Network Working Group S. Kitterman
Internet-Draft Kitterman Technical Services
Obsoletes: 4408 (if approved) January 15, 2013
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: July 19, 2013
Sender Policy Framework (SPF) for Authorizing Use of Domains in Email,
Version 1
draft-ietf-spfbis-4408bis-09.txt
Abstract
Email on the Internet can be forged in a number of ways. In
particular, existing protocols place no restriction on what a sending
host can use as the "MAIL FROM" of a message or the domain given on
the SMTP HELO/EHLO commands. This document describes version 1 of
the Sender Policy Framework (SPF) protocol, whereby an ADMD can
explicitly authorize the hosts that are allowed to use its domain
names, and a receiving host can check such authorization.
This document obsoletes RFC4408.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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This Internet-Draft will expire on July 19, 2013.
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document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1.1. Keywords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1.2. Imported Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1.3. MAIL FROM Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.1.4. HELO Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.1.5. Deprecated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. Operational Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1. The "HELO" Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2. The "MAIL FROM" Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3. Publishing Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4. Checking Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.5. Location of Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.6. Results of Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.6.1. None . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6.2. Neutral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6.3. Pass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6.4. Fail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6.5. Softfail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6.6. Temperror . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6.7. Permerror . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. SPF Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1. DNS Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2. Multiple DNS Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3. Multiple Strings in a Single DNS record . . . . . . . . . 13
3.4. Record Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.5. Wildcard Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. The check_host() Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.1. Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.3. Initial Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.4. Record Lookup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.5. Selecting Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.6. Record Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.6.1. Term Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.6.2. Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.6.3. Modifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.6.4. DNS Lookup Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.7. Default Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.8. Domain Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5. Mechanism Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1. "all" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.2. "include" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.3. "a" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.4. "mx" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.5. "ptr" (deprecated) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
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5.6. "ip4" and "ip6" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.7. "exists" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6. Modifier Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.1. redirect: Redirected Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.2. exp: Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7. Macros . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.1. Macro Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.2. Expansion Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8. Result Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
8.1. None . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
8.2. Neutral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
8.3. Pass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
8.4. Fail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
8.5. Softfail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
8.6. Temperror . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
8.7. Permerror . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
9. Recording The Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
9.1. The Received-SPF Header Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
9.2. SPF Results in the Authentication-Results Header Field . . 41
10. Effects on Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
10.1. Sending Domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
10.1.1. DNS Resource Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
10.1.2. Administrator's Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
10.1.3. Bounces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
10.2. Receivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
10.3. Mediators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
10.3.1. Mailing Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
10.3.2. Forwarding Services and Aliases . . . . . . . . . . . 46
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
11.1. Processing Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
11.2. SPF-Authorized Email May Contain Other False Identities . 47
11.3. Spoofed DNS and IP Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
11.4. Cross-User Forgery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
11.5. Untrusted Information Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
11.5.1. Recorded Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
11.5.2. External Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
11.5.3. Macro Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
11.6. Privacy Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
12. Contributors and Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
13.1. The SPF DNS Record Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
13.2. The Received-SPF Mail Header Field . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
13.3. SPF Modifier Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Appendix A. Collected ABNF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Appendix B. Extended Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
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B.1. Simple Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
B.2. Multiple Domain Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
B.3. DNSBL Style Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
B.4. Multiple Requirements Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Appendix C. Further Testing Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Appendix D. Updating Mail Forwarders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Appendix E. Mail Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Appendix F. MTA Relays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Appendix G. Local Policy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
G.1. Policy For SPF Pass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
G.2. Policy For SPF Fail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
G.3. Policy For SPF Permerror . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Appendix H. Protocol Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Appendix I. Experimental History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Appendix J. Change History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
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1. Introduction
The current email infrastructure has the property that any host
injecting mail into the system can use any DNS domain name it wants
in each of the various identifiers specified by [RFC5321] and
[RFC5322]. Although this feature is desirable in some circumstances,
it is a major obstacle to reducing Unsolicited Bulk Email (UBE, aka
spam). Furthermore, many domain owning ADMDs (ADministrative
Management Domains, see [RFC5598]) are understandably concerned about
the ease with which other entities can make use of their domain
names, often with malicious intent.
This document defines a protocol by which ADMDs can authorize hosts
to use their domain names in the "MAIL FROM" or "HELO" identities.
Compliant ADMDs publish Sender Policy Framework (SPF) records in the
DNS specifying which hosts are permitted to use their names, and
compliant mail receivers use the published SPF records to test the
authorization of sending Mail Transfer Agents (MTAs) using a given
"HELO" or "MAIL FROM" identity during a mail transaction.
An additional benefit to mail receivers is that after the use of an
identity is verified, local policy decisions about the mail can be
made based on the sender's domain, rather than the host's IP address.
This is advantageous because reputation of domain names is likely to
be more accurate than reputation of host IP addresses. Furthermore,
if a claimed identity fails verification, local policy can take
stronger action against such email, such as rejecting it.
1.1. Terminology
1.1.1. Keywords
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
1.1.2. Imported Definitions
The ABNF tokens "ALPHA", "DIGIT", and "SP" are defined in [RFC5234].
The token "local-part" is defined in [RFC5321].
"dot-atom", "quoted-string", "comment", "CFWS", "FWS", and "CRLF" are
defined in [RFC5322].
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1.1.3. MAIL FROM Definition
This document is concerned with the portion of a mail message
commonly called "envelope sender", "return path", "reverse path",
"bounce address", "5321 FROM", "MAIL FROM", or RFC5321.MailFrom.
Since these terms are either not well defined or often used casually,
this document uses "MAIL FROM" for consistency. This means the
RFC5321.MailFrom as defined in [RFC5598]. Note that other terms that
might superficially look like the common terms, such as "reverse-
path", are used only with the defined meanings from normative
documents.
1.1.4. HELO Definition
This document also makes use of the HELO/EHLO identity. The "HELO"
identity derives from either the SMTP HELO or EHLO command (see
[RFC5321]). Since HELO and EHLO can, in many cases, be used
interchangeably, they are identified commonly as "HELO" in this
document. This means RFC5321.HELO/.EHLO as defined in [RFC5598].
These commands supply the identity of the SMTP client (sending host)
for the SMTP session.
1.1.5. Deprecated
There are [RFC4408] features that are marked "deprecated". In the
context of this document, deprecated means that senders SHOULD NOT
publish SPF records that make use of such features because they might
be removed entirely in future updates to the protocol. Such features
do, however, remain part of the SPF protocol and receiving systems
MUST support them unless this document explicitly says otherwise.
[List of deprecated features to be added here]
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2. Operational Overview
2.1. The "HELO" Identity
It is RECOMMENDED that SPF verifiers not only check the "MAIL FROM"
identity, but also separately check the "HELO" identity by applying
the check_host() function (Section 4) to the "HELO" identity as the
<sender>. Checking "HELO" promotes consistency of results and can
reduce DNS resource usage. Additionally, since SPF records published
for "HELO" identities refer to a single host, when available, they
are a very reliable source of host authorization status.
Note that requirements for the domain presented in the EHLO or HELO
command are not always clear to the sending party, and SPF verifiers
MUST be prepared for the "HELO" identity to be malformed or an IP
address literal. This SPF check can only be performed when the
"HELO" string is a valid fully qualified domain.
2.2. The "MAIL FROM" Identity
SPF verifiers MUST check the ""MAIL FROM" identity if a completed
"HELO" check has not reached a definitive policy result by applying
the check_host() function to the "MAIL FROM" identity as the
<sender>.
[RFC5321] allows the reverse-path to be null (see Section 4.5.5 in
[RFC5321]). In this case, there is no explicit sender mailbox, and
such a message can be assumed to be a notification message from the
mail system itself. When the reverse-path is null, this document
defines the "MAIL FROM" identity to be the mailbox composed of the
local-part "postmaster" and the "HELO" identity (which might or might
not have been checked separately before).
2.3. Publishing Authorization
An SPF-compliant domain MUST have valid SPF records as described in
Section 3. These records authorize the use of the relevant domain
names in the "HELO" and "MAIL FROM" identities by the MTAs specified
therein.
SPF results can be used to make both positive (source is authorized)
and negative (source is not authorized) determinations. If domain
owners choose to publish SPF records and want to support receivers
making negative authorization determinations, then they MUST publish
records that end in "-all", or redirect to other records that do,
otherwise, no definitive determination of authorization can be made.
Potential issues and mitigations associated with negative
determinations are discussed in Section 10.
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ADMDs can publish SPF records that explicitly authorize no hosts for
domain names that are neither used in the domain part of email
addresses nor expected to originate mail.
When changing SPF records, care has to be taken to ensure that there
is a transition period so that the old policy remains valid until all
legitimate email can reasonably expect to have been checked. This
can be as much as 30 days.
2.4. Checking Authorization
A mail receiver can perform a set of SPF checks for each mail message
it receives. An SPF check tests the authorization of a client host
to emit mail with a given identity. Typically, such checks are done
by a receiving MTA, but can be performed elsewhere in the mail
processing chain so long as the required information is available and
reliable. At least the "MAIL FROM" identity MUST be checked, but it
is RECOMMENDED that the "HELO" identity also be checked beforehand.
Without explicit approval of the domain owner, checking other
identities against SPF version 1 records is NOT RECOMMENDED because
there are cases that are known to give incorrect results. For
example, almost all mailing lists rewrite the "MAIL FROM" identity
(see Section 10.3.1), but some do not change any other identities in
the message. The scenario described in Section 10.3.2, sub-section
1.2, is another example. Documents that define other identities will
have to define the method for explicit approval.
It is possible that mail receivers will use the SPF check as part of
a larger set of tests on incoming mail. The results of other tests
might influence whether or not a particular SPF check is performed.
For example, finding the sending host's IP address on a local white
list might cause all other tests to be skipped and all mail from that
host to be accepted.
When a mail receiver decides to perform an SPF check, it MUST use a
correctly-implemented check_host() function (Section 4) evaluated
with the correct parameters. Although the test as a whole is
optional, once it has been decided to perform a test it has to be
performed as specified so that the correct semantics are preserved
between publisher and receiver.
To make the test, the mail receiver MUST evaluate the check_host()
function with the arguments set as follows:
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<ip> - the IP address of the SMTP client that is emitting the
mail, either IPv4 or IPv6.
<domain> - the domain portion of the "MAIL FROM" or "HELO" identity.
<sender> - the "MAIL FROM" or "HELO" identity.
Although invalid, malformed, or non-existent domains cause SPF checks
to return "none" because no SPF record can be found, it has long been
the policy of many MTAs to reject email from such domains, especially
in the case of invalid "MAIL FROM". Rejecting email will prevent one
method of circumventing of SPF records.
Implementations have to take care to correctly extract the <domain>
from the data given with the SMTP MAIL FROM command as many MTAs will
still accept such things as source routes (see [RFC5321], Appendix
C), the %-hack (see [RFC1123]), and bang paths (see [RFC1983]).
These archaic features have been maliciously used to bypass security
systems.
2.5. Location of Checks
The authorization check SHOULD be performed during the processing of
the SMTP transaction that sends the mail. This reduces the
complexity of determining the correct IP address to use as an input
to check_host() and allows errors to be returned directly to the
sending MTA by way of SMTP replies.
Performing the authorization other than using the return-path and
client address at the time of the MAIL command during the SMTP
transaction can cause problems, such as the following: (1) It might
be difficult to accurately extract the required information from
potentially deceptive headers; (2) legitimate email might fail
because the sender's policy had since changed.
Generating non-delivery notifications to forged identities that have
failed the authorization check is a source of backscatter and SHOULD
be avoided. Section 2 of [RFC3834] describes backscatter and the
problems it causes.
2.6. Results of Evaluation
Section 4 defines check_host(), a model function definition that uses
the inputs defined above and the sender's policy published in the DNS
to reach a conclusion about client authorization. An SPF verifier
implements something semantically identical to the function defined
there.
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This section enumerates and briefly defines the possible outputs of
that function. Information about how to handle these outputs is in
Section 8.
2.6.1. None
A result of "none" means either (a) no syntactically valid DNS domain
name was extracted from the SMTP session that could be used as the
one to be authorized, or (b) no TXT records were retrieved from the
DNS that appeared to be intended for use by SPF verifiers.
