Network Working Group V. Paxson, Editor
Internet Draft M. Allman
S. Dawson
I. Heavens
B. Volz
Expiration Date: May 1998 November 1997
Known TCP Implementation Problems
<draft-ietf-tcpimpl-prob-02.txt>
1. Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet Draft. Internet Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet Drafts.
Internet Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
months, and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as ``work in progress''.
To learn the current status of any Internet Draft, please check the
``1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet Drafts shadow
directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), nic.nordu.net (Europe),
munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or
ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast).
This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo
does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of
this memo is unlimited.
2. Introduction
This memo catalogs a number of known TCP implementation problems.
The goal in doing so is to improve conditions in the existing
Internet by enhancing the quality of current TCP/IP implementations.
It is hoped that both performance and correctness issues can be
resolved by making implementors aware of the problems and their
solutions. In the long term, it is hoped that this will provide a
reduction in unnecessary traffic on the network, the rate of
connection failures due to protocol errors, and load on network
servers due to time spent processing both unsuccessful connections
and retransmitted data. This will help to ensure the stability of
the global Internet.
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ID Known TCP Implementation Problems November 1997
Each problem is defined as follows:
Name The name associated with the problem. In this memo, the name is
given as a subsection heading.
Classification
One or more problem categories for which the problem is classi-
fied. Categories used so far: "congestion control", "perfor-
mance", "reliability", "resource management". Others antici-
pated: "security", "interoperability", "configuration".
Description
A definition of the problem, succinct but including necessary
background material.
Significance
A brief summary of the sorts of environments for which the prob-
lem is significant.
Implications
Why the problem is viewed as a problem.
Relevant RFCs
Brief discussion of the RFCs with respect to which the problem
is viewed as an implementation error.
Trace file demonstrating the problem
One or more ASCII trace files demonstrating the problem, if
applicable. These may in the future be replaced with URLs to
on-line traces.
Trace file demonstrating correct behavior
One or more examples of how correct behavior appears in a trace,
if applicable. These may in the future be replaced with URLs to
on-line traces.
References
References that further discuss the problem.
How to detect
How to test an implementation to see if it exhibits the problem.
This discussion may include difficulties and subtleties associ-
ated with causing the problem to manifest itself, and with
interpreting traces to detect the presence of the problem (if
applicable). In the future, this may include URLs for diagnos-
tic tools.
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How to fix
For known causes of the problem, how to correct the implementa-
tion.
Implementation specifics
If it is viewed as beneficial to document particular implementa-
tions exhibiting the problem, and if the corresponding implemen-
tors approve, then this section gives the specifics of those
implementations, along with a contact address for the implemen-
tors.
3. Known implementation problems
3.1. No initial slow start
Classification
Congestion control
Description
When a TCP begins transmitting data, it is required by RFC 1122,
4.2.2.15, to engage in a "slow start" by initializing its conges-
tion window, cwnd, to one packet (one segment of the maximum size).
It subsequently increases cwnd by one packet for each ACK it
receives for new data. The minimum of cwnd and the receiver's
advertised window bounds the highest sequence number the TCP can
transmit. A TCP that fails to initialize and increment cwnd in
this fashion exhibits "No initial slow start".
Significance
In congested environments, detrimental to the performance of other
connections, and possibly to the connection itself.
Implications
A TCP failing to slow start when beginning a connection results in
traffic bursts that can stress the network, leading to excessive
queueing delays and packet loss.
Implementations exhibiting this problem might do so because they
suffer from the general problem of not including the required
congestion window. These implementations will also suffer from "No
slow start after retransmission timeout".
There are different shades of "No initial slow start". From the
perspective of stressing the network, the worst is a connection
that simply always sends based on the receiver's advertised window,
with no notion of a separate congestion window. Some other forms
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are described in "Uninitialized CWND" and "Initial CWND of 2 pack-
ets".
Relevant RFCs
RFC 1122 requires use of slow start. RFC 2001 gives the specifics
of slow start.
Trace file demonstrating it
Made using tcpdump/BPF recording at the connection responder. No
losses reported.
10:40:42.244503 B > A: S 1168512000:1168512000(0) win 32768
<mss 1460,nop,wscale 0> (DF) [tos 0x8]
10:40:42.259908 A > B: S 3688169472:3688169472(0)
ack 1168512001 win 32768 <mss 1460>
10:40:42.389992 B > A: . ack 1 win 33580 (DF) [tos 0x8]
10:40:42.664975 A > B: P 1:513(512) ack 1 win 32768
10:40:42.700185 A > B: . 513:1973(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:40:42.718017 A > B: . 1973:3433(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:40:42.762945 A > B: . 3433:4893(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:40:42.811273 A > B: . 4893:6353(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:40:42.829149 A > B: . 6353:7813(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:40:42.853687 B > A: . ack 1973 win 33580 (DF) [tos 0x8]
10:40:42.864031 B > A: . ack 3433 win 33580 (DF) [tos 0x8]
After the third packet, the connection is established. A, the con-
nection responder, begins transmitting to B, the connection initia-
tor. Host A quickly sends 6 packets comprising 7812 bytes, even
though the SYN exchange agreed upon an MSS of 1460 bytes (implying
an initial congestion window of 1 segment corresponds to 1460
bytes), and so A should have sent at most 1460 bytes.
The ACKs sent by B to A in the last two lines indicate that this
trace is not a measurement error (slow start really occurring but
the corresponding ACKs having been dropped by the packet filter).
A second trace confirmed that the problem is repeatable.
Trace file demonstrating correct behavior
Made using tcpdump/BPF recording at the connection originator. No
losses reported.
12:35:31.914050 C > D: S 1448571845:1448571845(0) win 4380 <mss 1460>
12:35:32.068819 D > C: S 1755712000:1755712000(0) ack 1448571846 win 4096
12:35:32.069341 C > D: . ack 1 win 4608
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12:35:32.075213 C > D: P 1:513(512) ack 1 win 4608
12:35:32.286073 D > C: . ack 513 win 4096
12:35:32.287032 C > D: . 513:1025(512) ack 1 win 4608
12:35:32.287506 C > D: . 1025:1537(512) ack 1 win 4608
12:35:32.432712 D > C: . ack 1537 win 4096
12:35:32.433690 C > D: . 1537:2049(512) ack 1 win 4608
12:35:32.434481 C > D: . 2049:2561(512) ack 1 win 4608
12:35:32.435032 C > D: . 2561:3073(512) ack 1 win 4608
12:35:32.594526 D > C: . ack 3073 win 4096
12:35:32.595465 C > D: . 3073:3585(512) ack 1 win 4608
12:35:32.595947 C > D: . 3585:4097(512) ack 1 win 4608
12:35:32.596414 C > D: . 4097:4609(512) ack 1 win 4608
12:35:32.596888 C > D: . 4609:5121(512) ack 1 win 4608
12:35:32.733453 D > C: . ack 4097 win 4096
References
This problem is documented in [Paxson97].
