates the assignment of
IP addresses for a portion of the area covered by a Regional (or
National) Registry.
NIR - National Internet Registry. An NIR is an organization that
manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a
portion of the geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry.
These form an optional second tier in the tree scheme used to
manage IP address and AS number allocation.
RIR - Regional Internet Registry. An RIR is an organization that
manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a
specified geopolitical area. At present, there are five RIRs:
ARIN (North America), RIPE NCC (Europe), APNIC (Asia -Pacific),
LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and AFRINIC (Africa).
ROA - Route Origination Authorization. This is a digitally signed
object that identifies a network operator, identified by an AS,
that is authorized to originate routes to a specified set of
address blocks.
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2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities
2.1. Repositories
As per the CP, certificates and CRLs will be made available for
downloading by all network operators, to enable them to validate this
data for use in support of routing security.
<If you maintain a local repository system, describe here its basic
set up.>
2.2. Publication of certification information
<Name of LIR/ISP> will upload certificates and CRLs issued by it to a
repository that operates as part of a world-wide distributed system
of repositories. <Name of LIR/ISP> will also upload to this
repository system any ROAs that it creates.
2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication
<Describe here your procedures for publication (to the global
repository system) of the certificates and CRLs that you issue. If
you choose to outsource publication of PKI data, you still need to
provide this information for relying parties.>
As per the CP, the following standards exist for publication times
and frequency:
o A certificate will be published within 24 hours after issuance.
o The <Name of LIR/ISP> CA will publish its CRL prior to the
nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by
the CA. Within 12 hours of effecting revocation, the CA will publish
a CRL with an entry for the revoked certificate.
o A new ROA will be published before a predecessor ROA has expired, or
within 24 hours after an address space holder has changed the set of
ASes that is authorized to advertise the address blocks it holds.
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2.4. Access controls on repositories
o Access to the repository system, for modification of entries,must be
controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data
(certificates, CRLs and ROAs) uploaded to a repository are digitally
signed. Updates to the repository system must be validated to ensure
that the data being added or replaced is authorized. This document
does not define the means by which updates are verified, but use of
the PKI itself to validate updates is anticipated.
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3. Identification And Authentication
3.1. Naming
3.1.1. Types of names
The Subject of each certificate issued by this LIR/ISP is identified
by an X.500 Disinguished Name (DN). It will consist of a single CN
attribute with a value generated by the issuer.
3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful
The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique
relative to all certificates issued by <Name of LIR/ISP>. However,
there is no guarantee that the subject name will be globally unique
in this PKI.
Note: The certificates issued under this PKI are used for
authorization in support of routing security, not for identification.
The name of the holder of an address block need not be "meaningful"
in the conventional, human-readable sense.
3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers
Although Subject names in certificates issued by this LIR/ISP need
not be meaningful, and may appear "random," anonymity is not a
function of this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature
is provided.
3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms
None
3.1.5. Uniqueness of names
<Name of LIR/ISP> certifies Subject names that are unique among the
certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate certificate
path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor enforced
through technical means.
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3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks
Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there is
no provision to either recognize or authenticate trademarks, service
marks, etc.
3.2. Initial identity validation
3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key
<Describe the method whereby each subscriber will be required to
demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to issuing
the certificate. Standard methods are described in the Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP) (RFC 2510) and the Certificate Management
Messages over CMS protocol (CMC), RFC 2797.>
3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity
Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the
organizational identity of resource holders, with the exception of
registries. However, certificates are issued to resource holders in a
fashion that preserves the accuracy of bindings in this ISP's
records.
<Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that each
certificate that is issued accurately reflects your records with
regard to the organization to which you have allocated (or sub-
allocated) the address space identified in the certificate. The
specific procedures employed for this purpose should be commensurate
with those you already employ as an ISP in the maintenance of address
allocation.>
3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity
Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual
identity of a resource holder. However, this ISP maintains contact
information for each resource holder in support of certificate
renewal, rekey, or revocation.
<Describe the procedures that will be used to identify at least one
individual as a representative of each organization that is an
address space holder. This is done in support of issuance, renewal,
and revocation of the certificate issued to the organization. The
procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in
authenticating individuals as representatives for address space
holders. Note that this authentication is solely for use by you in
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dealing with the organizations to which you allocate (or sub-
allocate) address space, and thus must not be relied upon outside of
this CA-subscriber relationship.>
3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information
No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued
under this certificate policy.