2.6.2. Neutral
The domain owner has explicitly stated that it is not asserting
whether the IP address is authorized. This result MUST be treated
exactly like the "none" result; the distinction exists only for
informational purposes.
2.6.3. Pass
A "pass" result means that the client is authorized to inject mail
with the given identity. The domain can now, in the sense of
reputation, be considered responsible for sending the message.
Further policy checks can now proceed with confidence in the
legitimate use of the identity. This is further discussed in
Appendix G.1.
2.6.4. Fail
A "fail" result is an explicit statement that the client is not
authorized to use the domain in the given identity.
2.6.5. Softfail
The domain owner has published a weak statement that the host is
probably not authorized. It has not published a stronger, more
definitive policy that results in a "fail"
2.6.6. Temperror
A "temperror" result means the SPF verifier encountered a transient
(generally DNS) error while performing the check.
2.6.7. Permerror
A "permerror" result means the domain's published records could not
be correctly interpreted. This signals an error condition that
definitely requires manual intervention to be resolved.
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3. SPF Records
An SPF record is a DNS record that declares which hosts are, and are
not, authorized to use a domain name for the "HELO" and "MAIL FROM"
identities. Loosely, the record partitions all hosts into permitted
and not-permitted sets (though some hosts might fall into neither
category).
The SPF record is a single string of text. The record format is
described below in Section 4. An example record is the following:
v=spf1 +mx a:colo.example.com/28 -all
This record has a version of "spf1" and three directives: "+mx",
"a:colo.example.com/28" (the + is implied), and "-all".
Each SPF record is placed in the DNS tree at the host name it
pertains to, not a subdomain under it, such as is done with SRV
records [RFC2782].
The example in this section might be published via these lines in a
domain zone file:
example.com. TXT "v=spf1 +mx a:colo.example.com/28 -all"
smtp-out.example.com. TXT "v=spf1 a -all"
Since TXT records have multiple uses, beware of other TXT records
published there for other purposes. They might cause problems with
size limits (see Section 3.4) and care has to be taken to ensure only
SPF records are used for SPF processing.
ADMDs publishing SPF records SHOULD try to keep the number of
"include" mechanisms and chained "redirect" modifiers to a minimum.
ADMDs SHOULD also try to minimize the amount of other DNS information
needed to evaluate a record. Section 4.6.4 and Section 10.1.1
provide some suggestions on how to achieve this.
3.1. DNS Resource Records
SPF records MUST be published as a DNS TXT (type 16) Resource Record
(RR) [RFC1035] only. The character content of the record is encoded
as [US-ASCII]. Use of alternate DNS RR types was supported in SPF's
experimental phase, but has been discontinued. See Appendix A of
[RFC6686] for further information.
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3.2. Multiple DNS Records
A domain name MUST NOT have multiple records that would cause an
authorization check to select more than one record. See Section 4.5
for the selection rules.
3.3. Multiple Strings in a Single DNS record
As defined in [RFC1035] sections 3.3.14 and 3.3, a single text DNS
record can be composed of more than one string. If a published
record contains multiple character-strings, then the record MUST be
treated as if those strings are concatenated together without adding
spaces. For example:
IN TXT "v=spf1 .... first" "second string..."
MUST be treated as equivalent to:
IN TXT "v=spf1 .... firstsecond string..."
TXT records containing multiple strings are useful in constructing
records that would exceed the 255-byte maximum length of a character-
string within a single TXT record.
3.4. Record Size
The published SPF record for a given domain name SHOULD remain small
enough that the results of a query for it will fit within 512 octets.
This UDP limit is defined in [RFC1035] section 2.3.4. This will keep
even older DNS implementations from falling over to TCP. Since the
answer size is dependent on many things outside the scope of this
document, it is only possible to give this guideline: If the combined
length of the DNS name and the text of all the records of a given
type is under 450 characters, then DNS answers ought to fit in UDP
packets. Note that when computing the sizes for queries of the TXT
format, one has to take into account any other TXT records published
at the domain name. Records that are too long to fit in a single UDP
packet could be silently ignored by SPF verifiers due to firewall and
other issues that cause DNS over TCP to be less reliable than DNS
over UDP.
3.5. Wildcard Records
Use of wildcard records for publishing is discouraged and care has to
be taken if they are used. If a zone includes wildcard MX records,
it might want to publish wildcard declarations, subject to the same
requirements and problems. In particular, the declaration MUST be
repeated for any host that has any RR records at all, and for
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subdomains thereof. Consider the example in [RFC1034], Section
4.3.3. Based on that, we can do the following:
EXAMPLE.COM. MX 10 A.EXAMPLE.COM
EXAMPLE.COM. TXT "v=spf1 a:A.EXAMPLE.COM -all"
*.EXAMPLE.COM. MX 10 A.EXAMPLE.COM
*.EXAMPLE.COM. TXT "v=spf1 a:A.EXAMPLE.COM -all"
A.EXAMPLE.COM. A 203.0.113.1
A.EXAMPLE.COM. MX 10 A.EXAMPLE.COM
A.EXAMPLE.COM. TXT "v=spf1 a:A.EXAMPLE.COM -all"
*.A.EXAMPLE.COM. MX 10 A.EXAMPLE.COM
*.A.EXAMPLE.COM. TXT "v=spf1 a:A.EXAMPLE.COM -all"
SPF records have to be listed twice for every name within the zone:
once for the name, and once with a wildcard to cover the tree under
the name, in order to cover all domains in use in outgoing mail.
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4. The check_host() Function
This description is not an API (Application Program Interface)
definition, but rather a function description used to illustrate the
algorithm. A compliant SPF implementation MUST do something
semantically equivalent to this description.
The check_host() function fetches SPF records, parses them, and
evaluates them to determine whether a particular host is or is not
permitted to send mail with a given identity. Mail receivers that
perform this check MUST correctly evaluate the check_host() function
as described here.
Implementations MAY use a different algorithm than the canonical
algorithm defined here, so long as the results are the same in all
cases.
4.1. Arguments
The check_host() function takes these arguments:
<ip> - the IP address of the SMTP client that is emitting the
mail, either IPv4 or IPv6.
<domain> - the domain that provides the sought-after authorization
information; initially, the domain portion of the "MAIL
FROM" or "HELO" identity.
<sender> - the "MAIL FROM" or "HELO" identity.
For recursive evaluations, the domain portion of <sender> might not
be the same as the <domain> argument when check_host() is initially
evaluated. In most other cases it will be the same. (See
Section 5.2 below).
Note that the <domain> argument might not be a well-formed domain
name. For example, if the reverse-path was null, then the EHLO/HELO
domain is used, with its associated problems (see Section 2.1). In
these cases, check_host() is defined in Section 4.3 to return a
"none" result.
4.2. Results
The function check_host() can return one of several results described
in Section 2.6. Based on the result, the action to be taken is
determined by the local policies of the receiver. This is discussed
in Section 8.
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4.3. Initial Processing
If the <domain> is malformed (e.g. label longer than 63 characters,
zero-length label not at the end, etc.) or is not a fully qualified
domain name, or if the DNS lookup returns "domain does not exist"
(RCODE 3), check_host() immediately returns the result "none".
Properly formed domains are fully qualified email domains as
described in [RFC5321] Section 2.3.5. Internationalized domain names
MUST be encoded as A-labels, as described in Section 2.3 of
[RFC5890].on 2.3 of [RFC5890].
If the <sender> has no local-part, substitute the string "postmaster"
for the local-part.
4.4. Record Lookup
In accordance with how the records are published (see Section 3
above), a DNS query needs to be made for the <domain> name, querying
for type TXT only.
If all DNS lookups that are made return a server failure (RCODE 2),
or other error (RCODE other than 0 or 3), or time out, then
check_host() terminates immediately with the result "temperror".
Alternatively, for a server failure (RCODE 2) result, check_host()
MAY track failures and treat multiple failures within 24 hours for
the same domain as "permerror".
This alternative is intended to shorten the queue time of messages
that cannot be accepted, by returning a permanent negative completion
reply code to the client, instead of a transient one. [RFC2308]
suggests on an algorithm for doing such tracking and handling of
server failure codes.
4.5. Selecting Records
Records begin with a version section:
record = version terms *SP
version = "v=spf1"
Starting with the set of records that were returned by the lookup,
discard records that do not begin with a version section of exactly
"v=spf1". Note that the version section is terminated either by an
SP character or the end of the record. A record with a version
section of "v=spf10" does not match and MUST be discarded.
If the resultant record set includes no records, check_host()
produces the "none" result. If the resultant record set includes
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more than one record, check_host() produces the "permerror" result.
4.6. Record Evaluation
The check_host() function parses and interprets the SPF record to
find a result for the current test. If there are any syntax errors,
check_host() returns immediately with the result "permerror".
Implementations MAY choose to parse the entire record first and
return "permerror" if the record is not syntactically well formed.
However, in all cases, any syntax errors anywhere in the record MUST
be detected.
4.6.1. Term Evaluation
There are two types of terms: mechanisms and modifiers. A record
contains an ordered list of these as specified in the following
Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF).
terms = *( 1*SP ( directive / modifier ) )
directive = [ qualifier ] mechanism
qualifier = "+" / "-" / "?" / "~"
mechanism = ( all / include
/ A / MX / PTR / IP4 / IP6 / exists )
modifier = redirect / explanation / unknown-modifier
unknown-modifier = name "=" macro-string
; where name is not any known modifier
name = ALPHA *( ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "_" / "." )
Most mechanisms allow a ":" or "/" character after the name.
Modifiers always contain an equals ('=') character immediately after
the name, and before any ":" or "/" characters that might be part of
the macro-string.
Terms that do not contain any of "=", ":", or "/" are mechanisms, as
defined in Section 5.
As per the definition of the ABNF notation in [RFC5234], mechanism
and modifier names are case-insensitive.
4.6.2. Mechanisms
Each mechanism is considered in turn from left to right. If there
are no more mechanisms, the result is specified in Section 4.7.
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When a mechanism is evaluated, one of three things can happen: it can
match, not match, or return an exception.
If it matches, processing ends and the qualifier value is returned as
the result of that record. If it does not match, processing
continues with the next mechanism. If it returns an exception,
mechanism processing ends and the exception value is returned.
The possible qualifiers, and the results they cause check_host() to
return are as follows:
"+" pass
"-" fail
"~" softfail
"?" neutral
The qualifier is optional and defaults to "+".
When a mechanism matches and the qualifier is "-", then a "fail"
result is returned and the explanation string is computed as
described in Section 6.2.
The specific mechanisms are described in Section 5.
4.6.3. Modifiers
Modifiers are not mechanisms. They do not return match or not-match.
Instead, they provide additional information. Although modifiers do
not directly affect the evaluation of the record, the "redirect"
modifier has an effect after all the mechanisms have been evaluated.
4.6.4. DNS Lookup Limits
SPF implementations MUST limit the number of mechanisms and modifiers
("terms") that cause any DNS query to at most 10 during SPF
evaluation. Specifically, the "include", "a", "mx", "ptr", and
"exists" mechanisms as well as the "redirect" modifier count against
this limit. The "all", "ip4", and "ip6" mechanisms do not count
against this limit. If this number is exceeded during a check, a
permerror MUST be returned. The "exp" modifier does not count
against this limit because the DNS lookup to fetch the explanation
string occurs after the SPF record evaluation has been completed.
When evaluating the "mx" and "ptr" mechanisms, or the %{p} macro,
there MUST be a limit of no more than 10 MX or PTR RRs looked up and
checked. If more than 10 "mx" or "ptr" records are returned for this
further lookup, a permerror MUST be returned. This limit is per
mechanism or macro in the record and in addition to the lookup limits
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above.
MTAs or other processors SHOULD impose a limit on the maximum amount
of elapsed time to evaluate check_host(). Such a limit SHOULD allow
at least 20 seconds. If such a limit is exceeded, the result of
authorization SHOULD be "temperror".
