tls                                                           R. Housley
Internet-Draft                                            Vigil Security
Intended status: Informational                                J. Hoyland
Expires: 8 August 2022                                   Cloudflare Ltd.
                                                                M. Sethi
                                                                Ericsson
                                                               C.A. Wood
                                                              Cloudflare
                                                         4 February 2022


                 Guidance for External PSK Usage in TLS
                draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-guidance-06

Abstract

   This document provides usage guidance for external Pre-Shared Keys
   (PSKs) in Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 as defined in RFC 8446.
   It lists TLS security properties provided by PSKs under certain
   assumptions, and then demonstrates how violations of these
   assumptions lead to attacks.  Advice for applications to help meet
   these assumptions is provided.  This document also discusses PSK use
   cases and provisioning processes.  Finally, it lists the privacy and
   security properties that are not provided by TLS 1.3 when external
   PSKs are used.

Discussion Venues

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/tlswg/external-psk-design-team.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."




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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 August 2022.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  PSK Security Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Shared PSKs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  PSK Entropy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  External PSKs in Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.2.  Provisioning Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.3.  Provisioning Constraints  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Recommendations for External PSK Usage  . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.1.  Stack Interfaces  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       6.1.1.  PSK Identity Encoding and Comparison  . . . . . . . .  10
       6.1.2.  PSK Identity Collisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15











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1.  Introduction

   This document provides guidance on the use of external Pre-Shared
   Keys (PSKs) in Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 [RFC8446].  This
   guidance also applies to Datagram TLS (DTLS) 1.3
   [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] and Compact TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-ctls].  For
   readability, this document uses the term TLS to refer to all such
   versions.

   External PSKs are symmetric secret keys provided to the TLS protocol
   implementation as external inputs.  External PSKs are provisioned
   out-of-band.

   This document lists TLS security properties provided by PSKs under
   certain assumptions and demonstrates how violations of these
   assumptions lead to attacks.  This document discusses PSK use cases,
   provisioning processes, and TLS stack implementation support in the
   context of these assumptions.  This document also provides advice for
   applications in various use cases to help meet these assumptions.

   There are many resources that provide guidance for password
   generation and verification aimed towards improving security.
   However, there is no such equivalent for external Pre-Shared Keys
   (PSKs) in TLS.  This document aims to reduce that gap.

2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Notation

   For purposes of this document, a "logical node" is a computing
   presence that other parties can interact with via the TLS protocol.
   A logical node could potentially be realized with multiple physical
   instances operating under common administrative control, e.g., a
   server farm.  An "endpoint" is a client or server participating in a
   connection.










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4.  PSK Security Properties

   The use of a previously established PSK allows TLS nodes to
   authenticate the endpoint identities.  It also offers other benefits,
   including resistance to attacks in presence of quantum computers; see
   Section 4.2 for related discussion.  However, these keys do not
   provide privacy protection of endpoint identities, nor do they
   provide non-repudiation (one endpoint in a connection can deny the
   conversation); see Section 7 for related discussion.

   PSK authentication security implicitly assumes one fundamental
   property: each PSK is known to exactly one client and one server, and
   that these never switch roles.  If this assumption is violated, then
   the security properties of TLS are severely weakened as discussed
   below.

4.1.  Shared PSKs

   As discussed in Section 5.1, to demonstrate their attack, [AASS19]
   describes scenarios where multiple clients or multiple servers share
   a PSK.  If this is done naively by having all members share a common
   key, then TLS authenticates only group membership, and the security
   of the overall system is inherently rather brittle.  There are a
   number of obvious weaknesses here:

   1.  Any group member can impersonate any other group member.

   2.  If PSK is combined with a fresh ephemeral key exchange, then
       compromise of a group member that knows the resulting shared
       secret will enable the attacker to passively read (and actively
       modify) traffic.

   3.  If PSK is not combined with fresh ephemeral key exchange, then
       compromise of any group member allows the attacker to passively
       read (and actively modify) all traffic, including reading past
       traffic.

