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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04                                                
S/MIME WG                                             Sean Turner, IECA
Internet Draft                                   Daniel Brown, Certicom
Intended Status: Informational                           April 22, 2008
Updates: 3278 (once approved)
Expires: October 22, 2008



       Update to Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms
                   in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
                  draft-ietf-smime-rfc3278-update-02.txt


Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 22, 2008.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

Abstract

   RFC 3278 describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
   public-key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).
   This document updates RFC 3278 to add support for the SHA2 family of
   hash algorithms.



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Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [MUST].

Discussion

   This draft is being discussed on the 'ietf-smime' mailing list. To
   subscribe, send a message to ietf-smime-request@imc.org with the
   single word subscribe in the body of the message. There is a Web site
   for the mailing list at <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/>.

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction...................................................2
   2. Updates to Paragraph 2.1.1.....................................3
   3. Updates to Paragraph 3.1.1.....................................4
   4. Updates to Paragraph 3.2.1.....................................4
   5. Updates to Paragraph 5.........................................5
   6. Updates to Paragraph 7.........................................5
   7. Updates to Paragraph 8.1.......................................9
   8. Updates to Paragraph 9........................................12
   9. Changes to Security Considerations............................13
   10. Add Annex A: ASN.1 Module....................................14
   11. Security Considerations......................................24
   12. IANA Considerations..........................................24
   13. References...................................................25
      13.1. Normative References....................................25
      13.2. Informative References..................................25

1. Introduction

   RFC 3278 describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
   public-key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).
   This document updates RFC 3278 to add support for the SHA2 family of
   hash algorithms.

   The following summarizes the changes:

    - Paragraph 2.1.1 limited the digest algorithm to SHA-1. This
      document expands the allowed algorithms to SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-
      384, and SHA-512.

    - Paragraph 3.1.1 used SHA1 in the KDF with ECDH std and cofactor
      methods.  This document expands the options to the allowed
      algorithms to SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.


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    - Paragraph 3.1.2 used SHA1 in the KDF with ECMQV. This document
      expands the options to the allowed algorithms to SHA-224, SHA-
      256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.

    - Paragraph 5 was update to include requirements for hash algorithms
      and recommendations for matching curves and hash algorithms. It
      also was expanded to indicate which ECDH and ECMQV variants are
      required.

    - Paragraph 7 was update to include S/MIME capabilities for ECDSA
      with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. It was also updated
      to include S/MIME capabilities for ECDH and ECMQV using SHA2
      algorithms as the KDF.

    - Paragraph 8.1 listed the algorithm identifiers for SHA-1 and SHA-1
      with ECDSA. This document adds algorithms for SHA-224, SHA-256,
      SHA-384, and SHA-512 and SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
      with ECDSA. This document also updates the list of algorithm
      identifiers for ECDH std, ECDH cofactor, and ECMQV with SHA2
      algorithms as the KDF.

    - Paragraph 9 references need to be updated.

    - Added ASN.1 module.

    - Security considerations paragraph referring to definitions of SHA-
      224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 needs to be deleted.

2. Updates to Paragraph 2.1.1

   Old:

      digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier sha-1 (see
      Section 8.1) which identifies the SHA-1 hash algorithm.

      signatureAlgorithm contains the algorithm identifier ecdsa-with-
      SHA1 (see Section 8.1) which identifies the ECDSA signature
      algorithm.

   New:

      digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash
      algorithm (see Section 8.1) which MUST be one of the following:
      id-sha1 identifies the SHA-1 hash algorithm, id-sha224 identifies
      the SHA-224 hash algorithm, id-sha256 identifies the SHA-256 hash
      algorithm, id-sha384 identifies the SHA-384 algorithm, and id-
      sha512 identifies the SHA-512 algorithm.


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      signatureAlgorithm contains the signature algorithm identifier
      (see Section 8.1): ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224, ecdsa-
      with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, or ecdsa-with-SHA512.

