Network Working Group A. Azimov
Internet-Draft Yandex
Intended status: Standards Track E. Bogomazov
Expires: January 9, 2020 Qrator Labs
K. Patel
Arrcus, Inc.
J. Snijders
NTT
July 8, 2019
Verification of AS_PATH Using the Resource Certificate Public Key
Infrastructure and Autonomous System Provider Authorization
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-01
Abstract
This document defines the semantics of an Autonomous System Provider
Authorization object in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure to
verify the AS_PATH attribute of routes advertised in the Border
Gateway Protocol.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2020.
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Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Anomaly Propagation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Autonomous System Provider Authorization . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Customer-Provider Verification Procedure . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. AS_PATH Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Upstream Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.2. Downstream Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.3. Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Disavowal of Provider Authorizaion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Siblings (Complex Relations) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) was designed without mechanisms to
validate BGP attributes. Two consequences are BGP Hijacks and BGP
Route Leaks [RFC7908]. BGP extensions are able to partially solve
these problems. For example, ROA-based Origin Validation [RFC6483]
can be used to detect and filter accidental mis-originations, and
[I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-detection-mitigation] can be used to detect
accidental route leaks. While these upgrades to BGP are quite
useful, they still rely on transitive BGP attributes, i.e. AS_PATH,
that can be manipulated by attackers.
BGPSec [RFC8205] was designed to solve the problem of AS_PATH
validation. Unfortunately, strict cryptographic validation brought
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expensive computational overhead for BGP routers. BGPSec also proved
vulnerable to downgrade attacks that nullify the benefits of AS_PATH
signing. As a result, to abuse the AS_PATH or any other signed
transit attribute, an attacker merely needs to downgrade to 'old'
BGP-4.
An alternative approach was introduced with soBGP
[I-D.white-sobgp-architecture]. Instead of strong cryptographic
AS_PATH validation, it created an AS_PATH security function based on
a shared database of ASN adjacencies. While such an approach has
reasonable computational cost, the two side adjacencies don't provide
a way to automate anomaly detection without high adoption rate - an
attacker can easily create a one-way adjacency. SO-BGP transported
data about adjacencies in new additional BGP messages, which was
recursively complex thus significantly increasing adoption complexity
and risk. In addition, the general goal to verify all AS_PATHs was
not achievable given the indirect adjacencies at internet exchange
points.
Instead of checking AS_PATH correctness, this document focuses on
solving real-world operational problems - automatic detection of
malicious hijacks and route leaks. To achieve this a new AS_PATH
verification procedure is defined which is able to automatically
detect invalid (malformed) AS_PATHs in announcements that are
received from customers and peers. This procedure uses a shared
signed database of customer-to-provider relationships using a new
RPKI object - Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA). This
technique provides benefits for participants even during early and
incremental adoption.
2. Anomaly Propagation
Both route leaks and hijacks have similar effects on ISP operations -
they redirect traffic, resulting in increased latency, packet loss,
or possible MiTM attacks. But the level of risk depends
significantly on the propagation of the anomalies. For example, a
hijack that is propagated only to customers may concentrate traffic
in a particular ISP's customer cone; while if the anomaly is
propagated through peers, upstreams, or reaches Tier-1 networks, thus
distributing globally, traffic may be redirected at the level of
entire countries and/or global providers.
The ability to constrain propagation of BGP anomalies to upstreams
and peers, without requiring support from the source of the anomaly
(which is critical if source has malicious intent), should
significantly improve the security of inter-domain routing and solve
the majority of problems.
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3. Autonomous System Provider Authorization
As described in [RFC6480], the RPKI is based on a hierarchy of
resource certificates that are aligned to the Internet Number
Resource allocation structure. Resource certificates are X.509
certificates that conform to the PKIX profile [RFC5280], and to the
extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779]. A resource
certificate is a binding by an issuer of IP address blocks and
Autonomous System (AS) numbers to the subject of a certificate,
identified by the unique association of the subject's private key
with the public key contained in the resource certificate. The RPKI
is structured so that each current resource certificate matches a
current resource allocation or assignment.
ASPAs are digitally signed objects that bind a selected AFI Provider
AS number to a Customer AS number (in terms of BGP announcements not
business), and are signed by the holder of the Customer AS. An ASPA
attests that a Customer AS holder (CAS) has authorized a particular
Provider AS (PAS) to propagate the Customer's IPv4/IPv6 announcements
onward, e.g. to the Provider's upstream providers or peers. The ASPA
record profile is described in [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile].
