SIP M. Munakata
Internet-Draft S. Schubert
Intended status: Informational T. Ohba
Expires: May 3, 2009 NTT
October 30, 2008
UA-Driven Privacy Mechanism for SIP
draft-ietf-sip-ua-privacy-03
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Abstract
This document defines a best current practice for a user agent to
generate an anonymous SIP message by utilizing mechanisms such as
GRUU (Globally Routable User Agent URIs) and TURN (Traversal Using
Relays around NAT) without the need for a privacy service defined in
RFC 3323.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Concept of Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Treatment of Privacy-Sensitive Information . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Obtaining a Functional Anonymous URI Using the GRUU
Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. Obtaining a Functional Anonymous IP Address Using the
TURN Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. User Agent Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Critical Privacy-Sensitive Information . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1.1. Contact Header Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1.2. From Header Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1.3. Via Header Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1.4. IP Addresses in SDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Non-Critical Privacy-Sensitive Information . . . . . . . . 8
5.2.1. Host Names in Other SIP Header Fields . . . . . . . . 8
5.2.2. Optional SIP Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 12
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1. Introduction
[RFC3323] defines a privacy mechanism for the SIP (Session Initiation
Protocol)[RFC3261], based on techniques available at the time of its
publication. This mechanism relies on the use of a separate privacy
service to remove privacy-sensitive information from SIP messages
sent by a user agent before forwarding those messages to the final
destination. Since then, numerous SIP extensions have been proposed
and standardized. Some of those enable a user agent to withhold its
user's identity and related information without the need for privacy
services, which was not possible when RFC 3323 was defined.
The purpose of this document is not to obsolete RFC 3323, but to
enhance overall privacy mechanism in SIP by allowing user agent to
take control of its privacy, rather than being completely dependent
on external privacy service.
The UA-driven privacy mechanism defined in this document will not
eliminate the need for RFC 3323 usage defined in [RFC3325] which
instructs privacy service to delete P-Asserted-Identity header. In
order to delete a P-Asserted-Identity header, a user agent needs to
set Privacy:id even when the user agent is utilizing this
specification.
This document defines a best current practice in which a user agent
controls all the privacy functions on its own utilizing SIP
extensions such as GRUU (Globally Routable User Agent URIs)
[I-D.ietf-sip-gruu] and TURN (Traversal Using Relays around NAT)
[I-D.ietf-behave-turn].
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
privacy-sensitive information:
The information that identifies a user who sends the SIP
message, as well as the supplementary information that
can be used to guess the user's identity.
3. Concept of Privacy
The concept of privacy in this document is the act of concealing
identity of a user and supplementary information. The protection of
network privacy (e.g., topology hiding) is outside the scope of this
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document.
Privacy-sensitive information includes display-name and URI (Uniform
Resource Identifier) in a From header field that can reveal the
user's name and affiliation (e.g., company name), and IP addresses or
host names in a Contact header field, a Via header field, a Call-ID
header field, or an SDP (Session Description Protocol) [RFC4566] body
that might reveal the location of a user agent.
4. Treatment of Privacy-Sensitive Information
Some fields of SIP messages that potentially contain privacy-
sensitive information do not interfere with establishing dialog and
can be omitted without any side effects. Other fields are essential
for establishing dialog and need to have its value replaced to
anonymized values in order to obscure privacy-sensitive information.
Of the privacy-sensitive information listed in section 3, URIs, host
names, and IP addresses in Contact, Via, and SDP must be functional
(i.e., suitable for purpose) even when they are anonymized.
With the use of GRUU [I-D.ietf-sip-gruu] and TURN
[I-D.ietf-behave-turn], a user agent can obtain URIs and IP addresses
for media and signaling that are functional yet anonymous, and do not
identify either the user agent or the user. Instructions on how to
obtain a functional anonymous URI and IP address are given in Section
4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
Host names should be concealed because the user's identity may be
guessed from them, but they are not always regarded as critical
privacy-sensitive information.
In addition, a user agent should be careful not to include any
information that identifies the user in optional SIP header fields
such as Subject and User-Agent.
4.1. Obtaining a Functional Anonymous URI Using the GRUU Mechanism
A user agent wanting to obtain a functional anonymous URI MUST
support and utilize the GRUU mechanism unless it is able to obtain a
functional anonymous URI through other means outside the scope of
this document. By sending a REGISTER request requesting GRUU, the
user agent can obtain an anonymous URI, which can later be used for
the Contact header field.
The detailed process on how a user agent obtains a GRUU is described
in [I-D.ietf-sip-gruu].