3. Updates to Paragraph 3.1.1

   Old:

     keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-
     scheme object identifier (see Section 8.1) if standard ECDH
     primitive is used, or the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme
     object identifier (see Section 8.1) if the cofactor ECDH primitive
     is used.  The parameters field contains KeyWrapAlgorithm.  The
     KeyWrapAlgorithm is the algorithm identifier that indicates the
     symmetric encryption algorithm used to encrypt the content-
     encryption key (CEK) with the key-encryption key (KEK).

   New:

     keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the key encryption algorithm
     object identifier (see Section 8.1).  The parameters field contains
     KeyWrapAlgorithm.  The KeyWrapAlgorithm is the algorithm identifier
     that indicates the symmetric encryption algorithm used to encrypt
     the content-encryption key (CEK) with the key-encryption key (KEK).
     Algorithm requirements are found in paragraph 5.

4. Updates to Paragraph 3.2.1

   Old:

     keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST be the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme
     algorithm identifier (see Section 8.1), with the parameters field
     KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm indicates the symmetric
     encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK generated
     using the 1-Pass ECMQV algorithm.

   New:

     keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST be the key encryption algorithm
     identifier (see Section 8.1), with the parameters field
     KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm indicates the symmetric
     encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK generated
     using the 1-Pass ECMQV algorithm. Algorithm requirements are found
     in paragraph 5.





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5. Updates to Paragraph 5

   Add the following to the end of the section:

      Implementations of this specification MUST implement the SHA-256
      hash algorithm. The SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-384, SHA-512 hash
      algorithms MAY be supported.

      When ECDSA, ECDH, or ECMQV is used, it is RECOMMENDED that the P-
      256 curve be used with SHA-256, the P-384 curve be used with SHA-
      384, and the P-521 curve be used with SHA-512.

      Implementations of this specification that support EnvelopedData
      with ephemeral-static ECDH standard primitive MUST support the
      dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme algorithm. They MUST also
      support the id-aes128-wrap algorithm.

      Implementations of this specification that support EnvelopedData
      with ephemeral-static ECDH cofactor primitive MUST support the
      dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme algorithm. They MUST
      also support the id-aes128-wrap algorithm.

      Implementations of this specification that support EnvelopedData
      with ECMQV MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme
      algorithm. They MUST also support the id-aes128-wrap algorithm.

      Implementations of this specification that support
      AuthenticatedData with ECMQV MUSt support the
      mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme algorithm. They MUST also support
      the id-aes128-wrap algorithm.

6. Updates to Paragraph 7

   Old:

      The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for the ECDSA
      signature algorithm is the SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field
      containing the object identifier ecdsa-with-SHA1 with NULL
      parameters.  The DER encoding is:

        30 0b 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 01 05 00

   New:

      The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for the ECDSA
      signature algorithm is the SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field
      containing the object identifiers ecdsa-with-SHA* object


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      identifiers (where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or 512) all with NULL
      parameters.  The DER encodings are:

        ecdsa-with-SHA1:   30 0b 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 01 05 00

        ecdsa-with-SHA224: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 01 05 00

        ecdsa-with-SHA256: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 02 05 00

        ecdsa-with-SHA384: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 03 05 00

        ecdsa-with-SHA512: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 04 05 00

   Old:

      The SMIMECapability capabilityID object identifiers for the
      supported key agreement algorithms in this document are
      dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-
      sha1kdf-scheme, and mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme.  For each of
      these SMIMECapability SEQUENCEs, the parameters field is present
      and indicates the supported key-encryption algorithm with the
      KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier.  The DER encodings that
      indicate capability of the three key agreement algorithms with
      CMS Triple-DES key wrap are:

        30 1c 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02 30 0f 06
        0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 05 00

      for ephemeral-static ECDH,

        30 1c 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03 30 0f 06
        0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 05 00

      for ephemeral-static ECDH with cofactor method, and

        30 1c 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10 30 0f 06
        0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 05 00

      for ECMQV.

