Internet Engineering Task Force W. Eddy, Ed.
Internet-Draft MTI Systems
Obsoletes: 793, 879, 2873, 6093, 6429, December 20, 2019
6528, 6691 (if approved)
Updates: 5961, 1122 (if approved)
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: June 22, 2020
Transmission Control Protocol Specification
draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-15
Abstract
This document specifies the Internet's Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP). TCP is an important transport layer protocol in the Internet
stack, and has continuously evolved over decades of use and growth of
the Internet. Over this time, a number of changes have been made to
TCP as it was specified in RFC 793, though these have only been
documented in a piecemeal fashion. This document collects and brings
those changes together with the protocol specification from RFC 793.
This document obsoletes RFC 793, as well as 879, 2873, 6093, 6429,
6528, and 6691 that updated parts of RFC 793. It updates RFC 1122,
and should be considered as a replacement for the portions of that
document dealing with TCP requirements. It updates RFC 5961 due to a
small clarification in reset handling while in the SYN-RECEIVED
state.
RFC EDITOR NOTE: If approved for publication as an RFC, this should
be marked additionally as "STD: 7" and replace RFC 793 in that role.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [4].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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This Internet-Draft will expire on June 22, 2020.
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Table of Contents
1. Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Key TCP Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Functional Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Header Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Terminology Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.1. Key Connection State Variables . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.2. State Machine Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3. Sequence Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.4. Establishing a connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.5. Closing a Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.5.1. Half-Closed Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
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3.6. Segmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.6.1. Maximum Segment Size Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.6.2. Path MTU Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.6.3. Interfaces with Variable MTU Values . . . . . . . . . 35
3.6.4. Nagle Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.6.5. IPv6 Jumbograms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.7. Data Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.7.1. Retransmission Timeout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.7.2. TCP Congestion Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.7.3. TCP Connection Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.7.4. TCP Keep-Alives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.7.5. The Communication of Urgent Information . . . . . . . 39
3.7.6. Managing the Window . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.8. Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.8.1. User/TCP Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.8.2. TCP/Lower-Level Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.9. Event Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.10. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4. Changes from RFC 793 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6. Security and Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Appendix A. Other Implementation Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
A.1. IP Security Compartment and Precedence . . . . . . . . . 99
A.1.1. Precedence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
A.1.2. MLS Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
A.2. Sequence Number Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
A.3. Nagle Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
A.4. Low Water Mark Settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Appendix B. TCP Requirement Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
1. Purpose and Scope
In 1981, RFC 793 [12] was released, documenting the Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP), and replacing earlier specifications for TCP
that had been published in the past.
Since then, TCP has been implemented many times, and has been used as
a transport protocol for numerous applications on the Internet.
For several decades, RFC 793 plus a number of other documents have
combined to serve as the specification for TCP [39]. Over time, a
number of errata have been identified on RFC 793, as well as
deficiencies in security, performance, and other aspects. The number
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of enhancements has grown over time across many separate documents.
These were never accumulated together into an update to the base
specification.
The purpose of this document is to bring together all of the IETF
Standards Track changes that have been made to the basic TCP
functional specification and unify them into an update of the RFC 793
protocol specification. Some companion documents are referenced for
important algorithms that TCP uses (e.g. for congestion control), but
have not been attempted to include in this document. This is a
conscious choice, as this base specification can be used with
multiple additional algorithms that are developed and incorporated
separately, but all TCP implementations need to implement this
specification as a common basis in order to interoperate. As some
additional TCP features have become quite complicated themselves
(e.g. advanced loss recovery and congestion control), future
companion documents may attempt to similarly bring these together.
In addition to the protocol specification that descibes the TCP
segment format, generation, and processing rules that are to be
implemented in code, RFC 793 and other updates also contain
informative and descriptive text for human readers to understand
aspects of the protocol design and operation. This document does not
attempt to alter or update this informative text, and is focused only
on updating the normative protocol specification. We preserve
references to the documentation containing the important explanations
and rationale, where appropriate.
This document is intended to be useful both in checking existing TCP
implementations for conformance, as well as in writing new
implementations.
2. Introduction
RFC 793 contains a discussion of the TCP design goals and provides
examples of its operation, including examples of connection
establishment, closing connections, and retransmitting packets to
repair losses.
This document describes the basic functionality expected in modern
implementations of TCP, and replaces the protocol specification in
RFC 793. It does not replicate or attempt to update the introduction
and philosophy content in RFC 793 (sections 1 and 2 of that
document). Other documents are referenced to provide explanation of
the theory of operation, rationale, and detailed discussion of design
decisions. This document only focuses on the normative behavior of
the protocol.
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The "TCP Roadmap" [39] provides a more extensive guide to the RFCs
that define TCP and describe various important algorithms. The TCP
Roadmap contains sections on strongly encouraged enhancements that
improve performance and other aspects of TCP beyond the basic
operation specified in this document. As one example, implementing
congestion control (e.g. [27]) is a TCP requirement, but is a complex
topic on its own, and not described in detail in this document, as
there are many options and possibilities that do not impact basic
interoperability. Similarly, most common TCP implementations today
include the high-performance extensions in [37], but these are not
strictly required or discussed in this document.
A list of changes from RFC 793 is contained in Section 4.
Each use of RFC 2119 keywords in the document is individually labeled
and referenced in Appendix B that summarizes implementation
requirements. Sentences using "MUST" are labeled as "MUST-X" with X
being a numeric identifier enabling the requirement to be located
easily when referenced from Appendix B. Similarly, sentences using
"SHOULD" are labeled with "SHLD-X", "MAY" with "MAY-X", and
"RECOMMENDED" with "REC-X". For the purposes of this labeling,
"SHOULD NOT" and "MUST NOT" are labeled the same as "SHOULD" and
"MUST" instances.
2.1. Key TCP Concepts
TCP provides a reliable, in-order, byte-stream service to
applications.
The application byte-stream is conveyed over the network via TCP
segments, with each TCP segment sent as an Internet Protocol (IP)
datagram.
TCP reliability consists of detecting packet losses (via sequence
numbers) and errors (via per-segment checksums), as well as
correction via retransmission.
TCP supports unicast delivery of data. Anycast applications exist
that successfully use TCP without modifications, though there is some
risk of instability due to changes of lower-layer forwarding
behavior.
TCP is connection-oriented, though does not inherently include a
liveness detection capability.
Data flow is supported bidirectionally over TCP connections, though
applications are free to send data only unidirectionally, if they so
choose.
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TCP uses port numbers to identify application services and to
multiplex multiple flows between hosts.
A more detailed description of TCP's features compared to other
transport protocols can be found in Section 3.1 of [42]. Further
description of the motivations for developing TCP and its role in the
Internet stack can be found in Section 2 of [12] and earlier versions
of the TCP specification.
3. Functional Specification
3.1. Header Format
TCP segments are sent as internet datagrams. The Internet Protocol
(IP) header carries several information fields, including the source
and destination host addresses [1] [11]. A TCP header follows the
Internet header, supplying information specific to the TCP protocol.
This division allows for the existence of host level protocols other
than TCP. In early development of the Internet suite of protocols,
the IP header fields had been a part of TCP.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Port | Destination Port |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Acknowledgment Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Data | |C|E|U|A|P|R|S|F| |
| Offset| Rsrvd |W|C|R|C|S|S|Y|I| Window |
| | |R|E|G|K|H|T|N|N| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Checksum | Urgent Pointer |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| data |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Note that one tick mark represents one bit position.
Figure 1: TCP Header Format
Source Port: 16 bits
The source port number.
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Destination Port: 16 bits
The destination port number.
Sequence Number: 32 bits
The sequence number of the first data octet in this segment (except
when SYN is present). If SYN is present the sequence number is the
initial sequence number (ISN) and the first data octet is ISN+1.
Acknowledgment Number: 32 bits
If the ACK control bit is set, this field contains the value of the
next sequence number the sender of the segment is expecting to
receive. Once a connection is established, this is always sent.
Data Offset: 4 bits
The number of 32 bit words in the TCP Header. This indicates where
the data begins. The TCP header (even one including options) is an
integral number of 32 bits long.
Rsrvd - Reserved: 4 bits
Reserved for future use. Must be zero in generated segments and
must be ignored in received segments, if corresponding future
features are unimplemented by the sending or receiving host.
Control Bits: 8 bits (from left to right):
CWR: Congestion Window Reduced (see [8])
ECE: ECN-Echo (see [8])
URG: Urgent Pointer field significant
ACK: Acknowledgment field significant
PSH: Push Function (see the Send Call description in
Section 3.8.1)
RST: Reset the connection
SYN: Synchronize sequence numbers
FIN: No more data from sender
The control bits are also know as "flags". Assignment is managed
by IANA from the "TCP Header Flags" registry [46].
Window: 16 bits
The number of data octets beginning with the one indicated in the
acknowledgment field that the sender of this segment is willing to
accept.
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The window size MUST be treated as an unsigned number, or else
large window sizes will appear like negative windows and TCP will
now work (MUST-1). It is RECOMMENDED that implementations will
reserve 32-bit fields for the send and receive window sizes in the
connection record and do all window computations with 32 bits (REC-
1).
Checksum: 16 bits
The checksum field is the 16 bit one's complement of the one's
complement sum of all 16 bit words in the header and text. The
checksum computation needs to ensure the 16-bit alignment of the
data being summed. If a segment contains an odd number of header
and text octets, alignment can be achieved by padding the last
octet with zeros on its right to form a 16 bit word for checksum
purposes. The pad is not transmitted as part of the segment.
While computing the checksum, the checksum field itself is replaced
with zeros.
The checksum also covers a pseudo header conceptually prefixed to
the TCP header. The pseudo header is 96 bits for IPv4 and 320 bits
for IPv6. For IPv4, this pseudo header contains the Source
Address, the Destination Address, the Protocol (PTCL), and TCP
length. This gives the TCP connection protection against misrouted
segments. This information is carried in IP headers and is
transferred across the TCP/Network interface in the arguments or
results of calls by the TCP implementation on the IP layer.
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Source Address |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Destination Address |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| zero | PTCL | TCP Length |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
Psuedo header components:
Source Address: the IPv4 source address in network byte order
Destination Address: the IPv4 destination address in network
byte order
zero: bits set to zero
PTCL: the protocol number from the IP header
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TCP Length: the TCP header length plus the data length in octets
(this is not an explicitly transmitted quantity, but is
computed), and it does not count the 12 octets of the pseudo
header.
For IPv6, the pseudo header is contained in section 8.1 of RFC 8200
[11], and contains the IPv6 Source Address and Destination Address,
an Upper Layer Packet Length (a 32-bit value otherwise equivalent
to TCP Length in the IPv4 pseudo header), three bytes of zero-
padding, and a Next Header value (differing from the IPv6 header
value in the case of extension headers present in between IPv6 and
TCP).
The TCP checksum is never optional. The sender MUST generate it
(MUST-2) and the receiver MUST check it (MUST-3).
Urgent Pointer: 16 bits
This field communicates the current value of the urgent pointer as
a positive offset from the sequence number in this segment. The
urgent pointer points to the sequence number of the octet following
the urgent data. This field is only be interpreted in segments
with the URG control bit set.
Options: variable
Options may occupy space at the end of the TCP header and are a
multiple of 8 bits in length. All options are included in the
checksum. An option may begin on any octet boundary. There are
two cases for the format of an option:
Case 1: A single octet of option-kind.
Case 2: An octet of option-kind, an octet of option-length, and
the actual option-data octets.
The option-length counts the two octets of option-kind and option-
length as well as the option-data octets.
Note that the list of options may be shorter than the data offset
field might imply. The content of the header beyond the End-of-
Option option must be header padding (i.e., zero).
The list of all currently defined options is managed by IANA [45],
and each option is defined in other RFCs, as indicated there. That
set includes experimental options that can be extended to support
multiple concurrent usages [36].
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A given TCP implementation can support any currently defined
options, but the following options MUST be supported (MUST-4) (kind
indicated in octal):
Kind Length Meaning
---- ------ -------
0 - End of option list.
1 - No-Operation.
2 4 Maximum Segment Size.
A TCP implementation MUST be able to receive a TCP option in any
segment (MUST-5).
A TCP implementation MUST (MUST-6) ignore without error any TCP
option it does not implement, assuming that the option has a length
field (all TCP options except End of option list and No-Operation
have length fields). TCP implementations MUST be prepared to
handle an illegal option length (e.g., zero); a suggested procedure
is to reset the connection and log the reason (MUST-7).
Specific Option Definitions
End of Option List
+--------+
|00000000|
+--------+
Kind=0
This option code indicates the end of the option list. This
might not coincide with the end of the TCP header according to
the Data Offset field. This is used at the end of all options,
not the end of each option, and need only be used if the end of
the options would not otherwise coincide with the end of the TCP
header.
No-Operation
+--------+
|00000001|
+--------+
Kind=1
This option code can be used between options, for example, to
align the beginning of a subsequent option on a word boundary.
There is no guarantee that senders will use this option, so
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receivers MUST be prepared to process options even if they do
not begin on a word boundary (MUST-64).
Maximum Segment Size (MSS)
+--------+--------+---------+--------+
|00000010|00000100| max seg size |
+--------+--------+---------+--------+
Kind=2 Length=4
Maximum Segment Size Option Data: 16 bits
If this option is present, then it communicates the maximum
receive segment size at the TCP endpoint that sends this
segment. This value is limited by the IP reassembly limit.
This field may be sent in the initial connection request (i.e.,
in segments with the SYN control bit set) and MUST NOT be sent
in other segments (MUST-65). If this option is not used, any
segment size is allowed. A more complete description of this
option is in Section 3.6.1.
Experimental TCP option values are defined in [20], and [36]
describes the current recommended usage for these experimental
values.
Note: There is ongoing work to extend the space available for
TCP options, such as [50].
Padding: variable
The TCP header padding is used to ensure that the TCP header ends
and data begins on a 32 bit boundary. The padding is composed of
zeros.
3.2. Terminology Overview
This section includes an overview of key terms needed to understand
the detailed protocol operation in the rest of the document. There
is a traditional glossary of terms in Section 3.10.
3.2.1. Key Connection State Variables
Before we can discuss very much about the operation of the TCP
implementation we need to introduce some detailed terminology. The
maintenance of a TCP connection requires the remembering of several
variables. We conceive of these variables being stored in a
connection record called a Transmission Control Block or TCB. Among
the variables stored in the TCB are the local and remote IP addresses
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and port numbers, the IP security level and compartment of the
connection (see Appendix A.1), pointers to the user's send and
receive buffers, pointers to the retransmit queue and to the current
segment. In addition several variables relating to the send and
receive sequence numbers are stored in the TCB.
Send Sequence Variables
SND.UNA - send unacknowledged
SND.NXT - send next
SND.WND - send window
SND.UP - send urgent pointer
SND.WL1 - segment sequence number used for last window update
SND.WL2 - segment acknowledgment number used for last window
update
ISS - initial send sequence number
Receive Sequence Variables
RCV.NXT - receive next
RCV.WND - receive window
RCV.UP - receive urgent pointer
IRS - initial receive sequence number
The following diagrams may help to relate some of these variables to
the sequence space.
1 2 3 4
----------|----------|----------|----------
SND.UNA SND.NXT SND.UNA
+SND.WND
1 - old sequence numbers that have been acknowledged
2 - sequence numbers of unacknowledged data
3 - sequence numbers allowed for new data transmission
4 - future sequence numbers that are not yet allowed
Figure 2: Send Sequence Space
The send window is the portion of the sequence space labeled 3 in
Figure 2.
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1 2 3
----------|----------|----------
RCV.NXT RCV.NXT
+RCV.WND
1 - old sequence numbers that have been acknowledged
2 - sequence numbers allowed for new reception
3 - future sequence numbers that are not yet allowed
Figure 3: Receive Sequence Space
The receive window is the portion of the sequence space labeled 2 in
Figure 3.
There are also some variables used frequently in the discussion that
take their values from the fields of the current segment.
Current Segment Variables
SEG.SEQ - segment sequence number
SEG.ACK - segment acknowledgment number
SEG.LEN - segment length
SEG.WND - segment window
SEG.UP - segment urgent pointer
3.2.2. State Machine Overview
A connection progresses through a series of states during its
lifetime. The states are: LISTEN, SYN-SENT, SYN-RECEIVED,
ESTABLISHED, FIN-WAIT-1, FIN-WAIT-2, CLOSE-WAIT, CLOSING, LAST-ACK,
TIME-WAIT, and the fictional state CLOSED. CLOSED is fictional
because it represents the state when there is no TCB, and therefore,
no connection. Briefly the meanings of the states are:
LISTEN - represents waiting for a connection request from any
remote TCP peer and port.
SYN-SENT - represents waiting for a matching connection request
after having sent a connection request.
SYN-RECEIVED - represents waiting for a confirming connection
request acknowledgment after having both received and sent a
connection request.
ESTABLISHED - represents an open connection, data received can be
delivered to the user. The normal state for the data transfer
phase of the connection.
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FIN-WAIT-1 - represents waiting for a connection termination
request from the remote TCP peer, or an acknowledgment of the
connection termination request previously sent.
FIN-WAIT-2 - represents waiting for a connection termination
request from the remote TCP peer.
CLOSE-WAIT - represents waiting for a connection termination
request from the local user.
CLOSING - represents waiting for a connection termination request
acknowledgment from the remote TCP peer.
LAST-ACK - represents waiting for an acknowledgment of the
connection termination request previously sent to the remote TCP
peer (this termination request sent to the remote TCP peer already
included an acknowledgment of the termination request sent from
the remote TCP peer).
TIME-WAIT - represents waiting for enough time to pass to be sure
the remote TCP peer received the acknowledgment of its connection
termination request.
CLOSED - represents no connection state at all.
A TCP connection progresses from one state to another in response to
events. The events are the user calls, OPEN, SEND, RECEIVE, CLOSE,
ABORT, and STATUS; the incoming segments, particularly those
containing the SYN, ACK, RST and FIN flags; and timeouts.
The state diagram in Figure 4 illustrates only state changes,
together with the causing events and resulting actions, but addresses
neither error conditions nor actions that are not connected with
state changes. In a later section, more detail is offered with
respect to the reaction of the TCP implementation to events. Some
state names are abbreviated or hyphenated differently in the diagram
from how they appear elsewhere in the document.
NOTA BENE: This diagram is only a summary and must not be taken as
the total specification. Many details are not included.
+---------+ ---------\ active OPEN
| CLOSED | \ -----------
+---------+<---------\ \ create TCB
| ^ \ \ snd SYN
passive OPEN | | CLOSE \ \
------------ | | ---------- \ \
create TCB | | delete TCB \ \
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V | \ \
rcv RST (note 1) +---------+ CLOSE | \
-------------------->| LISTEN | ---------- | |
/ +---------+ delete TCB | |
/ rcv SYN | | SEND | |
/ ----------- | | ------- | V
+--------+ snd SYN,ACK / \ snd SYN +--------+
| |<----------------- ------------------>| |
| SYN | rcv SYN | SYN |
| RCVD |<-----------------------------------------------| SENT |
| | snd SYN,ACK | |
| |------------------ -------------------| |
+--------+ rcv ACK of SYN \ / rcv SYN,ACK +--------+
| -------------- | | -----------
| x | | snd ACK
| V V
| CLOSE +---------+
| ------- | ESTAB |
| snd FIN +---------+
| CLOSE | | rcv FIN
V ------- | | -------
+---------+ snd FIN / \ snd ACK +---------+
| FIN |<----------------- ------------------>| CLOSE |
| WAIT-1 |------------------ | WAIT |
+---------+ rcv FIN \ +---------+
| rcv ACK of FIN ------- | CLOSE |
| -------------- snd ACK | ------- |
V x V snd FIN V
+---------+ +---------+ +---------+
|FINWAIT-2| | CLOSING | | LAST-ACK|
+---------+ +---------+ +---------+
| rcv ACK of FIN | rcv ACK of FIN |
| rcv FIN -------------- | Timeout=2MSL -------------- |
| ------- x V ------------ x V
\ snd ACK +---------+delete TCB +---------+
------------------------>|TIME WAIT|------------------>| CLOSED |
+---------+ +---------+
note 1: The transition from SYN-RECEIVED to LISTEN on receiving a RST is
conditional on having reached SYN-RECEIVED after a passive open.
note 2: An unshown transition exists from FIN-WAIT-1 to TIME-WAIT if
a FIN is received and the local FIN is also acknowledged.
Figure 4: TCP Connection State Diagram
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3.3. Sequence Numbers
A fundamental notion in the design is that every octet of data sent
over a TCP connection has a sequence number. Since every octet is
sequenced, each of them can be acknowledged. The acknowledgment
mechanism employed is cumulative so that an acknowledgment of
sequence number X indicates that all octets up to but not including X
have been received. This mechanism allows for straight-forward
duplicate detection in the presence of retransmission. Numbering of
octets within a segment is that the first data octet immediately
following the header is the lowest numbered, and the following octets
are numbered consecutively.