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If the Registrar supports the GRUU and returns a REGISTER response,
the user agent SHOULD search within the REGISTER response for a
"temp-gruu" URI parameter, which provides the desired privacy
property. If the "temp-gruu" URI parameter and value is present
within the REGISTER response, the user agent SHOULD use the value of
the "temp-gruu" as an anonymous URI representing the user agent.
This URI SHOULD be used for the Contact header in subsequent requests
and responses.
If there is no "temp-gruu" URI parameter in the 200 response to the
REGISTER request, a user agent SHOULD NOT proceed with its
anonymization process, unless something equivalent to "temp-gruu" is
provided through some administrative means.
It is RECOMMENDED that user agent consult the user before sending a
request without a functional anonymous URI when privacy is requested
from the user.
Due to the nature of how GRUU works, the domain name is always
revealed when GRUU is used. If revealing the domain name in Contact
header field is a concern, usage of a third-party GRUU server to
obtain a temp-gruu that is irrelevant to users' domain SHOULD be
considered. Refer to the Security Considerations section for
details.
4.2. Obtaining a Functional Anonymous IP Address Using the TURN
Mechanism
A user agent that is not provided with a functional anonymous IP
address through some administrative means, MUST obtain a relayed
address if anonymity is desired (IP address of the media relay) for
use in SDP and in Via header. Such IP address is to be derived from
a STUN relay server through TURN mechanism, which allows a STUN
server to act as a media relay.
Anonymous IP addresses are needed for two purposes. The first is for
use in the Via header field of a SIP request. By obtaining an IP
address from a STUN relay server, using that address in the Via
header field of the SIP request, and sending the SIP request to the
STUN relay server, the IP address of the user agent will not be
revealed beyond the relay server.
The second is for use in SDP as an address for receiving media. By
obtaining an IP address from a STUN relay server and using that
address in SDP, media will be received via the relay server. Also
media can be sent via the relay server. In this way, neither SDP nor
media packets reveal the IP address of the user agent.
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It is assumed that a user agent is either manually or automatically
configured through means such as the configuration framework
[I-D.ietf-sipping-config-framework] with the address of one or more
STUN (Session Traversal Utilities for NAT) [I-D.ietf-behave-turn]
relay servers to obtain anonymous IP address.
5. User Agent Behavior
This section describes how to generate an anonymous SIP message at a
user agent.
A user agent fully compliant with this document MUST obscure or
conceal all the critical UA-inserted privacy-sensitive information in
SIP requests and responses as shown in Section 5.1 when user privacy
is requested. In addition, the user agent SHOULD conceal the non-
critical privacy-sensitive information as shown in Section 5.2.
Furthermore, when a user agent uses relay server to conceal its
identity, the user agent MUST send requests to the relay server to
ensure request and response bypass the same signaling path.
5.1. Critical Privacy-Sensitive Information
5.1.1. Contact Header Field
Without privacy considerations, this field contains a URI used to
reach the user agent for mid-dialog requests and possibly out-of-
dialog requests, such as REFER [RFC3515]. The Contact header field
can also contain a display-name. Since the Contact header field is
used for routing further requests to the user agent, it must include
a functional URI even when it is anonymized.
A user agent generating an anonymous SIP message supporting this
specification MUST anonymize a Contact header using an anonymous URI
("temp-gruu") obtained through the GRUU mechanism or an anonymous URI
containing an IP address obtained through the TURN mechanism, unless
an equivalent functional anonymous URI is provided by some other
means.
Refer to Section 4.1 for details on how to obtain an anonymous URI
through GRUU, and refer to Section 4.2 for details on how to obtain
an IP address through TURN.
A display-name in a Contact header MUST be omitted or "Anonymous".
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5.1.2. From Header Field
Without privacy considerations, this field contains the identity of
the user, such as display-name and URI.
RFCs 3261 and 3323 recommend to set "sip:anonymous@anonymous.invalid"
as a SIP URI in a From header field when user privacy is requested.
This raises an issue when the SIP-Identity mechanism [RFC4474] is
applied to the message, because SIP-Identity requires an actual
domain name in the From header field.
A user agent generating an anonymous SIP message supporting this
specification MUST anonymize the From header field in one of the two
ways described below.
Option 1:
A user agent anonymizes a From header field using an anonymous
display-name and an anonymous URI following the procedure noted in
section 4.1.1.3 of RFC 3323.
The example form of the From header of option 1 is as follows:
From: "Anonymous" <sip:anonymous@anonymous.invalid>;tag=1928301774
Option 2:
A user agent anonymizes a From header field using an anonymous
display-name and an anonymous URI with user's valid domain name
instead of "anonymous.invalid".
The example form of the From header of option 2 is as follows:
From: "Anonymous" <sip:anonymous@atlanta.com>;tag=1928301774
A user agent SHOULD go with option 1 to conceal its domain name in
From header field. However, the SIP-Identity will fail with the From
header of option 1 because the SIP-Identity mechanism uses
authentication based on the domain name.