   New:

      The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for the ECDH
      standard key agreement algorithm is the SEQUENCE with the
      capabilityID field containing the object identifier
      dhSingPass-stdDH-sha*kdf-scheme (where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or
      512) with the parameters present. The parameters indicate the


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      supported key-encryption algorithm with the KeyWrapAlgorithm
      algorithm identifier.  The DER encodings that indicate some
      capabilities are as follows (KA is key agreement, KDF is key
      derivation function, and Wrap is key wrap algorithm) and NOTE
      this is not a complete list:

      KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA1 Wrap=3DES

        30 1c
              06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02
              30 0f
                    06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06
                    05 00

      KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES128

        30 1a
              06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 TBD
              30 0f
                    06 09 60 83 48 01 65 03 04 01 05
                    05 00

      KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES256

        30 1a
              06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 TBD
              30 0f
                    06 09 60 83 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D
                    05 00

      The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for the ECDH
      cofactor key agreement algorithm is the SEQUENCE with the
      capabilityID field containing the object identifier
      dhSingPass-cofactorDH-sha*kdf-scheme (where * is 1, 224, 256,
      384, or 512) with the parameters present. The parameters indicate
      the supported key-encryption algorithm with the KeyWrapAlgorithm
      algorithm identifier.  The DER encodings that indicate some
      capabilities are as follows (KA is key agreement, KDF is key
      derivation function, and Wrap is key wrap algorithm) and NOTE
      this is not a complete list:









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      KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA256 Wrap=3DES

        30 1c
              06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03
              30 0f
                    06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06
                    05 00

      KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES128

        30 1a
              06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 TBD
              30 0f
                    06 09 60 83 48 01 65 03 04 01 05
                    05 00

      KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES256

        30 1a
              06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 TBD
              30 0f
                    06 09 60 83 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D
                    05 00

      The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for the 1-Pass
      ECMWV key agreement algorithm is the SEQUENCE with the
      capabilityID field containing the object identifier
      mqvSinglePass-sha*kdf-scheme (where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or
      512) with the parameters present. The parameters indicate the
      supported key-encryption algorithm with the KeyWrapAlgorithm
      algorithm identifier.  The DER encodings that indicate some
      capabilities are as follows (KA is key agreement, KDF is key
      derivation function, and Wrap is key wrap algorithm) and NOTE
      this is not a complete list:

      KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA256 Wrap=3DES

         30 1c
               06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10
               30 0f
                     06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06
                     05 00







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      KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES128

        30 1a
              06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 TBD
              30 0f
                    06 09 60 83 48 01 65 03 04 01 05
                    05 00

      KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES256

        30 1a
              06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 TBD
              30 0f
                    06 09 60 83 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D
                    05 00

7. Updates to Paragraph 8.1

   Old:

      The algorithm identifiers used in this document are taken from
      [X9.62], [SEC1] and [SEC2].

      The following object identifier indicates the hash algorithm used
      in this document:

        sha-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
        oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithm(2) 26 }

   New:

      The algorithm identifiers used in this document are taken from
      [SMIME-SHA2]

      The following object identifier indicates the hash algorithm used
      in this document:

        id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-
        organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithm(2) 26 }

        id-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
        country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
        nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 4 }

        id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
        country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
        nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 }


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        id-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
        country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
        nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 2 }

        id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
        country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
        nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 }

   Old:

      The following object identifier indicates the digital signature
      algorithm used in this document:

        ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-x9-62
        signatures(4) 1 }

      When the object identifier ecdsa-with-SHA1 is used within an
      algorithm identifier, the associated parameters field contains
      NULL.

   New:

      The following object identifier indicates the digital signature
      algorithm used in this document:

        ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-x9-62
        signatures(4) 1 }

        ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-x9-62
        signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 }

        ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-x9-62
        signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }

        ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-x9-62
        signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }

        ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-x9-62
        signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 }

      When the object identifiers ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224,
      ecdsa-with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, or ecdsa-with-SHA512 is
      used within an algorithm identifier, the associated parameters
      field contains NULL.





