Secure Inter-Domain Routing G. Huston
Internet-Draft R. Loomans
Intended status: Standards Track B. Ellacott
Expires: August 11, 2009 APNIC
R. Austein
ISC
February 7, 2009
A Protocol for Provisioning Resource Certificates
draft-ietf-sidr-rescerts-provisioning-04.txt
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Abstract
This document defines a framework for certificate management
interactions between a resource issuer ("Internet Registry" or "IR")
and a resource recipient ("Internet Service Provider" or "ISP")
through the specification of a protocol for interaction between the
two parties. The protocol supports the transmission of requests from
the ISP, and corresponding responses from the IR encompassing the
actions of certificate issuance, certificate revocation and
certificate status information reports. This protocol is intended to
be limited to the application of resource certificate management and
is not intended to be used as part of a more general certificate
management framework.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Protocol Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. CMS Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.1. SignedData Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.2. ASN.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2. Common Message format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3. Control - Resource Class Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3.1. Resource Class List Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3.2. Resource Class List Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.4. CA - Certificate Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.4.1. Certificate Issuance Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.4.2. Certificate Issuance Response . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.5. Certificate Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.5.1. Certificate Revocation Request . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.5.2. Certificate Revocation Response . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.6. Request-Not-Performed Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4. XML Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
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1. Introduction
This document defines a framework for certificate management
interactions between a resource issuer ("Internet Registry" or "IR")
and a resource recipient ("Internet Service Provider" or "ISP")
through the specification of a protocol for interaction between the
two parties. The protocol supports the transmission of requests from
the ISP, and corresponding responses from the IR encompassing the
actions of certificate issuance, certificate revocation and
certificate status information reports. This protocol is intended to
be limited to the application of resource certificate management and
is not intended to be used as part of a more general certificate
management framework.
1.1. Terminology
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280], "X.509
Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet
Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing
Architecture" [RFC4291], "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines"
[RFC2050], and related regional Internet registry address management
policy documents.
Additional terms used in this document are:
"IR" an abbreviation of "Internet Registry", using in the context of
this document as an entity undertaking the role of resource
issuer. An IR is a Certificate Authority, and can issue Resource
Certificates.
"ISP" an abbreviation of "Internet Service Provider", using in the
context of this document as an entity undertaking the role of
resource recipient who is the subject of a Resource Certificate.
An ISP may be issued with a CA-enabled certificate, allowing the
entity to also assume the role of an IR.
"resource class" a resource class refers to a collection of
resources that can be certified in a single resource certificate
by an issuer.
"server" in the context of this client/server protocol
specification, the IR assumes the role of the "server."
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"client" in the context of this client/server protocol
specification, the ISP assumes the role of the "client."
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
2. Scope
This Resource PKI (RPKI) certificate provisioning protocol defines a
basic set of interactions that allow an ISP to request certificate
issuance, revocation and status information from the IR, and for a IR
to maintain an issued certificate set that is aligned to the
allocation records relating to each ISP. The IR's resource
allocation database, is the authoritative source of what resource
allocations the IR may certify for an ISP.
A resource recipient (ISP) may also undertake the role of a resource
issuer (IR), such as in the case of a Local Internet Registry (LIR).
This protocol specification does not encompass:
o signing of objects with keys that are certified by resource
certificates, nor the issuance of end-entity certificates.
o the specification of interaction with the IR's resource allocation
database, nor the specification of a protocol to manage the
publication repository.
o the interactions between client and server that establish
identities, exchange the keys used in the protection of the
communications channel between client and server, and the exchange
of the certificates and validation PKI contexts used in the
Cryptographic Message Syntax message exchange.
3. Protocol Specification
This RPKI certificate provisioning protocol is expressed as a simple
request/response interaction, where the client passes a request to
the server, and the server generates a corresponding response.
The protocol is implemented as an exchange of messages.
Messages are passed over an HTTPS [RFC2818] transport connection that
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safeguards against interception and replay attacks. The HTTPS
session uses mutually authenticated Transport Layer Security (TLS)
[RFC4346]. The TLS keys and associated certificate chain used to
validate TLS transactions is assumed to have been previously
communicated between the two entities, through mechanisms not defined
in this protocol specification. The HTTPS connection will use 2 way
(mutual) identification. A message exchange commences with the
client initiating an HTTP POST with content type of "application/
x-rpki", with the message object as the body. The server's response
will similarly be the body of the response with a content type of
"application/x-rpki".
