SIDR G. Huston
Internet-Draft G. Michaelson
Intended status: Standards Track R. Loomans
Expires: December 31, 2007 APNIC
June 29, 2007
A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates
draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-07.txt
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to-use"
of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System
Numbers). This profile is used to convey the issuer's authorization
of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of-
use" of the IP addresses and AS numbers that are described in the
issued Resource Certificate.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Resource Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Serial number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.6. Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.7. Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.8. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . . . . . 8
3.9.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.9.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.9.6. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.9.7. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.9.8. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.9.10. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.9.11. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2. Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3. This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.4. Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.5. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6. Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6.2. Revocation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.7. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.7.2. CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1. PCKS#10 Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template
Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2. CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . 17
5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . 18
5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate
Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . 20
6.2. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 30
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1. Introduction
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and AS Numbers.
These Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to
the PKIX profile [RFC3280], and also conform to the constraints
specified in this profile. Resource Certificates attest that the
issuer has granted the subject a "right-to-use" for a listed set of
IP addresses and Autonomous System numbers.
A Resource Certificate describes an action by a certificate issuer
that binds a list of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the subject
of the certificate. The binding is identified by the association of
the subject's private key with the subject's public key contained in
the Resource Certificate, signed by the private key of the
certificate's issuer.
In the context of the public Internet, and the use of public number
resources within this context, it is intended that Resource
Certificates are used in a manner that is explicitly aligned to the
public number resource distribution function. Specifically, when a
number resource is allocated or assigned by a number registry to an
entity, this allocation is described by an associated Resource
Certificate. This certificate is issued by the number registry, and
the subject's public key that is being certified by the issuer
corresponds to the public key part of a public / private key pair
that was generated by the same entity who is the recipient of the
number assignment or allocation. A critical extension to the
certificate enumerates the IP Resources that were allocated or
assigned by the issuer to the entity. In the context of the public
number distribution function, this corresponds to a hierarchical PKI
structure, where Resource Certificates are only issued in one
'direction' and there is a single unique path of certificates from a
certificate authority operating at the apex of a resource
distribution hierarchy to a valid certificate.
Validation of a Resource Certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can
be undertaken by establishing a valid issuer-subject certificate
chain from a certificate issued by a trust anchor certificate
authority to the certificate [RFC4158], with the additional
constraint of ensuring that each subject's listed resources are fully
encompassed by those of the issuer at each step in the issuer-subject
certificate chain.
Resource Certificates may be used in the context of the operation of
secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-to-use of an
IP number resource that is being passed within the routing protocol,
allowing relying parties to verify legitimacy and correctness of
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routing information. Related use contexts include validation of
Internet Routing Registry objects, validation of routing requests,
and detection of potential unauthorised use of IP addresses.
This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource
Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid.
Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to
this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate.
1.1. Terminology
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC3280], "X.509
Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet
Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing
Architecture" [RFC4291], "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines"
[RFC2050], and related regional Internet registry address management
policy documents.
The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
2. Describing Resources in Certificates
The framework for describing an association between the subject of a
certificate and the resources currently under the subject's current
control is described in [RFC3779].
There are three aspects of this resource extension that are noted in
this profile:
1. RFC 3779 notes that a resource extension SHOULD be a CRITICAL
extension to the X.509 Certificate. This Resource Certificate
profile further specifies that the use of this certificate
extension MUST be used in all Resource Certificates and MUST be
marked as CRITICAL.
2. RFC 3779 defines a sorted canonical form of describing a resource
set, with maximal spanning ranges and maximal spanning prefix
masks as appropriate. All valid certificates in this profile
MUST use this sorted canonical form of resource description in
the resource extension field.
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3. A test of the resource extension in the context of certificate
validity includes the condition that the resources described in
the immediate superior certificate in the PKI hierarchy (the
certificate where this certificate's issuer is the subject) has a
resource set (called here the "issuer's resource set") that must
encompass the resource set of the issued certificate. In this
context "encompass" allows for the issuer's resource set to be
the same as, or a strict superset of, any subject's resource set.
A test of certificate validity entails the identification of a
sequence of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain (where the
subject field of one certificate appears as the issuer in the next
certificate in the sequence) from a trust anchor certificate
authority to the certificate being validated, and that the resource
extensions in this certificate sequence from the trust anchor's
issued certificate to the certificate being validated form a sequence
of encompassing relationships in terms of the resources described in
the resource extension.