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   Old:

      The following object identifiers indicate the key agreement
      algorithms used in this document:

        dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
          x9-63-scheme 2}

        dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
          x9-63-scheme 3}

        mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
          x9-63-scheme 16}

      where

        x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
          identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840)
          x9-63(63) schemes(0) }

      When the object identifiers are used here within an algorithm
      identifier, the associated parameters field contains the CMS
      KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier.

   New:

      The following object identifiers indicate the key agreement
      algorithms used in this document:

        dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
          x9-63-scheme 2 }

        dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
          x9-63-scheme TBD }

        dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
          x9-63-scheme TBD }

        dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
          x9-63-scheme TBD }

        dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
          x9-63-scheme TBD }

        dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
          x9-63-scheme 3 }



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        dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
        { x9-63-scheme TBD }

        dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
        { x9-63-scheme TBD }

        dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
        { x9-63-scheme TBD }

        dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
        { x9-63-scheme TBD }

        mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
          x9-63-scheme 16 }

        mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
          x9-63-scheme TBD }

        mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
          x9-63-scheme TBD }

        mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
          x9-63-scheme TBD }

        mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
          x9-63-scheme TBD }

   where

      x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840)
        x9-63(63) schemes(0) }

      When the object identifiers are used here within an algorithm
      identifier, the associated parameters field contains the CMS
      KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier.

8. Updates to Paragraph 9

   Add the following reference:

      [SMIME-SHA2] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with
      Cryptographic Message Syntax", work-in-progress.






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   Update the following references:

   Old:

      [PKI-ALG] Bassham, L., Housley R. and W. Polk, "Algorithms and
      Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
      Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002.

      [FIPS-180] FIPS 180-1, "Secure Hash Standard", National Institute
      of Standards and Technology, April 17, 1995.

   New:

      [PKI-ALG] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and W.
      Polk," Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
      Information", work-in-progress.

      [FIPS] FIPS 180-2, "Secure Hash Standard", National Institute of
      Standards and Technology, August 1, 2002.

9. Changes to Security Considerations

   Delete the following:

      When 256, 384, and 512 bit hash functions succeed SHA-1 in future
      revisions of [FIPS], [FIPS-186-2], [X9.62] and [SEC1], then they
      can similarly succeed SHA-1 in a future revision of this
      document.





















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10. Add Annex A: ASN.1 Module

   Add the following section as Annex A ASN.1 Module.

   SMIMEECCAlgs-2008
     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
       smime(16) modules(0) TBD }

   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

   BEGIN

   -- EXPORTS ALL

   IMPORTS

   ALGORITHM, algorithmIdentifier, MessageDigestAlgorithms,
   SignatureAlgorithms
   ow-sha1, ow-sha224, ow-sha256, ow-sha384, ow-sha512,
   sa-ecdsaWithSHA1
     FROM PKIXAlgs-2008
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBD }

   id-aes128-CBC, id-aes192-CBC, id-aes256-CBC, AES-IV
   id-aes128-wrap, id-aes192-wrap, id-aes1256-wrap
     FROM CMSAesRsaesOaep
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
         smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(19) }

   id-aes128-CCM, id-aes192-CCM, id-aes256-CCM, CCMParameters
   id-aes128-GCM, id-aes192-GCM, id-aes256-GCM, GCMParameters
     FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
         smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(32) }

   OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial
     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
         smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }

   hMAC-SHA1, id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, CBCParameter
     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
         smime(16) modules(0) cmsalg-2001(16) }

   ;


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   -- Constrains the SignedData digestAlgorithms field
   -- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field
   -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm field

   MessageDigestAlgorithms ALGORITHM :: {
     ow-sha1   |
     ow-sha224 |
     ow-sha256 |
     ow-sha384 |
     ow-sha512,
     ... -- Extensible
   }