How to detect
For implementations always manifesting this problem, it shows up
immediately in a packet trace or a sequence plot, as illustrated
above.
How to fix
If the root problem is that the implementation lacks a notion of a
congestion window, then unfortunately this requires significant
work to fix. However, doing so is important, as such implementa-
tions also exhibit "No slow start after retransmission timeout".
3.2. No slow start after retransmission timeout
Classification
Congestion control
Description
When a TCP experiences a retransmission timeout, it is required by
RFC 1122, 4.2.2.15, to engage in "slow start" by initializing its
congestion window, cwnd, to one packet (one segment of the maximum
size). It subsequently increases cwnd by one packet for each ACK
it receives for new data until it reaches the "congestion
avoidance" threshold, ssthresh, at which point the congestion
avoidance algorithm for updating the window takes over. A TCP that
fails to enter slow start upon a timeout exhibits "No slow start
after retransmission timeout".
Significance
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In congested environments, severely detrimental to the performance
of other connections, and also the connection itself.
Implications
Entering slow start upon timeout forms one of the cornerstones of
Internet congestion stability, as outlined in [Jacobson88]. If
TCPs fail to do so, the network becomes at risk of suffering
"congestion collapse" [RFC896].
Relevant RFCs
RFC 1122 requires use of slow start after loss. RFC 2001 gives the
specifics of how to implement slow start. RFC 896 describes
congestion collapse.
The retransmission timeout discussed here should not be confused
with the separate "fast recovery" retransmission mechanism dis-
cussed in RFC 2001.
Trace file demonstrating it
Made using tcpdump/BPF recording at the sending TCP (A). No losses
reported.
10:40:59.090612 B > A: . ack 357125 win 33580 (DF) [tos 0x8]
10:40:59.222025 A > B: . 357125:358585(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:40:59.868871 A > B: . 357125:358585(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:41:00.016641 B > A: . ack 364425 win 33580 (DF) [tos 0x8]
10:41:00.036709 A > B: . 364425:365885(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:41:00.045231 A > B: . 365885:367345(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:41:00.053785 A > B: . 367345:368805(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:41:00.062426 A > B: . 368805:370265(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:41:00.071074 A > B: . 370265:371725(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:41:00.079794 A > B: . 371725:373185(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:41:00.089304 A > B: . 373185:374645(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:41:00.097738 A > B: . 374645:376105(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:41:00.106409 A > B: . 376105:377565(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:41:00.115024 A > B: . 377565:379025(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:41:00.123576 A > B: . 379025:380485(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:41:00.132016 A > B: . 380485:381945(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:41:00.141635 A > B: . 381945:383405(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:41:00.150094 A > B: . 383405:384865(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:41:00.158552 A > B: . 384865:386325(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:41:00.167053 A > B: . 386325:387785(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:41:00.175518 A > B: . 387785:389245(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:41:00.210835 A > B: . 389245:390705(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:41:00.226108 A > B: . 390705:392165(1460) ack 1 win 32768
10:41:00.241524 B > A: . ack 389245 win 8760 (DF) [tos 0x8]
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The first packet indicates the ack point is 357125. 130 msec after
receiving the ACK, A transmits the packet after the ACK point,
357125:358585. 640 msec after this transmission, it retransmits
357125:358585, in an apparent retransmission timeout. At this
point, A's cwnd should be one MSS, or 1460 bytes, as A enters slow
start. The trace is consistent with this possibility.
B replies with an ACK of 364425, indicating that A has filled a
sequence hole. At this point, A's cwnd should be 1460*2 = 2920
bytes, since in slow start receiving an ACK advances cwnd by MSS.
However, A then launches 19 consecutive packets, which is incon-
sistent with slow start.
A second trace confirmed that the problem is repeatable.
Trace file demonstrating correct behavior
Made using tcpdump/BPF recording at the sending TCP (C). No losses
reported.
12:35:48.442538 C > D: P 465409:465921(512) ack 1 win 4608
12:35:48.544483 D > C: . ack 461825 win 4096
12:35:48.703496 D > C: . ack 461825 win 4096
12:35:49.044613 C > D: . 461825:462337(512) ack 1 win 4608
12:35:49.192282 D > C: . ack 465921 win 2048
12:35:49.192538 D > C: . ack 465921 win 4096
12:35:49.193392 C > D: P 465921:466433(512) ack 1 win 4608
12:35:49.194726 C > D: P 466433:466945(512) ack 1 win 4608
12:35:49.350665 D > C: . ack 466945 win 4096
12:35:49.351694 C > D: . 466945:467457(512) ack 1 win 4608
12:35:49.352168 C > D: . 467457:467969(512) ack 1 win 4608
12:35:49.352643 C > D: . 467969:468481(512) ack 1 win 4608
12:35:49.506000 D > C: . ack 467969 win 3584
After C transmits the first packet shown to D, it takes no action
in response to D's ACKs for 461825, because the first packet
already reached the advertised window limit of 4096 bytes above
461825. 600 msec after transmitting the first packet, C
retransmits 461825:462337, presumably due to a timeout. Its
congestion window is now MSS (512 bytes).
D acks 465921, indicating that C's retransmission filled a sequence
hole. This ACK advances C's cwnd from 512 to 1024. Very shortly
after, D acks 465921 again in order to update the offered window
from 2048 to 4096. This ACK does not advance cwnd since it is not
for new data. Very shortly after, C responds to the newly enlarged
window by transmitting two packets. D acks both, advancing cwnd
from 1024 to 1536. C in turn transmits three packets.
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References
This problem is documented in [Paxson97].
How to detect
Packet loss is common enough in the Internet that generally it is
not difficult to find an Internet path that will force retransmis-
sion due to packet loss.
If the effective window prior to loss is large enough, however,
then the TCP may retransmit using the "fast recovery" mechanism
described in RFC 2001. In a packet trace, the signature of fast
recovery is that the packet retransmission occurs in response to
the receipt of three duplicate ACKs, and subsequent duplicate ACKs
may lead to the transmission of new data, above both the ack point
and the highest sequence transmitted so far. An absence of three
duplicate ACKs prior to retransmission suffices to distinguish
between timeout and fast recovery retransmissions. In the face of
only observing fast recovery retransmissions, generally it is not
difficult to repeat the data transfer until observing a timeout
retransmission.
Once armed with a trace exhibiting a timeout retransmission, deter-
mining whether the TCP follows slow start is done by computing the
correct progression of cwnd and comparing it to the amount of data
transmited by the TCP subsequent to the timeout rtransmission.
How to fix
If the root problem is that the implementation lacks a notion of a
congestion window, then unfortunately this requires significant
work to fix. However, doing so is critical, for reasons outlined
above.
3.3. Inconsistent retransmission
Classification
Reliability
Description
If, for a given sequence number, a sending TCP retransmits dif-
ferent data than previously sent for that sequence number, then a
strong possibility arises that the receiving TCP will reconstruct a
different byte stream than that sent by the sending application,
depending on which instance of the sequence number it accepts.