It is essential to remember that the actual sequence number space is
finite, though very large. This space ranges from 0 to 2**32 - 1.
Since the space is finite, all arithmetic dealing with sequence
numbers must be performed modulo 2**32. This unsigned arithmetic
preserves the relationship of sequence numbers as they cycle from
2**32 - 1 to 0 again. There are some subtleties to computer modulo
arithmetic, so great care should be taken in programming the
comparison of such values. The symbol "=<" means "less than or
equal" (modulo 2**32).
The typical kinds of sequence number comparisons that the TCP
implementation must perform include:
(a) Determining that an acknowledgment refers to some sequence
number sent but not yet acknowledged.
(b) Determining that all sequence numbers occupied by a segment
have been acknowledged (e.g., to remove the segment from a
retransmission queue).
(c) Determining that an incoming segment contains sequence numbers
that are expected (i.e., that the segment "overlaps" the receive
window).
In response to sending data the TCP endpoint will receive
acknowledgments. The following comparisons are needed to process the
acknowledgments.
SND.UNA = oldest unacknowledged sequence number
SND.NXT = next sequence number to be sent
SEG.ACK = acknowledgment from the receiving TCP peer (next
sequence number expected by the receiving TCP peer)
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SEG.SEQ = first sequence number of a segment
SEG.LEN = the number of octets occupied by the data in the segment
(counting SYN and FIN)
SEG.SEQ+SEG.LEN-1 = last sequence number of a segment
A new acknowledgment (called an "acceptable ack"), is one for which
the inequality below holds:
SND.UNA < SEG.ACK =< SND.NXT
A segment on the retransmission queue is fully acknowledged if the
sum of its sequence number and length is less or equal than the
acknowledgment value in the incoming segment.
When data is received the following comparisons are needed:
RCV.NXT = next sequence number expected on an incoming segments,
and is the left or lower edge of the receive window
RCV.NXT+RCV.WND-1 = last sequence number expected on an incoming
segment, and is the right or upper edge of the receive window
SEG.SEQ = first sequence number occupied by the incoming segment
SEG.SEQ+SEG.LEN-1 = last sequence number occupied by the incoming
segment
A segment is judged to occupy a portion of valid receive sequence
space if
RCV.NXT =< SEG.SEQ < RCV.NXT+RCV.WND
or
RCV.NXT =< SEG.SEQ+SEG.LEN-1 < RCV.NXT+RCV.WND
The first part of this test checks to see if the beginning of the
segment falls in the window, the second part of the test checks to
see if the end of the segment falls in the window; if the segment
passes either part of the test it contains data in the window.
Actually, it is a little more complicated than this. Due to zero
windows and zero length segments, we have four cases for the
acceptability of an incoming segment:
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Segment Receive Test
Length Window
------- ------- -------------------------------------------
0 0 SEG.SEQ = RCV.NXT
0 >0 RCV.NXT =< SEG.SEQ < RCV.NXT+RCV.WND
>0 0 not acceptable
>0 >0 RCV.NXT =< SEG.SEQ < RCV.NXT+RCV.WND
or RCV.NXT =< SEG.SEQ+SEG.LEN-1 < RCV.NXT+RCV.WND
Note that when the receive window is zero no segments should be
acceptable except ACK segments. Thus, it is be possible for a TCP
implementation to maintain a zero receive window while transmitting
data and receiving ACKs. A TCP receiver MUST process the RST and URG
fields of all incoming segments, even when the receive window is zero
(MUST-66).
We have taken advantage of the numbering scheme to protect certain
control information as well. This is achieved by implicitly
including some control flags in the sequence space so they can be
retransmitted and acknowledged without confusion (i.e., one and only
one copy of the control will be acted upon). Control information is
not physically carried in the segment data space. Consequently, we
must adopt rules for implicitly assigning sequence numbers to
control. The SYN and FIN are the only controls requiring this
protection, and these controls are used only at connection opening
and closing. For sequence number purposes, the SYN is considered to
occur before the first actual data octet of the segment in which it
occurs, while the FIN is considered to occur after the last actual
data octet in a segment in which it occurs. The segment length
(SEG.LEN) includes both data and sequence space occupying controls.
When a SYN is present then SEG.SEQ is the sequence number of the SYN.
Initial Sequence Number Selection
The protocol places no restriction on a particular connection being
used over and over again. A connection is defined by a pair of
sockets. New instances of a connection will be referred to as
incarnations of the connection. The problem that arises from this is
-- "how does the TCP implementation identify duplicate segments from
previous incarnations of the connection?" This problem becomes
apparent if the connection is being opened and closed in quick
succession, or if the connection breaks with loss of memory and is
then reestablished.
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To avoid confusion we must prevent segments from one incarnation of a
connection from being used while the same sequence numbers may still
be present in the network from an earlier incarnation. We want to
assure this, even if a TCP endpoint loses all knowledge of the
sequence numbers it has been using. When new connections are
created, an initial sequence number (ISN) generator is employed that
selects a new 32 bit ISN. There are security issues that result if
an off-path attacker is able to predict or guess ISN values.
The recommended ISN generator is based on the combination of a
(possibly fictitious) 32 bit clock whose low order bit is incremented
roughly every 4 microseconds, and a pseudorandom hash function (PRF).
The clock component is intended to insure that with a Maximum Segment
Lifetime (MSL), generated ISNs will be unique, since it cycles
approximately every 4.55 hours, which is much longer than the MSL.
This recommended algorithm is further described in RFC 6528 [34] and
builds on the basic clock-driven algorithm from RFC 793.
A TCP implementation MUST use a clock-driven selection of initial
sequence numbers (MUST-8), and SHOULD generate its Initial Sequence
Numbers with the expression:
ISN = M + F(localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport, secretkey)
where M is the 4 microsecond timer, and F() is a pseudorandom
function (PRF) of the connection's identifying parameters ("localip,
localport, remoteip, remoteport") and a secret key ("secretkey")
(SHLD-1). F() MUST NOT be computable from the outside (MUST-9), or
an attacker could still guess at sequence numbers from the ISN used
for some other connection. The PRF could be implemented as a
cryptographic hash of the concatenation of the TCP connection
parameters and some secret data. For discussion of the selection of
a specific hash algorithm and management of the secret key data,
please see Section 3 of [34].
For each connection there is a send sequence number and a receive
sequence number. The initial send sequence number (ISS) is chosen by
the data sending TCP peer, and the initial receive sequence number
(IRS) is learned during the connection establishing procedure.
For a connection to be established or initialized, the two TCP peers
must synchronize on each other's initial sequence numbers. This is
done in an exchange of connection establishing segments carrying a
control bit called "SYN" (for synchronize) and the initial sequence
numbers. As a shorthand, segments carrying the SYN bit are also
called "SYNs". Hence, the solution requires a suitable mechanism for
picking an initial sequence number and a slightly involved handshake
to exchange the ISN's.
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The synchronization requires each side to send its own initial
sequence number and to receive a confirmation of it in acknowledgment
from the remote TCP peer. Each side must also receive the remote
peer's initial sequence number and send a confirming acknowledgment.
1) A --> B SYN my sequence number is X
2) A <-- B ACK your sequence number is X
3) A <-- B SYN my sequence number is Y
4) A --> B ACK your sequence number is Y
Because steps 2 and 3 can be combined in a single message this is
called the three way (or three message) handshake.
A three way handshake is necessary because sequence numbers are not
tied to a global clock in the network, and TCP implementations may
have different mechanisms for picking the ISN's. The receiver of the
first SYN has no way of knowing whether the segment was an old
delayed one or not, unless it remembers the last sequence number used
on the connection (which is not always possible), and so it must ask
the sender to verify this SYN. The three way handshake and the
advantages of a clock-driven scheme are discussed in [52].
Knowing When to Keep Quiet
To be sure that a TCP implementation does not create a segment
carrying a sequence number that may be duplicated by an old segment
remaining in the network, the TCP endpoint must keep quiet for an MSL
before assigning any sequence numbers upon starting up or recovering
from a situation where memory of sequence numbers in use was lost.
For this specification the MSL is taken to be 2 minutes. This is an
engineering choice, and may be changed if experience indicates it is
desirable to do so. Note that if a TCP endpoint is reinitialized in
some sense, yet retains its memory of sequence numbers in use, then
it need not wait at all; it must only be sure to use sequence numbers
larger than those recently used.
The TCP Quiet Time Concept
Hosts that for any reason lose knowledge of the last sequence numbers
transmitted on each active (i.e., not closed) connection shall delay
emitting any TCP segments for at least the agreed MSL in the internet
system that the host is a part of. In the paragraphs below, an
explanation for this specification is given. TCP implementors may
violate the "quiet time" restriction, but only at the risk of causing
some old data to be accepted as new or new data rejected as old
duplicated by some receivers in the internet system.
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TCP endpoints consume sequence number space each time a segment is
formed and entered into the network output queue at a source host.
The duplicate detection and sequencing algorithm in the TCP protocol
relies on the unique binding of segment data to sequence space to the
extent that sequence numbers will not cycle through all 2**32 values
before the segment data bound to those sequence numbers has been
delivered and acknowledged by the receiver and all duplicate copies
of the segments have "drained" from the internet. Without such an
assumption, two distinct TCP segments could conceivably be assigned
the same or overlapping sequence numbers, causing confusion at the
receiver as to which data is new and which is old. Remember that
each segment is bound to as many consecutive sequence numbers as
there are octets of data and SYN or FIN flags in the segment.
Under normal conditions, TCP implementations keep track of the next
sequence number to emit and the oldest awaiting acknowledgment so as
to avoid mistakenly using a sequence number over before its first use
has been acknowledged. This alone does not guarantee that old
duplicate data is drained from the net, so the sequence space has
been made very large to reduce the probability that a wandering
duplicate will cause trouble upon arrival. At 2 megabits/sec. it
takes 4.5 hours to use up 2**32 octets of sequence space. Since the
maximum segment lifetime in the net is not likely to exceed a few
tens of seconds, this is deemed ample protection for foreseeable
nets, even if data rates escalate to l0's of megabits/sec. At 100
megabits/sec, the cycle time is 5.4 minutes, which may be a little
short, but still within reason.
The basic duplicate detection and sequencing algorithm in TCP can be
defeated, however, if a source TCP endpoint does not have any memory
of the sequence numbers it last used on a given connection. For
example, if the TCP implementation were to start all connections with
sequence number 0, then upon the host rebooting, a TCP peer might re-
form an earlier connection (possibly after half-open connection
resolution) and emit packets with sequence numbers identical to or
overlapping with packets still in the network, which were emitted on
an earlier incarnation of the same connection. In the absence of
knowledge about the sequence numbers used on a particular connection,
the TCP specification recommends that the source delay for MSL
seconds before emitting segments on the connection, to allow time for
segments from the earlier connection incarnation to drain from the
system.
Even hosts that can remember the time of day and used it to select
initial sequence number values are not immune from this problem
(i.e., even if time of day is used to select an initial sequence
number for each new connection incarnation).
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Suppose, for example, that a connection is opened starting with
sequence number S. Suppose that this connection is not used much and
that eventually the initial sequence number function (ISN(t)) takes
on a value equal to the sequence number, say S1, of the last segment
sent by this TCP endpoint on a particular connection. Now suppose,
at this instant, the host reboots and establishes a new incarnation
of the connection. The initial sequence number chosen is S1 = ISN(t)
-- last used sequence number on old incarnation of connection! If
the recovery occurs quickly enough, any old duplicates in the net
bearing sequence numbers in the neighborhood of S1 may arrive and be
treated as new packets by the receiver of the new incarnation of the
connection.
The problem is that the recovering host may not know for how long it
was down between rebooting nor does it know whether there are still
old duplicates in the system from earlier connection incarnations.
One way to deal with this problem is to deliberately delay emitting
segments for one MSL after recovery from a reboot - this is the
"quiet time" specification. Hosts that prefer to avoid waiting are
willing to risk possible confusion of old and new packets at a given
destination may choose not to wait for the "quiet time".
Implementors may provide TCP users with the ability to select on a
connection by connection basis whether to wait after a reboot, or may
informally implement the "quiet time" for all connections.
Obviously, even where a user selects to "wait," this is not necessary
after the host has been "up" for at least MSL seconds.
To summarize: every segment emitted occupies one or more sequence
numbers in the sequence space, the numbers occupied by a segment are
"busy" or "in use" until MSL seconds have passed, upon rebooting a
block of space-time is occupied by the octets and SYN or FIN flags of
the last emitted segment, if a new connection is started too soon and
uses any of the sequence numbers in the space-time footprint of the
last segment of the previous connection incarnation, there is a
potential sequence number overlap area that could cause confusion at
the receiver.
3.4. Establishing a connection
The "three-way handshake" is the procedure used to establish a
connection. This procedure normally is initiated by one TCP peer and
responded to by another TCP peer. The procedure also works if two
TCP peers simultaneously initiate the procedure. When simultaneous
open occurs, each TCP peer receives a "SYN" segment that carries no
acknowledgment after it has sent a "SYN". Of course, the arrival of
an old duplicate "SYN" segment can potentially make it appear, to the
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recipient, that a simultaneous connection initiation is in progress.
Proper use of "reset" segments can disambiguate these cases.
Several examples of connection initiation follow. Although these
examples do not show connection synchronization using data-carrying
segments, this is perfectly legitimate, so long as the receiving TCP
endpoint doesn't deliver the data to the user until it is clear the
data is valid (e.g., the data is buffered at the receiver until the
connection reaches the ESTABLISHED state, given that the three-way
handshake reduces the possibility of false connections). It is the
implementation of a trade-off between memory and messages to provide
information for this checking.
The simplest three-way handshake is shown in Figure 5 below. The
figures should be interpreted in the following way. Each line is
numbered for reference purposes. Right arrows (-->) indicate
departure of a TCP segment from TCP peer A to TCP peer B, or arrival
of a segment at B from A. Left arrows (<--), indicate the reverse.
Ellipsis (...) indicates a segment that is still in the network
(delayed). Comments appear in parentheses. TCP connection states
represent the state AFTER the departure or arrival of the segment
(whose contents are shown in the center of each line). Segment
contents are shown in abbreviated form, with sequence number, control
flags, and ACK field. Other fields such as window, addresses,
lengths, and text have been left out in the interest of clarity.
TCP Peer A TCP Peer B
1. CLOSED LISTEN
2. SYN-SENT --> <SEQ=100><CTL=SYN> --> SYN-RECEIVED
3. ESTABLISHED <-- <SEQ=300><ACK=101><CTL=SYN,ACK> <-- SYN-RECEIVED
4. ESTABLISHED --> <SEQ=101><ACK=301><CTL=ACK> --> ESTABLISHED
5. ESTABLISHED --> <SEQ=101><ACK=301><CTL=ACK><DATA> --> ESTABLISHED
Figure 5: Basic 3-Way Handshake for Connection Synchronization
In line 2 of Figure 5, TCP Peer A begins by sending a SYN segment
indicating that it will use sequence numbers starting with sequence
number 100. In line 3, TCP Peer B sends a SYN and acknowledges the
SYN it received from TCP Peer A. Note that the acknowledgment field
indicates TCP Peer B is now expecting to hear sequence 101,
acknowledging the SYN that occupied sequence 100.
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At line 4, TCP Peer A responds with an empty segment containing an
ACK for TCP Peer B's SYN; and in line 5, TCP Peer A sends some data.
Note that the sequence number of the segment in line 5 is the same as
in line 4 because the ACK does not occupy sequence number space (if
it did, we would wind up ACKing ACK's!).
Simultaneous initiation is only slightly more complex, as is shown in
Figure 6. Each TCP peer's connection state cycles from CLOSED to
SYN-SENT to SYN-RECEIVED to ESTABLISHED.
TCP Peer A TCP Peer B
1. CLOSED CLOSED
2. SYN-SENT --> <SEQ=100><CTL=SYN> ...
3. SYN-RECEIVED <-- <SEQ=300><CTL=SYN> <-- SYN-SENT
4. ... <SEQ=100><CTL=SYN> --> SYN-RECEIVED
5. SYN-RECEIVED --> <SEQ=100><ACK=301><CTL=SYN,ACK> ...
6. ESTABLISHED <-- <SEQ=300><ACK=101><CTL=SYN,ACK> <-- SYN-RECEIVED
7. ... <SEQ=100><ACK=301><CTL=SYN,ACK> --> ESTABLISHED
Figure 6: Simultaneous Connection Synchronization
A TCP implementation MUST support simultaneous open attempts (MUST-
10).
Note that a TCP implementation MUST keep track of whether a
connection has reached SYN-RECEIVED state as the result of a passive
OPEN or an active OPEN (MUST-11).
The principal reason for the three-way handshake is to prevent old
duplicate connection initiations from causing confusion. To deal
with this, a special control message, reset, is specified. If the
receiving TCP peer is in a non-synchronized state (i.e., SYN-SENT,
SYN-RECEIVED), it returns to LISTEN on receiving an acceptable reset.
If the TCP peer is in one of the synchronized states (ESTABLISHED,
FIN-WAIT-1, FIN-WAIT-2, CLOSE-WAIT, CLOSING, LAST-ACK, TIME-WAIT), it
aborts the connection and informs its user. We discuss this latter
case under "half-open" connections below.
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TCP Peer A TCP Peer B
1. CLOSED LISTEN
2. SYN-SENT --> <SEQ=100><CTL=SYN> ...
3. (duplicate) ... <SEQ=90><CTL=SYN> --> SYN-RECEIVED
4. SYN-SENT <-- <SEQ=300><ACK=91><CTL=SYN,ACK> <-- SYN-RECEIVED
5. SYN-SENT --> <SEQ=91><CTL=RST> --> LISTEN
6. ... <SEQ=100><CTL=SYN> --> SYN-RECEIVED
7. SYN-SENT <-- <SEQ=400><ACK=101><CTL=SYN,ACK> <-- SYN-RECEIVED
8. ESTABLISHED --> <SEQ=101><ACK=401><CTL=ACK> --> ESTABLISHED
Figure 7: Recovery from Old Duplicate SYN
As a simple example of recovery from old duplicates, consider
Figure 7. At line 3, an old duplicate SYN arrives at TCP Peer B.
TCP Peer B cannot tell that this is an old duplicate, so it responds
normally (line 4). TCP Peer A detects that the ACK field is
incorrect and returns a RST (reset) with its SEQ field selected to
make the segment believable. TCP Peer B, on receiving the RST,
returns to the LISTEN state. When the original SYN finally arrives
at line 6, the synchronization proceeds normally. If the SYN at line
6 had arrived before the RST, a more complex exchange might have
occurred with RST's sent in both directions.
Half-Open Connections and Other Anomalies
An established connection is said to be "half-open" if one of the TCP
peers has closed or aborted the connection at its end without the
knowledge of the other, or if the two ends of the connection have
become desynchronized owing to a failure or reboot that resulted in
loss of memory. Such connections will automatically become reset if
an attempt is made to send data in either direction. However, half-
open connections are expected to be unusual.
If at site A the connection no longer exists, then an attempt by the
user at site B to send any data on it will result in the site B TCP
endpoint receiving a reset control message. Such a message indicates
to the site B TCP endpoint that something is wrong, and it is
expected to abort the connection.
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Assume that two user processes A and B are communicating with one
another when a failure or reboot occurs causing loss of memory to A's
TCP implementation. Depending on the operating system supporting A's
TCP implementation, it is likely that some error recovery mechanism
exists. When the TCP endpoint is up again, A is likely to start
again from the beginning or from a recovery point. As a result, A
will probably try to OPEN the connection again or try to SEND on the
connection it believes open. In the latter case, it receives the
error message "connection not open" from the local (A's) TCP
implementation. In an attempt to establish the connection, A's TCP
implementation will send a segment containing SYN. This scenario
leads to the example shown in Figure 8. After TCP Peer A reboots,
the user attempts to re-open the connection. TCP Peer B, in the
meantime, thinks the connection is open.
TCP Peer A TCP Peer B
1. (REBOOT) (send 300,receive 100)
2. CLOSED ESTABLISHED
3. SYN-SENT --> <SEQ=400><CTL=SYN> --> (??)
4. (!!) <-- <SEQ=300><ACK=100><CTL=ACK> <-- ESTABLISHED
5. SYN-SENT --> <SEQ=100><CTL=RST> --> (Abort!!)
6. SYN-SENT CLOSED
7. SYN-SENT --> <SEQ=400><CTL=SYN> -->
Figure 8: Half-Open Connection Discovery
When the SYN arrives at line 3, TCP Peer B, being in a synchronized
state, and the incoming segment outside the window, responds with an
acknowledgment indicating what sequence it next expects to hear (ACK
100). TCP Peer A sees that this segment does not acknowledge
anything it sent and, being unsynchronized, sends a reset (RST)
because it has detected a half-open connection. TCP Peer B aborts at
line 5. TCP Peer A will continue to try to establish the connection;
the problem is now reduced to the basic 3-way handshake of Figure 5.