3. Resource Certificate Fields
A Resource Certificate is a valid X.509 v3 public key certificate,
consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC3280], containing the fields
listed in this section. Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL,
all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST
NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate. Where a field value
is specified here this value MUST be used in conforming Resource
Certificates.
3.1. Version
Resource Certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates. This field
MUST be present, and the Version MUST be 3 (i.e. the value of this
field is 2).
3.2. Serial number
The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique per
Issuer.
3.3. Signature Algorithm
This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on
this certificate. This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with
RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or
SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the
OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 } [RFC4055].
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It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for
both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should be taken
when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.
3.4. Issuer
This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the
certificate. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name.
If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue of
the "cA" bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then the
issuer name MUST correspond to the subject name as contained in the
immediate superior certificate.
This field MUST be non-empty.
3.5. Subject
This field identifies the entity to whom the resource has been
allocated / assigned. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name.
In this profile the subject name is determined by the issuer, and
each distinct entity certified by the issuer MUST be identified using
a subject name that is unique per issuer.
This field MUST be non-empty.
3.6. Valid From
The starting time at which point the certificate is valid. In this
profile the "Valid From" time SHOULD be no earlier than the time of
certificate generation. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280],
Certificate Authorities (CAs) conforming to this profile MUST always
encode the certificate's "Valid From" date through the year 2049 as
UTCTime, and dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as
GeneralizedTime. These two time formats are defined in [RFC3280].
In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for
this field that pre-dates the same field value in any superior
certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information
that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time
other than the current time.
3.7. Valid To
The Valid To time is the date and time at which point in time the
certificate's validity ends. It represents the anticipated lifetime
of the resource allocation / assignment arrangement between the
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issuer and the subject. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], CAs
conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's
"Valid To" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050
or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. These two time formats
are defined in [RFC3280].
In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for
this field that post-dates the same field value in any superior
certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information
that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time
other than the current time.
Certificate Authorities typically are advised against issuing a
certificate with a validity interval that exceeds the validity
interval of the CA certificate that will be used to validate the
issued certificate. However, in the context of this profile, it is
anticipated that a CA may have valid grounds to issue a certificate
with a validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the
CA's certificate.
3.8. Subject Public Key Info
This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with
which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and,
accordingly, the OID for the public key algorithm is
1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. The key size MUST be a minimum size of 1024
bits. In the context of certifying resources it is recommended that
the key size of keys that are intended to be used at the apex of a
certificate issuance hierarchy, and their immediate subordinates,
SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048 bits. Immediate subordinates
of these certificates, when used in the context of continued levels
of high trust, SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048 bits.
In the application of this profile to certification of public number
resources, it would be consistent with this recommendation that the
Regional Internet Registries use a key size of 2048 bits in their
issued certificates, and that their immediate subordinate certificate
authorities also use a key size of 2048 bits. All other subordinate
certificates MAY use a key size of 1024 bits.
It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for
both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should be taken
when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.
3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields
As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC3280], each extension in a certificate
is designated as either critical or non-critical. A certificate-
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using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical
extension it does not recognise; however, a non-critical extension
MAY be ignored if it is not recognised [RFC3280].
The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming
Resource Certificate, except where explicitly noted otherwise.
3.9.1. Basic Constraints
The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the
certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification
paths that include this certificate.
The issuer determines whether the "cA" boolean is set. If this bit
is set, then it indicates that the subject is allowed to issue
resources certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the
subject is permitted be a CA).
The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST
NOT be present.
The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the
Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present when the subject is
a CA, and MUST NOT be present otherwise.
3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier
The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying
certificates that contain a particular public key. To facilitate
certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all
Resource Certificates. This extension is non-critical.
The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in
the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of
immediate subordinate certificates (all certificates issued by the
subject of this certificate).
The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value
of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key, as
described in Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC3280].
3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier
The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying
certificates that are signed by the issuer's private key, by
providing a hash value of the issuer's public key. To facilitate
path construction, this extension MUST appear in all Resource
Certificates. The keyIdentifier sub field MUST be present in all
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Resource Certificates, with the exception of a CA who issues a "self-
signed" certificate. The authorityCertIssuer and
authorityCertSerialNumber sub fields MUST NOT be present. This
extension is non-critical.