4.7. Default Result
If none of the mechanisms match and there is no "redirect" modifier,
then the check_host() returns a result of "neutral", just as if
"?all" were specified as the last directive. If there is a
"redirect" modifier, check_host() proceeds as defined in Section 6.1.
Note that records SHOULD always use either a "redirect" modifier or
an "all" mechanism to explicitly terminate processing. Although the
latter has default (specifically "?all"), it aids debugging efforts
if it is explicitly included.
For example:
v=spf1 +mx -all
or
v=spf1 +mx redirect=_spf.example.com
4.8. Domain Specification
Several of these mechanisms and modifiers have a domain-spec section.
The domain-spec string is subject to macro expansion (see Section 7).
The resulting string is the common presentation form of a fully-
qualified DNS name: a series of labels separated by periods. This
domain is called the <target-name> in the rest of this document.
Note: The result of the macro expansion is not subject to any further
escaping. Hence, this facility cannot produce all characters that
are legal in a DNS label (e.g., the control characters). However,
this facility is powerful enough to express legal host names and
common utility labels (such as "_spf") that are used in DNS.
For several mechanisms, the <domain-spec> is optional. If it is not
provided, the <domain> is used as the <target-name>. Domain and
domain-spec are syntactically identical after macro expansion.
Domain is an input value for check_host() while domain-spec is
computed by check_host().
Note: Historically, this document has made no provisions for how to
handle domain-specs, or macro-expansions thereof, that are
syntactically invalid per [RFC1035], such as names with empty labels
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(e.g., "foo..example.com") or overlong labels (more than 63
characters). Some implementations choose to treat as a no-match
mechanisms, and ignore modifiers, with such names, whereas others
return a "permerror" exception. The outcome for an unexpected
domain-spec without macros might even differ from that for an
unexpected target-name after macro expansion.
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5. Mechanism Definitions
This section defines two types of mechanisms.
Basic mechanisms contribute to the language framework. They do not
specify a particular type of authorization scheme.
all
include
Designated sender mechanisms are used to designate a set of <ip>
addresses as being permitted or not permitted to use the <domain> for
sending mail.
a
mx
ptr (deprecated)
ip4
ip6
exists
The following conventions apply to all mechanisms that perform a
comparison between <ip> and an IP address at any point:
If no CIDR prefix length is given in the directive, then <ip> and the
IP address are compared for equality. (Here, CIDR is Classless
Inter-Domain Routing, described in [RFC4632].)
If a CIDR prefix length is specified, then only the specified number
of high-order bits of <ip> and the IP address are compared for
equality.
When any mechanism fetches host addresses to compare with <ip>, when
<ip> is an IPv4 address, A records are fetched; when <ip> is an IPv6
address, AAAA records are fetched. Even if the SMTP connection uses
IPv6, an IPv4-mapped IPv6 IP address (see [RFC4291], Section 2.5.5)
MUST still be considered an IPv4 address and MUST be evaluated using
IPv4 mechanisms (i.e. "ip4" and "a").
Several mechanisms rely on information fetched from the DNS. For
these DNS queries, except where noted, if the DNS server returns an
error (RCODE other than 0 or 3) or the query times out, the mechanism
stops and the topmost check_host() returns "temperror". If the
server returns "domain does not exist" (RCODE 3), then evaluation of
the mechanism continues as if the server returned no error (RCODE 0)
and zero answer records.
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5.1. "all"
all = "all"
The "all" mechanism is a test that always matches. It is used as the
rightmost mechanism in a record to provide an explicit default.
For example:
v=spf1 a mx -all
Mechanisms after "all" will never be tested. Mechanisms listed after
"all" MUST be ignored. Any "redirect" modifier (Section 6.1) MUST be
ignored when there is an "all" mechanism in the record.
5.2. "include"
include = "include" ":" domain-spec
The "include" mechanism triggers a recursive evaluation of
check_host().
1. The domain-spec is expanded as per Section 7.
2. Check_host() is evaluated with the resulting string as the
<domain>. The <ip> and <sender> arguments remain the same as in
the current evaluation of check_host().
3. The recursive evaluation returns either match, not match, or an
error. If it matches, then the appropriate result for the
include: mechanism is used (e.g. include or +include gives a
"pass" result and -include gives "fail).
4. If there is no match, the parent check_host() resumes processing
as per the table below, with the previous value of <domain>
restored.
In hindsight, the name "include" was poorly chosen. Only the
evaluated result of the referenced SPF record is used, rather than
acting as if the referenced SPF record was literally included in the
first. For example, evaluating a "-all" directive in the referenced
record does not terminate the overall processing and does not
necessarily result in an overall "fail". (Better names for this
mechanism would have been "if-match", "on-match", etc.)
The "include" mechanism makes it possible for one domain to designate
multiple administratively-independent domains. For example, a vanity
domain "example.net" might send mail using the servers of
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administratively-independent domains example.com and example.org.
Example.net could say
IN TXT "v=spf1 include:example.com include:example.org -all"
This would direct check_host() to, in effect, check the records of
example.com and example.org for a "pass" result. Only if the host
were not permitted for either of those domains would the result be
"fail".
Whether this mechanism matches, does not match, or returns an
exception depends on the result of the recursive evaluation of
check_host():
+---------------------------------+---------------------------------+
| A recursive check_host() result | Causes the "include" mechanism |
| of: | to: |
+---------------------------------+---------------------------------+
| pass | match |
| | |
| fail | not match |
| | |
| softfail | not match |
| | |
| neutral | not match |
| | |
| temperror | return temperror |
| | |
| permerror | return permerror |
| | |
| none | return permerror |
+---------------------------------+---------------------------------+
The "include" mechanism is intended for crossing administrative
boundaries. For example, if example.com and example.org were managed
by the same entity, and if the permitted set of hosts for both
domains was
"mx:example.com", it would be possible for example.org to specify
"include:example.com", but it would be preferable to specify
"redirect=example.com" or even "mx:example.com".
With the "include" mechanism an administratively external set of
hosts can be authorized, but determination of sender policy is still
a function of the original domain's SPF record (as determined by the
"all" mechanism in that record). The redirect modifier is more
suitable for consolidating both authorizations and policy into a
common set to be shared within an ADMD. Redirect is much more like a
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common code element to be shared among records in a single ADMD. It
is possible to control both authorized hosts and policy for an
arbitrary number of domains from a single record.
5.3. "a"
This mechanism matches if <ip> is one of the <target-name>'s IP
addresses.
a = "a" [ ":" domain-spec ] [ dual-cidr-length ]
An address lookup is done on the <target-name>. The <ip> is compared
to the returned address(es). If any address matches, the mechanism
matches.
5.4. "mx"
This mechanism matches if <ip> is one of the MX hosts for a domain
name.
mx = "mx" [ ":" domain-spec ] [ dual-cidr-length ]
check_host() first performs an MX lookup on the <target-name>. Then
it performs an address lookup on each MX name returned. The <ip> is
compared to each returned IP address. To prevent Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks, more than 10 MX names MUST NOT be looked up during the
evaluation of an "mx" mechanism. If there are more than 10 MX names
then permerror is returned and the evaluation terminated (see
Section 4.6.4). If any address matches, the mechanism matches.
Note regarding implicit MXs: If the <target-name> has no MX records,
check_host() MUST NOT pretend the target is its single MX, and MUST
NOT default to an A or AAAA lookup on the <target-name> directly.
This behavior diverges from the legacy "implicit MX" rule, (See
[RFC5321], Section 5. If such behavior is desired, the publisher
will have to specify an "a" directive).
5.5. "ptr" (deprecated)
This mechanism tests whether the DNS reverse-mapping for <ip> exists
and correctly points to a domain name within a particular domain.
This mechanism is deprecated and SHOULD NOT be used.
ptr = "ptr" [ ":" domain-spec ]
The <ip>'s name is looked up using this procedure:
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1. Perform a DNS reverse-mapping for <ip>: Look up the corresponding
PTR record in "in-addr.arpa." if the address is an IPv4 one and
in "ip6.arpa." if it is an IPv6 address.
2. For each record returned, validate the domain name by looking up
its IP addresses. To prevent DoS attacks, more than 10 PTR names
MUST NOT be looked up during the evaluation of a "ptr" mechanism
(see Section 4.6.4).
3. If <ip> is among the returned IP addresses, then that domain name
is validated.
Check all validated domain names to see if they either match the
<target-name> domain or are a subdomain of the <target-name> domain.
If any do, this mechanism matches. If no validated domain name can
be found, or if none of the validated domain names match or are a
subdomain of the <target-name>, this mechanism fails to match. If a
DNS error occurs while doing the PTR RR lookup, then this mechanism
fails to match. If a DNS error occurs while doing an A RR lookup,
then that domain name is skipped and the search continues.
Pseudocode:
sending-domain_names := ptr_lookup(sending-host_IP);
if more than 10 sending-domain_names are found, use at most 10.
for each name in (sending-domain_names) {
IP_addresses := a_lookup(name);
if the sending-domain_IP is one of the IP_addresses {
validated-sending-domain_names += name;
}
}
for each name in (validated-sending-domain_names) {
if name ends in <domain-spec>, return match.
if name is <domain-spec>, return match.
}
return no-match.
This mechanism matches if the <target-name> is either a subdomain of
a validated domain name or if the <target-name> and a validated
domain name are the same. For example: "mail.example.com" is within
the domain "example.com", but "mail.bad-example.com" is not.
Note: This mechanism has been deprecated because it is slow, it is
not as reliable as other mechanisms in cases of DNS errors, and it
places a large burden on the .arpa name servers. If used, proper PTR
records MUST be in place for the domain's hosts and the "ptr"
mechanism SHOULD be one of the last mechanisms checked. After many
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years of SPF deployment experience it has been concluded it is
unnecessary and more reliable alternatives used instead. It is,
however, still in use and part of the SPF protocol, so compliant
check_host() implementations MUST support it.
5.6. "ip4" and "ip6"
These mechanisms test whether <ip> is contained within a given IP
network.
ip4 = "ip4" ":" ip4-network [ ip4-cidr-length ]
ip6 = "ip6" ":" ip6-network [ ip6-cidr-length ]
ip4-cidr-length = "/" 1*DIGIT
ip6-cidr-length = "/" 1*DIGIT
dual-cidr-length = [ ip4-cidr-length ] [ "/" ip6-cidr-length ]
ip4-network = qnum "." qnum "." qnum "." qnum
qnum = DIGIT ; 0-9
/ %x31-39 DIGIT ; 10-99
/ "1" 2DIGIT ; 100-199
/ "2" %x30-34 DIGIT ; 200-249
/ "25" %x30-35 ; 250-255
; as per conventional dotted quad notation. e.g., 192.0.2.0
ip6-network = <as per [RFC 4291], section 2.2>
; e.g., 2001:DB8::CD30
The <ip> is compared to the given network. If CIDR prefix length
high-order bits match, the mechanism matches.
If ip4-cidr-length is omitted, it is taken to be "/32". If
ip6-cidr-length is omitted, it is taken to be "/128". It is not
permitted to omit parts of the IP address instead of using CIDR
notations. That is, use 192.0.2.0/24 instead of 192.0.2.
5.7. "exists"
This mechanism is used to construct an arbitrary domain name that is
used for a DNS A record query. It allows for complicated schemes
involving arbitrary parts of the mail envelope to determine what is
permitted.
exists = "exists" ":" domain-spec
The domain-spec is expanded as per Section 7. The resulting domain
name is used for a DNS A RR lookup. If any A record is returned,
this mechanism matches. The lookup type is A even when the
connection type is IPv6.
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Domains can use this mechanism to specify arbitrarily complex
queries. For example, suppose example.com publishes the record:
v=spf1 exists:%{ir}.%{l1r+-}._spf.%{d} -all
The <target-name> might expand to
"1.2.0.192.someuser._spf.example.com". This makes fine-grained
decisions possible at the level of the user and client IP address.
This mechanism enables queries that mimic the style of tests that
existing DNS white/black lists (DNSxLs) use, as described in
[RFC5782]. The query will either return NXDOMAIN (no match), any
valid answer (match), or an error.
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6. Modifier Definitions
Modifiers are name/value pairs that provide additional information.
