INTERNET-DRAFT Simon Blake-Wilson, Certicom Corp
draft-ietf-smime-ecc-02.txt Daniel R. L. Brown, Certicom Corp
7 September, 2000 Expires: 7 March, 2001
Use of ECC Algorithms in CMS
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
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Abstract
This document describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) public-key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS). The ECC algorithms support the creation of digital
signatures and the exchange of keys to encrypt or authenticate
content. The definition of the algorithm processing is based on
the ANSI X9.62 standard and the ANSI X9.63 draft, developed by the
ANSI X9F1 working group.
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ........................................ 3
1.1 Requirement terminology ........................ 3
2 SignedData using ECC ................................ 3
2.1 SignedData using ECDSA ......................... 3
2.1.1 Fields of the SignedData ................ 3
2.1.2 Actions of the sending agent ............ 4
2.1.3 Actions of the receiving agent .......... 4
3 EnvelopedData using ECC ............................. 5
3.1 EnvelopedData using ECDH ....................... 5
3.1.1 Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ......... 5
3.1.2 Actions of the sending agent ............ 5
3.1.3 Actions of the receiving agent .......... 6
3.2 EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV ............... 6
3.2.1 Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ......... 6
3.2.2 Actions of the sending agent ............ 7
3.2.3 Actions of the receiving agent .......... 8
4 AuthenticatedData using ECC ............ ............ 8
4.1 AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV ........... 8
4.1.1 Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ......... 8
4.1.2 Actions of the sending agent ............ 8
4.1.3 Actions of the receiving agent .......... 9
5 Recommended Elliptic Curves ......................... 9
6 Certificates using ECC .............................. 9
7 SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC ................. 9
8 ASN.1 Syntax ........................................ 9
8.1 Algorithm identifiers .......................... 9
8.2 Other syntax ................................... 11
9 Summary ............................................. 12
References ............................................. 12
Security Considerations ................................ 14
Intellectual Property Rights ........................... 14
Acknowledgments ........................................ 14
Authors' Address ....................................... 14
Full Copyright Statement ............................... 15
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1 Introduction
The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is cryptographic algorithm
independent. This specification defines a standard profile for the
use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public key algorithms in
the CMS. The ECC algorithms are incorporated into the following
CMS content types:
- 'SignedData' to support ECC-based digital signature methods
(ECDSA) to sign content
- 'EnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement
methods (ECDH and ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption
keys to encrypt content-encryption keys used for content
encryption
- 'AuthenticatedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement
methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to
encrypt MAC keys used for content authentication
Certification of EC public keys is also described to provide
public-key distribution in support of the specified techniques.
1.1 Requirements terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119
[MUST].
2 SignedData using ECC
This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
SignedData format to sign data.
2.1 SignedData using ECDSA
This section describes how to use the Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with SignedData. ECDSA is specified in
[X9.62]. The method is the elliptic curve analog of the
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [FIPS 186-2].
2.1.1 Fields of the SignedData
When using ECDSA with SignedData the fields of SignerInfo are as in
[CMS], but with the following restrictions:
digestAlgorithm contains the algorithm identifier sha-1 (see
Section 8.1) which identifies the SHA-1 hash algorithm.
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signatureAlgorithm contains the algorithm identifier
ecdsa-with-SHA1 (see Section 8.1) which identifies the ECDSA
signature algorithm.
signature contains the DER encoding (as an octet string) of a
value of the ASN.1 type ECDSA-Sig-Value (see Section
7.2).
When using ECDSA, the SignedData certificates field may include the
certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the generation of
the ECDSA signatures in SignedData. ECC certificates are discussed
in Section 6.
2.1.2 Actions of the sending agent
When using ECDSA with SignedData, the sending agent uses the
message digest calculation process and signature generation process
for SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To sign data, the
sending agent uses the signature method specified in [X9.62,
Section 5.3] with the following exceptions:
- In [X9.62, Section 5.3.1], the integer "e" shall instead be
determined by converting the octet string resulting from [CMS,
Section 5.4] to an integer using the data conversion method in
[X9.62, Section 4.3.2].
The sending agent encodes the resulting signature using the
ECDSA-sig-value syntax and places it in the SignerInfo signature
field.
2.1.3 Actions of the receiving agent
When using ECDSA with SignedData, the receiving agent uses the
message digest calculation process and signature verification
process for SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To verify
SignedData, the receiving agent uses the signature verification
method specified in [X9.62, Section 5.4] with the following
exceptions:
- In [X9.62, Section 5.4.1] the integer "e" shall instead be
determined by converting the octet string resulting from [CMS,
Section 5.4] to an integer using the data conversion method in
[X9.62, Section 4.3.2].