4. Customer-Provider Verification Procedure
This section describes an abstract procedure that checks that pair of
ASNs (AS1, AS2) is included in the set of signed ASPAs. The
semantics of its usage is defined in next section. The procedure
takes (AS1, AS2, ROUTE_AFI) as input parameters and returns three
types of results: "valid", "invalid" and "unknown".
A relying party (RP) must have access to a local cache of the
complete set of cryptographically valid ASPAs when performing
customer-provider verification procedure.
1. Retrieve all cryptographically valid ASPAs in a selected AFI with
a customer value of AS1. This selection forms the set of
"candidate ASPAs."
2. If the set of candidate ASPAs is empty, then the procedure exits
with an outcome of "unknown."
3. If there is at least one candidate ASPA where the provider field
is AS2, then the procedure exits with an outcome of "valid."
4. Otherwise, the procedure exits with an outcome of "invalid."
Since an AS1 may have different set providers in different AFI, it
should also have different set of corresponding ASPAs. In this case,
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the output of this procedure with input (AS1, AS2, ROUTE_AFI) may
have different output for different ROUTE_AFI values.
5. AS_PATH Verification
The AS_PATH attribute identifies the autonomous systems through which
an UPDATE message has passed. AS_PATH may contain two types of
components: ordered AS_SEQes and unordered AS_SETs, as defined in
[RFC4271].
The value of each concatenated value of AS_SEQ components can be
described as set of pairs {(AS(I), prepend(I)), (AS(I-1),
prepend(I-1))...}. In this case, the sequence {AS(I), AS(I-1),...}
represents different ASNs, that packet should pass towards the
destination.
The bellow procedure is applicable only for 32-bit AS number
compatible BGP speakers.
5.1. Upstream Paths
When a route is received from a customer, literal peer or by RS at
IX, each pair (AS(I-1), AS(I)) MUST belong to customer-provider or
sibling relationship. If there are other types of relationships, it
means that the route was leaked or the AS_PATH attribute was
malformed. The goal of the described bellow procedure is to check
the correctness of this statement.
If a route from ROUTE_AFI address family is received from a customer,
peer ot RS-client, its AS_PATH MUST be verified as follows:
1. If the closest AS in the AS_PATH is not the receiver's neighbor
ASN then procedure halts with the outcome "invalid";
2. If there is a pair (AS(I-1), AS(I)), and customer-provider
verification procedure (Section 4) with parameters (AS(I-1),
AS(I), ROUTE_AFI) returns "invalid" then the procedure also halts
with the outcome "invalid";
3. If the AS_PATH has at least one AS_SET segment then procedure
halts with the outcome "unverifiable";
4. Otherwise, the procedure halts with an outcome of "valid".
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5.2. Downstream Paths
When route is received from provider or RS it may have both Upstream
and Downstream paths. The first pair (AS(I-1), AS(I)) that has
"invalid" outcome of customer-provider verification procedure
indicates the end of Upstream path. All subsequent reverse pairs
(AS(J), AS(J-1)) MUST belong to customer-provider or sibling
relationship, thus can be also verified with ASPA objects. If there
are other types of relationships, it means that the route was leaked.
Additional caution should be done while processing prefixes that are
received from transparent IXes since they don't add their ASN in the
ASPATH.
If a route from ROUTE_AFI address family is received from a customer
or RS, its AS_PATH MUST be verified as follows:
1. If route is received from provider and the closest AS in the
AS_PATH is not the receiver's neighbor ASN then procedure halts
with the outcome "invalid";
2. If there are two pairs (AS(I-1), AS(I)), (AS(J-1), AS(J)) where J
> I, and customer-provider verification procedure (Section 4)
returns "invalid" for both (AS(I-1), AS(I), ROUTE_AFI) and
(AS(J), AS(J-1), ROUTE_AFI), then the procedure also halts with
the outcome "invalid";
3. If the AS_PATH has at least one AS_SET segment then procedure
halts with the outcome "unverifiable";
4. Otherwise, the procedure halts with an outcome of "valid".
5.3. Mitigation
If the output of the AS_PATH verification procedure is "invalid" the
route MUST be rejected.
If the output of the AS_PATH verification procedure is 'unverifiable'
it means that AS_PATH can't be fully checked. Such routes should be
treated with caution and SHOULD be processed the same way as
"invalid" routes. This policy goes with full correspondence to
[I-D.kumari-deprecate-as-set-confed-set].
