Network Working Group E. Rescorla
Internet-Draft RTFM, Inc.
Obsoletes: 5077, 5246, 5746 (if July 11, 2016
approved)
Updates: 4492, 6066, 6961 (if approved)
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: January 12, 2017
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3
draft-ietf-tls-tls13-14
Abstract
This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security
(TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate
over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
tampering, and message forgery.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 12, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
Contributions published or made publicly available before November
10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
than English.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2. Major Differences from TLS 1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1. Incorrect DHE Share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2. Resumption and Pre-Shared Key (PSK) . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3. Zero-RTT Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3. Presentation Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1. Basic Block Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2. Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.3. Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.4. Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.5. Enumerateds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.6. Constructed Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.6.1. Variants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.7. Constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4. Handshake Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.1. Key Exchange Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1.1. Client Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.1.2. Server Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.1.3. Hello Retry Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.2. Hello Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.2.1. Cookie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.2.2. Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.2.3. Negotiated Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.2.4. Key Share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.2.5. Pre-Shared Key Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.2.6. Early Data Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.2.7. OCSP Status Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2.8. Encrypted Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.2.9. Certificate Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
4.3. Authentication Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.3.1. Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3.2. Certificate Verify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.3.3. Finished . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.4. Post-Handshake Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4.1. New Session Ticket Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4.2. Post-Handshake Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.4.3. Key and IV Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5. Record Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.1. Record Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.2. Record Payload Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.3. Per-Record Nonce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.4. Record Padding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.5. Limits on Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6. Alert Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.1. Closure Alerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.2. Error Alerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
7. Cryptographic Computations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
7.1. Key Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
7.2. Updating Traffic Keys and IVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
7.3. Traffic Key Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
7.3.1. Diffie-Hellman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
7.3.2. Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
7.3.3. Exporters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
8. Compliance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
8.1. MTI Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
8.2. MTI Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Appendix A. Protocol Data Structures and Constant Values . . . . 89
A.1. Record Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
A.2. Alert Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
A.3. Handshake Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
A.3.1. Key Exchange Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
A.3.2. Server Parameters Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
A.3.3. Authentication Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A.3.4. Ticket Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A.4. Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
A.4.1. Unauthenticated Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Appendix B. Implementation Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B.1. Random Number Generation and Seeding . . . . . . . . . . 102
B.2. Certificates and Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
B.3. Cipher Suite Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
B.4. Implementation Pitfalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
B.5. Client Tracking Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
Appendix C. Backward Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
C.1. Negotiating with an older server . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
C.2. Negotiating with an older client . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
C.3. Zero-RTT backwards compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
C.4. Backwards Compatibility Security Restrictions . . . . . . 107
Appendix D. Overview of Security Properties . . . . . . . . . . 108
D.1. Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
D.2. Record Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Appendix E. Working Group Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Appendix F. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
1. Introduction
DISCLAIMER: This is a WIP draft of TLS 1.3 and has not yet seen
significant security analysis.
RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH The source for this
draft is maintained in GitHub. Suggested changes should be submitted
as pull requests at https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec.
Instructions are on that page as well. Editorial changes can be
managed in GitHub, but any substantive change should be discussed on
the TLS mailing list.
The primary goal of TLS is to provide a secure channel between two
communicating peers. Specifically, the channel should provide the
following properties.
- Authentication: The server side of the channel is always
authenticated; the client side is optionally authenticated.
Authentication can happen via asymmetric cryptography (e.g., RSA
[RSA], ECDSA [ECDSA]) or a pre-shared symmetric key.
- Confidentiality: Data sent over the channel is not visible to
attackers.
- Integrity: Data sent over the channel cannot be modified by
attackers.
These properties should be true even in the face of an attacker who
has complete control of the network, as described in [RFC3552]. See
Appendix D for a more complete statement of the relevant security
properties.
TLS consists of two primary components:
- A handshake protocol (Section 4) which authenticates the
communicating parties, negotiates cryptographic modes and
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
parameters, and establishes shared keying material. The handshake
protocol is designed to resist tampering; an active attacker
should not be able to force the peers to negotiate different
parameters than they would if the connection were not under
attack.
- A record protocol (Section 5) which uses the parameters
established by the handshake protocol to protect traffic between
the communicating peers. The record protocol divides traffic up
into a series of records, each of which is independently protected
using the traffic keys.
TLS is application protocol independent; higher-level protocols can
layer on top of TLS transparently. The TLS standard, however, does
not specify how protocols add security with TLS; the decisions on how
to initiate TLS handshaking and how to interpret the authentication
certificates exchanged are left to the judgment of the designers and
implementors of protocols that run on top of TLS.
This document defines TLS version 1.3. While TLS 1.3 is not directly
compatible with previous versions, all versions of TLS incorporate a
versioning mechanism which allows clients and servers to
interoperably negotiate a common version if one is supported.
1.1. Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
2119 [RFC2119].
The following terms are used:
client: The endpoint initiating the TLS connection.
connection: A transport-layer connection between two endpoints.
endpoint: Either the client or server of the connection.
handshake: An initial negotiation between client and server that
establishes the parameters of their transactions.
peer: An endpoint. When discussing a particular endpoint, "peer"
refers to the endpoint that is remote to the primary subject of
discussion.
receiver: An endpoint that is receiving records.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
sender: An endpoint that is transmitting records.
session: An association between a client and a server resulting from
a handshake.
server: The endpoint which did not initiate the TLS connection.
1.2. Major Differences from TLS 1.2
draft-14
- Allow cookies to be longer (*)
- Remove the "context" from EarlyDataIndication as it was undefined
and nobody used it (*)
- Remove 0-RTT EncryptedExtensions and replace the ticket_age
extension with an obfuscated version. Also necessitates a change
to NewSessionTicket (*).
- Move the downgrade sentinel to the end of ServerHello.Random to
accomodate tlsdate (*).
- Define ecdsa_sha1 (*).
- Allow resumption even after fatal alerts. This matches current
practice.
- Remove non-closure warning alerts. Require treating unknown
alerts as fatal.
- Make the rules for accepting 0-RTT less restrictive.
- Clarify 0-RTT backward-compatibility rules.
- Clarify how 0-RTT and PSK identities interact.
- Add a section describing the data limits for each cipher.
- Major editorial restructuring.
- Replace the Security Analysis section with a WIP draft.
(*) indicates changes to the wire protocol which may require
implementations to update.
draft-13
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
- Allow server to send SupportedGroups.
- Remove 0-RTT client authentication
- Remove (EC)DHE 0-RTT.
- Flesh out 0-RTT PSK mode and shrink EarlyDataIndication
- Turn PSK-resumption response into an index to save room
- Move CertificateStatus to an extension
- Extra fields in NewSessionTicket.
- Restructure key schedule and add a resumption_context value.
- Require DH public keys and secrets to be zero-padded to the size
of the group.
- Remove the redundant length fields in KeyShareEntry.
- Define a cookie field for HRR.
draft-12
- Provide a list of the PSK cipher suites.
- Remove the ability for the ServerHello to have no extensions (this
aligns the syntax with the text).
- Clarify that the server can send application data after its first
flight (0.5 RTT data)
- Revise signature algorithm negotiation to group hash, signature
algorithm, and curve together. This is backwards compatible.
- Make ticket lifetime mandatory and limit it to a week.
- Make the purpose strings lower-case. This matches how people are
implementing for interop.
- Define exporters.
- Editorial cleanup
draft-11
- Port the CFRG curves & signatures work from RFC4492bis.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
- Remove sequence number and version from additional_data, which is
now empty.
- Reorder values in HkdfLabel.
- Add support for version anti-downgrade mechanism.
- Update IANA considerations section and relax some of the policies.
- Unify authentication modes. Add post-handshake client
authentication.
- Remove early_handshake content type. Terminate 0-RTT data with an
alert.
- Reset sequence number upon key change (as proposed by Fournet et
al.)
draft-10
- Remove ClientCertificateTypes field from CertificateRequest and
add extensions.
- Merge client and server key shares into a single extension.
draft-09
- Change to RSA-PSS signatures for handshake messages.
- Remove support for DSA.
- Update key schedule per suggestions by Hugo, Hoeteck, and Bjoern
Tackmann.
- Add support for per-record padding.
- Switch to encrypted record ContentType.
- Change HKDF labeling to include protocol version and value
lengths.
- Shift the final decision to abort a handshake due to incompatible
certificates to the client rather than having servers abort early.
- Deprecate SHA-1 with signatures.
- Add MTI algorithms.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
draft-08
- Remove support for weak and lesser used named curves.
- Remove support for MD5 and SHA-224 hashes with signatures.
- Update lists of available AEAD cipher suites and error alerts.
- Reduce maximum permitted record expansion for AEAD from 2048 to
256 octets.
- Require digital signatures even when a previous configuration is
used.
- Merge EarlyDataIndication and KnownConfiguration.
- Change code point for server_configuration to avoid collision with
server_hello_done.
- Relax certificate_list ordering requirement to match current
practice.
draft-07
- Integration of semi-ephemeral DH proposal.
- Add initial 0-RTT support.
- Remove resumption and replace with PSK + tickets.
- Move ClientKeyShare into an extension.
- Move to HKDF.
draft-06
- Prohibit RC4 negotiation for backwards compatibility.
- Freeze & deprecate record layer version field.
- Update format of signatures with context.
- Remove explicit IV.
draft-05
- Prohibit SSL negotiation for backwards compatibility.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
- Fix which MS is used for exporters.
draft-04
- Modify key computations to include session hash.
- Remove ChangeCipherSpec.
- Renumber the new handshake messages to be somewhat more consistent
with existing convention and to remove a duplicate registration.
- Remove renegotiation.
- Remove point format negotiation.
draft-03
- Remove GMT time.
- Merge in support for ECC from RFC 4492 but without explicit
curves.
- Remove the unnecessary length field from the AD input to AEAD
ciphers.
- Rename {Client,Server}KeyExchange to {Client,Server}KeyShare.
- Add an explicit HelloRetryRequest to reject the client's.
draft-02
- Increment version number.
- Rework handshake to provide 1-RTT mode.
- Remove custom DHE groups.
- Remove support for compression.
- Remove support for static RSA and DH key exchange.
- Remove support for non-AEAD ciphers.
2. Protocol Overview
The cryptographic parameters of the session state are produced by the
TLS handshake protocol. When a TLS client and server first start
communicating, they agree on a protocol version, select cryptographic
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
algorithms, optionally authenticate each other, and establish shared
secret keying material. Once the handshake is complete, the peers
use the established keys to protect application layer traffic.
TLS supports three basic key exchange modes:
- Diffie-Hellman (of both the finite field and elliptic curve
varieties).
- A pre-shared symmetric key (PSK)
- A combination of a symmetric key and Diffie-Hellman
Which mode is used depends on the negotiated cipher suite.
Conceptually, the handshake establishes three secrets which are used
to derive all the keys.
Figure 1 below shows the basic full TLS handshake:
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
Client Server
Key ^ ClientHello
Exch | + key_share*
v + pre_shared_key* -------->
ServerHello ^ Key
+ key_share* | Exch
+ pre_shared_key* v
{EncryptedExtensions} ^ Server
{CertificateRequest*} v Params
{Certificate*} ^
{CertificateVerify*} | Auth
{Finished} v
<-------- [Application Data*]
^ {Certificate*}
Auth | {CertificateVerify*}
v {Finished} -------->
[Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
+ Indicates extensions sent in the
previously noted message.
* Indicates optional or situation-dependent
messages that are not always sent.
{} Indicates messages protected using keys
derived from handshake_traffic_secret.
[] Indicates messages protected using keys
derived from traffic_secret_N
Figure 1: Message flow for full TLS Handshake
The handshake can be thought of as having three phases, indicated in
the diagram above.
- Key Exchange: Establish shared keying material and select the
cryptographic parameters. Everything after this phase is
encrypted.
- Server Parameters: Establish other handshake parameters. (whether
the client is authenticated, application layer protocol support,
etc.)
- Authentication: Authenticate the server (and optionally the
client) and provide key confirmation and handshake integrity.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
In the Key Exchange phase, the client sends the ClientHello
(Section 4.1.1) message, which contains a random nonce
(ClientHello.random), its offered protocol version, cipher suite, and
extensions, and in general either one or more Diffie-Hellman key
shares (in the "key_share" extension Section 4.2.4), one or more pre-
shared key labels (in the "pre_shared_key" extension Section 4.2.5),
or both.
The server processes the ClientHello and determines the appropriate
cryptographic parameters for the connection. It then responds with
its own ServerHello which indicates the negotiated connection
parameters. [Section 4.1.2]. The combination of the ClientHello and
the ServerHello determines the shared keys. If either a pure (EC)DHE
or (EC)DHE-PSK cipher suite is in use, then the ServerHello will
contain a "key_share" extension with the server's ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman share which MUST be in the same group as one of the client's
shares. If a pure PSK or an (EC)DHE-PSK cipher suite is negotiated,
then the ServerHello will contain a "pre_shared_key" extension
indicating which of the client's offered PSKs was selected.
The server then sends two messages to establish the Server
Parameters:
EncryptedExtensions. responses to any extensions which are not
required in order to determine the cryptographic parameters.
[Section 4.2.8]
CertificateRequest. if certificate-based client authentication is
desired, the desired parameters for that certificate. This
message will be omitted if client authentication is not desired.
Finally, the client and server exchange Authentication messages. TLS
uses the same set of messages every time that authentication is
needed. Specifically:
Certificate. the certificate of the endpoint. This message is
omitted if the server is not authenticating with a certificate
(i.e., with PSK or (EC)DHE-PSK cipher suites). Note that if raw
public keys [RFC7250] or the cached information extension
[I-D.ietf-tls-cached-info] are in use, then this message will not
contain a certificate but rather some other value corresponding to
the server's long-term key. [Section 4.3.1]
CertificateVerify. a signature over the entire handshake using the
public key in the Certificate message. This message is omitted if
the server is not authenticating via a certificate (i.e., with PSK
or (EC)DHE-PSK cipher suites). [Section 4.3.2]
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
Finished. a MAC (Message Authentication Code) over the entire
handshake. This message provides key confirmation, binds the
endpoint's identity to the exchanged keys, and in PSK mode also
authenticates the handshake. [Section 4.3.3]
Upon receiving the server's messages, the client responds with its
Authentication messages, namely Certificate and CertificateVerify (if
requested), and Finished.
At this point, the handshake is complete, and the client and server
may exchange application layer data. Application data MUST NOT be
sent prior to sending the Finished message. Note that while the
server may send application data prior to receiving the client's
Authentication messages, any data sent at that point is, of course,
being sent to an unauthenticated peer.
2.1. Incorrect DHE Share
If the client has not provided a sufficient "key_share" extension
(e.g. it includes only DHE or ECDHE groups unacceptable or
unsupported by the server), the server corrects the mismatch with a
HelloRetryRequest and the client will need to restart the handshake
with an appropriate "key_share" extension, as shown in Figure 2. If
no common cryptographic parameters can be negotiated, the server will
send a "handshake_failure" or "insufficient_security" fatal alert
(see Section 6).
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
Client Server
ClientHello
+ key_share -------->
<-------- HelloRetryRequest
ClientHello
+ key_share -------->
ServerHello
+ key_share
{EncryptedExtensions}
{CertificateRequest*}
{Certificate*}
{CertificateVerify*}
{Finished}
<-------- [Application Data*]
{Certificate*}
{CertificateVerify*}
{Finished} -------->
[Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
Figure 2: Message flow for a full handshake with mismatched
parameters
Note: The handshake transcript includes the initial ClientHello/
HelloRetryRequest exchange; it is not reset with the new ClientHello.
TLS also allows several optimized variants of the basic handshake, as
described in the following sections.
2.2. Resumption and Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
Although TLS PSKs can be established out of band, PSKs can also be
established in a previous session and then reused ("session
resumption"). Once a handshake has completed, the server can send
the client a PSK identity which corresponds to a key derived from the
initial handshake (See Section 4.4.1). The client can then use that
PSK identity in future handshakes to negotiate use of the PSK. If
the server accepts it, then the security context of the new
connection is tied to the original connection. In TLS 1.2 and below,
this functionality was provided by "session IDs" and "session
tickets" [RFC5077]. Both mechanisms are obsoleted in TLS 1.3.
PSK cipher suites can either use PSK in combination with an (EC)DHE
exchange in order to provide forward secrecy in combination with
shared keys, or can use PSKs alone, at the cost of losing forward
secrecy.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
Figure 3 shows a pair of handshakes in which the first establishes a
PSK and the second uses it:
Client Server
Initial Handshake:
ClientHello
+ key_share -------->
ServerHello
+ key_share
{EncryptedExtensions}
{CertificateRequest*}
{Certificate*}
{CertificateVerify*}
{Finished}
<-------- [Application Data*]
{Certificate*}
{CertificateVerify*}
{Finished} -------->
<-------- [NewSessionTicket]
[Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
Subsequent Handshake:
ClientHello
+ pre_shared_key
+ key_share* -------->
ServerHello
+ pre_shared_key
+ key_share*
{EncryptedExtensions}
{Finished}
<-------- [Application Data*]
{Finished} -------->
[Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
Figure 3: Message flow for resumption and PSK
As the server is authenticating via a PSK, it does not send a
Certificate or a CertificateVerify. When a client offers resumption
via PSK it SHOULD also supply a "key_share" extension to the server
as well to allow the server to decline resumption and fall back to a
full handshake, if needed. A "key_share" extension MUST also be sent
if the client is attempting to negotiate an (EC)DHE-PSK cipher suite.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
2.3. Zero-RTT Data
When resuming via a PSK with an appropriate ticket (i.e., one with
the "allow_early_data" flag), clients can also send data on their
first flight ("early data"). This data is encrypted solely under
keys derived using the first offered PSK as the static secret. As
shown in Figure 4, the Zero-RTT data is just added to the 1-RTT
handshake in the first flight. The rest of the handshake uses the
same messages.
Client Server
ClientHello
+ early_data
+ pre_shared_key
+ key_share*
(Finished)
(Application Data*)
(end_of_early_data) -------->
ServerHello
+ early_data
+ pre_shared_key
+ key_share*
{EncryptedExtensions}
{CertificateRequest*}
{Finished}
<-------- [Application Data*]
{Certificate*}
{CertificateVerify*}
{Finished} -------->
[Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
* Indicates optional or situation-dependent
messages that are not always sent.