Modifiers always have an "=" separating the name and the value.
The modifiers defined in this document ("redirect" and "exp") MAY
appear anywhere in the record, but SHOULD appear at the end, after
all mechanisms. Ordering of these two modifiers does not matter.
These two modifiers MUST NOT appear in a record more than once each.
If they do, then check_host() exits with a result of "permerror".
Unrecognized modifiers MUST be ignored no matter where in a record,
or how often. This allows implementations of this document to
gracefully handle records with modifiers that are defined in other
specifications.
6.1. redirect: Redirected Query
The redirect modifier is intended for consolidating both
authorizations and policy into a common set to be shared within a
single ADMD. Redirect is like a common code element to be shared
among records in a single ADMD. It is possible to control both
authorized hosts and policy for an arbitrary number of domains from a
single record.
redirect = "redirect" "=" domain-spec
If all mechanisms fail to match, and a "redirect" modifier is
present, then processing proceeds as follows:
The domain-spec portion of the redirect section is expanded as per
the macro rules in Section 7. Then check_host() is evaluated with
the resulting string as the <domain>. The <ip> and <sender>
arguments remain the same as in the current evaluation of
check_host().
The result of this new evaluation of check_host() is then considered
the result of the current evaluation with the exception that if no
SPF record is found, or if the target-name is malformed, the result
is a "permerror" rather than "none".
Note that the newly-queried domain can itself specify redirect
processing.
This facility is intended for use by organizations that wish to apply
the same record to multiple domains. For example:
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la.example.com. TXT "v=spf1 redirect=_spf.example.com"
ny.example.com. TXT "v=spf1 redirect=_spf.example.com"
sf.example.com. TXT "v=spf1 redirect=_spf.example.com"
_spf.example.com. TXT "v=spf1 mx:example.com -all"
In this example, mail from any of the three domains is described by
the same record. This can be an administrative advantage.
Note: In general, the domain "A" cannot reliably use a redirect to
another domain "B" not under the same administrative control. Since
the <sender> stays the same, there is no guarantee that the record at
domain "B" will correctly work for mailboxes in domain "A",
especially if domain "B" uses mechanisms involving local-parts. An
"include" directive is generally be more appropriate.
For clarity, it is RECOMMENDED that any "redirect" modifier appear as
the very last term in a record.
6.2. exp: Explanation
explanation = "exp" "=" domain-spec
If check_host() results in a "fail" due to a mechanism match (such as
"-all"), and the "exp" modifier is present, then the explanation
string returned is computed as described below. If no "exp" modifier
is present, then either a default explanation string or an empty
explanation string MUST be returned.
The domain-spec is macro expanded (see Section 7) and becomes the
<target-name>. The DNS TXT record for the <target-name> is fetched.
If there are any DNS processing errors (any RCODE other than 0), or
if no records are returned, or if more than one record is returned,
or if there are syntax errors in the explanation string, then proceed
as if no exp modifier was given.
The fetched TXT record's strings are concatenated with no spaces, and
then treated as an explain-string, which is macro-expanded. This
final result is the explanation string. Implementations MAY limit
the length of the resulting explanation string to allow for other
protocol constraints and/or reasonable processing limits. Since the
explanation string is intended for an SMTP response and [RFC5321]
Section 2.4 says that responses are in [US-ASCII], the explanation
string MUST be limited to US-ASCII.
Software evaluating check_host() can use this string to communicate
information from the publishing domain in the form of a short message
or URL. Software SHOULD make it clear that the explanation string
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comes from a third party. For example, it can prepend the macro
string "%{o} explains: " to the explanation, such as shown in
Section 2.6.4.
Suppose example.com has this record:
v=spf1 mx -all exp=explain._spf.%{d}
Here are some examples of possible explanation TXT records at
explain._spf.example.com:
"Mail from example.com should only be sent by its own servers."
-- a simple, constant message
"%{i} is not one of %{d}'s designated mail servers."
-- a message with a little more information, including the IP
address that failed the check
"See http://%{d}/why.html?s=%{S}&i=%{I}"
-- a complicated example that constructs a URL with the
arguments to check_host() so that a web page can be
generated with detailed, custom instructions
Note: During recursion into an "include" mechanism, an exp= modifier
from the <target-name> MUST NOT be used. In contrast, when executing
a "redirect" modifier, an exp= modifier from the original domain MUST
NOT be used.
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7. Macros
7.1. Macro Definitions
Many mechanisms and modifiers perform macro expansion on a term.
domain-spec = macro-string domain-end
domain-end = ( "." toplabel [ "." ] ) / macro-expand
toplabel = ( *alphanum ALPHA *alphanum ) /
( 1*alphanum "-" *( alphanum / "-" ) alphanum )
; LDH rule plus additional TLD restrictions
; (see [RFC3696], Section 2 for background)
alphanum = ALPHA / DIGIT
explain-string = *( macro-string / SP )
macro-string = *( macro-expand / macro-literal )
macro-expand = ( "%{" macro-letter transformers *delimiter "}" )
/ "%%" / "%_" / "%-"
macro-literal = %x21-24 / %x26-7E
; visible characters except "%"
macro-letter = "s" / "l" / "o" / "d" / "i" / "p" / "h" /
"c" / "r" / "t" / "v"
transformers = *DIGIT [ "r" ]
delimiter = "." / "-" / "+" / "," / "/" / "_" / "="
A literal "%" is expressed by "%%".
"%_" expands to a single " " space.
"%-" expands to a URL-encoded space, viz., "%20".
The following macro letters are expanded in term arguments:
s = <sender>
l = local-part of <sender>
o = domain of <sender>
d = <domain>
i = <ip>
p = the validated domain name of <ip> (deprecated)
v = the string "in-addr" if <ip> is ipv4, or "ip6" if <ip> is ipv6
h = HELO/EHLO domain
The following macro letters are allowed only in "exp" text:
c = SMTP client IP (easily readable format)
r = domain name of host performing the check
t = current timestamp
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A '%' character not followed by a '{', '%', '-', or '_' character is
a syntax error. So
-exists:%(ir).sbl.spamhaus.example.org
is incorrect and will cause check_host() to yield a "permerror".
Instead, say
-exists:%{ir}.sbl.spamhaus.example.org
Optional transformers are the following:
*DIGIT = zero or more digits
'r' = reverse value, splitting on dots by default
If transformers or delimiters are provided, the replacement value for
a macro letter is split into parts. After performing any reversal
operation and/or removal of left-hand parts, the parts are rejoined
using "." and not the original splitting characters.
By default, strings are split on "." (dots). Note that no special
treatment is given to leading, trailing, or consecutive delimiters in
input strings, and so the list of parts might contain empty strings.
Some older implementations of SPF prohibit trailing dots in domain
names, so trailing dots SHOULD NOT be published by domain owners,
although they MUST be accepted by implementations conforming to this
document. Macros can specify delimiter characters that are used
instead of ".".
The 'r' transformer indicates a reversal operation: if the client IP
address were 192.0.2.1, the macro %{i} would expand to "192.0.2.1"
and the macro %{ir} would expand to "1.2.0.192".
The DIGIT transformer indicates the number of right-hand parts to
use, after optional reversal. If a DIGIT is specified, the value
MUST be nonzero. If no DIGITs are specified, or if the value
specifies more parts than are available, all the available parts are
used. If the DIGIT was 5, and only 3 parts were available, the macro
interpreter would pretend the DIGIT was 3. Implementations MUST
support at least a value of 128, as that is the maximum number of
labels in a domain name.
The "s" macro expands to the <sender> argument. It is an email
address with a local-part, an "@" character, and a domain. The "l"
macro expands to just the local-part. The "o" macro expands to just
the domain part. Note that these values remain the same during
recursive and chained evaluations due to "include" and/or "redirect".
Note also that if the original <sender> had no local-part, the local-
part was set to "postmaster" in initial processing (see Section 4.3).
For IPv4 addresses, both the "i" and "c" macros expand to the
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standard dotted-quad format.
For IPv6 addresses, the "i" macro expands to a dot-format address; it
is intended for use in %{ir}. The "c" macro can expand to any of the
hexadecimal colon-format addresses specified in [RFC4291], Section
2.2. It is intended for humans to read.
The "p" macro expands to the validated domain name of <ip>. The
procedure for finding the validated domain name is defined in
Section 5.5. If the <domain> is present in the list of validated
domains, it SHOULD be used. Otherwise, if a subdomain of the
<domain> is present, it SHOULD be used. Otherwise, any name from the
list can be used. If there are no validated domain names or if a DNS
error occurs, the string "unknown" is used. This macro is deprecated
and SHOULD NOT be used.
The "r" macro expands to the name of the receiving MTA. This SHOULD
be a fully qualified domain name, but if one does not exist (as when
the checking is done by a MUA) or if policy restrictions dictate
otherwise, the word "unknown" SHOULD be substituted. The domain name
can be different from the name found in the MX record that the client
MTA used to locate the receiving MTA.
The "t" macro expands to the decimal representation of the
approximate number of seconds since the Epoch (Midnight, January 1,
1970, UTC) at the time of the evaluation. This is the same value as
is returned by the POSIX time() function in most standards-compliant
libraries.
When the result of macro expansion is used in a domain name query, if
the expanded domain name exceeds 253 characters (the maximum length
of a domain name), the left side is truncated to fit, by removing
successive domain labels (and their following dots) until the total
length does not exceed 253 characters.
Uppercased macros expand exactly as their lowercased equivalents, and
are then URL escaped. URL escaping MUST be performed for characters
not in the "unreserved" set, which is defined in [RFC3986].
Note: Care has to be taken so that macro expansion for legitimate
email does not exceed the 63-character limit on DNS labels. The
local-part of email addresses, in particular, can have more than 63
characters between dots.
Note: Domains SHOULD avoid using the "s", "l", "o", or "h" macros in
conjunction with any mechanism directive. Although these macros are
powerful and allow per-user records to be published, they severely
limit the ability of implementations to cache results of check_host()
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and they reduce the effectiveness of DNS caches.
Note: If no directive processed during the evaluation of check_host()
contains an "s", "l", "o", or "h" macro, then the results of the
evaluation can be cached on the basis of <domain> and <ip> alone for
as long as the shortest Time To Live (TTL) of all the DNS records
involved.
7.2. Expansion Examples
The <sender> is strong-bad@email.example.com.
The IPv4 SMTP client IP is 192.0.2.3.
The IPv6 SMTP client IP is 2001:DB8::CB01.
The PTR domain name of the client IP is mx.example.org.
macro expansion
------- ----------------------------
%{s} strong-bad@email.example.com
%{o} email.example.com
%{d} email.example.com
%{d4} email.example.com
%{d3} email.example.com
%{d2} example.com
%{d1} com
%{dr} com.example.email
%{d2r} example.email
%{l} strong-bad
%{l-} strong.bad
%{lr} strong-bad
%{lr-} bad.strong
%{l1r-} strong
macro-string expansion
--------------------------------------------------------------------
%{ir}.%{v}._spf.%{d2} 3.2.0.192.in-addr._spf.example.com
%{lr-}.lp._spf.%{d2} bad.strong.lp._spf.example.com
%{lr-}.lp.%{ir}.%{v}._spf.%{d2}
bad.strong.lp.3.2.0.192.in-addr._spf.example.com
%{ir}.%{v}.%{l1r-}.lp._spf.%{d2}
3.2.0.192.in-addr.strong.lp._spf.example.com
%{d2}.trusted-domains.example.net
example.com.trusted-domains.example.net
IPv6:
%{ir}.%{v}._spf.%{d2} 1.0.B.C.0.0.0.0.
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0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.8.B.D.0.1.0.0.2.ip6._spf.example.com
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8. Result Handling
This section provides guidance for operators in response to the
various possible outputs of check_host() on a message. Terse
definitions of SPF results are presented in Section 2.6; this section
provides more detail on each for use in developing local policy for
message handling.