The content of the POST, and the server's response, will be a "well-
formed" Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC3852] object, encoded
using the Distinguished Encoding Rules for ASN.1 (DER) [X.509-88],
formatted in accordance with the CMS profile as specified in the
following section. CMS is used as the signing format to sign the
message object. The public part of the signing key and the
associated certificate chain that is used to validate the CMS digital
signature is assumed to have been communicated between the two
entities, through mechanisms not defined in this protocol
specification. The CMS keys and certificates MAY be the same as
those used for TLS.
The protocol's request / response interaction is assumed to be
reliable, in that all requests will generate a matching response.
The protocol requires sequential operation for each distinct client,
where the server MUST NOT accept a client's request unless it has
generated and sent a response to the client's previous request.
Attempts by the client to initiate multiple requests in parallel MUST
be detected by the server and rejected with an error response.
3.1. CMS Profile
The format of the CMS object is:
ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
contentType ContentType,
content [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType }
ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
The protocol objects are all instances of CMS signed-data objects,
where the ContentType used is the signed-data type of id-data, namely
id-signedData, OID = 1.2.840.113549.1.7.2.
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3.1.1. SignedData Content Type
According to [RFC3852], signed-data content types shall have the
ASN.1 type SignedData:
SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
certificates [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL,
crls [1] IMPLICIT RevocationInfoChoices OPTIONAL,
signerInfos SignerInfos }
DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier
SignerInfos ::= SET OF SignerInfo
3.1.1.1. version
The version is the syntax version number. It MUST be 3,
corresponding to the signerInfo structure having version number 3.
3.1.1.2. digestAlgorithms
The digestAlgorithms set MUST include only SHA-256, the OID for which
is 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1 [RFC4055]. It MUST NOT contain any other
algorithms.
3.1.1.3. encapContentInfo
encapContentInfo is the signed content, consisting of a content type
identifier and the content itself.
EncapsulatedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
eContentType ContentType,
eContent [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
3.1.1.3.1. eContentType
The eContentType for the RPKI Protocol Message object is defined as
id-ct-xml, and has the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.28.
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id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 16 }
id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }
id-ct-xml OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 28 }
3.1.1.3.2. eContent
The content of a RPKI XML Protocol Object consists of a single
protocol message, structured according to a define XML schema, as
defined in subsequent sections of this document. The eContent field
of the CMS object is formally defined using ASN.1 as:
id-ct-xml ::= OCTET STRING -- XML encoded message
3.1.1.4. certificates
The certificates field MUST be present, and MUST contain the EE
certificate of the key pair whose private key value was used to sign
the CMS. This MUST NOT be an RPKI certificate, and SHOULD be a
certificate that is recognised to attest to the identity of the party
that created the CMS object.
This field MAY contain other certificates that a relying party may
use to validate the digital signature of the CMS object.
3.1.1.5. crls
This field MUST be present. The contents of the field are specified
in [RFC3852].
3.1.1.6. signerInfo
SignerInfo is defined under CMS as:
SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
sid SignerIdentifier,
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
signedAttrs [0] IMPLICIT SignedAttributes OPTIONAL,
signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
signature SignatureValue,
unsignedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnsignedAttributes OPTIONAL }
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3.1.1.6.1. version
The version number MUST be 3, corresponding with the choice of
SubjectKeyIdentifier for the sid.
3.1.1.6.2. sid
The sid is defined as:
SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
subjectKeyIdentifier [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier }
In this profile, the sid MUST be a SubjectKeyIdentifier.
3.1.1.6.3. digestAlgorithm
The digestAlgorithm MUST be SHA-256, the OID for which is
2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1. [RFC4055]
3.1.1.6.4. signedAttrs
Signed Attributes are defined as:
SignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
UnsignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
attrType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
attrValues SET OF AttributeValue }
AttributeValue ::= ANY
The signer MUST digitally sign a collection of attributes along with
the content payload. Each attribute in the collection MUST be DER-
encoded. The syntax for attributes is defined in [X.501], and the
X.500 Directory provides a rich attribute syntax. A very simple
subset of this syntax is used extensively in [RFC3852], where
ATTRIBUTE.Type and ATTRIBUTE.id are the only parts of the ATTRIBUTE
class that are employed.
