Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Standards Track December 29, 2011
Expires: July 1, 2012
The RPKI Ghostbusters Record
draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-16
Abstract
In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), resource
certificates completely obscure names or any other information which
might be useful for contacting responsible parties to deal with
issues of certificate expiration, maintenance, roll-overs,
compromises, etc. This draft describes the RPKI Ghostbusters Record
containing human contact information which may be verified
(indirectly) by a CA certificate. The data in the record are those
of a severely profiled vCard.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 1, 2012.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
Bush Expires July 1, 2012 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft The RPKI Ghostbusters Record December 2011
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. RPKI Ghostbusters Record Payload Example . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. vCard Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. CMS Packaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8.1. OID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8.2. File Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.3. Media Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Bush Expires July 1, 2012 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft The RPKI Ghostbusters Record December 2011
1. Introduction
In the operational use of the RPKI it can become necessary to
contact, human to human, the party responsible for a resource-holding
CA certificate, AKA the certificate's maintainer, be it the holder of
the certificate's private key or an administrative person in the
organization, a NOC, etc. An important example is when the operator
of a prefix described by a Route Origin Authorization (ROA) sees a
problem, or an impending problem, with a certificate or CRL in the
path between the ROA and a trust anchor. E.g., a certificate along
that path has expired, is soon to expire, or a CRL associated with a
CA along the path is stale, thus placing the quality of the routing
of the address space described by the ROA in jeopardy.
As the names in RPKI certificates are not meaningful to humans, see
[I-D.ietf-sidr-cp], there is no way to use a certificate itself to
lead to the worrisome certificate's or CRL's maintainer. So, "Who
you gonna call?"
This document specifies the RPKI Ghostbusters Record, an object
verified via an End Entity (EE) certificate, issued under a CA
certificate, the maintainer of which may be contacted using the
payload information in the Ghostbusters Record.
The Ghostbusters Record conforms to the syntax defined in
[I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object]. The payload of this signed object is
a severely profiled vCard.
Note that the Ghostbusters Record is not an identity certificate, but
rather an attestation to the contact data made by the maintainer of
the CA certificate issuing the EE certificate whose corresponding
private key signs the Ghostbusters Record.
This record is not meant to supplant or be used as resource registry
whois data. It gives information about an RPKI CA certificate
maintainer not a resource holder.
The Ghostbusters Record is optional, CA certificates in the RPKI may
have zero or more associated Ghostbuster Records.
Given a certificate, to find the closest Ghostbuster Record, go up
until a CA certificate is reached, which may be the object itself of
course. That CA certificate will have an SIA to the publication
point where all subsidiary objects (until you hit a down-chain CA
certificate's signed objects) are published. The publication point
will contain zero or more Ghostbuster Records.
This specification has three main sections. The first, Section 4, is
Bush Expires July 1, 2012 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft The RPKI Ghostbusters Record December 2011
the format of the contact payload information, a severely profiled
vCard. The second, Section 5, profiles the packaging of the payload
as a profile of the RPKI Signed Object Template specification
[I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object]. The third, Section 6, describes the
proper validation of the signed Ghostbusters Record.
2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands the RPKI,
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch], the RPKI Repository Structure,
[I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct], Signed RPKI Objects,
[I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object], and vCards [RFC6350].
3. RPKI Ghostbusters Record Payload Example
An example of an RPKI Ghostbusters Record payload with all properties
populated is as follows:
BEGIN:VCARD
VERSION:4.0
FN:Human's Name
ORG:Organizational Entity
ADR;TYPE=WORK:;;42 Twisty Passage;Deep Cavern;WA;98666;U.S.A.
TEL;TYPE=VOICE,TEXT,WORK;VALUE=uri:tel:+1-666-555-1212
TEL;TYPE=FAX,WORK;VALUE=uri:tel:+1-666-555-1213
EMAIL:human@example.com
END:VCARD
4. vCard Profile
The goal in profiling the vCard is not to include as much information
as possible, but rather to include as few properties as possible
while providing the minimal necessary data to enable one to contact
the maintainer of the RPKI data which threatens the ROA[s] of
concern.
The Ghostbusters vCard payload is a minimalist subset of the vCard as
described in [RFC6350].
BEGIN - pro forma packaging which MUST be the first line in the
vCard and MUST have the value "BEGIN:VCARD" as described in
[RFC6350].
Bush Expires July 1, 2012 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft The RPKI Ghostbusters Record December 2011
VERSION - pro forma packaging which MUST be the second line in the
vCard and MUST have the value "VERSION:4.0" as described in 3.7.9
of [RFC6350].
FN - the name, as described in 6.2.1 of [RFC6350], of a contactable
person or role who is responsible for the CA certificate.
ORG - an organization as described in 6.6.4 of [RFC6350].