In order to verify the signature, the receiving agent retrieves the
integers r and s from the SignerInfo signature field of the
received message.
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3 EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms
This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
EnvelopedData format.
3.1 EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH
This section describes how to use ephemeral-static Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData.
Ephemeral-static ECDH is specified in [X9.63]. Ephemeral-static
ECDH is the the elliptic curve analog of the ephemeral-static
Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm specified jointly in the
documents [CMS, Section 12.3.1.1] and [CMS-DH].
3.1.1 Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the fields of
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are as in [CMS], but with the following
restrictions:
originator is the alternative originatorKey. The originatorKey
algorithm field contains the id-ecPublicKey object identifier
(see Section 8.1) with NULL parameters. The originatorKey
publicKey field contains the DER-encoding of a value of the
ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section 8.2).
keyEncryptionAlgorithm contains the
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme object identifier (see Section
7.1) if standard ECDH primitive is used, or the
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme object identifier (see
Section 8.1) if the cofactor ECDH primitive is used. The
parameter field contains KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm
is the algorithm identifier that indicates the symmetric
encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK.
3.1.2 Actions of the sending agent
When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the sending
agent first obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain
parameters (e.g. from the recipient's certificate). The sending
agent then determines an integer "keydatalen" which is the
key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm and a bit string
"SharedData". The "SharedData" bit string is the DER encoding of
ASN.1 type X9-63-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 8.2). The sending
agent then performs the initiator transformation of the 1-Pass
Diffie-Hellman scheme specified in [X9.63, Section 6.2.1]. As a
result the sending agent obtains:
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- an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of
the type ECPoint (see Section 8.2), encapsulated in a bit
string and placed in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator
field, and
- a shared secret bit string "KeyData" which is used as the
pairwise key-encryption key for that recipient.
3.1.3 Actions of the receiving agent
When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the receiving
agent determines the bit string "SharedData" (see Section 8.2) and
the integer "keydatalen" from the key-size, in bits, of the
KeyWrapAlgorithm. The receiving agent retrieves the ephemeral EC
public key from the bit string KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator,
which an value of the type ECPoint (see Section 8.2) encapsulated
as a bit string. The receiving agent completes the responder
transformation of the 1-Pass Diffie-Hellman scheme [X9.63, Section
6.2.2]. As a result the receiving agent obtains a shared secret
bit string "KeyData" which is used as the pairwise key-encryption
key to unwrap the CEK.
3.2 EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV
This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
(ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData. 1-Pass ECMQV
is specified in [X9.63]. Like the KEA algorithm [CMS-KEA], 1-Pass
ECMQV uses three key pairs: an ephemeral key pair, a static key
pair of the sending agent, and a static key pair of the receiving
agent. An advantage of using 1-Pass ECMQV is that it may be used
with both EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData.
3.2.1 Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData the fields of
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are:
version is 3
originator identifies the static EC public key of the sender.
It should be the one of the alternatives issuerAndSerialNumber
or subjectKeyIdentifier and point to one of the sending agent's
certificates supplied in the EnvelopedData originatorInfo field.
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ukm is present. The ukm field contains an octet string which is
the DER encoding of the type MQVuserKeyingMaterial (see Section
8.2). The MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey algorithm
field contains the id-ecPublicKey object identifier (see Section
8.1) with NULL parameters field. The MQVuserKeyingMaterial
ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field contains the DER-encoding of
the ASN.1 type ECPoint representing sending agent's ephemeral EC
public key. The MQVuserKeyingMaterial addedukm field, if
present, contains an octet string of additional user keying
material of the sending agent.
keyEncryptionAlgorithm is the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme
algorithm identifier (see Section 8.1), with parameter field
KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm indicates the symmetric
encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK
generated using the 1-Pass ECMQV algorithm.
3.2.2 Actions of the sending agent
When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the sending agent first
obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain parameters,
(e.g. from the recipient's certificate) and checks that the domain
parameters are the same. The sending agent then determines an
integer "keydatalen" which is the key-size, in bits, of the
KeyWrapAlgorithm and a bit string "SharedData" (see Section 8.2).
The sending agent then performs the initiator transformation of the
1-Pass ECMQV scheme specified in [X9.63, Section 6.9.1]. As a
result the sending agent obtains
- an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of
type ECPoint (see Section 8.2), encapsulated in a bit string,
placed in an MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey
publicKey field (see Section 8.2), and
- a shared secret bit string "KeyData" which is used as the
pairwise key-encryption key for that recipient. Parity bits
are adjust according to the key wrap algorithm.
The ephemeral public key may be re-used with an AuthenticatedData
for greater efficiency.
