syslog Working Group R. Gerhards
Internet-Draft Adiscon GmbH
Expires: January 13, 2005 July 15, 2004
The syslog Protocol
draft-ietf-syslog-protocol-05.txt
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
of section 3 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, each
author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of
which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of
which he or she become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with
RFC 3668.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as
Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://
www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 13, 2005.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document describes the syslog protocol. The syslog protocol is
used to convey event notifications. This documents describes a
layered architecture for an easily extensible syslog protocol. It
also describes the basic message format and structured elements used
to provide meta-information about the message.
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Definitions and Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Transport Layer Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1 Minimum Required Transport Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Required syslog Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1 Message Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2 HEADER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2.1 VERSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2.2 FACILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2.3 SEVERITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2.4 TIMESTAMP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2.5 HOSTNAME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2.6 TAG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3 STRUCTURED-DATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.3.1 Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.3.2 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.4 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5. Structured Data IDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1 time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1.1 tzknown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1.2 issynced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1.3 syncaccuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.1.4 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2 origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.2.1 format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.2.2 ip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.2.3 enterpriseID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.2.4 software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.2.5 version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.2.6 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.1 Diagnostic Logging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.2 Control Characters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.3 Packet Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.4 Single Source to a Destination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.5 Multiple Sources to a Destination . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.6 Multiple Sources to Multiple Destinations . . . . . . . . 31
6.7 Replaying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.8 Reliable Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.9 Message Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.10 Large Size Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.11 Message Observation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.12 Misconfiguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.13 Forwarding Loop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.14 Load Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.15 Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
6.16 Covert Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7. Notice to RFC Editor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
8.1 Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
8.2 SD-IDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
8.3 Facility and Severities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
9. Authors and Working Group Chair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 40
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
1. Introduction
This document describes the semantics of the syslog protocol,
outlines transport mappings and provides a standard format for all
syslog messages. It also describes structured data elements, which
can be used to precisely define specific message aspects. Many of
these structured data elements carry optional information and are
optional themselves.
This document describes a layered architecture for syslog. The goal
of this architecture is to separate the functionality into separate
layers and thus provide easy extensibility.
In order to claim compliance with this document, an implementation
MUST at least implement all REQUIRED parts. Optional parts must not
necessarily be implemented.
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
2. Definitions and Architecture
The following definitions will be used in this document:
o An application that can generate a message will be called a
"sender".
o An application that can receive a message will be called a
"receiver".
o An application that can receive the message and forward it to
another machine will be called a "relay".
o An application that receives the message and does not relay it to
any other receivers will be called a "collector". This has been
commonly known as a "syslog server".
There are applications that both receive messages and forward them to
another applicaton AND generate syslog messages themselfs. An
example for this may be an application that operates as a syslog
relay as one service while at the same time running other services.
These services may be monitored by the same application, generating
new syslog messages. Such an application acts both as a relay AND a
sender. This case is specifically mentioned as the role an
application plays has special significance, for example on
formatting. An application as described here may thus have two
separate configurations for each of the applications's operations
modes.
A given device may run multiple syslog instances. Thus, a device can
potentially be a sender, receiver, collector and relay all in once.
The key point is that there is not necessarily a direct relationship
between the syslog-enabled application and the device it is running
on. This is important to note because syslog was traditionally used
on many low-powered devices acting only as syslog senders. People
still tend to think of a syslog sender as a "device" - so it is
important to note that this is not necessarily correct.
The architecture of syslog appplications may be summarized as
follows:
o Senders send messages to relays or collectors with no knowledge of
whether it is a collector or relay.
o Senders may be configured to send the same message to multiple
receivers.
o Relays may send all or some of the messages that they receive to a
subsequent relay or collector. In the case where they do not
forward all of their messages, they are acting as both a collector
and a relay. In the following diagram, these applications will be
designated as relays.
o Relays may also generate their own messages and send them on to
subsequent relays or collectors. In that case it is acting as a
sender. These applications will also be designated as a relay in
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
the following diagram.
The following architectures shown in Diagram 1 are valid while the
first one has been known to be the most prevalent. Other
arrangements of these examples are also acceptable. As noted above,
in the following diagram relays may pass along all or some of the
messages that they receive along with passing along messages that
they internally generate.
+------+ +---------+
|Sender|---->----|Collector|
+------+ +---------+
+------+ +-----+ +---------+
|Sender|---->----|Relay|---->----|Collector|
+------+ +-----+ +---------+
+------+ +-----+ +-----+ +---------+
|Sender|-->--|Relay|-->--..-->--|Relay|-->--|Collector|
+------+ +-----+ +-----+ +---------+
+------+ +-----+ +---------+
|Sender|---->----|Relay|---->----|Collector|
| |-\ +-----+ +---------+
+------+ \
\ +-----+ +---------+
\-->--|Relay|---->----|Collector|
+-----+ +---------+
+------+ +---------+
|Sender|---->----|Collector|
| |-\ +---------+
+------+ \
\ +-----+ +---------+
\-->--|Relay|---->----|Collector|
+-----+ +---------+
+------+ +-----+ +---------+
|Sender|---->----|Relay|---->-------|Collector|
| |-\ +-----+ /--| |
+------+ \ / +---------+
\ +-----+ /
\-->--|Relay|-->--/
+-----+
+------+ +-----+ +---------+
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
|Sender|---->-----|Relay|---->----------|Collector|
| |-\ +-----+ /--| |
+------+ \ / +---------+
\ +--------+ /
\ |+------+| /
\-->-||Relay ||->---/
|+------|| /
||Sender||->-/
|+------+|
+--------+
Diagram 1. Some possible syslog Architectures
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
3. Transport Layer Protocol
This document DOES NOT specify a specific transport layer protocol.
Instead, it describes the format of a syslog message in a transport
layer independent way.
Transport mappings being defined MUST ensure that a message formatted
according to this document can be transmitted unaltered over the
mapping. If the mapping needs to perform temporary transformations,
it must be guaranteed that the message received at the final
destination is an exact copy of the message sent from the initial
originator. This is vital because otherwise cryptographic verifiers
(like signatures) would be broken.
3.1 Minimum Required Transport Mapping
To claim compliance with this document, each implementation MUST at
least implement the UDP transport mapping described in Anton
Okmianski "Transmission of syslog messages over UDP"
(draft-ietf-syslog-transport-udp-01). This is to ensure a minimum
interoperability between systems implementing this document.