() Indicates messages protected using keys
derived from early_traffic_secret.
{} Indicates messages protected using keys
derived from handshake_traffic_secret.
[] Indicates messages protected using keys
derived from traffic_secret_N
Figure 4: Message flow for a zero round trip handshake
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
[[OPEN ISSUE: Should it be possible to combine 0-RTT with the server
authenticating via a signature https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/
issues/443]]
IMPORTANT NOTE: The security properties for 0-RTT data (regardless of
the cipher suite) are weaker than those for other kinds of TLS data.
Specifically:
1. This data is not forward secret, because it is encrypted solely
with the PSK.
2. There are no guarantees of non-replay between connections.
Unless the server takes special measures outside those provided
by TLS, the server has no guarantee that the same 0-RTT data was
not transmitted on multiple 0-RTT connections (See
Section 4.2.6.2 for more details). This is especially relevant
if the data is authenticated either with TLS client
authentication or inside the application layer protocol.
However, 0-RTT data cannot be duplicated within a connection
(i.e., the server will not process the same data twice for the
same connection) and an attacker will not be able to make 0-RTT
data appear to be 1-RTT data (because it is protected with
different keys.)
The remainder of this document provides a detailed description of
TLS.
3. Presentation Language
This document deals with the formatting of data in an external
representation. The following very basic and somewhat casually
defined presentation syntax will be used. The syntax draws from
several sources in its structure. Although it resembles the
programming language "C" in its syntax and XDR [RFC4506] in both its
syntax and intent, it would be risky to draw too many parallels. The
purpose of this presentation language is to document TLS only; it has
no general application beyond that particular goal.
3.1. Basic Block Size
The representation of all data items is explicitly specified. The
basic data block size is one byte (i.e., 8 bits). Multiple byte data
items are concatenations of bytes, from left to right, from top to
bottom. From the byte stream, a multi-byte item (a numeric in the
example) is formed (using C notation) by:
value = (byte[0] << 8*(n-1)) | (byte[1] << 8*(n-2)) |
... | byte[n-1];
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
This byte ordering for multi-byte values is the commonplace network
byte order or big-endian format.
3.2. Miscellaneous
Comments begin with "/*" and end with "*/".
Optional components are denoted by enclosing them in "[[ ]]" double
brackets.
Single-byte entities containing uninterpreted data are of type
opaque.
3.3. Vectors
A vector (single-dimensioned array) is a stream of homogeneous data
elements. The size of the vector may be specified at documentation
time or left unspecified until runtime. In either case, the length
declares the number of bytes, not the number of elements, in the
vector. The syntax for specifying a new type, T', that is a fixed-
length vector of type T is
T T'[n];
Here, T' occupies n bytes in the data stream, where n is a multiple
of the size of T. The length of the vector is not included in the
encoded stream.
In the following example, Datum is defined to be three consecutive
bytes that the protocol does not interpret, while Data is three
consecutive Datum, consuming a total of nine bytes.
opaque Datum[3]; /* three uninterpreted bytes */
Datum Data[9]; /* 3 consecutive 3 byte vectors */
Variable-length vectors are defined by specifying a subrange of legal
lengths, inclusively, using the notation <floor..ceiling>. When
these are encoded, the actual length precedes the vector's contents
in the byte stream. The length will be in the form of a number
consuming as many bytes as required to hold the vector's specified
maximum (ceiling) length. A variable-length vector with an actual
length field of zero is referred to as an empty vector.
T T'<floor..ceiling>;
In the following example, mandatory is a vector that must contain
between 300 and 400 bytes of type opaque. It can never be empty.
The actual length field consumes two bytes, a uint16, which is
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
sufficient to represent the value 400 (see Section 3.4). On the
other hand, longer can represent up to 800 bytes of data, or 400
uint16 elements, and it may be empty. Its encoding will include a
two-byte actual length field prepended to the vector. The length of
an encoded vector must be an even multiple of the length of a single
element (for example, a 17-byte vector of uint16 would be illegal).
opaque mandatory<300..400>;
/* length field is 2 bytes, cannot be empty */
uint16 longer<0..800>;
/* zero to 400 16-bit unsigned integers */
3.4. Numbers
The basic numeric data type is an unsigned byte (uint8). All larger
numeric data types are formed from fixed-length series of bytes
concatenated as described in Section 3.1 and are also unsigned. The
following numeric types are predefined.
uint8 uint16[2];
uint8 uint24[3];
uint8 uint32[4];
uint8 uint64[8];
All values, here and elsewhere in the specification, are stored in
network byte (big-endian) order; the uint32 represented by the hex
bytes 01 02 03 04 is equivalent to the decimal value 16909060.
Note that in some cases (e.g., DH parameters) it is necessary to
represent integers as opaque vectors. In such cases, they are
represented as unsigned integers (i.e., additional leading zero
octets are not used even if the most significant bit is set).
3.5. Enumerateds
An additional sparse data type is available called enum. A field of
type enum can only assume the values declared in the definition.
Each definition is a different type. Only enumerateds of the same
type may be assigned or compared. Every element of an enumerated
must be assigned a value, as demonstrated in the following example.
Since the elements of the enumerated are not ordered, they can be
assigned any unique value, in any order.
enum { e1(v1), e2(v2), ... , en(vn) [[, (n)]] } Te;
An enumerated occupies as much space in the byte stream as would its
maximal defined ordinal value. The following definition would cause
one byte to be used to carry fields of type Color.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
enum { red(3), blue(5), white(7) } Color;
One may optionally specify a value without its associated tag to
force the width definition without defining a superfluous element.
In the following example, Taste will consume two bytes in the data
stream but can only assume the values 1, 2, or 4.
enum { sweet(1), sour(2), bitter(4), (32000) } Taste;
The names of the elements of an enumeration are scoped within the
defined type. In the first example, a fully qualified reference to
the second element of the enumeration would be Color.blue. Such
qualification is not required if the target of the assignment is well
specified.
Color color = Color.blue; /* overspecified, legal */
Color color = blue; /* correct, type implicit */
For enumerateds that are never converted to external representation,
the numerical information may be omitted.
enum { low, medium, high } Amount;
3.6. Constructed Types
Structure types may be constructed from primitive types for
convenience. Each specification declares a new, unique type. The
syntax for definition is much like that of C.
struct {
T1 f1;
T2 f2;
...
Tn fn;
} [[T]];
The fields within a structure may be qualified using the type's name,
with a syntax much like that available for enumerateds. For example,
T.f2 refers to the second field of the previous declaration.
Structure definitions may be embedded.
3.6.1. Variants
Defined structures may have variants based on some knowledge that is
available within the environment. The selector must be an enumerated
type that defines the possible variants the structure defines. There
must be a case arm for every element of the enumeration declared in
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
the select. Case arms have limited fall-through: if two case arms
follow in immediate succession with no fields in between, then they
both contain the same fields. Thus, in the example below, "orange"
and "banana" both contain V2. Note that this is a new piece of
syntax in TLS 1.2.
The body of the variant structure may be given a label for reference.
The mechanism by which the variant is selected at runtime is not
prescribed by the presentation language.
struct {
T1 f1;
T2 f2;
....
Tn fn;
select (E) {
case e1: Te1;
case e2: Te2;
case e3: case e4: Te3;
....
case en: Ten;
} [[fv]];
} [[Tv]];
For example:
enum { apple, orange, banana } VariantTag;
struct {
uint16 number;
opaque string<0..10>; /* variable length */
} V1;
struct {
uint32 number;
opaque string[10]; /* fixed length */
} V2;
struct {
select (VariantTag) { /* value of selector is implicit */
case apple:
V1; /* VariantBody, tag = apple */
case orange:
case banana:
V2; /* VariantBody, tag = orange or banana */
} variant_body; /* optional label on variant */
} VariantRecord;
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
3.7. Constants
Typed constants can be defined for purposes of specification by
declaring a symbol of the desired type and assigning values to it.
Under-specified types (opaque, variable-length vectors, and
structures that contain opaque) cannot be assigned values. No fields
of a multi-element structure or vector may be elided.
For example:
struct {
uint8 f1;
uint8 f2;
} Example1;
Example1 ex1 = {1, 4}; /* assigns f1 = 1, f2 = 4 */
4. Handshake Protocol
The handshake protocol is used to negotiate the secure attributes of
a session. Handshake messages are supplied to the TLS record layer,
where they are encapsulated within one or more TLSPlaintext or
TLSCiphertext structures, which are processed and transmitted as
specified by the current active session state.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
enum {
client_hello(1),
server_hello(2),
new_session_ticket(4),
hello_retry_request(6),
encrypted_extensions(8),
certificate(11),
certificate_request(13),
certificate_verify(15),
finished(20),
key_update(24),
(255)
} HandshakeType;
struct {
HandshakeType msg_type; /* handshake type */
uint24 length; /* bytes in message */
select (HandshakeType) {
case client_hello: ClientHello;
case server_hello: ServerHello;
case hello_retry_request: HelloRetryRequest;
case encrypted_extensions: EncryptedExtensions;
case certificate_request: CertificateRequest;
case certificate: Certificate;
case certificate_verify: CertificateVerify;
case finished: Finished;
case new_session_ticket: NewSessionTicket;
case key_update: KeyUpdate;
} body;
} Handshake;
Protocol messages MUST be sent in the order defined below (and shown
in the diagrams in Section 2). Sending handshake messages in an
unexpected order results in an "unexpected_message" fatal error.
Unneeded handshake messages are omitted, however.
New handshake message types are assigned by IANA as described in
Section 10.
4.1. Key Exchange Messages
The key exchange messages are used to exchange security capabilities
between the client and server and to establish the traffic keys used
to protect the handshake and data.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
4.1.1. Client Hello
When this message will be sent:
When a client first connects to a server, it is required to send
the ClientHello as its first message. The client will also send a
ClientHello when the server has responded to its ClientHello with
a ServerHello that selects cryptographic parameters that don't
match the client's "key_share" extension. In that case, the
client MUST send the same ClientHello (without modification)
except:
- Including a new KeyShareEntry as the lowest priority share (i.e.,
appended to the list of shares in the "key_share" extension).
- Removing the EarlyDataIndication Section 4.2.6 extension if one
was present. Early data is not permitted after HelloRetryRequest.
If a server receives a ClientHello at any other time, it MUST send a
fatal "unexpected_message" alert and close the connection.
Structure of this message:
struct {
uint8 major;
uint8 minor;
} ProtocolVersion;
struct {
opaque random_bytes[32];
} Random;
uint8 CipherSuite[2]; /* Cryptographic suite selector */
struct {
ProtocolVersion client_version = { 3, 4 }; /* TLS v1.3 */
Random random;
opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>;
CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>;
opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} ClientHello;
TLS allows extensions to follow the compression_methods field in an
extensions block. The presence of extensions can be detected by
determining whether there are bytes following the compression_methods
at the end of the ClientHello. Note that this method of detecting
optional data differs from the normal TLS method of having a
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
variable-length field, but it is used for compatibility with TLS
before extensions were defined. As of TLS 1.3, all clients and
servers will send at least one extension (at least "key_share" or
"pre_shared_key").
client_version The latest (highest valued) version of the TLS
protocol offered by the client. This SHOULD be the same as the
latest version supported. For this version of the specification,
the version will be { 3, 4 }. (See Appendix C for details about
backward compatibility.)
random 32 bytes generated by a secure random number generator. See
Appendix B for additional information.
legacy_session_id Versions of TLS before TLS 1.3 supported a session
resumption feature which has been merged with Pre-Shared Keys in
this version (see Section 2.2). This field MUST be ignored by a
server negotiating TLS 1.3 and SHOULD be set as a zero length
vector (i.e., a single zero byte length field) by clients which do
not have a cached session ID set by a pre-TLS 1.3 server.
cipher_suites This is a list of the cryptographic options supported
by the client, with the client's first preference first. Each
cipher suite defines a key exchange algorithm, a record protection
algorithm (including secret key length) and a hash to be used with
HKDF. The server will select a cipher suite or, if no acceptable
choices are presented, return a "handshake_failure" alert and
close the connection. If the list contains cipher suites the
server does not recognize, support, or wish to use, the server
MUST ignore those cipher suites, and process the remaining ones as
usual. Values are defined in Appendix A.4.
legacy_compression_methods Versions of TLS before 1.3 supported
compression with the list of supported compression methods being
sent in this field. For every TLS 1.3 ClientHello, this vector
MUST contain exactly one byte set to zero, which corresponds to
the "null" compression method in prior versions of TLS. If a TLS
1.3 ClientHello is received with any other value in this field,
the server MUST generate a fatal "illegal_parameter" alert. Note
that TLS 1.3 servers might receive TLS 1.2 or prior ClientHellos
which contain other compression methods and MUST follow the
procedures for the appropriate prior version of TLS.
extensions Clients request extended functionality from servers by
sending data in the extensions field. The actual "Extension"
format is defined in Section 4.2.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
In the event that a client requests additional functionality using
extensions, and this functionality is not supplied by the server, the
client MAY abort the handshake. Note that TLS 1.3 ClientHello
messages MUST always contain extensions, and a TLS 1.3 server MUST
respond to any TLS 1.3 ClientHello without extensions with a fatal
"decode_error" alert. TLS 1.3 servers may receive TLS 1.2
ClientHello messages without extensions. If negotiating TLS 1.2, a
server MUST check that the amount of data in the message precisely
matches one of these formats; if not, then it MUST send a fatal
"decode_error" alert.
After sending the ClientHello message, the client waits for a
ServerHello or HelloRetryRequest message.
4.1.2. Server Hello
When this message will be sent:
The server will send this message in response to a ClientHello
message when it was able to find an acceptable set of algorithms
and the client's "key_share" extension was acceptable. If the
client proposed groups are not acceptable by the server, it will
respond with a "handshake_failure" fatal alert.
Structure of this message:
struct {
ProtocolVersion server_version;
Random random;
CipherSuite cipher_suite;
Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} ServerHello;
server_version This field contains the version of TLS negotiated for
this session. Servers MUST select the lower of the highest
supported server version and the version offered by the client in
the ClientHello. In particular, servers MUST accept ClientHello
messages with versions higher than those supported and negotiate
the highest mutually supported version. For this version of the
specification, the version is { 3, 4 }. (See Appendix C for
details about backward compatibility.)
random This structure is generated by the server and MUST be
generated independently of the ClientHello.random.
cipher_suite The single cipher suite selected by the server from the
list in ClientHello.cipher_suites. For resumed sessions, this
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 27]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
field is the value from the state of the session being resumed.
[[TODO: interaction with PSK.]]
extensions A list of extensions. Note that only extensions offered
by the client can appear in the server's list. In TLS 1.3, as
opposed to previous versions of TLS, the server's extensions are
split between the ServerHello and the EncryptedExtensions
Section 4.2.8 message. The ServerHello MUST only include
extensions which are required to establish the cryptographic
context. Currently the only such extensions are "key_share",
"pre_shared_key", and "early_data". Clients MUST check the
ServerHello for the presence of any forbidden extensions and if
any are found MUST terminate the handshake with a
"illegal_parameter" alert. In prior versions of TLS, the
extensions field could be omitted entirely if not needed, similar
to ClientHello. As of TLS 1.3, all clients and servers will send
at least one extension (at least "key_share" or "pre_shared_key").
TLS 1.3 has a downgrade protection mechanism embedded in the server's
random value. TLS 1.3 server implementations which respond to a
ClientHello with a client_version indicating TLS 1.2 or below MUST
set the last eight bytes of their Random value to the bytes:
44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 01
TLS 1.2 server implementations which respond to a ClientHello with a
client_version indicating TLS 1.1 or below SHOULD set the last eight
bytes of their Random value to the bytes:
44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 00
TLS 1.3 clients receiving a TLS 1.2 or below ServerHello MUST check
that the last eight octets are not equal to either of these values.
TLS 1.2 clients SHOULD also perform this check if the ServerHello
indicates TLS 1.1 or below. If a match is found, the client MUST
abort the handshake with a fatal "illegal_parameter" alert. This
mechanism provides limited protection against downgrade attacks over
and above that provided by the Finished exchange: because the
ServerKeyExchange includes a signature over both random values, it is
not possible for an active attacker to modify the randoms without
detection as long as ephemeral ciphers are used. It does not provide
downgrade protection when static RSA is used.
Note: This is an update to TLS 1.2 so in practice many TLS 1.2
clients and servers will not behave as specified above.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
4.1.3. Hello Retry Request
When this message will be sent:
Servers send this message in response to a ClientHello message if
they were able to find an acceptable set of algorithms and groups
that are mutually supported, but the client's KeyShare did not
contain an acceptable offer. If it cannot find such a match, it
will respond with a fatal "handshake_failure" alert.
Structure of this message:
struct {
ProtocolVersion server_version;
CipherSuite cipher_suite;
NamedGroup selected_group;
Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} HelloRetryRequest;
selected_group The mutually supported group the server intends to
negotiate and is requesting a retried ClientHello/KeyShare for.
The server_version, cipher_suite, and extensions fields have the same
meanings as their corresponding values in the ServerHello. [[NOTE:
cipher_suite may disappear. https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/
issues/528]] The server SHOULD send only the extensions necessary for
the client to generate a correct ClientHello pair (currently no such
extensions exist). As with ServerHello, a HelloRetryRequest MUST NOT
contain any extensions that were not first offered by the client in
its ClientHello.
Upon receipt of a HelloRetryRequest, the client MUST first verify
that the selected_group field corresponds to a group which was
provided in the "supported_groups" extension in the original
ClientHello. It MUST then verify that the selected_group field does
not correspond to a group which was provided in the "key_share"
extension in the original ClientHello. If either of these checks
fails, then the client MUST abort the handshake with a fatal
"handshake_failure" alert. Clients SHOULD also abort with
"handshake_failure" in response to any second HelloRetryRequest which
was sent in the same connection (i.e., where the ClientHello was
itself in response to a HelloRetryRequest).
Otherwise, the client MUST send a ClientHello with an updated
KeyShare extension to the server. The client MUST append a new
KeyShareEntry for the group indicated in the selected_group field to
the groups in its original KeyShare.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 29]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
Upon re-sending the ClientHello and receiving the server's
ServerHello/KeyShare, the client MUST verify that the selected
CipherSuite and NamedGroup match that supplied in the
HelloRetryRequest. If either of these values differ, the client MUST
abort the connection with a fatal "handshake_failure" alert.