Each of the attributes used with this CMS profile has a single
attribute value. Even though the syntax is defined as a SET OF
AttributeValue, there MUST be exactly one instance of AttributeValue
present.
The SignedAttributes syntax within signerInfo is defined as a SET OF
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Attribute. The SignedAttributes MUST include only one instance of
any particular attribute.
The signer MUST include the content-type, message-digest and signing-
time signed attributes. The signer MAY also include the binary-
signing-time signed attribute. Other signed attributes that are
deemed appropriate MAY also be included. The intent is to allow
additional signed attributes to be included if a future need is
identified. This does not cause an interoperability concern because
unrecognized signed attributes are ignored at verification.
3.1.1.6.4.1. Content-Type Attribute
id-contentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 3 }
ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
A content-type attribute is required to contain the same object
identifier as the content type contained in the
EncapsulatedContentInfo. The signer MUST include a content-type
attribute containing the appropriate content type. Section 11.1 of
[RFC3852] defines the content-type attribute.
3.1.1.6.4.2. Message-Digest Attribute
id-messageDigest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 4 }
MessageDigest ::= OCTET STRING
The signer MUST include a message-digest attribute, having as its
value the output of a one-way hash function computed on the content
that is being signed. Section 11.2 of [RFC3852] defines the message-
digest attribute.
3.1.1.6.4.3. Signing-Time Attribute
id-signingTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 5 }
SigningTime ::= Time
Time ::= CHOICE {
utcTime UTCTime,
generalizedTime GeneralizedTime }
The signing-time attribute MUST be present.
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The signing-time attribute specifies the time, based on the local
system clock, when the digital signature was applied to the content.
Section 11.3 of [RFC3852] defines the content-type attribute.
3.1.1.6.4.4. Binary-Signing-Time Attribute
id-aa-binarySigningTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) aa(2) 46 }
BinarySigningTime ::= BinaryTime
BinaryTime ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
The signer MAY include a binary-signing-time attribute, specifying
the time at which the digital signature was applied to the content.
If the binary-signing-time is present, the time that is represented
MUST represent the same time value as the signing-time attribute.
The binary-signing-time attribute is defined in [RFC4049].
3.1.1.6.5. signatureAlgorithm
The signatureAlgorithm MUST be RSA (rsaEncryption), the OID for which
is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1.
3.1.1.6.6. signature
The signature value is defined as:
SignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING
The signature characteristics are defined by the digest and signature
algorithms.
3.1.1.6.7. unsignedAttrs
unsignedAttrs MUST be omitted.
3.1.2. ASN.1
The following is the ASN.1 specification of the CMS signed object
used by the RPKI provisioning protocol.
ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
contentType ContentType,
content [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType }
ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
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id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 16 }
id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }
id-ct-xml OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 28 }
id-ct-xml ::= OCTET STRING -- XML encoded message
id-signedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 2 }
SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
certificates [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL,
crls [1] IMPLICIT RevocationInfoChoices OPTIONAL,
signerInfos SignerInfos }
DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier
SignerInfos ::= SET OF SignerInfo
SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
sid SignerIdentifier,
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
signedAttrs [0] IMPLICIT SignedAttributes OPTIONAL,
signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
signature SignatureValue,
unsignedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnsignedAttributes OPTIONAL }
SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
subjectKeyIdentifier [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier }
SignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
UnsignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
attrType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
attrValues SET OF AttributeValue }
AttributeValue ::= ANY
SignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING
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id-contentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 3 }
ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
id-messageDigest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 4 }
MessageDigest ::= OCTET STRING
id-signingTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 5 }
SigningTime ::= Time
Time ::= CHOICE {
utcTime UTCTime,
generalizedTime GeneralizedTime }
id-aa-binarySigningTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) aa(2) 46 }
BinarySigningTime ::= BinaryTime
BinaryTime ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
3.2. Common Message format
The XML template for all messages is as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<message xmlns="http://www.apnic.net/specs/rescerts/up-down/"
version="1"
sender="sender name"
recipient = "recipient name"
type="message type">
[payload]
</message>
---------------------------------------------------------------
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version:
the value of this attribute is the version of this protocol. This
document describes version 1.