   Additionally, a malicious non-member can reroute handshakes between
   honest group members to connect them in unintended ways, as described
   below.  Note that a partial mitigation against this class of attack
   is available: each group member includes the SNI extension [RFC6066]
   and terminates the connection on mismatch between the presented SNI
   value and the receiving member's known identity.  See [Selfie] for
   details.

   To illustrate the rerouting attack, consider three peers, A, B, and
   C, who all know the PSK.  The attack proceeds as follows:




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   1.  A sends a ClientHello to B.

   2.  The attacker intercepts the message and redirects it to C.

   3.  C responds with a second flight (ServerHello, ...) to A.

   4.  A sends a Finished message to B.  A has completed the handshake,
       ostensibly with B.

   5.  The attacker redirects the Finished message to C.  C has
       completed the handshake with A.

   In this attack, peer authentication is not provided.  Also, if C
   supports a weaker set of cipher suites than B, cryptographic
   algorithm downgrade attacks might be possible.  This rerouting is a
   type of identity misbinding attack [Krawczyk][Sethi].  Selfie attack
   [Selfie] is a special case of the rerouting attack against a group
   member that can act both as TLS server and client.  In the Selfie
   attack, a malicious non-member reroutes a connection from the client
   to the server on the same endpoint.

   Finally, in addition to these weaknesses, sharing a PSK across nodes
   may negatively affect deployments.  For example, revocation of
   individual group members is not possible without establishing a new
   PSK for all of the non-revoked members.

4.2.  PSK Entropy

   Entropy properties of external PSKs may also affect TLS security
   properties.  For example, if a high entropy PSK is used, then PSK-
   only key establishment modes provide expected security properties for
   TLS, including establishing the same session keys between peers,
   secrecy of session keys, peer authentication, and downgrade
   protection.  See [RFC8446], Appendix E.1 for an explanation of these
   properties.  However, these modes lack forward security.  Forward
   security may be achieved by using a PSK-DH mode, or, alternatively,
   by using PSKs with short lifetimes.

   In contrast, if a low entropy PSK is used, then PSK-only key
   establishment modes are subject to passive exhaustive search attacks
   which will reveal the traffic keys.  PSK-DH modes are subject to
   active attacks in which the attacker impersonates one side.  The
   exhaustive search phase of these attacks can be mounted offline if
   the attacker captures a single handshake using the PSK, but those
   attacks will not lead to compromise of the traffic keys for that
   connection because those also depend on the Diffie-Hellman (DH)
   exchange.  Low entropy keys are only secure against active attack if
   a password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) is used with TLS.  The



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   Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) is currently working on specifying
   recommended PAKEs (see [I-D.irtf-cfrg-cpace] and
   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-opaque], for the symmetric and asymmetric cases,
   respectively).

5.  External PSKs in Practice

   PSK ciphersuites were first specified for TLS in 2005.  PSKs are now
   an integral part of the TLS version 1.3 specification [RFC8446].  TLS
   1.3 also uses PSKs for session resumption.  It distinguishes these
   resumption PSKs from external PSKs which have been provisioned out-
   of-band.  This section describes known use cases and provisioning
   processes for external PSKs with TLS.

5.1.  Use Cases

   This section lists some example use-cases where pair-wise external
   PSKs, i.e., external PSKs that are shared between only one server and
   one client, have been used for authentication in TLS.  There was no
   attempt to prioritize the examples in any particular order.

   *  Device-to-device communication with out-of-band synchronized keys.
      PSKs provisioned out-of-band for communicating with known
      identities, wherein the identity to use is discovered via a
      different online protocol.

   *  Intra-data-center communication.  Machine-to-machine communication
      within a single data center or point-of-presence (PoP) may use
      externally provisioned PSKs, primarily for the purposes of
      supporting TLS connections with early data; see Section 8 for
      considerations when using early data with external PSKs.

   *  Certificateless server-to-server communication.  Machine-to-
      machine communication may use externally provisioned PSKs,
      primarily for the purposes of establishing TLS connections without
      requiring the overhead of provisioning and managing PKI
      certificates.