4.2. Hello Extensions
The extension format is:
struct {
ExtensionType extension_type;
opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>;
} Extension;
enum {
supported_groups(10),
signature_algorithms(13),
key_share(40),
pre_shared_key(41),
early_data(42),
cookie(44),
(65535)
} ExtensionType;
Here:
- "extension_type" identifies the particular extension type.
- "extension_data" contains information specific to the particular
extension type.
The initial set of extensions is defined in [RFC6066]. The list of
extension types is maintained by IANA as described in Section 10.
An extension type MUST NOT appear in the ServerHello or
HelloRetryRequest unless the same extension type appeared in the
corresponding ClientHello. If a client receives an extension type in
ServerHello or HelloRetryRequest that it did not request in the
associated ClientHello, it MUST abort the handshake with an
"unsupported_extension" fatal alert.
Nonetheless, "server-oriented" extensions may be provided within this
framework. Such an extension (say, of type x) would require the
client to first send an extension of type x in a ClientHello with
empty extension_data to indicate that it supports the extension type.
In this case, the client is offering the capability to understand the
extension type, and the server is taking the client up on its offer.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 30]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
When multiple extensions of different types are present in the
ClientHello or ServerHello messages, the extensions MAY appear in any
order. There MUST NOT be more than one extension of the same type.
Finally, note that extensions can be sent both when starting a new
session and when in resumption-PSK mode. A client that requests
session resumption does not in general know whether the server will
accept this request, and therefore it SHOULD send the same extensions
as it would send normally.
In general, the specification of each extension type needs to
describe the effect of the extension both during full handshake and
session resumption. Most current TLS extensions are relevant only
when a session is initiated: when an older session is resumed, the
server does not process these extensions in ClientHello, and does not
include them in ServerHello. However, some extensions may specify
different behavior during session resumption. [[TODO: update this
and the previous paragraph to cover PSK-based resumption.]]
There are subtle (and not so subtle) interactions that may occur in
this protocol between new features and existing features which may
result in a significant reduction in overall security. The following
considerations should be taken into account when designing new
extensions:
- Some cases where a server does not agree to an extension are error
conditions, and some are simply refusals to support particular
features. In general, error alerts should be used for the former,
and a field in the server extension response for the latter.
- Extensions should, as far as possible, be designed to prevent any
attack that forces use (or non-use) of a particular feature by
manipulation of handshake messages. This principle should be
followed regardless of whether the feature is believed to cause a
security problem. Often the fact that the extension fields are
included in the inputs to the Finished message hashes will be
sufficient, but extreme care is needed when the extension changes
the meaning of messages sent in the handshake phase. Designers
and implementors should be aware of the fact that until the
handshake has been authenticated, active attackers can modify
messages and insert, remove, or replace extensions.
4.2.1. Cookie
struct {
opaque cookie<0..2^16-1>;
} Cookie;
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 31]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
Cookies serve two primary purposes:
- Allowing the server to force the client to demonstrate
reachability at their apparent network address (thus providing a
measure of DoS protection). This is primarily useful for non-
connection-oriented transports (see [RFC6347] for an example of
this).
- Allowing the server to offload state to the client, thus allowing
it to send a HelloRetryRequest without storing any state. The
server does this by pickling that post-ClientHello hash state into
the cookie (protected with some suitable integrity algorithm).
When sending a HelloRetryRequest, the server MAY provide a "cookie"
extension to the client (this is an exception to the usual rule that
the only extensions that may be sent are those that appear in the
ClientHello). When sending the new ClientHello, the client MUST echo
the value of the extension. Clients MUST NOT use cookies in
subsequent connections.
4.2.2. Signature Algorithms
The client uses the "signature_algorithms" extension to indicate to
the server which signature algorithms may be used in digital
signatures.
Clients which offer one or more cipher suites which use certificate
authentication (i.e., any non-PSK cipher suite) MUST send the
"signature_algorithms" extension. If this extension is not provided
and no alternative cipher suite is available, the server MUST close
the connection with a fatal "missing_extension" alert. (see
Section 8.2)
The "extension_data" field of this extension contains a
"supported_signature_algorithms" value:
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 32]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
enum {
/* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms */
rsa_pkcs1_sha1 (0x0201),
rsa_pkcs1_sha256 (0x0401),
rsa_pkcs1_sha384 (0x0501),
rsa_pkcs1_sha512 (0x0601),
/* ECDSA algorithms */
ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 (0x0403),
ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 (0x0503),
ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 (0x0603),
/* RSASSA-PSS algorithms */
rsa_pss_sha256 (0x0700),
rsa_pss_sha384 (0x0701),
rsa_pss_sha512 (0x0702),
/* EdDSA algorithms */
ed25519 (0x0703),
ed448 (0x0704),
/* Reserved Code Points */
private_use (0xFE00..0xFFFF),
(0xFFFF)
} SignatureScheme;
SignatureScheme supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
Note: This enum is named "SignatureScheme" because there is already a
"SignatureAlgorithm" type in TLS 1.2, which this replaces. We use
the term "signature algorithm" throughout the text.
Each SignatureScheme value lists a single signature algorithm that
the client is willing to verify. The values are indicated in
descending order of preference. Note that a signature algorithm
takes as input an arbitrary-length message, rather than a digest.
Algorithms which traditionally act on a digest should be defined in
TLS to first hash the input with a specified hash function and then
proceed as usual. The code point groups listed above have the
following meanings:
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms Indicates a signature algorithm using
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 [RFC3447] with the corresponding hash algorithm
as defined in [SHS]. These values refer solely to signatures
which appear in certificates (see Section 4.3.1.1) and are not
defined for use in signed TLS handshake messages.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 33]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
ECDSA algorithms Indicates a signature algorithm using ECDSA
[ECDSA], the corresponding curve as defined in ANSI X9.62 [X962]
and FIPS 186-4 [DSS], and the corresponding hash algorithm as
defined in [SHS]. The signature is represented as a DER-encoded
[X690] ECDSA-Sig-Value structure.
RSASSA-PSS algorithms Indicates a signature algorithm using RSASSA-
PSS [RFC3447] with MGF1. The digest used in the mask generation
function and the digest being signed are both the corresponding
hash algorithm as defined in [SHS]. When used in signed TLS
handshake messages, the length of the salt MUST be equal to the
length of the digest output.
EdDSA algorithms Indicates a signature algorithm using EdDSA as
defined in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa] or its successors. Note that
these correspond to the "PureEdDSA" algorithms and not the
"prehash" variants.
The semantics of this extension are somewhat complicated because the
cipher suite adds additional constraints on signature algorithms.
Section 4.3.1.1 describes the appropriate rules.
rsa_pkcs1_sha1, dsa_sha1, and ecdsa_sha1 SHOULD NOT be offered.
Clients offering these values for backwards compatibility MUST list
them as the lowest priority (listed after all other algorithms in the
supported_signature_algorithms vector). TLS 1.3 servers MUST NOT
offer a SHA-1 signed certificate unless no valid certificate chain
can be produced without it (see Section 4.3.1.1).
The signatures on certificates that are self-signed or certificates
that are trust anchors are not validated since they begin a
certification path (see [RFC5280], Section 3.2). A certificate that
begins a certification path MAY use a signature algorithm that is not
advertised as being supported in the "signature_algorithms"
extension.
Note that TLS 1.2 defines this extension differently. TLS 1.3
implementations willing to negotiate TLS 1.2 MUST behave in
accordance with the requirements of [RFC5246] when negotiating that
version. In particular:
- TLS 1.2 ClientHellos may omit this extension.
- In TLS 1.2, the extension contained hash/signature pairs. The
pairs are encoded in two octets, so SignatureScheme values have
been allocated to align with TLS 1.2's encoding. Some legacy
pairs are left unallocated. These algorithms are deprecated as of
TLS 1.3. They MUST NOT be offered or negotiated by any
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 34]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
implementation. In particular, MD5 [SLOTH] and SHA-224 MUST NOT
be used.
- ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, etc., align with TLS 1.2's ECDSA hash/
signature pairs. However, the old semantics did not constrain the
signing curve.
4.2.3. Negotiated Groups
When sent by the client, the "supported_groups" extension indicates
the named groups which the client supports for key exchange, ordered
from most preferred to least preferred.
Note: In versions of TLS prior to TLS 1.3, this extension was named
"elliptic_curves" and only contained elliptic curve groups. See
[RFC4492] and [I-D.ietf-tls-negotiated-ff-dhe]. This extension was
also used to negotiate ECDSA curves. Signature algorithms are now
negotiated independently (see Section 4.2.2).
Clients which offer one or more (EC)DHE cipher suites MUST send at
least one supported NamedGroup value and servers MUST NOT negotiate
any of these cipher suites unless a supported value was provided. If
this extension is not provided and no alternative cipher suite is
available, the server MUST close the connection with a fatal
"missing_extension" alert. (see Section 8.2) If the extension is
provided, but no compatible group is offered, the server MUST NOT
negotiate a cipher suite of the relevant type. For instance, if a
client supplies only ECDHE groups, the server MUST NOT negotiate
finite field Diffie-Hellman. If no acceptable group can be selected
across all cipher suites, then the server MUST generate a fatal
"handshake_failure" alert.
The "extension_data" field of this extension contains a
"NamedGroupList" value:
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 35]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
enum {
/* Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE) */
secp256r1 (23), secp384r1 (24), secp521r1 (25),
x25519 (29), x448 (30),
/* Finite Field Groups (DHE) */
ffdhe2048 (256), ffdhe3072 (257), ffdhe4096 (258),
ffdhe6144 (259), ffdhe8192 (260),
/* Reserved Code Points */
ffdhe_private_use (0x01FC..0x01FF),
ecdhe_private_use (0xFE00..0xFEFF),
(0xFFFF)
} NamedGroup;
struct {
NamedGroup named_group_list<1..2^16-1>;
} NamedGroupList;
Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE) Indicates support of the corresponding
named curve. Note that some curves are also recommended in ANSI
X9.62 [X962] and FIPS 186-4 [DSS]. Others are recommended in
[RFC7748]. Values 0xFE00 through 0xFEFF are reserved for private
use.
Finite Field Groups (DHE) Indicates support of the corresponding
finite field group, defined in [I-D.ietf-tls-negotiated-ff-dhe].
Values 0x01FC through 0x01FF are reserved for private use.
Items in named_group_list are ordered according to the client's
preferences (most preferred choice first).
As of TLS 1.3, servers are permitted to send the "supported_groups"
extension to the client. If the server has a group it prefers to the
ones in the "key_share" extension but is still willing to accept the
ClientHello, it SHOULD send "supported_groups" to update the client's
view of its preferences. Clients MUST NOT act upon any information
found in "supported_groups" prior to successful completion of the
handshake, but MAY use the information learned from a successfully
completed handshake to change what groups they offer to a server in
subsequent connections.
4.2.4. Key Share
The "key_share" extension contains the endpoint's cryptographic
parameters for non-PSK key establishment methods (currently DHE or
ECDHE).
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 36]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
Clients which offer one or more (EC)DHE cipher suites MUST send this
extension and SHOULD send at least one supported KeyShareEntry value.
Servers MUST NOT negotiate any of these cipher suites unless a
supported value was provided. If this extension is not provided in a
ServerHello or ClientHello, and the peer is offering (EC)DHE cipher
suites, then the endpoint MUST close the connection with a fatal
"missing_extension" alert. (see Section 8.2) Clients MAY send an
empty client_shares vector in order to request group selection from
the server at the cost of an additional round trip. (see
Section 4.1.3)
struct {
NamedGroup group;
opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
} KeyShareEntry;
group The named group for the key being exchanged. Finite Field
Diffie-Hellman [DH] parameters are described in Section 4.2.4.1;
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman parameters are described in
Section 4.2.4.2.
key_exchange Key exchange information. The contents of this field
are determined by the specified group and its corresponding
definition. Endpoints MUST NOT send empty or otherwise invalid
key_exchange values for any reason.
The "extension_data" field of this extension contains a "KeyShare"
value:
struct {
select (role) {
case client:
KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1>;
case server:
KeyShareEntry server_share;
}
} KeyShare;
client_shares A list of offered KeyShareEntry values in descending
order of client preference. This vector MAY be empty if the
client is requesting a HelloRetryRequest. The ordering of values
here SHOULD match that of the ordering of offered support in the
"supported_groups" extension.
server_share A single KeyShareEntry value for the negotiated cipher
suite.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 37]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
Clients offer an arbitrary number of KeyShareEntry values, each
representing a single set of key exchange parameters. For instance,
a client might offer shares for several elliptic curves or multiple
FFDHE groups. The key_exchange values for each KeyShareEntry MUST by
generated independently. Clients MUST NOT offer multiple
KeyShareEntry values for the same group. Clients and MUST NOT offer
any KeyShareEntry values for groups not listed in the client's
"supported_groups" extension.
Servers offer exactly one KeyShareEntry value, which corresponds to
the key exchange used for the negotiated cipher suite. Servers MUST
NOT offer a KeyShareEntry value for a group not offered by the client
in its corresponding KeyShare or "supported_groups" extension.
Implementations MAY check for violations of these rules and and MAY
abort the connection with a fatal "illegal_parameter" alert if one is
violated.
If the server selects an (EC)DHE cipher suite and no mutually
supported group is available between the two endpoints' KeyShare
offers, yet there is a mutually supported group that can be found via
the "supported_groups" extension, then the server MUST reply with a
HelloRetryRequest. If there is no mutually supported group at all,
the server MUST NOT negotiate an (EC)DHE cipher suite.
[[TODO: Recommendation about what the client offers. Presumably
which integer DH groups and which curves.]]
4.2.4.1. Diffie-Hellman Parameters
Diffie-Hellman [DH] parameters for both clients and servers are
encoded in the opaque key_exchange field of a KeyShareEntry in a
KeyShare structure. The opaque value contains the Diffie-Hellman
public value (Y = g^X mod p), encoded as a big-endian integer, padded
with zeros to the size of p in bytes.
Note: For a given Diffie-Hellman group, the padding results in all
public keys having the same length.
Peers SHOULD validate each other's public key Y by ensuring that 1 <
Y < p-1. This check ensures that the remote peer is properly behaved
and isn't forcing the local system into a small subgroup.
4.2.4.2. ECDHE Parameters
ECDHE parameters for both clients and servers are encoded in the the
opaque key_exchange field of a KeyShareEntry in a KeyShare structure.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 38]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
For secp256r1, secp384r1 and secp521r1, the contents are the byte
string representation of an elliptic curve public value following the
conversion routine in Section 4.3.6 of ANSI X9.62 [X962].
Although X9.62 supports multiple point formats, any given curve MUST
specify only a single point format. All curves currently specified
in this document MUST only be used with the uncompressed point format
(the format for all ECDH functions is considered uncompressed).
For x25519 and x448, the contents are the byte string inputs and
outputs of the corresponding functions defined in [RFC7748], 32 bytes
for x25519 and 56 bytes for x448.
Note: Versions of TLS prior to 1.3 permitted point negotiation; TLS
1.3 removes this feature in favor of a single point format for each
curve.
4.2.5. Pre-Shared Key Extension
The "pre_shared_key" extension is used to indicate the identity of
the pre-shared key to be used with a given handshake in association
with a PSK or (EC)DHE-PSK cipher suite (see [RFC4279] for
background).
Clients which offer one or more PSK cipher suites MUST send at least
one supported psk_identity value and servers MUST NOT negotiate any
of these cipher suites unless a supported value was provided. If
this extension is not provided and no alternative cipher suite is
available, the server MUST close the connection with a fatal
"missing_extension" alert. (see Section 8.2)
The "extension_data" field of this extension contains a
"PreSharedKeyExtension" value:
opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>;
struct {
select (Role) {
case client:
psk_identity identities<2..2^16-1>;
case server:
uint16 selected_identity;
}
} PreSharedKeyExtension;
identities A list of the identities (labels for keys) that the
client is willing to negotiate with the server. If sent alongside
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 39]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
the "early_data" extension (see Section 4.2.6), the first identity
is the one used for 0-RTT data.
selected_identity The server's chosen identity expressed as a
(0-based) index into the identies in the client's list.
If no suitable identity is provided, the server MUST NOT negotiate a
PSK cipher suite and MAY respond with an "unknown_psk_identity" alert
message. Sending this alert is OPTIONAL; servers MAY instead choose
to send a "decrypt_error" alert to merely indicate an invalid PSK
identity or instead negotiate use of a non-PSK cipher suite, if
available.
If the server selects a PSK cipher suite, it MUST send a
"pre_shared_key" extension with the identity that it selected. The
client MUST verify that the server's selected_identity is within the
range supplied by the client. If the server supplies an "early_data"
extension, the client MUST verify that the server selected the first
offered identity. If any other value is returned, the client MUST
generate a fatal "unknown_psk_identity" alert and close the
connection.
Note that although 0-RTT data is encrypted with the first PSK
identity, the server MAY fall back to 1-RTT and select a different
PSK identity if multiple identities are offered.
4.2.6. Early Data Indication
When PSK resumption is used, the client can send application data in
its first flight of messages. If the client opts to do so, it MUST
supply an "early_data" extension as well as the "pre_shared_key"
extension.
The "extension_data" field of this extension contains an
"EarlyDataIndication" value:
struct {
select (Role) {
case client:
uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age;
case server:
struct {};
}
} EarlyDataIndication;
obfuscated_ticket_age The time since the client learned about the
server configuration that it is using, in milliseconds. This
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 40]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
value is added modulo 2^32 to with the "ticket_age_add" value that
was included with the ticket, see Section 4.4.1. This addition
prevents passive observers from correlating sessions unless
tickets are reused. Note: because ticket lifetimes are restricted
to a week, 32 bits is enough to represent any plausible age, even
in milliseconds.
A server MUST validate that the ticket_age is within a small
tolerance of the time since the ticket was issued (see
Section 4.2.6.2).
The parameters for the 0-RTT data (symmetric cipher suite, ALPN,
etc.) are the same as those which were negotiated in the connection
which established the PSK. The PSK used to encrypt the early data
MUST be the first PSK listed in the client's "pre_shared_key"
extension.