An interesting alternative case occurs when TCP Peer A reboots and
TCP Peer B tries to send data on what it thinks is a synchronized
connection. This is illustrated in Figure 9. In this case, the data
arriving at TCP Peer A from TCP Peer B (line 2) is unacceptable
because no such connection exists, so TCP Peer A sends a RST. The
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RST is acceptable so TCP Peer B processes it and aborts the
connection.
TCP Peer A TCP Peer B
1. (REBOOT) (send 300,receive 100)
2. (??) <-- <SEQ=300><ACK=100><DATA=10><CTL=ACK> <-- ESTABLISHED
3. --> <SEQ=100><CTL=RST> --> (ABORT!!)
Figure 9: Active Side Causes Half-Open Connection Discovery
In Figure 10, we find the two TCP Peers A and B with passive
connections waiting for SYN. An old duplicate arriving at TCP Peer B
(line 2) stirs B into action. A SYN-ACK is returned (line 3) and
causes TCP A to generate a RST (the ACK in line 3 is not acceptable).
TCP Peer B accepts the reset and returns to its passive LISTEN state.
TCP Peer A TCP Peer B
1. LISTEN LISTEN
2. ... <SEQ=Z><CTL=SYN> --> SYN-RECEIVED
3. (??) <-- <SEQ=X><ACK=Z+1><CTL=SYN,ACK> <-- SYN-RECEIVED
4. --> <SEQ=Z+1><CTL=RST> --> (return to LISTEN!)
5. LISTEN LISTEN
Figure 10: Old Duplicate SYN Initiates a Reset on two Passive Sockets
A variety of other cases are possible, all of which are accounted for
by the following rules for RST generation and processing.
Reset Generation
As a general rule, reset (RST) must be sent whenever a segment
arrives that apparently is not intended for the current connection.
A reset must not be sent if it is not clear that this is the case.
There are three groups of states:
1. If the connection does not exist (CLOSED) then a reset is sent
in response to any incoming segment except another reset. In
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particular, SYNs addressed to a non-existent connection are
rejected by this means.
If the incoming segment has the ACK bit set, the reset takes its
sequence number from the ACK field of the segment, otherwise the
reset has sequence number zero and the ACK field is set to the sum
of the sequence number and segment length of the incoming segment.
The connection remains in the CLOSED state.
2. If the connection is in any non-synchronized state (LISTEN,
SYN-SENT, SYN-RECEIVED), and the incoming segment acknowledges
something not yet sent (the segment carries an unacceptable ACK),
or if an incoming segment has a security level or compartment that
does not exactly match the level and compartment requested for the
connection, a reset is sent.
If the incoming segment has an ACK field, the reset takes its
sequence number from the ACK field of the segment, otherwise the
reset has sequence number zero and the ACK field is set to the sum
of the sequence number and segment length of the incoming segment.
The connection remains in the same state.
3. If the connection is in a synchronized state (ESTABLISHED,
FIN-WAIT-1, FIN-WAIT-2, CLOSE-WAIT, CLOSING, LAST-ACK, TIME-WAIT),
any unacceptable segment (out of window sequence number or
unacceptable acknowledgment number) must elicit only an empty
acknowledgment segment containing the current send-sequence number
and an acknowledgment indicating the next sequence number expected
to be received, and the connection remains in the same state.
If an incoming segment has a security level, or compartment that
does not exactly match the level and compartment requested for the
connection, a reset is sent and the connection goes to the CLOSED
state. The reset takes its sequence number from the ACK field of
the incoming segment.
Reset Processing
In all states except SYN-SENT, all reset (RST) segments are validated
by checking their SEQ-fields. A reset is valid if its sequence
number is in the window. In the SYN-SENT state (a RST received in
response to an initial SYN), the RST is acceptable if the ACK field
acknowledges the SYN.
The receiver of a RST first validates it, then changes state. If the
receiver was in the LISTEN state, it ignores it. If the receiver was
in SYN-RECEIVED state and had previously been in the LISTEN state,
then the receiver returns to the LISTEN state, otherwise the receiver
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aborts the connection and goes to the CLOSED state. If the receiver
was in any other state, it aborts the connection and advises the user
and goes to the CLOSED state.
TCP implementations SHOULD allow a received RST segment to include
data (SHLD-2).
3.5. Closing a Connection
CLOSE is an operation meaning "I have no more data to send." The
notion of closing a full-duplex connection is subject to ambiguous
interpretation, of course, since it may not be obvious how to treat
the receiving side of the connection. We have chosen to treat CLOSE
in a simplex fashion. The user who CLOSEs may continue to RECEIVE
until the TCP receiver is told that the remote peer has CLOSED also.
Thus, a program could initiate several SENDs followed by a CLOSE, and
then continue to RECEIVE until signaled that a RECEIVE failed because
the remote peer has CLOSED. The TCP implementation will signal a
user, even if no RECEIVEs are outstanding, that the remote peer has
closed, so the user can terminate his side gracefully. A TCP
implementation will reliably deliver all buffers SENT before the
connection was CLOSED so a user who expects no data in return need
only wait to hear the connection was CLOSED successfully to know that
all their data was received at the destination TCP endpoint. Users
must keep reading connections they close for sending until the TCP
implementation indicates there is no more data.
There are essentially three cases:
1) The user initiates by telling the TCP implementation to CLOSE
the connection
2) The remote TCP endpoint initiates by sending a FIN control
signal
3) Both users CLOSE simultaneously
Case 1: Local user initiates the close
In this case, a FIN segment can be constructed and placed on the
outgoing segment queue. No further SENDs from the user will be
accepted by the TCP implementation, and it enters the FIN-WAIT-1
state. RECEIVEs are allowed in this state. All segments
preceding and including FIN will be retransmitted until
acknowledged. When the other TCP peer has both acknowledged the
FIN and sent a FIN of its own, the first TCP peer can ACK this
FIN. Note that a TCP endpoint receiving a FIN will ACK but not
send its own FIN until its user has CLOSED the connection also.
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Case 2: TCP endpoint receives a FIN from the network
If an unsolicited FIN arrives from the network, the receiving TCP
endpoint can ACK it and tell the user that the connection is
closing. The user will respond with a CLOSE, upon which the TCP
endpoint can send a FIN to the other TCP peer after sending any
remaining data. The TCP endpoint then waits until its own FIN is
acknowledged whereupon it deletes the connection. If an ACK is
not forthcoming, after the user timeout the connection is aborted
and the user is told.
Case 3: Both users close simultaneously
A simultaneous CLOSE by users at both ends of a connection causes
FIN segments to be exchanged. When all segments preceding the
FINs have been processed and acknowledged, each TCP peer can ACK
the FIN it has received. Both will, upon receiving these ACKs,
delete the connection.
TCP Peer A TCP Peer B
1. ESTABLISHED ESTABLISHED
2. (Close)
FIN-WAIT-1 --> <SEQ=100><ACK=300><CTL=FIN,ACK> --> CLOSE-WAIT
3. FIN-WAIT-2 <-- <SEQ=300><ACK=101><CTL=ACK> <-- CLOSE-WAIT
4. (Close)
TIME-WAIT <-- <SEQ=300><ACK=101><CTL=FIN,ACK> <-- LAST-ACK
5. TIME-WAIT --> <SEQ=101><ACK=301><CTL=ACK> --> CLOSED
6. (2 MSL)
CLOSED
Figure 11: Normal Close Sequence
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TCP Peer A TCP Peer B
1. ESTABLISHED ESTABLISHED
2. (Close) (Close)
FIN-WAIT-1 --> <SEQ=100><ACK=300><CTL=FIN,ACK> ... FIN-WAIT-1
<-- <SEQ=300><ACK=100><CTL=FIN,ACK> <--
... <SEQ=100><ACK=300><CTL=FIN,ACK> -->
3. CLOSING --> <SEQ=101><ACK=301><CTL=ACK> ... CLOSING
<-- <SEQ=301><ACK=101><CTL=ACK> <--
... <SEQ=101><ACK=301><CTL=ACK> -->
4. TIME-WAIT TIME-WAIT
(2 MSL) (2 MSL)
CLOSED CLOSED
Figure 12: Simultaneous Close Sequence
A TCP connection may terminate in two ways: (1) the normal TCP close
sequence using a FIN handshake, and (2) an "abort" in which one or
more RST segments are sent and the connection state is immediately
discarded. If the local TCP connection is closed by the remote side
due to a FIN or RST received from the remote side, then the local
application MUST be informed whether it closed normally or was
aborted (MUST-12).
3.5.1. Half-Closed Connections
The normal TCP close sequence delivers buffered data reliably in both
directions. Since the two directions of a TCP connection are closed
independently, it is possible for a connection to be "half closed,"
i.e., closed in only one direction, and a host is permitted to
continue sending data in the open direction on a half-closed
connection.
A host MAY implement a "half-duplex" TCP close sequence, so that an
application that has called CLOSE cannot continue to read data from
the connection (MAY-1). If such a host issues a CLOSE call while
received data is still pending in the TCP connection, or if new data
is received after CLOSE is called, its TCP implementation SHOULD send
a RST to show that data was lost (SHLD-3). See [17] section 2.17 for
discussion.
When a connection is closed actively, it MUST linger in TIME-WAIT
state for a time 2xMSL (Maximum Segment Lifetime) (MUST-13).
However, it MAY accept a new SYN from the remote TCP endpoint to
reopen the connection directly from TIME-WAIT state (MAY-2), if it:
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(1) assigns its initial sequence number for the new connection to
be larger than the largest sequence number it used on the previous
connection incarnation, and
(2) returns to TIME-WAIT state if the SYN turns out to be an old
duplicate.
When the TCP Timestamp options are available, an improved algorithm
is described in [32] in order to support higher connection
establishment rates. This algorithm for reducing TIME-WAIT is a Best
Current Practice that SHOULD be implemented, since timestamp options
are commonly used, and using them to reduce TIME-WAIT provides
benefits for busy Internet servers (SHLD-4).
3.6. Segmentation
The term "segmentation" refers to the activity TCP performs when
ingesting a stream of bytes from a sending application and
packetizing that stream of bytes into TCP segments. Individual TCP
segments often do not correspond one-for-one to individual send (or
socket write) calls from the application. Applications may perform
writes at the granularity of messages in the upper layer protocol,
but TCP guarantees no boundary coherence between the TCP segments
sent and received versus user application data read or write buffer
boundaries. In some specific protocols, such as RDMA using DDP and
MPA [24], there are performance optimizations possible when the
relation between TCP segments and application data units can be
controlled, and MPA includes a specific mechanism for detecting and
verifying this relationship between TCP segments and application
message data strcutures, but this is specific to applications like
RDMA. In general, multiple goals influence the sizing of TCP
segments created by a TCP implementation.
Goals driving the sending of larger segments include:
o Reducing the number of packets in flight within the network.
o Increasing processing efficiency and potential performance by
enabling a smaller number of interrupts and inter-layer
interactions.
o Limiting the overhead of TCP headers.
Note that the performance benefits of sending larger segments may
decrease as the size increases, and there may be boundaries where
advantages are reversed. For instance, on some implementation
architectures, 1025 bytes within a segment could lead to worse
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performance than 1024 bytes, due purely to data alignment on copy
operations.
Goals driving the sending of smaller segments include:
o Avoiding sending a TCP segment that would result in an IP datagram
larger than the smallest MTU along an IP network path, because
this results in either packet loss or packet fragmentation.
Making matters worse, some firewalls or middleboxes may drop
fragmented packets or ICMP messages related related to
fragmentation.
o Preventing delays to the application data stream, especially when
TCP is waiting on the application to generate more data, or when
the application is waiting on an event or input from its peer in
order to generate more data.
o Enabling "fate sharing" between TCP segments and lower-layer data
units (e.g. below IP, for links with cell or frame sizes smaller
than the IP MTU).
Towards meeting these competing sets of goals, TCP includes several
mechanisms, including the Maximum Segment Size option, Path MTU
Discovery, the Nagle algorithm, and support for IPv6 Jumbograms, as
discussed in the following subsections.
3.6.1. Maximum Segment Size Option
TCP endpoints MUST implement both sending and receiving the MSS
option (MUST-14).
TCP implementations SHOULD send an MSS option in every SYN segment
when its receive MSS differs from the default 536 for IPv4 or 1220
for IPv6 (SHLD-5), and MAY send it always (MAY-3).
If an MSS option is not received at connection setup, TCP
implementations MUST assume a default send MSS of 536 (576-40) for
IPv4 or 1220 (1280 - 60) for IPv6 (MUST-15).
The maximum size of a segment that TCP endpoint really sends, the
"effective send MSS," MUST be the smaller (MUST-16) of the send MSS
(that reflects the available reassembly buffer size at the remote
host, the EMTU_R [14]) and the largest transmission size permitted by
the IP layer (EMTU_S [14]):
Eff.snd.MSS =
min(SendMSS+20, MMS_S) - TCPhdrsize - IPoptionsize
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where:
o SendMSS is the MSS value received from the remote host, or the
default 536 for IPv4 or 1220 for IPv6, if no MSS option is
received.
o MMS_S is the maximum size for a transport-layer message that TCP
may send.
o TCPhdrsize is the size of the fixed TCP header and any options.
This is 20 in the (rare) case that no options are present, but may
be larger if TCP options are to be sent. Note that some options
may not be included on all segments, but that for each segment
sent, the sender should adjust the data length accordingly, within
the Eff.snd.MSS.
o IPoptionsize is the size of any IP options associated with a TCP
connection. Note that some options may not be included on all
packets, but that for each segment sent, the sender should adjust
the data length accordingly, within the Eff.snd.MSS.
The MSS value to be sent in an MSS option should be equal to the
effective MTU minus the fixed IP and TCP headers. By ignoring both
IP and TCP options when calculating the value for the MSS option, if
there are any IP or TCP options to be sent in a packet, then the
sender must decrease the size of the TCP data accordingly. RFC 6691
[35] discusses this in greater detail.
The MSS value to be sent in an MSS option must be less than or equal
to:
MMS_R - 20
where MMS_R is the maximum size for a transport-layer message that
can be received (and reassembled at the IP layer) (MUST-67). TCP
obtains MMS_R and MMS_S from the IP layer; see the generic call
GET_MAXSIZES in Section 3.4 of RFC 1122. These are defined in terms
of their IP MTU equivalents, EMTU_R and EMTU_S [14].
When TCP is used in a situation where either the IP or TCP headers
are not fixed, the sender must reduce the amount of TCP data in any
given packet by the number of octets used by the IP and TCP options.
This has been a point of confusion historically, as explained in RFC
6691, Section 3.1.
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3.6.2. Path MTU Discovery
A TCP implementation may be aware of the MTU on directly connected
links, but will rarely have insight about MTUs across an entire
network path. For IPv4, RFC 1122 provides an IP-layer recommendation
on the default effective MTU for sending to be less than or equal to
576 for destinations not directly connected. For IPv6, this would be
1280. In all cases, however, implementation of Path MTU Discovery
(PMTUD) and Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery (PLPMTUD) is
strongly recommended in order for TCP to improve segmentation
decisions. Both PMTUD and PLPMTUD help TCP choose segment sizes that
avoid both on-path (for IPv4) and source fragmentation (IPv4 and
IPv6).
PMTUD for IPv4 [2] or IPv6 [3] is implemented in conjunction between
TCP, IP, and ICMP protocols. It relies both on avoiding source
fragmentation and setting the IPv4 DF (don't fragment) flag, the
latter to inhibit on-path fragmentation. It relies on ICMP errors
from routers along the path, whenever a segment is too large to
traverse a link. Several adjustments to a TCP implementation with
PMTUD are described in RFC 2923 in order to deal with problems
experienced in practice [7]. PLPMTUD [21] is a Standards Track
improvement to PMTUD that relaxes the requirement for ICMP support
across a path, and improves performance in cases where ICMP is not
consistently conveyed, but still tries to avoid source fragmentation.
The mechanisms in all four of these RFCs are recommended to be
included in TCP implementations.
The TCP MSS option specifies an upper bound for the size of packets
that can be received. Hence, setting the value in the MSS option too
small can impact the ability for PMTUD or PLPMTUD to find a larger
path MTU. RFC 1191 discusses this implication of many older TCP
implementations setting MSS to 536 for non-local destinations, rather
than deriving it from the MTUs of connected interfaces as
recommended.
3.6.3. Interfaces with Variable MTU Values
The effective MTU can sometimes vary, as when used with variable
compression, e.g., RObust Header Compression (ROHC) [28]. It is
tempting for a TCP implementation to want to advertise the largest
possible MSS, to support the most efficient use of compressed
payloads. Unfortunately, some compression schemes occasionally need
to transmit full headers (and thus smaller payloads) to resynchronize
state at their endpoint compressors/decompressors. If the largest
MTU is used to calculate the value to advertise in the MSS option,
TCP retransmission may interfere with compressor resynchronization.
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As a result, when the effective MTU of an interface varies, TCP
implementations SHOULD use the smallest effective MTU of the
interface to calculate the value to advertise in the MSS option
(SHLD-6).
3.6.4. Nagle Algorithm
The "Nagle algorithm" was described in RFC 896 [13] and was
recommended in RFC 1122 [14] for mitigation of an early problem of
too many small packets being generated. It has been implemented in
most current TCP code bases, sometimes with minor variations (see
Appendix A.3).
If there is unacknowledged data (i.e., SND.NXT > SND.UNA), then the
sending TCP endpoint buffers all user data (regardless of the PSH
bit), until the outstanding data has been acknowledged or until the
TCP endpoint can send a full-sized segment (Eff.snd.MSS bytes).
A TCP implementation SHOULD implement the Nagle Algorithm to coalesce
short segments (SHLD-7). However, there MUST be a way for an
application to disable the Nagle algorithm on an individual
connection (MUST-17). In all cases, sending data is also subject to
the limitation imposed by the Slow Start algorithm [27].
3.6.5. IPv6 Jumbograms
In order to support TCP over IPv6 jumbograms, implementations need to
be able to send TCP segments larger than the 64KB limit that the MSS
option can convey. RFC 2675 [6] defines that an MSS value of 65,535
bytes is to be treated as infinity, and Path MTU Discovery [3] is
used to determine the actual MSS.
The Jumbo Payload option need not be implemented or understood by
IPv6 nodes that do not support attachment to links with a MTU greater
than 65,575 [6], and the present IPv6 Node Requiements does not
include support for Jumbograms [44].
3.7. Data Communication
Once the connection is established data is communicated by the
exchange of segments. Because segments may be lost due to errors
(checksum test failure), or network congestion, TCP uses
retransmission to ensure delivery of every segment. Duplicate
segments may arrive due to network or TCP retransmission. As
discussed in the section on sequence numbers the TCP implementation
performs certain tests on the sequence and acknowledgment numbers in
the segments to verify their acceptability.
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The sender of data keeps track of the next sequence number to use in
the variable SND.NXT. The receiver of data keeps track of the next
sequence number to expect in the variable RCV.NXT. The sender of
data keeps track of the oldest unacknowledged sequence number in the
variable SND.UNA. If the data flow is momentarily idle and all data
sent has been acknowledged then the three variables will be equal.
When the sender creates a segment and transmits it the sender
advances SND.NXT. When the receiver accepts a segment it advances
RCV.NXT and sends an acknowledgment. When the data sender receives
an acknowledgment it advances SND.UNA. The extent to which the
values of these variables differ is a measure of the delay in the
communication. The amount by which the variables are advanced is the
length of the data and SYN or FIN flags in the segment. Note that
once in the ESTABLISHED state all segments must carry current
acknowledgment information.
The CLOSE user call implies a push function, as does the FIN control
flag in an incoming segment.
3.7.1. Retransmission Timeout
Because of the variability of the networks that compose an
internetwork system and the wide range of uses of TCP connections the
retransmission timeout (RTO) must be dynamically determined.
The RTO MUST be computed according to the algorithm in [9], including
Karn's algorithm for taking RTT samples (MUST-18).
RFC 793 contains an early example procedure for computing the RTO.
This was then replaced by the algorithm described in RFC 1122, and
subsequently updated in RFC 2988, and then again in RFC 6298.
If a retransmitted packet is identical to the original packet (which
implies not only that the data boundaries have not changed, but also
that none of the headers have not changed), then the same IPv4
Identification field MAY be used (see Section 3.2.1.5 of RFC 1122)
(MAY-4).
3.7.2. TCP Congestion Control
RFC 1122 required implementation of Van Jacobson's congestion control
algorithm combining slow start with congestion avoidance. RFC 2581
provided IETF Standards Track description of this, along with fast
retransmit and fast recovery. RFC 5681 is the current description of
these algorithms and is the current standard for TCP congestion
control.
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A TCP endpoint MUST implement RFC 5681 (MUST-19).
Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) was defined in RFC 3168 and is
an IETF Standards Track enhancement that has many benefits [41].
A TCP endpoint SHOULD implement ECN as described in RFC 3168 (SHLD-
8).
3.7.3. TCP Connection Failures
Excessive retransmission of the same segment by a TCP endpoint
indicates some failure of the remote host or the Internet path. This
failure may be of short or long duration. The following procedure
MUST be used to handle excessive retransmissions of data segments
(MUST-20):
(a) There are two thresholds R1 and R2 measuring the amount of
retransmission that has occurred for the same segment. R1 and R2
might be measured in time units or as a count of retransmissions.
(b) When the number of transmissions of the same segment reaches
or exceeds threshold R1, pass negative advice (see [14]
Section 3.3.1.4) to the IP layer, to trigger dead-gateway
diagnosis.
(c) When the number of transmissions of the same segment reaches a
threshold R2 greater than R1, close the connection.
(d) An application MUST (MUST-21) be able to set the value for R2
for a particular connection. For example, an interactive
application might set R2 to "infinity," giving the user control
over when to disconnect.
(e) TCP implementations SHOULD inform the application of the
delivery problem (unless such information has been disabled by the
application; see Asynchronous Reports section), when R1 is reached
and before R2 (SHLD-9). This will allow a remote login (User
Telnet) application program to inform the user, for example.
The value of R1 SHOULD correspond to at least 3 retransmissions, at
the current RTO (SHLD-10). The value of R2 SHOULD correspond to at
least 100 seconds (SHLD-11).
An attempt to open a TCP connection could fail with excessive
retransmissions of the SYN segment or by receipt of a RST segment or
an ICMP Port Unreachable. SYN retransmissions MUST be handled in the
general way just described for data retransmissions, including
notification of the application layer.
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However, the values of R1 and R2 may be different for SYN and data
segments. In particular, R2 for a SYN segment MUST be set large
enough to provide retransmission of the segment for at least 3
minutes (MUST-23). The application can close the connection (i.e.,
give up on the open attempt) sooner, of course.
3.7.4. TCP Keep-Alives
Implementors MAY include "keep-alives" in their TCP implementations
(MAY-5), although this practice is not universally accepted. Some
TCP implementations, however, have included a keep-alive mechanism.
To confirm that an idle connection is still active, these
implementations send a probe segment designed to elicit a response
from the TCP peer. Such a segment generally contains SEG.SEQ =
SND.NXT-1 and may or may not contain one garbage octet of data. If
keep-alives are included, the application MUST be able to turn them
on or off for each TCP connection (MUST-24), and they MUST default to
off (MUST-25).
Keep-alive packets MUST only be sent when no data or acknowledgement
packets have been received for the connection within an interval
(MUST-26). This interval MUST be configurable (MUST-27) and MUST
default to no less than two hours (MUST-28).
It is extremely important to remember that ACK segments that contain
no data are not reliably transmitted by TCP. Consequently, if a
keep-alive mechanism is implemented it MUST NOT interpret failure to
respond to any specific probe as a dead connection (MUST-29).
An implementation SHOULD send a keep-alive segment with no data
(SHLD-12); however, it MAY be configurable to send a keep-alive
segment containing one garbage octet (MAY-6), for compatibility with
erroneous TCP implementations.
3.7.5. The Communication of Urgent Information
As a result of implementation differences and middlebox interactions,
new applications SHOULD NOT employ the TCP urgent mechanism (SHLD-
13). However, TCP implementations MUST still include support for the
urgent mechanism (MUST-30). Details can be found in RFC 6093 [31].
The objective of the TCP urgent mechanism is to allow the sending
user to stimulate the receiving user to accept some urgent data and
to permit the receiving TCP endpoint to indicate to the receiving
user when all the currently known urgent data has been received by
the user.
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This mechanism permits a point in the data stream to be designated as
the end of urgent information. Whenever this point is in advance of
the receive sequence number (RCV.NXT) at the receiving TCP endpoint,
that TCP must tell the user to go into "urgent mode"; when the
receive sequence number catches up to the urgent pointer, the TCP
implementation must tell user to go into "normal mode". If the
urgent pointer is updated while the user is in "urgent mode", the
update will be invisible to the user.
The method employs a urgent field that is carried in all segments
transmitted. The URG control flag indicates that the urgent field is
meaningful and must be added to the segment sequence number to yield
the urgent pointer. The absence of this flag indicates that there is
no urgent data outstanding.
To send an urgent indication the user must also send at least one
data octet. If the sending user also indicates a push, timely
delivery of the urgent information to the destination process is
enhanced.
A TCP implementation MUST support a sequence of urgent data of any
length (MUST-31). [14]
The urgent pointer MUST point to the sequence number of the octet
following the urgent data (MUST-62).
A TCP implementation MUST (MUST-32) inform the application layer
asynchronously whenever it receives an Urgent pointer and there was
previously no pending urgent data, or whenvever the Urgent pointer
advances in the data stream. There MUST (MUST-33) be a way for the
application to learn how much urgent data remains to be read from the
connection, or at least to determine whether or not more urgent data
remains to be read. [14]
3.7.6. Managing the Window
The window sent in each segment indicates the range of sequence
numbers the sender of the window (the data receiver) is currently
prepared to accept. There is an assumption that this is related to
the currently available data buffer space available for this
connection.
The sending TCP endpoint packages the data to be transmitted into
segments that fit the current window, and may repackage segments on
the retransmission queue. Such repackaging is not required, but may
be helpful.
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In a connection with a one-way data flow, the window information will
be carried in acknowledgment segments that all have the same sequence
number so there will be no way to reorder them if they arrive out of
order. This is not a serious problem, but it will allow the window
information to be on occasion temporarily based on old reports from
the data receiver. A refinement to avoid this problem is to act on
the window information from segments that carry the highest
acknowledgment number (that is segments with acknowledgment number
equal or greater than the highest previously received).
Indicating a large window encourages transmissions. If more data
arrives than can be accepted, it will be discarded. This will result
in excessive retransmissions, adding unnecessarily to the load on the
network and the TCP endpoints. Indicating a small window may
restrict the transmission of data to the point of introducing a round
trip delay between each new segment transmitted.
The mechanisms provided allow a TCP endpoint to advertise a large
window and to subsequently advertise a much smaller window without
having accepted that much data. This, so called "shrinking the
window," is strongly discouraged. The robustness principle [14]
dictates that TCP peers will not shrink the window themselves, but
will be prepared for such behavior on the part of other TCP peers.
A TCP receiver SHOULD NOT shrink the window, i.e., move the right
window edge to the left (SHLD-14). However, a sending TCP peer MUST
be robust against window shrinking, which may cause the "useable
window" (see Section 3.7.6.2.1) to become negative (MUST-34).
If this happens, the sender SHOULD NOT send new data (SHLD-15), but
SHOULD retransmit normally the old unacknowledged data between
SND.UNA and SND.UNA+SND.WND (SHLD-16). The sender MAY also
retransmit old data beyond SND.UNA+SND.WND (MAY-7), but SHOULD NOT
time out the connection if data beyond the right window edge is not
acknowledged (SHLD-17). If the window shrinks to zero, the TCP
implementation MUST probe it in the standard way (described below)
(MUST-35).
3.7.6.1. Zero Window Probing
The sending TCP peer must be prepared to accept from the user and
send at least one octet of new data even if the send window is zero.
The sending TCP peer must regularly retransmit to the receiving TCP
peer even when the window is zero, in order to "probe" the window.
Two minutes is recommended for the retransmission interval when the
window is zero. This retransmission is essential to guarantee that
when either TCP peer has a zero window the re-opening of the window
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will be reliably reported to the other. This is referred to as Zero-
Window Probing (ZWP) in other documents.
Probing of zero (offered) windows MUST be supported (MUST-36).
A TCP implementation MAY keep its offered receive window closed
indefinitely (MAY-8). As long as the receiving TCP peer continues to
send acknowledgments in response to the probe segments, the sending
TCP peer MUST allow the connection to stay open (MUST-37). This
enables TCP to function in scenarios such as the "printer ran out of
paper" situation described in Section 4.2.2.17 of RFC1122. The
behavior is subject to the implementation's resource management
concerns, as noted in [33].
When the receiving TCP peer has a zero window and a segment arrives
it must still send an acknowledgment showing its next expected
sequence number and current window (zero).
The transmitting host SHOULD send the first zero-window probe when a
zero window has existed for the retransmission timeout period (SHLD-
29) (see Section 3.7.1), and SHOULD increase exponentially the
interval between successive probes (SHLD-30).
3.7.6.2. Silly Window Syndrome Avoidance
The "Silly Window Syndrome" (SWS) is a stable pattern of small
incremental window movements resulting in extremely poor TCP
performance. Algorithms to avoid SWS are described below for both
the sending side and the receiving side. RFC 1122 contains more
detailed discussion of the SWS problem. Note that the Nagle
algorithm and the sender SWS avoidance algorithm play complementary
roles in improving performance. The Nagle algorithm discourages
sending tiny segments when the data to be sent increases in small
increments, while the SWS avoidance algorithm discourages small
segments resulting from the right window edge advancing in small
increments.
3.7.6.2.1. Sender's Algorithm - When to Send Data
A TCP implementation MUST include a SWS avoidance algorithm in the
sender (MUST-38).
The Nagle algorithm from Section 3.6.4 additionally describes how to
coalesce short segments.
The sender's SWS avoidance algorithm is more difficult than the
receivers's, because the sender does not know (directly) the
receiver's total buffer space RCV.BUFF. An approach that has been
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found to work well is for the sender to calculate Max(SND.WND), the
maximum send window it has seen so far on the connection, and to use
this value as an estimate of RCV.BUFF. Unfortunately, this can only
be an estimate; the receiver may at any time reduce the size of
RCV.BUFF. To avoid a resulting deadlock, it is necessary to have a
timeout to force transmission of data, overriding the SWS avoidance
algorithm. In practice, this timeout should seldom occur.
The "useable window" is:
U = SND.UNA + SND.WND - SND.NXT
i.e., the offered window less the amount of data sent but not
acknowledged. If D is the amount of data queued in the sending TCP
endpoint but not yet sent, then the following set of rules is
recommended.
Send data:
(1) if a maximum-sized segment can be sent, i.e, if:
min(D,U) >= Eff.snd.MSS;
(2) or if the data is pushed and all queued data can be sent now,
i.e., if:
[SND.NXT = SND.UNA and] PUSHED and D <= U
(the bracketed condition is imposed by the Nagle algorithm);
(3) or if at least a fraction Fs of the maximum window can be sent,
i.e., if:
[SND.NXT = SND.UNA and]
min(D.U) >= Fs * Max(SND.WND);
(4) or if data is PUSHed and the override timeout occurs.
Here Fs is a fraction whose recommended value is 1/2. The override
timeout should be in the range 0.1 - 1.0 seconds. It may be
convenient to combine this timer with the timer used to probe zero
windows (Section Section 3.7.6.1).
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3.7.6.2.2. Receiver's Algorithm - When to Send a Window Update
A TCP implementation MUST include a SWS avoidance algorithm in the
receiver (MUST-39).
The receiver's SWS avoidance algorithm determines when the right
window edge may be advanced; this is customarily known as "updating
the window". This algorithm combines with the delayed ACK algorithm
(see Section 3.7.6.3) to determine when an ACK segment containing the
current window will really be sent to the receiver.
The solution to receiver SWS is to avoid advancing the right window
edge RCV.NXT+RCV.WND in small increments, even if data is received
from the network in small segments.
Suppose the total receive buffer space is RCV.BUFF. At any given
moment, RCV.USER octets of this total may be tied up with data that
has been received and acknowledged but that the user process has not
yet consumed. When the connection is quiescent, RCV.WND = RCV.BUFF
and RCV.USER = 0.
Keeping the right window edge fixed as data arrives and is
acknowledged requires that the receiver offer less than its full
buffer space, i.e., the receiver must specify a RCV.WND that keeps
RCV.NXT+RCV.WND constant as RCV.NXT increases. Thus, the total
buffer space RCV.BUFF is generally divided into three parts:
|<------- RCV.BUFF ---------------->|
1 2 3
----|---------|------------------|------|----
RCV.NXT ^
(Fixed)
1 - RCV.USER = data received but not yet consumed;
2 - RCV.WND = space advertised to sender;
3 - Reduction = space available but not yet
advertised.
The suggested SWS avoidance algorithm for the receiver is to keep
RCV.NXT+RCV.WND fixed until the reduction satisfies:
RCV.BUFF - RCV.USER - RCV.WND >=
min( Fr * RCV.BUFF, Eff.snd.MSS )
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where Fr is a fraction whose recommended value is 1/2, and
Eff.snd.MSS is the effective send MSS for the connection (see
Section 3.6.1). When the inequality is satisfied, RCV.WND is set to
RCV.BUFF-RCV.USER.
Note that the general effect of this algorithm is to advance RCV.WND
in increments of Eff.snd.MSS (for realistic receive buffers:
Eff.snd.MSS < RCV.BUFF/2). Note also that the receiver must use its
own Eff.snd.MSS, assuming it is the same as the sender's.
3.7.6.3. Delayed Acknowledgements - When to Send an ACK Segment
A host that is receiving a stream of TCP data segments can increase
efficiency in both the Internet and the hosts by sending fewer than
one ACK (acknowledgment) segment per data segment received; this is
known as a "delayed ACK".
A TCP endpoint SHOULD implement a delayed ACK (SHLD-18), but an ACK
should not be excessively delayed; in particular, the delay MUST be
less than 0.5 seconds (MUST-40), and in a stream of full-sized
segments there SHOULD be an ACK for at least every second segment
(SHLD-19). Excessive delays on ACK's can disturb the round-trip
timing and packet "clocking" algorithms.
3.8. Interfaces
There are of course two interfaces of concern: the user/TCP interface
and the TCP/lower-level interface. We have a fairly elaborate model
of the user/TCP interface, but the interface to the lower level
protocol module is left unspecified here, since it will be specified
in detail by the specification of the lower level protocol. For the
case that the lower level is IP we note some of the parameter values
that TCP implementations might use.
3.8.1. User/TCP Interface
The following functional description of user commands to the TCP
implementation is, at best, fictional, since every operating system
will have different facilities. Consequently, we must warn readers
that different TCP implementations may have different user
interfaces. However, all TCP implementations must provide a certain
minimum set of services to guarantee that all TCP implementations can
support the same protocol hierarchy. This section specifies the
functional interfaces required of all TCP implementations.
Section 3.1 of [43] also identifies primitives provided by TCP, and
could be used as an additional reference for implementers.
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TCP User Commands
The following sections functionally characterize a USER/TCP
interface. The notation used is similar to most procedure or
function calls in high level languages, but this usage is not
meant to rule out trap type service calls.
The user commands described below specify the basic functions the
TCP implementation must perform to support interprocess
communication. Individual implementations must define their own
exact format, and may provide combinations or subsets of the basic
functions in single calls. In particular, some implementations
may wish to automatically OPEN a connection on the first SEND or
RECEIVE issued by the user for a given connection.
In providing interprocess communication facilities, the TCP
implementation must not only accept commands, but must also return
information to the processes it serves. The latter consists of:
(a) general information about a connection (e.g., interrupts,
remote close, binding of unspecified remote socket).
(b) replies to specific user commands indicating success or
various types of failure.
Open
Format: OPEN (local port, remote socket, active/passive [,
timeout] [, DiffServ field] [, security/compartment] [local IP
address,] [, options]) -> local connection name
We assume that the local TCP endpoint is aware of the identity
of the processes it serves and will check the authority of the
process to use the connection specified. Depending upon the
implementation of the TCP endpoint, the local network and TCP
identifiers for the source address will either be supplied by
the TCP endpoint or the lower level protocol (e.g., IP). These
considerations are the result of concern about security, to the
extent that no TCP peer be able to masquerade as another one,
and so on. Similarly, no process can masquerade as another
without the collusion of the TCP implementation.
If the active/passive flag is set to passive, then this is a
call to LISTEN for an incoming connection. A passive open may
have either a fully specified remote socket to wait for a
particular connection or an unspecified remote socket to wait
for any call. A fully specified passive call can be made
active by the subsequent execution of a SEND.
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A transmission control block (TCB) is created and partially
filled in with data from the OPEN command parameters.
Every passive OPEN call either creates a new connection record
in LISTEN state, or it returns an error; it MUST NOT affect any
previously created connection record (MUST-41).
A TCP implementation that supports multiple concurrent users
MUST provide an OPEN call that will functionally allow an
application to LISTEN on a port while a connection block with
the same local port is in SYN-SENT or SYN-RECEIVED state (MUST-
42).
On an active OPEN command, the TCP endpoint will begin the
procedure to synchronize (i.e., establish) the connection at
once.
The timeout, if present, permits the caller to set up a timeout
for all data submitted to TCP. If data is not successfully
delivered to the destination within the timeout period, the TCP
endpoint will abort the connection. The present global default
is five minutes.
The TCP implementation or some component of the operating
system will verify the users authority to open a connection
with the specified DiffServ field value or security/
compartment. The absence of a DiffServ field value or
security/compartment specification in the OPEN call indicates
the default values must be used.
TCP will accept incoming requests as matching only if the
security/compartment information is exactly the same as that
requested in the OPEN call.
The DiffServ field value indicated by the user only impacts
outgoing packets, may be altered en route through the network,
and has no direct bearing or relation to received packets.
A local connection name will be returned to the user by the TCP
implementation. The local connection name can then be used as
a short hand term for the connection defined by the <local
socket, remote socket> pair.
The optional "local IP address" parameter MUST be supported to
allow the specification of the local IP address (MUST-43).
This enables applications that need to select the local IP
address used when multihoming is present.
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A passive OPEN call with a specified "local IP address"
parameter will await an incoming connection request to that
address. If the parameter is unspecified, a passive OPEN will
await an incoming connection request to any local IP address,
and then bind the local IP address of the connection to the
particular address that is used.
For an active OPEN call, a specified "local IP address"
parameter will be used for opening the connection. If the
parameter is unspecified, the host will choose an appropriate
local IP address (see RFC 1122 section 3.3.4.2).
If an application on a multihomed host does not specify the
local IP address when actively opening a TCP connection, then
the TCP implementation MUST ask the IP layer to select a local
IP address before sending the (first) SYN (MUST-44). See the
function GET_SRCADDR() in Section 3.4 of RFC 1122.
At all other times, a previous segment has either been sent or
received on this connection, and TCP implementations MUST use
the same local address is used that was used in those previous
segments (MUST-45).
A TCP implementation MUST reject as an error a local OPEN call
for an invalid remote IP address (e.g., a broadcast or
multicast address) (MUST-46).
Send
Format: SEND (local connection name, buffer address, byte
count, PUSH flag (optional), URGENT flag [,timeout])
This call causes the data contained in the indicated user
buffer to be sent on the indicated connection. If the
connection has not been opened, the SEND is considered an
error. Some implementations may allow users to SEND first; in
which case, an automatic OPEN would be done. For example, this
might be one way for application data to be included in SYN
segments. If the calling process is not authorized to use this
connection, an error is returned.
A TCP endpoint MAY implement PUSH flags on SEND calls (MAY-15).
If PUSH flags are not implemented, then the sending TCP peer:
(1) MUST NOT buffer data indefinitely (MUST-60), and (2) MUST
set the PSH bit in the last buffered segment (i.e., when there
is no more queued data to be sent) (MUST-61). The remaining
description below assumes the PUSH flag is supported on SEND
calls.
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If the PUSH flag is set, the application intends the data to be
transmitted promptly to the receiver, and the PUSH bit will be
set in the last TCP segment created from the buffer. When an
application issues a series of SEND calls without setting the
PUSH flag, the TCP implementation MAY aggregate the data
internally without sending it (MAY-16).
The PSH bit is not a record marker and is independent of
segment boundaries. The transmitter SHOULD collapse successive
bits when it packetizes data, to send the largest possible
segment (SHLD-27).
If the PUSH flag is not set, the data may be combined with data
from subsequent SENDs for transmission efficiency. Note that
when the Nagle algorithm is in use, TCP implementations may
buffer the data before sending, without regard to the PUSH flag
(see Section 3.6.4).
An application program is logically required to set the PUSH
flag in a SEND call whenever it needs to force delivery of the
data to avoid a communication deadlock. However, a TCP
implementation SHOULD send a maximum-sized segment whenever
possible (SHLD-28), to improve performance (see
Section 3.7.6.2.1).
New applications SHOULD NOT set the URGENT flag [31] due to
implementation differences and middlebox issues (SHLD-13).