3.2.5. Validation of authority
<Describe the procedures that will be used to verify that an
individual claiming to represent a resource holder to which a
certificate is issued, is authorized to represent that resource
holder in this context. The procedures should be commensurate with
those you already employ as an LIR/ISP in authenticating individuals
as representatives of resource holders.>
3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation
This PKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
other PKI.
3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests
3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key
<Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that an
organization requesting a re-key is the legitimate holder of the
certificate (and associated address space) to be re-keyed. This
should also include the method employed for verifying PoP of the
private key corresponding to the new public key. With respect to
authentication of the holder of the address space, the procedures
should be commensurate with those you already employ in the
maintenance of address allocation. Note that your organization can
choose to require periodic re-keying consistent with contractual
agreements with the recipient.>
3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after
revocation
<Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that an
organization requesting a re-key after revocation is the legitimate
holder of the address space in the certificate being re-keyed. This
should also include the method employed for verifying PoP of the
private key corresponding to the new public key. With respect to
authentication of the resource holder, the procedures should be
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commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of
resource allocation records.>
3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request
<Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that the
resource holder requesting revocation is the subject of the
certificate (or an authorized representative thereof) to be revoked.
Note that there may be different procedures for the case where the
legitimate subject still possesses the original private key as
opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key.These
procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in
the maintenance of resource holder records.>
Note: If additional IP addresses are being added to an
organization's existing allocation, the old certificate is not
revoked. Instead, a new certificate is issued with both the old and
the new resources and the old key. If IP addresses or AS numbers are
being removed or if there has been a key compromise, then the old
certificate will be revoked (and a re-key will be performed in the
event of a key compromise). A subscriber may request that its
resource holdings be spread over a set of certificates, rather than
consolidating all resources in one certificate. This may be
appropriate if the subscriber wants to manage his resource
allocations as distinct allocations within his organization.
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4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements
4.1. Certificate Application
4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application
The following entities may submit a certificate application to this
CA:
o <Insert if appropriate: "Any ISP subordinate to this LIR.">
o Any entity that holds address space assigned by this LIR/ISP
4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities
<Describe your enrollment process for issuing certificates both for
initial deployment of the PKI and as an ongoing process. Note that
most of the certificates in this PKI are issued as part of ISP normal
business practices, as an adjunct to address space allocation, and
thus a separate application to request a certificate may not be
necessary. If so, reference should be made to where these practices
are documented.>
4.2. Certificate application processing
<Describe the certificate request/response standards that you will
employ. You should make use of existing standards for certificate
application processing. Relevant standards include RFC 4210,
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management
Protocol (CMP), RFC 2797, Certificate Management Messages over CMS,
and RSA Labs standards PKCS #7 and PKCS #10. >
4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions
<Describe your practices for identification and authentication of
certificate applicants. Often, existing practices employed by you to
identify and authenticate organizations form the basis for issuance
of certificates to these subscribers. Reference can be made to
documentation of such existing practices.>
4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications
<Describe your practices for approval or rejection of applications
and refer to documentation of existing business practices relevant to
this process. Note that according to the CP, certificate
applications will be approved based on the normal business practices
of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of address
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space holders. Also, each CA will verify that the requester holds the
corresponding private key for the public key that will be bound to
the certificate the CA issues to the requester.>
4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications
<You may declare here your expected time frame for processing
certificate applications.>
4.3. Certificate issuance
4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance
<Describe in this section your procedures for issuance of a
certificate.>
4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
certificate
<Describe in this section your procedures for notification of a
subscriber when a certificate has been issued.>
4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities [OMITTED]
4.4. Certificate acceptance
4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance
When a certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the repository
and notify the subscriber. This will be done without subscriber
review and acceptance.
4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA
Certificates will be published in the Repository system once issued
following the conduct described in 4.4.1. <Describe your procedures
for publication of the approved certificate.>
4.5. Key pair and certificate usage
A summary of the use model for the IP Address and AS Number PKI is
provided below.
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4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage
The certificates issued by this LIR/ISP to resource holders are CA
certificates. The private key associated with each of these
certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and
CRLs. Resource holders who are LIRs/ISPs will issue CA certificates
to any organizations which they allocate IP address space, one or
more end entity "shadow" certificates for use in verifying signatures
on ROAs, and end entity certificates to operators in support of
repository access control. Non-LIR/ISP resource holders will issue
just the latter two kinds of certificates since they will not be
allocating address space to other organizations.