0-RTT messages sent in the first flight have the same content types
as their corresponding messages sent in other flights (handshake,
application_data, and alert respectively) but are protected under
different keys. After all the 0-RTT application data messages (if
any) have been sent, an "end_of_early_data" alert of type "warning"
is sent to indicate the end of the flight. 0-RTT MUST always be
followed by an "end_of_early_data" alert.
A server which receives an "early_data" extension can behave in one
of two ways:
- Ignore the extension and return no response. This indicates that
the server has ignored any early data and an ordinary 1-RTT
handshake is required.
- Return an empty extension, indicating that it intends to process
the early data. It is not possible for the server to accept only
a subset of the early data messages.
In order to accept early data, the server server MUST have accepted a
PSK cipher suite and selected the the first key offered in the
client's "pre_shared_key" extension. In addition, it MUST verify
that the following values are consistent with those negotiated in the
connection during which the ticket was established.
- The TLS version number, symmetric ciphersuite, and the hash for
HKDF.
- The selected ALPN [RFC7443] value, if any.
- The server_name [RFC6066] value provided by the client, if any.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 41]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
Future extensions MUST define their interaction with 0-RTT.
If any of these checks fail, the server MUST NOT respond with the
extension and must discard all the remaining first flight data (thus
falling back to 1-RTT). If the client attempts a 0-RTT handshake but
the server rejects it, it will generally not have the 0-RTT record
protection keys and must instead trial decrypt each record with the
1-RTT handshake keys until it finds one that decrypts properly, and
then pick up the handshake from that point.
If the server chooses to accept the "early_data" extension, then it
MUST comply with the same error handling requirements specified for
all records when processing early data records. Specifically,
decryption failure of any 0-RTT record following an accepted
"early_data" extension MUST produce a fatal "bad_record_mac" alert as
per Section 5.2.
If the server rejects the "early_data" extension, the client
application MAY opt to retransmit the data once the handshake has
been completed. TLS stacks SHOULD not do this automatically and
client applications MUST take care that the negotiated parameters are
consistent with those it expected. For example, if the ALPN value
has changed, it is likely unsafe to retransmit the original
application layer data.
4.2.6.1. Processing Order
Clients are permitted to "stream" 0-RTT data until they receive the
server's Finished, only then sending the "end_of_early_data" alert.
In order to avoid deadlock, when accepting "early_data", servers MUST
process the client's Finished and then immediately send the
ServerHello, rather than waiting for the client's "end_of_early_data"
alert.
4.2.6.2. Replay Properties
As noted in Section 2.3, TLS provides a limited mechanism for replay
protection for data sent by the client in the first flight.
The "obfuscated_ticket_age" parameter in the client's "early_data"
extension SHOULD be used by servers to limit the time over which the
first flight might be replayed. A server can store the time at which
it sends a session ticket to the client, or encode the time in the
ticket. Then, each time it receives an "early_data" extension, it
can subtract the base value and check to see if the value used by the
client matches its expectations.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 42]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
The ticket age (the value with "ticket_age_add" subtracted) provided
by the client will be shorter than the actual time elapsed on the
server by a single round trip time. This difference is comprised of
the delay in sending the NewSessionTicket message to the client, plus
the time taken to send the ClientHello to the server. For this
reason, a server SHOULD measure the round trip time prior to sending
the NewSessionTicket message and account for that in the value it
saves.
To properly validate the ticket age, a server needs to save at least
two items:
- The time that the server generated the session ticket and the
estimated round trip time can be added together to form a baseline
time.
- The "ticket_age_add" parameter from the NewSessionTicket is needed
to recover the ticket age from the "obfuscated_ticket_age"
parameter.
There are several potential sources of error that make an exact
measurement of time difficult. Variations in client and server
clocks are likely to be minimal, outside of gross time corrections.
Network propagation delays are most likely causes of a mismatch in
legitimate values for elapsed time. Both the NewSessionTicket and
ClientHello messages might be retransmitted and therefore delayed,
which might be hidden by TCP.
A small allowance for errors in clocks and variations in measurements
is advisable. However, any allowance also increases the opportunity
for replay. In this case, it is better to reject early data than to
risk greater exposure to replay attacks.
4.2.7. OCSP Status Extensions
[RFC6066] and [RFC6961] provide extensions to negotiate the server
sending OCSP responses to the client. In TLS 1.2 and below, the
server sends an empty extension to indicate negotiation of this
extension and the OCSP information is carried in a CertificateStatus
message. In TLS 1.3, the server's OCSP information is carried in an
extension in EncryptedExtensions. Specifically: The body of the
"status_request" or "status_request_v2" extension from the server
MUST be a CertificateStatus structure as defined in [RFC6066] and
[RFC6961] respectively.
Note: This means that the certificate status appears prior to the
certificates it applies to. This is slightly anomalous but matches
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 43]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
the existing behavior for SignedCertificateTimestamps [RFC6962], and
is more easily extensible in the handshake state machine.
4.2.8. Encrypted Extensions
When this message will be sent:
In all handshakes, the server MUST send the EncryptedExtensions
message immediately after the ServerHello message. This is the
first message that is encrypted under keys derived from
handshake_traffic_secret.
Meaning of this message:
The EncryptedExtensions message contains any extensions which
should be protected, i.e., any which are not needed to establish
the cryptographic context.
The same extension types MUST NOT appear in both the ServerHello and
EncryptedExtensions. If the same extension appears in both
locations, the client MUST rely only on the value in the
EncryptedExtensions block. All server-sent extensions other than
those explicitly listed in Section 4.1.2 or designated in the IANA
registry MUST only appear in EncryptedExtensions. Extensions which
are designated to appear in ServerHello MUST NOT appear in
EncryptedExtensions. Clients MUST check EncryptedExtensions for the
presence of any forbidden extensions and if any are found MUST
terminate the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.
Structure of this message:
struct {
Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} EncryptedExtensions;
extensions A list of extensions.
4.2.9. Certificate Request
When this message will be sent:
A non-anonymous server can optionally request a certificate from
the client, if appropriate for the selected cipher suite. This
message, if sent, will follow EncryptedExtensions.
Structure of this message:
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 44]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
struct {
opaque certificate_extension_oid<1..2^8-1>;
opaque certificate_extension_values<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateExtension;
struct {
opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
SignatureScheme
supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
CertificateExtension certificate_extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateRequest;
certificate_request_context An opaque string which identifies the
certificate request and which will be echoed in the client's
Certificate message. The certificate_request_context MUST be
unique within the scope of this connection (thus preventing replay
of client CertificateVerify messages).
supported_signature_algorithms A list of the signature algorithms
that the server is able to verify, listed in descending order of
preference. Any certificates provided by the client MUST be
signed using a signature algorithm found in
supported_signature_algorithms.
certificate_authorities A list of the distinguished names [X501] of
acceptable certificate_authorities, represented in DER-encoded
[X690] format. These distinguished names may specify a desired
distinguished name for a root CA or for a subordinate CA; thus,
this message can be used to describe known roots as well as a
desired authorization space. If the certificate_authorities list
is empty, then the client MAY send any certificate that meets the
rest of the selection criteria in the CertificateRequest, unless
there is some external arrangement to the contrary.
certificate_extensions A list of certificate extension OIDs
[RFC5280] with their allowed values, represented in DER-encoded
[X690] format. Some certificate extension OIDs allow multiple
values (e.g. Extended Key Usage). If the server has included a
non-empty certificate_extensions list, the client certificate MUST
contain all of the specified extension OIDs that the client
recognizes. For each extension OID recognized by the client, all
of the specified values MUST be present in the client certificate
(but the certificate MAY have other values as well). However, the
client MUST ignore and skip any unrecognized certificate extension
OIDs. If the client has ignored some of the required certificate
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 45]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
extension OIDs, and supplied a certificate that does not satisfy
the request, the server MAY at its discretion either continue the
session without client authentication, or terminate the session
with a fatal unsupported_certificate alert. PKIX RFCs define a
variety of certificate extension OIDs and their corresponding
value types. Depending on the type, matching certificate
extension values are not necessarily bitwise-equal. It is
expected that TLS implementations will rely on their PKI libraries
to perform certificate selection using certificate extension OIDs.
This document defines matching rules for two standard certificate
extensions defined in [RFC5280]:
o The Key Usage extension in a certificate matches the request
when all key usage bits asserted in the request are also
asserted in the Key Usage certificate extension.
o The Extended Key Usage extension in a certificate matches the
request when all key purpose OIDs present in the request are
also found in the Extended Key Usage certificate extension.
The special anyExtendedKeyUsage OID MUST NOT be used in the
request.
Separate specifications may define matching rules for other
certificate extensions.
Note: It is a fatal "handshake_failure" alert for an anonymous server
to request client authentication.
4.3. Authentication Messages
As discussed in Section 2, TLS uses a common set of messages for
authentication, key confirmation, and handshake integrity:
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finished. These messages are
always sent as the last messages in their handshake flight. The
Certificate and CertificateVerify messages are only sent under
certain circumstances, as defined below. The Finished message is
always sent as part of the Authentication block.
The computations for the Authentication messages all uniformly take
the following inputs:
- The certificate and signing key to be used.
- A Handshake Context based on the hash of the handshake messages
- A base key to be used to compute a MAC key.
Based on these inputs, the messages then contain:
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 46]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
Certificate The certificate to be used for authentication and any
supporting certificates in the chain. Note that certificate-based
client authentication is not available in the 0-RTT case.
CertificateVerify A signature over the value Hash(Handshake Context
+ Certificate) + Hash(resumption_context) See Section 4.4.1 for
the definition of resumption_context.
Finished A MAC over the value Hash(Handshake Context + Certificate +
CertificateVerify) + Hash(resumption_context) using a MAC key
derived from the base key.
Because the CertificateVerify signs the Handshake Context +
Certificate and the Finished MACs the Handshake Context + Certificate
+ CertificateVerify, this is mostly equivalent to keeping a running
hash of the handshake messages (exactly so in the pure 1-RTT cases).
Note, however, that subsequent post-handshake authentications do not
include each other, just the messages through the end of the main
handshake.
The following table defines the Handshake Context and MAC Base Key
for each scenario:
+------------+--------------------------------+---------------------+
| Mode | Handshake Context | Base Key |
+------------+--------------------------------+---------------------+
| 0-RTT | ClientHello | early_traffic_secre |
| | | t |
| | | |
| 1-RTT | ClientHello ... later of Encry | handshake_traffic_s |
| (Server) | ptedExtensions/CertificateRequ | ecret |
| | est | |
| | | |
| 1-RTT | ClientHello ... ServerFinished | handshake_traffic_s |
| (Client) | | ecret |
| | | |
| Post- | ClientHello ... ClientFinished | traffic_secret_0 |
| Handshake | + CertificateRequest | |
+------------+--------------------------------+---------------------+
Note: The Handshake Context for the last three rows does not include
any 0-RTT handshake messages, regardless of whether 0-RTT is used.
4.3.1. Certificate
When this message will be sent:
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 47]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
The server MUST send a Certificate message whenever the agreed-
upon key exchange method uses certificates for authentication
(this includes all key exchange methods defined in this document
except PSK).
The client MUST send a Certificate message if and only if server
has requested client authentication via a CertificateRequest
message (Section 4.2.9). If the server requests client
authentication but no suitable certificate is available, the
client MUST send a Certificate message containing no certificates
(i.e., with the "certificate_list" field having length 0).
Meaning of this message:
This message conveys the endpoint's certificate chain to the peer.
The certificate MUST be appropriate for the negotiated cipher
suite's authentication algorithm and any negotiated extensions.
Structure of this message:
opaque ASN1Cert<1..2^24-1>;
struct {
opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
ASN1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
} Certificate;
certificate_request_context If this message is in response to a
CertificateRequest, the value of certificate_request_context in
that message. Otherwise, in the case of server authentication
this field SHALL be zero length.
certificate_list This is a sequence (chain) of certificates. The
sender's certificate MUST come first in the list. Each following
certificate SHOULD directly certify one preceding it. Because
certificate validation requires that trust anchors be distributed
independently, a certificate that specifies a trust anchor MAY be
omitted from the chain, provided that supported peers are known to
possess any omitted certificates.
Note: Prior to TLS 1.3, "certificate_list" ordering required each
certificate to certify the one immediately preceding it, however some
implementations allowed some flexibility. Servers sometimes send
both a current and deprecated intermediate for transitional purposes,
and others are simply configured incorrectly, but these cases can
nonetheless be validated properly. For maximum compatibility, all
implementations SHOULD be prepared to handle potentially extraneous
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 48]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
certificates and arbitrary orderings from any TLS version, with the
exception of the end-entity certificate which MUST be first.
The server's certificate list MUST always be non-empty. A client
will send an empty certificate list if it does not have an
appropriate certificate to send in response to the server's
authentication request.
4.3.1.1. Server Certificate Selection
The following rules apply to the certificates sent by the server:
- The certificate type MUST be X.509v3 [RFC5280], unless explicitly
negotiated otherwise (e.g., [RFC5081]).
- The server's end-entity certificate's public key (and associated
restrictions) MUST be compatible with the selected authentication
algorithm (currently RSA or ECDSA).
- The certificate MUST allow the key to be used for signing (i.e.,
the digitalSignature bit MUST be set if the Key Usage extension is
present) with a signature scheme indicated in the client's
"signature_algorithms" extension.
- The "server_name" and "trusted_ca_keys" extensions [RFC6066] are
used to guide certificate selection. As servers MAY require the
presence of the "server_name" extension, clients SHOULD send this
extension, when applicable.
All certificates provided by the server MUST be signed by a signature
algorithm that appears in the "signature_algorithms" extension
provided by the client, if they are able to provide such a chain (see
Section 4.2.2). Certificates that are self-signed or certificates
that are expected to be trust anchors are not validated as part of
the chain and therefore MAY be signed with any algorithm.
If the server cannot produce a certificate chain that is signed only
via the indicated supported algorithms, then it SHOULD continue the
handshake by sending the client a certificate chain of its choice
that may include algorithms that are not known to be supported by the
client. This fallback chain MAY use the deprecated SHA-1 hash
algorithm only if the "signature_algorithms" extension provided by
the client permits it. If the client cannot construct an acceptable
chain using the provided certificates and decides to abort the
handshake, then it MUST send an "unsupported_certificate" alert
message and close the connection.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 49]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
If the server has multiple certificates, it chooses one of them based
on the above-mentioned criteria (in addition to other criteria, such
as transport layer endpoint, local configuration and preferences).
As cipher suites that specify new key exchange methods are specified
for the TLS protocol, they will imply the certificate format and the
required encoded keying information.
4.3.1.2. Client Certificate Selection
The following rules apply to certificates sent by the client:
In particular:
- The certificate type MUST be X.509v3 [RFC5280], unless explicitly
negotiated otherwise (e.g., [RFC5081]).
- If the certificate_authorities list in the certificate request
message was non-empty, one of the certificates in the certificate
chain SHOULD be issued by one of the listed CAs.
- The certificates MUST be signed using an acceptable signature
algorithm, as described in Section 4.2.9. Note that this relaxes
the constraints on certificate-signing algorithms found in prior
versions of TLS.
- If the certificate_extensions list in the certificate request
message was non-empty, the end-entity certificate MUST match the
extension OIDs recognized by the client, as described in
Section 4.2.9.
Note that, as with the server certificate, there are certificates
that use algorithm combinations that cannot be currently used with
TLS.
4.3.1.3. Receiving a Certificate Message
In general, detailed certificate validation procedures are out of
scope for TLS (see [RFC5280]). This section provides TLS-specific
requirements.
If the server supplies an empty Certificate message, the client MUST
terminate the handshake with a fatal "decode_error" alert.
If the client does not send any certificates, the server MAY at its
discretion either continue the handshake without client
authentication, or respond with a fatal "handshake_failure" alert.
Also, if some aspect of the certificate chain was unacceptable (e.g.,
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 50]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
it was not signed by a known, trusted CA), the server MAY at its
discretion either continue the handshake (considering the client
unauthenticated) or send a fatal alert.
Any endpoint receiving any certificate signed using any signature
algorithm using an MD5 hash MUST send a "bad_certificate" alert
message and close the connection. SHA-1 is deprecated and therefore
NOT RECOMMENDED. All endpoints are RECOMMENDED to transition to
SHA-256 or better as soon as possible to maintain interoperability
with implementations currently in the process of phasing out SHA-1
support.
Note that a certificate containing a key for one signature algorithm
MAY be signed using a different signature algorithm (for instance, an
RSA key signed with an ECDSA key).
Endpoints that reject certification paths due to use of a deprecated
hash MUST send a fatal "bad_certificate" alert message before closing
the connection.
4.3.2. Certificate Verify
When this message will be sent:
This message is used to provide explicit proof that an endpoint
possesses the private key corresponding to its certificate and
also provides integrity for the handshake up to this point.
Servers MUST send this message when using a cipher suite which is
authenticated via a certificate. Clients MUST send this message
whenever authenticating via a Certificate (i.e., when the
Certificate message is non-empty). When sent, this message MUST
appear immediately after the Certificate Message and immediately
prior to the Finished message.
Structure of this message:
struct {
SignatureScheme algorithm;
opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateVerify;
The algorithm field specifies the signature algorithm used (see
Section 4.2.2 for the definition of this field). The signature is a
digital signature using that algorithm that covers the hash output
described in Section 4.3 namely:
Hash(Handshake Context + Certificate) + Hash(resumption_context)
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 51]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
In TLS 1.3, the digital signature process takes as input:
- A signing key
- A context string
- The actual content to be signed
The digital signature is then computed using the signing key over the
concatenation of:
- 64 bytes of octet 32
- The context string
- A single 0 byte which servers as the separator
- The content to be signed
This structure is intended to prevent an attack on previous versions
of previous versions of TLS in which the ServerKeyExchange format
meant that attackers could obtain a signature of a message with a
chosen, 32-byte prefix. The initial 64 byte pad clears that prefix.
The context string for a server signature is "TLS 1.3, server
CertificateVerify" and for a client signature is "TLS 1.3, client
CertificateVerify".