sender:
the value of this attribute is the agreed name of the message
sender, as determined between the client and the server by prior
arrangement.
recipient:
the value of this attribute is the agreed name of the message
recipient, as determined between the client and the server by
prior arrangement.
type:
the possible values of this attribute are "list", "list_response",
"issue", "issue_response", "revoke", "revoke_response", and
"error_response".
Conforming parsers MUST reject any document with a version number
they do not understand, or with any elements or attributes they do
not understand. Servers must generate an error response when
receiving such a request. Clients should generate an operator alert
error when receiving such a response.
A message in this protocol is a digitally signed object that makes
use of CMS [RFC3852], and is encoded as DER. It uses the signed-data
object contentType OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.7.2. The attribute "id-
signingTime" (contentType OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.9.5) MUST be present
in the CMS object.
The encapsulated content of the CMS wrapping is an XML document. The
remainder of this protocol specification omits this CMS wrapper and
only discusses the XML document.
Messages are checked using the following tests:
1. Check the integrity of the HTTPS message and validate the TLS
certificate using the PKI that has been determined by prior
arrangement between client and server.
2. Check that the CMS is well-formed.
3. Check that the XML is well-formed.
4. Check that the XML sender and recipient attributes reference a
known client and this server's system respectively.
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5. Verify the digital signature using the public key provided in the
certificate carried in the CMS wrapper.
6. Validate the CMS-provided certificate using the PKI that has been
determined by prior arrangement between client and server.
7. Check that the value of the version number of the message is 1.
The checks should generally be applied in the order specified here.
Any errors encountered while checking items 1 through 6 will cause
the server to generate an "HTTP 400 Bad Data" response to the HTTPS
POST operation. An error in step 7 will cause the server to generate
a "Request-Not-Performed" error response.
3.3. Control - Resource Class Query
3.3.1. Resource Class List Query
The value of the message "type" message attribute for this query is:
type="list"
---------------------------------------------------------------
Payload:
[No message payload is defined for this query]
---------------------------------------------------------------
3.3.2. Resource Class List Response
The value of the message "type" element for this response is:
type="list_response"
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---------------------------------------------------------------
Payload:
<class class_name="class name"
cert_url="url"
resource_set_as="as resource set"
resource_set_ipv4="ipv4 resource set"
resource_set_ipv6="ipv6 resource set"
resource_set_notafter="datetime"
suggested_sia_head="[directory uri]" >
<certificate cert_url="url"
req_resource_set_as="as resource set"
req_resource_set_ipv4="ipv4 resource set"
req_resource_set_ipv6="ipv6 resource set" >
[certificate]
</certificate>
...
(repeated for each current certificate where the client
is the certificate's subject)
<issuer>[issuer's certificate]</issuer>
</class>
...
(repeated for each of the issuer's resource class where the
client has been allocated resources)
---------------------------------------------------------------
Where the client has been allocated resources from multiple resource
classes, then the response will contain multiple class elements,
corresponding to the complete set of the issuer's resource classes
where the client holds allocated resources. Those issuer's resource
classes where the client holds no allocated resources will not be
included in the response.
Where the issuer has issued multiple certificates in a resource class
signed with different keys (as may occur during a staged issuer-key
rollover), only the most recent certificate issued with the currently
"active" issuer's key will be listed in the response.
Each "class" element describes a set of resources that are certified
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within the scope of a single certificate, referring to a single
resource class with a common validation path.
class_name:
the value of this attribute is the issuer-assigned name of the
issuer's Resource Class.
cert_url:
in the context of a class element, the value of this attribute is
a pointer to the issuer's CA certificate (i.e. a reference to the
immediate superior certificate, being the CA-enabled certificate
where the issuer is the certificate's subject). Its value is a
comma-separated list of URIs, of which at least one MUST be an
RSYNC URI. Any comma values within a URI MUST be escaped ("%2C").