If the URGENT flag is set, segments sent to the destination TCP
peer will have the urgent pointer set. The receiving TCP peer
will signal the urgent condition to the receiving process if
the urgent pointer indicates that data preceding the urgent
pointer has not been consumed by the receiving process. The
purpose of urgent is to stimulate the receiver to process the
urgent data and to indicate to the receiver when all the
currently known urgent data has been received. The number of
times the sending user's TCP implementation signals urgent will
not necessarily be equal to the number of times the receiving
user will be notified of the presence of urgent data.
If no remote socket was specified in the OPEN, but the
connection is established (e.g., because a LISTENing connection
has become specific due to a remote segment arriving for the
local socket), then the designated buffer is sent to the
implied remote socket. Users who make use of OPEN with an
unspecified remote socket can make use of SEND without ever
explicitly knowing the remote socket address.
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However, if a SEND is attempted before the remote socket
becomes specified, an error will be returned. Users can use
the STATUS call to determine the status of the connection.
Some TCP implementations may notify the user when an
unspecified socket is bound.
If a timeout is specified, the current user timeout for this
connection is changed to the new one.
In the simplest implementation, SEND would not return control
to the sending process until either the transmission was
complete or the timeout had been exceeded. However, this
simple method is both subject to deadlocks (for example, both
sides of the connection might try to do SENDs before doing any
RECEIVEs) and offers poor performance, so it is not
recommended. A more sophisticated implementation would return
immediately to allow the process to run concurrently with
network I/O, and, furthermore, to allow multiple SENDs to be in
progress. Multiple SENDs are served in first come, first
served order, so the TCP endpoint will queue those it cannot
service immediately.
We have implicitly assumed an asynchronous user interface in
which a SEND later elicits some kind of SIGNAL or pseudo-
interrupt from the serving TCP endpoint. An alternative is to
return a response immediately. For instance, SENDs might
return immediate local acknowledgment, even if the segment sent
had not been acknowledged by the distant TCP endpoint. We
could optimistically assume eventual success. If we are wrong,
the connection will close anyway due to the timeout. In
implementations of this kind (synchronous), there will still be
some asynchronous signals, but these will deal with the
connection itself, and not with specific segments or buffers.
In order for the process to distinguish among error or success
indications for different SENDs, it might be appropriate for
the buffer address to be returned along with the coded response
to the SEND request. TCP-to-user signals are discussed below,
indicating the information that should be returned to the
calling process.
Receive
Format: RECEIVE (local connection name, buffer address, byte
count) -> byte count, urgent flag, push flag (optional)
This command allocates a receiving buffer associated with the
specified connection. If no OPEN precedes this command or the
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calling process is not authorized to use this connection, an
error is returned.
In the simplest implementation, control would not return to the
calling program until either the buffer was filled, or some
error occurred, but this scheme is highly subject to deadlocks.
A more sophisticated implementation would permit several
RECEIVEs to be outstanding at once. These would be filled as
segments arrive. This strategy permits increased throughput at
the cost of a more elaborate scheme (possibly asynchronous) to
notify the calling program that a PUSH has been seen or a
buffer filled.
A TCP receiver MAY pass a received PSH flag to the application
layer via the PUSH flag in the interface (MAY-17), but it is
not required (this was clarified in RFC 1122 section 4.2.2.2).
The remainder of text describing the RECEIVE call below assumes
that passing the PUSH indication is supported.
If enough data arrive to fill the buffer before a PUSH is seen,
the PUSH flag will not be set in the response to the RECEIVE.
The buffer will be filled with as much data as it can hold. If
a PUSH is seen before the buffer is filled the buffer will be
returned partially filled and PUSH indicated.
If there is urgent data the user will have been informed as
soon as it arrived via a TCP-to-user signal. The receiving
user should thus be in "urgent mode". If the URGENT flag is
on, additional urgent data remains. If the URGENT flag is off,
this call to RECEIVE has returned all the urgent data, and the
user may now leave "urgent mode". Note that data following the
urgent pointer (non-urgent data) cannot be delivered to the
user in the same buffer with preceding urgent data unless the
boundary is clearly marked for the user.
To distinguish among several outstanding RECEIVEs and to take
care of the case that a buffer is not completely filled, the
return code is accompanied by both a buffer pointer and a byte
count indicating the actual length of the data received.
Alternative implementations of RECEIVE might have the TCP
endpoint allocate buffer storage, or the TCP endpoint might
share a ring buffer with the user.
Close
Format: CLOSE (local connection name)
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This command causes the connection specified to be closed. If
the connection is not open or the calling process is not
authorized to use this connection, an error is returned.
Closing connections is intended to be a graceful operation in
the sense that outstanding SENDs will be transmitted (and
retransmitted), as flow control permits, until all have been
serviced. Thus, it should be acceptable to make several SEND
calls, followed by a CLOSE, and expect all the data to be sent
to the destination. It should also be clear that users should
continue to RECEIVE on CLOSING connections, since the remote
peer may be trying to transmit the last of its data. Thus,
CLOSE means "I have no more to send" but does not mean "I will
not receive any more." It may happen (if the user level
protocol is not well thought out) that the closing side is
unable to get rid of all its data before timing out. In this
event, CLOSE turns into ABORT, and the closing TCP peer gives
up.
The user may CLOSE the connection at any time on his own
initiative, or in response to various prompts from the TCP
implementation (e.g., remote close executed, transmission
timeout exceeded, destination inaccessible).
Because closing a connection requires communication with the
remote TCP peer, connections may remain in the closing state
for a short time. Attempts to reopen the connection before the
TCP peer replies to the CLOSE command will result in error
responses.
Close also implies push function.
Status
Format: STATUS (local connection name) -> status data
This is an implementation dependent user command and could be
excluded without adverse effect. Information returned would
typically come from the TCB associated with the connection.
This command returns a data block containing the following
information:
local socket,
remote socket,
local connection name,
receive window,
send window,
connection state,
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number of buffers awaiting acknowledgment,
number of buffers pending receipt,
urgent state,
DiffServ field value,
security/compartment,
and transmission timeout.
Depending on the state of the connection, or on the
implementation itself, some of this information may not be
available or meaningful. If the calling process is not
authorized to use this connection, an error is returned. This
prevents unauthorized processes from gaining information about
a connection.
Abort
Format: ABORT (local connection name)
This command causes all pending SENDs and RECEIVES to be
aborted, the TCB to be removed, and a special RESET message to
be sent to the remote TCP peer of the connection. Depending on
the implementation, users may receive abort indications for
each outstanding SEND or RECEIVE, or may simply receive an
ABORT-acknowledgment.
Flush
Some TCP implementations have included a FLUSH call, which will
empty the TCP send queue of any data that the user has issued
SEND calls but is still to the right of the current send
window. That is, it flushes as much queued send data as
possible without losing sequence number synchronization. The
FLUSH call MAY be implemented (MAY-14).
Asynchronous Reports
There MUST be a mechanism for reporting soft TCP error
conditions to the application (MUST-47). Generically, we
assume this takes the form of an application-supplied
ERROR_REPORT routine that may be upcalled asynchronously from
the transport layer:
ERROR_REPORT(local connection name, reason, subreason)
The precise encoding of the reason and subreason parameters is
not specified here. However, the conditions that are reported
asynchronously to the application MUST include:
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* ICMP error message arrived (see Section 3.8.2.2 for
description of handling each ICMP message type, since some
message types need to be suppressed from generating reports
to the application)
* Excessive retransmissions (see Section 3.7.3)
* Urgent pointer advance (see Section 3.7.5)
However, an application program that does not want to receive
such ERROR_REPORT calls SHOULD be able to effectively disable
these calls (SHLD-20).
Set Differentiated Services Field (IPv4 TOS or IPv6 Traffic Class)
The application layer MUST be able to specify the
Differentiated Services field for segments that are sent on a
connection (MUST-48). The Differentiated Services field
includes the 6-bit Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP)
value. It is not required, but the application SHOULD be able
to change the Differentiated Services field during the
connection lifetime (SHLD-21). TCP implementations SHOULD pass
the current Differentiated Services field value without change
to the IP layer, when it sends segments on the connection
(SHLD-22).
The Differentiated Services field will be specified
independently in each direction on the connection, so that the
receiver application will specify the Differentiated Services
field used for ACK segments.
TCP implementations MAY pass the most recently received
Differentiated Services field up to the application (MAY-9).
3.8.2. TCP/Lower-Level Interface
The TCP endpoint calls on a lower level protocol module to actually
send and receive information over a network. The two current
standard Internet Protocol (IP) versions layered below TCP are IPv4
[1] and IPv6 [11].
If the lower level protocol is IPv4 it provides arguments for a type
of service (used within the Differentiated Services field) and for a
time to live. TCP uses the following settings for these parameters:
DiffServ field: The IP header value for the DiffServ field is
given by the user. This includes the bits of the DiffServ Code
Point (DSCP).
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Time to Live (TTL): The TTL value used to send TCP segments MUST
be configurable (MUST-49).
Note that RFC 793 specified one minute (60 seconds) as a
constant for the TTL, because the assumed maximum segment
lifetime was two minutes. This was intended to explicitly ask
that a segment be destroyed if it cannot be delivered by the
internet system within one minute. RFC 1122 changed this
specification to require that the TTL be configurable.
Note that the DiffServ field is permitted to change during a
connection (section 4.2.4.2 of RFC 1122). However, the
application interface might not support this ability, and the
application does not have knowledge about individual TCP
segments, so this can only be done on a coarse granularity, at
best. This limitation is further discussed in RFC 7657 (sec
5.1, 5.3, and 6) [40]. Generally, an application SHOULD NOT
change the DiffServ field value during the course of a
connection (SHLD-23).
Any lower level protocol will have to provide the source address,
destination address, and protocol fields, and some way to determine
the "TCP length", both to provide the functional equivalent service
of IP and to be used in the TCP checksum.
When received options are passed up to TCP from the IP layer, TCP
implementations MUST ignore options that it does not understand
(MUST-50).
A TCP implementation MAY support the Time Stamp (MAY-10) and Record
Route (MAY-11) options.
3.8.2.1. Source Routing
If the lower level is IP (or other protocol that provides this
feature) and source routing is used, the interface must allow the
route information to be communicated. This is especially important
so that the source and destination addresses used in the TCP checksum
be the originating source and ultimate destination. It is also
important to preserve the return route to answer connection requests.
An application MUST be able to specify a source route when it
actively opens a TCP connection (MUST-51), and this MUST take
precedence over a source route received in a datagram (MUST-52).
When a TCP connection is OPENed passively and a packet arrives with a
completed IP Source Route option (containing a return route), TCP
implementations MUST save the return route and use it for all
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segments sent on this connection (MUST-53). If a different source
route arrives in a later segment, the later definition SHOULD
override the earlier one (SHLD-24).
3.8.2.2. ICMP Messages
TCP implementations MUST act on an ICMP error message passed up from
the IP layer, directing it to the connection that created the error
(MUST-54). The necessary demultiplexing information can be found in
the IP header contained within the ICMP message.
This applies to ICMPv6 in addition to IPv4 ICMP.
[25] contains discussion of specific ICMP and ICMPv6 messages
classified as either "soft" or "hard" errors that may bear different
responses. Treatment for classes of ICMP messages is described
below:
Source Quench
TCP implementations MUST silently discard any received ICMP Source
Quench messages (MUST-55). See [10] for discussion.
Soft Errors
For ICMP these include: Destination Unreachable -- codes 0, 1, 5,
Time Exceeded -- codes 0, 1, and Parameter Problem.
For ICMPv6 these include: Destination Unreachable -- codes 0 and 3,
Time Exceeded -- codes 0, 1, and Parameter Problem -- codes 0, 1, 2
Since these Unreachable messages indicate soft error conditions,
TCP implementations MUST NOT abort the connection (MUST-56), and it
SHOULD make the information available to the application (SHLD-25).
Hard Errors
For ICMP these include Destination Unreachable -- codes 2-4">
These are hard error conditions, so TCP implementations SHOULD
abort the connection (SHLD-26). [25] notes that some
implementations do not abort connections when an ICMP hard error is
received for a connection that is in any of the synchronized
states.
Note that [25] section 4 describes widespread implementation behavior
that treats soft errors as hard errors during connection
establishment.
3.8.2.3. Remote Address Validation
RFC 1122 requires addresses to be validated in incoming SYN packets:
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An incoming SYN with an invalid source address MUST be ignored
either by TCP or by the IP layer (MUST-63) (see Section 3.2.1.3 of
[14]).
A TCP implementation MUST silently discard an incoming SYN segment
that is addressed to a broadcast or multicast address (MUST-57).
This prevents connection state and replies from being erroneously
generated, and implementers should note that this guidance is
applicable to all incoming segments, not just SYNs, as specifically
indicated in RFC 1122.
3.9. Event Processing
The processing depicted in this section is an example of one possible
implementation. Other implementations may have slightly different
processing sequences, but they should differ from those in this
section only in detail, not in substance.
The activity of the TCP endpoint can be characterized as responding
to events. The events that occur can be cast into three categories:
user calls, arriving segments, and timeouts. This section describes
the processing the TCP endpoint does in response to each of the
events. In many cases the processing required depends on the state
of the connection.
Events that occur:
User Calls
OPEN
SEND
RECEIVE
CLOSE
ABORT
STATUS
Arriving Segments
SEGMENT ARRIVES
Timeouts
USER TIMEOUT
RETRANSMISSION TIMEOUT
TIME-WAIT TIMEOUT
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The model of the TCP/user interface is that user commands receive an
immediate return and possibly a delayed response via an event or
pseudo interrupt. In the following descriptions, the term "signal"
means cause a delayed response.
Error responses in this document are identified by character strings.
For example, user commands referencing connections that do not exist
receive "error: connection not open".
Please note in the following that all arithmetic on sequence numbers,
acknowledgment numbers, windows, et cetera, is modulo 2**32 the size
of the sequence number space. Also note that "=<" means less than or
equal to (modulo 2**32).
A natural way to think about processing incoming segments is to
imagine that they are first tested for proper sequence number (i.e.,
that their contents lie in the range of the expected "receive window"
in the sequence number space) and then that they are generally queued
and processed in sequence number order.
When a segment overlaps other already received segments we
reconstruct the segment to contain just the new data, and adjust the
header fields to be consistent.
Note that if no state change is mentioned the TCP connection stays in
the same state.
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OPEN Call
CLOSED STATE (i.e., TCB does not exist)
Create a new transmission control block (TCB) to hold
connection state information. Fill in local socket identifier,
remote socket, DiffServ field, security/compartment, and user
timeout information. Note that some parts of the remote socket
may be unspecified in a passive OPEN and are to be filled in by
the parameters of the incoming SYN segment. Verify the
security and DiffServ value requested are allowed for this
user, if not return "error: precedence not allowed" or "error:
security/compartment not allowed." If passive enter the LISTEN
state and return. If active and the remote socket is
unspecified, return "error: remote socket unspecified"; if
active and the remote socket is specified, issue a SYN segment.
An initial send sequence number (ISS) is selected. A SYN
segment of the form <SEQ=ISS><CTL=SYN> is sent. Set SND.UNA to
ISS, SND.NXT to ISS+1, enter SYN-SENT state, and return.
If the caller does not have access to the local socket
specified, return "error: connection illegal for this process".
If there is no room to create a new connection, return "error:
insufficient resources".
LISTEN STATE
If active and the remote socket is specified, then change the
connection from passive to active, select an ISS. Send a SYN
segment, set SND.UNA to ISS, SND.NXT to ISS+1. Enter SYN-SENT
state. Data associated with SEND may be sent with SYN segment
or queued for transmission after entering ESTABLISHED state.
The urgent bit if requested in the command must be sent with
the data segments sent as a result of this command. If there
is no room to queue the request, respond with "error:
insufficient resources". If Foreign socket was not specified,
then return "error: remote socket unspecified".
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SYN-SENT STATE
SYN-RECEIVED STATE
ESTABLISHED STATE
FIN-WAIT-1 STATE
FIN-WAIT-2 STATE
CLOSE-WAIT STATE
CLOSING STATE
LAST-ACK STATE
TIME-WAIT STATE
Return "error: connection already exists".
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SEND Call
CLOSED STATE (i.e., TCB does not exist)
If the user does not have access to such a connection, then
return "error: connection illegal for this process".
Otherwise, return "error: connection does not exist".
LISTEN STATE
If the remote socket is specified, then change the connection
from passive to active, select an ISS. Send a SYN segment, set
SND.UNA to ISS, SND.NXT to ISS+1. Enter SYN-SENT state. Data
associated with SEND may be sent with SYN segment or queued for
transmission after entering ESTABLISHED state. The urgent bit
if requested in the command must be sent with the data segments
sent as a result of this command. If there is no room to queue
the request, respond with "error: insufficient resources". If
Foreign socket was not specified, then return "error: remote
socket unspecified".
SYN-SENT STATE
SYN-RECEIVED STATE
Queue the data for transmission after entering ESTABLISHED
state. If no space to queue, respond with "error: insufficient
resources".
ESTABLISHED STATE
CLOSE-WAIT STATE
Segmentize the buffer and send it with a piggybacked
acknowledgment (acknowledgment value = RCV.NXT). If there is
insufficient space to remember this buffer, simply return
"error: insufficient resources".
If the urgent flag is set, then SND.UP <- SND.NXT and set the
urgent pointer in the outgoing segments.
FIN-WAIT-1 STATE
FIN-WAIT-2 STATE
CLOSING STATE
LAST-ACK STATE
TIME-WAIT STATE
Return "error: connection closing" and do not service request.
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RECEIVE Call
CLOSED STATE (i.e., TCB does not exist)
If the user does not have access to such a connection, return
"error: connection illegal for this process".
Otherwise return "error: connection does not exist".
LISTEN STATE
SYN-SENT STATE
SYN-RECEIVED STATE
Queue for processing after entering ESTABLISHED state. If
there is no room to queue this request, respond with "error:
insufficient resources".
ESTABLISHED STATE
FIN-WAIT-1 STATE
FIN-WAIT-2 STATE
If insufficient incoming segments are queued to satisfy the
request, queue the request. If there is no queue space to
remember the RECEIVE, respond with "error: insufficient
resources".
Reassemble queued incoming segments into receive buffer and
return to user. Mark "push seen" (PUSH) if this is the case.
If RCV.UP is in advance of the data currently being passed to
the user notify the user of the presence of urgent data.
When the TCP endpoint takes responsibility for delivering data
to the user that fact must be communicated to the sender via an
acknowledgment. The formation of such an acknowledgment is
described below in the discussion of processing an incoming
segment.
CLOSE-WAIT STATE
Since the remote side has already sent FIN, RECEIVEs must be
satisfied by text already on hand, but not yet delivered to the
user. If no text is awaiting delivery, the RECEIVE will get a
"error: connection closing" response. Otherwise, any remaining
text can be used to satisfy the RECEIVE.
CLOSING STATE
LAST-ACK STATE
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TIME-WAIT STATE
Return "error: connection closing".
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CLOSE Call
CLOSED STATE (i.e., TCB does not exist)
If the user does not have access to such a connection, return
"error: connection illegal for this process".
Otherwise, return "error: connection does not exist".
LISTEN STATE
Any outstanding RECEIVEs are returned with "error: closing"
responses. Delete TCB, enter CLOSED state, and return.
SYN-SENT STATE
Delete the TCB and return "error: closing" responses to any
queued SENDs, or RECEIVEs.
SYN-RECEIVED STATE
If no SENDs have been issued and there is no pending data to
send, then form a FIN segment and send it, and enter FIN-WAIT-1
state; otherwise queue for processing after entering
ESTABLISHED state.
ESTABLISHED STATE
Queue this until all preceding SENDs have been segmentized,
then form a FIN segment and send it. In any case, enter FIN-
WAIT-1 state.
FIN-WAIT-1 STATE
FIN-WAIT-2 STATE
Strictly speaking, this is an error and should receive a
"error: connection closing" response. An "ok" response would
be acceptable, too, as long as a second FIN is not emitted (the
first FIN may be retransmitted though).
CLOSE-WAIT STATE
Queue this request until all preceding SENDs have been
segmentized; then send a FIN segment, enter LAST-ACK state.
CLOSING STATE
LAST-ACK STATE
TIME-WAIT STATE
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Respond with "error: connection closing".
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ABORT Call
CLOSED STATE (i.e., TCB does not exist)
If the user should not have access to such a connection, return
"error: connection illegal for this process".
Otherwise return "error: connection does not exist".
LISTEN STATE
Any outstanding RECEIVEs should be returned with "error:
connection reset" responses. Delete TCB, enter CLOSED state,
and return.
SYN-SENT STATE
All queued SENDs and RECEIVEs should be given "connection
reset" notification, delete the TCB, enter CLOSED state, and
return.
SYN-RECEIVED STATE
ESTABLISHED STATE
FIN-WAIT-1 STATE
FIN-WAIT-2 STATE
CLOSE-WAIT STATE
Send a reset segment:
<SEQ=SND.NXT><CTL=RST>
All queued SENDs and RECEIVEs should be given "connection
reset" notification; all segments queued for transmission
(except for the RST formed above) or retransmission should be
flushed, delete the TCB, enter CLOSED state, and return.