For example, if Hash(Handshake Context + Certificate) was 32 bytes of
01 and Hash(resumption_context) was 32 bytes of 02 (these lengths
would make sense for SHA-256, the input to the final signing process
for a server CertificateVerify would be:
2020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020
2020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020
544c5320312e332c207365727665722043657274696669636174655665726966
79
00
0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101
0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202
If sent by a server, the signature algorithm MUST be one offered in
the client's "signature_algorithms" extension unless no valid
certificate chain can be produced without unsupported algorithms (see
Section 4.2.2). Note that there is a possibility for inconsistencies
here. For instance, the client might offer an ECDHE_ECDSA cipher
suite but omit any ECDSA and EdDSA values from its
"signature_algorithms" extension. In order to negotiate correctly,
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 52]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
the server MUST check any candidate cipher suites against the
"signature_algorithms" extension before selecting them. This is
somewhat inelegant but is a compromise designed to minimize changes
to the original cipher suite design.
If sent by a client, the signature algorithm used in the signature
MUST be one of those present in the supported_signature_algorithms
field of the CertificateRequest message.
In addition, the signature algorithm MUST be compatible with the key
in the sender's end-entity certificate. RSA signatures MUST use an
RSASSA-PSS algorithm, regardless of whether RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
algorithms appear in "signature_algorithms". SHA-1 MUST NOT be used
in any signatures in CertificateVerify. All SHA-1 signature
algorithms in this specification are defined solely for use in legacy
certificates, and are not valid for CertificateVerify signatures.
Note: When used with non-certificate-based handshakes (e.g., PSK),
the client's signature does not cover the server's certificate
directly, although it does cover the server's Finished message, which
transitively includes the server's certificate when the PSK derives
from a certificate-authenticated handshake. [PSK-FINISHED] describes
a concrete attack on this mode if the Finished is omitted from the
signature. It is unsafe to use certificate-based client
authentication when the client might potentially share the same PSK/
key-id pair with two different endpoints. In order to ensure this,
implementations MUST NOT mix certificate-based client authentication
with pure PSK modes (i.e., those where the PSK was not derived from a
previous non-PSK handshake).
4.3.3. Finished
When this message will be sent:
The Finished message is the final message in the authentication
block. It is essential for providing authentication of the
handshake and of the computed keys.
Meaning of this message:
Recipients of Finished messages MUST verify that the contents are
correct. Once a side has sent its Finished message and received
and validated the Finished message from its peer, it may begin to
send and receive application data over the connection.
The key used to compute the finished message is computed from the
Base key defined in Section 4.3 using HKDF (see Section 7.1).
Specifically:
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 53]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
client_finished_key =
HKDF-Expand-Label(BaseKey, "client finished", "", Hash.Length)
server_finished_key =
HKDF-Expand-Label(BaseKey, "server finished", "", Hash.Length)
Structure of this message:
struct {
opaque verify_data[Hash.length];
} Finished;
The verify_data value is computed as follows:
verify_data =
HMAC(finished_key, Hash(
Handshake Context +
Certificate* +
CertificateVerify*
) +
Hash(resumption_context)
)
* Only included if present.
Where HMAC [RFC2104] uses the Hash algorithm for the handshake. As
noted above, the HMAC input can generally be implemented by a running
hash, i.e., just the handshake hash at this point.
In previous versions of TLS, the verify_data was always 12 octets
long. In the current version of TLS, it is the size of the HMAC
output for the Hash used for the handshake.
Note: Alerts and any other record types are not handshake messages
and are not included in the hash computations.
4.4. Post-Handshake Messages
TLS also allows other messages to be sent after the main handshake.
These messages use a handshake content type and are encrypted under
the application traffic key.
4.4.1. New Session Ticket Message
At any time after the server has received the client Finished
message, it MAY send a NewSessionTicket message. This message
creates a pre-shared key (PSK) binding between the ticket value and
the following two values derived from the resumption master secret:
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 54]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
resumption_psk = HKDF-Expand-Label(
resumption_secret,
"resumption psk", "", Hash.Length)
resumption_context = HKDF-Expand-Label(
resumption_secret,
"resumption context", "", Hash.Length)
The client MAY use this PSK for future handshakes by including the
ticket value in the "pre_shared_key" extension in its ClientHello
(Section 4.2.5) and supplying a suitable PSK cipher suite. Servers
may send multiple tickets on a single connection, for instance after
post-handshake authentication. For handshakes that do not use a
resumption_psk, the resumption_context is a string of Hash.Length
zeroes.
enum { (65535) } TicketExtensionType;
struct {
TicketExtensionType extension_type;
opaque extension_data<1..2^16-1>;
} TicketExtension;
enum {
allow_early_data(1),
allow_dhe_resumption(2),
allow_psk_resumption(4)
} TicketFlags;
struct {
uint32 ticket_lifetime;
uint32 flags;
uint32 ticket_age_add;
TicketExtension extensions<2..2^16-2>;
opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>;
} NewSessionTicket;
flags A 32-bit value indicating the ways in which this ticket may be
used (as a bitwise OR of the flags values).
ticket_lifetime Indicates the lifetime in seconds as a 32-bit
unsigned integer in network byte order from the time of ticket
issuance. Servers MUST NOT use any value more than 604800 seconds
(7 days). The value of zero indicates that the ticket should be
discarded immediately. Clients MUST NOT cache session tickets for
longer than 7 days, regardless of the ticket_lifetime. It MAY
delete the ticket earlier based on local policy. A server MAY
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 55]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
treat a ticket as valid for a shorter period of time than what is
stated in the ticket_lifetime.
ticket_age_add A randomly generated 32-bit value that is used to
obscure the age of the ticket that the client includes in the
"early_data" extension. The actual ticket age is added to this
value modulo 2^32 to obtain the value that is transmitted by the
client.
ticket_extensions A placeholder for extensions in the ticket.
Clients MUST ignore unrecognized extensions.
ticket The value of the ticket to be used as the PSK identifier.
The ticket itself is an opaque label. It MAY either be a database
lookup key or a self-encrypted and self-authenticated value.
Section 4 of [RFC5077] describes a recommended ticket construction
mechanism.
The meanings of the flags are as follows:
allow_early_data When resuming with this ticket, the client MAY send
data in its first flight (early data) encrypted under a key
derived from this PSK.
allow_dhe_resumption This ticket MAY be used with (EC)DHE-PSK cipher
suite.
allow_psk_resumption This ticket MAY be used with a pure PSK cipher
suite.
In all cases, the PSK or (EC)DHE-PSK cipher suites that the client
offers/uses MUST have the same symmetric parameters (cipher/hash) as
the cipher suite negotiated for this connection. If no flags are set
that the client recognizes, it MUST ignore the ticket.
4.4.2. Post-Handshake Authentication
The server is permitted to request client authentication at any time
after the handshake has completed by sending a CertificateRequest
message. The client SHOULD respond with the appropriate
Authentication messages. If the client chooses to authenticate, it
MUST send Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finished. If it
declines, it MUST send a Certificate message containing no
certificates followed by Finished.
Note: Because client authentication may require prompting the user,
servers MUST be prepared for some delay, including receiving an
arbitrary number of other messages between sending the
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 56]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
CertificateRequest and receiving a response. In addition, clients
which receive multiple CertificateRequests in close succession MAY
respond to them in a different order than they were received (the
certificate_request_context value allows the server to disambiguate
the responses).
4.4.3. Key and IV Update
struct {} KeyUpdate;
The KeyUpdate handshake message is used to indicate that the sender
is updating its sending cryptographic keys. This message can be sent
by the server after sending its first flight and the client after
sending its second flight. Implementations that receive a KeyUpdate
message prior to receiving a Finished message as part of the 1-RTT
handshake MUST generate a fatal "unexpected_message" alert. After
sending a KeyUpdate message, the sender SHALL send all its traffic
using the next generation of keys, computed as described in
Section 7.2. Upon receiving a KeyUpdate, the receiver MUST update
their receiving keys and if they have not already updated their
sending state up to or past the then current receiving generation
MUST send their own KeyUpdate prior to sending any other messages.
This mechanism allows either side to force an update to the entire
connection. Note that implementations may receive an arbitrary
number of messages between sending a KeyUpdate and receiving the
peer's KeyUpdate because those messages may already be in flight.
Note that if implementations independently send their own KeyUpdates
and they cross in flight, this only results in an update of one
generation; when each side receives the other side's update it just
updates its receive keys and notes that the generations match and
thus no send update is needed.
Note that the side which sends its KeyUpdate first needs to retain
its receive traffic keys (though not the traffic secret) for the
previous generation of keys until it receives the KeyUpdate from the
other side.
Both sender and receiver MUST encrypt their KeyUpdate messages with
the old keys. Additionally, both sides MUST enforce that a KeyUpdate
with the old key is received before accepting any messages encrypted
with the new key. Failure to do so may allow message truncation
attacks.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 57]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
5. Record Protocol
The TLS record protocol takes messages to be transmitted, fragments
the data into manageable blocks, protects the records, and transmits
the result. Received data is decrypted and verified, reassembled,
and then delivered to higher-level clients.
TLS records are typed, which allows multiple higher level protocols
to be multiplexed over the same record layer. This document
specifies three content types: handshake, application data, and
alert. Implementations MUST NOT send record types not defined in
this document unless negotiated by some extension. If a TLS
implementation receives an unexpected record type, it MUST send an
"unexpected_message" alert. New record content type values are
assigned by IANA in the TLS Content Type Registry as described in
Section 10.
Application data messages are carried by the record layer and are
fragmented and encrypted as described below. The messages are
treated as transparent data to the record layer.
5.1. Record Layer
The TLS record layer receives uninterpreted data from higher layers
in non-empty blocks of arbitrary size.
The record layer fragments information blocks into TLSPlaintext
records carrying data in chunks of 2^14 bytes or less. Message
boundaries are not preserved in the record layer (i.e., multiple
messages of the same ContentType MAY be coalesced into a single
TLSPlaintext record, or a single message MAY be fragmented across
several records). Alert messages (Section 6) MUST NOT be fragmented
across records.
enum {
alert(21),
handshake(22),
application_data(23)
(255)
} ContentType;
struct {
ContentType type;
ProtocolVersion record_version = { 3, 1 }; /* TLS v1.x */
uint16 length;
opaque fragment[TLSPlaintext.length];
} TLSPlaintext;
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 58]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
type The higher-level protocol used to process the enclosed
fragment.
record_version The protocol version the current record is compatible
with. This value MUST be set to { 3, 1 } for all records. This
field is deprecated and MUST be ignored for all purposes.
length The length (in bytes) of the following TLSPlaintext.fragment.
The length MUST NOT exceed 2^14.
fragment The data being transmitted. This value transparent and
treated as an independent block to be dealt with by the higher-
level protocol specified by the type field.
This document describes TLS Version 1.3, which uses the version { 3,
4 }. The version value 3.4 is historical, deriving from the use of {
3, 1 } for TLS 1.0 and { 3, 0 } for SSL 3.0. In order to maximize
backwards compatibility, the record layer version identifies as
simply TLS 1.0. Endpoints supporting other versions negotiate the
version to use by following the procedure and requirements in
Appendix C.
Implementations MUST NOT send zero-length fragments of Handshake or
Alert types, even if those fragments contain padding. Zero-length
fragments of Application data MAY be sent as they are potentially
useful as a traffic analysis countermeasure.
When record protection has not yet been engaged, TLSPlaintext
structures are written directly onto the wire. Once record
protection has started, TLSPlaintext records are protected and sent
as described in the following section.
5.2. Record Payload Protection
The record protection functions translate a TLSPlaintext structure
into a TLSCiphertext. The deprotection functions reverse the
process. In TLS 1.3 as opposed to previous versions of TLS, all
ciphers are modeled as "Authenticated Encryption with Additional
Data" (AEAD) [RFC5116]. AEAD functions provide a unified encryption
and authentication operation which turns plaintext into authenticated
ciphertext and back again. Each encrypted record consists of a
plaintext header followed by an encrypted body, which itself contains
a type and optional padding.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 59]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
struct {
opaque content[TLSPlaintext.length];
ContentType type;
uint8 zeros[length_of_padding];
} TLSInnerPlaintext;
struct {
ContentType opaque_type = application_data(23); /* see fragment.type */
ProtocolVersion record_version = { 3, 1 }; /* TLS v1.x */
uint16 length;
opaque encrypted_record[length];
} TLSCiphertext;
content The cleartext of TLSPlaintext.fragment.
type The content type of the record.
zeros An arbitrary-length run of zero-valued bytes may appear in the
cleartext after the type field. This provides an opportunity for
senders to pad any TLS record by a chosen amount as long as the
total stays within record size limits. See Section 5.4 for more
details.
opaque_type The outer opaque_type field of a TLSCiphertext record is
always set to the value 23 (application_data) for outward
compatibility with middleboxes accustomed to parsing previous
versions of TLS. The actual content type of the record is found
in fragment.type after decryption.
record_version The record_version field is identical to
TLSPlaintext.record_version and is always { 3, 1 }. Note that the
handshake protocol including the ClientHello and ServerHello
messages authenticates the protocol version, so this value is
redundant.
length The length (in bytes) of the following
TLSCiphertext.fragment, which is the sum of the lengths of the
content and the padding, plus one for the inner content type. The
length MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + 256. An endpoint that receives a
record that exceeds this length MUST generate a fatal
"record_overflow" alert.
encrypted_record The AEAD encrypted form of the serialized
TLSInnerPlaintext structure.
AEAD ciphers take as input a single key, a nonce, a plaintext, and
"additional data" to be included in the authentication check, as
described in Section 2.1 of [RFC5116]. The key is either the
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 60]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
client_write_key or the server_write_key, the nonce is derived from
the sequence number (see Section 5.3) and the client_write_iv or
server_write_iv, and the additional data input is empty (zero
length). Derivation of traffic keys is defined in Section 7.3.
The plaintext is the concatenation of TLSPlaintext.fragment,
TLSPlaintext.type, and any padding bytes (zeros).
The AEAD output consists of the ciphertext output by the AEAD
encryption operation. The length of the plaintext is greater than
TLSPlaintext.length due to the inclusion of TLSPlaintext.type and
however much padding is supplied by the sender. The length of the
AEAD output will generally be larger than the plaintext, but by an
amount that varies with the AEAD cipher. Since the ciphers might
incorporate padding, the amount of overhead could vary with different
lengths of plaintext. Symbolically,
AEADEncrypted =
AEAD-Encrypt(write_key, nonce, plaintext of fragment)
In order to decrypt and verify, the cipher takes as input the key,
nonce, and the AEADEncrypted value. The output is either the
plaintext or an error indicating that the decryption failed. There
is no separate integrity check. That is:
plaintext of fragment =
AEAD-Decrypt(write_key, nonce, AEADEncrypted)
If the decryption fails, a fatal "bad_record_mac" alert MUST be
generated.
An AEAD cipher MUST NOT produce an expansion of greater than 255
bytes. An endpoint that receives a record from its peer with
TLSCipherText.length larger than 2^14 + 256 octets MUST generate a
fatal "record_overflow" alert. This limit is derived from the
maximum TLSPlaintext length of 2^14 octets + 1 octet for ContentType
+ the maximum AEAD expansion of 255 octets.
5.3. Per-Record Nonce
A 64-bit sequence number is maintained separately for reading and
writing records. Each sequence number is set to zero at the
beginning of a connection and whenever the key is changed.
The sequence number is incremented after reading or writing each
record. The first record transmitted under a particular set of
traffic keys record key MUST use sequence number 0.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 61]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
Sequence numbers do not wrap. If a TLS implementation would need to
wrap a sequence number, it MUST either rekey (Section 4.4.3) or
terminate the connection.
The length of the per-record nonce (iv_length) is set to max(8 bytes,
N_MIN) for the AEAD algorithm (see [RFC5116] Section 4). An AEAD
algorithm where N_MAX is less than 8 bytes MUST NOT be used with TLS.
The per-record nonce for the AEAD construction is formed as follows:
1. The 64-bit record sequence number is padded to the left with
zeroes to iv_length.
2. The padded sequence number is XORed with the static
client_write_iv or server_write_iv, depending on the role.
The resulting quantity (of length iv_length) is used as the per-
record nonce.
Note: This is a different construction from that in TLS 1.2, which
specified a partially explicit nonce.
5.4. Record Padding
All encrypted TLS records can be padded to inflate the size of the
TLSCipherText. This allows the sender to hide the size of the
traffic from an observer.
When generating a TLSCiphertext record, implementations MAY choose to
pad. An unpadded record is just a record with a padding length of
zero. Padding is a string of zero-valued bytes appended to the
ContentType field before encryption. Implementations MUST set the
padding octets to all zeros before encrypting.
Application Data records may contain a zero-length fragment.content
if the sender desires. This permits generation of plausibly-sized
cover traffic in contexts where the presence or absence of activity
may be sensitive. Implementations MUST NOT send Handshake or Alert
records that have a zero-length fragment.content.
The padding sent is automatically verified by the record protection
mechanism: Upon successful decryption of a TLSCiphertext.fragment,
the receiving implementation scans the field from the end toward the
beginning until it finds a non-zero octet. This non-zero octet is
the content type of the message. This padding scheme was selected
because it allows padding of any encrypted TLS record by an arbitrary
size (from zero up to TLS record size limits) without introducing new
content types. The design also enforces all-zero padding octets,
which allows for quick detection of padding errors.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 62]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
Implementations MUST limit their scanning to the cleartext returned
from the AEAD decryption. If a receiving implementation does not
find a non-zero octet in the cleartext, it should treat the record as
having an unexpected ContentType, sending an "unexpected_message"
alert.
The presence of padding does not change the overall record size
limitations - the full fragment plaintext may not exceed 2^14 octets.
Selecting a padding policy that suggests when and how much to pad is
a complex topic, and is beyond the scope of this specification. If
the application layer protocol atop TLS has its own padding padding,
it may be preferable to pad application_data TLS records within the
application layer. Padding for encrypted handshake and alert TLS
records must still be handled at the TLS layer, though. Later
documents may define padding selection algorithms, or define a
padding policy request mechanism through TLS extensions or some other
means.