4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage
The primary relying parties in this PKI are LIRs/ISPs, who will use
shadow certificates to verify ROAs, e.g., in support of generating
route filters. Repositories will use operator certificates to verify
the authorization of entities to engage in repository maintenance
activities, and thus repositories represent a secondary type of
relying party.
4.6. Certificate renewal
4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal
As per the CP, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on
its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate
Subject. If <Name of LIR/ISP> initiates the renewal process based on
the certificate expiration date, then <Name of LIR/ISP> will notify
the resource holder <insert the period of advance warning, e.g., "2
weeks in advance of the expiration date", or the general policy,
e.g., "in conjunction with notification of service expiration".> The
validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that
of the previous certificate by <insert length of overlap period,
e.g., 1 week>, to ensure uninterrupted coverage.
Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the
previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
compromised. If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
Section 4.7 will apply.
4.6.2. Who may request renewal
The certificate holder or <Name of LIR/ISP> may initiate the renewal
process. <For the case of the certificate holder, describe what steps
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will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of the entity
requesting the renewal.>
4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests
<Describe your procedures for handling certificate renewal requests.
This must include verification that the certificate in question has
not been revoked.>
4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
<Describe your procedure for notification of new certificate issuance
to the subscriber. This should be consistent with 4.3.2.>
4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate
When a renewal certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without
subscriber review and acceptance.
4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA
<Describe your policy and procedures for publication of a renewed
certificate. This should be consistent with 4.4.2.>
4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities [OMITTED]
4.7. Certificate re-key
4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key
As per the CP, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when
required, based on:
1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
private key, or
2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key
pair
If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the
replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a
new key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time.
If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
certificate will be revoked.
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Section 5.6 of the Certificate Policy notes that when a CA signs a
certificate, the signing key should have a validity period that
exceeds the validity period of the certificate. This places
additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key.
4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key
The holder of the certificate may request a re-key. In addition,
<Name of LIR/ISP> may initiate a re-key based on a verified
compromise report. <Describe what steps will be taken to verify the
identity and authorization of a subscriber to request a re-key when
the private key has been reported as compromised. Also describe how a
compromise report received from other than a subscriber is verified.>
4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests
<Describe your process for handling re-keying requests. As per the
CP, this should be consistent with the process described in Section
4.3. So reference can be made to that section.>
4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
<Describe your policy regarding notifying the subscriber re:
availability of the new certificate. This should be consistent with
the notification process for any new certificate issuance (see
section 4.3.2).>
4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate
When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without
subscriber review and acceptance.
4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA
<Describe your policy regarding publication of the new certificate.
This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
certificate (see section 4.4.2).>
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4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities [OMITTED]
4.8. Certificate modification
4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification
As per the CP, modification of a certificate occurs to implement
changes to the RFC 3779 extension values in a certificate. A
subscriber can request a certificate modification when this
information in a currently valid certificate has changed, as a result
of changes in the resource holdings of the subscriber.
If a subscriber is to be allocated address space in addition to a
current allocation, then this is accomplished through a certificate
modification. When a certificate modification is approved, a new
certificate is issued. The new certificate will contain the same
public key and the same expiration date as the original certificate,
but with the incidental information corrected and/or the address
space and AS allocations expanded. When previously allocated address
space is to be removed from a certificate, then the old certificate
MUST be revoked and a new certificate (reflecting the new allocation)
issued.
4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification
The certificate holder or <Name of LIR/ISP> may initiate the
certificate modification process. <For the case of the certificate
holder, state here what steps will be taken to verify the identity
and authorization of the entity requesting the modification.>
4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests
<Describe your procedures for verification of the modification
request and procedures for the issuance of a new certificate. These
should be consistent with the processes described in Sections 4.2 and
4.3.1.>
4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to
subscriber
<Describe your procedure for notification of issuance of a modified
certificate. This should be consistent with the notification process
for any new certificate (see section 4.3.2).>
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4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
When a modified certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without
subscriber review and acceptance.
4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA
<Describe your procedure for publication of a modified certificate.
This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
certificate (see section 4.4.2).>
4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities [OMITTED]
4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension
4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation
As per the CP, certificates can be revoked for several reasons.
Either <Name of ISP> or the subject may choose to end the
relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to
revoke the certificate. A certificate also may be revoked due to
loss or compromise of the private key corresponding to the public key
in the certificate. Finally, a certificate may be revoked in order
to invalidate data signed by that certificate.