The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value
of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as
described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280].
3.9.4. Key Usage
This describes the purpose of the certificate. This is a critical
extension, and it MUST be present.
In certificates issued to CAs only the keyCertSign and CRLSign bits
are set to TRUE and MUST be the only bits set to TRUE.
In end-entity certificates the digitialSignature bit MUST be set and
MUST be the only bit set to TRUE.
3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points
This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s)
associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile
uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access
mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] that references
a single inclusive CRL for each issuer.
In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer,
implying at the CRLIssuer sub field MUST be omitted, and the
distributionPoint sub-field MUST be present. The Reasons sub-field
MUST be omitted.
The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT
contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The type of the general name MUST
be of type URI. In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified
to be all certificates issued by this CA issuer using a given key
pair. The sequence of distributionPoint values MUST contain only a
single DistributionPointName set. The DistributionPointName set MAY
contain more than one URI value. An RSYNC URI MUST be present in the
DistributionPointName set, and reference the most recent instance of
this issuer's certificate revocation list. Other access form URIs
MAY be used in addition to the RSYNC URI.
This extension MUST be present and it is non-critical. There is one
exception; where a CA distributes its public key in the form of a
"self-signed" certificate, the CRLDP MUST be omitted.
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3.9.6. Authority Information Access
This field (AIA) identifies the point of publication of the
certificate that is issued by the issuer's immediate superior CA,
where this certificate's issuer is the subject. In this profile a
single reference object to publication location of the immediate
superior certificate MUST be used, except in the case where a CA
distributes its public key in the form of a "self-signed"
certificate, the authority key identifier SHOULD be omitted.
This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred
URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified
with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI MUST
reference the point of publication of the certificate where this
issuer is the subject (the issuer's immediate superior certificate).
Other access method URIs referencing the same object MAY also be
included in the value sequence of this extension.
When an Issuer re-issues a CA certificate, the subordinate
certificates need to reference this new certificate via the AIA
field. In order to avoid the situation where a certificate re-
issuance necessarily implies a requirement to re-issue all
subordinate certificates, CA Certificate issuers SHOULD use a
persistent URL name scheme for issued certificates. This implies
that re-issued certificates overwrite previously issued certificates
to the same subject, and use the same publication name as previously
issued certificates. In this way subordinate certificates can
maintain a constant AIA field value and need not be re-issued due
solely to a re-issue of the superior certificate. The issuers'
policy with respect to the persistence of name objects of issued
certificates MUST be specified in the Issuer's Certificate Practice
Statement.
This extension is non-critical.
3.9.7. Subject Information Access
This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services
relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension
appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this information
and service collection will include all current valid certificates
that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the
subject's corresponding private key.
This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The
preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be
specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the
subject of the certificate is a CA. The RSYNC URI must reference an
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object collection rather than an individual object and MUST use a
trailing '/' in the URI.
Other access method URIs that reference the same location MAY also be
included in the value sequence of this extension. The ordering of
URIs in this sequence reflect the subject's relative preferences for
access methods, with the first method in the sequence being the most
preferred.
This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non-
critical.
For End Entity certificates, where the subject is not a CA, this
field MAY be present, and is non-critical. If present, it references
the location where objects signed by the key pair associated with the
End Entity certificate can be accessed. The id-ad-
signedObjectRepository OID is used when the subject is an End Entity
and it publishes objects signed with the matching private key in a
repository.
id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }
id-ad-signedObjectRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 9 }
3.9.8. Certificate Policies
This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using
the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2". This field
MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource
Certificates.
PolicyQualifiers MUST NOT be used in this profile.
This extension MUST be present and it is critical.
3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name
This is an optional extension, and MAY contain an X.501 Name as
supplied by the subject in the Certificate Request, or as assigned by
the issuer.
3.9.10. IP Resources
This field contains the list of IP address resources as per
[RFC3779]. The value may specify the "inherit" element for a
particular AFI value. In the context of resource certificates
describing public number resources for use in the public Internet,
the SAFI value MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST
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include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both
extensions.
This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical.
3.9.11. AS Resources
This field contains the list of AS number resources as per [RFC3779],
or may specify the "inherit" element. RDI values are NOT supported
in this profile and MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST
include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both
extensions.