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
4. Required syslog Format
The syslog message has the following ABNF [8] definition:
; The general syslog message format
SYSLOG-MSG = HEADER STRUCTURED-DATA MSG
HEADER = "V" VERSION SP SP FACILITY SP
SEVERITY SP TIMESTAMP SP HOSTNAME SP TAG SP
VERSION = 1*3DIGIT
FACILITY = 1*10DIGIT ; range 0..2147483648
SEVERITY = "0" / "1" / "2" / "3" / "4" / "5" /
"6" / "7"
HOSTNAME = 1*255PRINTUSASCII ; a FQDN
TAG = SENDER-NAME SP SENDER-INST; 64 chars max
SENDER-NAME = 1*48VISUAL
SENDER-INST = 1*16VISUAL
VISUAL = (%d33-57/%d59-126) ; all but SP
TIMESTAMP = full-date "T" full-time
date-fullyear = 4DIGIT
date-month = 2DIGIT ; 01-12
date-mday = 2DIGIT ; 01-28, 01-29, 01-30, 01-31 based on
; month/year
time-hour = 2DIGIT ; 00-23
time-minute = 2DIGIT ; 00-59
time-second = 2DIGIT ; 00-58, 00-59, 00-60 based on leap
; second rules
time-secfrac = "." 1*6DIGIT
time-offset = "Z" / time-numoffset
time-numoffset = ("+" / "-") time-hour ":" time-minute
partial-time = time-hour ":" time-minute ":" time-second
[time-secfrac]
full-date = date-fullyear "-" date-month "-" date-mday
full-time = partial-time time-offset
STRUCTURED-DATA = *STR-DATA-ELT SP
MSG = *OCTET ; VALID UTF-8 String
OCTET = %d00..255
LF = %d10
CR = %d13
SP = %d32
PRINTUSASCII = %d33-126
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
; Format of structured data element
STR-DATA-ELT = "[" SD-ID 0*(1*SP SD-PARAM) *SP "]"
SD-ID = SD-ID-IANA / SD-ID-EXPERI
SD-ID-IANA = 1*1ID-CHAR [1*1ID-CHARNOSLASH [1*62ID-CHAR]]
SD-ID-EXPERI = %d120 "-" 1*62ID-CHAR ; "x-" (lower case 'x'!)
ID-CHAR = %d32-33 / %d35-60 / %d62-92 / %d94-126 /
%d128-254
; all US-ASCII but '"' (%d34), '=' (%d61), ']'
; (%d93)
ID-CHARNOSLASH = %d32-33 / %d35-44 / %d46-60 / %d62-92 /
%d94-126 / %d128-254
; same as ID-CHAR but without '-' (%d45)
SD-PARAM = PARAM-ID "=%d34" PARAM-VALUE "%d34"
PARAM-ID = 1*64ID-CHAR
PARAM-VALUE = *(SAFE-CHAR / ESCAPED-CHAR)
SAFE-CHAR = *((%d32-33) / (%d35-46) / (%d48-92) /
(%d94-126) / (%d128-254))
ESCAPED-CHAR = ("\\" / %d47.34 / "]") ; 47.34 is \"
4.1 Message Length
The maximum length of any syslog message is 16,000,000 bytes. Any
receiver receiving a larger message MUST discard the message. A
diagnostic message SHOULD be logged in this case.
In order to claim compliance with this document, an implementation
MUST support messages of at least 65,000 bytes.
A receiver MAY support messages longer than the minumum outlined
above. However, it MUST NOT do so. The receiver MAY support any
length between the minimum and the maximum lengthes defined. If it
receives messages within the maximum length, but with a length larger
than it handles, the receiver MAY either discard the message as whole
or MAY truncate it.
As such, a sender MUST NOT assume that a message can processed by all
receivers if it is larger than the minimum length defined here. If
the message generated is larger, the most important parts of the
message SHOULD be placed early in the message (within the minimum
length area). This ensures the most important parts will be seen by
the receiver even if it (or an interim relay) truncates the message.
For performance and usability reasons, a sender SHOULD try to limit
the message to have a maximum size of 480 bytes (total including the
header part).
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
4.2 HEADER
The header MUST contain the token identifying the message as a syslog
message complying with this specification, the version of the
specification it complies to, the facility, the severity, the
timestamp, the hostname and the tag. Each of this fields MUST be
present and MUST be of correct syntax. The code set used in the
HEADER MUST be seven-bit ASCII in an eight-bit field as described in
RFC 2234 [8]. These are the ASCII codes as defined in "USA Standard
Code for Information Interchange" ANSI.X3-4.1968 [2].
If the header is not syntactically correct, the receiver MUST NOT try
to sub-parse some of the header fields in order to find a "good"
interpretation. However, the receiver MAY assume it is a RFC3164
compliant message and MAY decide to process it as such. In this
case, RFC3164 semantics MUST be used.
As a note to implementors, the "V" token at the very beginning of the
message MAY be used as a rough indication whether or not the message
complies to this document. However, it is not sufficient to assume
it complies to this document just because the first character is a
"V". As written above, the full header MUST be validated to assume
this.
4.2.1 VERSION
The Version field denotes the version of the syslog protocol
specification the message is formatted to. It is used to uniquely
identify the message format should later revisions of the syslog
protocol specification change the format.
Note well: this document is the first to specify this format,
including the VERSION in the header. Any previous syslog
specification had a different header. As outlined under HEADER
above, an invalid HEADER will automatically tell the receiver that
the message is NOT compliant to this specification. As such, all
version information is well defined (absence of version information
means legacy syslog by the fact that the header is invalid).
The VERSION MUST be a numerical value. It MUST be one of the IANA
assigned valid VERSION numbers. It starts at 1, which means the
format specified in this document. The VERSION number MUST be
incremented for each new syslog protocol specification that changes
the format. If MUST NOT be incremented if a new syslog protocol
specification does not change the syntax and semantics of the message
format.
The sender of the syslog message MUST specify the VERSION of the
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
format that the message was formatted to.
The receiver MUST check the VERSION. If the VERSION is within the
set of format versions supported by the receiver, the receiver MUST
parse the message according to the correct syslog protcol
specification. A receiver MUST NOT parse a previous version with
some parsing rules from a later specification.
If the receiver does not support the specified VERSION, it SHOULD log
a diagnostic message. It SHOULD NOT parse beyond the VERSION field.
This is because the header format may have changed in a newer
version. It SHOULD NOT try to process the message, but I MAY try
this if the administrator has configured the receiver to do so. In
the later case, the results may be undefined. If the administrator
has instructed the receiver to parse non-supported version, it SHOULD
assume that these messages are legacy syslog messages and parse and
process them in respect to RFC 3164. Again, the administrator MAY
configure the receiver to use a different algorithm.
To be precise, a receiver receiving an unknown VERSION number, MUST,
by default, ignore it. The administrator may configure it to not
ignore it. Then, the receiver MUST, by default, parse it according
to RFC 3164. The administrator may again override this setting. In
this case, the receiver MAY use whatever method the administor has
choosen. In this case, the receiver MUST ensure that no application
reliability issue occurs. If there is a chance for this, it MUST NOT
allow the administrator to select an insecure mode.
The spirit of this behaviour is that the administrator may sometime
need the power to allow overriding of version-specific parsing, but
this should be done in the most secure and reliable way. Therefore,
the receiver MUST use the appropriate defaults specified above. This
document is so specific on the defaults and modes because it is
common experience that parsing unknown formats often leads to
security issues.
4.2.2 FACILITY
The facility is primarily a way to filter messages at the receiver.
It is a numerical value. There exist some traditional facility code
semantics for the codes in the range from 0 to 23. These semantics
are not closely followed by all vendors, softwares and senders.
