SIDR G. Huston
Internet-Draft G. Michaelson
Intended status: Standards Track R. Loomans
Expires: March 10, 2009 APNIC
September 6, 2008
A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates
draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-12
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-of-use"
of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System
Numbers). This profile is used to convey the issuer's authorization
of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of-
use" of the IP addresses and AS numbers that are described in the
issued certificate.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Resource Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Serial number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.6. Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.7. Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.8. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . . . . . 8
3.9.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.9.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.9.6. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.9.7. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.9.8. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.9.9. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.9.10. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2. Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3. This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.4. Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.5. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6. Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.6.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.6.2. Revocation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.7. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.7.2. CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.1. PCKS#10 Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template
Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2. CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . 17
5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . 18
5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate
Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.1. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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6.2. Resource Certification Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.3. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . 24
6.3.1. Distribution Format of Nominated Trust Anchor
Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10. Draft Review Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 34
Appendix C. Cryptographic Message Syntax Profile for RPKI
Trust Anchor Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
C.1. Signed-Data ContentType . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
C.1.1. encapContentInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
C.1.2. signerInfos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
C.2. RTA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 42
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1. Introduction
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates
[X.509] for use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and
AS Numbers. Such certificates are termed here "Resource
Certificates." Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that
conform to the PKIX profile [RFC5280], and also conform to the
constraints specified in this profile. Resource Certificates attest
that the issuer has granted the subject a "right-of-use" for a listed
set of IP addresses and Autonomous System numbers.
A Resource Certificate describes an action by a certificate issuer
that binds a list of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the subject
of the issued certificate. The binding is identified by the
association of the subject's private key with the subject's public
key contained in the Resource Certificate, as signed by the private
key of the certificate's issuer.
In the context of the public Internet, and the use of public number
resources within this context, it is intended that Resource
Certificates are used in a manner that is explicitly aligned to the
public number resource distribution function. Specifically, when a
number resource is allocated or assigned by a number registry to an
entity, this allocation is described by an associated Resource
Certificate. This certificate is issued by the number registry, and
the subject's public key that is being certified by the issuer
corresponds to the public key part of a public / private key pair
that was generated by the same entity who is the recipient of the
number assignment or allocation. A critical extension to the
certificate enumerates the IP Resources that were allocated or
assigned by the issuer to the entity. In the context of the public
number distribution function, this corresponds to a hierarchical PKI
structure, where Resource Certificates are only issued in one
'direction' and there is a single unique path of certificates from a
certification authority operating at the apex of a resource
distribution hierarchy to a valid certificate.
Validation of a Resource Certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can
be undertaken by establishing a valid issuer-subject certificate
chain from a certificate issued by a trust anchor certification
authority to the certificate [RFC4158], with the additional
constraint of ensuring that each subject's listed resources are fully
encompassed by those of the issuer at each step in the issuer-subject
certificate chain.
Resource Certificates may be used in the context of the operation of
secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-of-use of an
IP number resource that is being passed within the routing protocol,
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allowing relying parties to verify legitimacy and correctness of
routing information. Related use contexts include validation of
Internet Routing Registry objects, validation of routing requests,
and detection of potential unauthorised use of IP addresses.
This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource
Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid.
Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to
this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate.
1.1. Terminology
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280], "X.509
Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet
Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing
Architecture" [RFC4291], "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines"
[RFC2050], and related regional Internet registry address management
policy documents.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
2. Describing Resources in Certificates
The framework for describing an association between the subject of a
certificate and the resources currently under the subject's control
is described in [RFC3779].
There are three aspects of this resource extension that are noted in
this profile:
1. RFC 3779 notes that a resource extension SHOULD be a CRITICAL
extension to the X.509 Certificate. This Resource Certificate
profile further specifies that the use of this certificate
extension MUST be used in all Resource Certificates and MUST be
marked as CRITICAL.
2. RFC 3779 defines a sorted canonical form of describing a resource
set, with maximal spanning ranges and maximal spanning prefix
masks as appropriate. All valid certificates in this profile
MUST use this sorted canonical form of resource description in
the resource extension field.
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3. A test of the resource extension in the context of certificate
validity includes the condition that the resources described in
the immediate superior certificate in the PKI hierarchy (the
certificate where this certificate's issuer is the subject) has a
resource set (called here the "issuer's resource set") that must
encompass the resource set of the issued certificate. In this
context "encompass" allows for the issuer's resource set to be
the same as, or a strict superset of, any subject's resource set.
A test of certificate validity entails the identification of a
sequence of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain (where the
subject field of one certificate appears as the issuer in the next
certificate in the sequence) from a trust anchor certification
authority to the certificate being validated, and that the resource
extensions in this certificate sequence from the trust anchor's
issued certificate to the certificate being validated form a sequence
of encompassing relationships in terms of the resources described in
the resource extension.
3. Resource Certificate Fields
A Resource Certificate is a valid X.509 v3 public key certificate,
consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280], containing the fields
listed in this section. Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL,
all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST
NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate. Where a field value
is specified here this value MUST be used in conforming Resource
Certificates.
3.1. Version
Resource Certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates. This field
MUST be present, and the Version MUST be 3 (i.e. the value of this
field is 2).
3.2. Serial number
The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique per
Issuer.
3.3. Signature Algorithm
This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on
this certificate. This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with
RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or
SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the
OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 } [RFC4055].
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3.4. Issuer
This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the
certificate. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name.
If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue of
the "cA" bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then the
issuer name MUST correspond to the subject name as contained in the
immediate superior certificate.
This field MUST be non-empty.
3.5. Subject
This field identifies the entity to whom the resource has been
allocated / assigned. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name.
In this profile the subject name is determined by the issuer, and
each distinct entity certified by the issuer MUST be identified using
a subject name that is unique per issuer.
This field MUST be non-empty.
3.6. Valid From
The starting time at which point the certificate is valid. In this
profile the "Valid From" time SHOULD be no earlier than the time of
certificate generation. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC5280],
Certification Authorities (CAs) conforming to this profile MUST
always encode the certificate's "Valid From" date through the year
2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as
GeneralizedTime. These two time formats are defined in [RFC5280].
In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for
this field that pre-dates the same field value in any superior
certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information
that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time
other than the current time.
3.7. Valid To
The Valid To time is the date and time at which point in time the
certificate's validity ends. It represents the anticipated lifetime
of the resource allocation / assignment arrangement between the
issuer and the subject. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC5280], CAs
conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's
"Valid To" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050
or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. These two time formats
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are defined in [RFC5280].
In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for
this field that post-dates the same field value in any superior
certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information
that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time
other than the current time.