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3.2.3 Actions of the receiving agent
When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the receiving agent
determines the bit string "SharedData" (see Section 8.2) and the
integer "keydatalen" from the key-size, in bits, of the
KeyWrapAlgorithm. The receiving agent then retrieves the static
and ephemeral EC public keys of the originator, from the originator
and ukm fields as described in Section 3.2.1, and its static EC
public key identified in the rid field and checks that the domain
parameters are the same. The receiving agent then performs the
responder transformation of the 1-Pass ECMQV scheme [X9.63, Section
6.9.2]. As a result the receiving agent obtains a shared secret
bit string "KeyData" which is used as the pairwise key-encryption
key to unwrap the CEK.
4 AuthenticatedData using ECC
This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
AuthenticatedData format. AuthenticatedData lacks non-repudiation,
and so in some instances is preferrable SignedData. (For example,
the sending agent may not want the message to be authenticated when
forwarded.)
4.1 AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV
This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
(ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthenticatedData. 1-Pass
ECMQV is specified in [X9.63]. An advantage of using 1-Pass ECMQV
is that it may be used with both EnvelopedData and
AuthenticatedData.
4.1.1 Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
The AuthenticatedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the
same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document.
4.1.2 Actions of the sending agent
The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData
with 1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.2 of this document.
The ephemeral public key may be re-used with an EnvelopedData for
greater efficiency.
Note: if there are multiple recipients then an attack is possible
where one recipient modifies the content without other recipients
noticing [BON]. A sending agent who is concerned with such an
attack should use a separate AuthenticatedData for each recipient.
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4.1.3 Actions of the receiving agent
The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData
with 1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document.
Note: see Note in Section 4.1.2.
5 Recommended Elliptic Curves
It is strongly recommended that agents use the elliptic curve
domain parameters recommended by ANSI [X9.62, X9.63], NIST [REC-EC]
and SECG [SEC3].
6 Certificates using ECC
Internet X.509 certificates [PKI] may be used in conjunction with
this specification to distribute agents' public keys. The use of
ECC algorithms and keys within X.509 certificates is specified in
[PKI-ALG]. More details can be found in [SEC3].
7 SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC
A sending agent may choose to announce to receiving agents that it
supports one or more of the ECC algorithms in this document by
using the SMIMECapabilities signed attribute [MSG, Section 2.5.2].
The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for the ECDSA
signature algorithm is the SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field
containing the object identifier ecdsa-with-SHA1 with NULL
parameters.
The SMIMECapability capabilityID object identifiers for the
supported key agreement algorithms in this document are
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme,
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme, and
mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme. For each of these SMIMECapability
SEQUENCEs the parameters field is present and indicates the
supported key-encryption algorithm with the KeyWrapAlgorithm
algorithm identifier.
8 ASN.1 Syntax
The ASN.1 syntax that is used in this document is gathered together
in this section for reference purposes.
8.1 Algorithm identifiers
The algorithm identifiers used in this document are taken from
[X9.62] and [X9.63].
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The following object identifier indicates the hash algorithm used
in this document:
sha-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithm(2) 26 }
The following object identifier is used in this document to
indicate an elliptic curve public key:
id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-x9-62 keyType(2) 1 }
where
ansi-x9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
10045 }
When the object identifier id-ecPublicKey is used here with an
algorithm identifier, the associated parameters contain NULL.
The following object identifier indicates the digital signature
algorithm used in this document:
ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-x9-62 signatures(4)
1 }
When the object identifier ecdsa-with-SHA1 is used within an
algorithm identifier, the associated parameters field contains
NULL.
The following object identifiers indicate the key agreement
algorithms used in this document:
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 2}
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 3}
mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 16}
where
x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840)
x9-63(63) schemes(0) }
When the object identifiers are used here within an algorithm
identifier, the associated parameters field contains the CMS
KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier.
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8.2 Other syntax
The following additional syntax is used here.
When using ECDSA with SignedData, ECDSA signatures are encoded
using the type:
ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
r INTEGER,
s INTEGER }
ECDSA-Sig-Value is specified in [X9.62]. Within CMS,
ECDSA-Sig-Value is DER-encoded and placed within a signature field
of SignedData.
When using ECDH and ECMQV with EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData,
ephemeral and static public keys are encoded using the type
ECPoint.
ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING
When using ECQMV with EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData, the
sending agent's ephemeral public key and additional keying material
are encoded using the type:
MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey,
addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL }
The ECPoint syntax in used to represent the ephemeral public key
and placed in the ephemeralPublicKey field. The additional user
keying material is place in the addedukm field. Then the
MQVuserKeyingMaterial value is DER-encoded and placed within in a
ukm field of EnvelopedData or AuthenticatedData.