This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical.
4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile
Each CA MUST issue a version 2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL),
consistent with [RFC3280]. The CRL issuer is the CA, and no indirect
CRLs are supported in this profile. The scope of the CRL MUST be
"all certificates issued by this CA using a given key pair". The
contents of the CRL are a list of all non-expired certificates issued
by the CA using a given key pair that have been revoked by the CA.
An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one
regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's
validity period.
This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs.
The profile allows the issuance of multiple current CRLs with
different scope by a single CA, with the scope being defined by the
key pair used by the CA.
No CRL fields other than those listed here are permitted in CRLs
issued under this profile. Unless otherwise indicated, these fields
MUST be present in the CRL. Where two or more CRLs issued by a
single CA with the same scope, the CRL with the highest value of the
"CRL Number" field supersedes all other CRLs issued by this CA.
4.1. Version
Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the
integer value of this field is 1).
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4.2. Issuer Name
The value of this field is the X.501 name of the issuing CA who is
also the signer of the CRL, and is identical to the Issuer name in
the Resource Certificates that are issued by this issuer.
4.3. This Update
This field contains the date and time that this CRL was issued. The
value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the
year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the
year 2050 or later.
4.4. Next Update
This is the date and time by which the next CRL SHOULD be issued.
The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through
the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in
the year 2050 or later.
4.5. Signature
This field contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL. This
profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA
(sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or SHA-
512. This field MUST be present.
It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for
both the CRL Issuer and relying parties, indicating that care should
be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.
4.6. Revoked Certificate List
When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate
list MUST be absent.
For each revoked resource certificate only the following fields MUST
be present. No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile,
and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL.
4.6.1. Serial Number
The issuer's serial number of the revoked certificate.
4.6.2. Revocation Date
The time the certificate was revoked. This time SHOULD NOT be a
future date. The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for
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dates through the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime
for dates in the year 2050 or later.
4.7. CRL Extensions
The X.509 v2 CRL format allows extensions to be placed in a CRL. The
following extensions are supported in this profile, and MUST be
present in a CRL.
4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier
The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to
sign a CRL. Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier
method. The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section
4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280].
This extension is non-critical.
4.7.2. CRL Number
The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence
number of positive integers for a given CA and scope. This extension
allows users to easily determine when a particular CRL supersedes
another CRL. The highest CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs
issued by the CA with the same scope.
This extension is non-critical.
5. Resource Certificate Request Profile
A resource certificate request MAY use either of PKCS#10 or
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF). There is no requirement
for a CA Issuer to support both request formats, and the choice of
formats is a matter for the Issuer and Subject to resolve.
5.1. PCKS#10 Profile
This profile refines the specification in [RFC2986], as it relates to
Resource Certificates. A Certificate Request Message object,
formatted according to PKCS#10, is passed to a Certificate Authority
as the initial step in issuing a certificate.
This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority
(RA), acting under the direction of a Subject.
With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is
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permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding
certificate.
5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template Fields
This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
that may appear in a CertificationRequestInfo:
Version
This field is mandatory and MUST have the value 0.
Subject
The CA SHOULD consider this name as the subject's suggestion, but
the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion, as the subject name
MUST be unique per issuer in certificates issued by this issuer.
This field MAY be empty, in which case the issuer MUST generate a
subject name that is unique in the context of certificates issued
by this issuer.
SubjectPublicKeyInfo
This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm
with which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA,
and the OID for the algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. This field
also includes a bit-string representation of the entity's public
key. For the RSA public-key algorithm the bit string contains the
DER encoding of a value of PKCS #1 type RSAPublicKey.
Attributes
[RFC2986] defines the attributes field as key-value pairs where
the key is an OID and the value's structure depends on the key.
The only attribute used in this profile is the ExtensionRequest
attribute as defined in [RFC2985]. This attribute contains X509v3
Certificate Extensions. The profile for extensions in certificate
requests is specified in Section 5.3.
This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
that MAY appear in a CertificationRequest Object:
signatureAlgorithm
This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA
(sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or
SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the
OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 }
[RFC4055].
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It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive
for both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should
be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.
5.2. CRMF Profile
This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)
specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to Resource Certificates.
A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the
CRMF, is passed to a Certificate Authority as the initial step in
issuing a certificate.