Such a sending TCP exhibits "Inconsistent retransmission".
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Significance
Critical for all environments.
Implications
Reliable delivery of data is a fundamental property of TCP.
Relevant RFCs
RFC 793, section 1.5, discusses the central role of reliability in
TCP operation.
Trace file demonstrating it
Made using tcpdump/BPF recording at the receiving TCP (B). No
losses reported.
12:35:53.145503 A > B: FP 90048435:90048461(26) ack 393464682 win 4096
4500 0042 9644 0000
3006 e4c2 86b1 0401 83f3 010a b2a4 0015
055e 07b3 1773 cb6a 5019 1000 68a9 0000
data starts here>504f 5254 2031 3334 2c31 3737*2c34 2c31
2c31 3738 2c31 3635 0d0a
12:35:53.146479 B > A: R 393464682:393464682(0) win 8192
12:35:53.851714 A > B: FP 90048429:90048463(34) ack 393464682 win 4096
4500 004a 965b 0000
3006 e4a3 86b1 0401 83f3 010a b2a4 0015
055e 07ad 1773 cb6a 5019 1000 8bd3 0000
data starts here>5041 5356 0d0a 504f 5254 2031 3334 2c31
3737*2c31 3035 2c31 3431 2c34 2c31 3539
0d0a
The sequence numbers shown in this trace are absolute and not
adjusted to reflect the ISN. The 4-digit hex values show a dump of
the packet's IP and TCP headers, as well as payload. A first sends
to B data for 90048435:90048461. The corresponding data begins
with hex words 504f, 5254, etc.
B responds with a RST. Since the recording location was local to
B, it is unknown whether A received the RST.
A then sends 90048429:90048463, which includes six sequence posi-
tions below the earlier transmission, all 26 positions of the ear-
lier transmission, and two additional sequence positions.
The retransmission disagrees starting just after sequence 90048447,
annotated above with a leading '*'. These two bytes were origi-
nally transmitted as hex 2c34 but retransmitted as hex 2c31. Sub-
sequent positions disagree as well.
This behavior has been observed in other traces involving different
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ID Known TCP Implementation Problems November 1997
hosts. It is unknown how to repeat it.
In this instance, no corruption would occur, since B has already
indicated it will not accept further packets from A.
A second example illustrates a slightly different instance of the
problem. The tracing again was made with tcpdump/BPF at the
receiving TCP (D).
22:23:58.645829 C > D: P 185:212(27) ack 565 win 4096
4500 0043 90a3 0000
3306 0734 cbf1 9eef 83f3 010a 0525 0015
a3a2 faba 578c 70a4 5018 1000 9a53 0000
data starts here>504f 5254 2032 3033 2c32 3431 2c31 3538
2c32 3339 2c35 2c34 330d 0a
22:23:58.646805 D > C: . ack 184 win 8192
4500 0028 beeb 0000
3e06 ce06 83f3 010a cbf1 9eef 0015 0525
578c 70a4 a3a2 fab9 5010 2000 342f 0000
22:31:36.532244 C > D: FP 186:213(27) ack 565 win 4096
4500 0043 9435 0000
3306 03a2 cbf1 9eef 83f3 010a 0525 0015
a3a2 fabb 578c 70a4 5019 1000 9a51 0000
data starts here>504f 5254 2032 3033 2c32 3431 2c31 3538
2c32 3339 2c35 2c34 330d 0a
In this trace, sequence numbers are relative. C sends 185:212, but
D only sends an ACK for 184 (so sequence number 184 is missing). C
then sends 186:213. The packet payload is identical to the previ-
ous payload, but the base sequence number is one higher, resulting
in an inconsistent retransmission.
Neither trace exhibits checksum errors.
Trace file demonstrating correct behavior
(Omitted, as presumably correct behavior is obvious.)
References
None known.
How to detect
This problem unfortunately can be very difficult to detect, since
available experience indicates it is quite rare that it is mani-
fested. No "trigger" has been identified that can be used to
reproduce the problem.
How to fix
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ID Known TCP Implementation Problems November 1997
In the absence of a known "trigger", we cannot always assess how to
fix the problem.
In one implementation (not the one illustrated above), the problem
manifested itself when (1) the sender received a zero window and
stalled; (2) eventually an ACK arrived that offered a window larger
than that in effect at the time of the stall; (3) the sender
transmitted out of the buffer of data it held at the time of the
stall, but (4) failed to limit this transfer to the buffer length,
instead using the newly advertised (and larger) offered window.
Consequently, in addition to the valid buffer contents, it sent
whatever garbage values followed the end of the buffer. If it then
retransmitted the corresponding sequence numbers, at that point it
sent the correct data, resulting in an inconsistent retransmission.
Note that this instance of the problem reflects a more general
problem, that of initially transmitting incorrect data.
3.4. Failure to retain above-sequence data
Classification
Congestion control, performance
Description
When a TCP receives an "above sequence" segment, meaning one with a
sequence number exceeding RCV.NXT but below RCV.NXT+RCV.WND, it
SHOULD queue the segment for later delivery (RFC 1122, 4.2.2.20).
A TCP that fails to do so is said to exhibit "Failure to retain
above-sequence data".
It may sometimes be appropriate for a TCP to discard above-sequence
data to reclaim memory. If they do so only rarely, then we would
not consider them to exhibit this problem. Instead, the particular
concern is with TCPs that always discard above-sequence data.
Significance
In environments prone to packet loss, detrimental to the perfor-
mance of both other connections and the connection itself.
Implications
In times of congestion, a failure to retain above-sequence data
will lead to numerous otherwise-unnecessary retransmissions, aggra-
vating the congestion and potentially reducing performance by a
large factor.
Relevant RFCs
RFC 1122 revises RFC 793 by upgrading the latter's MAY to a SHOULD
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ID Known TCP Implementation Problems November 1997
on this issue.
Trace file demonstrating it
Made using tcpdump/BPF recording at the receiving TCP. No losses
reported.
B is the TCP sender, A the receiver. A exhibits failure to retain
above sequence data:
10:38:10.164860 B > A: . 221078:221614(536) ack 1 win 33232 [tos 0x8]
10:38:10.170809 B > A: . 221614:222150(536) ack 1 win 33232 [tos 0x8]
10:38:10.177183 B > A: . 222150:222686(536) ack 1 win 33232 [tos 0x8]
10:38:10.225039 A > B: . ack 222686 win 25800
Here B has sent up to (relative) sequence 222686 in-sequence, and A
accordingly acknowledges.