Every operating environment is different. There are some receivers
for whom strict adherence to SPF is appropriate, and definitive
treatment of messages that are evaluated to be explicity unauthorized
("fail" and sometimes "softfail") is the norm. There are others for
which the "false negative" cases are more of a concern. This concern
is typically handled by merely recording the result in the header and
allowing the message to pass on for additional processing. There are
still others where SPF is one of several inputs to the message
handling decision. As such, there is no normative requirement for
message handling in response to any particular result. This section
is provided to present a complete picture of the likely cause of each
result, and where available, the experience gained during
experimental deployment.
There are essentially two classes of handling choices:
o Handling within the SMTP session that attempted to deliver the
message, such as by returning a permanent SMTP error (rejection)
or temporary SMTP error ("try again later");
o Permitting the message to pass (a successful SMTP reply code) and
adding an additional header field that indicates the result
returned by check_host() and other salient details; this is
discussed in more detail in Section 9.
8.1. None
With a "none" result, the SPF verifier has no information at all
about the authorization or lack thereof of the client to use the
checked idenity or identities. The check_host() function completed
without errors but was not able to reach any conclusion.
8.2. Neutral
A "neutral" result indicates that although a policy for the identity
was discovered, there is no definite assertion about the (positive or
negative) about the client.
A "neutral" result MUST be treated exactly like the "none" result;
the distinction exists only for informational purposes. Treating
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"neutral" more harshly than "none" would discourage domain owners
from testing the use of SPF records (see Section 10.1).
8.3. Pass
A "pass" result means that the client is authorized to inject mail
with the given identity. The domain can now, in the sense of
reputation, be considered responsible for sending the message.
Further policy checks can now proceed with confidence in the
legitimate use of the identity. This is further discussed in
Appendix G.1.
8.4. Fail
A "fail" result is an explicit statement that the client is not
authorized to use the domain in the given identity. Disposition of
SPF fail messages is a matter of local policy. See Appendix G.2 for
considerations on developing local policy.
If the checking software chooses to reject the mail during the SMTP
transaction, then it SHOULD use an SMTP reply code of 550 (see
[RFC5321]) and, if supported, the 5.7.1 enhanced status code (see
[RFC3463]), in addition to an appropriate reply text. The
check_host() function will return either a default explanation string
or one from the domain that published the SPF records (see
Section 6.2). If the information does not originate with the
checking software, it is good to make it clear that the text is
provided by the sender's domain. For example:
550-5.7.1 SPF MAIL FROM check failed:
550-5.7.1 The domain example.com explains:
550 5.7.1 Please see http://www.example.com/mailpolicy.html
If the checking software chooses not to reject the mail during the
SMTP transaction, then it SHOULD add a Received-SPF or
Authentication-Results header field (see Section 9) to communicate
this result to downstream message processors. While this is true for
all SPF results, it is of particular importance for "fail" results
since the message is explicitly not authorized by the domain owner.
8.5. Softfail
A "softfail" result ought to be treated as somewhere between "fail"
and "neutral"/"none". The domain owner believes the host is not
authorized but is not willing to make a strong policy statement.
Receiving software SHOULD NOT reject the message based solely on this
result, but MAY subject the message to closer scrutiny than normal.
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The domain owner wants to discourage the use of this host and thus
desires limited feedback when a "softfail" result occurs. For
example, the recipient's Mail User Agent (MUA) could highlight the
"softfail" status, or the receiving MTA could give the sender a
message using greylisting, [RFC6647], with a note the first time the
message is received, but accept it on a later attempt based on
receiver policy.
8.6. Temperror
A "temperror" result means the SPF verifier encountered a transient
(generally DNS) error while performing the check. Checking software
can choose to accept or temporarily reject the message. If the
message is rejected during the SMTP transaction for this reason, the
software SHOULD use an SMTP reply code of 451 and, if supported, the
4.4.3 enhanced status code. These errors can be caused by problems
in either the sender's or receiver's DNS software.
8.7. Permerror
A "permerror" result means the domain's published records could not
be correctly interpreted. This signals an error condition that
definitely requires manual intervention to be resolved. If the
message is rejected during the SMTP transaction for this reason, the
software SHOULD use an SMTP reply code of 550 and, if supported, the
5.5.2 enhanced status code. Be aware that if the domain owner uses
macros (Section 7), it is possible that this result is due to the
checked identities having an unexpected format. It is also possible
that this result is generated by certain SPF clients due to the input
arguments having an unexpected format; see Section 4.8.
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9. Recording The Result
To provide downstream agents, such as MUAs, with the information they
might need in terms of evaluating or representing the apparent safety
of the message content, it is RECOMMENDED that SMTP receivers record
the result of SPF processing in the message header. For operators
that choose to record SPF results in the header of the message for
processing by internal filters or MUAs, two methods are presented.
Section 9.1 defines the Received-SPF field, which is the results
field originally defined for SPF use. Section 9.2 discusses
Authentication-Results [RFC5451] which was specified more recently
and is designed for use by SPF and other authentication methods.
Both are in common use, and hence both are included here. However,
it is important to note that they were designed to serve slightly
different purposes. Received-SPF is intended to include enough
forensic information to enable reconstruction of the SPF evaluation
of the message, while Authentication-Results is designed only to
relay the result itself and related output details of likely use to
end users (e.g., what property of the message was actually
authenticated and what it contained), leaving forensic work to the
purview of system logs and the Received field contents. Also,
Received-SPF relies on compliance of agents within the receiving ADMD
to adhere to the header field ordering rules of [RFC5321] and
[RFC5322], while Authentication-Results includes some provisions to
protect against non-compliant implementations.
An operator could choose to use both to serve different downstream
agents. In such cases, care needs to be taken to ensure both fields
are conveying the same details, or unexpected results can occur.
9.1. The Received-SPF Header Field
The Received-SPF header field is a trace field (see [RFC5322] Section
3.6.7) and SHOULD be prepended to the existing header, above the
Received: field that is generated by the SMTP receiver. It MUST
appear above all other Received-SPF fields in the message. The
header field has the following format:
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header-field = "Received-SPF:" [CFWS] result FWS [comment FWS]
[ key-value-list ] CRLF
result = "pass" / "fail" / "softfail" / "neutral" /
"none" / "temperror" / "permerror"
key-value-list = key-value-pair *( ";" [CFWS] key-value-pair )
[";"]
key-value-pair = key [CFWS] "=" ( dot-atom / quoted-string )
key = "client-ip" / "envelope-from" / "helo" /
"problem" / "receiver" / "identity" /
mechanism / name
identity = "mailfrom" ; for the "MAIL FROM" identity
/ "helo" ; for the "HELO" identity
/ name ; other identities
dot-atom = <unquoted word as per [RFC5322]>
quoted-string = <quoted string as per [RFC5322]>
comment = <comment string as per [RFC5322]>
CFWS = <comment or folding white space as per [RFC5322]>
FWS = <folding white space as per [RFC5322]>
CRLF = <standard end-of-line token as per [RFC2532]>
The header field SHOULD include a "(...)" style comment after the
result, conveying supporting information for the result, such as
<ip>, <sender>, and <domain>.
The following key-value pairs are designed for later machine parsing.
SPF verifiers SHOULD give enough information so that the SPF results
can be verified. That is, at least "client-ip", "helo", and, if the
"MAIL FROM" identity was checked, "envelope-from".
client-ip the IP address of the SMTP client
envelope-from the envelope sender mailbox
helo the host name given in the HELO or EHLO command
mechanism the mechanism that matched (if no mechanisms matched,
substitute the word "default")
problem if an error was returned, details about the error
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receiver the host name of the SPF verifier
identity the identity that was checked; see the <identity> ABNF
rule
Other keys MAY be defined by SPF verifiers.
SPF verifiers MUST make sure that the Received-SPF header field does
not contain invalid characters, is not excessively long (See
[RFC5322] Section 2.1.1), and does not contain malicious data that
has been provided by the sender.
Examples of various header field styles that could be generated are
the following:
Received-SPF: pass (mybox.example.org: domain of
myname@example.com designates 192.0.2.1 as permitted sender)
receiver=mybox.example.org; client-ip=192.0.2.1;
envelope-from="myname@example.com"; helo=foo.example.com;
Received-SPF: fail (mybox.example.org: domain of
myname@example.com does not designate
192.0.2.1 as permitted sender)
identity=mailfrom; client-ip=192.0.2.1;
envelope-from="myname@example.com";
9.2. SPF Results in the Authentication-Results Header Field
As mentioned in Section 9, the Authentication-Results header field is
designed to communicate lists of tests a border MTA did and their
results. The specified elements of the field provide less
information than the Received-SPF field:
Authentication-Results: myhost.example.org; spf=pass
smtp.mailfrom=example.net
Received-SPF: pass (myhost.example.org: domain of
myname@example.com designates 192.0.2.1 as permitted sender)
receiver=mybox.example.org; client-ip=192.0.2.1;
envelope-from="myname@example.com"; helo=foo.example.com;
It is, however, possible to add CFWS in the "reason" part of an
Authentication-Results header field and provide the equivalent
information, if desired.
As an example, an expanded Authentication-Results header field might
look like (for a "MAIL FROM" check in this example):
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Authentication-Results: myhost.example.org; spf=pass
reason="client-ip=192.0.2.1; smtp.helo=foo.example.com"
smtp.mailfrom=user@example.net
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10. Effects on Infrastructure
This section outlines the major implications that adoption of this
document will have on various entities involved in Internet email.
It is intended to make clear to the reader where this document
knowingly affects the operation of such entities. This section is
not a "how-to" manual, or a "best practices" document, and it is not
a comprehensive list of what such entities SHOULD do in light of this
document.
This section provides operational advice and instruction only. It is
non-normative.
[RFC5598] describes the Internet email architecture. This section is
organized based on the different segments of the architecture.
10.1. Sending Domains
Originating ADMDs (ADministrative Management Domains - [RFC5598]
Section 2.2.1 and Section 2.3) that wish to be compliant with this
specification will need to determine the list of relays ([RFC5598]
Section 2.2.2) that they allow to use their domain name in the "HELO"
and "MAIL FROM" identities when relaying to other ADMDs. It is
recognized that forming such a list is not just a simple technical
exercise, but involves policy decisions with both technical and
administrative considerations.
10.1.1. DNS Resource Considerations
Minimizing the DNS resources required for SPF lookups can be done by
choosing directives that require less DNS information and by placing
lower-cost mechanisms earlier in the SPF record.
+----------+--------+-----------------+
| term | cost | limit |
+----------+--------+-----------------+
| ip4/ip6 | 0 | - |
| a | 1 | 10 |
| include | 1 | 10 |
| redirect | 1 | 10 |
| exists | 1 | 10 |
| mx | 1 + N* | 10 and N* <= 10 |
| ptr/%{p} | 1 + N* | 10 and N* <= 10 |
| all | 0 | - |
+----------+--------+-----------------+
* N is the number of RRs found during each term evaluation
Section 4.6.4 specifies the limits receivers have to use. It is
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essential to publish records that do not exceed these requirements.
It is also required to carefully weight the cost and the
maintainability of licit solutions.
For example, consider a domain set up as follows:
example.com. IN MX 10 mx.example.com.
IN MX 20 mx2.example.com.
mx.example.com. IN A 192.0.2.1
mx2.example.com. IN A 192.0.2.129
Assume the administrative point is to authorize (pass) mx and mx2
while failing every other host. Compare the following solutions:
Best record:
example.com. IN TXT "v=spf1 ip4:192.0.2.1 ip4:192.0.2.129 -all"
Good record:
$ORIGIN example.com.
@ IN TXT "v=spf1 a:authorized-spf.example.com -all"
authorized-spf IN A 192.0.2.1
IN A 192.0.2.129
Expensive record:
example.com. IN TXT "v=spf1 mx:example.com -all"
Wasteful, bad record:
example.com. IN TXT "v=spf1 ip4:192.0.2.0/24 mx -all"
10.1.2. Administrator's Considerations
There might be administrative considerations: using "a" over "ip4" or
"ip6" allows hosts to be renumbered easily. Using "mx" over "a"
allows the set of mail hosts to be changed easily. Unless such
changes are common, it is better to use the less resource intensive
mechanisms like "ip4" and "ip6" over "a" or "a" or "mx".
