Network Working Group                                            R. Bush
Internet-Draft                                 Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Informational                         December 30, 2014
Expires: July 3, 2015


                   RPKI Local Trust Anchor Use Cases
                    draft-ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases-02

Abstract

   There are a number of critical circumstances where a localized
   routing domain needs to augment or modify its view of the Global
   RPKI.  This document attempts to outline a few of them.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  What is 'Local' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   4.  Example Uses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   8.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

.  Introduction

   Today RPKI-based Origin Validation, [RFC6811], relies on widespread
   deployment of the Global Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI),
   [RFC6480].  In the future, RPKI-based Path Validation,
   [I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview], will be even more reliant on the
   Global RPKI.

   But there are critical circumstances in which a local, well-scoped,
   administrative and/or routing domain will need to augment and/or
   modify their internal view of the Global RPKI.

   This document attempts to lay out a few of those use cases.  It is
   not intended to be authoritative, complete, or to become a standard.
   It merely tries to lay out a few critical examples to help scope the
   issues.

.  Suggested Reading

   It is assumed that the reader understands the RPKI, see [RFC6480],
   the RPKI Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], Route Origin
   Authorizations (ROAs), see [RFC6482], and GhostBusters Records, see
   [RFC6493].

.  What is 'Local'

   The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs,
   manifests, ROAs, and GhostBusters Records as described in [RFC6481].
   Policies and considerations for RPKI object generation and
   maintenance are discussed elsewhere.

   Like the DNS, the Global RPKI presents a single global view, although
   only a loosely consistent view, depending on timing, updating,



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   fetching, etc.  There is no 'fix' for this, it is not broken, it is
   the nature of distributed data with distributed caches.

   There are critical uses of the RPKI where a local administrative and/
   or routing domain, e.g. an end-user site, a particular ISP or content
   provider, an organization, a geo-political region, ... may wish to
   have a specialized view of the RPKI.

   For the purposes of this exploration, we refer to this localized view
   as a 'Local Trust Anchor', mostly for historical reasons, but also
   because implementation would likely be the local distribution of one
   or more specialized trust anchors, [RFC6481].

.  Example Uses

   Carol, a RIPE resource holder (LIR, PI holder, ...), statistically
   likely not to actually be in the Netherlands, is a victim of the
   "Dutch Court Attack," i.e. someone convinces a Dutch court to force
   the RIPE/NCC to remove or modify some or all of Carol's certificates,
   ROAs, etc. or the resources they represent, and the operational
   community wants to retain the ability to route to Carol's network(s).
   There is need for some channel through which operators can exchange
   local trust, command, and data collections necessary to propagate
   patches local to all their caches.

   Bob has a multi-AS network under his administration and some of those
   ASs use private ([RFC1918]) or 'borrowed' address space which is
   otherwise unrouted in the global Internet (US military space is
   popular), and he wishes to certify them for use in his internal
   routing.

   Alice runs the root trust for a large organization, commercial or
   geo-political, where upper management requests routing engineering to
   redirect their competitors' prefixes to socially acceptable data, and
   Alice is responsible for making the CA hierarchy have validated
   certificates for those redirected resources as well as the rest of
   the Internet.

.  Notes

   In these examples, it is ultimately the ROAs, not the certificates,
   which one wants to modify.  But one can't just hack new ROAs as one
   does not have the private keys needed to sign them.  Hence one has to
   first hack the 3779 certificates.

   But we should not lose sight of the goal that it is the ROAs and
   GhostBuster Records which need re-issuing under the new 3779
   certificates.



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   Further, since we're not the NSA, GCHQ, ..., we can not assume that
   we can reissue down from the root trust anchor at the IANA or from
   the RIRs' certificates.  So we have to create a new trust anchor
   which, for ease of use, will contain the new/hacked certificates and
   ROAs as well as the unmodified remainder of the Global RPKI.

   And, because Alice, Bob, and Carol want to be able to archive,
   reproduce, and send to friends the data necessary to recreate their
   hacks, there will need to be a formally defined set of data which is
   input to a well-defind process to take an existing Global RPKI tree
   and produce the desired modified re-anchored tree.

.  Security Considerations

   These use cases are all about violating global security, albeit
   within a constrained local context.

.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA Considerations.

.  Acknowledgments

   The author wishes to thank Rob Austein, Steve Kent, and Karen Seo.

.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC6481]  Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
              Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
              February 2012.

   [RFC6482]  Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
              Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.

   [RFC6493]  Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
              Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, February 2012.

   [RFC6811]  Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
              Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, January
              2013.

9.2.  Informative References







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   [I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview]
              Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC",
              draft-lepinski-bgpsec-overview-00 (work in progress),
              March 2011.

   [RFC1918]  Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
              and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
              BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.

   [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.

Author's Address

   Randy Bush
   Internet Initiative Japan
   5147 Crystal Springs
   Bainbridge Island, Washington  98110
   US

   Email: randy@psg.com






























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