   -- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field

   SignatureAlgorithms ALGORITHM :: {
     sa-ecdsaWithSHA1   |
     sa-ecdsaWithSHA224 |
     sa-ecdsaWithSHA256 |
     sa-ecdsaWithSHA384 |
     sa-ecdsaWithSHA512 ,
     ... -- Extensible
   }

   sa-ecdsa-with-SHA224 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID ecdsa-with-SHA224 PARMS NULL }

   ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
     ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 }

   sa-ecdsa-with-SHA256 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID ecdsa-with-SHA256 PARMS NULL }

   ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
     ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }

   sa-ecdsa-with-SHA384 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID ecdsa-with-SHA384 PARMS NULL }

   ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
     ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }

   sa-ecdsa-with-SHA512 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID ecdsa-with-SHA512 PARMS NULL }


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   ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
     ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 }

   -- ECDSA Signature Value
   -- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING

   ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
     r  INTEGER,
     s  INTEGER
   }

   -- Constrains the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
   -- keyEncryption Algorithm field
   -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData RecipientInfo
   -- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field
   -- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData RecipientInfo
   -- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field

   -- DH variants are not used with AuthenticatedData or
   -- AuthEnvelopedData

   KeyAgreementAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
     kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf        |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf      |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf      |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf      |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf      |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf   |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf |
     kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf             |
     kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf           |
     kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf           |
     kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf           |
     kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf,
     ... -- Extensible
   }

   x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840)
     x9-63(63) schemes(0) }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }


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   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme 2 }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme TBD }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme TBD }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme TBD }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme TBD }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme 3 }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme
    PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme TBD }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme
    PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme TBD }



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   kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme
    PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme TBD }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme
    PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme TBD }

   kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme 16 }

   kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme TBD }

   kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme TBD }

   kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme TBD }

   kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme TBD }






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   KeyWrapAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
     kwa-3des   |
     kwa-aes128 |
     kwa-aes192 |
     kwa-aes256,
     ... -- Extensible
   }

   kwa-3des ALGORITHM :: = {
     OID id-alg-CMS3DESwrap PARMS NULL }

   kwa-aes128 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes128-wrap PARMS ABSENT }

   kwa-aes192 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes192-wrap PARMS ABSENT }

   kwa-aes256 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes256-wrap PARMS ABSENT }

   -- Constrains the EnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo encryptedContent
   -- field

   ContentEncryptionAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
     cea-des-ede3-cbc |
     cea-aes128-cbc   |
     cea-aes192-cbc   |
     cea-aes256-cbc   |
     cea-aes128-ccm   |
     cea-aes192-ccm   |
     cea-aes256-ccm   |
     cea-aes128-gcm   |
     cea-aes128-gcm   |
     cea-aes128-gcm,
     ... -- Extensible
     }

   cea-des-ede3-cbc ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID des-ede3-cbc PARMS CBCParameter }

   cea-aes128-cbc ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes128-CBC PARMS AES-IV }

   cea-aes192-cbc ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes192-CBC PARMS AES-IV }




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   cea-aes256-cbc ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes256-CBC PARMS AES-IV }

   cea-aes128-ccm ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes128-CCM PARMS CCMParameters }

   cea-aes192-ccm ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes192-CCM PARMS CCMParameters }

   cea-aes256-ccm ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes256-CCM PARMS CCMParameters }

   cea-aes128-gcm ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes128-GCM PARMS GCMParameters }

   cea-aes192-gcm ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes192-GCM PARMS GCMParameters }

   cea-aes256-gcm ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes256-GCM PARMS GCMParameters }

   -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData
   -- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field
   -- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData
   -- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field

   MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
     maca-sha1   |
     maca-sha224 |
     maca-sha256 |
     maca-sha384 |
     maca-sha512,
     ... -- Extensible
   }

   maca-sha1 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID hMAC-SHA1 PARMS NULL }

   maca-sha224 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-hmacWithSHA224 PARMS NULL }