When using ECDH or ECMQV with EnvelopedData or AuthenticatedData,
the key-encryption keys are derived by using the type:
ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier,
entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING }
The fields of ECC-63-CMS-SharedInfo are as follows:
keyInfo contains the object identifier of the key-encryption
algorithm (used to wrap the CEK) and NULL parameters.
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entityUInfo optionally contains additional keying material
supplied by the sending agent. When used with ECDH and CMS, the
entityUInfo field contains the octet string ukm. When used with
ECMQV and CMS, the entityUInfo contains the octet string
addedukm (encoded in MQVuserKeyingMaterial).
suppPubInfo contains the length of the generated KEK, in bits,
represented as a 32 bit number, as in [CMS-DH]. (E.g. for 3DES
it would be 00 00 00 c0.)
Within CMS, ECC-CMS-SharedInfo is DER-encoded and used as input to
the key derivation function, as specified in [X9.63]. Note that
ECC-CMS-SharedInfo differs from the OtherInfo specified in
[CMS-DH]. Here a counter value is not included in the keyInfo
field because the key derivation function specified in [X9.63]
ensures that sufficient keying data is provided.
9 Summary
This document specifies how to use ECC algorithms with the S/MIME
CMS. Use of ECC algorithm within CMS can result in reduced
processing requirements for S/MIME agents, and reduced bandwidth
for CMS messages.
References
[X9.42] ANSI X9.42-xxxx, "Agreement Of Symmetric Keys Using
Diffie-Hellman and MQV Algorithms", American National
Standards Institute, 2000, Working draft.
[X9.62] ANSI X9.62-1999, "Public Key Cryptography For The
Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)", Americal
National Standards Institute, 1999.
[X9.63] ANSI X9.63-xzxx, "Public Key Cryptography For The
Financial Services Industry: Key Agreement and Key
Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography", American
National Standards Institute, 1999, Working draft.
[PKI-ALG] L. Bassham, R. Housley and W. Polk, "Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Representation of Public
Keys and Digital Signatures in Internet X.509 Public
Key Infrastructure Certificates", PKIX Working Group
Internet-Draft, July 2000.
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[BON] D. Boneh, "The Security of Multicast MAC",
Presentation at Selected Areas of Cryptography 2000,
Center for Applied Cryptographic Research, University
of Waterloo, 2000
[MUST] S. Bradner, "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.
[FIPS-180] FIPS 180-1, "Secure Hash Standard", National Institute
of Standards and Technology, April 17, 1995.
[FIPS-186-2] FIPS 186-2, "Digital Signature Standard", National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 15 February
2000.
[PKI] W. Ford, R. Housley, W. Polk and D. Solo, "Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL
Profile", PKIX Working Group Internet-Draft, July
2000.
[CMS] R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 2630,
June 1999.
[IEEE1363] IEEE P1363, "Standard Specifications for Public Key
Cryptography", Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, 2000.
[LMQSV] L. Law, A. Menezes, M. Qu, J. Solinas and S. Vanstone,
"An efficient protocol for authenticated key agreement",
Technical report CORR 98-05, University of Waterloo,
1998.
[REC-EC] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommended Elliptic Curves for Federal Government
Use", July, 1999. Available from:
<http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/>.
[CMS-KEA] J. Pawling, "CMS KEA and SKIPJACK Conventions", S/MIME
Working Group Internet-Draft, December, 1999.
[MSG] B. Ramsdell, "S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification",
RFC 2633, June 1999.
[CMS-DH] E. Rescorla, "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",
RFC 2631, June 1999.
[SEC1] SECG, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Standards for
Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000.
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[SEC2] SECG, "Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters",
Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000.
[SEC3] SECG, "ECC in X.509", Standards for Efficient
Cryptography Group, 2000.
Security Considerations
This specification is based on [CMS], [X9.62] and [X9.63] and the
appropriate security considerations of those documents apply.
Intellectual Property Rights
The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed
in regard to the specification contained in this document. For
more information, consult the online list of claimed rights
(http://www.ietf.org/ipr.html).
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the
IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of
claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances
of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made
to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification
can be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
Acknowledgments
The methods described in this document are based on work done by
the ANSI X9F1 working group. The authors wish to extend their
thanks to ANSI X9F1 for their assistance.
The authors also wish to thank Paul Lambert and Peter de Rooij for
their patient assistance.
Authors' Address
Simon Blake-Wilson
Certicom Corp
5520 Explorer Drive #400
Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1
EMail: sblakewi@certicom.com
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Daniel R. L. Brown
Certicom Corp
5520 Explorer Drive #400
Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1
EMail: dbrown@certicom.com
Full Copyright Statement
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