   *  Internet of Things (IoT) and devices with limited computational
      capabilities.  [RFC7925] defines TLS and DTLS profiles for
      resource-constrained devices and suggests the use of PSK
      ciphersuites for compliant devices.  The Open Mobile Alliance
      Lightweight Machine to Machine Technical Specification [LwM2M]
      states that LwM2M servers MUST support the PSK mode of DTLS.

   *  Securing RADIUS [RFC2865] with TLS.  PSK ciphersuites are optional
      for this use case, as specified in [RFC6614].




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   *  3GPP server to user equipment authentication.  The Generic
      Authentication Architecture (GAA) defined by 3GGP mentions that
      TLS-PSK ciphersuites can be used between server and user equipment
      for authentication [GAA].

   *  Smart Cards.  The electronic German ID (eID) card supports
      authentication of a card holder to online services with TLS-PSK
      [SmartCard].

   *  Quantum resistance.  Some deployments may use PSKs (or combine
      them with certificate-based authentication as described in
      [RFC8773]) because of the protection they provide against quantum
      computers.

   There are also use cases where PSKs are shared between more than two
   entities.  Some examples below (as noted by Akhmetzyanova et al.
   [AASS19]):

   *  Group chats.  In this use-case, group participants may be
      provisioned an external PSK out-of-band for establishing
      authenticated connections with other members of the group.

   *  Internet of Things (IoT) and devices with limited computational
      capabilities.  Many PSK provisioning examples are possible in this
      use-case.  For example, in a given setting, IoT devices may all
      share the same PSK and use it to communicate with a central server
      (one key for n devices), have their own key for communicating with
      a central server (n keys for n devices), or have pairwise keys for
      communicating with each other (n^2 keys for n devices).

5.2.  Provisioning Examples

   The exact provisioning process depends on the system requirements and
   threat model.  Whenever possible, avoid sharing a PSK between nodes;
   however, sharing a PSK among several nodes is sometimes unavoidable.
   When PSK sharing happens, other accommodations SHOULD be used as
   discussed in Section 6.

   Examples of PSK provisioning processes are included below.

   *  Many industrial protocols assume that PSKs are distributed and
      assigned manually via one of the following approaches: typing the
      PSK into the devices, or using a Trust On First Use (TOFU)
      approach with a device completely unprotected before the first
      login did take place.  Many devices have very limited UI.  For
      example, they may only have a numeric keypad or even fewer
      buttons.  When the TOFU approach is not suitable, entering the key
      would require typing it on a constrained UI.



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   *  Some devices provision PSKs via an out-of-band, cloud-based
      syncing protocol.

   *  Some secrets may be baked into hardware or software device
      components.  Moreover, when this is done at manufacturing time,
      secrets may be printed on labels or included in a Bill of
      Materials for ease of scanning or import.

5.3.  Provisioning Constraints

   PSK provisioning systems are often constrained in application-
   specific ways.  For example, although one goal of provisioning is to
   ensure that each pair of nodes has a unique key pair, some systems do
   not want to distribute pair-wise shared keys to achieve this.  As
   another example, some systems require the provisioning process to
   embed application-specific information in either PSKs or their
   identities.  Identities may sometimes need to be routable, as is
   currently under discussion for EAP-TLS-PSK
   [I-D.mattsson-emu-eap-tls-psk].

6.  Recommendations for External PSK Usage

   Recommended requirements for applications using external PSKs are as
   follows:

   1.  Each PSK SHOULD be derived from at least 128 bits of entropy,
       MUST be at least 128 bits long, and SHOULD be combined with an
       ephemeral key exchange, e.g., by using the "psk_dhe_ke" Pre-
       Shared Key Exchange Mode in TLS 1.3, for forward secrecy.  As
       discussed in Section 4, low entropy PSKs, i.e., those derived
       from less than 128 bits of entropy, are subject to attack and
       SHOULD be avoided.  If only low-entropy keys are available, then
       key establishment mechanisms such as Password Authenticated Key
       Exchange (PAKE) that mitigate the risk of offline dictionary
       attacks SHOULD be employed.  Note that no such mechanisms have
       yet been standardised, and further that these mechanisms will not
       necessarily follow the same architecture as the process for
       incorporating external PSKs described in
       [I-D.ietf-tls-external-psk-importer].