Therefore, no specifc semantics for facility codes are implied in
this document.
FACILITY is just a sender-supplied numerical identifier that can be
used for filtering by the receiver. The facility in itself does not
have any semantics. Semantics MUST be applied by site configuration
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
(through the site's administrator).
Any implementation of this document MUST support free configuration
of the FACILITY on the sender.
4.2.3 SEVERITY
The SEVERITY field is used to indicate the severity that the sender
of the message assgined to it. It is a numerical value with just few
values. The traditional syslog severity values are reused, because
they have prooven to be useful and sufficient in reality.
SEVERITY is a numerical field, which MUST contain one of the digits
from 0 to 7. Any other value is invalid and MUST NOT be used.
Each of the numerical codes has been assigned the follwing semantics:
Numerical Severity
Code
0 Emergency: system is unusable
1 Alert: action must be taken immediately
2 Critical: critical conditions
3 Error: error conditions
4 Warning: warning conditions
5 Notice: normal but significant condition
6 Informational: informational messagestoday's activity chart
7 Debug: debug-level messages
All implementations SHOULD try to assign the most appropriate
severity to their message. Most importantly, test aid like messages
or programm debugging information SHOULD be assiged severity 7.
Severity 0 SHOULD be reserved for high-priviledge core processes of
very high importance (like serious hardware failures or a very soon
power failure). An implementation MAY use severities 0 and 7 for
other purposes if this is configured by the administrator.
In general, a receiver should abide to the fact that severities are
often very subjective. As such, a receiver MUST not assume that all
senders have the same sense of severities.
4.2.4 TIMESTAMP
The TIMESTAMP field is a formalized timestamp as taken from RFC 3339
[12].
Note well: RFC 3339 makes allowances for multiple syntaxes for a
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
timestamp to be used in various cases. This document mandates a
restricted set of syntaxes. The primary characteristics of TIMESTAMP
used in this document are as follows.
o the "T" and "Z" characters in this syntax MUST be upper case.
o usage of the "T" character is mandatory. It MUST NOT be replaced
by any other character (like a SP character).
o the sender SHOULD include time-secfrac (fractional seconds) if its
clock accuracy and performance permits.
o the entire length of the TIMESTAMP field MUST NOT exceed 32
characters.
Please also note that RFC 3339 permits the value "60" in the second
part to indicate a leap second. This must not be misinterpreted. As
a suggestion for application developer, it is advised to replace the
value "60" if seen in the header, with the value "59" if it otherwise
can not be processed, e.g. stored to a database. It SHOULD NOT be
converted to the first second of the next minute. Please note that
such a conversion, if done on the message text itself, will cause
cryptographical signatures to become invalid. As such, it is
suggested that the adjustment is not done when the plain message text
is to be stored (e.g. for later verification of signatures).
Two samples of this format are:
1985-04-12T23:20:50.52Z
1985-04-12T18:20:50.52-06:00
The first represents 20 minutes and 50.52 seconds after the 23rd hour
of April 12th, 1985 in UTC. The second represents the same time but
expressed in the Eastern US timezone (daylight savings time being
observed).
A single space character MUST follow the TIMESTAMP field.
4.2.4.1 Syslog Senders without knowledge of Time
There is one special case, and this is a syslog sender that is NOT
aware of time at all. It can be argued if such a syslog sender is
something that actually can be found in todays IT infrastructure.
However, discussion has indicated that those things may exist in
reality and as such there should be a guideline what to do in such a
case. The other assumes that those syslog senders will most probably
be found in embeded devices.
Note well: an implementation MUST emit a valid TIMESTAMP if the
underlying operating system, programming system and hardware is
capable of doing so. A proper TIMESTAMP MUST be emited even if it is
hard, but doable, to obtain the system time. The rule outlined here
MUST only be used when there is absolutely no way to obtain time
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
information from the system environment. This rule MUST NOT be used
as an excuse for lazy implementations.
A syslog sender who has absolutely no way of obtaining system time
from its environment, MUST write the following TIMESTAMP:
2000-01-01T00:00:60Z
This TIMESTAMP is in the past, but more importantly, it shows a time
that never existed, because January, 1st 2000 had no leap second
(note the 60 in the second indicator). As such, this TIMESTAMP can
never exist in a valid syslog message, but it is still syntactially
correct in regard to the ABNF above.
If a syslog receiver receives this TIMESTAMP it MUST treat the
TIMESTAMP to be well-formed but MUST also know that the sender had no
idea of what the time actually is. It is left to the application
devloper what this means for further processing of the message (this
is beyond the scope of this document).
4.2.5 HOSTNAME
The HOSTNAME field contains the original creator of the syslog
message.
The HOSTNAME field SHOULD contain the host name and the domain name
of the originator in the format specified in STD 13 [3]. This format
will be referred to in this document as HOSTNAME-STD13.
If the HOSTNAME-STD13 is not known to the orginator, but it knows its
statically assigned IP address, it SHOULD use either its statically
assigned IPv4 address or its statically assigned IPv6 address.
If the IP address is not statically assigned, it SHOULD specify its
host name (without domain name).
If the host name is not known, it SHOULD specify its dynamically
assigned IPv4 or IPv6 address.
If the sender does not know its IP address at all, it SHOULD provide
the value "0.0.0.0" if it knowns it has an IPv4 stack and
"0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0" if it knows it has an IPv6 stack.
If the sender does not know anything about its identity or the type
of stack used, it MUST provide the value "0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0".
If an IPv4 address is used, it MUST be shown as the dotted decimal
notation as used in STD 13 [4], and will be referred to as
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
HOSTNAME-IPV4. If an IPv6 address is used, any valid textual
representation used in RFC 2373 [9], section 2 MUST be used and will
be referred to as HOSTNAME-IPV6.
If a sender has multiple IP addresses, it SHOULD use a consistent
value in the HOSTNAME field. This consistent value MUST be one of
its actual IP addresses. If a sender is running on a machine which
has been assigned addresses both statically and dynamically, that
consistent value SHOULD be from the statically assigned addresses.
As an alternative, it MAY use the IP address of the interface that is
used to send the message.
Please note that the "SHOULD"s above are very strong "SHOULD"s.
Please consider them to being "MUST"s, except that an
operator-override of the precedence is allowed. The default settings
MUST be as specified above.
A single space character MUST follow the HOSTNAME field.
4.2.6 TAG
The TAG is a way to facilitate identification of classes of syslog
messages at the receiver. The TAG is composed of a more or less
static part, which identifies the sender and a dynamic part, which
identifies a specific sender instance (at least this is the
intention).
These two parts are included in their very own fields, which are
described below. The author has decided to use the name "TAG" as an
umbrella for these two fields, because this is historically
well-known syslog terminology. As such, it is easier to understand
the meaning of these two fields if the well-known term is being used.
4.2.6.1 SENDER-NAME
The SENDER-NAME is a string of visible (printing) characters
excluding SP, that MUST NOT exceed 48 characters in length. The
first occurrence of a SP (space) will terminate the SENDER-NAME
field, but is not part of it.
