Record Size Limit Extension for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
draft-ietf-tls-record-limit-01

TLS                                                           M. Thomson
Internet-Draft                                                   Mozilla
Updates: 6066 (if approved)                            September 7, 2017
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: March 11, 2018


     Record Size Limit Extension for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
                     draft-ietf-tls-record-limit-01

Abstract

   An extension to Transport Layer Security (TLS) is defined that allows
   endpoints to negotiate the maximum size of protected records that
   each will send the other.

   This replaces the maximum fragment length extension defined in RFC
   6066.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 11, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of



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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Limitations of the "max_fragment_length" Extension  . . . . .   3
   4.  The "record_size_limit" Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Record Expansion Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Deprecating "max_fragment_length" . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   Implementing Transport Layer Security (TLS) [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] for
   constrained devices can be challenging.  However, recent improvements
   to the design and implementation of cryptographic algorithms have
   made TLS accessible to some highly limited devices (see for example
   [RFC7925]).

   Receiving large protected records can be particularly difficult for a
   device with limited operating memory.  TLS versions 1.2 and earlier
   [RFC5246] permit senders to generate records 16384 octets in size,
   plus any expansion from compression and protection up to 2048 octets
   (though typically this expansion is only 16 octets).  TLS 1.3 reduces
   the allowance for expansion to 256 octets.  Allocating up to 18K of
   memory for ciphertext is beyond the capacity of some implementations.

   An Authentication Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) ciphers (see
   [RFC5116]) API requires that an entire record be present to decrypt
   and authenticate it.  Similarly, other ciphers cannot produce
   authenticated data until the entire record is present.  Thus,
   incremental processing of records minimally exposes endpoints to the
   risk of forged data.

   The "max_fragment_length" extension [RFC6066] was designed to enable
   constrained clients to negotiate a lower record size.  However,
   "max_fragment_length" suffers from several design problems (see
   Section 3).





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   This document defines a "record_size_limit" extension (Section 4).
   This extension replaces "max_fragment_length" [RFC6066], which this
   document deprecates.  This extension is valid in all versions of TLS.

2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", and "MAY" are used in this
   document.  It's not shouting; when they are capitalized, they have
   the special meaning defined in [RFC2119].

3.  Limitations of the "max_fragment_length" Extension

   The "max_fragment_length" extension has several limitations that make
   it unsuitable for use.

   A client that has no constraints preventing it from accepting a large
   record cannot use "max_fragment_length" without risking a reduction
   in the size of records.  The maximum value that the extension permits
   is 2^12, much smaller than the maximum record size of 2^14 that the
   protocol permits.

   For large data transfers, small record sizes can materially affect
   performance.  Every record incurs additional costs, both in the
   additional octets for record headers and for expansion due to
   encryption.  Processing more records also adds computational
   overheads that can be amortized more effectively for larger record
   sizes.  Consequently, clients that are capable of receiving large
   records could be unwilling to risk reducing performance by offering
   the extension, especially if the extension is rarely needed.

   This would not be an issue if a codepoint were available or could be
   added for fragments of 2^14 octets.  However, RFC 6066 requires that
   servers abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert if they
   receive the extension with a value they don't understand.  This makes
   it impossible to add new values to the extension without risking
   connection attempts failing.

   A server that negotiates "max_fragment_length" is required to echo
   the value selected by the client.  The server cannot request a lower
   limit than the one the client offered.  This is a significant problem
   if a server is more constrained than the clients it serves.

   The "max_fragment_length" extension is also ill-suited to cases where
   the capabilities of client and server are asymmetric.  Constraints on
   record size are often receiver constraints.

   In comparison, an implementation might be able to send data
   incrementally.  Encryption does not have the same atomicity



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   requirement.  Some ciphers can be encrypted and sent progressively.
   Thus, an endpoint might be willing to send more than its receive
   limit.

   If these disincentives are sufficient to discourage clients from
   deploying the "max_fragment_length" extension, then constrained
   servers are unable to limit record sizes.

4.  The "record_size_limit" Extension

   The ExtensionData of the "record_size_limit" extension is
   RecordSizeLimit:

      uint16 RecordSizeLimit;

   The value of RecordSizeLimit is the maximum size of record in octets
   that the endpoint is willing to receive.  This value is used to limit
   the size of records that are created when encoding application data
   and handshake message into records.

   When the "record_size_limit" extension is negotiated, an endpoint
   MUST NOT generate a protected record with plaintext that is larger
   than the RecordSizeLimit value it receives from its peer.
   Unprotected messages - handshake messages in particular - are not
   subject to this limit.