10:38:10.268131 B > A: . 223222:223758(536) ack 1 win 33232 [tos 0x8]
10:38:10.337995 B > A: . 223758:224294(536) ack 1 win 33232 [tos 0x8]
10:38:10.344065 B > A: . 224294:224830(536) ack 1 win 33232 [tos 0x8]
10:38:10.350169 B > A: . 224830:225366(536) ack 1 win 33232 [tos 0x8]
10:38:10.356362 B > A: . 225366:225902(536) ack 1 win 33232 [tos 0x8]
10:38:10.362445 B > A: . 225902:226438(536) ack 1 win 33232 [tos 0x8]
10:38:10.368579 B > A: . 226438:226974(536) ack 1 win 33232 [tos 0x8]
10:38:10.374732 B > A: . 226974:227510(536) ack 1 win 33232 [tos 0x8]
10:38:10.380825 B > A: . 227510:228046(536) ack 1 win 33232 [tos 0x8]
10:38:10.387027 B > A: . 228046:228582(536) ack 1 win 33232 [tos 0x8]
10:38:10.393053 B > A: . 228582:229118(536) ack 1 win 33232 [tos 0x8]
10:38:10.399193 B > A: . 229118:229654(536) ack 1 win 33232 [tos 0x8]
10:38:10.405356 B > A: . 229654:230190(536) ack 1 win 33232 [tos 0x8]
A now receives 13 additional packets from B. These are above-
sequence because 222686:223222 was dropped. The packets do however
fit within the offered window of 25800. A does not generate any
duplicate ACKs for them.
The trace contributor (V. Paxson) verified that these 13 packets
had valid IP and TCP checksums.
10:38:11.917728 B > A: . 222686:223222(536) ack 1 win 33232 [tos 0x8]
10:38:11.930925 A > B: . ack 223222 win 32232
B times out for 222686:223222 and retransmits it. Upon receiving
it, A only acknowledges 223222. Had it retained the valid above-
sequence packets, it would instead have ack'd 230190.
10:38:12.048438 B > A: . 223222:223758(536) ack 1 win 33232 [tos 0x8]
10:38:12.054397 B > A: . 223758:224294(536) ack 1 win 33232 [tos 0x8]
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ID Known TCP Implementation Problems November 1997
10:38:12.068029 A > B: . ack 224294 win 31696
B retransmits two more packets, and A only acknowledges them. This
pattern continues as B retransmits the entire set of previously-
received packets.
A second trace confirmed that the problem is repeatable.
Trace file demonstrating correct behavior
Made using tcpdump/BPF recording at the receiving TCP (C). No
losses reported.
09:11:25.790417 D > C: . 33793:34305(512) ack 1 win 61440
09:11:25.791393 D > C: . 34305:34817(512) ack 1 win 61440
09:11:25.792369 D > C: . 34817:35329(512) ack 1 win 61440
09:11:25.792369 D > C: . 35329:35841(512) ack 1 win 61440
09:11:25.793345 D > C: . 36353:36865(512) ack 1 win 61440
09:11:25.794321 C > D: . ack 35841 win 59904
A sequence hole occurs because 35841:36353 has been dropped.
09:11:25.794321 D > C: . 36865:37377(512) ack 1 win 61440
09:11:25.794321 C > D: . ack 35841 win 59904
09:11:25.795297 D > C: . 37377:37889(512) ack 1 win 61440
09:11:25.795297 C > D: . ack 35841 win 59904
09:11:25.796273 C > D: . ack 35841 win 61440
09:11:25.798225 D > C: . 37889:38401(512) ack 1 win 61440
09:11:25.799201 C > D: . ack 35841 win 61440
09:11:25.807009 D > C: . 38401:38913(512) ack 1 win 61440
09:11:25.807009 C > D: . ack 35841 win 61440
(many additional lines omitted)
09:11:25.884113 D > C: . 52737:53249(512) ack 1 win 61440
09:11:25.884113 C > D: . ack 35841 win 61440
Each additional, above-sequence packet C receives from D elicits a
duplicate ACK for 35841.
09:11:25.887041 D > C: . 35841:36353(512) ack 1 win 61440
09:11:25.887041 C > D: . ack 53249 win 44032
D retransmits 35841:36353 and C acknowledges receipt of data all
the way up to 53249.
References
This problem is documented in [Paxson97].
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ID Known TCP Implementation Problems November 1997
How to detect
Packet loss is common enough in the Internet that generally it is
not difficult to find an Internet path that will result in some
above-sequence packets arriving. A TCP that exhibits "Failure to
retain ..." may not generate duplicate ACKs for these packets.
However, some TCPs that do retain above-sequence data also do not
generate duplicate ACKs, so failure to do so does not definitively
identify the problem. Instead, the key observation is whether upon
retransmission of the dropped packet, data that was previously
above-sequence is acknowledged.
Two considerations in detecting this problem using a packet trace
are that it is easiest to do so with a trace made at the TCP
receiver, in order to unambiguously determine which packets arrived
successfully, and that such packets may still be correctly dis-
carded if they arrive with checksum errors. The latter can be
tested by capturing the entire packet contents and performing the
IP and TCP checksum algorithms to verify their integrity; or by
confirming that the packets arrive with the same checksum and con-
tents as that with which they were sent, with a presumption that
the sending TCP correctly calculates checksums for the packets it
transmits.
It is considerably easier to verify that an implementation does NOT
exhibit this problem. This can be done by recording a trace at the
data sender, and observing that sometimes after a retransmission
the receiver acknowledges a higher sequence number than just that
which was retransmitted.
How to fix
If the root problem is that the implementation lacks buffer, then
then unfortunately this requires significant work to fix. However,
doing so is important, for reasons outlined above.
3.5. Excessively short keepalive connection timeout
Classification
Reliability
Description
Keep-alive is a mechanism for checking whether an idle connection
is still alive. According to RFC-1122, keepalive should only be
invoked in server applications that might otherwise hang indefin-
itely and consume resources unnecessarily if a client crashes or
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ID Known TCP Implementation Problems November 1997
aborts a connection during a network failure.
RFC-1122 also specifies that if a keep-alive mechanism is imple-
mented it MUST NOT interpret failure to respond to any specific
probe as a dead connection. The RFC does not specify a particular
mechanism for timing out a connection when no response is received
for keepalive probes. However, if the mechanism does not allow
ample time for recovery from network congestion or delay, connec-
tions may be timed out unnecessarily.
Significance
In congested networks, can lead to unwarranted termination of con-
nections.
Implications
It is possible for the network connection between two peer machines
to become congested or to exhibit packet loss at the time that a
keep-alive probe is sent on a connection. If the keep-alive
mechanism does not allow sufficient time before dropping connec-
tions in the face of unacknowledged probes, connections may be
dropped even when both peers of a connection are still alive.
Relevant RFCs
RFC 1122 specifies that the keep-alive mechanism may be provided.
It does not specify a mechanism for determining dead connections
when keepalive probes are not acknowledged.
Trace file demonstrating it
Made using the Orchestra tool at the peer of the machine using
keep-alive. After connection establishment, incoming keep-alives
were dropped by Orchestra to simulate a dead connection.