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   2.  Unless other accommodations are made to mitigate the risks of
       PSKs known to a group, each PSK MUST be restricted in its use to
       at most two logical nodes: one logical node in a TLS client role
       and one logical node in a TLS server role.  (The two logical
       nodes MAY be the same, in different roles.)  Two acceptable
       accommodations are described in
       [I-D.ietf-tls-external-psk-importer]: (1) exchanging client and
       server identifiers over the TLS connection after the handshake,
       and (2) incorporating identifiers for both the client and the
       server into the context string for an external PSK importer.

   3.  Nodes SHOULD use external PSK importers
       [I-D.ietf-tls-external-psk-importer] when configuring PSKs for a
       client-server pair when applicable.  Importers make provisioning
       external PSKs easier and less error prone by deriving a unique,
       imported PSK from the external PSK for each key derivation
       function a node supports.  See the Security Considerations in
       [I-D.ietf-tls-external-psk-importer] for more information.

   4.  Where possible the main PSK (that which is fed into the importer)
       SHOULD be deleted after the imported keys have been generated.
       This prevents an attacker from bootstrapping a compromise of one
       node into the ability to attack connections between any node;
       otherwise the attacker can recover the main key and then re-run
       the importer itself.

6.1.  Stack Interfaces

   Most major TLS implementations support external PSKs.  Stacks
   supporting external PSKs provide interfaces that applications may use
   when configuring PSKs for individual connections.  Details about some
   existing stacks at the time of writing are below.

   *  OpenSSL and BoringSSL: Applications can specify support for
      external PSKs via distinct ciphersuites in TLS 1.2 and below.
      They also then configure callbacks that are invoked for PSK
      selection during the handshake.  These callbacks must provide a
      PSK identity and key.  The exact format of the callback depends on
      the negotiated TLS protocol version, with new callback functions
      added specifically to OpenSSL for TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] PSK support.
      The PSK length is validated to be between [1, 256] bytes.  The PSK
      identity may be up to 128 bytes long.

   *  mbedTLS: Client applications configure PSKs before creating a
      connection by providing the PSK identity and value inline.
      Servers must implement callbacks similar to that of OpenSSL.  Both
      PSK identity and key lengths may be between [1, 16] bytes long.




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   *  gnuTLS: Applications configure PSK values, either as raw byte
      strings or hexadecimal strings.  The PSK identity and key size are
      not validated.

   *  wolfSSL: Applications configure PSKs with callbacks similar to
      OpenSSL.

6.1.1.  PSK Identity Encoding and Comparison

   Section 5.1 of [RFC4279] mandates that the PSK identity should be
   first converted to a character string and then encoded to octets
   using UTF-8.  This was done to avoid interoperability problems
   (especially when the identity is configured by human users).  On the
   other hand, [RFC7925] advises implementations against assuming any
   structured format for PSK identities and recommends byte-by-byte
   comparison for any operation.  When PSK identities are configured
   manually it is important to be aware that due to encoding issues
   visually identical strings may, in fact, differ.

   TLS version 1.3 [RFC8446] follows the same practice of specifying the
   PSK identity as a sequence of opaque bytes (shown as opaque
   identity<1..2^16-1> in the specification) that thus is compared on a
   byte-by-byte basis.  [RFC8446] also requires that the PSK identities
   are at least 1 byte and at the most 65535 bytes in length.  Although
   [RFC8446] does not place strict requirements on the format of PSK
   identities, we do however note that the format of PSK identities can
   vary depending on the deployment:

   *  The PSK identity MAY be a user configured string when used in
      protocols like Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748].
      gnuTLS for example treats PSK identities as usernames.

   *  PSK identities MAY have a domain name suffix for roaming and
      federation.  In applications and settings where the domain name
      suffix is privacy sensitive, this practice is NOT RECOMMENDED.

   *  Deployments should take care that the length of the PSK identity
      is sufficient to avoid collisions.