The SENDER-NAME SHOULD identify the sender. For example, it may
include a configured name (e.g. "MySuperSender") or the (partial)
image name of the application senden (e.g. "postfix/smtpd"). The
basic idea is that SENDER-NAME should be relatively static during the
lifespan of a sender.
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
4.2.6.2 SENDER-INST
The SENDER-INST is a string of visible (printing) characters
excluding SP, that MUST NOT exceed 16 characters in length. The
first occurrence of a SP (space) will terminate the SENDER-INST
field, but is not part of it.
The SENDER-INST SHOULD identify a specific instance of the sender
process. It is recommended to provide an operating system process
ID, eventually together with a thread ID, if these things exist.
There is no specific format for this information required.
If the sender has no concept (or knowledge) of its instance, a dash
"-" SHOULD be placed inside SENDER-INST. A sender aware of its
instance SHOULD NOT place a dash inside SENDER-INST. In the remote
case the dash may actually be the instance ID, the sender SHOULD
escape it in some way, e.g. by sepcifying "ID:-".
The objective behind SENDER-INST is to provide a quick, but
unreliable, way to detect a new instance of the same sender.
Properly used, the SENDER-INST can be especially helpful for analysis
purposes. However, a receiver MUST NOT assume that the SENDER-INST
is actually instance-specific and MUST work flawlessly even if the
SENDER-INST never changes.
4.3 STRUCTURED-DATA
While syslog traditionally contains freeform data, the structured
data field is used to represent well-structured data. Structured
data are special, well defined data elements designed to be easily
computer-parsable. They may transport meta data for the syslog
protocol as well as application-defined information (like traffic
counters, IP addresses and other well-defined elements).
Structured data elements MUST be present in the STRUCTURED-DATA
field. This field MUST be followed by a SP character. Structured
data elements themselvs contain SP characters, but only within a
single element. These "in-element" SP characters MUST NOT be
mistaken as terminators of the STRUCTURED-DATA field. Structured
data elements MUST immediately follow each other, without any SP in
between.
The code set used in STRUCTURED-DATA must be UNICODE. It MUST be
encoded in UTF-8 as specified in RFC 2279 [7]. A sender MAY issue
any valid UTF-8 sequence. A receiver MUST accept any valid UTF-8
sequence. Most importantly, it must not fail if control characters
are present in the STRUCTURED-DATA part.
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
There is a certain set of structured data that is under IANA control.
These structured data elements are described in this and other RFCs.
A second set of structured data elements is not under IANA-control.
This set MUST be used for experimental or vendor-specific elements.
A syslog message may contain none, one or multiple structured data
elements.
4.3.1 Format
Structured data elements MUST conform to the ABNF above.
Each structured data element MUST begin with the token "[". It also
MUST end with the token "]". These tokens define the begin and end
of the element. SP characters may occur within the element, but not
outside of it.
The beginning token MUST immediatly be followed by the ID of the
structured data element. No space is allowed between the beginning
token and the SD-ID. The SD-ID uniquely identifies the type and
purpose of the element.
IANA controls ALL SD-IDs without a hyphen '-' in the second character
position. Experimental or vendor-specific SD-IDs MUST start with
"x-". Values with a hypen on the second character position and the
first character position not being a lower case "x" are undefined and
SHOULD NOT be used. Receivers MAY accept them.
If a receiver receives a well-formed but unknown SD-ID, the receiver
SHOULD ignore this element. It MUST NOT malfunction because of this
unknown SD-ID.
The SD-ID is followed by none, one or many optional parameter/value
pairs. Each of them MUST start with the parameter name, MUST be
followed by an equal sign and a quote sign. There MUST NOT be any
space between the SD-ID, the equal and the quote sign. This is
followed by the parameter value and then another quote sign.
The parameter value may contain any character, but the three special
characters '"', '\' and ']' MUST be escaped. This is neccessary to
avoid parsing errors. Please note that escaping ']' would actually
not be necessary but is required in order to avoid parser
implementation errors. Each of these three characters MUST be
escaped as '\"', '\\' and '\]' respectively.
A backslash ('\') followed by none of the three described characters
is considered an invalid escape sequence. Upon reception of such an
invalid message, the receiver MUST replace the two-character sequence
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
with just the second character received. It is recommended that the
receivers logs a diagnostic message in this case. The receiver MUST
otherwise ignore the invalid escape sequence.
Parameter/Value pairs MUST be separated by at least one SP character.
Multiple SP characters MAY be used, but SHOULD be avoided.
The structured data element MUST be terminated by the character ']',
the ending token. This MUST follow the last parameter/value pair.
There SHOULD be no SP in front of the ending token, but there MAY be
one or multiple SP in front of it.
If multiple structured data elements are written, they MUST all
sequentially be written and no SP be written between those elements.
4.3.2 Examples
All examples show the structured data part of the message, only.
examples should be considered to be on one line. They are wrapped on
multiple lines for readabily purposes, only.
Example 1
[x-adiscon-iut iut="3" EventSource="Application"
EventID="1011"]
This example is a structured data element with an experimental SD-ID
of type "x-adiscon-iut" which has two parameters.
Example 2
[x-adiscon-iut iut="3" EventSource="Application"
EventID="1011"][x-adiscon-priority class="high"]
This is the same example, but with a second structured data element.
Please note that the structured data element does immediately follow
the first one.
Example 3 - Invalid
[x-adiscon-iut iut="3" EventSource="Application"
EventID="1011"] [x-adiscon-priority class="high"]
This is more or less the same example as in example 2, but it has a
subtle error. Please note that there is a SP character between the
two structured data elements ("]SP["). This is invalid. It will
The code set used in MSG must be UNICODE. It MUST be encoded in
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
UTF-8 as specified in RFC 2279 [7]. A sender MAY issue any valid
UTF-8 sequence. A receiver MUST accept any valid UTF-8 sequence.
Most importantly, it must not fail if control characters are present
in the MSG part. cause the STRUCTURED-DATA field to end after the
first element. The second element will actually become part of the
MSG field.
Example 4 - Invalid
[ x-adiscon-iut iut="3" EventSource="Application"
EventID="1011"][x-adiscon-priority class="high"]
This example again looks much like example 2. It has another subtle
error. Please note the SP character after the initial bracket. A
structured data element SD-ID must immediately follow the begin
bracket, so the SP character makes this an invalid element.
Example 5
[sigSig Ver="1" RSID="1234" ... Signature="......"]
Example 5 is not a full example. It shows how a hypothetical IANA
assigned SD-ID may be used inside an otherwise empty message. Please
note that the dots denote missing fields, which have been left out
for brevity.
The code set used in MSG must be UNICODE. It MUST be encoded in
UTF-8 as specified in RFC 2279 [7]. A sender MAY issue any valid
UTF-8 sequence. A receiver MUST accept any valid UTF-8 sequence.
Most importantly, it must not fail if control characters are present
in the MSG part.
The code set used in MSG must be UNICODE. It MUST be encoded in
UTF-8 as specified in RFC 2279 [7]. A sender MAY issue any valid
UTF-8 sequence. A receiver MUST accept any valid UTF-8 sequence.
