Network Working Group                                        J. Snijders
Internet-Draft                                                    Fastly
Obsoletes: 6482 (if approved)                                M. Lepinski
Intended status: Standards Track                     New College Florida
Expires: 11 May 2023                                             D. Kong
                                                                Raytheon
                                                                 S. Kent
                                                             Independent
                                                         7 November 2022


            A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
                    draft-ietf-sidrops-rfc6482bis-01

Abstract

   This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin
   Authorizations (ROAs).  A ROA is a digitally signed object that
   provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has
   authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or
   more prefixes within the address block.  This document obsoletes RFC
   6482.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 11 May 2023.




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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Changes from RFC6482  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Related Work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  The ROA ContentType . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  The ROA eContent  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  asID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.3.  ipAddrBlocks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  ROA Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     7.1.  SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
           (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     7.2.  RPKI Signed Objects sub-registry  . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     7.3.  File Extension  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     7.4.  SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier
           (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.5.  Media Type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Appendix B.  Example ROA eContent Payload . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12











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1.  Introduction

   The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
   is to improve routing security.  (See [RFC6480] for more
   information.)  As part of this system, a mechanism is needed to allow
   entities to verify that an AS has been given permission by an IP
   address block holder to advertise routes to one or more prefixes
   within that block.  A ROA provides this function.

   The ROA makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed objects
   [RFC6488], which defines a Crytopgraphic Message Syntax (CMS)
   [RFC5652] wrapper for the ROA content as well as a generic validation
   procedure for RPKI signed objects.  Therefore, to complete the
   specification of the ROA (see Section 4 of [RFC6488]), this document
   defines:

   *  The OID that identifies the signed object as being a ROA.  (This
      OID appears within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object
      as well as the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo
      object).

   *  The ASN.1 syntax for the ROA eContent.  (This is the payload that
      specifies the AS being authorized to originate routes as well as
      the prefixes to which the AS may originate routes.)  The ROA
      eContent is ASN.1 encoded using the Distinguished Encoding Rules
      (DER) [X.690].

   *  Additional steps required to validate ROAs (in addition to the
      validation steps specified in [RFC6488]).

1.1.  Changes from RFC6482

   This section summarizes the significant changes between [RFC6482] and
   the profile described in this document.

   *  Clarifications on the requirements for IP Addresses and AS
      Identifiers X.509 certificate extension.

   *  Strengthening of ASN.1 formal notation.

   *  Incorporate errata.

   *  Add an example ROA payload and ROA as appendix.








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2.  Related Work

   It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
   described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
   and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280] and "X.509
   Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779].

   Additionally, this document makes use of the RPKI signed object
   profile [RFC6488]; thus, familiarity with that document is assumed.
   Note that the RPKI signed object profile makes use of certificates
   adhering to the RPKI Resource Certificate Profile [RFC6487]; thus,
   familiarly with that profile is also assumed.

3.  The ROA ContentType

   The content-type for a ROA is defined as routeOriginAuthz and has the
   numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24.

   This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the
   encapContentInfo object as well as the ContentType signed attribute
   in the signerInfo object (see [RFC6488]).

4.  The ROA eContent

   The content of a ROA identifies a single AS that has been authorized
   by the address space holder to originate routes and a list of one or
   more IP address prefixes that will be advertised.  If the address
   space holder needs to authorize multiple ASes to advertise the same
   set of address prefixes, the holder issues multiple ROAs, one per AS
   number.  A ROA is formally defined as:





















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   RPKI-ROA-2022 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
     pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) id-mod-rpkiROA-2022(TBD) }

   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
   BEGIN

   IMPORTS
     CONTENT-TYPE
     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268]
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
         pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;

   ct-routeOriginAttestation CONTENT-TYPE ::=
     { TYPE RouteOriginAttestation
       IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-routeOriginAuthz }

   id-ct-routeOriginAuthz OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
       pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) routeOriginAuthz(24) }

   RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
     version [0]           INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
     asID                  ASID,
     ipAddrBlocks          SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..2)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily }

   ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)

   ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
     -- Note: addressFamily can only be '0001'H (IPv4) or '0002'H (IPv6) --
     addressFamily         OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)),
     addresses             SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress
   }

   ROAIPAddress ::= SEQUENCE {
     address               IPAddress,
     -- Note: maxLength must be equal or larger than size of IPAddress, --
     -- and equal or smaller to what the AFI context permits --
     maxLength             INTEGER (0..128) OPTIONAL
   }

   -- Note: if the ROAIPAddressFamily's addressFamily is IPv4, the  --
   -- IPAddress' size cannot exceed 32; conversely if addressFamily --
   -- is IPv6, size can't exceed 128.                               --
   IPAddress ::= BIT STRING (SIZE(0..128))

   END





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4.1.  version

   The version number of the RouteOriginAttestation MUST be 0.