This request MAY be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority
(RA), acting under the direction of a subject.
With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is
permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding
certificate.
5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields
This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
that may appear in a Certificate Request Template:
Version
This field MAY be absent, or MAY specify the request of a Version
3 Certificate. It SHOULD be omitted.
SerialNumber
As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be
omitted in this profile.
SigningAlgorithm
As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be
omitted in this profile.
Issuer
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile.
Validity
This field MAY be omitted. If omitted, the CA will issue a
Certificate with Validity dates as determined by the CA. If
specified, then the CA MAY override the requested values with
dates as determined by the CA.
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Subject As the subject name is assigned by the CA, this field MAY be
omitted, in which case the subject name will be generated by the
CA. If specified, the CA SHOULD consider this as the subject's
suggestion, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion.
PublicKey
This field MUST be present.
extensions
This attribute contains X509v3 Certificate Extensions. The
profile for extensions in certificate requests is specified in
Section 5.3.
5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields
The following control fields are supported in this profile:
Authenticator Control
It is noted that the intended model of authentication of the
subject is a long term one, and the advice as offered in [RFC4211]
is that the Authenticator Control field be used.
[Note - not for publication: The method of generation and
authentication of this field is not specified in this document.
It is assumed that the Certificate Issuer and subject have
securely exchanged credentials using some other mechanism and the
Authenticator Control shall reference these credentials. The
desirable properties include the ability to validate the subject
and the authenticity of the provided public key. An alternative
is to remove this control field from this profile and defer
authentication of the request to some unspecified external
mechanism.]
5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests
The following extensions MAY appear in a PKCS#10 or CRMF Certificate
Request. Any other extensions MUST NOT appear in a Certificate
Request. This profile places the following additional constraints on
these extensions.:
BasicConstraints
If this is omitted then the CA will issue an end entity
certificate with the BasicConstraints extension not present in the
issued certificate.
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The Path Length Constraint is not supported in this Resource
Certificate Profile, and this field MUST be omitted in this
profile.
The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to on. If this bit
is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue
resource certificates within this overall framework.
The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to off (End Entity
certificate request), in which case the corresponding end entity
certificate will not contain a BasicConstraints extension.
SubjectKeyIdentifier
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile.
AuthorityKeyIdentifier
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile.
KeyUsage
The CA MAY honor KeyUsage extensions of CertificateSigning and
CRLSigning if present, as long as this is consistent with the
BasicConstraints SubjectType sub field, when specified.
SubjectInformationAccess
This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and the field
value SHOULD be honoured by the CA. If the CA is not able to
honor the requested field value, then the CA MUST reject the
Certificate Request.
This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and
services relating to the subject of the certificate in which the
SIA extension appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile,
this information and service collection will include all current
valid certificates that have been issued by this subject that are
signed with the subject's corresponding private key.
This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The
preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST
be specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository
when the subject of the certificate is a CA. The RSYNC URI MUST
reference an object collection rather than an individual object
and MUST use a trailing '/' in the URI. Other access method URIs
that reference the same location MAY also be included in the value
sequence of this extension. The ordering of URIs in this sequence
reflect the subject's relative preferences for access methods,
with the first method in the sequence being the most preferred by
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the Subject.
SubjectAlternateName
This field MAY be present, and the CA MAY use this as the
SubjectAltName in the issued Certificate.
CRLDistributionPoints
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile.
AuthorityInformationAccess
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile.
CertificatePolicies
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile.
With the exceptions of the publicKey field and the
SubjectInformationAccess field, the CA is permitted to alter any
requested field.
6. Resource Certificate Validation
This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure.
This refines the generic procedure described in section 6 of
[RFC3280]:
To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other
things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n
certificates) satisfies the following conditions:
1. for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the
issuer of certificate x+1;
2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor;
3. certificate n is the certificate to be validated; and
4. for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate is valid.
6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates
The trust model that may be used in the resource certificate
framework in the context of validation of assertions of public number
resources in public-use contexts is one that readily maps to a top-
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down delegated CA model that mirrors the delegation of resources from
a registry distribution point to the entities that are the direct
recipients of these resources. Within this trust model these
recipient entities may, in turn, operate a registry and perform
further allocations or assignments. This is a strict hierarchy, in
that any number resource and a corresponding recipient entity has
only one 'parent' issuing registry for that number resource (i.e.
there is always a unique parent entity for any resource and
corresponding entity), and that the issuing registry is not a direct
or indirect subordinate recipient entity of the recipient entity in
question (i.e. no loops in the model).