ADR - a postal address as described in 6.3 of [RFC6350].
TEL - a voice and/or fax phone as described in 6.4.1 of [RFC6350].
EMAIL - an Email address as described in 6.4.2 of [RFC6350]
END - pro forma packaging which MUST be the last line in the vCard
and MUST have the value "END:VCARD" as described in [RFC6350].
Per [RFC6350], the BEGIN, VERSION, FN, and END properties MUST be
included in a record. To be useful, zero or more of ADR, TEL, and
EMAIL MUST be included. Other properties MUST NOT be included.
5. CMS Packaging
The Ghostbusters Record is a CMS signed-data object conforming to the
Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure,
[I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object].
The ContentType of a Ghostbusters Record is defined as id-ct-
rpkiGhostbusters, and has the numerical value of
1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.35. This OID MUST appear both within the
eContentType in the encapContentInfo object as well as the
ContentType signed attribute in the signerInfo object. See
[I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object].
eContent: The content of a Ghostbusters Record is described above in
Section 4 above.
Similarly to a ROA, a Ghostbusters Record is verified using an EE
certificate issued by the resource-holding CA certificate whose
maintainer is described in the vCard.
The EE certificate used to verify the Ghostbusters Record is the one
that appears in the CMS data structure which contains the payload
defined above.
This EE certificate MUST describe its internet number resources using
Bush Expires July 1, 2012 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft The RPKI Ghostbusters Record December 2011
the "inherit" attribute, rather than explicit description of a
resource set, see [RFC3779].
6. Validation
The validation procedure defined in Section 3 of
[I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object] is applied to a Ghostbusters Record.
After this procedure has been performed, the Version number type
within the payload is checked, and the OCTET STRING containing the
vCard data is extracted. These data are checked against the profile
defined in Section 4 of this document. Only if all of these checks
pass is the Ghostbusters payload deemed valid and made available to
the application that requested the payload.
7. Security Considerations
Though there is no on-the-wire protocol in this specification, there
are attacks which could abuse the data described. As the data, to be
useful, need to be public, little can be done to avoid this exposure.
Phone Numbers: The vCards may contain real world telephone numbers
which could be abused for telemarketing, abusive calls, etc.
Email Addresses: The vCards may contain Email addresses which could
be abused for purposes of spam.
Relying parties are hereby warned that the data in a Ghostbusters
Record are self-asserted. These data have not been verified by the
CA that issued the CA certificate to the entity that issued the EE
certificate used to validate the Ghostbusters Record.
8. IANA Considerations
8.1. OID
The IANA is requested to register the OID for the Ghostbusters Record
in the registry created by [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object] as follows:
Name OID Specification
-----------------------------------------------------------
Ghostbusters 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.35 [ This document ]
Bush Expires July 1, 2012 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft The RPKI Ghostbusters Record December 2011
8.2. File Extension
Realizing the deep issues raised by [RFC5513], the IANA is requested
to add an item for the Ghostbusters Record file extension to the RPKI
Repository Name Scheme created by [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct] as
follows:
Filename Extension RPKI Object Reference
-----------------------------------------------------------
.gbr Ghostbusters Record [ This document ]
8.3. Media Type
The IANA is requested to register the media type application/
rpki-ghostbusters as follows
Type name: application
Subtype name: rpki-ghostbusters
Required parameters: None
Optional parameters: None
Encoding considerations: binary
Security considerations: Carries an RPKI Ghostbusters Record
[this document].
Interoperability considerations: None
Published specification: This document.
Applications that use this media type: RPKI administrators.
Additional information:
Content: This media type is a signed object, as defined
in [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object], which contains a payload
of a profiled vCard as defined above in this document.
Magic number(s): None
File extension(s): .gbr
Macintosh file type code(s):
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: None
Author: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
Change controller: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
9. Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Russ Housley, the authors of
[I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct], Stephen Kent, Sandy Murphy, Rob
Austein, Michael Elkins, and Barry Leiba for their contributions.
Bush Expires July 1, 2012 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft The RPKI Ghostbusters Record December 2011
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]
Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure",
draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-09 (work in progress),
July 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object]
Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure",
draft-ietf-sidr-signed-object-04 (work in progress),
May 2011.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC6350] Perreault, S., "vCard Format Specification", RFC 6350,
August 2011.
10.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-13 (work in
progress), May 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-cp]
Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate
Policy (CP) for the Resource PKI (RPKI",
draft-ietf-sidr-cp-17 (work in progress), April 2011.
[RFC5513] Farrel, A., "IANA Considerations for Three Letter
Acronyms", RFC 5513, April 1 2009.
Bush Expires July 1, 2012 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft The RPKI Ghostbusters Record December 2011
Author's Address
Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US
Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1
Email: randy@psg.com
Bush Expires July 1, 2012 [Page 9]