Most importantly, it must not fail if control characters are present
in the MSG part.
The code set used in MSG must be UNICODE. It MUST be encoded in
UTF-8 as specified in RFC 2279 [7]. A sender MAY issue any valid
UTF-8 sequence. A receiver MUST accept any valid UTF-8 sequence.
Most importantly, it must not fail if control characters are present
in the MSG part.
Note to implementors: the octect value 0 (0x00), the C string
terminator, is a valid character and MAY be present in the MSG part.
The implementor must ensure that reception of 0x00 causes no
malfunction, specifically does not cause message truncation. C
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
programmers please be aware that this requires proper escaping and/or
special string handling.
Another note to implementors: please keep the presence of control
characters in mind when writing textual log files. For example, LF
is a valid character and may be present in the MSG part. Writing
this plainly to a log file may cause problems with log parsers and
other programs that process the log file. It is good practice to
escape non-printable characters in a consistent way when writing to
text files.
4.4 Examples
The following examples are given.
Example 1
V1 888 4 2003-10-11T22:14:15.003Z mymachine.example.com su: 'su
root' failed for lonvick on /dev/pts/8
In this example, the VERSION is 1 (formatted according this
document), the FACILITY has the value of 888 (whatever this means is
up to the sender and recipient). The message was created on October,
11th 2003 at 10:14:15pm, 3 milliseconds into the next second. The
timestamp is in UTC. Please note that the sender had millisecond
resolution. The sender may have actually had a better resolution,
but by providing just three digits for the fractional settings, he
does not tell us this. The message orignated from a host that calls
itself "mymachine.example.com". The TAG is "su:". Note that the
colon is part of the tag. Note the TWO SP characters following - the
second SP character is the STRUCTURED-DATA delimiter. It tell us
that no STRUCTURED-DATA is present in this message. The MSG is "'su
root' failed for lonvick...". Please note that the SP characters are
not part of the MSG, they are the seperators.
As a note to implementors: please note that the sender had
millisecond time resolution in this example. A common coding bug is
that leading zeros are not written for fractional seconds. Very
often, the above timestamp is errornously being written as:
"2003-10-11T22:13:14.3". This would indicate 300 milliseconds
instead of the 3 milliseconds that are actually meant. Please make
sure that an implementation handles this correctly.
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
Example 2
V1 20 6 2003-08-24T05:14:15.000003-09:00 10.1.1.1
myproc[10]:%% It's time to
make the do-nuts. %% Ingredients: Mix=OK, Jelly=OK #
Devices: Mixer=OK, Jelly_Injector=OK, Frier=OK # Transport:
Conveyer1=OK, Conveyer2=OK # %%
In this example, the VERSION is again 1. The FACILITY is within the
legacy syslog range (20), as such we assume the user has
specificalhttp://www.adiscon.com/Common/en/products/
winsyslog5-editions.phply configure the sender to use this FACILITY.
The severity is 6 ("Notice" semantics). The timestamp now has
microsecond resolution, indicated by the additional digits in the
fractional seconds. The sender indicates that its local time is -9
hours from UTC. Given the date stamp, we can assume the sender is in
the US Pacific time zone during daylight savings time. The HOSTNAME
is "10.1.1.1", so the sender did not know its host- and domainname
and used the IPv4 address instead. The TAG is "myproc[10]:%%" - we
can speculate that the sender actually wanted the tag to be
"myproc[10]:", but because there was no SP following it, the TAG
continues until the first SP. The message is "It's time to make the
do-nuts......".
Example 3 - An Invalid Message
V1 20 6 2003-08-24T05:14:15.000000003-09:00 10.1.1.1
myproc[10]:%% It's time to
make the do-nuts. %% Ingredients: Mix=OK, Jelly=OK #
Devices: Mixer=OK, Jelly_Injector=OK, Frier=OK # Transport:
Conveyer1=OK, Conveyer2=OK # %%
This example just just like Example 2, but this time the sender is
overdoing with the clock resolution. It is supplying nanosecond
resolution. This will result in the TIME-SECFRAC part to be longer
than the allowed 6 digits, which invalidates the header and thus the
message. A receiver MUST NOT try to "fix" this error. It MUST
detect this as an invalid message and SHOULD log a diagnostic entry.
If the receiver is capable of processing legacy syslog messages, it
MUST assume that this message is legacy syslog and act accordingly.
Example 4 - with STRUCTURED-DATA
V1 888 4 2003-10-11T22:14:15.003Z mymachine.example.com
EvntSLog: [x-adiscon-iut iut="3" EventSource="Application"
EventID="1011"] An application event log entry.
This example is modelled after example one. However, this time it
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
contains a STRUCTURED-DATA, a single element with the value
"[x-adiscon-iut iut="3" EventSource="Application" EventID="1011"]".
The MSG itself is "An application event log entry."
Example 5 - subtle error
V1 888 4 2003-10-11T22:14:15.003Z mymachine.example.com
EvntSLog: [x-adiscon-iut iut="3" EventSource="Application"
EventID="1011"] [x-adiscon-priority class="high"] An
application event log entry.
Here, the sender seems to have intended to send two structured data
elements. However, he included a SP character AFTER the first
element. That space terminates the STRUCTURED-DATA field. So it
will be interpreted as follows. STRUCTURED-DATA is: "[x-adiscon-iut
iut="3" EventSource="Application" EventID="1011"]". The MSG is
"[x-Adiscon-priority class="high"] An application event log entry."
Example 6 - Correct form of Example 5
V1 888 4 2003-10-11T22:14:15.003Z mymachine.example.com
EvntSLog: [x-adiscon-iut iut="3" EventSource="Application"
EventID="1011"][x-adiscon-priority class="high"] An
application event log entry.
This is the corrected form of what has been shown in example 5. Now
the STRUCTURED-DATA is "[x-adiscon-iut iut="3"
EventSource="Application" EventID="1011"] [x-Adiscon-priority
class="high"]" and the MSG is "An application event log entry.".
Example 7 - Just STRUCTURED-DATA
V1 888 4 2003-10-11T22:14:15.003Z mymachine.example.com
EvntSLog: [x-adiscon-iut iut="3" EventSource="Application"
EventID="1011"][x-adiscon-priority class="high"]
This example shows that a message with just STRUCTURED-DATA (and no
MSG part). This is a valid case.
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
5. Structured Data IDs
This section defines the currently IANA-registred structured data IDs
(SD-IDs). See Section 4.3 for a definition of structured data
elements.
5.1 time
The SD-ID "time" is used by the original sender to describe its
notation of system time. This SD-ID SHOULD be written if the sender
is not properly synchronized with a reliable external time source or
if it does not know if its time zone information is correct. It MAY
be written in any other case. The main use of this structured data
element is to provide some information on how much the TIMESTAMP
described in Section 4.2.4 can be trusted.