CLOSING STATE LAST-ACK STATE TIME-WAIT STATE
Respond with "ok" and delete the TCB, enter CLOSED state, and
return.
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STATUS Call
CLOSED STATE (i.e., TCB does not exist)
If the user should not have access to such a connection, return
"error: connection illegal for this process".
Otherwise return "error: connection does not exist".
LISTEN STATE
Return "state = LISTEN", and the TCB pointer.
SYN-SENT STATE
Return "state = SYN-SENT", and the TCB pointer.
SYN-RECEIVED STATE
Return "state = SYN-RECEIVED", and the TCB pointer.
ESTABLISHED STATE
Return "state = ESTABLISHED", and the TCB pointer.
FIN-WAIT-1 STATE
Return "state = FIN-WAIT-1", and the TCB pointer.
FIN-WAIT-2 STATE
Return "state = FIN-WAIT-2", and the TCB pointer.
CLOSE-WAIT STATE
Return "state = CLOSE-WAIT", and the TCB pointer.
CLOSING STATE
Return "state = CLOSING", and the TCB pointer.
LAST-ACK STATE
Return "state = LAST-ACK", and the TCB pointer.
TIME-WAIT STATE
Return "state = TIME-WAIT", and the TCB pointer.
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SEGMENT ARRIVES
If the state is CLOSED (i.e., TCB does not exist) then
all data in the incoming segment is discarded. An incoming
segment containing a RST is discarded. An incoming segment not
containing a RST causes a RST to be sent in response. The
acknowledgment and sequence field values are selected to make
the reset sequence acceptable to the TCP endpoint that sent the
offending segment.
If the ACK bit is off, sequence number zero is used,
<SEQ=0><ACK=SEG.SEQ+SEG.LEN><CTL=RST,ACK>
If the ACK bit is on,
<SEQ=SEG.ACK><CTL=RST>
Return.
If the state is LISTEN then
first check for an RST
An incoming RST should be ignored. Return.
second check for an ACK
Any acknowledgment is bad if it arrives on a connection
still in the LISTEN state. An acceptable reset segment
should be formed for any arriving ACK-bearing segment. The
RST should be formatted as follows:
<SEQ=SEG.ACK><CTL=RST>
Return.
third check for a SYN
If the SYN bit is set, check the security. If the security/
compartment on the incoming segment does not exactly match
the security/compartment in the TCB then send a reset and
return.
<SEQ=0><ACK=SEG.SEQ+SEG.LEN><CTL=RST,ACK>
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Set RCV.NXT to SEG.SEQ+1, IRS is set to SEG.SEQ and any
other control or text should be queued for processing later.
ISS should be selected and a SYN segment sent of the form:
<SEQ=ISS><ACK=RCV.NXT><CTL=SYN,ACK>
SND.NXT is set to ISS+1 and SND.UNA to ISS. The connection
state should be changed to SYN-RECEIVED. Note that any
other incoming control or data (combined with SYN) will be
processed in the SYN-RECEIVED state, but processing of SYN
and ACK should not be repeated. If the listen was not fully
specified (i.e., the remote socket was not fully specified),
then the unspecified fields should be filled in now.
fourth other text or control
Any other control or text-bearing segment (not containing
SYN) must have an ACK and thus would be discarded by the ACK
processing. An incoming RST segment could not be valid,
since it could not have been sent in response to anything
sent by this incarnation of the connection. So, if this
unlikely condition is reached, the correct behavior is to
drop the segment and return.
If the state is SYN-SENT then
first check the ACK bit
If the ACK bit is set
If SEG.ACK =< ISS, or SEG.ACK > SND.NXT, send a reset
(unless the RST bit is set, if so drop the segment and
return)
<SEQ=SEG.ACK><CTL=RST>
and discard the segment. Return.
If SND.UNA < SEG.ACK =< SND.NXT then the ACK is
acceptable. Some deployed TCP code has used the check
SEG.ACK == SND.NXT (using "==" rather than "=<", but this
is not appropriate when the stack is capable of sending
data on the SYN, because the TCP peer may not accept and
acknowledge all of the data on the SYN.
second check the RST bit
If the RST bit is set
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A potential blind reset attack is described in RFC 5961
[30], with the mitigation that a TCP implementation
SHOULD first check that the sequence number exactly
matches RCV.NXT prior to executing the action in the next
paragraph.
If the ACK was acceptable then signal the user "error:
connection reset", drop the segment, enter CLOSED state,
delete TCB, and return. Otherwise (no ACK) drop the
segment and return.
third check the security
If the security/compartment in the segment does not exactly
match the security/compartment in the TCB, send a reset
If there is an ACK
<SEQ=SEG.ACK><CTL=RST>
Otherwise
<SEQ=0><ACK=SEG.SEQ+SEG.LEN><CTL=RST,ACK>
If a reset was sent, discard the segment and return.
fourth check the SYN bit
This step should be reached only if the ACK is ok, or there
is no ACK, and it the segment did not contain a RST.
If the SYN bit is on and the security/compartment is
acceptable then, RCV.NXT is set to SEG.SEQ+1, IRS is set to
SEG.SEQ. SND.UNA should be advanced to equal SEG.ACK (if
there is an ACK), and any segments on the retransmission
queue that are thereby acknowledged should be removed.
If SND.UNA > ISS (our SYN has been ACKed), change the
connection state to ESTABLISHED, form an ACK segment
<SEQ=SND.NXT><ACK=RCV.NXT><CTL=ACK>
and send it. Data or controls that were queued for
transmission may be included. If there are other controls
or text in the segment then continue processing at the sixth
step below where the URG bit is checked, otherwise return.
Otherwise enter SYN-RECEIVED, form a SYN,ACK segment
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<SEQ=ISS><ACK=RCV.NXT><CTL=SYN,ACK>
and send it. Set the variables:
SND.WND <- SEG.WND
SND.WL1 <- SEG.SEQ
SND.WL2 <- SEG.ACK
If there are other controls or text in the segment, queue
them for processing after the ESTABLISHED state has been
reached, return.
Note that it is legal to send and receive application data
on SYN segments (this is the "text in the segment" mentioned
above. There has been significant misinformation and
misunderstanding of this topic historically. Some firewalls
and security devices consider this suspicious. However, the
capability was used in T/TCP [16] and is used in TCP Fast
Open (TFO) [38], so is important for implementations and
network devices to permit.
fifth, if neither of the SYN or RST bits is set then drop the
segment and return.
Otherwise,
first check sequence number
SYN-RECEIVED STATE
ESTABLISHED STATE
FIN-WAIT-1 STATE
FIN-WAIT-2 STATE
CLOSE-WAIT STATE
CLOSING STATE
LAST-ACK STATE
TIME-WAIT STATE
Segments are processed in sequence. Initial tests on
arrival are used to discard old duplicates, but further
processing is done in SEG.SEQ order. If a segment's
contents straddle the boundary between old and new, only the
new parts should be processed.
In general, the processing of received segments MUST be
implemented to aggregate ACK segments whenever possible
(MUST-58). For example, if the TCP endpoint is processing a
series of queued segments, it MUST process them all before
sending any ACK segments (MUST-59).
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There are four cases for the acceptability test for an
incoming segment:
Segment Receive Test
Length Window
------- ------- -------------------------------------------
0 0 SEG.SEQ = RCV.NXT
0 >0 RCV.NXT =< SEG.SEQ < RCV.NXT+RCV.WND
>0 0 not acceptable
>0 >0 RCV.NXT =< SEG.SEQ < RCV.NXT+RCV.WND
or RCV.NXT =< SEG.SEQ+SEG.LEN-1 < RCV.NXT+RCV.WND
In implementing sequence number validation as described
here, please note Appendix A.2.
If the RCV.WND is zero, no segments will be acceptable, but
special allowance should be made to accept valid ACKs, URGs
and RSTs.
If an incoming segment is not acceptable, an acknowledgment
should be sent in reply (unless the RST bit is set, if so
drop the segment and return):
<SEQ=SND.NXT><ACK=RCV.NXT><CTL=ACK>
After sending the acknowledgment, drop the unacceptable
segment and return.
Note that for the TIME-WAIT state, there is an improved
algorithm described in [32] for handling incoming SYN
segments, that utilizes timestamps rather than relying on
the sequence number check described here. When the improved
algorithm is implemented, the logic above is not applicable
for incoming SYN segments with timestamp options, received
on a connection in the TIME-WAIT state.
In the following it is assumed that the segment is the
idealized segment that begins at RCV.NXT and does not exceed
the window. One could tailor actual segments to fit this
assumption by trimming off any portions that lie outside the
window (including SYN and FIN), and only processing further
if the segment then begins at RCV.NXT. Segments with higher
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beginning sequence numbers SHOULD be held for later
processing (SHLD-31).
second check the RST bit,
RFC 5961 section 3 describes a potential blind reset attack
and optional mitigation approach that SHOULD be implemented.
For stacks implementing RFC 5961, the three checks below
apply, otherwise processesing for these states is indicated
further below.
1) If the RST bit is set and the sequence number is
outside the current receive window, silently drop the
segment.
2) If the RST bit is set and the sequence number exactly
matches the next expected sequence number (RCV.NXT), then
TCP endpoints MUST reset the connection in the manner
prescribed below according to the connection state.
3) If the RST bit is set and the sequence number does not
exactly match the next expected sequence value, yet is
within the current receive window, TCP endpoints MUST
send an acknowledgement (challenge ACK):
<SEQ=SND.NXT><ACK=RCV.NXT><CTL=ACK>
After sending the challenge ACK, TCP endpoints MUST drop
the unacceptable segment and stop processing the incoming
packet further. Note that RFC 5961 and Errata ID 4772
contain additional considerations for ACK throttling in
an implementation.
SYN-RECEIVED STATE
If the RST bit is set
If this connection was initiated with a passive OPEN
(i.e., came from the LISTEN state), then return this
connection to LISTEN state and return. The user need
not be informed. If this connection was initiated
with an active OPEN (i.e., came from SYN-SENT state)
then the connection was refused, signal the user
"connection refused". In either case, all segments on
the retransmission queue should be removed. And in
the active OPEN case, enter the CLOSED state and
delete the TCB, and return.
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ESTABLISHED
FIN-WAIT-1
FIN-WAIT-2
CLOSE-WAIT
If the RST bit is set then, any outstanding RECEIVEs and
SEND should receive "reset" responses. All segment
queues should be flushed. Users should also receive an
unsolicited general "connection reset" signal. Enter the
CLOSED state, delete the TCB, and return.
CLOSING STATE
LAST-ACK STATE
TIME-WAIT
If the RST bit is set then, enter the CLOSED state,
delete the TCB, and return.
third check security
SYN-RECEIVED
If the security/compartment in the segment does not
exactly match the security/compartment in the TCB then
send a reset, and return.
ESTABLISHED
FIN-WAIT-1
FIN-WAIT-2
CLOSE-WAIT
CLOSING
LAST-ACK
TIME-WAIT
If the security/compartment in the segment does not
exactly match the security/compartment in the TCB then
send a reset, any outstanding RECEIVEs and SEND should
receive "reset" responses. All segment queues should be
flushed. Users should also receive an unsolicited
general "connection reset" signal. Enter the CLOSED
state, delete the TCB, and return.
Note this check is placed following the sequence check to
prevent a segment from an old connection between these ports
with a different security from causing an abort of the
current connection.
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fourth, check the SYN bit,
SYN-RECEIVED
If the connection was initiated with a passive OPEN, then
return this connection to the LISTEN state and return.
Otherwise, handle per the directions for synchronized
states below.
ESTABLISHED STATE
FIN-WAIT STATE-1
FIN-WAIT STATE-2
CLOSE-WAIT STATE
CLOSING STATE
LAST-ACK STATE
TIME-WAIT STATE
If the SYN bit is set in these synchronized states, it
may be either a legitimate new connection attempt (e.g.
in the case of TIME-WAIT), an error where the connection
should be reset, or the result of an attack attempt, as
described in RFC 5961 [30]. For the TIME-WAIT state, new
connections can be accepted if the timestamp option is
used and meets expectations (per [32]). For all other
caess, RFC 5961 provides a mitigation that SHOULD be
implemented, though there are alternatives (see
Section 6). RFC 5961 recommends that in these
synchronized states, if the SYN bit is set, irrespective
of the sequence number, TCP endpoints MUST send a
"challenge ACK" to the remote peer:
<SEQ=SND.NXT><ACK=RCV.NXT><CTL=ACK>
After sending the acknowledgement, TCP implementations
MUST drop the unacceptable segment and stop processing
further. Note that RFC 5961 and Errata ID 4772 contain
additional ACK throttling notes for an implementation.
For implementations that do not follow RFC 5961, the
original RFC 793 behavior follows in this paragraph. If
the SYN is in the window it is an error, send a reset,
any outstanding RECEIVEs and SEND should receive "reset"
responses, all segment queues should be flushed, the user
should also receive an unsolicited general "connection
reset" signal, enter the CLOSED state, delete the TCB,
and return.
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If the SYN is not in the window this step would not be
reached and an ack would have been sent in the first step
(sequence number check).
fifth check the ACK field,
if the ACK bit is off drop the segment and return
if the ACK bit is on
RFC 5961 section 5 describes a potential blind data
injection attack, and mitigation that implementations MAY
choose to include (MAY-12). TCP stacks that implement
RFC 5961 MUST add an input check that the ACK value is
acceptable only if it is in the range of ((SND.UNA -
MAX.SND.WND) =< SEG.ACK =< SND.NXT). All incoming
segments whose ACK value doesn't satisfy the above
condition MUST be discarded and an ACK sent back. The
new state variable MAX.SND.WND is defined as the largest
window that the local sender has ever received from its
peer (subject to window scaling) or may be hard-coded to
a maximum permissible window value. When the ACK value
is acceptable, the processing per-state below applies:
SYN-RECEIVED STATE
If SND.UNA < SEG.ACK =< SND.NXT then enter ESTABLISHED
state and continue processing with variables below set
to:
SND.WND <- SEG.WND
SND.WL1 <- SEG.SEQ
SND.WL2 <- SEG.ACK
If the segment acknowledgment is not acceptable,
form a reset segment,
<SEQ=SEG.ACK><CTL=RST>
and send it.
ESTABLISHED STATE
If SND.UNA < SEG.ACK =< SND.NXT then, set SND.UNA <-
SEG.ACK. Any segments on the retransmission queue
that are thereby entirely acknowledged are removed.
Users should receive positive acknowledgments for
buffers that have been SENT and fully acknowledged
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(i.e., SEND buffer should be returned with "ok"
response). If the ACK is a duplicate (SEG.ACK =<
SND.UNA), it can be ignored. If the ACK acks
something not yet sent (SEG.ACK > SND.NXT) then send
an ACK, drop the segment, and return.
If SND.UNA =< SEG.ACK =< SND.NXT, the send window
should be updated. If (SND.WL1 < SEG.SEQ or (SND.WL1
= SEG.SEQ and SND.WL2 =< SEG.ACK)), set SND.WND <-
SEG.WND, set SND.WL1 <- SEG.SEQ, and set SND.WL2 <-
SEG.ACK.
Note that SND.WND is an offset from SND.UNA, that
SND.WL1 records the sequence number of the last
segment used to update SND.WND, and that SND.WL2
records the acknowledgment number of the last segment
used to update SND.WND. The check here prevents using
old segments to update the window.
FIN-WAIT-1 STATE
In addition to the processing for the ESTABLISHED
state, if the FIN segment is now acknowledged then
enter FIN-WAIT-2 and continue processing in that
state.
FIN-WAIT-2 STATE
In addition to the processing for the ESTABLISHED
state, if the retransmission queue is empty, the
user's CLOSE can be acknowledged ("ok") but do not
delete the TCB.
CLOSE-WAIT STATE
Do the same processing as for the ESTABLISHED state.
CLOSING STATE
In addition to the processing for the ESTABLISHED
state, if the ACK acknowledges our FIN then enter the
TIME-WAIT state, otherwise ignore the segment.
LAST-ACK STATE
The only thing that can arrive in this state is an
acknowledgment of our FIN. If our FIN is now
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acknowledged, delete the TCB, enter the CLOSED state,
and return.
TIME-WAIT STATE
The only thing that can arrive in this state is a
retransmission of the remote FIN. Acknowledge it, and
restart the 2 MSL timeout.
sixth, check the URG bit,
ESTABLISHED STATE
FIN-WAIT-1 STATE
FIN-WAIT-2 STATE
If the URG bit is set, RCV.UP <- max(RCV.UP,SEG.UP), and
signal the user that the remote side has urgent data if
the urgent pointer (RCV.UP) is in advance of the data
consumed. If the user has already been signaled (or is
still in the "urgent mode") for this continuous sequence
of urgent data, do not signal the user again.
CLOSE-WAIT STATE
CLOSING STATE
LAST-ACK STATE
TIME-WAIT
This should not occur, since a FIN has been received from
the remote side. Ignore the URG.
seventh, process the segment text,
ESTABLISHED STATE
FIN-WAIT-1 STATE
FIN-WAIT-2 STATE
Once in the ESTABLISHED state, it is possible to deliver
segment text to user RECEIVE buffers. Text from segments
can be moved into buffers until either the buffer is full
or the segment is empty. If the segment empties and
carries a PUSH flag, then the user is informed, when the
buffer is returned, that a PUSH has been received.
When the TCP endpoint takes responsibility for delivering
the data to the user it must also acknowledge the receipt
of the data.
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Once the TCP endpoint takes responsibility for the data
it advances RCV.NXT over the data accepted, and adjusts
RCV.WND as appropriate to the current buffer
availability. The total of RCV.NXT and RCV.WND should
not be reduced.
A TCP implementation MAY send an ACK segment
acknowledging RCV.NXT when a valid segment arrives that
is in the window but not at the left window edge (MAY-
13).
Please note the window management suggestions in
Section 3.7.
Send an acknowledgment of the form:
<SEQ=SND.NXT><ACK=RCV.NXT><CTL=ACK>
This acknowledgment should be piggybacked on a segment
being transmitted if possible without incurring undue
delay.
CLOSE-WAIT STATE
CLOSING STATE
LAST-ACK STATE
TIME-WAIT STATE
This should not occur, since a FIN has been received from
the remote side. Ignore the segment text.
eighth, check the FIN bit,
Do not process the FIN if the state is CLOSED, LISTEN or
SYN-SENT since the SEG.SEQ cannot be validated; drop the
segment and return.
If the FIN bit is set, signal the user "connection closing"
and return any pending RECEIVEs with same message, advance
RCV.NXT over the FIN, and send an acknowledgment for the
FIN. Note that FIN implies PUSH for any segment text not
yet delivered to the user.
SYN-RECEIVED STATE
ESTABLISHED STATE
Enter the CLOSE-WAIT state.
FIN-WAIT-1 STATE
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If our FIN has been ACKed (perhaps in this segment),
then enter TIME-WAIT, start the time-wait timer, turn
off the other timers; otherwise enter the CLOSING
state.
FIN-WAIT-2 STATE
Enter the TIME-WAIT state. Start the time-wait timer,
turn off the other timers.
CLOSE-WAIT STATE
Remain in the CLOSE-WAIT state.
CLOSING STATE
Remain in the CLOSING state.
LAST-ACK STATE
Remain in the LAST-ACK state.
TIME-WAIT STATE
Remain in the TIME-WAIT state. Restart the 2 MSL
time-wait timeout.
and return.
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USER TIMEOUT
USER TIMEOUT
For any state if the user timeout expires, flush all queues,
signal the user "error: connection aborted due to user timeout"
in general and for any outstanding calls, delete the TCB, enter
the CLOSED state and return.
RETRANSMISSION TIMEOUT
For any state if the retransmission timeout expires on a
segment in the retransmission queue, send the segment at the
front of the retransmission queue again, reinitialize the
retransmission timer, and return.
TIME-WAIT TIMEOUT
If the time-wait timeout expires on a connection delete the
TCB, enter the CLOSED state and return.
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3.10. Glossary
ACK
A control bit (acknowledge) occupying no sequence space,
which indicates that the acknowledgment field of this segment
specifies the next sequence number the sender of this segment
is expecting to receive, hence acknowledging receipt of all
previous sequence numbers.
connection
A logical communication path identified by a pair of sockets.
datagram
A message sent in a packet switched computer communications
network.
Destination Address
The network layer address of the remote endpoint.
FIN
A control bit (finis) occupying one sequence number, which
indicates that the sender will send no more data or control
occupying sequence space.
fragment
A portion of a logical unit of data, in particular an
internet fragment is a portion of an internet datagram.
header
Control information at the beginning of a message, segment,
fragment, packet or block of data.
host
A computer. In particular a source or destination of
messages from the point of view of the communication network.