6.1.2.  PSK Identity Collisions

   It is possible, though unlikely, that an external PSK identity may
   clash with a resumption PSK identity.  The TLS stack implementation
   and sequencing of PSK callbacks influences the application's behavior
   when identity collisions occur.  When a server receives a PSK
   identity in a TLS 1.3 ClientHello, some TLS stacks execute the
   application's registered callback function before checking the
   stack's internal session resumption cache.  This means that if a PSK



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   identity collision occurs, the application's external PSK usage will
   typically take precedence over the internal session resumption path.

   Since resumption PSK identities are assigned by the TLS stack
   implementation, it is RECOMMENDED that these identifiers be assigned
   in a manner that lets resumption PSKs be distinguished from external
   PSKs to avoid concerns with collisions altogether.

7.  Privacy Considerations

   PSK privacy properties are orthogonal to security properties
   described in Section 4.  TLS does little to keep PSK identity
   information private.  For example, an adversary learns information
   about the external PSK or its identifier by virtue of the identifier
   appearing in cleartext in a ClientHello.  As a result, a passive
   adversary can link two or more connections together that use the same
   external PSK on the wire.  Depending on the PSK identity, a passive
   attacker may also be able to identify the device, person, or
   enterprise running the TLS client or TLS server.  An active attacker
   can also use the PSK identity to suppress handshakes or application
   data from a specific device by blocking, delaying, or rate-limiting
   traffic.  Techniques for mitigating these risks require further
   analysis and are out of scope for this document.

   In addition to linkability in the network, external PSKs are
   intrinsically linkable by PSK receivers.  Specifically, servers can
   link successive connections that use the same external PSK together.
   Preventing this type of linkability is out of scope.

8.  Security Considerations

   Security considerations are provided throughout this document.  It
   bears repeating that there are concerns related to the use of
   external PSKs regarding proper identification of TLS 1.3 endpoints
   and additional risks when external PSKs are known to a group.
















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   It is NOT RECOMMENDED to share the same PSK between more than one
   client and server.  However, as discussed in Section 5.1, there are
   application scenarios that may rely on sharing the same PSK among
   multiple nodes.  [I-D.ietf-tls-external-psk-importer] helps in
   mitigating rerouting and Selfie style reflection attacks when the PSK
   is shared among multiple nodes.  This is achieved by correctly using
   the node identifiers in the ImportedIdentity.context construct
   specified in [I-D.ietf-tls-external-psk-importer].  One solution
   would be for each endpoint to select one globally unique identifier
   and use it in all PSK handshakes.  The unique identifier can, for
   example, be one of its MAC addresses, a 32-byte random number, or its
   Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) [RFC4122].  Note that such
   persistent, global identifiers have privacy implications; see
   Section 7.

   Each endpoint SHOULD know the identifier of the other endpoint with
   which it wants to connect and SHOULD compare it with the other
   endpoint's identifier used in ImportedIdentity.context.  It is
   however important to remember that endpoints sharing the same group
   PSK can always impersonate each other.

   Considerations for external PSK usage extend beyond proper
   identification.  When early data is used with an external PSK, the
   random value in the ClientHello is the only source of entropy that
   contributes to key diversity between sessions.  As a result, when an
   external PSK is used more than one time, the random number source on
   the client has a significant role in the protection of the early
   data.

9.  IANA Considerations

   This document makes no IANA requests.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-tls-external-psk-importer]
              Benjamin, D. and C. A. Wood, "Importing External PSKs for
              TLS", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-
              external-psk-importer-06, 3 December 2020,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-external-
              psk-importer-06.txt>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.



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   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [AASS19]   Akhmetzyanova, L., Alekseev, E., Smyshlyaeva, E., and A.
              Sokolov, "Continuing to reflect on TLS 1.3 with external
              PSK", 2019, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/421.pdf>.

   [GAA]      "TR33.919 version 12.0.0 Release 12", n.d.,
              <https://www.etsi.org/deliver/
              etsi_tr/133900_133999/133919/12.00.00_60/
              tr_133919v120000p.pdf>.