5.5. Limits on Key Usage
There are cryptographic limits on the amount of plaintext which can
be safely encrypted under a given set of keys. [AEAD-LIMITS]
provides an analysis of these limits under the assumption that the
underlying primitive (AES or ChaCha20) has no weaknesses.
Implementations SHOULD do a key update Section 4.4.3 prior to
reaching these limits.
For AES-GCM, up to 2^24.5 full-size records may be encrypted on a
given connection while keeping a safety margin of approximately 2^-57
for Authenticated Encryption (AE) security. For ChaCha20/Poly1305,
the record sequence number will wrap before the safety limit is
reached.
6. Alert Protocol
One of the content types supported by the TLS record layer is the
alert type. Like other messages, alert messages are encrypted as
specified by the current connection state.
Alert messages convey the severity of the message (warning or fatal)
and a description of the alert. Warning-level messages are used to
indicate orderly closure of the connection (see Section 6.1). Upon
receiving a warning-level alert, the TLS implementation SHOULD
indicate end-of-data to the application and, if appropriate for the
alert type, send a closure alert in response.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 63]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
Fatal-level messages are used to indicate abortive closure of the
connection (See Section 6.2). Upon receiving a fatal-level alert,
the TLS implementation SHOULD indicate an error to the application
and MUST NOT allow any further data to be sent or received on the
connection. Servers and clients MUST forget keys and secrets
associated with a failed connection. Stateful implementations of
session tickets (as in many clients) SHOULD discard tickets
associated with failed connections.
All the alerts listed in Section 6.2 MUST be sent as fatal and MUST
be treated as fatal regardless of the AlertLevel in the message.
Unknown alert types MUST be treated as fatal.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 64]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
enum { warning(1), fatal(2), (255) } AlertLevel;
enum {
close_notify(0),
end_of_early_data(1),
unexpected_message(10),
bad_record_mac(20),
record_overflow(22),
handshake_failure(40),
bad_certificate(42),
unsupported_certificate(43),
certificate_revoked(44),
certificate_expired(45),
certificate_unknown(46),
illegal_parameter(47),
unknown_ca(48),
access_denied(49),
decode_error(50),
decrypt_error(51),
protocol_version(70),
insufficient_security(71),
internal_error(80),
inappropriate_fallback(86),
user_canceled(90),
missing_extension(109),
unsupported_extension(110),
certificate_unobtainable(111),
unrecognized_name(112),
bad_certificate_status_response(113),
bad_certificate_hash_value(114),
unknown_psk_identity(115),
(255)
} AlertDescription;
struct {
AlertLevel level;
AlertDescription description;
} Alert;
6.1. Closure Alerts
The client and the server must share knowledge that the connection is
ending in order to avoid a truncation attack. Failure to properly
close a connection does not prohibit a session from being resumed.
close_notify This alert notifies the recipient that the sender will
not send any more messages on this connection. Any data received
after a closure MUST be ignored.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 65]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
end_of_early_data This alert is sent by the client to indicate that
all 0-RTT application_data messages have been transmitted (or none
will be sent at all) and that this is the end of the flight. This
alert MUST be at the warning level. Servers MUST NOT send this
alert and clients receiving it MUST terminate the connection with
an "unexpected_message" alert.
user_canceled This alert notifies the recipient that the sender is
canceling the handshake for some reason unrelated to a protocol
failure. If a user cancels an operation after the handshake is
complete, just closing the connection by sending a "close_notify"
is more appropriate. This alert SHOULD be followed by a
"close_notify". This alert is generally a warning.
Either party MAY initiate a close by sending a "close_notify" alert.
Any data received after a closure alert is ignored. If a transport-
level close is received prior to a "close_notify", the receiver
cannot know that all the data that was sent has been received.
Each party MUST send a "close_notify" alert before closing the write
side of the connection, unless some other fatal alert has been
transmitted. The other party MUST respond with a "close_notify"
alert of its own and close down the connection immediately,
discarding any pending writes. The initiator of the close need not
wait for the responding "close_notify" alert before closing the read
side of the connection.
If the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be
carried over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is
closed, the TLS implementation must receive the responding
"close_notify" alert before indicating to the application layer that
the TLS connection has ended. If the application protocol will not
transfer any additional data, but will only close the underlying
transport connection, then the implementation MAY choose to close the
transport without waiting for the responding "close_notify". No part
of this standard should be taken to dictate the manner in which a
usage profile for TLS manages its data transport, including when
connections are opened or closed.
Note: It is assumed that closing a connection reliably delivers
pending data before destroying the transport.
6.2. Error Alerts
Error handling in the TLS Handshake Protocol is very simple. When an
error is detected, the detecting party sends a message to its peer.
Upon transmission or receipt of a fatal alert message, both parties
immediately close the connection. Whenever an implementation
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 66]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
encounters a condition which is defined as a fatal alert, it MUST
send the appropriate alert prior to closing the connection. All
alerts defined in this section below, as well as all unknown alerts
are universally considered fatal as of TLS 1.3 (see Section 6).
The following error alerts are defined:
unexpected_message An inappropriate message was received. This
alert should never be observed in communication between proper
implementations.
bad_record_mac This alert is returned if a record is received which
cannot be deprotected. Because AEAD algorithms combine decryption
and verification, this alert is used for all deprotection
failures. This alert should never be observed in communication
between proper implementations, except when messages were
corrupted in the network.
record_overflow A TLSCiphertext record was received that had a
length more than 2^14 + 256 bytes, or a record decrypted to a
TLSPlaintext record with more than 2^14 bytes. This alert should
never be observed in communication between proper implementations,
except when messages were corrupted in the network.
handshake_failure Reception of a "handshake_failure" alert message
indicates that the sender was unable to negotiate an acceptable
set of security parameters given the options available.
bad_certificate A certificate was corrupt, contained signatures that
did not verify correctly, etc.
unsupported_certificate A certificate was of an unsupported type.
certificate_revoked A certificate was revoked by its signer.
certificate_expired A certificate has expired or is not currently
valid.
certificate_unknown Some other (unspecified) issue arose in
processing the certificate, rendering it unacceptable.
illegal_parameter A field in the handshake was out of range or
inconsistent with other fields.
unknown_ca A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received,
but the certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate
could not be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted
CA.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 67]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
access_denied A valid certificate or PSK was received, but when
access control was applied, the sender decided not to proceed with
negotiation.
decode_error A message could not be decoded because some field was
out of the specified range or the length of the message was
incorrect. This alert should never be observed in communication
between proper implementations, except when messages were
corrupted in the network.
decrypt_error A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including
being unable to correctly verify a signature or validate a
Finished message.
protocol_version The protocol version the peer has attempted to
negotiate is recognized but not supported. (see Appendix C)
insufficient_security Returned instead of "handshake_failure" when a
negotiation has failed specifically because the server requires
ciphers more secure than those supported by the client.
internal_error An internal error unrelated to the peer or the
correctness of the protocol (such as a memory allocation failure)
makes it impossible to continue.
inappropriate_fallback Sent by a server in response to an invalid
connection retry attempt from a client. (see [RFC7507])
missing_extension Sent by endpoints that receive a hello message not
containing an extension that is mandatory to send for the offered
TLS version. [[TODO: IANA Considerations.]]
unsupported_extension Sent by endpoints receiving any hello message
containing an extension known to be prohibited for inclusion in
the given hello message, including any extensions in a ServerHello
not first offered in the corresponding ClientHello.
certificate_unobtainable Sent by servers when unable to obtain a
certificate from a URL provided by the client via the
"client_certificate_url" extension [RFC6066].
unrecognized_name Sent by servers when no server exists identified
by the name provided by the client via the "server_name" extension
[RFC6066].
bad_certificate_status_response Sent by clients when an invalid or
unacceptable OCSP response is provided by the server via the
"status_request" extension [RFC6066]. This alert is always fatal.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 68]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
bad_certificate_hash_value Sent by servers when a retrieved object
does not have the correct hash provided by the client via the
"client_certificate_url" extension [RFC6066].
unknown_psk_identity Sent by servers when a PSK cipher suite is
selected but no acceptable PSK identity is provided by the client.
Sending this alert is OPTIONAL; servers MAY instead choose to send
a "decrypt_error" alert to merely indicate an invalid PSK
identity.
New Alert values are assigned by IANA as described in Section 10.
7. Cryptographic Computations
In order to begin connection protection, the TLS Record Protocol
requires specification of a suite of algorithms, a master secret, and
the client and server random values. The authentication, key
exchange, and record protection algorithms are determined by the
cipher_suite selected by the server and revealed in the ServerHello
message. The random values are exchanged in the hello messages. All
that remains is to calculate the key schedule.
7.1. Key Schedule
The TLS handshake establishes one or more input secrets which are
combined to create the actual working keying material, as detailed
below. The key derivation process makes use of the HKDF-Extract and
HKDF-Expand functions as defined for HKDF [RFC5869], as well as the
functions defined below:
HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, HashValue, Length) =
HKDF-Expand(Secret, HkdfLabel, Length)
Where HkdfLabel is specified as:
struct HkdfLabel
{
uint16 length = Length;
opaque label<9..255> = "TLS 1.3, " + Label;
opaque hash_value<0..255> = HashValue;
};
Derive-Secret(Secret, Label, Messages) =
HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label,
Hash(Messages) +
Hash(resumption_context), Hash.Length)
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 69]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
The Hash function and the HKDF hash are the cipher suite hash
function. Hash.Length is its output length.
Given a set of n InputSecrets, the final "master secret" is computed
by iteratively invoking HKDF-Extract with InputSecret_1,
InputSecret_2, etc. The initial secret is simply a string of zeroes
as long as the size of the Hash that is the basis for the HKDF.
Concretely, for the present version of TLS 1.3, secrets are added in
the following order:
- PSK
- (EC)DHE shared secret
This produces a full key derivation schedule shown in the diagram
below. In this diagram, the following formatting conventions apply:
- HKDF-Extract is drawn as taking the Salt argument from the top and
the IKM argument from the left.
- Derive-Secret's Secret argument is indicated by the arrow coming
in from the left. For instance, the Early Secret is the Secret
for generating the early_traffic-secret.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 70]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
0
|
v
PSK -> HKDF-Extract
|
v
Early Secret ---> Derive-Secret(., "early traffic secret",
| ClientHello)
| = early_traffic_secret
v
(EC)DHE -> HKDF-Extract
|
v
Handshake
Secret -----> Derive-Secret(., "handshake traffic secret",
| ClientHello + ServerHello)
| = handshake_traffic_secret
v
0 -> HKDF-Extract
|
v
Master Secret
|
+---------> Derive-Secret(., "application traffic secret",
| ClientHello...Server Finished)
| = traffic_secret_0
|
+---------> Derive-Secret(., "exporter master secret",
| ClientHello...Client Finished)
| = exporter_secret
|
+---------> Derive-Secret(., "resumption master secret",
ClientHello...Client Finished)
= resumption_secret
The general pattern here is that the secrets shown down the left side
of the diagram are just raw entropy without context, whereas the
secrets down the right side include handshake context and therefore
can be used to derive working keys without additional context. Note
that the different calls to Derive-Secret may take different Messages
arguments, even with the same secret. In a 0-RTT exchange, Derive-
Secret is called with four distinct transcripts; in a 1-RTT only
exchange with three distinct transcripts.
If a given secret is not available, then the 0-value consisting of a
string of Hash.length zeroes is used. Note that this does not mean
skipping rounds, so if PSK is not in use Early Secret will still be
HKDF-Extract(0, 0).
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 71]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
7.2. Updating Traffic Keys and IVs
Once the handshake is complete, it is possible for either side to
update its sending traffic keys using the KeyUpdate handshake message
defined in Section 4.4.3. The next generation of traffic keys is
computed by generating traffic_secret_N+1 from traffic_secret_N as
described in this section then re-deriving the traffic keys as
described in Section 7.3.
The next-generation traffic_secret is computed as:
traffic_secret_N+1 = HKDF-Expand-Label(
traffic_secret_N,
"application traffic secret", "", Hash.Length)
Once traffic_secret_N+1 and its associated traffic keys have been
computed, implementations SHOULD delete traffic_secret_N. Once the
directional keys are no longer needed, they SHOULD be deleted as
well.
7.3. Traffic Key Calculation
The traffic keying material is generated from the following input
values:
- A secret value
- A phase value indicating the phase of the protocol the keys are
being generated for
- A purpose value indicating the specific value being generated
- The length of the key
The keying material is computed using:
key = HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret,
phase + ", " + purpose,
"",
key_length)
The following table describes the inputs to the key calculation for
each class of traffic keys:
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 72]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
+-------------+--------------------------+--------------------------+
| Record Type | Secret | Phase |
+-------------+--------------------------+--------------------------+
| 0-RTT | early_traffic_secret | "early handshake key |
| Handshake | | expansion" |
| | | |
| 0-RTT | early_traffic_secret | "early application data |
| Application | | key expansion" |
| | | |
| Handshake | handshake_traffic_secret | "handshake key |
| | | expansion" |
| | | |
| Application | traffic_secret_N | "application data key |
| Data | | expansion" |
+-------------+--------------------------+--------------------------+
The following table indicates the purpose values for each type of
key:
+------------------+--------------------+
| Key Type | Purpose |
+------------------+--------------------+
| client_write_key | "client write key" |
| | |
| server_write_key | "server write key" |
| | |
| client_write_iv | "client write iv" |
| | |
| server_write_iv | "server write iv" |
+------------------+--------------------+
All the traffic keying material is recomputed whenever the underlying
Secret changes (e.g., when changing from the handshake to application
data keys or upon a key update).
7.3.1. Diffie-Hellman
A conventional Diffie-Hellman computation is performed. The
negotiated key (Z) is converted to byte string by encoding in big-
endian, padded with zeros up to the size of the prime. This byte
string is used as the shared secret, and is used in the key schedule
as specified above.
Note that this construction differs from previous versions of TLS
which remove leading zeros.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 73]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
7.3.2. Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
For secp256r1, secp384r1 and secp521r1, ECDH calculations (including
parameter and key generation as well as the shared secret
calculation) are performed according to [IEEE1363] using the ECKAS-
DH1 scheme with the identity map as key derivation function (KDF), so
that the shared secret is the x-coordinate of the ECDH shared secret
elliptic curve point represented as an octet string. Note that this
octet string (Z in IEEE 1363 terminology) as output by FE2OSP, the
Field Element to Octet String Conversion Primitive, has constant
length for any given field; leading zeros found in this octet string
MUST NOT be truncated.
(Note that this use of the identity KDF is a technicality. The
complete picture is that ECDH is employed with a non-trivial KDF
because TLS does not directly use this secret for anything other than
for computing other secrets.)
ECDH functions are used as follows:
- The public key to put into the KeyShareEntry.key_exchange
structure is the result of applying the ECDH function to the
secret key of appropriate length (into scalar input) and the
standard public basepoint (into u-coordinate point input).
- The ECDH shared secret is the result of applying ECDH function to
the secret key (into scalar input) and the peer's public key (into
u-coordinate point input). The output is used raw, with no
processing.
For X25519 and X448, see [RFC7748].
7.3.3. Exporters
[RFC5705] defines keying material exporters for TLS in terms of the
TLS PRF. This document replaces the PRF with HKDF, thus requiring a
new construction. The exporter interface remains the same, however
the value is computed as:
HKDF-Expand-Label(exporter_secret,
label, context_value, key_length)
8. Compliance Requirements
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 74]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
8.1. MTI Cipher Suites
In the absence of an application profile standard specifying
otherwise, a TLS-compliant application MUST implement the following
cipher suites:
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
These cipher suites MUST support both digital signatures and key
exchange with secp256r1 (NIST P-256) and SHOULD support key exchange
with X25519 [RFC7748].
A TLS-compliant application SHOULD implement the following cipher
suites:
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
8.2. MTI Extensions
In the absence of an application profile standard specifying
otherwise, a TLS-compliant application MUST implement the following
TLS extensions:
- Signature Algorithms ("signature_algorithms"; Section 4.2.2)
- Negotiated Groups ("supported_groups"; Section 4.2.3)
- Key Share ("key_share"; Section 4.2.4)
- Pre-Shared Key ("pre_shared_key"; Section 4.2.5)
- Server Name Indication ("server_name"; Section 3 of [RFC6066])
- Cookie ("cookie"; Section 4.2.1)
All implementations MUST send and use these extensions when offering
applicable cipher suites:
- "signature_algorithms" is REQUIRED for certificate authenticated
cipher suites.
- "supported_groups" and "key_share" are REQUIRED for DHE or ECDHE
cipher suites.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 75]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
- "pre_shared_key" is REQUIRED for PSK cipher suites.
- "cookie" is REQUIRED for all cipher suites.
When negotiating use of applicable cipher suites, endpoints MUST
abort the connection with a "missing_extension" alert if the required
extension was not provided. Any endpoint that receives any invalid
combination of cipher suites and extensions MAY abort the connection
with a "missing_extension" alert, regardless of negotiated
parameters.
Additionally, all implementations MUST support use of the
"server_name" extension with applications capable of using it.
Servers MAY require clients to send a valid "server_name" extension.
Servers requiring this extension SHOULD respond to a ClientHello
lacking a "server_name" extension with a fatal "missing_extension"
alert.
Servers MUST NOT send the "signature_algorithms" extension; if a
client receives this extension it MUST respond with a fatal
"unsupported_extension" alert and close the connection.
9. Security Considerations
Security issues are discussed throughout this memo, especially in
Appendices B, C, and D.
10. IANA Considerations
This document uses several registries that were originally created in
[RFC4346]. IANA has updated these to reference this document. The
registries and their allocation policies are below:
- TLS Cipher Suite Registry: Values with the first byte in the range
0-254 (decimal) are assigned via Specification Required [RFC2434].
Values with the first byte 255 (decimal) are reserved for Private
Use [RFC2434]. IANA [SHALL add/has added] a "Recommended" column
to the cipher suite registry. All cipher suites listed in
Appendix A.4 are marked as "Yes". All other cipher suites are
marked as "No". IANA [SHALL add/has added] add a note to this
column reading:
Cipher suites marked as "Yes" are those allocated via Standards
Track RFCs. Cipher suites marked as "No" are not; cipher
suites marked "No" range from "good" to "bad" from a
cryptographic standpoint.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 76]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
- TLS ContentType Registry: Future values are allocated via
Standards Action [RFC2434].