The ordering of the list may be interpreted by the client as a
relative preference for access methods as expressed by the
publisher of this certificate.
resource_set_as:
in the context of a class element, the value of this attribute is
the set of AS numbers and AS number ranges that the issuer has
allocated to the client within the scope of this resource class,
presented in ASCII as a comma-separated list. The list elements
are decimal integer values and ranges of decimal integers
specified by the low and high value of the range with a hyphen
delimiter, using the canonical order as described in [RFC3779],
without leading zeros, and with no white space or punctuation
other than the comma and the hyphen range designator (e.g.:
resource_set_as="123,456-789,123456"). If there are no AS numbers
in this Resource Class the empty set will be represented by a null
string value ("") for this attribute.
resource_set_ipv4:
in the context of a class element, the value of this attribute is
the set of IPv4 addresses that the issuer has allocated to the
client within the scope of this resource class. The value is
presented in ASCII as a comma-separated list of elements. Each
element is either an address prefix using the notation of <dotted
quad>/mask length, or a range specified as low and high range
values in dotted quad notation with a hyphen delimiter. The list
is presented in canonical order, as described in [RFC3779]. The
dotted quad notation is without leading zeros, and the list
contains no white space or punctuation other than the period,
forward slash, hyphen and comma. (e.g.
resource_set_ipv4="192.0.2.0/26,192.0.2.66-192.0.2.76") If there
are no IPv4 addresses in this resource class the empty set will be
represented by a null string value ("") for this attribute.
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resource_set_ipv6:
in the context of a class element, the value of this attribute is
the set of IPv6 addresses that the issuer has allocated to the
client within the scope of this resource class. The value is
presented in ASCII as a comma-separated list of elements. Each
element is either an address prefix using the notation of <hex
nibble sequence>/mask length, or a range specified as low and high
range values in hex nibble notation with a hyphen delimiter.
Trailing zero nibbles are truncated and represented by '::'. The
list is presented in canonical order, as described in [RFC3779].
The hex nibble sequence notation is without leading zeros, and the
list contains no white space or punctuation other than the colon,
forward slash, hyphen and comma (e.g. resource_set_ipv6="2001:
0DB8::/48,2001:0DB8:002::-2001:0DB8:005::"). The XML Schema data
type is "http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlschema-2/#hexBinary" and value is
case insensitive, with the canonical form being upper case. If
there are no IPv6 addresses in this resource class the empty set
will be represented by a null string value ("") for this
attribute.
resource_set_notafter:
The value of this attribute specified the date/time that would be
set in the Validity notAfter field in any new certificate issued
for this particular client within the scope of this resource
class, should the client request a new certificate. The time
format used for the value of this attribute is specified as ISO
8601 [ISO.8601:2004], and MUST use UTC time (i.e. YYYY-MM-
DDThh:mm:ssZ, e.g. 2007-11-29T04:40:00Z). If the client's
certificate has a validity notAfter time that is different to this
this time then the client SHOULD request a new certificate to be
issued for this resource class.
suggested_sia_head: (OPTIONAL)
If this field is present then it indicates a publication namespace
which the server has made available to the client to use for its
own collection of published products. Presence of this field does
not mean that the client has permission from the repository
operator to lodge under this URI, only that the client has
permission from the server to lodge under this URI.
[issuer's certificate]
value is the Base64 encoding of the DER-encoded issuer's CA
certificate (the CA-enabled certificate where the issuer is the
certificate's subject).
Each certificate element describes the most recently issued current
certificate where the certificate's subject refers to the client for
each active client key pair. A "current" certificate is a non-
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expired, non-revoked certificate. If no current certificate has been
issued, then no certificate element will be included in the response.
cert_url:
in the context of a certificate element, this is a pointer to the
location where the certificate issuer has published this
certificate. This field is the issuer's suggestion for the AIA
field for the subject to use in subordinate certificates that are
issued by the subject. According to the Resource Certificate
Profile [insert ref here] the AIA field is a non-empty (contains a
minimum of 1 element) list of URI's, one of which MUST be an RSYNC
URI. The order of URI's in the AIA field may be interpreted as
the publisher's relative preference for access methods for this
certificate. The cert_url conforms to this AIA specification.