   This value is the length of the plaintext of a protected record.  The
   value includes the content type and padding added in TLS 1.3 (that
   is, the complete length of TLSInnerPlaintext).  In TLS 1.2 and
   earlier, the limit covers all input to compression and encryption,
   that is the data that ultimately produces TLSCiphertext.fragment.
   Padding added as part of encryption, such as that added by a block
   cipher, is not included in this count (see Section 4.1).

   An endpoint that supports all record sizes can include any limit up
   to the protocol-defined limit for maximum record size.  For TLS 1.3
   and earlier, that limit is 2^14 octets.  Higher values are currently
   reserved for future versions of the protocol that may allow larger
   records; an endpoint MUST NOT send a value higher than the protocol-
   defined maximum record size unless explicitly allowed by such a
   future version or extension.

   Even if a larger record size limit is provided by a peer, an endpoint
   MUST NOT send records larger than the protocol-defined limit, unless
   explicitly allowed by a future TLS version or extension.

   The record size limit only applies to records sent toward the
   endpoint that advertises the limit.  An endpoint can send records



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   that are larger than the limit it advertises as its own limit.  An
   endpoint that receives a record larger than its advertised limit MUST
   generate a fatal "record_overflow" alert.

   Clients SHOULD advertise the "record_size_limit" extension, even if
   they have no need to limit the size of records.  This allows servers
   to apply a limit at their discretion.  If this extension is not
   negotiated, endpoints can send records of any size permitted by the
   protocol or other negotiated extensions.

   Endpoints MUST NOT send a "record_size_limit" extension with a value
   smaller than 64.  An endpoint MUST treat receipt of a smaller value
   as a fatal error and generate an "illegal_parameter" alert.

   In TLS 1.3, the server sends the "record_size_limit" extension in the
   EncryptedExtensions message.

   During renegotiation, the record size limit is renegotiated.  Records
   are subject to the limits that were set in the handshake that
   produces the keys that are used to protect those records.  This
   admits the possibility that the extension might not be negotiated
   when a connection is renegotiated.

4.1.  Record Expansion Limits

   The size limit expressed in the "record_size_limit" extension doesn't
   account for expansion due to compression or record protection.  It is
   expected that a constrained device will disable compression to avoid
   unpredictable increases in record size.  Stream ciphers and existing
   AEAD ciphers don't permit variable amounts of expansion, but block
   ciphers do permit variable expansion.

   In TLS 1.2, block ciphers allow between 1 and 256 octets of padding.
   When a limit lower than the protocol-defined limit is advertised, a
   second limit applies to the length of records that use block ciphers.
   An endpoint MUST NOT add padding to records that would cause the
   protected record to exceed the size of a protected record that
   contains the maximum amount of plaintext and the minimum permitted
   amount of padding.

   For example, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA has 16 octet blocks and a
   20 octet MAC.  Given a record size limit of 256, a record of that
   length would require a minimum of 11 octets of padding (for [RFC5246]
   where the MAC is covered by encryption); or 15 octets if the
   "encrypt_then_mac" extension [RFC7366] is negotiated.  With this
   limit, a record with 250 octets of plaintext could be padded to the
   same length by including at most 17 octets of padding; or 21 octets
   with "encrypt_then_mac".



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   An implementation that always adds the minimum amount of padding will
   always comply with this requirement.

5.  Deprecating "max_fragment_length"

   The "record_size_limit" extension replaces the "max_fragment_length"
   extension [RFC6066].  A server that supports the "record_size_limit"
   extension MUST ignore and "max_fragment_length" that appears in a
   ClientHello if both extensions appear.  A client MUST treat receipt
   of both "max_fragment_length" and "record_size_limit" as a fatal
   error, and SHOULD generate an "illegal_parameter" alert.

   Clients that depend on having a small record size MAY continue to
   advertise the "max_fragment_length".

6.  Security Considerations

   Very small record sizes might generate additional work for senders
   and receivers, limiting throughput and increasing exposure to denial
   of service.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document registers the "record_size_limit" extension in the TLS
   "ExtensionType Values" registry established in [RFC5246].  The
   "record_size_limit" extension has been assigned a code point of TBD;
   it is recommended and marked as "Encrypted" in TLS 1.3.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
              Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-21 (work in progress),
              July 2017.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.





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   [RFC6066]  Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>.

   [RFC7366]  Gutmann, P., "Encrypt-then-MAC for Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
              (DTLS)", RFC 7366, DOI 10.17487/RFC7366, September 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7366>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [RFC5116]  McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
              Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.

   [RFC7925]  Tschofenig, H., Ed. and T. Fossati, "Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) / Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
              Profiles for the Internet of Things", RFC 7925,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7925, July 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7925>.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgments

   Thomas Pornin and Hannes Tschofenig provided significant input to
   this document.

Author's Address

   Martin Thomson
   Mozilla

   Email: martin.thomson@gmail.com


















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