5.1.1 tzknown
The "tzknown" parameter indicates if the original sender knows its
timezone, as specified in the TIMESTAMP. If so, the value "1" MUST
be used. If the time zone information is in doubt, the value "0"
MUST be used. Please note that if the sender KNOWS its timezone but
decides to emit UTC, the value "1" should still be used (because the
time zone is known).
It is suggested that an implementation uses "0" be default and
changes to "1" only after the administrator has specifically
configured the time zone. The value "1" MAY be used as the default
if the underlying operating system provides accurate time zone
information. It is still advised that the administrator explictely
acknowledges the correctness of the time zone information.
If a system is properly synchronized to an external time zone, the
value "1" should be used in most cases. However, we known of
external time zone synchronizations that do NOT provide the exact
time zone information, just a precise local time. In such (rare)
cases, the "time" structured data element should indicate a properly
synced time but the absence of time zone information by setting the
"tzknown" value to "0".
5.1.2 issynced
The "issynced" parameter indicates if the original sender is
synchronized to a reliable external time source, e.g. via NTP. If
so, the value "1" MUST be provided. If not, the value "0" MUST be
provided.
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
5.1.3 syncaccuracy
The "syncaccuracy" parameter indicates how accurate the original
sender thinks the time synchronization it participates in is.
If the value "0" is used for "issynced", this parameter MUST NOT be
written. If the value "1" is used for "issynced" but the
"syncaccuracy" parameter is absent, a receiver should assume that the
time information provided is accurate enough to be considered
correct. The "syncaccuracy" parameter should ONLY be written if the
original sender actually has knowledge of the reliabilty of the
external time source. In reality, in most cases, it does not have
this - then the "syncaccuracy" parameter MUST not be written to
prevent false impressions.
The "syncaccuracy" parameter is an interger describing the maximum
number of milliseconds that the clock may be off between
synchoronization intervals.
5.1.4 Examples
The following is an example of a system that knows that it does
neither know its time zone nor if it is being synchronized:
[time tzknown="0" issynced="0"]
With this information, the sender indicates that its time information
can not be trusted. This may be a hint for the receiver to use its
local time instead of the message-provided TIMESTAMP for correlation
of multiple messages from different senders.
The following is an example of a system that has knows its time zone
and knows that it is properly synchronized to a reliable external
source:
[time tzknown="1" issynced="1"]
The author considers this to be the typical case. While we do not
know the accuracy of the external time synchronization, the time
stamp should be good enough for all message correlations with other
senders' messages.
Note well: this case SHOULD be assumed by a receiver if no "time"
structured data element is provided by the sender.
The following is an example of a system that knows both its time zone
and that it is externally synchronized. It also knows the accuracy
of the external synchronization:
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
[time tzknown="1" issynced="1" syncaccuracy="60000"]
The difference between this and the previous example is that the
sender knows that its clock will be kept within 60 seconds (more or
less) of the official time. So if the sender reports it is 9:00:00,
it is no earlier than 8:59:00 and no later then 9:01:00.
Knowing the accuracy of the time synchronization can be helpful when
correlating syslog messages.
It is important to not create a false impression of accuracy. A
sender MUST only indicate a given accuracy, if it actually knows it
is within these bounds. It is generally assumed that the sender
gains this in-depth knowledge through operator configuration. As
such, by default, an accuracy should not be provided.
5.2 origin
The SD-ID "origin" is optional. It MAY be used by a sender to
indicate the origin of a syslog message. It has the following
parameters:
5.2.1 format
The "format" parameter is optional. If it is present, it denotes the
format that this message was originally been created in. Its value
MUST be the number of the RFC it complies to. If the message
complies to an Internet-Draft format, it must specifiy the full
internet draft name. For example, as of this writing, format may
either hold the string "3164" (RFC 3164) or
"draft-ietf-syslog-protocol-05.txt".
5.2.2 ip
The "ip" parameter is optional. If it is present, it denotes the IP
address that the sender knows it had at the time of sending this
message. It must be either the textual representation of an IPv4
address or the textual representation of an IPv6 address as outlined
in Section 4.2.5. A host name or FQDN MUST NOT be used inside the
"ip" parameter.
If a sender has multiple IP addresses, it MAY either use a single of
its IP addresses in the "ip" parameter or it MAY include MULTIPLE
"ip" parameters in a single "origin" structured data element.
5.2.3 enterpriseID
The "enterpriseID" is optional. If it is present, it unquily
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
identifies the vender whom's software or device created the message.
By specifying an enterpriseID, the vendor allows more specific
parsing of the message. This may be of aid to log analysers and
similar processes.
The enterprise ID is an integer. It MUST be the enterprise ID
assigned by IANA to the vendor whoms software or device created the
syslog message.
5.2.4 software
The "software" parameter is optional. If it is present, it unquily
identifies the software that created this message. Please note that
when "software" is specified "enterpriseID" SHOULD also be specified,
so that a specific vendor's software can be identified.
Specifying the "software" parameter is an aid to log analysers and
similar processes.
The "software" parameter is a string. It MUST not be longer than 48
characters.
5.2.5 version
The "version" parameter is optional. If it is present, it unquily
identifies the version of the originator that wrote this log message.
This is most useful in combination with the "software" and
"enterpriseID" parameters. If it is used, the "software" and
"enterpriseID" parameters SHOULD be provided, too.
Specifying the "version" parameter is an aid to log analysers and
similar processes.
The "version" is a string. It MUST not be longer than 32 characters.
5.2.6 Example
The following is an example with multiple IP addresses:
[origin format="draft-ietf-syslog-protocol-05.txt" ip="192.0.2.1"
ip="192.0.2.129"]
This example is wrapped for readability. With it, the sender
indicates that it has formatted the message according to this draft
and that it has two ip address, one being 192.0.2.1 and the other one
being 192.0.2.129.
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 27]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
6. Security Considerations
This section is to be updated once the rest of the document has been
confirmed. The current content is incomplete and potentially not in
sync with the rest of the draft.
6.1 Diagnostic Logging
This document, in multiple sections, recommends that an
implementation writes a diagnostic message to indicate unusual
situations or other things noteworthy. Diagnostic messages are a
very useful tool in finding configuration issues as well as a system
penetration.
Unfortunately, diagnostic logging can cause issues by itself, for
example if an attacker tries to create a denial of service condition
by willingly sending malformed messages that will lead to the
creation of diagnostic log entries. Due to sheer volume, the
resulting diagnostic log entries may exhaust system ressources, e.g.
processing power, I/O capability or simply storage space. For
example, an attacker could flood a system with messages generating
diagnostic log entries after he has compromised a system. If the log
entries are stored, e.g. in a circular buffer, the flood of
diagnostic log entries would eventually overwrite useful previous
diagnostics.
Besides this risk, diagnostic message, if they occur too frequently,
can become meaningless to many administrators. Common practice is to
turn off diagnostic logging if it turns out to be too verbose. This
potentially removes the administrator of important diagnostic
information.