Identification
An Internet Protocol field. This identifying value assigned
by the sender aids in assembling the fragments of a datagram.
internet address
A network layer address.
internet datagram
The unit of data exchanged between an internet module and the
higher level protocol together with the internet header.
internet fragment
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A portion of the data of an internet datagram with an
internet header.
IP
Internet Protocol. See [1] and [11].
IRS
The Initial Receive Sequence number. The first sequence
number used by the sender on a connection.
ISN
The Initial Sequence Number. The first sequence number used
on a connection, (either ISS or IRS). Selected in a way that
is unique within a given period of time and is unpredictable
to attackers.
ISS
The Initial Send Sequence number. The first sequence number
used by the sender on a connection.
left sequence
This is the next sequence number to be acknowledged by the
data receiving TCP endpoint (or the lowest currently
unacknowledged sequence number) and is sometimes referred to
as the left edge of the send window.
module
An implementation, usually in software, of a protocol or
other procedure.
MSL
Maximum Segment Lifetime, the time a TCP segment can exist in
the internetwork system. Arbitrarily defined to be 2
minutes.
octet
An eight bit byte.
Options
An Option field may contain several options, and each option
may be several octets in length.
packet
A package of data with a header that may or may not be
logically complete. More often a physical packaging than a
logical packaging of data.
port
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The portion of a connection identifier used for
demultiplexing connections at an endpoint.
process
A program in execution. A source or destination of data from
the point of view of the TCP endpoint or other host-to-host
protocol.
PUSH
A control bit occupying no sequence space, indicating that
this segment contains data that must be pushed through to the
receiving user.
RCV.NXT
receive next sequence number
RCV.UP
receive urgent pointer
RCV.WND
receive window
receive next sequence number
This is the next sequence number the local TCP endpoint is
expecting to receive.
receive window
This represents the sequence numbers the local (receiving)
TCP endpoint is willing to receive. Thus, the local TCP
endpoint considers that segments overlapping the range
RCV.NXT to RCV.NXT + RCV.WND - 1 carry acceptable data or
control. Segments containing sequence numbers entirely
outside of this range are considered duplicates and
discarded.
RST
A control bit (reset), occupying no sequence space,
indicating that the receiver should delete the connection
without further interaction. The receiver can determine,
based on the sequence number and acknowledgment fields of the
incoming segment, whether it should honor the reset command
or ignore it. In no case does receipt of a segment
containing RST give rise to a RST in response.
SEG.ACK
segment acknowledgment
SEG.LEN
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segment length
SEG.SEQ
segment sequence
SEG.UP
segment urgent pointer field
SEG.WND
segment window field
segment
A logical unit of data, in particular a TCP segment is the
unit of data transfered between a pair of TCP modules.
segment acknowledgment
The sequence number in the acknowledgment field of the
arriving segment.
segment length
The amount of sequence number space occupied by a segment,
including any controls that occupy sequence space.
segment sequence
The number in the sequence field of the arriving segment.
send sequence
This is the next sequence number the local (sending) TCP
endpoint will use on the connection. It is initially
selected from an initial sequence number curve (ISN) and is
incremented for each octet of data or sequenced control
transmitted.
send window
This represents the sequence numbers that the remote
(receiving) TCP endpoint is willing to receive. It is the
value of the window field specified in segments from the
remote (data receiving) TCP endpoint. The range of new
sequence numbers that may be emitted by a TCP implementation
lies between SND.NXT and SND.UNA + SND.WND - 1.
(Retransmissions of sequence numbers between SND.UNA and
SND.NXT are expected, of course.)
SND.NXT
send sequence
SND.UNA
left sequence
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SND.UP
send urgent pointer
SND.WL1
segment sequence number at last window update
SND.WL2
segment acknowledgment number at last window update
SND.WND
send window
socket (or socket number, or socket address, or socket identifier)
An address that specifically includes a port identifier, that
is, the concatenation of an Internet Address with a TCP port.
Source Address
The network layer address of the sending endpoint.
SYN
A control bit in the incoming segment, occupying one sequence
number, used at the initiation of a connection, to indicate
where the sequence numbering will start.
TCB
Transmission control block, the data structure that records
the state of a connection.
TCP
Transmission Control Protocol: A host-to-host protocol for
reliable communication in internetwork environments.
TOS
Type of Service, an obsoleted IPv4 field. The same header
bits currently are used for the Differentiated Services field
[5] containing the Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP)
value and the 2-bit ECN codepoint [8].
Type of Service
An Internet Protocol field that indicates the type of service
for this internet fragment.
URG
A control bit (urgent), occupying no sequence space, used to
indicate that the receiving user should be notified to do
urgent processing as long as there is data to be consumed
with sequence numbers less than the value indicated in the
urgent pointer.
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urgent pointer
A control field meaningful only when the URG bit is on. This
field communicates the value of the urgent pointer that
indicates the data octet associated with the sending user's
urgent call.
4. Changes from RFC 793
This document obsoletes RFC 793 as well as RFC 6093 and 6528, which
updated 793. In all cases, only the normative protocol specification
and requirements have been incorporated into this document, and some
informational text with background and rationale may not have been
carried in. The informational content of those documents is still
valuable in learning about and understanding TCP, and they are valid
Informational references, even though their normative content has
been incorporated into this document.
The main body of this document was adapted from RFC 793's Section 3,
titled "FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION", with an attempt to keep formatting
and layout as close as possible.
The collection of applicable RFC Errata that have been reported and
either accepted or held for an update to RFC 793 were incorporated
(Errata IDs: 573, 574, 700, 701, 1283, 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565, 1571,
1572, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2748, 2749, 2934, 3213, 3300, 3301). Some
errata were not applicable due to other changes (Errata IDs: 572,
575, 1569, 3305, 3602).
Changes to the specification of the Urgent Pointer described in RFC
1122 and 6093 were incorporated. See RFC 6093 for detailed
discussion of why these changes were necessary.
The discussion of the RTO from RFC 793 was updated to refer to RFC
6298. The RFC 1122 text on the RTO originally replaced the 793 text,
however, RFC 2988 should have updated 1122, and has subsequently been
obsoleted by 6298.
RFC 1122 contains a collection of other changes and clarifications to
RFC 793. The normative items impacting the protocol have been
incorporated here, though some historically useful implementation
advice and informative discussion from RFC 1122 is not included here.
RFC 1122 contains more than just TCP requirements, so this document
can't obsolete RFC 1122 entirely. It is only marked as "updating"
1122, however, it should be understood to effectively obsolete all of
the RFC 1122 material on TCP.
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The more secure Initial Sequence Number generation algorithm from RFC
6528 was incorporated. See RFC 6528 for discussion of the attacks
that this mitigates, as well as advice on selecting PRF algorithms
and managing secret key data.
A note based on RFC 6429 was added to explicitly clarify that system
resource mangement concerns allow connection resources to be
reclaimed. RFC 6429 is obsoleted in the sense that this
clarification has been reflected in this update to the base TCP
specification now.
RFC EDITOR'S NOTE: the content below is for detailed change tracking
and planning, and not to be included with the final revision of the
document.
This document started as draft-eddy-rfc793bis-00, that was merely a
proposal and rough plan for updating RFC 793.
The -01 revision of this draft-eddy-rfc793bis incorporates the
content of RFC 793 Section 3 titled "FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION".
Other content from RFC 793 has not been incorporated. The -01
revision of this document makes some minor formatting changes to the
RFC 793 content in order to convert the content into XML2RFC format
and account for left-out parts of RFC 793. For instance, figure
numbering differs and some indentation is not exactly the same.
The -02 revision of draft-eddy-rfc793bis incorporates errata that
have been verified:
Errata ID 573: Reported by Bob Braden (note: This errata basically
is just a reminder that RFC 1122 updates 793. Some of the
associated changes are left pending to a separate revision that
incorporates 1122. Bob's mention of PUSH in 793 section 2.8 was
not applicable here because that section was not part of the
"functional specification". Also the 1122 text on the
retransmission timeout also has been updated by subsequent RFCs,
so the change here deviates from Bob's suggestion to apply the
1122 text.)
Errata ID 574: Reported by Yin Shuming
Errata ID 700: Reported by Yin Shuming
Errata ID 701: Reported by Yin Shuming
Errata ID 1283: Reported by Pei-chun Cheng
Errata ID 1561: Reported by Constantin Hagemeier
Errata ID 1562: Reported by Constantin Hagemeier
Errata ID 1564: Reported by Constantin Hagemeier
Errata ID 1565: Reported by Constantin Hagemeier
Errata ID 1571: Reported by Constantin Hagemeier
Errata ID 1572: Reported by Constantin Hagemeier
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Errata ID 2296: Reported by Vishwas Manral
Errata ID 2297: Reported by Vishwas Manral
Errata ID 2298: Reported by Vishwas Manral
Errata ID 2748: Reported by Mykyta Yevstifeyev
Errata ID 2749: Reported by Mykyta Yevstifeyev
Errata ID 2934: Reported by Constantin Hagemeier
Errata ID 3213: Reported by EugnJun Yi
Errata ID 3300: Reported by Botong Huang
Errata ID 3301: Reported by Botong Huang
Errata ID 3305: Reported by Botong Huang
Note: Some verified errata were not used in this update, as they
relate to sections of RFC 793 elided from this document. These
include Errata ID 572, 575, and 1569.
Note: Errata ID 3602 was not applied in this revision as it is
duplicative of the 1122 corrections.
Not related to RFC 793 content, this revision also makes small tweaks
to the introductory text, fixes indentation of the pseudoheader
diagram, and notes that the Security Considerations should also
include privacy, when this section is written.
The -03 revision of draft-eddy-rfc793bis revises all discussion of
the urgent pointer in order to comply with RFC 6093, 1122, and 1011.
Since 1122 held requirements on the urgent pointer, the full list of
requirements was brought into an appendix of this document, so that
it can be updated as-needed.
The -04 revision of draft-eddy-rfc793bis includes the ISN generation
changes from RFC 6528.
The -05 revision of draft-eddy-rfc793bis incorporates MSS
requirements and definitions from RFC 879, 1122, and 6691, as well as
option-handling requirements from RFC 1122.
The -00 revision of draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis incorporates several
additional clarifications and updates to the section on segmentation,
many of which are based on feedback from Joe Touch improving from the
initial text on this in the previous revision.
The -01 revision incorporates the change to Reserved bits due to ECN,
as well as many other changes that come from RFC 1122.
The -02 revision has small formating modifications in order to
address xml2rfc warnings about long lines. It was a quick update to
avoid document expiration. TCPM working group discussion in 2015
also indicated that that we should not try to add sections on
implementation advice or similar non-normative information.
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The -03 revision incorporates more content from RFC 1122: Passive
OPEN Calls, Time-To-Live, Multihoming, IP Options, ICMP messages,
Data Communications, When to Send Data, When to Send a Window Update,
Managing the Window, Probing Zero Windows, When to Send an ACK
Segment. The section on data communications was re-organized into
clearer subsections (previously headings were embedded in the 793
text), and windows management advice from 793 was removed (as
reviewed by TCPM working group) in favor of the 1122 additions on
SWS, ZWP, and related topics.
The -04 revision includes reference to RFC 6429 on the ZWP condition,
RFC1122 material on TCP Connection Failures, TCP Keep-Alives,
Acknowledging Queued Segments, and Remote Address Validation. RTO
computation is referenced from RFC 6298 rather than RFC 1122.
The -05 revision includes the requirement to implement TCP congestion
control with recommendation to implemente ECN, the RFC 6633 update to
1122, which changed the requirement on responding to source quench
ICMP messages, and discussion of ICMP (and ICMPv6) soft and hard
errors per RFC 5461 (ICMPv6 handling for TCP doesn't seem to be
mentioned elsewhere in standards track).
The -06 revision includes an appendix on "Other Implementation Notes"
to capture widely-deployed fundamental features that are not
contained in the RFC series yet. It also added mention of RFC 6994
and the IANA TCP parameters registry as a reference. It includes
references to RFC 5961 in appropriate places. The references to TOS
were changed to DiffServ field, based on reflecting RFC 2474 as well
as the IPv6 presence of traffic class (carrying DiffServ field)
rather than TOS.
The -07 revision includes reference to RFC 6191, updated security
considerations, discussion of additional implementation
considerations, and clarification of data on the SYN.
The -08 revision includes changes based on:
describing treatment of reserved bits (following TCPM mailing list
thread from July 2014 on "793bis item - reserved bit behavior"
addition a brief TCP key concepts section to make up for not
including the outdated section 2 of RFC 793
changed "TCP" to "host" to resolve conflict between 1122 wording
on whether TCP or the network layer chooses an address when
multihomed
fixed/updated definition of options in glossary
moved note on aggregating ACKs from 1122 to a more appropriate
location
resolved notes on IP precedence and security/compartment
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added implementation note on sequence number validation
added note that PUSH does not apply when Nagle is active
added 1122 content on asynchronous reports to replace 793 section
on TCP to user messages
The -09 revision fixes section numbering problems.
The -10 revision includes additions to the security considerations
based on comments from Joe Touch, and suggested edits on RST/FIN
notification, RFC 2525 reference, and other edits suggested by
Yuchung Cheng, as well as modifications to DiffServ text from Yuchung
Cheng and Gorry Fairhurst.
The -11 revision includes a start at identifying all of the
requirements text and referencing each instance in the common table
at the end of the document.
The -12 revision completes the requirement language indexing started
in -11 and adds necessary description of the PUSH functionality that
was missing.
The -13 revision contains only changes in the inline editor notes.
The -14 revision includes updates with regard to several comments
from the mailing list, including editorial fixes, adding IANA
considerations for the header flags, improving figure title
placement, and breaking up the "Terminology" section into more
appropriately titled subsections.
The -15 revision has many technical and editorial corrections from
Gorry Fairhurst's review, and subsequent discussion on the TCPM list,
as well as some other collected clarifications and improvements from
mailing list discussion.
Some other suggested changes that will not be incorporated in this
793 update unless TCPM consensus changes with regard to scope are:
1. Tony Sabatini's suggestion for describing DO field
2. Per discussion with Joe Touch (TAPS list, 6/20/2015), the
description of the API could be revisited
Early in the process of updating RFC 793, Scott Brim mentioned that
this should include a PERPASS/privacy review. This may be something
for the chairs or AD to request during WGLC or IETF LC.
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5. IANA Considerations
In the "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Header Flags" registry,
IANA is asked to assign values indicated below. RFC 3168 originally
created this registry, but only populated it with the new bits
defined in RFC 3168, not these earlier bits that had been described
in RFC 793 and earlier documents.
TCP Header Flags
Bit Name Reference
--- ---- ---------
10 Urgent Pointer field significant (URG) (this document)
11 Acknowledgment field significant (ACK) (this document)
12 Push Function (PSH) (this document)
13 Reset the connection (RST) (this document)
14 Synchronize sequence numbers (SYN) (this document)
15 No more data from sender (FIN) (this document)
This TCP Header Flags registry should also be moved to a sub-registry
under the global "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Parameters
registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/tcp-parameters/tcp-
parameters.xhtml).
6. Security and Privacy Considerations
The TCP design includes only rudimentary security features that
improve the robustness and reliability of connections and application
data transfer, but there are no built-in cryptographic capabilities
to support any form of privacy, authentication, or other typical
security functions. Non-cryptographic enhancements (e.g. [30]) have
been developed to improve robustness of TCP connections to particular
types of attacks, but the applicability and protections of non-
cryptographic enhancements are limited (e.g. see section 1.1 of
[30]). Applications typically utilize lower-layer (e.g. IPsec) and
upper-layer (e.g. TLS) protocols to provide security and privacy for
TCP connections and application data carried in TCP. Methods based
on TCP options have been developed as well, to support some security
capabilities.
In order to fully protect TCP connections (including their control
flags) IPsec or the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO) [29] are the
only current effective methods. Other methods discussed in this
section may protect the payload, but either only a subset of the
fields (e.g. tcpcrypt) or none at all (e.g. TLS). Other security
features that have been added to TCP (e.g. ISN generation, sequence
number checks, etc.) are only capable of partially hindering attacks.
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Applications using long-lived TCP flows have been vulnerable to
attacks that exploit the processing of control flags described in
earlier TCP specifications [23]. TCP-MD5 was a commonly implemented
TCP option to support authentication for some of these connections,
but had flaws and is now deprecated. TCP-AO provides a capability to
protect long-lived TCP connections from attacks, and has superior
properties to TCP-MD5. It does not provide any privacy for
application data, nor for the TCP headers.
The "tcpcrypt" [49] Experimental extension to TCP provides the
ability to cryptographically protect connection data. Metadata
aspects of the TCP flow are still visible, but the application stream
is well-protected. Within the TCP header, only the urgent pointer
and FIN flag are protected through tcpcrypt.
The TCP Roadmap [39] includes notes about several RFCs related to TCP
security. Many of the enhancements provided by these RFCs have been
integrated into the present document, including ISN generation,
mitigating blind in-window attacks, and improving handling of soft
errors and ICMP packets. These are all discussed in greater detail
in the referenced RFCs that originally described the changes needed
to earlier TCP specifications. Additionally, see RFC 6093 [31] for
discussion of security considerations related to the urgent pointer
field, that has been deprecated.
Since TCP is often used for bulk transfer flows, some attacks are
possible that abuse the TCP congestion control logic. An example is
"ACK-division" attacks. Updates that have been made to the TCP
congestion control specifications include mechanisms like Appropriate
Byte Counting (ABC) [19] that act as mitigations to these attacks.
Other attacks are focused on exhausting the resources of a TCP
server. Examples include SYN flooding [22] or wasting resources on
non-progressing connections [33]. Operating systems commonly
implement mitigations for these attacks. Some common defenses also
utilize proxies, stateful firewalls, and other technologies outside
of the end-host TCP implementation.
7. Acknowledgements
This document is largely a revision of RFC 793, which Jon Postel was
the editor of. Due to his excellent work, it was able to last for
three decades before we felt the need to revise it.
Andre Oppermann was a contributor and helped to edit the first
revision of this document.
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We are thankful for the assistance of the IETF TCPM working group
chairs, over the course of work on this document:
Michael Scharf
Yoshifumi Nishida
Pasi Sarolahti
Michael Tuexen
During early discussion of this work on the TCPM mailing list, and at
the IETF 88 meeting in Vancouver, and following adoption by the TCPM
working group, helpful comments, critiques, and reviews were received
from (listed alphabetically): David Borman, Mohamed Boucadair, Bob
Briscoe, Neal Cardwell, Yuchung Cheng, Martin Duke, Ted Faber, Gorry
Fairhurst, Rodney Grimes, Mike Kosek, Kevin Lahey, Kevin Mason, Matt
Mathis, Jonathan Morton, Tommy Pauly, Hagen Paul Pfeifer, Anthony
Sabatini, Michael Scharf, Greg Skinner, Joe Touch, Reji Varghese, Tim
Wicinski, Lloyd Wood, and Alex Zimmermann. Joe Touch provided
additional help in clarifying the description of segment size
parameters and PMTUD/PLPMTUD recommendations.
This document includes content from errata that were reported by
(listed chronologically): Yin Shuming, Bob Braden, Morris M. Keesan,
Pei-chun Cheng, Constantin Hagemeier, Vishwas Manral, Mykyta
Yevstifeyev, EungJun Yi, Botong Huang.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[1] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>.
[2] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1191, November 1990,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1191>.
[3] McCann, J., Deering, S., and J. Mogul, "Path MTU Discovery
for IP version 6", RFC 1981, DOI 10.17487/RFC1981, August
1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1981>.
[4] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[5] Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F., and D. Black,
"Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS
Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers", RFC 2474,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2474, December 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2474>.
[6] Borman, D., Deering, S., and R. Hinden, "IPv6 Jumbograms",
RFC 2675, DOI 10.17487/RFC2675, August 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2675>.
[7] Lahey, K., "TCP Problems with Path MTU Discovery",
RFC 2923, DOI 10.17487/RFC2923, September 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2923>.
[8] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition
of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP",
RFC 3168, DOI 10.17487/RFC3168, September 2001,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3168>.
[9] Paxson, V., Allman, M., Chu, J., and M. Sargent,
"Computing TCP's Retransmission Timer", RFC 6298,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6298, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6298>.
[10] Gont, F., "Deprecation of ICMP Source Quench Messages",
RFC 6633, DOI 10.17487/RFC6633, May 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6633>.
[11] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.
8.2. Informative References
[12] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc793>.
[13] Nagle, J., "Congestion Control in IP/TCP Internetworks",
RFC 896, DOI 10.17487/RFC0896, January 1984,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc896>.
[14] Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1122, October 1989,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1122>.
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[15] Almquist, P., "Type of Service in the Internet Protocol
Suite", RFC 1349, DOI 10.17487/RFC1349, July 1992,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1349>.
[16] Braden, R., "T/TCP -- TCP Extensions for Transactions
Functional Specification", RFC 1644, DOI 10.17487/RFC1644,
July 1994, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1644>.