CAs are typically advised against issuing a certificate with a
validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the CA's
certificate that will be used to validate the issued certificate.
However, in the context of this profile, it is anticipated that a CA
may have valid grounds to issue a certificate with a validity
interval that exceeds the validity interval of the CA's certificate.
3.8. Subject Public Key Info
This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with
which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and,
accordingly, the OID for the public key algorithm is
1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. The key size MUST be a minimum size of 2048
bits.
It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for
both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should be taken
when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.
3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields
As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC5280], each extension in a certificate
is designated as either critical or non-critical. A certificate-
using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical
extension it does not recognise; however, a non-critical extension
MAY be ignored if it is not recognised [RFC5280].
The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming
Resource Certificate, except where explicitly noted otherwise.
3.9.1. Basic Constraints
The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the
certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification
paths that include this certificate.
The issuer determines whether the "cA" boolean is set. If this bit
is set, then it indicates that the subject is allowed to issue
resources certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the
subject is permitted be a CA).
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The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST
NOT be present.
The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the
Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present when the subject is
a CA, and MUST NOT be present otherwise.
3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier
The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying
certificates that contain a particular public key. To facilitate
certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all
Resource Certificates. This extension is non-critical.
The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in
the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of
immediate subordinate certificates (all certificates issued by the
subject of this certificate).
The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value
of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key, as
described in Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC5280].
3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier
The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
identifying certificates that are signed by the issuer's private key,
by providing a hash value of the issuer's public key. To facilitate
path construction, this extension MUST appear in all Resource
Certificates. The keyIdentifier sub field MUST be present in all
Resource Certificates, with the exception of a CA who issues a "self-
signed" certificate. The authorityCertIssuer and
authorityCertSerialNumber sub fields MUST NOT be present. This
extension is non-critical.
The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value
of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as
described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC5280].
3.9.4. Key Usage
This describes the purpose of the certificate. This is a critical
extension, and it MUST be present.
In certificates issued to Certificate Authorities only the
keyCertSign and CRLSign bits are set to TRUE and MUST be the only
bits set to TRUE.
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In end-entity certificates the digitalSignature bit MUST be set and
MUST be the only bit set to TRUE.
3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points
This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s)
associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile
uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access
mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] that references
a single inclusive CRL for each issuer.
In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer,
implying at the CRLIssuer sub field MUST be omitted, and the
distributionPoint sub-field MUST be present. The Reasons sub-field
MUST be omitted.
The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT
contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The type of the general name MUST
be of type URI.
In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified to be all
certificates issued by this CA issuer using a given key pair.
The sequence of distributionPoint values MUST contain only a single
DistributionPointName set. The DistributionPointName set MAY contain
more than one URI value. An RSYNC URI MUST be present in the
DistributionPointName set, and reference the most recent instance of
this issuer's certificate revocation list. Other access form URIs
MAY be used in addition to the RSYNC URI.
This extension MUST be present and it is non-critical. There is one
exception, namely where a CA distributes its public key in the form
of a "self-signed" certificate, the CRLDP MUST be omitted.
3.9.6. Authority Information Access
This field (AIA) identifies the point of publication of the
certificate that is issued by the issuer's immediate superior CA,
where this certificate's issuer is the subject. In this profile a
single reference object to publication location of the immediate
superior certificate MUST be used, except in the case where a CA
distributes its public key in the form of a "self-signed"
certificate, in which case the AIA field SHOULD be omitted.
This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred
URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified
with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI MUST
reference the point of publication of the certificate where this
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issuer is the subject (the issuer's immediate superior certificate).
Other access method URIs referencing the same object MAY also be
included in the value sequence of this extension.
When an Issuer re-issues a CA certificate, the subordinate
certificates need to reference this new certificate via the AIA
field. In order to avoid the situation where a certificate re-
issuance necessarily implies a requirement to re-issue all
subordinate certificates, CA Certificate issuers SHOULD use a
persistent URL name scheme for issued certificates. This implies
that re-issued certificates overwrite previously issued certificates
to the same subject in the publication repository, and use the same
publication name as previously issued certificates. In this way
subordinate certificates can maintain a constant AIA field value and
need not be re-issued due solely to a re-issue of the superior
certificate. The issuers' policy with respect to the persistence of
name objects of issued certificates MUST be specified in the Issuer's
Certification Practice Statement.
This extension is non-critical.
3.9.7. Subject Information Access
This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services
relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension
appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this information
and service collection will include all current valid certificates
that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the
subject's corresponding private key.
This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The
preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be
specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the
subject of the certificate is a CA. The RSYNC URI must reference an
object collection rather than an individual object and MUST use a
trailing '/' in the URI.
Other access method URIs that reference the same location MAY also be
included in the value sequence of this extension. The ordering of
URIs in this sequence reflect the subject's relative preferences for
access methods, with the first method in the sequence being the most
preferred.
This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non-
critical.
For End Entity (EE) certificates, where the subject is not a CA, this
field MAY be present, and is non-critical. If present, it either
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references the location where objects signed by the key pair
associated with the EE certificate can be accessed, or, in the case
of single-use EE certificates it references the location of the
single object that has been signed by the corresponding key pair.
When the subject is an End Entity, and it publishes objects signed
with the matching private key in a repository, the directory where
these signed objects is published is referenced the id-ad-
signedObjectRepository OID.
id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }
id-ad-signedObjectRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 9 }
When the subject is an End Entity, and it publishes a single object
signed with the matching private key, the location where this signed
object is published is referenced the id-ad-signedObject OID.
id-ad-signedObject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 11 }
This profile requires the use of repository publication manifests
[ID.SIDR-MANIFESTS] to list all signed objects that are deposited in
the repository publication point associated with a CA or an EE. The
publication point of the manifest for a CA or EE is placed in the SIA
extension of the CA or EE certificate. This profile uses a URI form
of manifest identification for the accessLocation. The preferred URI
access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified.
Other accessDescription fields may exist with this id-ad-Manifest
accessMethod, where the accessLocation value indicates alternate URI
access mechanisms for the same manifest object.
id-ad-rpkiManifest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 10 }
CA certificates MUST include in the SIA an accessMethod OID of id-ad-
rpkiManifest, where the associated accessLocation refers to the
subject's published manifest object as an object URL.
When an EE certificate is intended for use in verifying multiple
objects, EE certificate MUST include in the SIA an access method OID
of id-ad-rpkiManifest, where the associated access location refers to
the publication point of the objects that are verified using this EE
certificate.