4.9.2. Who can request revocation
The certificate holder or <Name of LIR/ISP> may request a revocation.
<For the case of the certificate holder, describe what steps will be
taken to verify the identity and authorization of the entity
requesting the revocation.>
4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request
<Describe your process for handling a certificate revocation request.
This should include:
o Procedure to be used by the certificate holder to request a
revocation
o Procedure for notification of the certificate holder when the
revocation is initiated by <Name of LIR/ISP>.>
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4.9.4. Revocation request grace period
A subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the
need for revocation has been identified.
4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request
<Describe your policy on the time period within which you will
process a revocation request.>
4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties
As per the CP, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and
checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the
certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate.
4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency
<Name of LIR/ISP> will publish CRLs approximately every 24 hours.
Each CRL will carry a nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL will be
published at or before that time. <Name of LIR/ISP> will set the
nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the
next scheduled CRL will be issued.
4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs
A CRL will be posted to the repository system with minimal delay
after generation.
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4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]
4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED]
4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available
[OMITTED]
4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]
4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED]
4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]
4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED]
4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]
4.10. Certificate status services
<Name of LIR/ISP> does not support OCSP or SCVP.
4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED}
4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED]
4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]
4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]
4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED]
4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and
practices [OMITTED]
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5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls
5.1. Physical controls
<As per the CP, describe the physical controls that you employ for
certificate management. These should be commensurate to those used in
the management of address space allocation.>
5.1.1. Site location and construction
5.1.2. Physical access
5.1.3. Power and air conditioning
5.1.4. Water exposures
5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection
5.1.6. Media storage
5.1.7. Waste disposal
5.1.8. Off-site backup
5.2. Procedural controls
<As per the CP, describe the procedural security controls that you
employ for certificate management. These should be commensurate to
those used in the management of address space allocation.>
5.2.1. Trusted roles
5.2.2. Number of persons required per task
5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role
5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties
5.3. Personnel controls
<As per the CP, describe the personnel security controls that you
employ for individuals associated with certificate management. These
should be commensurate to those used in the management of address
space allocation.>
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5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
5.3.2. Background check procedures
5.3.3. Training requirements
5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements
5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence
5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions
5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements
5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel
5.4. Audit logging procedures
5.4.1. Types of events recorded
Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the
certification authority computing equipment. Audit records will
include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
content data relating to the event. Auditable events include:
. Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)
. Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate
requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise
notifications)
. Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions
. Posting of any material to a repository
. Any attempts to change or delete audit data
<List here any additional types of events that will be audited.>
5.4.2. Frequency of processing log
<Describe your procedures for review of audit logs.>
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5.4.3. Retention period for audit log
<Describe your policies for retention of audit logs.>
5.4.4. Protection of audit log
<Describe your policies for protection of the audit logs.>
5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures
<Describe your policies for backup of the audit logs.>
5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]
5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED]
5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments
<Describe any vulnerability assessments that you will apply (or have
already applied) to the PKI subsystems. This should include whether
such assessments have taken place and any procedures or plans to
perform or repeat/reassess vulnerabilities in the future.>
5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]
5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED]
5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]
5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED]
5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED]
5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED]
5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external)
[OMITTED]
5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information
[OMITTED]
5.6. Key changeover
The <Name of LIR/ISP> CA certificate will contain a validity period
that encompasses that of all certificates verifiable using this CA
certificate. To support this, <Name of LIR/ISP> will create a new
signature key pair, and acquire and publish a new certificate
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containing the public key of the pair, <specify here the minimum
amount of lead time, e.g., "a minimum of 6 months"> in advance of the
scheduled change of the current signature key pair.
5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]
5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]
5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted
[OMITTED]
5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]
5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster
[OMITTED]
5.8. CA or RA termination
<Describe the fallback policy for management of your CA's IP address
space allocations in case of its own termination.>
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6. Technical Security Controls
This section describes the security controls used by <Name of
LIR/ISP>.
6.1. Key pair generation and installation
6.1.1. Key pair generation
<Describe the procedures that will be used to generate the CA key
pair, and, if applicable, key pairs for network subscribers. In most
instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the subscriber,
i.e., the organization receiving the allocation of address space.
