Network Working Group T. King
Internet-Draft D. Kopp
Intended status: Standards Track DE-CIX
Expires: July 20, 2017 A. Lambrianidis
AMS-IX
A. Fenioux
France-IX
January 16, 2017
Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-Server to Peers
draft-ietf-sidrops-route-server-rpki-light-01
Abstract
This document defines the usage of the BGP Prefix Origin Validation
State Extended Community [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]
to signal prefix origin validation results from a route-server to its
peers. Upon reception of prefix origin validation results peers can
use this information in their local routing decision process.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] only when they appear in all
upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English
words, without normative meaning.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 20, 2017.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-
Server to Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Operational Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Local Routing Decision Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Route-Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation
State Extended Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.3. Information about Validity of a BGP Prefix Origin Not
Available at a Route-Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.4. Error Handling at Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. Introduction
RPKI-based prefix origin validation [RFC6480] can be a significant
operational burden for BGP peers to implement and adopt. In order to
boost acceptance and usage of prefix origin validation and ultimately
increase the security of the Internet routing system, IXPs may
provide RPKI-based prefix origin validation at the route-server
[I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]. The result of this prefix origin
validation is signaled to peers by using the BGP Prefix Origin
Validation State Extended Community as introduced in
[I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling].
Peers receiving the prefix origin validation result from the route-
server(s) can use this information in their local routing decision
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process for acceptance, rejection, preference, or other traffic
engineering purposes of a particular route.
2. Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-Server to
Peers
The BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community (as defined
in [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]) is utilized for
signaling prefix origin validation result from a route-server to
peers.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] proposes an encoding of
the prefix origin validation result [RFC6811] as follows:
+-------+-----------+
| Value | Meaning |
+-------+-----------+
| 0 | Valid |
| 1 | Not found |
| 2 | Invalid |
+-------+-----------+
Table 1
This encoding is re-used. Route-servers providing RPKI-based prefix
origin validation set the validation state according to the prefix
origin validation result (see [RFC6811]).
3. Operational Recommendations
3.1. Local Routing Decision Process
A peer receiving prefix origin validation results from the route-
server MAY use the information in its own local routing decision
process. The local routing decision process SHOULD apply to the
rules as described in section 5 [RFC6811].
A peer receiving a prefix origin validation result from the route-
server MAY redistribute this information within its own AS.
3.2. Route-Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State
Extended Community
An IXP route-server receiving routes from its peers containing the
BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community MUST remove the
extended community before the route is re-distributed to its peers.
This is required regardless of whether the route-server is executing
prefix origin validation or not.
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Failure to do so would allow opportunistic peers to advertise routes
tagged with arbitrary prefix origin validation results via a route-
server, influencing maliciously the decision process of other route-
server peers.
3.3. Information about Validity of a BGP Prefix Origin Not Available at
a Route-Server
In case information about the validity of a BGP prefix origin is not
available at the route-server (e.g., error in the ROA cache, CPU
overload) the route-server MUST NOT add the BGP Prefix Origin
Validation State Extended Community to the route.
3.4. Error Handling at Peers
A route sent by a route-server SHOULD only contain none or one BGP
Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community.
A peer receiving a route from a route-server containing more than one
BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community SHOULD only
consider the largest value (as described in Table 1) in the
validation result field and disregard the other values. Values
larger than two in the validation result field MUST be disregarded.
4. IANA Considerations
None.
5. Security Considerations
All security considerations described in RFC RFC6811 [RFC6811] fully
apply to this document.
Additionally, threat agents polluting ROA cache server(s) run by IXPs
can cause significant operational impact, since multiple route-server
clients could be affected. Peers should be vigilant as to the
integrity and authenticity of the origin validation results, as they
are provided by a third party, namely the IXP hosting both the route-
server as well as any ROA cache server(s).
Therefore, a route-server could be misused to spread malicious prefix
origin validation results. However, peers already trust route-server
for the collection and redistribution of BGP routing information to
other peers.
Similar issues may arise due to inadvertent corruption of the ROA
cache database.
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To facilitate trust and help with peers establishing appropriate
controls in mitigating the risks mentioned above, IXPs SHOULD provide
out-of-band means for peers to ensure that the ROA validation process
has not been compromised or corrupted.
To countermeasure DDoS attacks, it is common practice to make use of
blackholing services (see RFC 7999 [RFC7999]). Peers are using
blackholing to drop traffic, typically by announcing a more specific
prefix, which is under attack. If no ROA entry exists for the more
specific prefix, its validation status would be "Invalid". This
might be undesirable, in which case it would be recommended for
targeted peers to either create the appropriate ROA entry as
necessary, or use adopted classification for such more specific
prefixes.
The introduction of a mechanisms described in this document does not
pose a new class of attack vectors to the relationship between route-
servers and peers.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360,
February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC7999] King, T., Dietzel, C., Snijders, J., Doering, G., and G.
Hankins, "BLACKHOLE Community", RFC 7999,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7999, October 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7999>.
6.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]
Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker,
"Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", draft-ietf-idr-ix-
bgp-route-server-12 (work in progress), June 2016.
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[I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]
Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R.
Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended
Community", draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-07
(work in progress), November 2015.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
Authors' Addresses
Thomas King
DE-CIX Management GmbH
Lichtstrasse 43i
Cologne 50825
DE
Email: thomas.king@de-cix.net
Daniel Kopp
DE-CIX Management GmbH
Lichtstrasse 43i
Cologne 50825
DE
Email: daniel.kopp@de-cix.net
Aristidis Lambrianidis
Amsterdam Internet Exchange
Frederiksplein 42
Amsterdam 1017 XN
NL
Email: aristidis.lambrianidis@ams-ix.net
Arnaud Fenioux
France-IX
88 Avenue Des Ternes
Paris 75017
FR
Email: afenioux@franceix.net
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