When an EE certificate is used to sign a single published object, the
EE certificate MUST include in the SIA an access method OID of id-ad-
signedObject, where the associated access location refers to the
publication point of the single object that is verified using this EE
certificate. In this case, the SIA MUST NOT include the access
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method OID of id-ad-rpkiManifest.
3.9.8. Certificate Policies
This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using
the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2". This field
MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource
Certificates.
PolicyQualifiers MUST NOT be used in this profile.
This extension MUST be present and it is critical.
3.9.9. IP Resources
This field contains the list of IP address resources as per
[RFC3779]. The value may specify the "inherit" element for a
particular AFI value. In the context of resource certificates
describing public number resources for use in the public Internet,
the SAFI value MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST
include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both
extensions.
This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical.
3.9.10. AS Resources
This field contains the list of AS number resources as per [RFC3779],
or may specify the "inherit" element. RDI values are NOT supported
in this profile and MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST
include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both
extensions.
This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical.
4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile
Each CA MUST issue a version 2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL),
consistent with [RFC5280]. The CRL issuer is the CA, and no indirect
CRLs are supported in this profile.
An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one
regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's
validity period.
This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs.
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The scope of the CRL MUST be "all certificates issued by this CA
using a given key pair". The contents of the CRL are a list of all
non-expired certificates issued by the CA using a given key pair that
have been revoked by the CA.
The profile allows the issuance of multiple current CRLs with
different scope by a single CA, with the scope being defined by the
key pair used by the CA.
No CRL fields other than those listed here are permitted in CRLs
issued under this profile. Unless otherwise indicated, these fields
MUST be present in the CRL. Where two or more CRLs issued by a
single CA with the same scope, the CRL with the highest value of the
"CRL Number" field supersedes all other CRLs issued by this CA.
4.1. Version
Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the
integer value of this field is 1).
4.2. Issuer Name
The value of this field is the X.501 name of the issuing CA who is
also the signer of the CRL, and is identical to the Issuer name in
the Resource Certificates that are issued by this issuer.
4.3. This Update
This field contains the date and time that this CRL was issued. The
value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the
year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the
year 2050 or later.
4.4. Next Update
This is the date and time by which the next CRL SHOULD be issued.
The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through
the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in
the year 2050 or later.
4.5. Signature
This field contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL. This
profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA
(sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or SHA-
512. This field MUST be present.
It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for
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both the CRL Issuer and relying parties, indicating that care should
be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.
4.6. Revoked Certificate List
When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate
list MUST be absent.
For each revoked resource certificate only the following fields MUST
be present. No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile,
and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL.
4.6.1. Serial Number
The issuer's serial number of the revoked certificate.
4.6.2. Revocation Date
The time the certificate was revoked. This time MUST NOT be a future
date. The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates
through the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for
dates in the year 2050 or later.
4.7. CRL Extensions
The X.509 v2 CRL format allows extensions to be placed in a CRL. The
following extensions are supported in this profile, and MUST be
present in a CRL.
4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier
The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to
sign a CRL. Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier
method. The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section
4.2.1.1 of [RFC5280].
This extension is non-critical.
4.7.2. CRL Number
The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence
number of positive integers for a given CA and scope. This extension
allows users to easily determine when a particular CRL supersedes
another CRL. The highest CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs
issued by the CA with the same scope.
This extension is non-critical.
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5. Resource Certificate Request Profile
A resource certificate request MAY use either of PKCS#10 or
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF). A CA Issuer MUST support
PKCS#10 and a CA Issuer may, with mutual consent of the subject,
support CRMF.
5.1. PCKS#10 Profile
This profile refines the specification in [RFC2986], as it relates to
Resource Certificates. A Certificate Request Message object,
formatted according to PKCS#10, is passed to a CA as the initial step
in issuing a certificate.
This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority
(RA), acting under the direction of a Subject.
With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is
permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding
certificate.
5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template Fields
This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
that may appear in a CertificationRequestInfo:
Version
This field is mandatory and MUST have the value 0.
Subject
This field is optional. If present, the value of this field
SHOULD be empty, in which case the issuer MUST generate a subject
name that is unique in the context of certificates issued by this
issuer. If the value of this field is non-empty, then the CA MAY
consider the value of this field as the subject's suggested
subject name, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion,
as the subject name MUST be unique per issuer in certificates
issued by this issuer.
SubjectPublicKeyInfo
This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm
with which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA,
and the OID for the algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. This field
also includes a bit-string representation of the entity's public
key. For the RSA public-key algorithm the bit string contains the
DER encoding of a value of PKCS #1 type RSAPublicKey.
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Attributes
[RFC2986] defines the attributes field as key-value pairs where
the key is an OID and the value's structure depends on the key.
The only attribute used in this profile is the ExtensionRequest
attribute as defined in [RFC2985]. This attribute contains X509v3
Certificate Extensions. The profile for extensions in certificate
requests is specified in Section 5.3.
This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
that MAY appear in a CertificationRequest Object:
signatureAlgorithm
This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA
(sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or
SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the
OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 }
[RFC4055].
It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive
for both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should
be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.
5.2. CRMF Profile
This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)
specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to Resource Certificates.
A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the
CRMF, is passed to a CA as the initial step in issuing a certificate.
This request MAY be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority
(RA), acting under the direction of a subject.
With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is
permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding
certificate.
5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields
This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
that may appear in a Certificate Request Template:
Version
This field MAY be absent, or MAY specify the request of a Version
3 Certificate. It SHOULD be omitted.
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SerialNumber
As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be
omitted in this profile.
SigningAlgorithm
As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be
omitted in this profile.
Issuer
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile.
Validity
This field MAY be omitted. If omitted, the CA will issue a
Certificate with Validity dates as determined by the CA. If
specified, then the CA MAY override the requested values with
dates as determined by the CA.
Subject
This field is optional. If present, the value of this field
SHOULD be empty, in which case the issuer MUST generate a subject
name that is unique in the context of certificates issued by this
issuer. If the value of this field is non-empty, then the CA MAY
consider the value of this field as the subject's suggested
subject name, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion,
as the subject name MUST be unique per issuer in certificates
issued by this issuer.
PublicKey
This field MUST be present.
extensions
This attribute contains X509v3 Certificate Extensions. The
profile for extensions in certificate requests is specified in
Section 5.3.
5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields
The following control fields are supported in this profile:
Authenticator Control
It is noted that the intended model of authentication of the
subject is a long term one, and the advice as offered in [RFC4211]
is that the Authenticator Control field be used.