[17] Paxson, V., Allman, M., Dawson, S., Fenner, W., Griner,
J., Heavens, I., Lahey, K., Semke, J., and B. Volz, "Known
TCP Implementation Problems", RFC 2525,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2525, March 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2525>.
[18] Xiao, X., Hannan, A., Paxson, V., and E. Crabbe, "TCP
Processing of the IPv4 Precedence Field", RFC 2873,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2873, June 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2873>.
[19] Allman, M., "TCP Congestion Control with Appropriate Byte
Counting (ABC)", RFC 3465, DOI 10.17487/RFC3465, February
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3465>.
[20] Fenner, B., "Experimental Values In IPv4, IPv6, ICMPv4,
ICMPv6, UDP, and TCP Headers", RFC 4727,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4727, November 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4727>.
[21] Mathis, M. and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer Path MTU
Discovery", RFC 4821, DOI 10.17487/RFC4821, March 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4821>.
[22] Eddy, W., "TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common
Mitigations", RFC 4987, DOI 10.17487/RFC4987, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4987>.
[23] Touch, J., "Defending TCP Against Spoofing Attacks",
RFC 4953, DOI 10.17487/RFC4953, July 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4953>.
[24] Culley, P., Elzur, U., Recio, R., Bailey, S., and J.
Carrier, "Marker PDU Aligned Framing for TCP
Specification", RFC 5044, DOI 10.17487/RFC5044, October
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5044>.
[25] Gont, F., "TCP's Reaction to Soft Errors", RFC 5461,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5461, February 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5461>.
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[26] StJohns, M., Atkinson, R., and G. Thomas, "Common
Architecture Label IPv6 Security Option (CALIPSO)",
RFC 5570, DOI 10.17487/RFC5570, July 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5570>.
[27] Allman, M., Paxson, V., and E. Blanton, "TCP Congestion
Control", RFC 5681, DOI 10.17487/RFC5681, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5681>.
[28] Sandlund, K., Pelletier, G., and L-E. Jonsson, "The RObust
Header Compression (ROHC) Framework", RFC 5795,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5795, March 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5795>.
[29] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
Authentication Option", RFC 5925, DOI 10.17487/RFC5925,
June 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5925>.
[30] Ramaiah, A., Stewart, R., and M. Dalal, "Improving TCP's
Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks", RFC 5961,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5961, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5961>.
[31] Gont, F. and A. Yourtchenko, "On the Implementation of the
TCP Urgent Mechanism", RFC 6093, DOI 10.17487/RFC6093,
January 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6093>.
[32] Gont, F., "Reducing the TIME-WAIT State Using TCP
Timestamps", BCP 159, RFC 6191, DOI 10.17487/RFC6191,
April 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6191>.
[33] Bashyam, M., Jethanandani, M., and A. Ramaiah, "TCP Sender
Clarification for Persist Condition", RFC 6429,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6429, December 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6429>.
[34] Gont, F. and S. Bellovin, "Defending against Sequence
Number Attacks", RFC 6528, DOI 10.17487/RFC6528, February
2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6528>.
[35] Borman, D., "TCP Options and Maximum Segment Size (MSS)",
RFC 6691, DOI 10.17487/RFC6691, July 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6691>.
[36] Touch, J., "Shared Use of Experimental TCP Options",
RFC 6994, DOI 10.17487/RFC6994, August 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6994>.
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[37] Borman, D., Braden, B., Jacobson, V., and R.
Scheffenegger, Ed., "TCP Extensions for High Performance",
RFC 7323, DOI 10.17487/RFC7323, September 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7323>.
[38] Cheng, Y., Chu, J., Radhakrishnan, S., and A. Jain, "TCP
Fast Open", RFC 7413, DOI 10.17487/RFC7413, December 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7413>.
[39] Duke, M., Braden, R., Eddy, W., Blanton, E., and A.
Zimmermann, "A Roadmap for Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) Specification Documents", RFC 7414,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7414, February 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7414>.
[40] Black, D., Ed. and P. Jones, "Differentiated Services
(Diffserv) and Real-Time Communication", RFC 7657,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7657, November 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7657>.
[41] Fairhurst, G. and M. Welzl, "The Benefits of Using
Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN)", RFC 8087,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8087, March 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8087>.
[42] Fairhurst, G., Ed., Trammell, B., Ed., and M. Kuehlewind,
Ed., "Services Provided by IETF Transport Protocols and
Congestion Control Mechanisms", RFC 8095,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8095, March 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8095>.
[43] Welzl, M., Tuexen, M., and N. Khademi, "On the Usage of
Transport Features Provided by IETF Transport Protocols",
RFC 8303, DOI 10.17487/RFC8303, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8303>.
[44] Chown, T., Loughney, J., and T. Winters, "IPv6 Node
Requirements", BCP 220, RFC 8504, DOI 10.17487/RFC8504,
January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8504>.
[45] IANA, "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Parameters,
https://www.iana.org/assignments/tcp-parameters/tcp-
parameters.xhtml", 2019.
[46] IANA, "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Header Flags,
https://www.iana.org/assignments/tcp-header-flags/tcp-
header-flags.xhtml", 2019.
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[47] Gont, F., "Processing of IP Security/Compartment and
Precedence Information by TCP", draft-gont-tcpm-tcp-
seccomp-prec-00 (work in progress), March 2012.
[48] Gont, F. and D. Borman, "On the Validation of TCP Sequence
Numbers", draft-gont-tcpm-tcp-seq-validation-02 (work in
progress), March 2015.
[49] Bittau, A., Giffin, D., Handley, M., Mazieres, D., Slack,
Q., and E. Smith, "Cryptographic protection of TCP Streams
(tcpcrypt)", draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt-09 (work in
progress), November 2017.
[50] Touch, J. and W. Eddy, "TCP Extended Data Offset Option",
draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-edo-10 (work in progress), July 2018.
[51] Minshall, G., "A Proposed Modification to Nagle's
Algorithm", draft-minshall-nagle-01 (work in progress),
June 1999.
[52] Dalal, Y. and C. Sunshine, "Connection Management in
Transport Protocols", Computer Networks Vol. 2, No. 6, pp.
454-473, December 1978.
Appendix A. Other Implementation Notes
This section includes additional notes and references on TCP
implementation decisions that are currently not a part of the RFC
series or included within the TCP standard. These items can be
considered by implementers, but there was not yet a consensus to
include them in the standard.
A.1. IP Security Compartment and Precedence
The IPv4 specification [1] includes a precedence value in the (now
obsoleted) Type of Service field (TOS) field. It was modified in
[15], and then obsoleted by the definition of Differentiated Services
(DiffServ) [5]. Setting and conveying TOS between the network layer,
TCP implementation, and applications is obsolete, and replaced by
DiffServ in the current TCP specification.
RFC 793 requires checking the IP security compartment and precedence
on incoming TCP segments for consistency within a connection, and
with application requests. Each of these aspects of IP have become
outdated, without specific updates to RFC 793. The issues with
precedence were fixed by [18], which is Standards Track, and so this
present TCP specification includes those changes. However, the state
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of IP security options that may be used by MLS systems is not as
clean.
Reseting connections when incoming packets do not meet expected
security compartment or precedence expectations has been recognized
as a possible attack vector [47], and there has been discussion about
ammending the TCP specification to prevent connections from being
aborted due to non-matching IP security compartment and DiffServ
codepoint values.
A.1.1. Precedence
In DiffServ the former precedence values are treated as Class
Selector codepoints, and methods for compatible treatment are
described in the DiffServ architecture. The RFC 793/1122 TCP
specification includes logic intending to have connections use the
highest precedence requested by either endpoint application, and to
keep the precedence consistent throughout a connection. This logic
from the obsolete TOS is not applicable for DiffServ, and should not
be included in TCP implementations, though changes to DiffServ values
within a connection are discouraged. For discussion of this, see RFC
7657 (sec 5.1, 5.3, and 6) [40].
The obsoleted TOS processing rules in TCP assumed bidirectional (or
symmetric) precedence values used on a connection, but the DiffServ
architecture is asymmetric. Problems with the old TCP logic in this
regard were described in [18] and the solution described is to ignore
IP precedence in TCP. Since RFC 2873 is a Standards Track document
(although not marked as updating RFC 793), current implementations
are expected to be robust to these conditions. Note that the
DiffServ field value used in each direction is a part of the
interface between TCP and the network layer, and values in use can be
indicated both ways between TCP and the application.
A.1.2. MLS Systems
The IP security option (IPSO) and compartment defined in [1] was
refined in RFC 1038 that was later obsoleted by RFC 1108. The
Commercial IP Security Option (CIPSO) is defined in FIPS-188, and is
supported by some vendors and operating systems. RFC 1108 is now
Historic, though RFC 791 itself has not been updated to remove the IP
security option. For IPv6, a similar option (CALIPSO) has been
defined [26]. RFC 793 includes logic that includes the IP security/
compartment information in treatment of TCP segments. References to
the IP "security/compartment" in this document may be relevant for
Multi-Level Secure (MLS) system implementers, but can be ignored for
non-MLS implementations, consistent with running code on the
Internet. See Appendix A.1 for further discussion. Note that RFC
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5570 describes some MLS networking scenarios where IPSO, CIPSO, or
CALIPSO may be used. In these special cases, TCP implementers should
see section 7.3.1 of RFC 5570, and follow the guidance in that
document.
A.2. Sequence Number Validation
There are cases where the TCP sequence number validation rules can
prevent ACK fields from being processed. This can result in
connection issues, as described in [48], which includes descriptions
of potential problems in conditions of simultaneous open, self-
connects, simultaneous close, and simultaneous window probes. The
document also describes potential changes to the TCP specification to
mitigate the issue by expanding the acceptable sequence numbers.
In Internet usage of TCP, these conditions are rarely occuring.
Common operating systems include different alternative mitigations,
and the standard has not been updated yet to codify one of them, but
implementers should consider the problems described in [48].
A.3. Nagle Modification
In common operating systems, both the Nagle algorithm and delayed
acknowledgements are implemented and enabled by default. TCP is used
by many applications that have a request-response style of
communication, where the combination of the Nagle algorithm and
delayed acknowledgements can result in poor application performance.
A modification to the Nagle algorithm is described in [51] that
improves the situation for these applications.
This modification is implemented in some common operating systems,
and does not impact TCP interoperability. Additionally, many
applications simply disable Nagle, since this is generally supported
by a socket option. The TCP standard has not been updated to include
this Nagle modification, but implementers may find it beneficial to
consider.
A.4. Low Water Mark Settings
Some operating system kernel TCP implementations include socket
options that allow specifying the number of bytes in the buffer until
the socket layer will pass sent data to TCP (SO_SNDLOWAT) or to the
application on receiving (SO_RCVLOWAT).
In addition, another socket option (TCP_NOTSENT_LOWAT) can be used to
control the amount of unsent bytes in the write queue. This can help
a sending TCP application to avoid creating large amounts of buffered
data (and corresponding latency). As an example, this may be useful
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for applications that are multiplexing data from multiple upper level
streams onto a connection, especially when streams may be a mix of
interactive/realtime and bulk data transfer.
Appendix B. TCP Requirement Summary
This section is adapted from RFC 1122.
Note that there is no requirement related to PLPMTUD in this list,
but that PLPMTUD is recommended.
| | | | |S| |
| | | | |H| |F
| | | | |O|M|o
| | |S| |U|U|o
| | |H| |L|S|t
| |M|O| |D|T|n
| |U|U|M| | |o
| |S|L|A|N|N|t
| |T|D|Y|O|O|t
FEATURE | ReqID | | | |T|T|e
-------------------------------------------------|--------|-|-|-|-|-|--
| | | | | | |
Push flag | | | | | | |
Aggregate or queue un-pushed data | MAY-16 | | |x| | |
Sender collapse successive PSH flags | SHLD-27| |x| | | |
SEND call can specify PUSH | MAY-15 | | |x| | |
If cannot: sender buffer indefinitely | MUST-60| | | | |x|
If cannot: PSH last segment | MUST-61|x| | | | |
Notify receiving ALP of PSH | MAY-17 | | |x| | |1
Send max size segment when possible | SHLD-28| |x| | | |
| | | | | | |
Window | | | | | | |
Treat as unsigned number | MUST-1 |x| | | | |
Handle as 32-bit number | REC-1 | |x| | | |
Shrink window from right | SHLD-14| | | |x| |
- Send new data when window shrinks | SHLD-15| | | |x| |
- Retransmit old unacked data within window | SHLD-16| |x| | | |
- Time out conn for data past right edge | SHLD-17| | | |x| |
Robust against shrinking window | MUST-34|x| | | | |
Receiver's window closed indefinitely | MAY-8 | | |x| | |
Use standard probing logic | MUST-35|x| | | | |
Sender probe zero window | MUST-36|x| | | | |
First probe after RTO | SHLD-29| |x| | | |
Exponential backoff | SHLD-30| |x| | | |
Allow window stay zero indefinitely | MUST-37|x| | | | |
Retransmit old data beyond SND.UNA+SND.WND | MAY-7 | | |x| | |
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Process RST and URG even with zero window | MUST-66|x| | | | |
| | | | | | |
Urgent Data | | | | | | |
Include support for urgent pointer | MUST-30|x| | | | |
Pointer indicates first non-urgent octet | MUST-62|x| | | | |
Arbitrary length urgent data sequence | MUST-31|x| | | | |
Inform ALP asynchronously of urgent data | MUST-32|x| | | | |1
ALP can learn if/how much urgent data Q'd | MUST-33|x| | | | |1
ALP employ the urgent mechanism | SHLD-13| | | |x| |
| | | | | | |
TCP Options | | | | | | |
Support the mandatory option set | MUST-4 |x| | | | |
Receive TCP option in any segment | MUST-5 |x| | | | |
Ignore unsupported options | MUST-6 |x| | | | |
Cope with illegal option length | MUST-7 |x| | | | |
Process options regardless of word alignment | MUST-64|x| | | | |
Implement sending & receiving MSS option | MUST-14|x| | | | |
IPv4 Send MSS option unless 536 | SHLD-5 | |x| | | |
IPv6 Send MSS option unless 1220 | SHLD-5 | |x| | | |
Send MSS option always | MAY-3 | | |x| | |
IPv4 Send-MSS default is 536 | MUST-15|x| | | | |
IPv6 Send-MSS default is 1220 | MUST-15|x| | | | |
Calculate effective send seg size | MUST-16|x| | | | |
MSS accounts for varying MTU | SHLD-6 | |x| | | |
MSS not sent on non-SYN segments | MUST-65| | | | |x|
MSS value based on MMS_R | MUST-67|x| | | | |
| | | | | | |
TCP Checksums | | | | | | |
Sender compute checksum | MUST-2 |x| | | | |
Receiver check checksum | MUST-3 |x| | | | |
| | | | | | |
ISN Selection | | | | | | |
Include a clock-driven ISN generator component | MUST-8 |x| | | | |
Secure ISN generator with a PRF component | SHLD-1 | |x| | | |
PRF computable from outside the host | MUST-9 | | | | |x|
| | | | | | |
Opening Connections | | | | | | |
Support simultaneous open attempts | MUST-10|x| | | | |
SYN-RECEIVED remembers last state | MUST-11|x| | | | |
Passive Open call interfere with others | MUST-41| | | | |x|
Function: simultan. LISTENs for same port | MUST-42|x| | | | |
Ask IP for src address for SYN if necc. | MUST-44|x| | | | |
Otherwise, use local addr of conn. | MUST-45|x| | | | |
OPEN to broadcast/multicast IP Address | MUST-46| | | | |x|
Silently discard seg to bcast/mcast addr | MUST-57|x| | | | |
| | | | | | |
Closing Connections | | | | | | |
RST can contain data | SHLD-2 | |x| | | |
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Inform application of aborted conn | MUST-12|x| | | | |
Half-duplex close connections | MAY-1 | | |x| | |
Send RST to indicate data lost | SHLD-3 | |x| | | |
In TIME-WAIT state for 2MSL seconds | MUST-13|x| | | | |
Accept SYN from TIME-WAIT state | MAY-2 | | |x| | |
Use Timestamps to reduce TIME-WAIT | SHLD-4 | |x| | | |
| | | | | | |
Retransmissions | | | | | | |
Implement RFC 5681 | MUST-19|x| | | | |
Retransmit with same IP ident | MAY-4 | | |x| | |
Karn's algorithm | MUST-18|x| | | | |
| | | | | | |
Generating ACK's: | | | | | | |
Aggregate whenever possible | MUST-58|x| | | | |
Queue out-of-order segments | SHLD-31| |x| | | |
Process all Q'd before send ACK | MUST-59|x| | | | |
Send ACK for out-of-order segment | MAY-13 | | |x| | |
Delayed ACK's | SHLD-18| |x| | | |
Delay < 0.5 seconds | MUST-40|x| | | | |
Every 2nd full-sized segment ACK'd | SHLD-19|x| | | | |
Receiver SWS-Avoidance Algorithm | MUST-39|x| | | | |
| | | | | | |
Sending data | | | | | | |
Configurable TTL | MUST-49|x| | | | |
Sender SWS-Avoidance Algorithm | MUST-38|x| | | | |
Nagle algorithm | SHLD-7 | |x| | | |
Application can disable Nagle algorithm | MUST-17|x| | | | |
| | | | | | |
Connection Failures: | | | | | | |
Negative advice to IP on R1 retxs | MUST-20|x| | | | |
Close connection on R2 retxs | MUST-20|x| | | | |
ALP can set R2 | MUST-21|x| | | | |1
Inform ALP of R1<=retxs<R2 | SHLD-9 | |x| | | |1
Recommended value for R1 | SHLD-10| |x| | | |
Recommended value for R2 | SHLD-11| |x| | | |
Same mechanism for SYNs | MUST-22|x| | | | |
R2 at least 3 minutes for SYN | MUST-23|x| | | | |
| | | | | | |
Send Keep-alive Packets: | MAY-5 | | |x| | |
- Application can request | MUST-24|x| | | | |
- Default is "off" | MUST-25|x| | | | |
- Only send if idle for interval | MUST-26|x| | | | |
- Interval configurable | MUST-27|x| | | | |
- Default at least 2 hrs. | MUST-28|x| | | | |
- Tolerant of lost ACK's | MUST-29|x| | | | |
- Send with no data | SHLD-12| |x| | | |
- Configurable to send garbage octet | MAY-6 | | |x| | |
| | | | | | |
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IP Options | | | | | | |
Ignore options TCP doesn't understand | MUST-50|x| | | | |
Time Stamp support | MAY-10 | | |x| | |
Record Route support | MAY-11 | | |x| | |
Source Route: | | | | | | |
ALP can specify | MUST-51|x| | | | |1
Overrides src rt in datagram | MUST-52|x| | | | |
Build return route from src rt | MUST-53|x| | | | |
Later src route overrides | SHLD-24| |x| | | |
| | | | | | |
Receiving ICMP Messages from IP | MUST-54|x| | | | |
Dest. Unreach (0,1,5) => inform ALP | SHLD-25| |x| | | |
Dest. Unreach (0,1,5) => abort conn | MUST-56| | | | |x|
Dest. Unreach (2-4) => abort conn | SHLD-26| |x| | | |
Source Quench => silent discard | MUST-55|x| | | | |
Time Exceeded => tell ALP, don't abort | MUST-56| | | | |x|
Param Problem => tell ALP, don't abort | MUST-56| | | | |x|
| | | | | | |
Address Validation | | | | | | |
Reject OPEN call to invalid IP address | MUST-46|x| | | | |
Reject SYN from invalid IP address | MUST-63|x| | | | |
Silently discard SYN to bcast/mcast addr | MUST-57|x| | | | |
| | | | | | |
TCP/ALP Interface Services | | | | | | |
Error Report mechanism | MUST-47|x| | | | |
ALP can disable Error Report Routine | SHLD-20| |x| | | |
ALP can specify DiffServ field for sending | MUST-48|x| | | | |
Passed unchanged to IP | SHLD-22| |x| | | |
ALP can change DiffServ field during connection| SHLD-21| |x| | | |
ALP generally changing DiffServ during conn. | SHLD-23| | | |x| |
Pass received DiffServ field up to ALP | MAY-9 | | |x| | |
FLUSH call | MAY-14 | | |x| | |
Optional local IP addr parm. in OPEN | MUST-43|x| | | | |
| | | | | | |
RFC 5961 Support: | | | | | | |
Implement data injection protection | MAY-12 | | |x| | |
| | | | | | |
Explicit Congestion Notification: | | | | | | |
Support ECN | SHLD-8 | |x| | | |
-------------------------------------------------|--------|-|-|-|-|-|-
FOOTNOTES: (1) "ALP" means Application-Layer program.
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Author's Address
Wesley M. Eddy (editor)
MTI Systems
US
Email: wes@mti-systems.com
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