- TLS Alert Registry: Future values are allocated via Standards
Action [RFC2434].
- TLS HandshakeType Registry: Future values are allocated via
Standards Action [RFC2434]. IANA [SHALL update/has updated] this
registry to rename item 4 from "NewSessionTicket" to
"new_session_ticket".
This document also uses a registry originally created in [RFC4366].
IANA has updated it to reference this document. The registry and its
allocation policy is listed below:
- TLS ExtensionType Registry: Values with the first byte in the
range 0-254 (decimal) are assigned via Specification Required
[RFC2434]. Values with the first byte 255 (decimal) are reserved
for Private Use [RFC2434]. IANA [SHALL update/has updated] this
registry to include the "key_share", "pre_shared_key", and
"early_data" extensions as defined in this document.
IANA [shall update/has updated] this registry to include a "TLS
1.3" column with the following four values: "Client", indicating
that the server shall not send them. "Clear", indicating that
they shall be in the ServerHello. "Encrypted", indicating that
they shall be in the EncryptedExtensions block, and "No"
indicating that they are not used in TLS 1.3. This column [shall
be/has been] initially populated with the values in this document.
IANA [shall update/has updated] this registry to add a
"Recommended" column. IANA [shall/has] initially populated this
column with the values in the table below. This table has been
generated by marking Standards Track RFCs as "Yes" and all others
as "No".
+-------------------------------+-----------+-----------------------+
| Extension | Recommend | TLS 1.3 |
| | ed | |
+-------------------------------+-----------+-----------------------+
| server_name [RFC6066] | Yes | Encrypted |
| | | |
| max_fragment_length [RFC6066] | Yes | Encrypted |
| | | |
| client_certificate_url | Yes | Encrypted |
| [RFC6066] | | |
| | | |
| trusted_ca_keys [RFC6066] | Yes | Encrypted |
| | | |
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 77]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
| truncated_hmac [RFC6066] | Yes | No |
| | | |
| status_request [RFC6066] | Yes | No |
| | | |
| user_mapping [RFC4681] | Yes | Encrypted |
| | | |
| client_authz [RFC5878] | No | Encrypted |
| | | |
| server_authz [RFC5878] | No | Encrypted |
| | | |
| cert_type [RFC6091] | Yes | Encrypted |
| | | |
| supported_groups [RFC-ietf- | Yes | Encrypted |
| tls-negotiated-ff-dhe] | | |
| | | |
| ec_point_formats [RFC4492] | Yes | No |
| | | |
| srp [RFC5054] | No | No |
| | | |
| signature_algorithms | Yes | Client |
| [RFC5246] | | |
| | | |
| use_srtp [RFC5764] | Yes | Encrypted |
| | | |
| heartbeat [RFC6520] | Yes | Encrypted |
| | | |
| application_layer_protocol_ne | Yes | Encrypted |
| gotiation [RFC7301] | | |
| | | |
| status_request_v2 [RFC6961] | Yes | Encrypted |
| | | |
| signed_certificate_timestamp | No | Encrypted |
| [RFC6962] | | |
| | | |
| client_certificate_type | Yes | Encrypted |
| [RFC7250] | | |
| | | |
| server_certificate_type | Yes | Encrypted |
| [RFC7250] | | |
| | | |
| padding [RFC7685] | Yes | Client |
| | | |
| encrypt_then_mac [RFC7366] | Yes | No |
| | | |
| extended_master_secret | Yes | No |
| [RFC7627] | | |
| | | |
| SessionTicket TLS [RFC4507] | Yes | No |
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 78]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
| | | |
| renegotiation_info [RFC5746] | Yes | No |
| | | |
| key_share [[this document]] | Yes | Clear |
| | | |
| pre_shared_key [[this | Yes | Clear |
| document]] | | |
| | | |
| early_data [[this document]] | Yes | Encrypted |
| | | |
| cookie [[this document]] | Yes | Encrypted/HelloRetryR |
| | | equest |
+-------------------------------+-----------+-----------------------+
In addition, this document defines two new registries to be
maintained by IANA
- TLS SignatureScheme Registry: Values with the first byte in the
range 0-254 (decimal) are assigned via Specification Required
[RFC2434]. Values with the first byte 255 (decimal) are reserved
for Private Use [RFC2434]. This registry SHALL have a
"Recommended" column. The registry [shall be/ has been] initially
populated with the values described in Section 4.2.2. The
following values SHALL be marked as "Recommended":
ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, rsa_pss_sha256,
rsa_pss_sha384, rsa_pss_sha512, ed25519.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES)", NIST FIPS 197, November 2001.
[DH] Diffie, W. and M. Hellman, "New Directions in
Cryptography", IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
V.IT-22 n.6 , June 1977.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa]
Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", draft-irtf-cfrg-eddsa-05
(work in progress), March 2016.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 79]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
[I-D.mattsson-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead]
Mattsson, J. and D. Migault, "ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and
AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
draft-mattsson-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-05 (work in progress),
April 2016.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 2434,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2434, October 1998,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2434>.
[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.1", RFC 3447, DOI 10.17487/RFC3447, February
2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3447>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5288] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois
Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5288, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5288>.
[RFC5289] Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-
256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)", RFC 5289,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5289, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5289>.
[RFC5487] Badra, M., "Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-
256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode", RFC 5487,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5487, March 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5487>.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 80]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
[RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
March 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
[RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>.
[RFC6209] Kim, W., Lee, J., Park, J., and D. Kwon, "Addition of the
ARIA Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 6209, DOI 10.17487/RFC6209, April 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6209>.
[RFC6367] Kanno, S. and M. Kanda, "Addition of the Camellia Cipher
Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6367,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6367, September 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6367>.
[RFC6655] McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6655, July 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6655>.
[RFC6961] Pettersen, Y., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Multiple Certificate Status Request Extension", RFC 6961,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6961, June 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6961>.
[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.
[RFC7251] McGrew, D., Bailey, D., Campagna, M., and R. Dugal, "AES-
CCM Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
TLS", RFC 7251, DOI 10.17487/RFC7251, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7251>.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 81]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
[RFC7443] Patil, P., Reddy, T., Salgueiro, G., and M. Petit-
Huguenin, "Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN)
Labels for Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)
Usages", RFC 7443, DOI 10.17487/RFC7443, January 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7443>.
[RFC7748] Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748>.
[RFC7905] Langley, A., Chang, W., Mavrogiannopoulos, N.,
Strombergson, J., and S. Josefsson, "ChaCha20-Poly1305
Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 7905, DOI 10.17487/RFC7905, June 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7905>.
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
Department of Commerce, "Secure Hash Standard", NIST FIPS
PUB 180-4, March 2012.
[X690] ITU-T, "Information technology - ASN.1 encoding Rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002, 2002.
[X962] ANSI, "Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services
Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA)", ANSI X9.62, 1998.
11.2. Informative References
[AEAD-LIMITS]
Luykx, A. and K. Paterson, "Limits on Authenticated
Encryption Use in TLS", 2016,
<http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/TLS-AEbounds.pdf>.
[BBFKZG16]
Bhargavan, K., Brzuska, C., Fournet, C., Kohlweiss, M.,
Zanella-Beguelin, S., and M. Green, "Downgrade Resilience
in Key-Exchange Protocols", Proceedings of IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy (Oakland) 2016 , 2016.
[CHSV16] Cremers, C., Horvat, M., Scott, S., and T. van der Merwe,
"Automated Analysis and Verification of TLS 1.3: 0-RTT,
Resumption and Delayed Authentication", Proceedings of
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland) 2016 ,
2016.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 82]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
[CK01] Canetti, R. and H. Krawczyk, "Analysis of Key-Exchange
Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels",
Proceedings of Eurocrypt 2001 , 2001.
[DOW92] Diffie, W., van Oorschot, P., and M. Wiener,
""Authentication and authenticated key exchanges"",
Designs, Codes and Cryptography , n.d..
[DSS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
Department of Commerce, "Digital Signature Standard,
version 4", NIST FIPS PUB 186-4, 2013.
[ECDSA] American National Standards Institute, "Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)",
ANSI ANS X9.62-2005, November 2005.
[FGSW16] Fischlin, M., Guenther, F., Schmidt, B., and B. Warinschi,
"Key Confirmation in Key Exchange: A Formal Treatment and
Implications for TLS 1.3", Proceedings of IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy (Oakland) 2016 , 2016.
[FI06] Finney, H., "Bleichenbacher's RSA signature forgery based
on implementation error", August 2006,
<https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/openpgp/current/
msg00999.html>.
[GCM] Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC",
NIST Special Publication 800-38D, November 2007.
[I-D.ietf-tls-cached-info]
Santesson, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Cached Information Extension", draft-ietf-tls-
cached-info-23 (work in progress), May 2016.
[I-D.ietf-tls-negotiated-ff-dhe]
Gillmor, D., "Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman
Ephemeral Parameters for TLS", draft-ietf-tls-negotiated-
ff-dhe-10 (work in progress), June 2015.
[IEEE1363]
IEEE, "Standard Specifications for Public Key
Cryptography", IEEE 1363 , 2000.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 83]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
[LXZFH16] Li, X., Xu, J., Feng, D., Zhang, Z., and H. Hu, "Multiple
Handshakes Security of TLS 1.3 Candidates", Proceedings of
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland) 2016 ,
2016.
[PKCS6] RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #6: RSA Extended Certificate
Syntax Standard, version 1.5", November 1993.
[PKCS7] RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #7: RSA Cryptographic Message
Syntax Standard, version 1.5", November 1993.
[PSK-FINISHED]
Cremers, C., Horvat, M., van der Merwe, T., and S. Scott,
"Revision 10: possible attack if client authentication is
allowed during PSK", 2015, <https://www.ietf.org/mail-
archive/web/tls/current/msg18215.html>.
[RFC0793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc793>.
[RFC1948] Bellovin, S., "Defending Against Sequence Number Attacks",
RFC 1948, DOI 10.17487/RFC1948, May 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1948>.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC4279] Eronen, P., Ed. and H. Tschofenig, Ed., "Pre-Shared Key
Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4279, DOI 10.17487/RFC4279, December 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4279>.
[RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4302, December 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4302>.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 84]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4346, April 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4346>.
[RFC4366] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J.,
and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions", RFC 4366, DOI 10.17487/RFC4366, April 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4366>.
[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4492, May 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4492>.
[RFC4506] Eisler, M., Ed., "XDR: External Data Representation
Standard", STD 67, RFC 4506, DOI 10.17487/RFC4506, May
2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4506>.
[RFC4507] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
Server-Side State", RFC 4507, DOI 10.17487/RFC4507, May
2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4507>.
[RFC4681] Santesson, S., Medvinsky, A., and J. Ball, "TLS User
Mapping Extension", RFC 4681, DOI 10.17487/RFC4681,
October 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4681>.
[RFC5054] Taylor, D., Wu, T., Mavrogiannopoulos, N., and T. Perrin,
"Using the Secure Remote Password (SRP) Protocol for TLS
Authentication", RFC 5054, DOI 10.17487/RFC5054, November
2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5054>.
[RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
Server-Side State", RFC 5077, DOI 10.17487/RFC5077,
January 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5077>.
[RFC5081] Mavrogiannopoulos, N., "Using OpenPGP Keys for Transport
Layer Security (TLS) Authentication", RFC 5081,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5081, November 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5081>.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 85]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5746] Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
Extension", RFC 5746, DOI 10.17487/RFC5746, February 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5746>.
[RFC5763] Fischl, J., Tschofenig, H., and E. Rescorla, "Framework
for Establishing a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol
(SRTP) Security Context Using Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS)", RFC 5763, DOI 10.17487/RFC5763, May
2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5763>.
[RFC5764] McGrew, D. and E. Rescorla, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys for the Secure
Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 5764,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5764, May 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5764>.
[RFC5878] Brown, M. and R. Housley, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Authorization Extensions", RFC 5878, DOI 10.17487/RFC5878,
May 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5878>.
[RFC5929] Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings
for TLS", RFC 5929, DOI 10.17487/RFC5929, July 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5929>.
[RFC6091] Mavrogiannopoulos, N. and D. Gillmor, "Using OpenPGP Keys
for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authentication",
RFC 6091, DOI 10.17487/RFC6091, February 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6091>.
[RFC6176] Turner, S. and T. Polk, "Prohibiting Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) Version 2.0", RFC 6176, DOI 10.17487/RFC6176, March
2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6176>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
[RFC6520] Seggelmann, R., Tuexen, M., and M. Williams, "Transport
Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS) Heartbeat Extension", RFC 6520,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6520, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6520>.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 86]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
[RFC6962] Laurie, B., Langley, A., and E. Kasper, "Certificate
Transparency", RFC 6962, DOI 10.17487/RFC6962, June 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6962>.
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J.,
Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 7250, DOI 10.17487/RFC7250,
June 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7250>.
[RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
July 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.
[RFC7366] Gutmann, P., "Encrypt-then-MAC for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", RFC 7366, DOI 10.17487/RFC7366, September 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7366>.
[RFC7465] Popov, A., "Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites", RFC 7465,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7465, February 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7465>.
[RFC7568] Barnes, R., Thomson, M., Pironti, A., and A. Langley,
"Deprecating Secure Sockets Layer Version 3.0", RFC 7568,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7568, June 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7568>.
[RFC7627] Bhargavan, K., Ed., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A.,
Langley, A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension",
RFC 7627, DOI 10.17487/RFC7627, September 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7627>.
[RFC7685] Langley, A., "A Transport Layer Security (TLS) ClientHello
Padding Extension", RFC 7685, DOI 10.17487/RFC7685,
October 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7685>.
[RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and L. Adleman, "A Method for
Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key
Cryptosystems", Communications of the ACM v. 21, n. 2, pp.
120-126., February 1978.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 87]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
[SIGMA] Krawczyk, H., "SIGMA: the 'SIGn-and-MAc' approach to
authenticated Di e-Hellman and its use in the IKE
protocols", Proceedings of CRYPTO 2003 , 2003.
[SLOTH] Bhargavan, K. and G. Leurent, "Transcript Collision
Attacks: Breaking Authentication in TLS, IKE, and SSH",
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS
2016) , 2016.
[SSL2] Hickman, K., "The SSL Protocol", February 1995.
[SSL3] Freier, A., Karlton, P., and P. Kocher, "The SSL 3.0
Protocol", November 1996.
[TIMING] Boneh, D. and D. Brumley, "Remote timing attacks are
practical", USENIX Security Symposium, 2003.
[X501] "Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
The Directory: Models", ITU-T X.501, 1993.
11.3. URIs
[1] mailto:tls@ietf.org
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 88]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
Appendix A. Protocol Data Structures and Constant Values
This section describes protocol types and constants. Values listed
as _RESERVED were used in previous versions of TLS and are listed
here for completeness. TLS 1.3 implementations MUST NOT send them
but might receive them from older TLS implementations.