In some specific cases, standard advice on record content is
appropriate. Publishing SPF records for domains that send no mail is
a well established best practice. The record for a domain that sends
no mail is:
www.example.com. IN TXT "v=spf1 -all"
Publishing SPF records for individual hosts is also best practice.
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The hostname is generally the identity used in the 5321.HELO/.EHLO
command. In the case of messages with a null 5321.MailFrom, this is
used as the domain for 5321.MailFrom SPF checks, in addition to being
used in 5321.HELO/.EHLO based SPF checks. The standard SPF record
for an individual host that is involved in mail processing is:
relay.example.com. IN TXT "v=spf1 a -all"
Validating correct deployment is difficult. [RFC6652] describes one
mechanism for soliciting feedback on SPF failures. Another
suggestion can be found in Appendix C.
Regardless of the method used, understanding the ADMD's outbound mail
architecture is essential to effective deployment.
10.1.3. Bounces
As explained in Section 1.1.3, [RFC5321] allows the reverse-path to
be null, which is typical of some Delivery Status Notification
[RFC3464], commonly called email bounces. In this case the only
entity available for performing an SPF check is the "HELO" identity
defined in Section 1.1.4. SPF functionality is enhanced by
administrators ensuring this identity is set correctly and has an
appropriate SPF record. It is normal to have the HELO identity set
to hostname instead of domain. Zone file generation for significant
numbers of hosts can be consolidated using the redirect modifier and
scripted for initial deployment. Specific deployment advice is given
above in Section 10.1.2.
10.2. Receivers
SPF results can be used in combination with other methods to
determine the final local disposition (either positive or negative of
a message. It can also be considered dispositive on its own.
An attempt to have one organization (sender) direct the email
handling policies of another (receiver) is inherently challenging and
often controversial. As stated elsewhere in this document, there is
no normative requirement for specific handling of a message based on
any SPF result. The information presented in Section 8 and in
Appendix G is offered for receiver consideration when forming local
handling policies.
The primary considerations are that SPF might return "pass" for mail
that is ultimately harmful (e.g., spammers that arrange for SPF to
pass using nonsense domain names, or virus or spam outbreaks from
within trusted sources), and might also return "fail" for mail that
is ultimately legitimate (e.g., legitimate mail that has traversed a
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mail alias). It is important take both of these cases under
consideration when establishing local handling policy.
10.3. Mediators
Broadly speaking, there are two types of mediating ADMDs that can
affect SPF deployment of other ADMDs: mailing lists (see [RFC5598]
Section 5.3) and ReSenders ([RFC5598] Section 5.2).
10.3.1. Mailing Lists
Mailing lists have to be aware of how they re-inject mail that is
sent to the list. Mailing lists MUST comply with the requirements in
[RFC5321], Section 3.10, and [RFC1123], Section 5.3.6, that say that
the reverse-path MUST be changed to be the mailbox of a person or
other entity who administers the list. Whereas the reasons for
changing the reverse-path are many and long-standing, SPF adds
enforcement to this requirement.
In practice, almost all mailing list software in use already complies
with this requirement. Mailing lists that do not comply might
encounter problems depending on how access to the list is restricted.
Such lists that are entirely internal to a domain (only people in the
domain can send to or receive from the list) are not affected.
10.3.2. Forwarding Services and Aliases
Forwarding services take mail that is received at a mailbox and
direct it to some external mailbox. At the time of this writing, the
near-universal practice of such services is to use the original "MAIL
FROM" of a message when re-injecting it for delivery to the external
mailbox. [RFC1123] and [RFC5321] describe this action as an "alias"
rather than a "mail list". This means the external mailbox's MTA
sees all such mail in a connection from a host of the forwarding
service, and so the "MAIL FROM" identity will not, in general, pass
authorization.
Appendix D provides some operational suggestions to adapt these
services to an SPF-aware environment.
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11. Security Considerations
11.1. Processing Limits
As with most aspects of email, there are a number of ways that
malicious parties could use the protocol as an avenue for a
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. The processing limits outlined in
Section 4.6.4 are designed to prevent attacks such as the following:
o A malicious party could create an SPF record with many references
to a victim's domain and send many emails to different SPF
verifiers; those SPF verifiers would then create a DoS attack. In
effect, the SPF verifiers are being used to amplify the attacker's
bandwidth by using fewer bytes in the SMTP session than are used
by the DNS queries. Using SPF clients also allows the attacker to
hide the true source of the attack.
o Whereas implementations of check_host() are supposed to limit the
number of DNS lookups, malicious domains could publish records
that exceed these limits in an attempt to waste computation effort
at their targets when they send them mail. Malicious domains
could also design SPF records that cause particular
implementations to use excessive memory or CPU usage, or to
trigger bugs.
o Malicious parties could send a large volume of mail purporting to
come from the intended target to a wide variety of legitimate mail
hosts. These legitimate machines would then present a DNS load on
the target as they fetched the relevant records.
Of these, the case of a third party referenced in the SPF record is
the easiest for a DoS attack to effectively exploit. As a result,
limits that might seem reasonable for an individual mail server can
still allow an unreasonable amount of bandwidth amplification.
Therefore, the processing limits need to be quite low.
11.2. SPF-Authorized Email May Contain Other False Identities
Do not construe the "MAIL FROM" and "HELO" identity authorizations to
provide more assurance than they do. It is entirely possible for a
malicious sender to inject a message using his own domain in the
identities used by SPF, to have that domain's SPF record authorize
the sending host, and yet the message can easily list other
identities in its header. Unless the user or the MUA takes care to
note that the authorized identity does not match the other more
commonly-presented identities (such as the From: header field), the
user might be lulled into a false sense of security.
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11.3. Spoofed DNS and IP Data
There are two aspects of this protocol that malicious parties could
exploit to undermine the validity of the check_host() function:
o The evaluation of check_host() relies heavily on DNS. A malicious
attacker could attack the DNS infrastructure and cause
check_host() to see spoofed DNS data, and then return incorrect
results. This could include returning "pass" for an <ip> value
where the actual domain's record would evaluate to "fail". See
[RFC3833] for a description of DNS weaknesses.
o The client IP address, <ip>, is assumed to be correct. In a
modern, correctly configured system the risk of this not being
true is nil.
11.4. Cross-User Forgery
By definition, SPF policies just map domain names to sets of
authorized MTAs, not whole email addresses to sets of authorized
users. Although the "l" macro (Section 7) provides a limited way to
define individual sets of authorized MTAs for specific email
addresses, it is generally impossible to verify, through SPF, the use
of specific email addresses by individual users of the same MTA.
It is up to mail services and their MTAs to directly prevent
cross-user forgery: based on SMTP AUTH ([RFC4954]), users have to be
restricted to using only those email addresses that are actually
under their control (see [RFC6409], Section 6.1). Another means to
verify the identity of individual users is message cryptography such
as PGP ([RFC4880]) or S/MIME ([RFC5751]).
11.5. Untrusted Information Sources
An SPF compliant receiver gathers information from the SMTP commands
it receives and from the published DNS records of the sending domain
holder, (e.g., "HELO" domain name, the "MAIL FROM" address from the
envelope, and SPF DNS records published by the domain holder).
11.5.1. Recorded Results
This information, passed to the receiver in the Received-SPF: or
Authentication-Results: trace fields, may be returned to the client
MTA as an SMTP rejection message. If such an SMTP rejection message
is generated, the information from the trace fields has to be checked
for such problems as invalid characters and excessively long lines.
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11.5.2. External Explanations
When the authorization check fails, an explanation string could be
included in the reject response. Both the sender and the rejecting
receiver need to be aware that the explanation was determined by the
publisher of the SPF record checked and, in general, not the
receiver. The explanation can contain malicious URLs, or it might be
offensive or misleading.
Explanations returned to sender domains due to "exp" modifiers,
(Section 6.2), were generated by the sender policy published by the
domain holders themselves. As long as messages are only returned
with non-delivery notification ([RFC3464]) to domains publishing the
explanation strings from their own DNS SPF records, the only affected
parties are the original publishers of the domain's SPF records.
In practice, such non-delivery notifications can be misdirected, such
as when an MTA accepts an email and only later generates the
notification to a forged address, or when an email forwarder does not
direct the bounce back to the original sender.
11.5.3. Macro Expansion
Macros (Section 7) allow senders to inject arbitrary text (any non-
null [US-ASCII] character) into receiver DNS queries. It is necesary
to be prepared for hostile or unexpected content.
11.6. Privacy Exposure
Checking SPF records causes DNS queries to be sent to the domain
owner. These DNS queries, especially if they are caused by the
"exists" mechanism, can contain information about who is sending
email and likely to which MTA the email is being sent. This can
introduce some privacy concerns, which are more or less of an issue
depending on local laws and the relationship between the domain owner
and the person sending the email.
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12. Contributors and Acknowledgements
This document is largely based on the work of Meng Weng Wong, Mark
Lentczner, and Wayne Schlitt. Although, as this section
acknowledges, many people have contributed to this document, a very
large portion of the writing and editing are due to Meng, Mark, and
Wayne.
This design owes a debt of parentage to [RMX] by Hadmut Danisch and
to [DMP] by Gordon Fecyk. The idea of using a DNS record to check
the legitimacy of an email address traces its ancestry further back
through messages on the namedroppers mailing list by Paul Vixie
[Vixie] (based on suggestion by Jim Miller) and by David Green
[Green].
Philip Gladstone contributed the concept of macros to the
specification, multiplying the expressiveness of the language and
making per-user and per-IP lookups possible.
The authors of both this document and [RFC4408] would also like to
thank the literally hundreds of individuals who have participated in
the development of this design. They are far too numerous to name,
but they include the following:
The participants in the SPFbis working group.
The folks on the spf-discuss mailing list.
The folks on the SPAM-L mailing list.
The folks on the IRTF ASRG mailing list.
The folks on the IETF MARID mailing list.
The folks on #perl.
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13. IANA Considerations
13.1. The SPF DNS Record Type
Per [RFC4408], the IANA assigned the Resource Record Type and Qtype
from the DNS Parameters Registry for the SPF RR type with code 99.
The format of this type is identical to the TXT RR [RFC1035]. The
character content of the record is encoded as [US-ASCII]. Use of
this record type is obsolete for SPF Version 1.
IANA is requested to add an annotation to the SPF RRTYPE saying
"(OBSOLETE - use TXT)" in the DNS Parameters registry.
[NOTE TO RFC EDITOR: (to be changed to " ... has added ..." upon
publication)]
13.2. The Received-SPF Mail Header Field
Per [RFC3864], the "Received-SPF:" header field is added to the IANA
Permanent Message Header Field Registry. The following is the
registration template:
Header field name: Received-SPF
Applicable protocol: mail ([RFC5322])
Status: Standards Track
Author/Change controller: IETF
Specification document(s): RFC XXXX
[NOTE TO RFC EDITOR: (this document)]
13.3. SPF Modifier Registration
[RFC6652] created a new SPF Modifier Registration. IANA is requested
to change the reference for the exp and redirect modifiers from
[RFC4408] to this document. Their status should not be changed.
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14. References
14.1. Normative References
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC1123] Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts - Application
and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123, October 1989.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3463] Vaudreuil, G., "Enhanced Mail System Status Codes",
RFC 3463, January 2003.
[RFC3864] Klyne, G., Nottingham, M., and J. Mogul, "Registration
Procedures for Message Header Fields", BCP 90, RFC 3864,
September 2004.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, January 2005.
[RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
[RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
October 2008.
[RFC5322] Resnick, P., Ed., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322,
October 2008.
[RFC5451] Kucherawy, M., "Message Header Field for Indicating
Message Authentication Status", RFC 5451, April 2009.
[RFC5598] Crocker, D., "Internet Mail Architecture", RFC 5598,
July 2009.
[RFC5890] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework",
RFC 5890, August 2010.
[US-ASCII]
American National Standards Institute (formerly United
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States of America Standards Institute), "USA Code for
Information Interchange, X3.4", 1968.
ANSI X3.4-1968 has been replaced by newer versions with
slight modifications, but the 1968 version remains
definitive for the Internet.