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5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests
The following extensions MAY appear in a PKCS#10 or CRMF Certificate
Request. Any other extensions MUST NOT appear in a Certificate
Request. This profile places the following additional constraints on
these extensions.:
BasicConstraints
If this is omitted then the CA will issue an end entity
certificate with the BasicConstraints extension not present in the
issued certificate.
The Path Length Constraint is not supported in this Resource
Certificate Profile, and this field MUST be omitted in this
profile.
The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to on. If this bit
is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue
resource certificates within this overall framework.
The CA MUST honour the SubjectType CA bit set to off (End Entity
certificate request), in which case the corresponding end entity
certificate will not contain a BasicConstraints extension.
SubjectKeyIdentifier
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile.
AuthorityKeyIdentifier
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile.
KeyUsage
The CA MAY honor KeyUsage extensions of keyCertSign and cRLSign if
present, as long as this is consistent with the BasicConstraints
SubjectType sub field, when specified.
SubjectInformationAccess
This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and the field
value SHOULD be honoured by the CA. If the CA is not able to
honor the requested field value, then the CA MUST reject the
Certificate Request.
This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and
services relating to the subject of the certificate in which the
SIA extension appears.
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Where the subject is a CA in this profile, this information and
service collection will include all current valid certificates
that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the
subject's corresponding private key.
This profile uses a URI form of location identification. An RSYNC
URI MUST be specified, with an access method value of id-ad-
caRepository when the subject of the certificate is a CA. The
RSYNC URI MUST reference an object collection rather than an
individual object and MUST use a trailing '/' in the URI. Other
access method URIs that reference the same location MAY also be
included in the value sequence of this extension. The ordering of
URIs in this sequence reflect the subject's relative preferences
for access methods, with the first method in the sequence being
the most preferred by the Subject.
A request for a CA certificate MUST include in the SIA of the
request the id-ad-caRepository access method, and also MUST
include in the SIA of the request the accessMethod OID of id-ad-
rpkiManifest, where the associated accessLocation refers to the
subject's published manifest object as an object URL.
This field MAY be present when the subject is a EE. If it is
present the field value SHOULD be honoured by the CA. If the CA
is not able to honor the requested field value, then the CA MUST
reject the Certificate Request. If it is not present the CA
SHOULD honor this request and omit the SIA from the issued
certificate. If the CA is not able to honor the request to omit
the SIA, then the CA MUST reject the Certificate Request.
When an EE certificate is intended for use in verifying multiple
objects, the certificate request for the EE certificate MUST
include in the SIA of the request an access method OID of id-ad-
signedObjectRepository, and also MUST include in the SIA of the
request an access method OID of id-ad-rpkiManifest, where the
associated access location refers to the publication point of the
objects that are verified using this EE certificate.
When an EE certificate is used to sign a single published object,
the certificate request for the EE certificate MUST include in the
SIA of the request an access method OID of id-ad-signedObject,
where the associated access location refers to the publication
point of the single object that is verified using this EE
certificate, and MUST NOT include an id-ad-rpkiManifest access
method OID in the SIA of the request.
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In the case when the EE certificate is to be used exclusively to
sign one or more unpublished objects, such that the all signed
objects will not be published in any RPKI repository, then the SIA
SHOULD be omitted from the request.
CRLDistributionPoints
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile.
AuthorityInformationAccess
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile.
CertificatePolicies
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile.
With the exceptions of the publicKey field and the
SubjectInformationAccess field, the CA is permitted to alter any
requested field.
6. Resource Certificate Validation
This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure.
This refines the generic procedure described in section 6 of
[RFC5280]:
To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other
things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n
certificates) satisfies the following conditions:
1. for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the
issuer of certificate x+1;
2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor;
3. certificate n is the certificate to be validated; and
4. for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate is valid.
6.1. Resource Extension Validation
The IP resource extension definition [RFC3779] defines a critical
extensions for Internet number resources. These are ASN.1 encoded
representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range (either as a
prefix/length, or start-end pair) and the AS number set.
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Valid Resource Certificates MUST have a valid IP address and/or AS
number resource extension. In order to validate a Resource
Certificate the resource extension must also be validated. This
validation process relies on definitions of comparison of resource
sets:
more specific: Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges,
A and B, A is "more specific" than B if range B includes all IP
addresses or AS numbers described by range A, and if range B is
larger than range A.
equal: Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B,
A is "equal" to B if range A describes precisely the same
collection of IP addresses or AS numbers as described by range B.
The definition of "inheritance" in [RFC3779] is equivalent to this
"equality" comparison.
encompass: Given two IP address and AS number sets X and Y, X
"encompasses" Y if, for every contiguous range of IP addresses or
AS numbers elements in set Y, the range element is either more
specific than or equal to a contiguous range element within the
set X.
Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of an
ordered certificate sequence of {1,2, ... , n} where '1' is issued by
a trust anchor and 'n' is the target certificate, and where the
subject of certificate 'x' is the issuer of certificate 'x' + 1,
implies that the resources described in certificate 'x' "encompass"
the resources described in certificate 'x' + 1, and the resources
described in the trust anchor information "encompass" the resources
described in certificate 1.
6.2. Resource Certification Path Validation
Validation of signed resource data using a target resource
certificate consists of assembling an ordered sequence (or
'Certification Path') of certificates ({1,2,...n} where '1' is a
certificate that has been issued by a trust anchor, and 'n' is the
target certificate) verifying that all of the following conditions
hold:
1. The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key and
the signature algorithm
2. The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From and
To values.
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3. The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present and
contains field values as specified in this profile for all field
values that MUST be present.
4. No field value that MUST NOT be present in this profile is
present in the certificate.
5. The Issuer has not revoked the certificate by placing the
certificate's serial number on the Issuer's current Certificate
Revocation List, and the Certificate Revocation List is itself
valid.
6. That the resource extension data is "encompassed" by the resource
extension data contained in a valid certificate where this Issuer
is the Subject (the previous certificate in the ordered sequence)
7. The Certification Path originates with a certificate issued by a
trust anchor, and there exists a signing chain across the
Certification Path where the Subject of Certificate x in the
Certification Path matches the Issuer in Certificate x+1 in the
Certification Path.
A certificate validation algorithm may perform these tests in any
chosen order.
Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found in a locally
maintained cache, maintained by a regular top-down synchronization
pass, seeded with the CAs who operate at the apex of the resource
distribution hierarchy, via reference to issued certificates and
their SIA fields as forward pointers, plus the CRLDP. Alternatively,
validation may be performed using a bottom-up process with on-line
certificate access using the certificate's AIA and CRLDP pointers to
guide the certificate retrieval process for each certificate's
immediate superior CA certificate.
There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that
are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as
means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator.