4.2.  asID

   The asID field contains the AS number that is authorized to originate
   routes to the given IP address prefixes.

4.3.  ipAddrBlocks

   The ipAddrBlocks field encodes the set of IP address prefixes to
   which the AS is authorized to originate routes.  Note that the syntax
   here is more restrictive than that used in the IP Address Delegation
   extension defined in RFC 3779.  That extension can represent
   arbitrary address ranges, whereas ROAs need to represent only
   prefixes.

   Within the ROAIPAddressFamily structure, addressFamily contains the
   Address Family Identifier (AFI) of an IP address family.  This
   specification only supports IPv4 and IPv6.  Therefore, addressFamily
   MUST be either 0001 or 0002.  There MUST be only one instance of
   ROAIPAddressFamily per unique AFI.  The ROAIPAddressFamily structure
   MUST NOT appear more than twice.

   Within a ROAIPAddress structure, the addresses field represents
   prefixes as a sequence of type IPAddress.  (See [RFC3779] for more
   details).  If present, the maxLength MUST be an integer greater than
   or equal to the length of the accompanying prefix, and less than or
   equal to the length (in bits) of an IP address in the address family
   (32 for IPv4 and 128 for IPv6).  When present, the maxLength
   specifies the maximum length of the IP address prefix that the AS is
   authorized to advertise.  (For example, if the IP address prefix is
   203.0.113/24 and the maxLength is 26, the AS is authorized to
   advertise any more specific prefix with a maximum length of 26.  In
   this example, the AS would be authorized to advertise 203.0.113/24,
   203.0.113.128/25, or 203.0.113.0/25, but not 203.0.113.0/27.)  When
   the maxLength is not present, the AS is only authorized to advertise
   the exact prefix specified in the ROA.

   Note that a valid ROA may contain an IP address prefix (within a
   ROAIPAddress element) that is encompassed by another IP address
   prefix (within a separate ROAIPAddress element).  For example, a ROA
   may contain the prefix 203.0.113/24 with maxLength 26, as well as the
   prefix 203.0.113.0/28 with maxLength 28.  (Such a ROA would authorize
   the indicated AS to advertise any prefix beginning with 203.0.113
   with a minimum length of 24 and a maximum length of 26, as well as
   the specific prefix 203.0.113.0/28.)  Additionally, a ROA MAY contain



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   two ROAIPAddress elements, where the IP address prefix is identical
   in both cases.  However, this is NOT RECOMMENDED as, in such a case,
   the ROAIPAddress with the shorter maxLength grants no additional
   privileges to the indicated AS and thus can be omitted without
   changing the meaning of the ROA.

5.  ROA Validation

   Before a relying party can use a ROA to validate a routing
   announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ROA.  To
   validate a ROA, the relying party MUST perform all the validation
   checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following additional
   ROA-specific validation steps.

   *  The IP Address Delegation extension [RFC3779] is present in the
      end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the ROA), and every
      IP address prefix(es) in the ROA payload is contained within the
      set of IP addresses specified by the EE certificate's IP Address
      Delegation extension.

   *  The EE certificate MUST NOT use "inherit" elements as described in
      [RFC3779].

   *  The Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension described in
      [RFC3779] is not used in Route Origin Authorizations and MUST NOT
      be present.

6.  Security Considerations

   There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a ROA; it
   is anticipated that ROAs will be stored in repositories that are
   accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users.  There is
   no explicit authentication associated with a ROA, since the PKI used
   for ROA validation provides authorization but not authentication.
   Although the ROA is a signed, application-layer object, there is no
   intent to convey non-repudiation via a ROA.

   The purpose of a ROA is to convey authorization for an AS to
   originate a route to the prefix(es) in the ROA.  Thus, the integrity
   of a ROA MUST be established.  The ROA specification makes use of the
   RPKI signed object format; thus, all security considerations in
   [RFC6488] also apply to ROAs.  Additionally, the signed object
   profile uses the CMS signed message format for integrity; thus, ROAs
   inherit all security considerations associated with that data
   structure.






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   The right of the ROA signer to authorize the target AS to originate
   routes to the prefix(es) is established through use of the address
   space and AS number PKI described in [RFC6480].  Specifically, one
   MUST verify the signature on the ROA using an X.509 certificate
   issued under this PKI, and check that the prefix(es) in the ROA are
   contained within those in the certificate's IP Address Delegation
   Extension.

7.  IANA Considerations

7.1.  SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)

   The IANA has allocated for this document in the "SMI Security for S/
   MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry:

   Decimal   Description             References
   ---------------------------------------------------------------
     24      id-ct-routeOriginAuthz  [RFC6482][RFC-to-be]


   Upon publication of this document, IANA is requested to reference the
   RFC publication instead of this draft.