If a user agent is aware that SIP-Identity mechanism will be applied
to the request, it is RECOMMENDED to go with option 2. However, the
user's domain name will be revealed from the From header field of
option 2.
If user wants both anonymity and strong identity, use a third party
anonymization service which issues AoR for the use in From address
which also provides SIP-Identity.
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5.1.3. Via Header Field
Without privacy considerations, the bottommost Via header field added
by a user agent contains the IP address and port or hostname that are
used to reach the user agent for responses.
A user agent generating an anonymous SIP request supporting this
specification MUST anonymize the IP address in the Via header field
using an anonymous IP address obtained through the TURN mechanism,
unless an equivalent functional anonymous IP address is provided by
some other means.
Refer to Section 4.2 for details on how to obtain an IP address
through TURN.
Via header SHOULD NOT include a host name.
5.1.4. IP Addresses in SDP
A user agent generating an anonymous SIP message supporting this
specification MUST anonymize IP addresses in SDP, if present, using
an anonymous IP address obtained through the TURN mechanism, unless
an equivalent functional anonymous IP address is provided by some
other means.
Refer to Section 4.2 for details on how to obtain an IP address
through TURN.
5.2. Non-Critical Privacy-Sensitive Information
5.2.1. Host Names in Other SIP Header Fields
A user agent generating an anonymous SIP message supporting this
specification SHOULD conceal host names in any SIP header fields,
such as Call-ID and Warning header fields, if considered privacy-
sensitive.
5.2.2. Optional SIP Header Fields
Other optional SIP header fields (such as Call-Info, In-Reply-To,
Organization, Referred-By, Reply-To, Server, Subject, User-Agent, and
Warning) can contain privacy-sensitive information.
A user agent generating an anonymous SIP message supporting this
specification SHOULD NOT include any information that identifies the
user in such optional header fields.
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6. Security Considerations
This specification uses GRUU and TURN and inherits any security
considerations described in these drafts.
Furthermore, if the provider of the caller intending to obscure its
identity consists of a small number of people (e.g. small enterprise,
SOHO), the domain name alone can reveal the identity of the caller
when this specification is used.
Same can be true when the provider is large, but the receiver of the
call only knows few people from the source of call.
There are mainly two places in the message, From header and Contact
header, where domain name must be functional.
The domain name in From header can be obscured as described in
section 5.1.2, on contrary the Contact header needs to contain a
valid domain name at all time to function properly.
It is probably important to note that generally a device will not
show the contact address to the receiver, but this does not mean that
one can not find the domain name in a message. In fact as long as
this specification is used to obscure identity, the message will
always contain a valid domain name as it inherits key characteristics
of GRUU.
If one wants to assure anonymization, it is recommended for the user
to seek and rely on third party anonymization service.
A third party anonymization service provides registrar and TURN
service which has no affiliation with the caller's provider, allowing
caller to completely withhold its identity.
7. IANA Considerations
This document requires no action by IANA.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-behave-turn]
Rosenberg, J., Mahy, R., and P. Matthews, "Traversal Using
Relays around NAT (TURN): Relay Extensions to Session
Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)",
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draft-ietf-behave-turn-11 (work in progress),
October 2008.
[I-D.ietf-sip-gruu]
Rosenberg, J., "Obtaining and Using Globally Routable User
Agent (UA) URIs (GRUU) in the Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP)", draft-ietf-sip-gruu-15 (work in progress),
October 2007.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
June 2002.
[RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session
Description Protocol", RFC 4566, July 2006.
8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sipping-config-framework]
Channabasappa, S., "A Framework for Session Initiation
Protocol User Agent Profile Delivery",
draft-ietf-sipping-config-framework-15 (work in progress),
February 2008.
[RFC3323] Peterson, J., "A Privacy Mechanism for the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 3323, November 2002.
[RFC3325] Jennings, C., Peterson, J., and M. Watson, "Private
Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for
Asserted Identity within Trusted Networks", RFC 3325,
November 2002.
[RFC3515] Sparks, R., "The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Refer
Method", RFC 3515, April 2003.
[RFC4474] Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for
Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4474, August 2006.
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Authors' Addresses
Mayumi Munakata
NTT Corporation
Email: munakata.mayumi@lab.ntt.co.jp
Shida Schubert
NTT Corporation
Email: shida@ntt-at.com
Takumi Ohba
NTT Corporation
9-11, Midori-cho 3-Chome
Musashino-shi, Tokyo 180-8585
Japan
Phone: +81 422 59 7748
Email: ohba.takumi@lab.ntt.co.jp
URI: http://www.ntt.co.jp
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