However, your procedures may include one for generating key pairs on
behalf of your subscribers if they so request. (This might be done
for subscribers who do not have the ability to perform key generation
in a secure fashion or who want a registry to provide backup for the
subscriber private key.) Since the keys used in this PKI are not for
non-repudiation purposes, generation of key pairs by CAs does not
inherently undermine the security of the PKI.>
6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber
<If the procedures in 6.1.1 include providing key pair generation
services for subscribers, describe the means by which private keys
are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion. Otherwise say this
is not applicable.>
6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer
<Describe the means by which the public keys are delivered to you,
e.g., electronic submission using a PKCS#10 Certificate Signing
Request (CSR). This description should explain how this public key
delivery fits in with the process whereby the subscriber requests IP
address space, authenticates itself, pays for the resources, etc. The
security of the procedures used by a subscriber to deliver its public
key to you need only be commensurate with the security of the
procedures already employed for management of the IP address space.>
6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties
Except for the Root CA, all CA public keys used in this PKI are
contained in certificates issued by other CAs and will be published
via a repository system. Relying parties will download these
certificates from this system. Public key values and associated data
for the default trust anchors (RIRs) will be distributed out of band,
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e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be made
available to the Internet community.
6.1.5. Key sizes
For the <Name of LIR/ISP> CA's certificate and shadow CA certificate,
the RSA key size will be <insert key size -- e.g., 2048 or 1024
bits.>
6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking
The RSA algorithm [RSA] is used in this PKI with the public exponent
(e) F4 (65,537).
<If the procedures in 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair generation,
insert here text specifying EITHER that the subscriber is responsible
for performing checks on the quality of its key pair and saying that
<Name of ISP> is not responsible for performing such checks for
subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA for checking
the quality of these subscriber key pairs.>
6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)
The Key usage extension bit values will be consistent with RFC 3280.
For <Name of LIR/ISP>'s CA certificates, the keyCertSign and cRLSign
bits will be set TRUE. All other bits (including digitalSignature)
will be set FALSE, and the extension will be marked critical.
<Specify whether end entity certificates (issued by the CA for its
operators) will include this extension and if so, the appropriate bit
values as per RFC 3280.>
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls
6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls
The <Name of LIR/ISP> CA employs a cryptographic module evaluated
under FIPS 140-2, at level 4 [FIPS].
6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control
<If you choose to use multi-person controls to constrain access to
this CA's private keys, then insert the following text. "There will
be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m> multi-person
control.">
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6.2.3. Private key escrow
No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI.
6.2.4. Private key backup
<Describe the procedures used for backing up your CA's private key.
The following aspects should be included. (1) The copying should be
done under the same multi-party control as is used for controlling
the original private key. (2) At least one copy should be kept at an
off-site location for disaster recovery purposes.>
6.2.5. Private key archival
See sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4
6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module
The private keys for <Name of LIR/ISP>'s CA and shadow CA will be
generated by the cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1. The
private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted form for
backup and/or transfer to a new module.
6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module
The private keys for <Name of LIR/ISP>'s CA will be stored in the
cryptographic module and will be protected from unauthorized use in
accordance with the FIPS 140-2 requirements applicable to the module.
(See [FIPS])
6.2.8. Method of activating private key
<Describe the mechanisms and data used to activate your CA's private
key.>
6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key
The cryptographic module, when activated, will not be left
unattended. After use, it will be deactivated by <Describe the
procedure for deactivation of your CA's private key.> The module will
be stored securely when not in use.
6.2.10. Method of destroying private key
<Describe the method used for destroying your CA's private key, e.g.,
when it is superseded. This will depend on the particular module.>
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6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating
The cryptographic module will be certified FIPS 140-2, at level 2 or
3 [FIPS].
6.3. Other aspects of key pair management
6.3.1. Public key archival
Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
to archive public keys.
6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
periods
The <Name of LIR/ISP> CA's key pair will have a validity interval of
<insert number of years - LIR/ISP key pairs and certificates should
have reasonably long validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize
the disruption caused by key changeover.>
6.4. Activation data
6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation
<Describe how activation data for your CA will be generated.>
6.4.2. Activation data protection
Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by <Describe
your procedures here>.