7.2.  RPKI Signed Objects sub-registry

   The IANA has registered the OID for the RPKI Signed Checklist in the
   "RPKI Signed Objects" registry created by [RFC6488] as follows:

   Name              OID                         Specification
   -------------------------------------------------------------
   ROA               1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24  [RFC6482][RFC-TBD]


7.3.  File Extension

   The IANA has added an item for the ROA file extension to the "RPKI
   Repository Name Schemes" registry created by [RFC6481] as follows:

Filename Extension  RPKI Object                     Reference
------------------------------------------------------------------------
       .roa         Route Origination Authorization [RFC6481][RFC-to-be]


   Upon publication of this document, IANA is requested to make this
   addition permanent and to reference the RFC publication instead of
   this draft.





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7.4.  SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier
      (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)

   The IANA is requested to allocate for this document in the "SMI
   Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)"
   registry:

 Decimal  Description                      References
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
     TBD  id-mod-rpkiROA-2022              [RFC-to-be]


7.5.  Media Type

   The IANA is requested to update the media type application/rpki-roa
   in the "Media Type" registry as follows:

      Type name: application
      Subtype name: rpki-roa
      Required parameters: N/A
      Optional parameters: N/A
      Encoding considerations: binary
      Security considerations: Carries an RPKI ROA [RFC-to-be].
          This media type contains no active content. See
          Section 6 of [RFC-to-be] for further information.
      Interoperability considerations: None
      Published specification: [RFC-to-be]
      Applications that use this media type: RPKI operators
      Additional information:
        Content: This media type is a signed object, as defined
            in [RFC6488], which contains a payload of a list of
            prefixes and an AS identifer as defined in [RFC-to-be].
        Magic number(s): None
        File extension(s): .roa
        Macintosh file type code(s):
      Person & email address to contact for further information:
        Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
      Intended usage: COMMON
      Restrictions on usage: None
      Change controller: IETF


8.  References

8.1.  Normative References






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   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC6481]  Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
              Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.

   [RFC6482]  Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
              Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.

   [RFC6487]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
              X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.

   [RFC6488]  Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
              Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [X.690]    ITU-T, "Information Technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules:
              Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
              Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
              (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2015.

8.2.  Informative References

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.



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   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
              February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

   The authors wish to thank Charles Gardiner and Russ Housley for their
   help and contributions.  Additionally, the authors thank Rob Austein,
   Roque Gagliano, Danny McPherson, and Sam Weiler for their careful
   reviews and helpful comments.

Appendix B.  Example ROA eContent Payload

   Below an example of a DER encoded ROA eContent is provided with
   annotation following the '#' character.

$ echo 302402023CCA301E301C04020002301630090307002001067C208C30090307002A0EB2400000 \
  | xxd -r -ps \
  | openssl asn1parse -i -dump -inform DER
    0:d=0  hl=2 l=  36 cons: SEQUENCE                   # RouteOriginAttestation
    2:d=1  hl=2 l=   2 prim:  INTEGER           :3CCA   # asID 15562
    6:d=1  hl=2 l=  30 cons:  SEQUENCE                  # ipAddrBlocks
    8:d=2  hl=2 l=  28 cons:   SEQUENCE                 #  ROAIPAddressFamily
   10:d=3  hl=2 l=   2 prim:    OCTET STRING            #   addressFamily
      0000 - 00 02                              ..      #    IPv6
   14:d=3  hl=2 l=  22 cons:    SEQUENCE                #   addresses
   16:d=4  hl=2 l=   9 cons:     SEQUENCE               #    ROAIPAddress
   18:d=5  hl=2 l=   7 prim:      BIT STRING            #     address
      0000 - 00 20 01 06 7c 20 8c               . ..| . #      2001:67c:208c::/48
   27:d=4  hl=2 l=   9 cons:     SEQUENCE               #    ROAIPAddress
   29:d=5  hl=2 l=   7 prim:      BIT STRING            #     address
      0000 - 00 2a 0e b2 40                     .*..@   #      2a0e:b240::/48
      0007 - <SPACES/NULS>


   Below is a complete Base64 [RFC4648] encoded RPKI ROA Signed Object.









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MIIHCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIG/DCCBvgCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwNwYLKoZIhvcNAQkQ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Authors' Addresses

   Job Snijders
   Fastly
   Amsterdam
   Netherlands
   Email: job@fastly.com


   Matthew Lepinski
   New College Florida
   Email: mlepinski@ncf.edu



Snijders, et al.           Expires 11 May 2023                 [Page 12]


Internet-Draft  A Profile for Route Origin Authorization   November 2022


   Derrick Kong
   Raytheon
   Email: derrick.kong@raytheon.com


   Stephen Kent
   Independent
   Email: kent@alum.mit.edu











































Snijders, et al.           Expires 11 May 2023                 [Page 13]