While this document recommends to write meaningful diagnostic logs,
the author also recommends to allow an administrator to limit the
amount of diagnostic logging. At least, an implemenation SHOULD
differentiate between critical, informational and debuging diagnostic
message. Critical messages should only be issued in real critical
states, e.g. expected or happening malfunction of the application or
parts of it. A strong indication of an ongoing attack can eventually
alse be considered critical. As a guideline, there should be very
few critical message. Informational message should indicate all
conditions not fully correct, but still within the bounds of normal
processing. A diagnostic message logging the fact that a malformed
message has been received is a good example of this category. A
debug diagnostic message should not be needed during normal
operation, but merely as a tool for setting up or testing a system
(which includes the process of an administrator configuring multiple
syslog applications in a complex environment). An application may
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
decide NOT to provide any debugging diagnostic messages.
An administrator should be able to configure the level for which
diagnostic messages will be written. Non-configured diagnostics
should not be written but discarded. An implementor may create as
many different levels of diagnostic messages as he see useful - the
above recommendation is just based on real-world experience of what
is considered useful. Please not that experience also shows that too
many levels of diagnostics typically do no good, because the typical
administrator may no longer be able to understand what each level
means.
Even with this categorization, a single diagnostic (or a set of them)
may frequnetly be generated when a specific condition exists (or a
system is being attacked). It will lead to the security issues
outlined at the beginning of this section. To solve this, it is
recommended that an implementation allows to set a limit of how many
"same" diagnostic messages will be generated within a limited amount
of time. E.g. an administrator should be able to say that only the
first 50 identical messages are logged within a 30 minute interval.
All subsequent identical messages will be discarded until the next
time interval. While this causes some information loss, it is
considered a good compromise between avoiding overruns and providing
most in-depth diagnostic information. An implementation offering
this feature should allow the administrator to configure the number
of identical messages as well as the time interval to whatever the
administrator thinks to be reasonable for his needs. It is up to the
implementor of what the term "identical" means. Some may decide that
only totally identical (in byte-to-byte comparison) messages are
actually identical, some other may say that a message which is of
identical type but with just some changed parameter (e.g. changed
remote host address) is also considered identical. Both approaches
have there advantages and disadvantages. Probably, it is best to
leave this, too, configurable and allow the administrator to set the
mode.
This document does NOT require nor enforce the outlined diagnostic
message categorization or the duplicate supression feature. It just
would like to show some real-world solutions, which may be helpful
for implementors. A system MAY claim to be compliant to this
document even if it does not implement anything of the above.
6.2 Control Characters
This documents does not impose any restrictions on the MSG content.
As such, MSG MAY contain control characters, including the NUL
character.
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 29]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
In some programming languages (most notably C and C++), the NUL
(0x00) character traditionally has a special significance as string
terminator. Most, if not all, implementations of these languages
assume that a string will NOT extend beyond the first NUL character.
This is primarily a restriction of the supporting run-time libraries.
Please not that this rescriction is also often carried over to
programs and scrip languages written in those languages.
As such, NUL characters must be taken with great care and be properly
handled. An attacker may deliberately include NUL characters to hide
information after the NUL characters. Wrong handling of the NUL
character may also invalidate cryptographic checksums that are
transmitted inside the message.
Many popular text editors are also written in languages with this
restriction. This means that NUL characters should never be written
to a file in an unencoded way - otherwise it would potentially render
the file unreadable.
The same is true for other control characters. For example,
deliberately included backspace characters may be used by an attacker
to render parts of the log message unreadable. Similiar approaches
exist for almost all control characters.
Finally, invalid UTF-8 sequences may be used to inject ASCII control
characters. This is why invalid UTF-8 sequences are not allowed and
MUST be rejected.
6.3 Packet Parameters
The message length MUST NOT exceed the maximum value outlined in
Section 4. Various problems may result if a sender sends out
messages with a greater length. While this document forbids oversize
messages, an attacker may deliberately introduce them. As such, it
is vital that each receiver performs the necessary sanity checks.
6.4 Single Source to a Destination
The syslog messages are usually presented (placed in a file,
displayed on the console, etc.) in the order in which they are
received. This is not always in accordance with the sequence in
which they were generated. As they are transmitted across an IP
network, some out of order receipt should be expected. This may lead
to some confusion a messages may be received that would indicate that
a process has stopped before it was started. This is somewhat
rectified as the sender had timestamped each of the messages before
transmission. Please note, however, that the TIMESTAMP is not always
accurate.
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 30]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
It is desirable to use a transport with guaranteed delivery, if such
one is available.
6.5 Multiple Sources to a Destination
In syslog, there is no concept of unified event numbering. Single
senders are free to include a sequence number within the MSG but that
can hardly be coordinated between multiple senders. In such cases,
multiple senders may report that each one is sending message number
one. Again, this may be rectified somewhat by the TIMESTAMP. As has
been noted, however, even messages from a single sender to a single
collector may be received out of order. This situation is compounded
when there are several senders configured to send their syslog
messages to a single collector. Messages from one sender may be
delayed so the collector receives messages from another sender first
even though the messages from the first sender were generated before
the messages from the second. If there is no suffciently-precise
timestamp or coordinated sequence number, then the messages may be
presented in the order in which they were received which may give an
inaccurate view of the sequence of actual events.
6.6 Multiple Sources to Multiple Destinations
The plethora of configuration options available to the network
administrators may further skew the perception of the order of
events. It is possible to configure a group of senders to send the
status messages -or other informative messages- to one collector,
while sending messages of relatively higher importance to another
collector. Additionally, the messages may be sent to different files
on the same collector. If the messages do not contain
sufficiently-precise timestamps from the source, it may be difficult
to order the messages if they are kept in different places. An
administrator may not be able to determine if a record in one file
occurred before or after a record in a different file. This may be
somewhat alleviated by placing marking messages with a timestamp into
all destination files. If these have coordinated timestamps, then
there will be some indication of the time of receipt of the
individual messages. As such, it is highly recommended to use the
best available precision in the TIMESTAMP and use automatic time
synchronization on each systems (as, for example, can be done via
NTP).
6.7 Replaying
This needs also to be addressed in each transport mapping. Here is
the general information on the issue, the transport mapping should
address the specifcs for the transport in question.
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 31]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
Messages may be recorded and replayed at a later time. An attacker
may record a set of messages that indicate normal activity of a
machine. At a later time, that attacker may remove that machine from
the network and replay the syslog messages to the collector. Even
with a TIMESTAMP field in the HEADER part, an attacker may record the
packets and could simply modify them to reflect the current time
before retransmitting them. The administrators may find nothing
unusual in the received messages and their receipt would falsely
indicate normal activity of the machine.
6.8 Reliable Delivery
As there is no mechanism within either the syslog process or the
protocol to ensure delivery, and since the underlying transport may
be lossy (e.g. UDP), some messages may be lost. They may either be
dropped through network congestion, or they may be maliciously
intercepted and discarded. The consequences of the drop of one or
more syslog messages cannot be determined. If the messages are
simple status updates, then their non-receipt may either not be
noticed, or it may cause an annoyance for the system operators. On
the other hand, if the messages are more critical, then the
administrators may not become aware of a developing and potentially
serious problem. Messages may also be intercepted and discarded by
an attacker as a way to hide unauthorized activities.