   -- Would love to import the HMAC224-512 OIDS but they're not in a
   -- module (that I could find)

   id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) rsadsi(2) 8 }



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   maca-sha256 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-hmacWithSHA256 PARMS NULL }

   id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) rsadsi(2) 9 }

   maca-sha384 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-hmacWithSHA384 PARMS NULL }

   id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) rsadsi(2) 10 }

   maca-sha512 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-hmacWithSHA512 PARMS NULL }

   id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) rsadsi(2) 11 }

   -- Constraints on KeyAgreeRecipientInfo OriginatorIdentifierOrKey
   -- OriginatorPublicKey algorithm field

   -- PARMS are NULL

   OriginatorPKAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
     opka-ec,
     ... -- Extensible
   }

   opka-ec AGLORITHM ::={
     OID id-ecPublicKey PARMS NULL }

   -- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys

   ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING

   -- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with
   -- ECDH or ECmqv

   MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
     ephemeralPublicKey       OriginatorPublicKey,
     addedukm             [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL
   }







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   -- Format for ECDH and ECMQV key-encryption keys when using
   -- EnvelopedData or AuthenticatedData

   ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
     keyInfo         AlgorithmIdentifier { KeyWrapAlgorithms },
     entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
     suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
   }

   SMIME-CAPS ::= CLASS {
     &Type  OPTIONAL,
     &id    OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE
   }
   WITH SYNTAX {TYPE &Type IDENTIFIED BY &id }

   SMIMECapability ::= SEQUENCE {
     capabilityID  SMIME-CAPS.&id({SMimeCapsSet}),
     parameters    SMIME-CAPS.
                     &Type({SMimeCapsSet}{@capabilityID}) OPTIONAL
   }

   SMimeCapsSet SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     cap-ecdsa-with-SHA1                   |
     cap-ecdsa-with-SHA224                 |
     cap-ecdsa-with-SHA256                 |
     cap-ecdsa-with-SHA384                 |
     cap-ecdsa-with-SHA512                 |
     cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf        |
     cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf      |
     cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf      |
     cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf      |
     cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf      |
     cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf   |
     cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf |
     cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf |
     cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf |
     cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf |
     cap-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf             |
     cap-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf           |
     cap-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf           |
     cap-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf           |
     cap-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf,
     ... -- Extensible
   }

   cap-ecdsa-with-SHA1 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA1 }


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   cap-ecdsa-with-SHA224 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA224 }

   cap-ecdsa-with-SHA256 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA256 }

   cap-ecdsa-with-SHA384 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA384 }

   cap-ecdsa-with-SHA512 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA512 }

   cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms
     IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms
     IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms
     IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms
     IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms
     IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf }



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   cap-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf }

   cap-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf }

   cap-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf }

   cap-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf }

   cap-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf }

   END

11. Security Considerations

   No new security considerations to those already specified in
   [RFC3278], [SMIME-SHA2], and [PKI-ALG].

12. IANA Considerations

   None: All identifiers are already registered.  Please remove this
   section prior to publication as an RFC.























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13. References

13.1. Normative References

   [MUST]        Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
                 Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997.

   [PKI-ALG]     Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and W.
                 Polk, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
                 Information", work-in-progress.

   [SMIME-SHA2]  Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic
                 Message Syntax", work-in-progress.

   [RFC3278]     Blake-Wilson, S., Brown, D., and P. Lambert, "Use of
                 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in
                 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3278, April
                 2002.

13.2. Informative References

   None.



























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Author's Addresses

   Sean Turner

   IECA, Inc.
   3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
   Fairfax, VA 22031
   USA

   Email: turners@ieca.com

   Daniel R. L. Brown

   Certicom Corp
   5520 Explorer Drive #400
   Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1
   CANADA

   Email: dbrown@certicom.com






























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Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
   THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
   OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
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   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

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Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).





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