14.2. Informative References
[DMP] Fecyk, G., "Designated Mailers Protocol".
Work In Progress
[Green] Green, D., "Domain-Authorized SMTP Mail", 2002.
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[RFC1983] Malkin, G., "Internet Users' Glossary", RFC 1983,
August 1996.
[RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS
NCACHE)", RFC 2308, March 1998.
[RFC2782] Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P., and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for
specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782,
February 2000.
[RFC3464] Moore, K. and G. Vaudreuil, "An Extensible Message Format
for Delivery Status Notifications", RFC 3464,
January 2003.
[RFC3696] Klensin, J., "Application Techniques for Checking and
Transformation of Names", RFC 3696, February 2004.
[RFC3833] Atkins, D. and R. Austein, "Threat Analysis of the Domain
Name System (DNS)", RFC 3833, August 2004.
[RFC3834] Moore, K., "Recommendations for Automatic Responses to
Electronic Mail", RFC 3834, August 2004.
[RFC4408] Wong, M. and W. Schlitt, "Sender Policy Framework (SPF)
for Authorizing Use of Domains in E-Mail, Version 1",
RFC 4408, April 2006.
[RFC4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
(CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, August 2006.
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[RFC4880] Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Shaw, D., and R.
Thayer, "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 4880, November 2007.
[RFC4954] Siemborski, R. and A. Melnikov, "SMTP Service Extension
for Authentication", RFC 4954, July 2007.
[RFC5751] Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet
Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message
Specification", RFC 5751, January 2010.
[RFC5782] Levine, J., "DNS Blacklists and Whitelists", RFC 5782,
February 2010.
[RFC6409] Gellens, R. and J. Klensin, "Message Submission for Mail",
STD 72, RFC 6409, November 2011.
[RFC6647] Kucherawy, M. and D. Crocker, "Email Greylisting: An
Applicability Statement for SMTP", RFC 6647, June 2012.
[RFC6652] Kitterman, S., "Sender Policy Framework (SPF)
Authentication Failure Reporting Using the Abuse Reporting
Format", RFC 6652, June 2012.
[RFC6686] Kucherawy, M., "Resolution of the Sender Policy Framework
(SPF) and Sender ID Experiments", RFC 6686, July 2012.
[RMX] Danisch, H., "The RMX DNS RR Type for light weight sender
authentication".
Work In Progress
[Vixie] Vixie, P., "Repudiating MAIL FROM", 2002.
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Appendix A. Collected ABNF
This section is normative and any discrepancies with the ABNF
fragments in the preceding text are to be resolved in favor of this
grammar.
See [RFC5234] for ABNF notation. Please note that as per this ABNF
definition, literal text strings (those in quotes) are case-
insensitive. Hence, "mx" matches "mx", "MX", "mX", and "Mx".
record = version terms *SP
version = "v=spf1"
terms = *( 1*SP ( directive / modifier ) )
directive = [ qualifier ] mechanism
qualifier = "+" / "-" / "?" / "~"
mechanism = ( all / include
/ A / MX / PTR / IP4 / IP6 / exists )
all = "all"
include = "include" ":" domain-spec
A = "a" [ ":" domain-spec ] [ dual-cidr-length ]
MX = "mx" [ ":" domain-spec ] [ dual-cidr-length ]
PTR = "ptr" [ ":" domain-spec ]
IP4 = "ip4" ":" ip4-network [ ip4-cidr-length ]
IP6 = "ip6" ":" ip6-network [ ip6-cidr-length ]
exists = "exists" ":" domain-spec
modifier = redirect / explanation / unknown-modifier
redirect = "redirect" "=" domain-spec
explanation = "exp" "=" domain-spec
unknown-modifier = name "=" macro-string
; where name is not any known modifier
ip4-cidr-length = "/" 1*DIGIT
ip6-cidr-length = "/" 1*DIGIT
dual-cidr-length = [ ip4-cidr-length ] [ "/" ip6-cidr-length ]
ip4-network = qnum "." qnum "." qnum "." qnum
qnum = DIGIT ; 0-9
/ %x31-39 DIGIT ; 10-99
/ "1" 2DIGIT ; 100-199
/ "2" %x30-34 DIGIT ; 200-249
/ "25" %x30-35 ; 250-255
; conventional dotted quad notation. e.g., 192.0.2.0
ip6-network = <as per [RFC 4291], section 2.2>
; e.g., 2001:DB8::CD30
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domain-spec = macro-string domain-end
domain-end = ( "." toplabel [ "." ] ) / macro-expand
toplabel = ( *alphanum ALPHA *alphanum ) /
( 1*alphanum "-" *( alphanum / "-" ) alphanum )
; LDH rule plus additional TLD restrictions
; (see [RFC3696], Section 2 for background)
alphanum = ALPHA / DIGIT
explain-string = *( macro-string / SP )
macro-string = *( macro-expand / macro-literal )
macro-expand = ( "%{" macro-letter transformers *delimiter "}" )
/ "%%" / "%_" / "%-"
macro-literal = %x21-24 / %x26-7E
; visible characters except "%"
macro-letter = "s" / "l" / "o" / "d" / "i" / "p" / "h" /
"c" / "r" / "t" / "v"
transformers = *DIGIT [ "r" ]
delimiter = "." / "-" / "+" / "," / "/" / "_" / "="
name = ALPHA *( ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "_" / "." )
header-field = "Received-SPF:" [CFWS] result FWS [comment FWS]
[ key-value-list ] CRLF
result = "pass" / "fail" / "softfail" / "neutral" /
"none" / "temperror" / "permerror"
key-value-list = key-value-pair *( ";" [CFWS] key-value-pair )
[";"]
key-value-pair = key [CFWS] "=" ( dot-atom / quoted-string )
key = "client-ip" / "envelope-from" / "helo" /
"problem" / "receiver" / identity /
mechanism / name
identity = "mailfrom" ; for the "MAIL FROM" identity
/ "helo" ; for the "HELO" identity
/ name ; other identities
ALPHA = <A-Z / a-z as per [RFC5234]>
DIGIT = <0-9 as per [RFC5234]>
SP = <space character as per [RFC5234]>
domain = <fully qualified domain as per [RFC5321]>
dot-atom = <unquoted word as per [RFC5322]>
quoted-string = <quoted string as per [RFC5322]>
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comment = <comment string as per [RFC5322]>
CFWS = <comment or folding white space as per [RFC5322]>
FWS = <folding white space as per [RFC5322]>
CRLF = <standard end-of-line token as per [RFC5322]>
authserv-id = <authserv-id per [RFC5451]>
reasonspec = <reason per [RFC5451]>
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Appendix B. Extended Examples
These examples are based on the following DNS setup:
; A domain with two mail servers, two hosts
; and two servers at the domain name
$ORIGIN example.com.
@ MX 10 mail-a
MX 20 mail-b
A 192.0.2.10
A 192.0.2.11
amy A 192.0.2.65
bob A 192.0.2.66
mail-a A 192.0.2.129
mail-b A 192.0.2.130
www CNAME example.com.
; A related domain
$ORIGIN example.org.
@ MX 10 mail-c
mail-c A 192.0.2.140
; The reverse IP for those addresses
$ORIGIN 2.0.192.in-addr.arpa.
10 PTR example.com.
11 PTR example.com.
65 PTR amy.example.com.
66 PTR bob.example.com.
129 PTR mail-a.example.com.
130 PTR mail-b.example.com.
140 PTR mail-c.example.org.
; A rogue reverse IP domain that claims to be
; something it's not
$ORIGIN 0.0.10.in-addr.arpa.
4 PTR bob.example.com.
B.1. Simple Examples
These examples show various possible published records for
example.com and which values if <ip> would cause check_host() to
return "pass". Note that <domain> is "example.com".
v=spf1 +all
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-- any <ip> passes
v=spf1 a -all
-- hosts 192.0.2.10 and 192.0.2.11 pass
v=spf1 a:example.org -all
-- no sending hosts pass since example.org has no A records
v=spf1 mx -all
-- sending hosts 192.0.2.129 and 192.0.2.130 pass
v=spf1 mx:example.org -all
-- sending host 192.0.2.140 passes
v=spf1 mx mx:example.org -all
-- sending hosts 192.0.2.129, 192.0.2.130, and 192.0.2.140 pass
v=spf1 mx/30 mx:example.org/30 -all
-- any sending host in 192.0.2.128/30 or 192.0.2.140/30 passes
v=spf1 ptr -all
-- sending host 192.0.2.65 passes (reverse DNS is valid and is in
example.com)
-- sending host 192.0.2.140 fails (reverse DNS is valid, but not
in example.com)
-- sending host 10.0.0.4 fails (reverse IP is not valid)
v=spf1 ip4:192.0.2.128/28 -all
-- sending host 192.0.2.65 fails
-- sending host 192.0.2.129 passes
B.2. Multiple Domain Example
These examples show the effect of related records:
example.org: "v=spf1 include:example.com include:example.net -all"
This record would be used if mail from example.org actually came
through servers at example.com and example.net. Example.org's
designated servers are the union of example.com's and example.net's
designated servers.
la.example.org: "v=spf1 redirect=example.org"
ny.example.org: "v=spf1 redirect=example.org"
sf.example.org: "v=spf1 redirect=example.org"
These records allow a set of domains that all use the same mail
system to make use of that mail system's record. In this way, only
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the mail system's record needs to be updated when the mail setup
changes. These domains' records never have to change.
B.3. DNSBL Style Example
Imagine that, in addition to the domain records listed above, there
are these:
$ORIGIN _spf.example.com.
mary.mobile-users A 127.0.0.2
fred.mobile-users A 127.0.0.2
15.15.168.192.joel.remote-users A 127.0.0.2
16.15.168.192.joel.remote-users A 127.0.0.2
The following records describe users at example.com who mail from
arbitrary servers, or who mail from personal servers.
example.com:
v=spf1 mx
include:mobile-users._spf.%{d}
include:remote-users._spf.%{d}
-all
mobile-users._spf.example.com:
v=spf1 exists:%{l1r+}.%{d}
remote-users._spf.example.com:
v=spf1 exists:%{ir}.%{l1r+}.%{d}
B.4. Multiple Requirements Example
Say that your sender policy requires both that the IP address is
within a certain range and that the reverse DNS for the IP matches.
This can be done several ways, including the following:
example.com. SPF ( "v=spf1 "
"-include:ip4._spf.%{d} "
"-include:ptr._spf.%{d} "
"+all" )
ip4._spf.example.com. SPF "v=spf1 -ip4:192.0.2.0/24 +all"
ptr._spf.example.com. SPF "v=spf1 -ptr +all"
This example shows how the "-include" mechanism can be useful, how an
SPF record that ends in "+all" can be very restrictive, and the use
of De Morgan's Law.
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Appendix C. Further Testing Advice
Another approach that can be helpful to publish records that include
a "tracking exists:" mechanism. By looking at the name server logs,
a rough list can then be generated. For example:
v=spf1 exists:_h.%{h}._l.%{l}._o.%{o}._i.%{i}._spf.%{d} ?all
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Appendix D. Updating Mail Forwarders
There are three places that techniques can be used to ameliorate this
problem.
1. The beginning, when email is first sent (Originating ADMDs).
* "Neutral" results could be given for IP addresses that might
be forwarders, instead of "fail" results based on a list of
known reliable forwarders. For example:
"v=spf1 mx ?exists:%{ir}.whitlist.example.org -all"
This would cause a lookup on an DNS white list (DNSWL) and
cause a result of "fail" only for email not either coming from
the domain's mx host(s) (SPF pass) or white listed sources
(SPF neutral). This, in effect, outsources an element of
sender policy to the maintainer of the whitelist.
* The "MAIL FROM" identity could have additional information in
the local-part that cryptographically identifies the mail as
coming from an authorized source. In this case, such an SPF
record could be used:
"v=spf1 mx exists:%{l}._spf_verify.%{d} -all"
Then, a specialized DNS server can be set up to serve the
_spf_verify subdomain that validates the local-part. Although
this requires an extra DNS lookup, this happens only when the
email would otherwise be rejected as not coming from a known
good source.