22:11:12.040000 A > B: 22666019:0 win 8192 datasz 4 SYN
22:11:12.060000 B > A: 2496001:22666020 win 4096 datasz 4 SYN ACK
22:11:12.130000 A > B: 22666020:2496002 win 8760 datasz 0 ACK
(more than two hours elapse)
00:23:00.680000 A > B: 22666019:2496002 win 8760 datasz 1 ACK
00:23:01.770000 A > B: 22666019:2496002 win 8760 datasz 1 ACK
00:23:02.870000 A > B: 22666019:2496002 win 8760 datasz 1 ACK
00:23.03.970000 A > B: 22666019:2496002 win 8760 datasz 1 ACK
00:23.05.070000 A > B: 22666019:2496002 win 8760 datasz 1 ACK
The initial three packets are the SYN exchange for connection
setup. About two hours later, the keepalive timer fires because
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ID Known TCP Implementation Problems November 1997
the connection has been idle. Keepalive probes are transmitted a
total of 5 times, with a 1 second spacing between probes, after
which the connection is dropped. This is problematic because a 5
second network outage at the time of the first probe results in the
connection being killed.
Trace file demonstrating correct behavior
Made using the Orchestra tool at the peer of the machine using
keep-alive. After connection establishment, incoming keep-alives
were dropped by Orchestra to simulate a dead connection.
16:01:52.130000 A > B: 1804412929:0 win 4096 datasz 4 SYN
16:01:52.360000 B > A: 16512001:1804412930 win 4096 datasz 4 SYN ACK
16:01:52.410000 A > B: 1804412930:16512002 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
(two hours elapse)
18:01:57.170000 A > B: 1804412929:16512002 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
18:03:12.220000 A > B: 1804412929:16512002 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
18:04:27.270000 A > B: 1804412929:16512002 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
18:05:42.320000 A > B: 1804412929:16512002 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
18:06:57.370000 A > B: 1804412929:16512002 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
18:08:12.420000 A > B: 1804412929:16512002 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
18:09:27.480000 A > B: 1804412929:16512002 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
18:10:43.290000 A > B: 1804412929:16512002 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
18:11:57.580000 A > B: 1804412929:16512002 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
18:13:12.630000 A > B: 1804412929:16512002 win 4096 datasz 0 RST ACK
In this trace, when the keep-alive timer expires, 9 keepalive
probes are sent at 75 second intervals. 75 seconds after the last
probe is sent, a final RST segment is sent indicating that the con-
nection has been closed. This implementation waits about 11
minutes before timing out the connection, while the first implemen-
tation shown allows only 5 seconds.
References
This problem is documented in [Dawson97].
How to detect
For implementations manifesting this problem, it shows up on a
packet trace after the keepalive timer fires if the peer machine
receiving the keepalive does not respond. Usually the keepalive
timer will fire at least two hours after keepalive is turned on,
but it may be sooner if the timer value has been configured lower,
or if the keepalive mechanism violates the specification (see
Insufficient interval between keepalives problem). In this exam-
ple, suppressing the response of the peer to keepalive probes was
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ID Known TCP Implementation Problems November 1997
accomplished using the Orchestra toolkit, which can be configured
to drop packets. It could also have been done by creating a con-
nection, turning on keepalive, and disconnecting the network con-
nection at the receiver machine.
How to fix
This problem can be fixed by using a different method for timing
out keepalives that allows a longer period of time to elapse before
dropping the connection. For example, the algorithm for timing out
on dropped data could be used. Another possibility is an algorithm
such as the one shown in the trace above, which sends 9 probes at
75 second intervals and then waits an additional 75 seconds for a
response before closing the connection.
3.6. Insufficient interval between keepalives
Classification
Reliability
Description
Keep-alive is a mechanism for checking whether an idle connection
is still alive. According to RFC-1122, keep-alive may be included
in an implementation. If it is included, the interval between
keep-alive packets MUST be configurable, and MUST default to no
less than two hours.
Significance
In congested networks, can lead to unwarranted termination of con-
nections.
Implications
According to RFC-1122, keep-alive is not required of implementa-
tions because it could: (1) cause perfectly good connections to
break during transient Internet failures; (2) consume unnecessary
bandwidth ("if no one is using the connection, who cares if it is
still good?"); and (3) cost money for an Internet path that charges
for packets. Regarding this last point, we note that in addition
the presence of dial-on-demand links in the route can greatly mag-
nify the cost penalty of excess keepalives, potentially forcing a
full-time connection on a link that would otherwise only be con-
nected a few minutes a day.
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If keepalive is provided the RFC states that the required inter-
keepalive distance MUST default to no less than two hours. If it
does not, the probability of connections breaking increases, the
bandwidth used due to keepalives increases, and cost increases over
paths which charge per packet.
Relevant RFCs
RFC 1122 specifies that the keep-alive mechanism may be provided.
It also specifies the two hour minimum for the default interval
between keepalive probes.
Trace file demonstrating it
Made using the Orchestra tool at the peer of the machine using
keep-alive. Machine A was configured to use default settings for
the keepalive timer.
11:36:32.910000 A > B: 3288354305:0 win 28672 datasz 4 SYN
11:36:32.930000 B > A: 896001:3288354306 win 4096 datasz 4 SYN ACK
11:36:32.950000 A > B: 3288354306:896002 win 28672 datasz 0 ACK
11:50:01.190000 A > B: 3288354305:896002 win 28672 datasz 0 ACK
11:50:01.210000 B > A: 896002:3288354306 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
12:03:29.410000 A > B: 3288354305:896002 win 28672 datasz 0 ACK
12:03:29.430000 B > A: 896002:3288354306 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
12:16:57.630000 A > B: 3288354305:896002 win 28672 datasz 0 ACK
12:16:57.650000 B > A: 896002:3288354306 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
12:30:25.850000 A > B: 3288354305:896002 win 28672 datasz 0 ACK
12:30:25.870000 B > A: 896002:3288354306 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
12:43:54.070000 A > B: 3288354305:896002 win 28672 datasz 0 ACK
12:43:54.090000 B > A: 896002:3288354306 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
The initial three packets are the SYN exchange for connection
setup. About 13 minutes later, the keepalive timer fires because
the connection is idle. The keepalive is acknowledged, and the
timer fires again in about 13 more minutes. This behavior contin-
ues indefinitely until the connection is closed, and is a violation
of the specification.
Trace file demonstrating correct behavior
Made using the Orchestra tool at the peer of the machine using
keep-alive. Machine A was configured to use default settings for
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ID Known TCP Implementation Problems November 1997
the keepalive timer.