The more general consideration is that selection of a trust anchor CA
is a task undertaken by relying parties. The structure of the
resource certificate profile admits potentially the same variety of
trust models as the PKIX profile. There is only one additional
caveat on the general applicability of trust models and PKIX
frameworks, namely that in forming a validation path to a trust
anchor CA, the sequence of certificates MUST preserve the resource
extension validation property, as described in Section 6.2, and the
validation of the first certificate in the validation path not only
involves the verification that the certificate was issued by a trust
anchor CA, but also that the resource set described in the
certificate MUST be encompassed by the trust anchor CA's resource
set, as described in Section 6.2.
The trust anchor information, describing a CA that serves as a trust
anchor, includes the following:
1. the trusted issuer name,
2. the trusted public key algorithm,
3. the trusted public key,
4. optionally, the trusted public key parameters associated with the
public key, and
5. a resource set, consisting of a set of IPv4 resources, IPv6
resources and AS number resources.
The trust anchor information may be provided to the path processing
procedure in the form of a self-signed certificate.
6.2. Resource Extension Validation
The IP resource extension definition [RFC3779] defines a critical
extensions for Internet number resources. These are ASN.1 encoded
representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range (either as a
prefix/length, or start-end pair) and the AS number set.
Valid Resource Certificates MUST have a valid IP address and/or AS
number resource extension. In order to validate a Resource
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Certificate the resource extension must also be validated. This
validation process relies on definitions of comparison of resource
sets:
more specific: Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges,
A and B, A is "more specific" than B if range B includes all IP
addresses or AS numbers described by range A, and if range B is
larger than range A.
equal: Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B,
A is "equal" to B if range A describes precisely the same
collection of IP addresses or AS numbers as described by range B.
The definition of "inheritance" in [RFC3779]is equivalent to this
"equality" comparison.
encompass: Given two IP address and AS number sets X and Y, X
"encompasses" Y if, for every contiguous range of IP addresses or
AS numbers elements in set Y, the range element is either more
specific than or equal to a contiguous range element within the
set X.
Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of an
ordered certificate sequence of {1,2, ... , n} where '1'is issued by
a trust anchor and 'n' is the target certificate, and where the
subject of certificate 'x' is the issuer of certificate 'x' + 1,
implies that the resources described in certificate 'x' "encompass"
the resources described in certificate 'x' + 1, and the resources
described in the trust anchor information "encompass" the resources
described in certificate 1.
6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation
Validation of signed resource data using a target resource
certificate consists of assembling an ordered sequence (or
'Certificate Path') of certificates ({1,2,...n} where '1' is a
certificate that has been issued by a trust anchor, and 'n' is the
target certificate) verifying that all of the following conditions
hold:
1. The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key and
the signature algorithm
2. The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From and
To values.
3. The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present and
contains field values as specified in this profile for all field
values that MUST be present.
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4. No field value that MUST NOT be present in this profile is
present in the certificate.
5. The Issuer has not revoked the certificate by placing the
certificate's serial number on the Issuer's current Certificate
Revocation List, and the Certificate Revocation List is itself
valid.
6. That the resource extension data is "encompassed" by the resource
extension data contained in a valid certificate where this Issuer
is the Subject (the previous certificate in the ordered sequence)
7. The Certificate Path originates with a certificate issued by a
trust anchor, and there exists a signing chain across the
Certificate Path where the Subject of Certificate x in the
Certificate Path matches the Issuer in Certificate x+1 in the
Certificate Path.
A certificate validation algorithm may perform these tests in any
chosen order.
Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found in a locally
maintained cache, maintained by a regular top-down synchronization
pass, seeded with the CAs who operate at the apex of the resource
distribution hierarchy, via reference to Issued certificates and
their SIA fields as forward pointers, plus the CRLDP. Alternatively,
validation may be performed using a bottom-up process with on-line
certificate access using the AIA and CRLDP pointers to guide the
certificate retrieval process.
There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that
are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as
means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator.