Its value is a comma-separated list of URIs, one of which MUST be
an RSYNC URI. Any comma values within a URI MUST be escaped
("%2C").
req_resource_set_as:
the set of AS numbers that were specified in the corresponding
original certificate request that defined the maximal requested
span of the certified AS number set, following the syntax
described above. If this attribute was present in the certificate
request, then the attribute MUST be present in this response,
otherwise it MUST NOT be present.
req_resource_set_ipv4:
the set of IPv4 addresses that were specified in the corresponding
original certificate request that defined the maximal requested
span of the certified IPv4 address set, following the syntax
described above. If this attribute was present in the certificate
request, then the attribute MUST be present in this response,
otherwise it MUST NOT be present.
req_resource_set_ipv6:
the set of IPv6 addresses that were specified in the corresponding
original certificate request that defined the maximal requested
span of the certified IPv6 address set, following the syntax
described above. If this attribute was present in the certificate
request, then the attribute MUST be present in this response,
otherwise it MUST NOT be present.
[certificate]
value is the Base64 encoding of the DER-encoded certificate.
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3.4. CA - Certificate Issuance
3.4.1. Certificate Issuance Request
The value of the message "type" element for this request is:
type="issue"
---------------------------------------------------------------
Payload:
<request
class_name="class name"
req_resource_set_as="as resource set"
req_resource_set_ipv4="ipv4 resource set"
req_resource_set_ipv6="ipv6 resource set">
[Certificate request]
</request>
---------------------------------------------------------------
The client must use different key pairs for each distinct resource
class.
If any of the req_resource_set attributes are specified in the
request, then any missing req_resource_set attributes are to be
interpreted as specifying the complete set of the corresponding
resource type that match the client's current resource allocation.
If the value of any req_resource_set attributes is the null value
(""), then this indicates that no resources of that resource type are
to be certified with this request.
The requested resource set values are held as a local record by the
issuer against the resource class and the client's public key. Any
subsequent Certificate Issuance Requests that specify the same
Resource Class and the same client's public key will (re)set the
issuer's local record of the requested resource sets to the most
recently specified values.
class_name:
value is the server's identifier of a Resource Class.
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req_resource_set_as: (OPTIONAL)
the set of AS numbers that define the maximal requested span of
the certified AS number set, formatted as per the resource_set_as
attribute of the Resource Class List Response.
req_resource_set_ipv4: (OPTIONAL)
the set of IPv4 addresses that define the maximal requested span
of the certified IPv4 address set, formatted as per the
resource_set_ipv4 attribute of the Resource Class List Response.
req_resource_set_ipv6: (OPTIONAL)
the set of IPv6 addresses that define the maximal requested span
of the certified IPv6 address set, formatted as per the
resource_set_ipv6 attribute of the Resource Class List Response.
[Certificate request]
value is the certificate request. This is a Base-64 encoded DER
version of a request formatted using PKCS#10.
3.4.2. Certificate Issuance Response
The value of the message "type" element for this response is:
type="issue_response"
---------------------------------------------------------------
Payload:
<class class_name="class name"
cert_url="url"
resource_set_as="as resource set"
resource_set_ipv4="ipv4 resource set"
resource_set_ipv6="ipv6 resource set" >
<certificate cert_url="url"
req_resource_set_as="as resource set"
req_resource_set_ipv4="ipv4 resource set"
req_resource_set_ipv6="ipv6 resource set" >
[certificate]
</certificate>
<issuer>[issuer's certificate]</issuer>
</class>
---------------------------------------------------------------
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If the certificate issuer determines that the issued certificate
would be identical in all respects to the most recently issued
certificate for this client, other than the certificate's serial
number, were the certificate to be issued, the issuer may choose to
respond with the most recently issued certificate and not issue a new
certificate for this request.
The definition of the attributes and syntax of the values is the same
as the resource class list response, but the response only references
the (single) named resource class, and the (single) certificate
issued against the client's public key as provided in the
corresponding certificate request.
3.5. Certificate Revocation
3.5.1. Certificate Revocation Request
The value of the message "type" element for this request is:
type="revoke"
---------------------------------------------------------------
Payload:
<key class_name="class name"
ski="encoded hash of the subject public key]" />
---------------------------------------------------------------
This command 'retires' a client's key pair by requesting the issuer
to revoke all certificates for this client that contain the matching
public key, within the scope of a named Resource Class. Individual
issued certificates cannot be revoked within the scope of this
protocol.