RFC 3195 may be used for the reliable delivery of all syslog
messages.
6.9 Message Integrity
Besides being discarded, syslog messages may be damaged in transit,
or an attacker may maliciously modify them. In the case of a packet
containing a syslog message being damaged, there are various
mechanisms built into the link layer as well as into the IP [9] and
UDP protocols which may detect the damage. An intermediary router
may discard a damaged IP packet [10]. Damage to a UDP packet may be
detected by the receiving UDP module, which may silently discard it.
Depending on the transport used, additional or other mechanisms may
be available. In any case, the original contents of the message will
not be delivered to the collector. Additionally, if an attacker is
positioned between the sender and collector of syslog messages, they
may be able to intercept and modify those messages while in-transit
to hide unauthorized activities.
6.10 Large Size Messages
Messages larger than the minumum size required to be supported by the
transport may be discarded or truncated by either a relay or the
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 32]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
receiver. This can also lead to message loss, as already indicated
above.
In order to avoid this, it is recommended that no sender does
generate messages larger than the minimum size, at least not by
default.
6.11 Message Observation
While there are no strict guidelines pertaining to the event message
format, most syslog messages are generated in human readable form
with the assumption that capable administrators should be able to
read them and understand their meaning. Neither the syslog protocol
nor the syslog application have mechanisms to provide confidentiality
of the messages in transit. In most cases passing clear-text
messages is a benefit to the operations staff if they are sniffing
the packets off of the wire. The operations staff may be able to
read the messages and associate them with other events seen from
other packets crossing the wire to track down and correct problems.
Unfortunately, an attacker may also be able to observe the human-
readable contents of syslog messages. The attacker may then use the
knowledge gained from those messages to compromise a machine or do
other damage.
6.12 Misconfiguration
Since there is no control information distributed about any messages
or configurations, it is wholly the responsibility of the network
administrator to ensure that the messages are actually going to the
intended recipient. Cases have been noted where senders were
inadvertently configured to send syslog messages to the wrong
receiver. In many cases, the inadvertent receiver may not be
configured to receive syslog messages and it will probably discard
them. In certain other cases, the receipt of syslog messages has
been known to cause problems for the unintended recipient. If
messages are not going to the intended recipient, then they cannot be
reviewed or processed.
6.13 Forwarding Loop
As it is shown in Figure 1, machines may be configured to relay
syslog messages to subsequent relays before reaching a collector. In
one particular case, an administrator found that he had mistakenly
configured two relays to forward messages with certain Priority
values to each other. When either of these machines either received
or generated that type of message, it would forward it to the other
relay. That relay would, in turn, forward it back. This cycle did
cause degradation to the intervening network as well as to the
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 33]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
processing availability on the two devices. Network administrators
must take care to not cause such a death spiral.
6.14 Load Considerations
Network administrators must take the time to estimate the appropriate
size of the syslog receivers. An attacker may perform a Denial of
Service attack by filling the disk of the collector with false
messages. Placing the records in a circular file may alleviate this
but that has the consequence of not ensuring that an administrator
will be able to review the records in the future. Along this line, a
receiver or collector must have a network interface capable of
receiving all messages sent to it.
Administrators and network planners must also critically review the
network paths between the devices, the relays, and the collectors.
Generated syslog messages should not overwhelm any of the network
links.
In order to reduce the impact of this issue, it is recommended to use
transports with guaranteed delivery.
6.15 Denial of Service
As with any system, an attacker may just overwhelm a receiver by
sending more messages to it than can be handled by the infrastructure
or the device itself. Implementors should attempt to provide
features that minimize this threat. Such as only receiving syslog
messages from known IP addresses.
6.16 Covert Channels
Nothing in this protocol attempts to eliminate covert channels.
Indeed, the unformatted message syntax in the packets could be very
amenable to sending embedded secret messages. In fact, just about
every aspect of syslog messages lends itself to the conveyance of
covert signals. For example, a collusionist could send odd and even
PRI values to indicate Morse Code dashes and dots.
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 34]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
7. Notice to RFC Editor
This is a notice to the RFC editor. This ID is submitted along with
ID draft-ietf-syslog-transport-udp and they cross-reference each
other. When RFC numbers are determined for each of these IDs, these
references will be updated to use the RFC numbers. This section will
be removed at that time.
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 35]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
8. IANA Considerations
8.1 Version
IANA MUST maintain a registry of VERSION values.
To register a VERSION number, a specification is required. The
values and their meaning must be documented in an RFC or other
permanent and readily available reference, in sufficient detail so
that interoperability between independent implementations is
possible. IANA MUST NOT register version "0" or any negative version
number.
For this document, IANA must register the version "1".
8.2 SD-IDs
IANA MUST maintain a registry of SD-ID-IANA values. These are the
SD-IDs which do NOT have a hyphen ("-") in the second character
position.
To register one of these SD-IDs, a specification is required. The
values and their meaning must be documented in an RFC or other
permanent and readily available reference, in sufficient detail so
that interoperability between independent implementations is
possible.
For this document, IANA must register the SD-IDs "time" and "origin".
8.3 Facility and Severities
This document also upholds the Facilities and Severities listed in
RFC 3164 [11]. Those values range from 0 to 191. This document also
instructs the IANA to reserve all other possible values of the
Severities and Facilities above the value of 191 and to distribute
them via the consensus process as defined in RFC 2434 [10].
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 36]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
9. Authors and Working Group Chair
The working group can be contacted via the mailing list:
syslog-sec@employees.org
The current Chair of the Working Group may be contacted at:
Chris Lonvick
Cisco Systems
Email: clonvick@cisco.com
The author of this draft is:
Rainer Gerhards
Email: rgerhards@hq.adiscon.com
Phone: +49-9349-92880
Fax: +49-9349-928820
Adiscon GmbH
Mozartstrasse 21
97950 Grossrinderfeld
Germany
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 37]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
10. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Chris Lonvick, Jon Callas, Andrew Ross,
Albert Mietus, Anton Okmianski, Tina Bird, David Harrington and all
other people who commented on various versions of this proposal.
11 References
[1] Okmianski, A., "Transmission of syslog messages over UDP", ANSI
X3.4, May 2004.
[2] American National Standards Institute, "USA Code for
Information Interchange", ANSI X3.4, 1968.
[3] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", STD
13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[4] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[5] Malkin, G., "Internet Users' Glossary", RFC 1983, August 1996.
[6] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[7] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", RFC
2279, January 1998.
[8] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997.
[9] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 2373, July 1998.
[10] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October
1998.
[11] Lonvick, C., "The BSD Syslog Protocol", RFC 3164, August 2001.
[12] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, July 2002.
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 38]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
Author's Address
Rainer Gerhards
Adiscon GmbH
Mozartstrasse 21
Grossrinderfeld, BW 97950
Germany
EMail: rgerhards@hq.adiscon.com
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 39]
Internet-Draft The syslog Protocol July 2004
Intellectual Property Statement
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Disclaimer of Validity
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
Acknowledgment
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
Gerhards Expires January 13, 2005 [Page 40]