   [I-D.ietf-tls-ctls]
              Rescorla, E., Barnes, R., and H. Tschofenig, "Compact TLS
              1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-
              ctls-04, 25 October 2021,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-ctls-
              04.txt>.

   [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
              Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
              Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
              1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-
              dtls13-43, 30 April 2021,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-
              dtls13-43.txt>.

   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-cpace]
              Abdalla, M., Haase, B., and J. Hesse, "CPace, a balanced
              composable PAKE", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              irtf-cfrg-cpace-05, 14 January 2022,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-cpace-
              05.txt>.

   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-opaque]
              Bourdrez, D., Krawczyk, H., Lewi, K., and C. A. Wood, "The
              OPAQUE Asymmetric PAKE Protocol", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque-07, 25 October
              2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-
              opaque-07.txt>.




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   [I-D.mattsson-emu-eap-tls-psk]
              Mattsson, J. P., Sethi, M., Aura, T., and O. Friel, "EAP-
              TLS with PSK Authentication (EAP-TLS-PSK)", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mattsson-emu-eap-tls-psk-
              00, 9 March 2020, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
              mattsson-emu-eap-tls-psk-00.txt>.

   [Krawczyk] Krawczyk, H., "SIGMA: The 'SIGn-and-MAc' Approach to
              Authenticated Diffie-Hellman and Its Use in the IKE
              Protocols", Annual International Cryptology Conference.
              Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg , 2003,
              <https://link.springer.com/content/
              pdf/10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_24.pdf>.

   [LwM2M]    "Lightweight Machine to Machine Technical Specification",
              n.d.,
              <http://www.openmobilealliance.org/release/LightweightM2M/
              V1_0-20170208-A/OMA-TS-LightweightM2M-
              V1_0-20170208-A.pdf>.

   [RFC2865]  Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
              "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
              RFC 2865, DOI 10.17487/RFC2865, June 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2865>.

   [RFC3748]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
              Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
              (EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748>.

   [RFC4122]  Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
              Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>.

   [RFC4279]  Eronen, P., Ed. and H. Tschofenig, Ed., "Pre-Shared Key
              Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
              RFC 4279, DOI 10.17487/RFC4279, December 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4279>.

   [RFC6066]  Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>.







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   [RFC6614]  Winter, S., McCauley, M., Venaas, S., and K. Wierenga,
              "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Encryption for RADIUS",
              RFC 6614, DOI 10.17487/RFC6614, May 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6614>.

   [RFC7925]  Tschofenig, H., Ed. and T. Fossati, "Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) / Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
              Profiles for the Internet of Things", RFC 7925,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7925, July 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7925>.

   [RFC8773]  Housley, R., "TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-Based
              Authentication with an External Pre-Shared Key", RFC 8773,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8773, March 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8773>.

   [Selfie]   Drucker, N. and S. Gueron, "Selfie: reflections on TLS 1.3
              with PSK", 2019, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/347.pdf>.

   [Sethi]    Sethi, M., Peltonen, A., and T. Aura, "Misbinding Attacks
              on Secure Device Pairing and Bootstrapping", Proceedings
              of the 2019 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and
              Communications Security , 2019,
              <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.07550>.

   [SmartCard]
              "Technical Guideline TR-03112-7 eCard-API-Framework -
              Protocols", 2015, <https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Down
              loads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03112/
              TR-03112-api_teil7.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1>.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

   This document is the output of the TLS External PSK Design Team,
   comprised of the following members: Benjamin Beurdouche, Björn Haase,
   Christopher Wood, Colm MacCarthaigh, Eric Rescorla, Jonathan Hoyland,
   Martin Thomson, Mohamad Badra, Mohit Sethi, Oleg Pekar, Owen Friel,
   and Russ Housley.

   This document was improved by a high quality reviews by Ben Kaduk and
   John Mattsson.

Authors' Addresses

   Russ Housley
   Vigil Security

   Email: housley@vigilsec.com



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   Jonathan Hoyland
   Cloudflare Ltd.

   Email: jonathan.hoyland@gmail.com


   Mohit Sethi
   Ericsson

   Email: mohit@piuha.net


   Christopher A. Wood
   Cloudflare

   Email: caw@heapingbits.net



































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