This command directs the issuer to immediately mark all issued valid
certificates issued by this issuer within the named Resource Class
with this client's SKI value to be marked as revoked, causing the
issued certificates to be withdrawn from the publication repository
and to be listed in the server's subsequent CRLs within this Resource
Class.
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class_name:
value is the issuer-assigned name of the issuer's Resource Class.
ski:
value is the encoded hash of the client's public key that is to be
revoked. The algorithm for the encoding is to generate the 160-
bit SHA-1 hash of the client's public key, as defined in method
(1) of section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC5280], and encode this value using
the Base 64 encoding with URL and Filename Safe Alphabet, as
defined in section 5 of [RFC4648].
3.5.2. Certificate Revocation Response
The value of the message "type" element for this response is:
type="revoke_response"
---------------------------------------------------------------
Payload:
<key class_name="class name"
ski="encoded hash of the subject public key" />
---------------------------------------------------------------
class_name:
value is the issuer-assigned name of the server's Resource Class.
ski:
value is the encoded hash of the client's public key that is to be
revoked. The algorithm for the encoding is to generate the 160-
bit SHA-1 hash of the client's public key, as defined in method
(1) of section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC5280], and encode this value using
the Base 64 encoding with URL and Filename Safe Alphabet, as
defined in section 5 of [RFC4648].
3.6. Request-Not-Performed Response
The value of the message "type" element for this response is:
type="error_response"
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---------------------------------------------------------------
Payload:
<status>[Code]</status>
<description xml:lang="en-US">[Readable text]</description>
---------------------------------------------------------------
All states where an error response if to be generated, either due to
detected errors or inconsistencies in the content of the request or
server-side states that prevent the request being performed, generate
a Request-Not-Performed response.
description:
value is a text field. This element MAY be present. It's value
has no defined meaning within the scope of this protocol, and
implementations may assume that some form of human-readable text
may be used here. If the HTTP request that triggered this error
response includes an Accept-Language header as defined in section
14.4 of the HTTP/1.1 specification [RFC2616] then the server will
make a best effort to include a second description element using
the highest ranked preferred language of the client. The en-US
description will always be included if the element is present.
The error code set is:
Code Value Description
1101 already processing request
1102 version number error
1103 unrecognised request type
1201 request - no such resource class
1202 request - no resources allocated in resource class
1203 request - badly formed certificate request
1301 revoke - no such resource class
1302 revoke - no such key 2000+ Server Error
2001 Internal Server Error - Request not performed
4. XML Schema
The following is a RelaxNG compact form schema describing the IR-ISP
Protocol, version 1.
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default namespace = "http://www.apnic.net/specs/rescerts/up-down/"
grammar {
start = element message {
attribute version { xsd:positiveInteger { maxInclusive="1" } },
attribute sender { xsd:token { maxLength="1024" } },
attribute recipient { xsd:token { maxLength="1024" } },
payload
}
payload |= attribute type { "list" }, list_request
payload |= attribute type { "list_response"}, list_response
payload |= attribute type { "issue" }, issue_request
payload |= attribute type { "issue_response"}, issue_response
payload |= attribute type { "revoke" }, revoke_request
payload |= attribute type { "revoke_response"}, revoke_response
payload |= attribute type { "error_response"}, error_response
list_request = empty
list_response = class*
class = element class {
attribute class_name { xsd:token { maxLength="1024" } },
attribute cert_url { xsd:string { maxLength="4096" } },
attribute resource_set_as { xsd:string { maxLength="512000"
pattern="[\-,0-9]*" } },
attribute resource_set_ipv4 { xsd:string { maxLength="512000"
pattern="[\-,/.0-9]*" } },
attribute resource_set_ipv6 { xsd:string { maxLength="512000"
pattern="[\-,/:0-9a-fA-F]*" } },
attribute resource_set_notafter { xsd:dateTime },
attribute suggested_sia_head { xsd:anyURI { maxLength="1024"
pattern="rsync://.+"} }?,
element certificate {
attribute cert_url { xsd:string { maxLength="4096" } },
attribute req_resource_set_as { xsd:string {
maxLength="512000" pattern="[\-,0-9]*" } }?,
attribute req_resource_set_ipv4 { xsd:string {