Some further heuristics may be required to halt the certification
path validation process in order to avoid some of the issues
associated with attempts to validate such structures. It is
suggested that implementations of Resource Certificate validation MAY
halt with a validation failure if the certification path length
exceeds a pre-determined configuration parameter.
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6.3. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates
The trust model that may be used in the resource certificate
framework in the context of validation of assertions of public number
resources in public-use contexts is one that readily maps to a top-
down delegated CA model that mirrors the delegation of resources from
a registry distribution point to the entities that are the direct
recipients of these resources. Within this trust model these
recipient entities may, in turn, operate a registry and perform
further allocations or assignments. This is a strict hierarchy, in
that any number resource and a corresponding recipient entity has
only one 'parent' issuing registry for that number resource (i.e.
there is always a unique parent entity for any resource and
corresponding entity), and that the issuing registry is not a direct
or indirect subordinate recipient entity of the recipient entity in
question (i.e. no loops in the model).
The more general consideration is that selection of one or more trust
anchor CAs is a task undertaken by relying parties. The structure of
the resource certificate profile admits potentially the same variety
of trust models as the PKIX profile. There is only one additional
caveat on the general applicability of trust models and PKIX
frameworks, namely that in forming a validation path to a trust
anchor CA, the sequence of certificates MUST preserve the resource
extension validation property, as described in Section 6.1, and the
validation of the first certificate in the validation path not only
involves the verification that the certificate was issued by a trust
anchor CA, but also that the resource set described in the
certificate MUST be encompassed by the trust anchor CA's resource
set, as described in Section 6.1.
The trust anchor information, describing a CA that serves as a trust
anchor, includes the following:
1. the trusted issuer name,
2. the trusted public key algorithm,
3. the trusted public key,
4. optionally, the trusted public key parameters associated with the
public key, and
5. a resource set, consisting of a set of IPv4 resources, IPv6
resources and AS number resources.
The trust anchor information may be provided to the path processing
procedure in the form of a self-signed certificate.
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6.3.1. Distribution Format of Nominated Trust Anchor Material
In the RPKI the hierarchical certificate framework corresponds to the
hierarchies of the resource distribution function. In consideration
of this, it is reasonable to nominate to relying parties a default
set of trust anchors for the RPKI that correspond to the entities who
operate at the upper levels of the associated resource allocation
hierarchy. The corresponding nominated trust anchor CA(s) should
therefore map, in some fashion, to apex point(s) of the hierarchical
resource distribution structure.
The characteristics of a trust anchor framework for the RPKI includes
the following considerations:
o The entity or entities that issue proposed trust anchor material
for the RPKI should be as close as possible to the apex of the
associated resource distribution hierarchy.
o Such trust anchor material should be long-lived. As it can be
reasonably anticipated that default nominated trust anchor
material would be distributed with relying party validation
software, the implication is that the distributed default
nominated trust anchor material should remain constant for
extended time intervals.
o It is a poor trust model when any entity that issues putative
trust anchor material is forced to be authoritative over
information or actions of which the entity has no direct
knowledge, nor is in possession of a current definitive record of
such actions. Entities who propose themselves in a role of a
trust anchor issuer should be able to point to corroborative
material supporting the assertion that they are legitimate
authorities for the information where they are representing
themselves as a potential trust anchor for relying parties.
An entity offering itself as a putative RPKI trust anchor for a part
of the RPKI is required to regularly publish a RPKI CA certificate at
a stable URL, and to publish a packaged form of this URL as
distributed trust anchor material, as follows:
o The entity issues a RPKI self-signed "root" CA certificate that is
used as the apex of a RPKI certificate issuance hierarchy. This
certificate MUST have the keyCertSign sign bit set in the key
usage extension, and the CA flag set in the basic constraints
extension, no AIA value and no CRLDP value. This certificate MUST
be reissued at regular intervals prior to expiration of the
current RPKI self-signed certificate, and MUST be reissued upon
any change in the resource set that has been allocated to the
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entity who is operating this CA. The validity interval of this
certificate should reflect the anticipated period of the regular
RPKI certificate re-issuance.
o The entity maintains a "trust anchor material" key pair.
o The entity issues a PKI self-signed CA certificate [RFC5280] using
the trust anchor material key pair, where the subject public key
in the certificate is the public key of the trust anchor material
key pair and the certificate is signed by the corresponding
private key of trust anchor material key pair. This certificate
MUST have the keyCertSign sign bit set in the key usage extension,
and the CA flag set in the basic constraints extension, no AIA
value and no CRLDP value. The validity period of this certificate
shold be very long-lived, with the period to be defined by the
entity. The SIA of this certificate references a publication
point where the CRL and the subordinate product of this
certificate are published.
o The PKI CA issues a subordinate PKI EE certificate with a validity
period identical to the validity period of the RPKI self-signed
"root" CA certificate. This PKI EE certificate MUST have the
digitalSignature bit set, and this MUST be the only bit set to
TRUE. The CA flag set MUST be cleared in the basic constraints
extension. The validity period of this certificate should be
aligned to the validity period of the RPKI self-signed "root" CA
certificate.
o The PKI CA regularly issues a CRL. The CRL issuance cycle SHOULD
be shorter than the validity period for the RPKI self-signed
"root" certificate.
o Each time the RPKI self-signed "root" certificate is re-issued, or
prior to the expiration of the PKI EE certificate, the PKI CA
generates a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC3852] signed-
data object, where the payload is the RPKI self-signed "root"
certificate. The object is CMS-signed with the private key of the
PKI EE certificate. The PKI EE certificate is included as a CMS
signed attribute in the CMS object. The PKI self-signed CA
certificate and the asociated CRL are not to be included in the
CMS object. The format of the CMS object is specified in
Appendix C. The CMS object is published at the location
referenced in the SIA of the PKI self-signed CA certificate.
o The entity publically distributes the PKI self-signed CA
certificate as its proposed trust anchor material.
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o The entity publishes the modulus and exponent of the "trust anchor
material" public key using a trusted form of publication that
allows the entity's identity to be validated and the retrieval of
the published information to be secured.
Relying Parties can assemble the default trust anchor collection by
using the distributed PKI self-signed CA certificate for each
nominated trust anchor:
o The public key in the self-signed CA PKI certificate can be
validated using the modulus and exponent values as retrieved from
the entity's publication point using a secured retrieval
operation.
o The PKI CA's CRL and CMS objects can be retrieved from the
publication point referenced by the SIA in the PKI CA certificate.
o The CRL can be verified against the PKI CA certificate.
o The CMS signature can be verified using the included PKI EE
certificate together with the retrieved CRL and the self-signed
PKI CA certificate.
o The relying party can then load the enclosed RPKI self-signed CA
certificate as a trust anchor for RPKI validation for those
resources described in the resource extension of this RPKI
certificate.