6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data
<Add here any details you wish to provide with regard to the
activation data for your CA. If there are none, say "None.">
6.5. Computer security controls
6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement
<Describe your security requirements for the computers used to
support this PKI, e.g., requirements for authenticated logins, audit
capabilities, etc. These requirements should be commensurate with
those used for the computers used for managing allocation of IP
addresses.>
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6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]
6.6. Life cycle technical controls
6.6.1. System development controls
<Describe any system development controls that you will apply to the
PKI systems, e.g., use of Trusted System Development Methodology
(TSDM) Level 2.>
6.6.2. Security management controls
<Describe the security management controls that will be used for the
software and equipment employed by the CA. These security measures
should be commensurate with those used for the systems used by the
CAs for managing and allocating IP addresses.>
6.6.3. Life cycle security controls
<Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for PKI
functions will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated. This
should be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which
equipment for the management and allocation of IP address space is
handled. >
6.7. Network security controls
<Describe the network security controls that will be used for CA
operation. These should be commensurate with the network security
controls employed for the computers used for managing allocation of
IP addresses.>
6.8. Time-stamping
The PKI in question does not make use of time stamping.
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7. Certificate and CRL Profiles
Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RESCERT].
7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]
7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]
7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]
7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED]
7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED]
7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED]
7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]
7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]
7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]
7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]
7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED]
7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]
7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate
Policies extension [OMITTED]
7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]
7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]
7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]
7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED]
7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED]
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7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED]
7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]
7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]
7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]
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8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments
<List here any audit and other assessments used to ensure the
security of the administration of IP addresses. These are sufficient
for the PKI systems.>
8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment
8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor
8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity
8.4. Topics covered by assessment
8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency
8.6. Communication of results
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9. Other Business And Legal Matters
<The sections below are optional. Fill them in as appropriate for
your organization. Note that the manner in which you manage your
business and legal matters for this PKI should be commensurate with
the way in which you manage business and legal matters for the
allocation of IP addresses.>
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9.1. Fees
9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees
9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable)
9.1.3. Refund policy
9.2. Financial responsibility
9.2.1. Insurance coverage
9.2.2. Other assets
9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities
9.3. Confidentiality of business information
9.3.1. Scope of confidential information
9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
information
9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information
9.4. Privacy of personal information
9.4.1. Privacy plan
9.4.2. Information treated as private
9.4.3. Information not deemed private
9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information
9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information
9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process
9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances
9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable)
9.6. Representations and warranties
9.6.1. CA representations and warranties
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9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties
9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties
9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants
[OMITTED]
9.7. Disclaimers of warranties
9.8. Limitations of liability
9.9. Indemnities
9.10. Term and termination
9.10.1. Term
9.10.2. Termination
9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival
9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants
9.12. Amendments
9.12.1. Procedure for amendment
9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period
9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED]
9.13. Dispute resolution provisions
9.14. Governing law
9.15. Compliance with applicable law
9.16. Miscellaneous provisions
9.16.1. Entire agreement
9.16.2. Assignment
9.16.3. Severability
9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)
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9.16.5. Force Majeure
9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]
10. Security Considerations
The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in
a certificate depends on several factors. These factors can include
the practices followed by the certification authority (CA) in
authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy, procedures,
and technical security controls, including the scope of the
subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the private
key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms and
conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of
warranties, and limitations of liability). This document provides a
framework to address the technical, procedural, personnel, and
physical security aspects of Certification Authorities, Registration
Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and relying party
cryptographic modules, in order to ensure that the certificate
generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and revocation is
done in a secure manner. Specifically, Section 3 Identification and
Authentication (I&A); Section 4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational
Requirements; Section 5 Facility Management, and Operational
Controls; Section 6 Technical Security Controls; Section 7
Certificate and CRL Profiles; and Section 8 Compliance Audit and
Other Assessments are oriented towards ensuring secure operation of
the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and
relying party systems.
11. IANA Considerations
None.
12. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Matt Lepinski for his help with the
formatting of this document.
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13. References
13.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., "Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March
1997.
[CP] Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S., "Certificate
Policy for the Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI",
draft-ietf-sidr-cp, July 2007 (work in progress).
[RESCERT] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", draft-ietf-sidr-res-
certs, June 2007 (work in progress).
13.2. Informative References
[BGP4] Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors), A Border Gateway Protocol 4
(BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995.
[FIPS] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2
(FIPS PUB 140-2), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, May 25, 2001.
[RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method
for obtaining digital signatures and public-key
cryptosystems. Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126.
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Author's Addresses
Stephen Kent
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
Email: skent@bbn.com
Derrick Kong
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA
Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
Email: dkong@bbn.com
Karen Seo
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
Email: kseo@bbn.com
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Intellectual Property Statement
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Disclaimer of Validity
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
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