17:37:20.500000 A > B: 34155521:0 win 4096 datasz 4 SYN
17:37:20.520000 B > A: 6272001:34155522 win 4096 datasz 4 SYN ACK
17:37:20.540000 A > B: 34155522:6272002 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
19:37:25.430000 A > B: 34155521:6272002 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
19:37:25.450000 B > A: 6272002:34155522 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
21:37:30.560000 A > B: 34155521:6272002 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
21:37:30.570000 B > A: 6272002:34155522 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
23:37:35.580000 A > B: 34155521:6272002 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
23:37:35.600000 B > A: 6272002:34155522 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
01:37:40.620000 A > B: 34155521:6272002 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
01:37:40.640000 B > A: 6272002:34155522 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
03:37:45.590000 A > B: 34155521:6272002 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
03:37:45.610000 B > A: 6272002:34155522 win 4096 datasz 0 ACK
The initial three packets are the SYN exchange for connection
setup. Just over two hours later, the keepalive timer fires
because the connection is idle. The keepalive is acknowledged, and
the timer fires again just over two hours later. This behavior
continues indefinitely until the connection is closed.
References
This problem is documented in [Dawson97].
How to detect
For implementations manifesting this problem, it shows up on a
packet trace. If the connection is left idle, the keepalive probes
will arrive closer together than the two hour minimum.
3.7. Stretch ACK Violation
Classification
Congestion Control/Performance
Description
To improve efficiency (both computer and network) a data receiver
may refrain from sending an ACK for each incoming segment,
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ID Known TCP Implementation Problems November 1997
according to [RFC1122]. However, an ACK should not be delayed an
inordinate amount of time. Specifically, ACKs MUST be sent for
every second full-sized segment that arrives. If a second full-
sized segment does not arrive within a given timeout (of no more
than 0.5 seconds), an ACK must be transmitted, according to
[RFC1122]. A TCP receiver which does not generate an ACK for every
second full-sized segment exhibits a "Stretch ACK Violation".
Significance
TCP receivers exhibiting this behavior will cause TCP senders to
generate burstier traffic, which can degrade performance in cong-
ested environments. In addition, generating fewer ACKs increases
the amount of time needed by the slow start algorithm to open the
congestion window to an appropriate point, which diminishes perfor-
mance in environments with large bandwidth-delay products.
Finally, generating fewer ACKs may cause needless retransmission
timeouts in lossy environments, as it increases the possibility
that an entire window of ACKs is lost, forcing a retransmission
timeout.
Implications
When not in loss recovery, every ACK received by a TCP sender
triggers the transmission of new data segments. The burst size is
determined by the number of previously unacknowledged segments each
ACK covers. Therefore, a TCP receiver ACKing more than 2 segments
at a time causes the sending TCP to generate a larger burst of
traffic upon receipt of the ACK. This large burst of traffic can
overwhelm an intervening gateway, leading to higher drop rates for
both the connection and other connections passing through the cong-
ested gateway.
In addition, the TCP slow start algorithm increases the congestion
window by 1 segment for each ACK received. Therefore, increasing
the ACK interval (thus decreasing the rate at which ACKs are
transmitted) increases the amount of time it takes slow start to
increase the congestion window to an appropriate operating point,
and the connection consequently suffers from reduced performance.
This is especially true for connections using large windows.
Relevant RFCs
RFC 1122 outlines delayed ACKs as a recommended mechanism.
Trace file demonstrating it
Trace file taken using tcpdump at host B, the data receiver (and
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ID Known TCP Implementation Problems November 1997
ACK originator). The advertised window (which never changed) and
timestamp options have been omitted for clarity, except for the
first packet sent by A:
12:09:24.820187 A.1174 > B.3999: . 2049:3497(1448) ack 1
win 33580 <nop,nop,timestamp 2249877 2249914> [tos 0x8]
12:09:24.824147 A.1174 > B.3999: . 3497:4945(1448) ack 1
12:09:24.832034 A.1174 > B.3999: . 4945:6393(1448) ack 1
12:09:24.832222 B.3999 > A.1174: . ack 6393
12:09:24.934837 A.1174 > B.3999: . 6393:7841(1448) ack 1
12:09:24.942721 A.1174 > B.3999: . 7841:9289(1448) ack 1
12:09:24.950605 A.1174 > B.3999: . 9289:10737(1448) ack 1
12:09:24.950797 B.3999 > A.1174: . ack 10737
12:09:24.958488 A.1174 > B.3999: . 10737:12185(1448) ack 1
12:09:25.052330 A.1174 > B.3999: . 12185:13633(1448) ack 1
12:09:25.060216 A.1174 > B.3999: . 13633:15081(1448) ack 1
12:09:25.060405 B.3999 > A.1174: . ack 15081
This portion of the trace clearly shows that the receiver (host B)
sends an ACK for every third full sized packet received. Further
investigation of this implementation found that the cause of the
increased ACK interval was the TCP options being used. The imple-
mentation sent an ACK after it was holding 2*MSS worth of unack-
nowledged data. In the above case, the MSS is 1460 bytes so the
receiver transmits an ACK after it is holding at least 2920 bytes
of unacknowledged data. However, the length of the TCP options
being used [RFC1323] took 12 bytes away from the data portion of
each packet. This produced packets containing 1448 bytes of data.
But the additional bytes used by the options in the header were not
taken into account when determining when to trigger an ACK. There-
fore, it took 3 data segments before the data receiver was holding
enough unacknowledged data (>= 2*MSS, or 2920 bytes in the above
example) to transmit an ACK.
Trace file demonstrating correct behavior
Trace file taken using tcpdump at host B, the data receiver (and
ACK originator), again with window and timestamp information omit-
ted except for the first packet:
12:06:53.627320 A.1172 > B.3999: . 1449:2897(1448) ack 1
win 33580 <nop,nop,timestamp 2249575 2249612> [tos 0x8]
12:06:53.634773 A.1172 > B.3999: . 2897:4345(1448) ack 1
12:06:53.634961 B.3999 > A.1172: . ack 4345
12:06:53.737326 A.1172 > B.3999: . 4345:5793(1448) ack 1
12:06:53.744401 A.1172 > B.3999: . 5793:7241(1448) ack 1
12:06:53.744592 B.3999 > A.1172: . ack 7241
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ID Known TCP Implementation Problems November 1997
12:06:53.752287 A.1172 > B.3999: . 7241:8689(1448) ack 1
12:06:53.847332 A.1172 > B.3999: . 8689:10137(1448) ack 1
12:06:53.847525 B.3999 > A.1172: . ack 10137
This trace shows the TCP receiver (host B) ack'ing every second
full-sized packet, according to [RFC1122]. This is the same imple-
mentation shown above, with slight modifications that allow the
receiver to take the length of the options into account when decid-
ing when to transmit an ACK.
References
This problem is documented in [Allman97] and [Paxson97].
How to detect
Stretch ACK violations show up immediately in receiver-side packet
traces of bulk transfers, as shown above. However, packet traces
made on the sender side of the TCP connection may lead to ambigui-
ties when diagnosing this problem due to the possibility of lost
ACKs.
3.8. Failure to send FIN notification promptly
Classification
Performance
Description
When an application closes a connection, the corresponding TCP
should send the FIN notification promptly to its peer (unless
prevented by the congestion window). If a TCP implementation
delays in sending the FIN notification, for example due to waiting
until unacknowledged data has been acknowledged, then it is said to
exhibit "Failure to send FIN notification promptly".