Relying Parties should perform this retrieval and validation
operation at intervals no less frequent than the nextUpdate time of
the published CRL, and should perform the retrieval operation prior
to the expiration of the PKI EE certificate, or upon revocation of
the PKI EE certificate that was used to sign the CMS object that held
the relying party's current RPKI self-signed CA certificate.
If a trust anchor CA wishes to perform an issuance of the RPKI self-
signed CA certificate outside the established update cycle time, it
can notify relying parties of this by revising the nextUpdate time of
the PKI CA's CRL to a shorter interval, issuing a new PKI CA
certificate and a new CMS object with the new RPKI self-signed CA
certificate, and revoking the old PKI EE certificate at the
nextUpdate time in the next issued CRL. This revocation will provide
an indication to relying parties to perform the retrieval operation
ofthe RPKI self-signed CA certificate at a time earlier than the
normal update cycle time.
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7. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations of [RFC5280] and [RFC3779]apply to
Resource Certificates as defined by this profile, and their use.
A Resource Certificate PKI cannot in and of itself resolve any forms
of ambiguity relating to uniqueness of assertions of rights of use in
the event that two or more valid certificates encompass the same
resource. If the issuance of resource certificates is aligned to the
status of resource allocations and assignments then the information
conveyed in a certificate is no better than the information in the
allocation and assignment databases.
8. IANA Considerations
[Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA
considerations stated in this document.]
9. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from
Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo
Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of
this document. The document also reflects review comments received
from Sean Turner and David Cooper.
10. Draft Review Notes
The following review comments are unresolved at present:
1. Use of additional non-critical extensions:
Section 3: "Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, all the
fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST NOT
appear in a conforming Resource Certificate."
The review comment was that certificate profile should permit
the use of non-critical extensions. The scenario nominatedwas
one in which a CA product added non-critical extensions to a
certificate that would not affect a relying party's decision
to accept the certificate, regardless of whether the relying
party could process the extension. It was noted that it may
be possible to configure these CA products so that they do not
include these extensions in the certificates, but that is a
question that would need to be answered by someone more
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familiar with particular CA products that add non-critical
extensions that identify the CA product used to mint the
certificate.
The rationale for not permitting non-critical extensions is
that it was not seen as being appropriate to be in the
position of having certificates with extensions which relying
parties may see as valid, but contain extensions that, were
the relying party to understand the extension, would
contradict or qualify in some way this original validity. The
profile takes the position of minimialism over extensibility,
taking the approach of nomination of a specific goal for the
PKI, namely to construct a PKI that precisely matches the IP
number resource allocation structure, and then defining a
certificate profile that was precisely aligned to this
objective. If there is some need or requirement to use the
RFC3779 extensions in contexts other than assertions about
right of use of resources by virtue of an allocation action,
that make use of other extensions than are specified here,
then the authors suggest that it would be more appropriate to
define a distinct profile to fulfil this function.
It is proposed to leave the text as is.
2. CRL Scope:
Section 3.9.5: In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified
to be all certificates issued by this CA issue using a given key
pair.
The review comment was that the scope of a CRL must be all
certificates issued by the issuing CA unless the CRL includes
an issuingDistributionPoint extension. So, if the scope of
CRLs is to be limited to certificates signed with a given key
pair, then the profile must either require inclusion of the
issuingDistributionPoint extension in CRLs or forbid CAs from
performing key rollover. The latter option may be implemented
by having issuers change names whenever changing the key pair
used to sign certificates.
It is proposed to drop the scope restriction, and remove the
text in Section 3.9.5.
3. Name Uniqueness:
Section 3.5 stipulates that subject names must simply be unique
per issuer, while X.509 requires that names must be globally
unique.
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The review comment was that the Security Considerations
section in RFC5280 states: " While X.509 mandates that names
be unambiguous, there is a risk that two unrelated authorities
will issue certificates and/or CRLs under the same issuer
name." X.501 states that a (directory) name shall be
unambiguous, in that it denotes just one object, but need not
be unique, in that it not be the only name that unambiguously
denotes the object, and that for every name form used in the
GeneralName type, there shall be a name registration system
that ensures that any name used unambiguously identifies one
entity to both certificate issuer and certificate users. The
review comment is that problem with a less stringent
requirement is that if two CAs issue certificates and CRLs
under the same name, there is a risk that a relying party will
use a CRL issued by one of these CAs to determine the status
of a certificate issued by the other CA.
The rationale for using a name this is unique per issuer is
that the RPKI is strictly hierarchical, the repository
publication structure is structured on a per-CA basis, the
CRLDP is mandatory to include in all RPKI certificates (except
apex self-signed certs) so that each certificate points
directly to the associated CRL that can revoke it, the
contextof the use of names is within a per issuer context, a
single entity may hold resources from multiple sources and the
RPKI name space is unconstrained such that it is neither
coordinated nor restricted to be structured in any fashion,
and the RPKI is not attesting a name or an identity but a
right to use resources. Because the context of the use of
names in the RPKI is one that positions names within a strict
hierarchy, then the essential name attribute of unambiguity is
achieved in the RPKI when names are specified to be unique per
issuer.
It is proposed not to alter the existing specification of
uniqueness of names on a per-issuer basis.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
September 1981.
[RFC2050] Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and
J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES",
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BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC3852] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
RFC 3852, July 2004.
[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
June 2005.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
September 2005.
[RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[X.509] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.509: The Directory -
Authentication Framework", 2000.
11.2. Informative References
[ID.SIDR-MANIFESTS]
Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure",
Work in progress: Internet
Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-manifests-00.txt,
January 2008.
[RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
November 2000.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
November 2000.
[RFC4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R.
Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
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Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, September 2005.
[rsync] Tridgell, A., "rsync", April 2006,
<http://samba.anu.edu.au/rsync/>.
Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate
The following is an example Resource Certificate.