maxLength="512000" pattern="[\-,/.0-9]*" } }?,
attribute req_resource_set_ipv6 { xsd:string {
maxLength="512000" pattern="[\-,/:0-9a-fA-F]*" } }?,
xsd:base64Binary { maxLength="512000" }
}*,
element issuer { xsd:base64Binary { maxLength="512000" } }
}
issue_request = element request {
attribute class_name { xsd:token { maxLength="1024" } },
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attribute req_resource_set_as { xsd:string {
maxLength="512000" pattern="[\-,0-9]*" } }?,
attribute req_resource_set_ipv4 { xsd:string {
maxLength="512000" pattern="[\-,/.0-9]*" } }?,
attribute req_resource_set_ipv6 { xsd:string {
maxLength="512000" pattern="[\-,/:0-9a-fA-F]*" } }?,
xsd:base64Binary { maxLength="512000"
}
}
issue_response = class
revoke_request = revocation
revoke_response =
revocation
revocation = element key { attribute class_name { xsd:token {
maxLength="1024" } }, attribute ski {
xsd:token { maxLength="1024" } }
}
error_response =
element status { xsd:positiveInteger {
maxInclusive="999999999999999" }
},
element description { attribute xml:lang { xsd:language },
xsd:string { maxLength="1024" }
}?
}
5. Security Considerations
The intent of this protocol is to define a protocol to support the
maintenance of Resource Certificates that the IR issues for an ISP in
certifying resources that have been allocated or assigned by the IR
to the ISP [ID.SIDR-RES-CERTS]. This protocol assumes that the IR
and ISP are known to each other and have exchanged credentials so as
to support the operation of a TLS channel with mutual identification.
The mechanisms used to perform this credential exchange are not
described in this specification.
The primary objective of this provisioning protocol is to ensure that
attempts to disrupt the interaction between client and server are
identifiable by both parties. The mechanisms used to support this
level of integrity of protocol operation include the use of TLS with
mutual identification, and the use of message objects that are
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digitally signed and dated using CMS. This is intended to ensure
that the communication is resistant to attempts to disrupt the
communication or to replay earlier communication fragments (man-in-
the middle disruption and replay attacks).
The protocol is a minimal query / response protocol, that imposes
strict serialization on each query / response transaction, reducing
the potential for the ISP and the IR to lose synchronization over the
issued certificate state.
The inner protocol elements explicitly reference the intended sender
and receiver to present an IR or an ISP attempting to masquerade as
another party within the secure channel.
6. IANA Considerations
[Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA
considerations stated in this version of the document.]
7. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from
Russ Housley, Steve Kent, Randy Bush, George Michaelson, and Robert
Kisteleki in the preparation of the protocol described in this
document.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[ISO.8601:2004]
ISO, "ISO 8601:2004 Representation of dates and Times",
2004.
[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
September 1981.
[RFC2050] Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and
J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES",
BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
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[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC3852] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
RFC 3852, July 2004.
[RFC4049] Housley, R., "BinaryTime: An Alternate Format for
Representing Date and Time in ASN.1", RFC 4049,
April 2005.
[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
June 2005.
[RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.
[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[X.501] CCITT, "Recommendation X.501: The Directory - Models",
1988.
[X.509-88]
CCITT, "Recommendation X.509: The Directory -
Authentication Framework", 1988.
8.2. Informative References
[ID.SIDR-RES-CERTS]
Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", Work in progress:
Internet Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-11.txt,
August 2008.
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Authors' Addresses
Geoff Huston
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
33 Park Rd
Milton, QLD 4064
Australia
Email: gih@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
Robert Loomans
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
33 Park Rd
Milton, QLD 4064
Australia
Email: robertl@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
Byron Ellacott
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
33 Park Rd
Milton, QLD 4064
Australia
Email: bje@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
Rob Austein
Internet Systems Consortium
950 Charter St
Redwood City, CA 94063
USA
Email: sra@isc.org
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