Also, while not strictly required, FIN segments should include the
PSH flag to ensure expedited delivery of any pending data at the
receiver.
Significance
The greatest impact occurs for short-lived connections, since for
these the additional time required to close the connection intro-
duces the greatest relative delay.
Paxson, Editor [Page 22]
ID Known TCP Implementation Problems November 1997
The additional time can be significant in the common case of the
sender waiting for an ACK that is delayed by the receiver.
Implications
Can diminish total throughput as seen at the application layer,
because connection termination takes longer to complete.
Relevant RFCs
RFC 793 indicates that a receiver should treat an incoming FIN flag
as implying the push function.
Trace file demonstrating it
Made using tcpdump (no losses reported).
10:04:38.68 A > B: S 1031850376:1031850376(0) win 4096
<mss 1460,wscale 0,eol> (DF)
10:04:38.71 B > A: S 596916473:596916473(0) ack 1031850377
win 8760 <mss 1460> (DF)
10:04:38.73 A > B: . ack 1 win 4096 (DF)
10:04:41.98 A > B: P 1:4(3) ack 1 win 4096 (DF)
10:04:42.15 B > A: . ack 4 win 8757 (DF)
10:04:42.23 A > B: P 4:7(3) ack 1 win 4096 (DF)
10:04:42.25 B > A: P 1:11(10) ack 7 win 8754 (DF)
10:04:42.32 A > B: . ack 11 win 4096 (DF)
10:04:42.33 B > A: P 11:51(40) ack 7 win 8754 (DF)
10:04:42.51 A > B: . ack 51 win 4096 (DF)
10:04:42.53 B > A: F 51:51(0) ack 7 win 8754 (DF)
10:04:42.56 A > B: FP 7:7(0) ack 52 win 4096 (DF)
10:04:42.58 B > A: . ack 8 win 8754 (DF)
Machine B in the trace above does not send out a FIN notification
promptly if there is any data outstanding. It instead waits for
all unacknowledged data to be acknowledged before sending the FIN
segment. The connection was closed at 10:04.42.33 after requesting
40 bytes to be sent. However, the FIN notification isn't sent
until 10:04.42.51, after the (delayed) acknowledgement of the 40
bytes of data.
Trace file demonstrating correct behavior
Made using tcpdump (no losses reported).
10:27:53.85 C > D: S 419744533:419744533(0) win 4096
<mss 1460,wscale 0,eol> (DF)
10:27:53.92 D > C: S 10082297:10082297(0) ack 419744534
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ID Known TCP Implementation Problems November 1997
win 8760 <mss 1460> (DF)
10:27:53.95 C > D: . ack 1 win 4096 (DF)
10:27:54.42 C > D: P 1:4(3) ack 1 win 4096 (DF)
10:27:54.62 D > C: . ack 4 win 8757 (DF)
10:27:54.76 C > D: P 4:7(3) ack 1 win 4096 (DF)
10:27:54.89 D > C: P 1:11(10) ack 7 win 8754 (DF)
10:27:54.90 D > C: FP 11:51(40) ack7 win 8754 (DF)
10:27:54.92 C > D: . ack 52 win 4096 (DF)
10:27:55.01 C > D: FP 7:7(0) ack 52 win 4096 (DF)
10:27:55.09 D > C: . ack 8 win 8754 (DF)
References
This problem is documented in [Dawson97].
How to detect
For implementations manifesting this problem, it shows up on a
packet trace. If the connection is left idle, the keepalive probes
will arrive closer together than the two hour minimum.
Here, Machine D sends a FIN with 40 bytes of data even before the
original 10 octets have been acknowledged. This is correct behavoir
as it provides for the highest performance.
3.9. Failure to send a RST after Half Duplex Close
Classification
Resource management
[[ editor's comment: this is a new classification category ]]
Description
RFC 1122 4.2.2.13 states that a TCP SHOULD send a RST if data is
received after "half duplex close", i.e. if it cannot be delivered
to the application. A TCP that fails to do so is said to exhibit
"Failure to send a RST after Half Duplex Close".
Significance
Potentially serious for TCP endpoints that manage large numbers of
connections, due to exhaustion of memory available for managing
connection state.
Paxson, Editor [Page 24]
ID Known TCP Implementation Problems November 1997
Implications
Failure to send the RST can lead to permanently hung TCP connec-
tions. This problem has been demonstrated when HTTP clients abort
connections, common when users move on to a new page before the
current page has finished downloading. The HTTP client closes by
transmitting a FIN while the server is transmitting images, text,
etc. The server TCP receives the FIN, but its application does
not close the connection until all data has been queued for
transmission. Since the server will not transmit a FIN until all
the preceding data has been transmitted, deadlock results if the
client TCP does not consume the pending data or tear down the con-
nection: the window decreases to zero, since the client cannot pass
the data to the application, and the server sends probe segments.
The client acknowledges the probe segments with a zero window. As
mandated in RFC1122 4.2.2.17, the probe segments are transmitted
forever. Server connection state remains in CLOSE_WAIT, and even-
tually server processes are exhausted.
Note that there are two bugs. First, probe segments should be
ignored if the window can never subsequently increase. Second, a
RST should be sent when data is received after half duplex close.
Fixing the first bug, but not the second, results in the probe seg-
ments eventually timing out the connection, but the server remains
in CLOSE_WAIT for a significant and unnecessary period.
Relevant RFCs
RFC 1122 sections 4.2.2.13 and 4.2.2.17.
Trace file demonstrating it
Made using an unknown network analyzer. No drop information avail-
able.