Certificate Name: hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ-3.cer
Data:
Version: 3
Serial: 3
Signature Algorithm: Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA
Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use,
E=ca@apnic.net
Validity:
Not Before: Thu Jul 27 06:34:04 2006 GMT
Not After: Fri Jul 27 06:34:04 2007 GMT
Subject: CN=APNIC own-use network resources
Subject Key Identifier:
86:ef:5f:74:30:6a:eb:49:ab:93:b7:0f:46:e5:f6:0d:
8b:97:49:14
Subject Key Identifier g(SKI):
hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: Modulus:
c1:25:a1:b0:db:89:83:a0:fc:f1:c0:e4:7b:93:76:c1:
59:b7:0d:ac:25:25:ed:88:ce:00:03:ea:99:1a:9a:2a:
0e:10:2e:5f:c0:45:87:47:81:7b:1d:4d:44:aa:65:a3:
f8:07:84:32:ea:04:70:27:05:2b:79:26:e6:e6:3a:cb:
b2:9a:65:6c:c1:4e:d7:35:fb:f6:41:1e:8b:1c:b8:e4:
5a:3a:d6:d0:7b:82:9a:23:03:f8:05:4c:68:42:67:fe:
e7:45:d9:2c:a6:d1:b3:da:cf:ad:77:c5:80:d2:e3:1e:
4d:e8:bf:a2:f2:44:10:b2:2f:61:bc:f4:89:31:54:7c:
56:47:d5:b1:c3:48:26:95:93:c9:6f:70:14:4d:ac:a5:
c2:8e:3d:1f:6d:f8:d4:93:9d:14:c7:15:c7:34:8e:ba:
dd:70:b3:c2:2b:08:78:59:97:dd:e4:34:c7:d8:de:5c:
f7:94:6f:95:59:ba:29:65:f5:98:15:8f:8e:57:59:5d:
92:1f:64:2f:b5:3d:69:2e:69:83:c2:10:c6:aa:8e:03:
d5:69:11:bd:0d:b5:d8:27:6c:74:2f:60:47:dd:2e:87:
24:c2:36:68:2b:3c:fd:bd:22:57:a9:4d:e8:86:3c:27:
03:ce:f0:03:2e:59:ce:05:a7:41:3f:2f:64:50:dd:e7
RSA Public Key: Exponent: 65537
Basic Constraints: CA: TRUE
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Subject Info Access:
caRepository - rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/
hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ/
Key Usage: keyCertSign, cRLSign
CRL Distribution Points:
rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/
q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl
Authority Info Access: caIssuers -
rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.cer
Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier:
ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:07:02:
51:c2:a9:1c
Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI):
q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw
Certificate Policies: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2
IPv4: 192.0.2.0/24,
IPv6: 2001:DB8::/32
ASNum: 4608, 4777, 9545, 18366-18370
Signature:
c5:e7:b2:f3:62:cb:e3:bc:50:1e:6b:90:13:19:f4:5b:
4a:1c:1c:ab:b5:de:b1:a4:22:e0:28:f5:3b:d0:8c:59:
0f:85:f2:06:a6:ae:22:e6:d0:99:fe:cb:eb:1d:6a:e2:
a3:f1:a2:25:95:ec:a7:7d:96:35:dc:16:a7:2f:f5:b7:
11:ba:97:05:57:5f:5d:07:5a:c8:19:c8:27:d3:f7:a3:
92:66:cb:98:2d:e1:7f:a8:25:96:ab:af:ed:87:02:28:
f5:ae:b6:e3:0c:f7:18:82:70:82:f4:76:54:06:b9:9f:
e1:a5:f7:ae:72:dd:ee:f0:d4:d2:78:bb:61:73:cf:51:
26:9f:ea:e8:20:49:06:ba:0c:ac:1d:f6:07:b8:63:a0:
4d:3d:8e:12:84:3a:d0:ec:94:7e:02:db:d4:85:cf:12:
5c:7b:12:1a:52:ab:3c:ba:00:f2:71:e7:f0:fd:b3:f4:
81:e8:a7:cb:07:ca:3a:a4:24:fe:dc:bb:51:16:6a:28:
33:40:a4:64:60:75:0e:c8:06:c8:5f:e5:98:be:16:a3:
bc:19:e7:b3:4f:00:0a:8e:81:33:dd:4c:a0:fb:f5:1c:
1f:1d:3f:b5:90:8b:ec:98:67:76:95:56:8a:94:45:54:
52:3d:1c:69:4c:6f:8a:9f:09:ec:ef:b0:a9:bc:cf:9d
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Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List
The following is an example Certificate Revocation List.
CRL Name: q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl
Data:
Version: 2
Signature Algorithm:
Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA
Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use,
E=ca@apnic.net
This Update: Thu Jul 27 06:30:34 2006 GMT
Next Update: Fri Jul 28 06:30:34 2006 GMT
Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier:
ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:
07:02:51:c2:a9:1c
Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI):
q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw
CRLNumber: 4
Revoked Certificates: 1
Serial Number: 1
Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:10:19 2006 GMT
Serial Number: 2
Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:12:25 2006 GMT
Serial Number: 4
Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:40:39 2006 GMT
Signature:
b2:5a:e8:7c:bd:a8:00:0f:03:1a:17:fd:40:2c:46:
0e:d5:64:87:e7:e7:bc:10:7d:b6:3e:39:21:a9:12:
f4:5a:d8:b8:d4:bd:57:1a:7d:2f:7c:0d:c6:4f:27:
17:c8:0e:ae:8c:89:ff:00:f7:81:97:c3:a1:6a:0a:
f7:d2:46:06:9a:d1:d5:4d:78:e1:b7:b0:58:4d:09:
d6:7c:1e:a0:40:af:86:5d:8c:c9:48:f6:e6:20:2e:
b9:b6:81:03:0b:51:ac:23:db:9f:c1:8e:d6:94:54:
66:a5:68:52:ee:dd:0f:10:5d:21:b8:b8:19:ff:29:
6f:51:2e:c8:74:5c:2a:d2:c5:fa:99:eb:c5:c2:a2:
d0:96:fc:54:b3:ba:80:4b:92:7f:85:54:76:c9:12:
cb:32:ea:1d:12:7b:f8:f9:a2:5c:a1:b1:06:8e:d8:
c5:42:61:00:8c:f6:33:11:29:df:6e:b2:cc:c3:7c:
d3:f3:0c:8d:5c:49:a5:fb:49:fd:e7:c4:73:68:0a:
09:0e:6d:68:a9:06:52:3a:36:4f:19:47:83:59:da:
02:5b:2a:d0:8a:7a:33:0a:d5:ce:be:b5:a2:7d:8d:
59:a1:9d:ee:60:ce:77:3d:e1:86:9a:84:93:90:9f:
34:a7:02:40:59:3a:a5:d1:18:fb:6f:fc:af:d4:02:
d9
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Appendix C. Cryptographic Message Syntax Profile for RPKI Trust Anchor
Material
Using the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC3852], a RPKI Trust
Anchor Object (RTA) is a type of signed-data object. The general
format of a CMS object is:
ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
contentType ContentType,
content [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType }
ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
As a RTA is a signed-data object, it uses the corresponding OID,
1.2.840.113549.1.7.2. [RFC3852].