The above AS_PATH verification procedure is able to check routes
received from customers and peers. The ASPA mechanism combined with
BGP Roles [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy] and ROA-based Origin
Validation [RFC6483] provide a fully automated solution to detect and
filter hijacks and route leaks, including malicious ones.
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6. Disavowal of Provider Authorizaion
An ASPA is a positive attestation that an AS holder has authorized
its provider to redistribute received routes to the provider's
providers and peers. This does not preclude the provider AS from
redistribution to its other customers. By creating an ASPA where the
provider AS is 0, the customer indicates that no provider should
further announce its routes. Specifically, AS 0 is reserved to
identify provider-free networks, Internet exchange meshes, etc.
An ASPA with a provider AS of 0 is a statement by the customer AS
that the its routes should not be received by any relying party AS
from any of its customers or peers.
By convention, an ASPA with a provider AS of 0 should be the only
ASPA issued by a given AS holder; although this is not a strict
requirement. A provider 0 ASPA may coexist with ASPAs that have
different provider AS values; though in such cases, the presence or
absence of the provider AS 0 ASPA does not alter the AS_PATH
verification procedure.
7. Siblings (Complex Relations)
There are peering relationships which can not be described as
strictly simple peer-peer or customer-provider; e.g. when both
parties are intentionally sending prefixes received from each other
to their peers and/or upstreams.
In this case, two symmetric ASPAs records {(AS1, AS2), (AS2, AS1)}
must be created by AS1 and AS2 respectively.
8. Security Considerations
The proposed mechanism is compatible only with BGP implementations
that can process 32-bit ASNs in the ASPATH. This limitation should
not have a real effect on operations - such legacy BGP routers a rare
and it's highly unlikely that they do support integration with RPKI.
ASPA issuers should be aware of the verification implication in
issuing an ASPA - an ASPA implicitly invalidates all routes passed to
upstream providers other than the provider ASs listed in the
collection of ASPAs. It is the Customer AS's duty to maintain a
correct set of ASPAs.
While the ASPA is capable to detect both mistake and malicious
activity for routes received from customers, RS-clients or peers, it
provides only detection of mistakes for routes that are received from
upstream providers and RS(s).
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Since upstream provider becomes a trusted point, it will be able to
send hijacked prefixes of its customers or send hijacked prefixes
with malformed AS_PATHs back. While it may happen in theory, it's
doesn't seem to be a real scenario: normally customer and provider
have a signed agreement and such policy violation should have legal
consequences or customer can just drop relation with such provider
and remove corresponding ASPA record.
9. Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank authors of [RFC6483] since its text was
used as an example while writing this document. The also authors
wish to thank Iljitsch van Beijnum for giving a hint about Downstream
paths.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
10.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-detection-mitigation]
Sriram, K. and A. Azimov, "Methods for Detection and
Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks", draft-ietf-grow-route-
leak-detection-mitigation-00 (work in progress), April
2019.
[I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy]
Azimov, A., Bogomazov, E., Bush, R., Patel, K., and K.
Sriram, "Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and
Open messages", draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-05 (work in
progress), February 2019.
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]
Azimov, A., Uskov, E., Bush, R., Patel, K., Snijders, J.,
and R. Housley, "A Profile for Autonomous System Provider
Authorization", draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-00 (work
in progress), May 2019.
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[I-D.kumari-deprecate-as-set-confed-set]
Kumari, W. and K. Sriram, "Deprecation of AS_SET and
AS_CONFED_SET in BGP", draft-kumari-deprecate-as-set-
confed-set-12 (work in progress), July 2018.
[I-D.white-sobgp-architecture]
White, R., "Architecture and Deployment Considerations for
Secure Origin BGP (soBGP)", draft-white-sobgp-
architecture-02 (work in progress), June 2006.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC6483] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "Validation of Route
Origination Using the Resource Certificate Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) and Route Origin Authorizations
(ROAs)", RFC 6483, DOI 10.17487/RFC6483, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6483>.
[RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.
[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
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Authors' Addresses
Alexander Azimov
Yandex
Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com
Eugene Bogomazov
Qrator Labs
Email: eb@qrator.net
Keyur Patel
Arrcus, Inc.
Email: keyur@arrcus.com
Job Snijders
NTT Communications
Theodorus Majofskistraat 100
Amsterdam 1065 SZ
The Netherlands
Email: job@ntt.net
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