Note that due to the 63-character limit for domain labels,
this approach only works reliably if the local-part signature
scheme is guaranteed either to only produce local-parts with a
maximum of 63 characters or to gracefully handle truncated
local-parts.
* Similarly, a specialized DNS server could be set up that will
rate-limit the email coming from unexpected IP addresses.
"v=spf1 mx exists:%{ir}._spf_rate.%{d} -all"
* SPF allows the creation of per-user policies for special
cases. For example, the following SPF record and appropriate
wildcard DNS records can be used:
"v=spf1 mx redirect=%{l1r+}._at_.%{o}._spf.%{d}"
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2. The middle, when email is forwarded (Mediating ADMDs).
* Forwarding services can solve the problem by rewriting the
"MAIL FROM" to be in their own domain. This means mail
rejected from the external mailbox will have to be forwarded
back to the original sender by the forwarding service.
Various schemes to do this exist though they vary widely in
complexity and resource requirements on the part of the
forwarding service.
* Several popular MTAs can be forced from "alias" semantics to
"mailing list" semantics by configuring an additional alias
with "owner-" prepended to the original alias name (e.g., an
alias of "friends: george@example.com, fred@example.org" would
need another alias of the form "owner-friends: localowner").
* Forwarding servers could reject mail that would "fail" SPF if
forwarded using an SMTP reply code of 551, User not local,
(see [RFC5321] section 3.4) to communicate the correct target
address to resend the mail to.
3. The end, when email is received (Receiving ADMDs).
* If the owner of the external mailbox wishes to trust the
forwarding service, he can direct the external mailbox's MTA
to skip SPF tests when the client host belongs to the
forwarding service.
* Tests against other identities, such as the "HELO" identity,
MAY be used to override a failed test against the "MAIL FROM"
identity.
* For larger domains, it might not be possible to have a
complete or accurate list of forwarding services used by the
owners of the domain's mailboxes. In such cases, whitelists
of generally-recognized forwarding services could be employed.
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Appendix E. Mail Services
MSPs (Mail Service Providers - [RFC5598] Section 2.3) that offer mail
services to third-party domains, such as sending of bulk mail, might
want to adjust their configurations in light of the authorization
check described in this document. If the domain part of the "MAIL
FROM" identity used for such email uses the domain of one of the MSPs
domain, then the provider needs only to ensure that its sending host
is authorized by its own SPF record, if any.
If the "MAIL FROM" identity does not use the MSP's domain, then extra
care has to be taken. The SPF record format has several options for
the third-party domain to authorize the service provider's MTAs to
send mail on its behalf. For MSPs, such as ISPs, that have a wide
variety of customers using the same MTA, steps are required to
mitiate the risk of cross-customer forgery (see Section 11.4).
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Appendix F. MTA Relays
Relays are described in [RFC5598] Section 2.2.2. The authorization
check generally precludes the use of arbitrary MTA relays between
sender and receiver of an email message.
Within an organization, MTA relays can be effectively deployed.
However, for purposes of this document, such relays are effectively
transparent. The SPF authorization check is a check between border
MTAs of different ADMDs.
For mail senders, this means that published SPF records have to
authorize any MTAs that actually send across the Internet. Usually,
these are just the border MTAs as internal MTAs simply forward mail
to these MTAs for relaying.
The receiving ADMD will generally want to perform the authorization
check at the boundary MTAs, including all secondary MXs. Internal
MTAs (including MTAs that might serve both as boundary MTAs and
internal relays from secondary MXs when they are processing the
relayed mail stream) then do not perform the authorization test. To
perform the authorization test other than at the boundary, the host
that first transferred the message to the receiving ADMD have to be
determined, which can be difficult to extract from the message header
because (a) header fields can be forged or malformed, and (b) there's
no standard way to encode that information such that it can be
reliably extracted. Testing other than at the boundary is likely to
produce unreliable results.
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Appendix G. Local Policy Considerations
SPF results can be used in combination with other methods to
determine the final local disposition (either positive or negative of
a message. It can also be considered dispositive on its own.
G.1. Policy For SPF Pass
SPF pass results can be used in combination with "white lists" of
known "good" domains to bypass some or all additional pre-delivery
email checks. Exactly which checks and how to determine appropriate
white list entries has to be based on local conditions and
requirements.
G.2. Policy For SPF Fail
SPF fail results can be used to reject messages during the SMTP
transaction based on either "MAIL FROM" or "HELO" identity results.
This reduces resource requirements for various content filtering
methods and conserves bandwidth since rejection can be done before
the SMTP content is transferred. It also gives immediate feedback to
the sender who might then be able to resolve the issue. Due to some
of the issues described above in this section (Section 10), SPF based
rejection does present some risk of rejecting legitimate email when
rejecting based on "MAIL FROM" results.
SPF fail results can alternately be used as one input into a larger
set of evaluations which might, based on a combination with other
evaluation techniques, result in the email being marked negatively in
some way (this might be via delivery to a special spam folder,
modifying subject lines, or other locally determined means).
Developing the details of such an approach have to be based on local
conditions and requirements. Using SPF results in this way does not
have the advantages of resource conservation and immediate feedback
to the sender associated with SMTP rejection, but could produce fewer
undesirable rejections in a well designed system. Such an approach
might result in email that was not authorized by the sending ADMD
being unknowingly delivered to end users.
Either general approach can be used as they both leave a clear
disposition of emails. They are either delivered in some manner or
the sender is notified of the failure. Other dispositions such as
"dropping" or deleting email after acceptance are inappropriate
because they leave uncertainty and reduce the overall reliabilility
and utility of email across the Internet.
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G.3. Policy For SPF Permerror
The "permerror" result (see Section 2.6.7) indicates the SPF
processing module at the receiver determined that the retrieved SPF
policy record could not be interpreted. This gives no true
indication about the authorized use of the data found in the
envelope.
As with all results, implementers have a choice to make regarding
what to do with a message that yields this result. SMTP allows only
a few basic options.
Rejection of the message is an option, in that it is the one thing a
receiver can do to draw attention to the difficulty encountered while
protecting itself from messages that do not have a definite SPF
result of some kind. However, if the SPF implementation is defective
and returns spurious "permerror" results, only the sender is actively
notified of the defect (in the form of rejected mail), and not the
receiver making use of SPF.
The less intrusive handling choice is to deliver the message, perhaps
with some kind of annotation of the difficulty encountered and/or
logging of a similar nature. However, this will not be desirable to
operators that wish to implement SPF checking as strictly as
possible, nor is this sort of passive problem reporting typically
effective.
There is of course the option placing this choice in the hands of the
operator rather than the implementer since this kind of choice is
often a matter of local policy rather than a condition with a
universal solution, but this adds one more piece of complexity to an
already non-trivial environment.
Both implementers and operators need to be cautious of all choices
and outcomes when handling SPF results.
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Appendix H. Protocol Status
SPF has been in development since the summer of 2003 and has seen
deployment beyond the developers beginning in December 2003. The
design of SPF slowly evolved until the spring of 2004 and has since
stabilized. There have been quite a number of forms of SPF, some
written up as documents, some submitted as Internet Drafts, and many
discussed and debated in development forums. The protocol was
originally defined in [RFC4408], which this document replaces.
[RFC4408] was designed to clearly document the protocol defined by
earlier draft specifications of SPF as used in existing
implementations. This updated specification is intended to clarify
identified ambiguities in [RFC4408], resolve techincal issues
identified in post-RFC 4408 deplyment experience, and document widely
deployed extensions to SPF that have been developed since [RFC4408]
was published.
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Appendix I. Experimental History
This document updates and replaces RFC 4408 that was part of a group
of simultaneously published Experimental RFCs (RFC 4405, RFC 4406,
RFC 4407, and RFC 4408) in 2006. At that time the IESG requested the
community observe the success or failure of the two approaches
documented in these RFCs during the two years following publication,
in order that a community consensus could be reached in the future.
SPF is widely deployed by large and small email providers alike.
There are multiple, interoperable implementations.
For SPF (as documented in RFC 4408) a careful effort was made to
collect and document lessons learned and errata during the two year
period. The errata list has been stable (no new submissions) and
only minor protocol lessons learned were identified. Resolution of
the IESG's experiment is documented in [RFC6686].
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Appendix J. Change History
Changes since RFC 4408 (to be removed prior to publication)
Moved to standards track
Authors updated
IESG Note regarding experimental use replaced with discussion of
results
Process errata:
Resolved Section 2.5.7 PermError on invalid domains after macro
expansion errata in favor of documenting that different clients
produce different results.
Add %v macro to ABNF grammar
Replace "uric" by "unreserved"
Recommend an SMTP reply code for optional permerror rejections
Correct syntax in Received-SPF examples
Fix unknown-modifier clause is too greedy in ABNF
Correct use of empty domain-spec on exp modifier
Fix minor typo errata
Convert to spfbis working group draft,
draft-ietf-spfbis-4408bis-00
Addressed Ticket #1, RFC 4408 Section 2.5.6 - Temporary errors by
giving the option to turn repeated SERVFAIL into permerror and
adding RFC 2308 reference.
Clarified text about IPv4 mapped addresses to resolve test suite
ambiguity
Clarified ambiguity about result when more than 10 "mx" or "ptr"
records are returned for lookup to specify permerror. This
resolves one of the test suite ambiguities
Made all references to result codes lower case per issue #7
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Adjusted section 2.2 Requirement to check mail from per issue #15
Added missing "v" element in macro-letter in the collected ABNF
per issue #16 - section 8.1 was already fixed in the pre-WG draft
Marked ptr and "p" macro deprecated/SHOULD NOT use per issue #27
Expunged lower case may from the draft per issue #8
Expunged "x-" name as an obsolete concept
Updated obslete references: RFC2821 to RFC5321, RFC2822 to
RFC5322, and RFC4234 to RFC5234
Refer to RFC6647 to describe greylisting instead of trying to
describe it directly.
Updated informative references to the current versions.
Added definition for deprecated since there are questions.
Start to rework section 9 with some RFC5598 terms.
Added mention of RFC 6552 feedback reports in section 9.
Added draft-ietf-spfbis-experiment as an informational reference.
Drop Type SPF.
Try and clarify informational nature of RFC3696
Fix ABNF nits and add missing definitions per Bill's ABNF checker.
Make DNS lookup time limit SHOULD instead of MAY.
Reorganize and clarify processing limits. Move hard limits to new
section 4.6.4, Evaluation Limits. Move advice to non-normative
section 9.
Removed paragraph in section 10.1 about limiting total data
volumes as it is unused (and removable per the charter) and serves
no purpose (it isn't something that actually can be implemented in
any reasonable way).
Added text and figures from Alessandro Vesely in section 9.1 to
better explain DNS resource limits.
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Multiple editorial fixes from Murray Kucherawy's review.
Also based on Murray's review, reworked SMTP identity definitions
and made RFC 5598 a normative reference instead of informative.
This is a downref that will have to be mentioned in the last call.
Added RFC 3834 as an informative reference about backscatter.
Added IDN requirements and normative reference to RFC 5890 to deal
with the question "like DKIM did it.:
Added informative reference to RFC 4632 for CIDR and use CIDR
prefix length instead of CIDR-length to match its terminology.
Added RFC 5782 informative reference on DNSxLs to support
improving the exists description.
Added text on creating a Authentication-Results header field that
matches the Received-SPF header field information and added a
normative reference to RFC 5451.
Added informative reference to RFC 2782 due to SRV mention.
Added informative reference to RFC 3464 due to DSN mention.
Added informative reference to RFC 5617 for it's DNS wildcard use.
Added informative reference to RFC 5782 to enhance the explanation
of how the exists mechanism works. Clarified the intended match/
no-match method.
Added new sections on Receiver policy for SPF pass, fail, and
permerror.
Added new section 9 discussion on treatment of bounces and the
significance of HELO records.
Added request to IANA to update the SPF modifier registry.
Substantially reorganized the document for improved readability
for new users based on WG consensus.
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Author's Address
Scott Kitterman
Kitterman Technical Services
3611 Scheel Dr
Ellicott City, MD 21042
United States of America
Email: scott@kitterman.com
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