C.1. Signed-Data ContentType
According to the CMS specification, the signed-data content type
shall have ASN.1 type SignedData:
SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
certificates [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL,
crls [1] IMPLICIT RevocationInfoChoices OPTIONAL,
signerInfos SignerInfos }
DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier
SignerInfos ::= SET OF SignerInfo
The elements of the signed-data content type are as follows:
version
The version is the syntax version number. It MUST be 3,
corresponding to the signerInfo structure having version
number 3.
digestAlgorithms
The digestAlgorithms set MUST include only SHA-256, the OID
for which is 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1. [RFC4055]. It MUST
NOT contain any other algorithms.
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encapContentInfo
This element is defined in Appendix C.1.1.
certificates
The certificates element MUST be included and MUST contain
only the single PKI EE certificate needed to validate this
CMS Object. The CertificateSet type is defined in section
10 of [RFC3852]
crls
The crls element MUST be omitted.
signerInfos
This element is defined in Appendix C.1.2.
C.1.1. encapContentInfo
encapContentInfo is the signed content, consisting of a content type
identifier and the content itself.
EncapsulatedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
eContentType ContentType,
eContent [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
The elements of this signed content type are as follows:
eContentType
The ContentType for an RTA is defined as id-ct-
RPKITrustAnchor and has the numerical value of
1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.33.
id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 16 }
id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }
id-ct-RPKITrustAnchor OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 33 }
eContent
The content of an RTA is an RPKI self-signed CA certificate.
It is formally defined as:
id-ct-RPKITrustAnchor ::= Certificate
The definition of Certificate is taken from [X.509].
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C.1.2. signerInfos
SignerInfo is defined under CMS as:
SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
sid SignerIdentifier,
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
signedAttrs [0] IMPLICIT SignedAttributes OPTIONAL,
signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
signature SignatureValue,
unsignedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnsignedAttributes OPTIONAL }
The content of the SignerInfo element are as follows:
version
The version number MUST be 3, corresponding with the choice
of SubjectKeyIdentifier for the sid.
sid
The sid is defined as:
SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
subjectKeyIdentifier [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier }
For a RTA, the sid MUST be a SubjectKeyIdentifier.
digestAlgorithm
The digestAlgorithm MUST be SHA-256, the OID for which is
2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1. [RFC4055]
signedAttrs
The signedAttrs element is defined as:
SignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
attrType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
attrValues SET OF AttributeValue }
AttributeValue ::= ANY
The signedAttr element MUST be present and MUST include the
content-type and message-digest attributes. The signer MAY
also include the signing-time signed attribute, the binary-
signing-time signed attribute, or both signed attributes.
Other signed attributes that are deemed appropriate MAY also
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be included. The intent is to allow additional signed
attributes to be included if a future need is identified.
This does not cause an interoperability concern because
unrecognized signed attributes are ignored by the relying
party.
The signedAttr MUST include only a single instance of any
particular attribute. Additionally, even though the syntax
allows for a SET OF AttributeValue, in a RTA the attrValues
must consist of only a single AttributeValue.
ContentType Attribute
The ContentType attribute MUST be present. The
attrType OID for the ContentType attribute is
1.2.840.113549.1.9.3.
The attrValues for the ContentType attribute in
a RTA MUST be 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24
(matching the eContentType in the
EncapsulatedContentInfo).
MessageDigest Attribute
The MessageDigest attribute MUST be present.
The attrType OID for the MessageDigest Attribute
is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.4.
The attrValues for the MessageDigest attribute
contains the output of the digest algorithm
applied to the content being signed, as
specified in Section 11.1 of [RFC3852].
SigningTime Attribute
The SigningTime attribute MAY be present. If it
is present it MUST be ignored by the relying
party. The presence of absence of the
SigningTime attribute in no way affects the
validation of the RTA. The attrType OID for the
SigningTime attribute is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.5.
The attrValues for the SigningTime attribute is
defined as:
SigningTime ::= Time
Time ::= CHOICE {
utcTime UTCTime,
generalizedTime GeneralizedTime }
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The Time element specifies the time, based on
the local system clock, at which the digital
signature was applied to the content.
BinarySigningTime Attribute
The The BinarySigningTime attribute MAY be
present. If it is present it MUST be ignored by
the relying party. The presence of absence of
the BinarySigningTime attribute in no way
affects the validation of the RTA. The attrType
OID for the SigningTime attribute is
1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.2.46.
The attrValues for the SigningTime attribute is
defined as:
BinarySigningTime ::= BinaryTime
BinaryTime ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
The BinaryTime element specifies the time, based
on the local system clock, at which the digital
signature was applied to the content.
signatureAlgorithm
The signatureAlgorithm MUST be RSA (rsaEncryption), the OID
for which is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1.q
signature
The signature value is defined as:
SignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING
The signature characteristics are defined by the digest and
signature algorithms.
unsignedAttrs
unsignedAttrs MUST be omitted.
C.2. RTA Validation
Before a relying party can use an RTA, the relying party must first
validate the RTA by performing the following steps.
1. Verify that the RTA syntax complies with this specification. In
particular, verify the following:
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a. The contentType of the CMS object is SignedData (OID
1.2.840.113549.1.7.2).
b. The version of the SignedData object is 3.
c. The digestAlgorithm in the SignedData object is SHA-256 (OID
2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1).
d. The certificates field in the SignedData object is present
and contains an EE certificate whose Subject Key Identifier
(SKI) matches the sid field of the SignerInfo object.
e. The crls field in the SignedData object is omitted.
f. The eContentType in the EncapsulatedContentInfo is id-ct-
RPKITrustAnchor (OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.[TBD])
g. The version of the SignerInfo is 3.
h. The digestAlgorithm in the SignerInfo object is SHA-256 (OID
2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1).
i. The signatureAlgorithm in the SignerInfo object is RSA (OID
1.2.840.113549.1.1.1).
j. The signedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is present and
contains both the ContentType attribute (OID
1.2.840.113549.1.9.3) and the MessageDigest attribute (OID
1.2.840.113549.1.9.4).
k. The unsignedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is omitted.
2. Use the public key in the EE certificate to verify the signature
on the RTA.
3. Verify that the EE certificate is a valid end-entity certificate
in the Trust Anchor PKI by validating that the PKI CA certificate
issued this EE certificate, and the PKI CA's CRL has not revoked
the EE certificate, and that the PKI CA's CRL is valid.
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Authors' Addresses
Geoff Huston
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: gih@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
George Michaelson
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: ggm@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
Robert Loomans
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: robertl@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
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Full Copyright Statement
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This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
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This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
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Huston, et al. Expires March 10, 2009 [Page 42]