client.1391 > server.8080: S 0:1(0) ack: 0 win: 2000 <mss: 5b4>
server.8080 > client.1391: SA 8c01:8c02(0) ack: 1 win: 8000 <mss:100>
client.1391 > server.8080: PA
client.1391 > server.8080: PA 1:1c2(1c1) ack: 8c02 win: 2000
server.8080 > client.1391: [DF] PA 8c02:8cde(dc) ack: 1c2 win: 8000
server.8080 > client.1391: [DF] A 8cde:9292(5b4) ack: 1c2 win: 8000
server.8080 > client.1391: [DF] A 9292:9846(5b4) ack: 1c2 win: 8000
server.8080 > client.1391: [DF] A 9846:9dfa(5b4) ack: 1c2 win: 8000
client.1391 > server.8080: PA
server.8080 > client.1391: [DF] A 9dfa:a3ae(5b4) ack: 1c2 win: 8000
server.8080 > client.1391: [DF] A a3ae:a962(5b4) ack: 1c2 win: 8000
server.8080 > client.1391: [DF] A a962:af16(5b4) ack: 1c2 win: 8000
server.8080 > client.1391: [DF] A af16:b4ca(5b4) ack: 1c2 win: 8000
client.1391 > server.8080: PA
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ID Known TCP Implementation Problems November 1997
server.8080 > client.1391: [DF] A b4ca:ba7e(5b4) ack: 1c2 win: 8000
server.8080 > client.1391: [DF] A b4ca:ba7e(5b4) ack: 1c2 win: 8000
client.1391 > server.8080: PA
server.8080 > client.1391: [DF] A ba7e:bdfa(37c) ack: 1c2 win: 8000
client.1391 > server.8080: PA
server.8080 > client.1391: [DF] A bdfa:bdfb(1) ack: 1c2 win: 8000
client.1391 > server.8080: PA
[ HTTP client aborts and enters FIN_WAIT_1 ]
client.1391 > server.8080: FPA
[ server ACKs the FIN and enters CLOSE_WAIT ]
server.8080 > client.1391: [DF] A
[ client enters FIN_WAIT_2 ]
server.8080 > client.1391: [DF] A bdfa:bdfb(1) ack: 1c3 win: 8000
[ server continues to try to send its data ]
client.1391 > server.8080: PA < window = 0 >
server.8080 > client.1391: [DF] A bdfa:bdfb(1) ack: 1c3 win: 8000
client.1391 > server.8080: PA < window = 0 >
server.8080 > client.1391: [DF] A bdfa:bdfb(1) ack: 1c3 win: 8000
client.1391 > server.8080: PA < window = 0 >
server.8080 > client.1391: [DF] A bdfa:bdfb(1) ack: 1c3 win: 8000
client.1391 > server.8080: PA < window = 0 >
server.8080 > client.1391: [DF] A bdfa:bdfb(1) ack: 1c3 win: 8000
client.1391 > server.8080: PA < window = 0 >
[ ... repeat ad exhaustium ... ]
Trace file demonstrating correct behavior
Made using an unknown network analyzer. No drop information avail-
able.
client > server D=80 S=59500 Syn Seq=337 Len=0 Win=8760
server > client D=59500 S=80 Syn Ack=338 Seq=80153 Len=0 Win=8760
client > server D=80 S=59500 Ack=80154 Seq=338 Len=0 Win=8760
[ ... normal data omitted ... ]
client > server D=80 S=59500 Ack=14559 Seq=596 Len=0 Win=8760
server > client D=59500 S=80 Ack=596 Seq=114559 Len=1460 Win=8760
Paxson, Editor [Page 26]
ID Known TCP Implementation Problems November 1997
[ client closes connection ]
client > server D=80 S=59500 Fin Seq=596 Len=0 Win=8760
server > client D=59500 S=80 Ack=597 Seq=116019 Len=1460 Win=8760
[ client sends RST (RFC1122 4.2.2.13) ]
client > server D=80 S=59500 Rst Seq=597 Len=0 Win=0
server > client D=59500 S=80 Ack=597 Seq=117479 Len=1460 Win=8760
[[ editor's comment: why doesn't the RST result in the
connection being torn down at this point ??]]
client > server D=80 S=59500 Rst Seq=597 Len=0 Win=0
server > client D=59500 S=80 Ack=597 Seq=118939 Len=1460 Win=8760
client > server D=80 S=59500 Rst Seq=597 Len=0 Win=0
server > client D=59500 S=80 Ack=597 Seq=120399 Len=892 Win=8760
client > server D=80 S=59500 Rst Seq=597 Len=0 Win=0
server > client D=59500 S=80 Ack=597 Seq=121291 Len=1460 Win=8760
client > server D=80 S=59500 Rst Seq=597 Len=0 Win=0
How to detect
The problem can be detected by inspecting packet traces of a large,
interrupted bulk transfer.
4. Security Considerations
This version of this memo does not discuss any security-related
implementation problems. Futures versions most likely will, so secu-
rity considerations will require revisiting.
5. Acknowledgements
Thanks to numerous correspondents on the tcp-impl mailing list for
their input: Steve Alexander, Mark Allman, Larry Backman, Jerry Chu,
Alan Cox, Kevin Fall, Richard Fox, Jim Gettys, Rick Jones, Allison
Mankin, Neal McBurnett, Perry Metzger, der Mouse, Thomas Narten,
Andras Olah, Steve Parker, Francesco Potorti`, Luigi Rizzo, Allyn
Romanow, Jeff Semke, Al Smith, Jerry Toporek, Joe Touch, and Curtis
Villamizar.
Thanks also to Josh Cohen for the traces documenting the "Failure to
send a RST after Half Duplex Close" problem.
Paxson, Editor [Page 27]
ID Known TCP Implementation Problems November 1997
6. References
[Allman97]
Mark Allman, "Fixing Two BSD TCP Bugs," Technical Report CR-204151,
NASA Lewis Research Center, October 1997.
http://gigahertz.lerc.nasa.gov/~mallman/papers/bug.ps
[RFC1122]
R. Braden, Editor, "Requirements for Internet Hosts -- Communica-
tion Layers," Oct. 1989.
[Dawson97]
S. Dawson, F. Jahanian, and T. Mitton, "Experiments on Six Commer-
cial TCP Implementations Using a Software Fault Injection Tool," to
appear in Software Practice & Experience, 1997. A technical report
version of this paper can be obtained at
ftp://rtcl.eecs.umich.edu/outgoing/sdawson/CSE-TR-298-96.ps.gz.
[Jacobson88]
V. Jacobson, "Congestion Avoidance and Control," Proc. SIGCOMM '88.
ftp://ftp.ee.lbl.gov/papers/congavoid.ps.Z
[RFC896]
J. Nagle, "Congestion Control in IP/TCP Internetworks," Jan. 1984.
[Paxson97]
V. Paxson, "Automated Packet Trace Analysis of TCP Implementa-
tions," Proc. SIGCOMM '97, available from
ftp://ftp.ee.lbl.gov/papers/vp-tcpanaly-sigcomm97.ps.Z.
[RFC793]
J. Postel, Editor, "Transmission Control Protocol," Sep. 1981.
[RFC2001]
W. Stevens, "TCP Slow Start, Congestion Avoidance, Fast Retransmit,
and Fast Recovery Algorithms," Jan. 1997.
7. Authors' Addresses
Vern Paxson <vern@ee.lbl.gov>
Network Research Group
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Berkeley, CA 94720
USA
Phone: +1 510/486-7504
Paxson, Editor [Page 28]
ID Known TCP Implementation Problems November 1997
Mark Allman <mallman@lerc.nasa.gov>
NASA Lewis Research Center/Sterling Software
21000 Brookpark Road
MS 54-2
Cleveland, OH 44135
USA
Phone: +1 216/433-6586
Scott Dawson <sdawson@eecs.umich.edu>
Real-Time Computing Laboratory
EECS Building
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-2122
USA
Phone: +1 313/763-5363
Ian Heavens <ian@spider.com>
Spider Software Ltd.
8 John's Place, Leith
Edinburgh EH6 7EL
UK
Phone: +44 131/475-7015
Bernie Volz <volz@process.com>
Process Software Corporation
959 Concord Street
Framingham, MA 01701
USA
Phone: +1 508/879-6994
Paxson, Editor [Page 29]