Some further heuristics may be required to halt the certificate path
validation process in order to avoid some of the issues associated
with attempts to validate such structures. It is suggested that
implementations of Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a
validation failure if the certificate path length exceeds a pre-
determined configuration parameter.
7. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations of [RFC3280] and [RFC3779]apply to
Resource Certificates as defined by this profile, and their use.
A Resource Certificate PKI cannot in and of itself resolve any forms
of ambiguity relating to uniqueness of assertions of rights of use in
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the event that two or more valid certificates encompass the same
resource. If the issuance of resource certificates is aligned to the
status of resource allocations and assignments then the information
conveyed in a certificate is no better than the information in the
allocation and assignment databases.
8. IANA Considerations
[Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA
considerations stated in this version of the document.]
9. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from
Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo
Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of
this document.
10. Normative References
[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
September 1981.
[RFC2050] Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and
J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES",
BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996.
[RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
November 2000.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
November 2000.
[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
April 2002.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
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the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
June 2005.
[RFC4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R.
Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, September 2005.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
September 2005.
[RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.
[rsync] Tridgell, A., "rsync", April 2006,
<http://samba.anu.edu.au/rsync/>.
Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate
The following is an example Resource Certificate.
Certificate Name: hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ-3.cer
Data:
Version: 3
Serial: 3
Signature Algorithm: Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA
Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use,
E=ca@apnic.net
Validity:
Not Before: Thu Jul 27 06:34:04 2006 GMT
Not After: Fri Jul 27 06:34:04 2007 GMT
Subject: CN=APNIC own-use network resources
Subject Key Identifier:
86:ef:5f:74:30:6a:eb:49:ab:93:b7:0f:46:e5:f6:0d:
8b:97:49:14
Subject Key Identifier g(SKI):
hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: Modulus:
c1:25:a1:b0:db:89:83:a0:fc:f1:c0:e4:7b:93:76:c1:
59:b7:0d:ac:25:25:ed:88:ce:00:03:ea:99:1a:9a:2a:
0e:10:2e:5f:c0:45:87:47:81:7b:1d:4d:44:aa:65:a3:
f8:07:84:32:ea:04:70:27:05:2b:79:26:e6:e6:3a:cb:
b2:9a:65:6c:c1:4e:d7:35:fb:f6:41:1e:8b:1c:b8:e4:
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5a:3a:d6:d0:7b:82:9a:23:03:f8:05:4c:68:42:67:fe:
e7:45:d9:2c:a6:d1:b3:da:cf:ad:77:c5:80:d2:e3:1e:
4d:e8:bf:a2:f2:44:10:b2:2f:61:bc:f4:89:31:54:7c:
56:47:d5:b1:c3:48:26:95:93:c9:6f:70:14:4d:ac:a5:
c2:8e:3d:1f:6d:f8:d4:93:9d:14:c7:15:c7:34:8e:ba:
dd:70:b3:c2:2b:08:78:59:97:dd:e4:34:c7:d8:de:5c:
f7:94:6f:95:59:ba:29:65:f5:98:15:8f:8e:57:59:5d:
92:1f:64:2f:b5:3d:69:2e:69:83:c2:10:c6:aa:8e:03:
d5:69:11:bd:0d:b5:d8:27:6c:74:2f:60:47:dd:2e:87:
24:c2:36:68:2b:3c:fd:bd:22:57:a9:4d:e8:86:3c:27:
03:ce:f0:03:2e:59:ce:05:a7:41:3f:2f:64:50:dd:e7
RSA Public Key: Exponent: 65537
Basic Constraints: CA: TRUE
Subject Info Access:
caRepository - rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/
hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ/
Key Usage: keyCertSign, cRLSign
CRL Distribution Points:
rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/
q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl
Authority Info Access: caIssuers -
rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.cer
Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier:
ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:07:02:
51:c2:a9:1c
Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI):
q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw
Certificate Policies: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2
IPv4: 202.12.27.0-202.12.29.255, 202.12.31.0/24,
203.119.0.0/24, 203.119.42.0/23
IPv6: 2001:dc0::/32
ASNum: 4608, 4777, 9545, 18366-18370
Signature:
c5:e7:b2:f3:62:cb:e3:bc:50:1e:6b:90:13:19:f4:5b:
4a:1c:1c:ab:b5:de:b1:a4:22:e0:28:f5:3b:d0:8c:59:
0f:85:f2:06:a6:ae:22:e6:d0:99:fe:cb:eb:1d:6a:e2:
a3:f1:a2:25:95:ec:a7:7d:96:35:dc:16:a7:2f:f5:b7:
11:ba:97:05:57:5f:5d:07:5a:c8:19:c8:27:d3:f7:a3:
92:66:cb:98:2d:e1:7f:a8:25:96:ab:af:ed:87:02:28:
f5:ae:b6:e3:0c:f7:18:82:70:82:f4:76:54:06:b9:9f:
e1:a5:f7:ae:72:dd:ee:f0:d4:d2:78:bb:61:73:cf:51:
26:9f:ea:e8:20:49:06:ba:0c:ac:1d:f6:07:b8:63:a0:
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4d:3d:8e:12:84:3a:d0:ec:94:7e:02:db:d4:85:cf:12:
5c:7b:12:1a:52:ab:3c:ba:00:f2:71:e7:f0:fd:b3:f4:
81:e8:a7:cb:07:ca:3a:a4:24:fe:dc:bb:51:16:6a:28:
33:40:a4:64:60:75:0e:c8:06:c8:5f:e5:98:be:16:a3:
bc:19:e7:b3:4f:00:0a:8e:81:33:dd:4c:a0:fb:f5:1c:
1f:1d:3f:b5:90:8b:ec:98:67:76:95:56:8a:94:45:54:
52:3d:1c:69:4c:6f:8a:9f:09:ec:ef:b0:a9:bc:cf:9d
Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List
The following is an example Certificate Revocation List.
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CRL Name: q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl
Data:
Version: 2
Signature Algorithm:
Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA
Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use,
E=ca@apnic.net
This Update: Thu Jul 27 06:30:34 2006 GMT
Next Update: Fri Jul 28 06:30:34 2006 GMT
Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier:
ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:
07:02:51:c2:a9:1c
Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI):
q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw
CRLNumber: 4
Revoked Certificates: 1
Serial Number: 1
Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:10:19 2006 GMT
Serial Number: 2
Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:12:25 2006 GMT
Serial Number: 4
Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:40:39 2006 GMT
Signature:
b2:5a:e8:7c:bd:a8:00:0f:03:1a:17:fd:40:2c:46:
0e:d5:64:87:e7:e7:bc:10:7d:b6:3e:39:21:a9:12:
f4:5a:d8:b8:d4:bd:57:1a:7d:2f:7c:0d:c6:4f:27:
17:c8:0e:ae:8c:89:ff:00:f7:81:97:c3:a1:6a:0a:
f7:d2:46:06:9a:d1:d5:4d:78:e1:b7:b0:58:4d:09:
d6:7c:1e:a0:40:af:86:5d:8c:c9:48:f6:e6:20:2e:
b9:b6:81:03:0b:51:ac:23:db:9f:c1:8e:d6:94:54:
66:a5:68:52:ee:dd:0f:10:5d:21:b8:b8:19:ff:29:
6f:51:2e:c8:74:5c:2a:d2:c5:fa:99:eb:c5:c2:a2:
d0:96:fc:54:b3:ba:80:4b:92:7f:85:54:76:c9:12:
cb:32:ea:1d:12:7b:f8:f9:a2:5c:a1:b1:06:8e:d8:
c5:42:61:00:8c:f6:33:11:29:df:6e:b2:cc:c3:7c:
d3:f3:0c:8d:5c:49:a5:fb:49:fd:e7:c4:73:68:0a:
09:0e:6d:68:a9:06:52:3a:36:4f:19:47:83:59:da:
02:5b:2a:d0:8a:7a:33:0a:d5:ce:be:b5:a2:7d:8d:
59:a1:9d:ee:60:ce:77:3d:e1:86:9a:84:93:90:9f:
34:a7:02:40:59:3a:a5:d1:18:fb:6f:fc:af:d4:02:
d9
Huston, et al. Expires December 31, 2007 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft Resource Certificate Profile June 2007
Authors' Addresses
Geoff Huston
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: gih@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
George Michaelson
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: ggm@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
Robert Loomans
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: robertl@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
Huston, et al. Expires December 31, 2007 [Page 29]
Internet-Draft Resource Certificate Profile June 2007
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
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WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Intellectual Property
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this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
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on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
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Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
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Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
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Huston, et al. Expires December 31, 2007 [Page 30]