A.1. Record Layer
enum {
invalid_RESERVED(0),
change_cipher_spec_RESERVED(20),
alert(21),
handshake(22),
application_data(23)
(255)
} ContentType;
struct {
ContentType type;
ProtocolVersion record_version = { 3, 1 }; /* TLS v1.x */
uint16 length;
opaque fragment[TLSPlaintext.length];
} TLSPlaintext;
struct {
opaque content[TLSPlaintext.length];
ContentType type;
uint8 zeros[length_of_padding];
} TLSInnerPlaintext;
struct {
ContentType opaque_type = application_data(23); /* see fragment.type */
ProtocolVersion record_version = { 3, 1 }; /* TLS v1.x */
uint16 length;
opaque encrypted_record[length];
} TLSCiphertext;
A.2. Alert Messages
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 89]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
enum { warning(1), fatal(2), (255) } AlertLevel;
enum {
close_notify(0),
end_of_early_data(1),
unexpected_message(10),
bad_record_mac(20),
decryption_failed_RESERVED(21),
record_overflow(22),
decompression_failure_RESERVED(30),
handshake_failure(40),
no_certificate_RESERVED(41),
bad_certificate(42),
unsupported_certificate(43),
certificate_revoked(44),
certificate_expired(45),
certificate_unknown(46),
illegal_parameter(47),
unknown_ca(48),
access_denied(49),
decode_error(50),
decrypt_error(51),
export_restriction_RESERVED(60),
protocol_version(70),
insufficient_security(71),
internal_error(80),
inappropriate_fallback(86),
user_canceled(90),
no_renegotiation_RESERVED(100),
missing_extension(109),
unsupported_extension(110),
certificate_unobtainable(111),
unrecognized_name(112),
bad_certificate_status_response(113),
bad_certificate_hash_value(114),
unknown_psk_identity(115),
(255)
} AlertDescription;
struct {
AlertLevel level;
AlertDescription description;
} Alert;
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 90]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
A.3. Handshake Protocol
enum {
hello_request_RESERVED(0),
client_hello(1),
server_hello(2),
new_session_ticket(4),
hello_retry_request(6),
encrypted_extensions(8),
certificate(11),
server_key_exchange_RESERVED(12),
certificate_request(13),
server_hello_done_RESERVED(14),
certificate_verify(15),
client_key_exchange_RESERVED(16),
finished(20),
key_update(24),
(255)
} HandshakeType;
struct {
HandshakeType msg_type; /* handshake type */
uint24 length; /* bytes in message */
select (HandshakeType) {
case client_hello: ClientHello;
case server_hello: ServerHello;
case hello_retry_request: HelloRetryRequest;
case encrypted_extensions: EncryptedExtensions;
case certificate_request: CertificateRequest;
case certificate: Certificate;
case certificate_verify: CertificateVerify;
case finished: Finished;
case new_session_ticket: NewSessionTicket;
case key_update: KeyUpdate;
} body;
} Handshake;
A.3.1. Key Exchange Messages
struct {
uint8 major;
uint8 minor;
} ProtocolVersion;
struct {
opaque random_bytes[32];
} Random;
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 91]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
uint8 CipherSuite[2]; /* Cryptographic suite selector */
struct {
ProtocolVersion client_version = { 3, 4 }; /* TLS v1.3 */
Random random;
opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>;
CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>;
opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} ClientHello;
struct {
ProtocolVersion server_version;
Random random;
CipherSuite cipher_suite;
Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} ServerHello;
struct {
ProtocolVersion server_version;
CipherSuite cipher_suite;
NamedGroup selected_group;
Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} HelloRetryRequest;
struct {
ExtensionType extension_type;
opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>;
} Extension;
enum {
supported_groups(10),
signature_algorithms(13),
key_share(40),
pre_shared_key(41),
early_data(42),
cookie(44),
(65535)
} ExtensionType;
struct {
NamedGroup group;
opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
} KeyShareEntry;
struct {
select (role) {
case client:
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 92]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1>;
case server:
KeyShareEntry server_share;
}
} KeyShare;
opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>;
struct {
select (Role) {
case client:
psk_identity identities<2..2^16-1>;
case server:
uint16 selected_identity;
}
} PreSharedKeyExtension;
struct {
select (Role) {
case client:
uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age;
case server:
struct {};
}
} EarlyDataIndication;
A.3.1.1. Cookie Extension
struct {
opaque cookie<0..2^16-1>;
} Cookie;
A.3.1.2. Signature Algorithm Extension
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 93]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
enum {
/* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms */
rsa_pkcs1_sha1 (0x0201),
rsa_pkcs1_sha256 (0x0401),
rsa_pkcs1_sha384 (0x0501),
rsa_pkcs1_sha512 (0x0601),
/* ECDSA algorithms */
ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 (0x0403),
ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 (0x0503),
ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 (0x0603),
/* RSASSA-PSS algorithms */
rsa_pss_sha256 (0x0700),
rsa_pss_sha384 (0x0701),
rsa_pss_sha512 (0x0702),
/* EdDSA algorithms */
ed25519 (0x0703),
ed448 (0x0704),
/* Reserved Code Points */
dsa_sha1_RESERVED (0x0202),
dsa_sha256_RESERVED (0x0402),
dsa_sha384_RESERVED (0x0502),
dsa_sha512_RESERVED (0x0602),
ecdsa_sha1_RESERVED (0x0203),
obsolete_RESERVED (0x0000..0x0200),
obsolete_RESERVED (0x0204..0x0400),
obsolete_RESERVED (0x0404..0x0500),
obsolete_RESERVED (0x0504..0x0600),
obsolete_RESERVED (0x0604..0x06FF),
private_use (0xFE00..0xFFFF),
(0xFFFF)
} SignatureScheme;
SignatureScheme supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
A.3.1.3. Named Group Extension
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 94]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
enum {
/* Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE) */
obsolete_RESERVED (1..22),
secp256r1 (23), secp384r1 (24), secp521r1 (25),
obsolete_RESERVED (26..28),
x25519 (29), x448 (30),
/* Finite Field Groups (DHE) */
ffdhe2048 (256), ffdhe3072 (257), ffdhe4096 (258),
ffdhe6144 (259), ffdhe8192 (260),
/* Reserved Code Points */
ffdhe_private_use (0x01FC..0x01FF),
ecdhe_private_use (0xFE00..0xFEFF),
obsolete_RESERVED (0xFF01..0xFF02),
(0xFFFF)
} NamedGroup;
struct {
NamedGroup named_group_list<1..2^16-1>;
} NamedGroupList;
Values within "obsolete_RESERVED" ranges were used in previous
versions of TLS and MUST NOT be offered or negotiated by TLS 1.3
implementations. The obsolete curves have various known/theoretical
weaknesses or have had very little usage, in some cases only due to
unintentional server configuration issues. They are no longer
considered appropriate for general use and should be assumed to be
potentially unsafe. The set of curves specified here is sufficient
for interoperability with all currently deployed and properly
configured TLS implementations.
A.3.1.4. Deprecated Extensions
The following extensions are no longer applicable to TLS 1.3,
although TLS 1.3 clients MAY send them if they are willing to
negotiate them with prior versions of TLS. TLS 1.3 servers MUST
ignore these extensions if they are negotiating TLS 1.3:
truncated_hmac [RFC6066], srp [RFC5054], encrypt_then_mac [RFC7366],
extended_master_secret [RFC7627], SessionTicket [RFC5077], and
renegotiation_info [RFC5746].
A.3.2. Server Parameters Messages
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 95]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
struct {
Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} EncryptedExtensions;
opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
struct {
opaque certificate_extension_oid<1..2^8-1>;
opaque certificate_extension_values<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateExtension;
struct {
opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
SignatureScheme
supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
CertificateExtension certificate_extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateRequest;
A.3.3. Authentication Messages
opaque ASN1Cert<1..2^24-1>;
struct {
opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
ASN1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
} Certificate;
struct {
SignatureScheme algorithm;
opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateVerify;
struct {
opaque verify_data[Hash.length];
} Finished;
A.3.4. Ticket Establishment
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 96]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
enum { (65535) } TicketExtensionType;
struct {
TicketExtensionType extension_type;
opaque extension_data<1..2^16-1>;
} TicketExtension;
enum {
allow_early_data(1),
allow_dhe_resumption(2),
allow_psk_resumption(4)
} TicketFlags;
struct {
uint32 ticket_lifetime;
uint32 flags;
uint32 ticket_age_add;
TicketExtension extensions<2..2^16-2>;
opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>;
} NewSessionTicket;
A.4. Cipher Suites
A cipher suite defines a cipher specification supported in TLS and
negotiated via hello messages in the TLS handshake. Cipher suite
names follow a general naming convention composed of a series of
component algorithm names separated by underscores:
CipherSuite TLS_KEA_AUTH_WITH_CIPHER_HASH = VALUE;
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| Component | Contents |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| TLS | The string "TLS" |
| | |
| KEA | The key exchange algorithm (e.g. ECDHE, DHE) |
| | |
| AUTH | The authentication algorithm (e.g. certificates, PSK) |
| | |
| WITH | The string "WITH" |
| | |
| CIPHER | The symmetric cipher used for record protection |
| | |
| HASH | The hash algorithm used with HKDF |
| | |
| VALUE | The two byte ID assigned for this cipher suite |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 97]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
The "CIPHER" component commonly has sub-components used to designate
the cipher name, bits, and mode, if applicable. For example,
"AES_256_GCM" represents 256-bit AES in the GCM mode of operation.
Cipher suite names that lack a "HASH" value that are defined for use
with TLS 1.2 or later use the SHA-256 hash algorithm by default.
The primary key exchange algorithm used in TLS is Ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman [DH]. The finite field based version is denoted "DHE" and
the elliptic curve based version is denoted "ECDHE". Prior versions
of TLS supported non-ephemeral key exchanges, however these are not
supported by TLS 1.3.
See the definitions of each cipher suite in its specification
document for the full details of each combination of algorithms that
is specified.
The following is a list of standards track server-authenticated (and
optionally client-authenticated) cipher suites which are currently
available in TLS 1.3:
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 98]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
+----------------------------------------+-----------+--------------+
| Cipher Suite Name | Value | Specificatio |
| | | n |
+----------------------------------------+-----------+--------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | {0x00,0x9 | [RFC5288] |
| | E} | |
| | | |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | {0x00,0x9 | [RFC5288] |
| | F} | |
| | | |
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA25 | {0xC0,0x2 | [RFC5289] |
| 6 | B} | |
| | | |
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA38 | {0xC0,0x2 | [RFC5289] |
| 4 | C} | |
| | | |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | {0xC0,0x2 | [RFC5289] |
| | F} | |
| | | |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | {0xC0,0x3 | [RFC5289] |
| | 0} | |
| | | |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM | {0xC0,0x9 | [RFC6655] |
| | E} | |
| | | |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM | {0xC0,0x9 | [RFC6655] |
| | F} | |
| | | |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 | {0xC0,0xA | [RFC6655] |
| | 2} | |
| | | |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 | {0xC0,0xA | [RFC6655] |
| | 3} | |
| | | |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_S | {0xCC,0xA | [RFC7905] |
| HA256 | 8} | |
| | | |
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 | {0xCC,0xA | [RFC7905] |
| _SHA256 | 9} | |
| | | |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA | {0xCC,0xA | [RFC7905] |
| 256 | A} | |
+----------------------------------------+-----------+--------------+
Note: The values listed for ChaCha/Poly are preliminary but are being
or will be used for interop testing and therefore are likely to be
assigned.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 99]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
Note: ECDHE AES GCM was not yet standards track prior to the
publication of this specification. This document promotes the above-
listed ciphers to standards track.
The following is a list of standards track ephemeral pre-shared key
cipher suites which are currently available in TLS 1.3:
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 100]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
+------------------------------+----------+-------------------------+
| Cipher Suite Name | Value | Specification |
+------------------------------+----------+-------------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM | {0x00,0x | [RFC5487] |
| _SHA256 | AA} | |
| | | |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM | {0x00,0x | [RFC5487] |
| _SHA384 | AB} | |
| | | |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM | {0xC0,0x | [RFC6655] |
| | A6} | |
| | | |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM | {0xC0,0x | [RFC6655] |
| | A7} | |
| | | |
| TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM | {0xC0,0x | [RFC6655] |
| _8 | AA} | |
| | | |
| TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM | {0xC0,0x | [RFC6655] |
| _8 | AB} | |
| | | |
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_G | {0xD0,0x | [I-D.mattsson-tls-ecdhe |
| CM_SHA256 | 01} | -psk-aead] |
| | | |
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_G | {0xD0,0x | [I-D.mattsson-tls-ecdhe |
| CM_SHA384 | 02} | -psk-aead] |
| | | |
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_C | {0xD0,0x | [I-D.mattsson-tls-ecdhe |
| CM_8_SHA256 | 03} | -psk-aead] |
| | | |
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_C | {0xD0,0x | [I-D.mattsson-tls-ecdhe |
| CM_SHA256 | 04} | -psk-aead] |
| | | |
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_C | {0xD0,0x | [I-D.mattsson-tls-ecdhe |
| CM_SHA384 | 05} | -psk-aead] |
| | | |
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_ | {0xCC,0x | [RFC7905] |
| POLY1305_SHA256 | AC} | |
| | | |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_PO | {0xCC,0x | [RFC7905] |
| LY1305_SHA256 | AD} | |
+------------------------------+----------+-------------------------+
Note: The values listed for ECDHE and ChaCha/Poly are preliminary but
are being or will be used for interop testing and therefore are
likely to be assigned.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 101]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
Note: [RFC6655] is inconsistent with respect to the ordering of
components within PSK AES CCM cipher suite names. The names above
are as defined.
All cipher suites in this section are specified for use with both TLS
1.2 and TLS 1.3, as well as the corresponding versions of DTLS. (see
Appendix C)
New cipher suite values are assigned by IANA as described in
Section 10.
A.4.1. Unauthenticated Operation
Previous versions of TLS offered explicitly unauthenticated cipher
suites based on anonymous Diffie-Hellman. These cipher suites have
been deprecated in TLS 1.3. However, it is still possible to
negotiate cipher suites that do not provide verifiable server
authentication by several methods, including:
- Raw public keys [RFC7250].
- Using a public key contained in a certificate but without
validation of the certificate chain or any of its contents.
Either technique used alone is are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle
attacks and therefore unsafe for general use. However, it is also
possible to bind such connections to an external authentication
mechanism via out-of-band validation of the server's public key,
trust on first use, or channel bindings [RFC5929]. [[NOTE: TLS 1.3
needs a new channel binding definition that has not yet been
defined.]] If no such mechanism is used, then the connection has no
protection against active man-in-the-middle attack; applications MUST
NOT use TLS in such a way absent explicit configuration or a specific
application profile.
Appendix B. Implementation Notes
The TLS protocol cannot prevent many common security mistakes. This
section provides several recommendations to assist implementors.
B.1. Random Number Generation and Seeding
TLS requires a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator
(PRNG). Care must be taken in designing and seeding PRNGs. PRNGs
based on secure hash operations, most notably SHA-256, are
acceptable, but cannot provide more security than the size of the
random number generator state.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 102]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
To estimate the amount of seed material being produced, add the
number of bits of unpredictable information in each seed byte. For
example, keystroke timing values taken from a PC compatible 18.2 Hz
timer provide 1 or 2 secure bits each, even though the total size of
the counter value is 16 bits or more. Seeding a 128-bit PRNG would
thus require approximately 100 such timer values.
[RFC4086] provides guidance on the generation of random values.
B.2. Certificates and Authentication
Implementations are responsible for verifying the integrity of
certificates and should generally support certificate revocation
messages. Certificates should always be verified to ensure proper
signing by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA). The selection and
addition of trusted CAs should be done very carefully. Users should
be able to view information about the certificate and root CA.
B.3. Cipher Suite Support
TLS supports a range of key sizes and security levels, including some
that provide no or minimal security. A proper implementation will
probably not support many cipher suites. Applications SHOULD also
enforce minimum and maximum key sizes. For example, certification
paths containing keys or signatures weaker than 2048-bit RSA or
224-bit ECDSA are not appropriate for secure applications. See also
Appendix C.4.
B.4. Implementation Pitfalls
Implementation experience has shown that certain parts of earlier TLS
specifications are not easy to understand, and have been a source of
interoperability and security problems. Many of these areas have
been clarified in this document, but this appendix contains a short
list of the most important things that require special attention from
implementors.
TLS protocol issues:
- Do you correctly handle handshake messages that are fragmented to
multiple TLS records (see Section 5.1)? Including corner cases
like a ClientHello that is split to several small fragments? Do
you fragment handshake messages that exceed the maximum fragment
size? In particular, the certificate and certificate request
handshake messages can be large enough to require fragmentation.
- Do you ignore the TLS record layer version number in all TLS
records? (see Appendix C)
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 103]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
- Have you ensured that all support for SSL, RC4, EXPORT ciphers,
and MD5 (via the "signature_algorithm" extension) is completely
removed from all possible configurations that support TLS 1.3 or
later, and that attempts to use these obsolete capabilities fail
correctly? (see Appendix C)
- Do you handle TLS extensions in ClientHello correctly, including
unknown extensions or omitting the extensions field completely?
- When the server has requested a client certificate, but no
suitable certificate is available, do you correctly send an empty
Certificate message, instead of omitting the whole message (see
Section 4.3.1.2)?
- When processing the plaintext fragment produced by AEAD-Decrypt
and scanning from the end for the ContentType, do you avoid
scanning past the start of the cleartext in the event that the
peer has sent a malformed plaintext of all-zeros?
- When processing a ClientHello containing a version of { 3, 5 } or
higher, do you respond with the highest common version of TLS
rather than requiring an exact match? Have you ensured this
continues to be true with arbitrarily higher version numbers?
(e.g. { 4, 0 }, { 9, 9 }, { 255, 255 })
- Do you properly ignore unrecognized cipher suites (Section 4.1.1),
hello extensions (Section 4.2), named groups (Section 4.2.3), and
signature algorithms (Section 4.2.2)?
Cryptographic details:
- What countermeasures do you use to prevent timing attacks against
RSA signing operations [TIMING]?
- When verifying RSA signatures, do you accept both NULL and missing
parameters? Do you verify that the RSA padding doesn't have
additional data after the hash value? [FI06]
- When using Diffie-Hellman key exchange, do you correctly preserve
leading zero bytes in the negotiated key (see Section 7.3.1)?
- Does your TLS client check that the Diffie-Hellman parameters sent
by the server are acceptable, (see Section 4.2.4.1)?
- Do you use a strong and, most importantly, properly seeded random
number generator (see Appendix B.1) when generating Diffie-Hellman
private values, the ECDSA "k" parameter, and other security-
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 104]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
critical values? It is RECOMMENDED that implementations implement
"deterministic ECDSA" as specified in [RFC6979].
- Do you zero-pad Diffie-Hellman public key values to the group size
(see Section 4.2.4.1)?
B.5. Client Tracking Prevention
Clients SHOULD NOT reuse a session ticket for multiple connections.
Reuse of a session ticket allows passive observers to correlate
different connections. Servers that issue session tickets SHOULD
offer at least as many session tickets as the number of connections
that a client might use; for example, a web browser using HTTP/1.1
[RFC7230] might open six connections to a server. Servers SHOULD
issue new session tickets with every connection. This ensures that
clients are always able to use a new session ticket when creating a
new connection.
Appendix C. Backward Compatibility
The TLS protocol provides a built-in mechanism for version
negotiation between endpoints potentially supporting different
versions of TLS.
TLS 1.x and SSL 3.0 use compatible ClientHello messages. Servers can
also handle clients trying to use future versions of TLS as long as
the ClientHello format remains compatible and the client supports the
highest protocol version available in the server.
Prior versions of TLS used the record layer version number for
various purposes. (TLSPlaintext.record_version &
TLSCiphertext.record_version) As of TLS 1.3, this field is deprecated
and its value MUST be ignored by all implementations. Version
negotiation is performed using only the handshake versions.
(ClientHello.client_version & ServerHello.server_version) In order to
maximize interoperability with older endpoints, implementations that
negotiate the use of TLS 1.0-1.2 SHOULD set the record layer version
number to the negotiated version for the ServerHello and all records
thereafter.
For maximum compatibility with previously non-standard behavior and
misconfigured deployments, all implementations SHOULD support
validation of certification paths based on the expectations in this
document, even when handling prior TLS versions' handshakes. (see
Section 4.3.1.1)
TLS 1.2 and prior supported an "Extended Master Secret" [RFC7627]
extension which digested large parts of the handshake transcript into
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 105]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
the master secret. Because TLS 1.3 always hashes in the transcript
up to the server CertificateVerify, implementations which support
both TLS 1.3 and earlier versions SHOULD indicate the use of the
Extended Master Secret extension in their APIs whenever TLS 1.3 is
used.
C.1. Negotiating with an older server
A TLS 1.3 client who wishes to negotiate with such older servers will
send a normal TLS 1.3 ClientHello containing { 3, 4 } (TLS 1.3) in
ClientHello.client_version. If the server does not support this
version it will respond with a ServerHello containing an older
version number. If the client agrees to use this version, the
negotiation will proceed as appropriate for the negotiated protocol.
A client resuming a session SHOULD initiate the connection using the
version that was previously negotiated.
Note that 0-RTT data is not compatible with older servers. See
Appendix C.3.
If the version chosen by the server is not supported by the client
(or not acceptable), the client MUST send a "protocol_version" alert
message and close the connection.
If a TLS server receives a ClientHello containing a version number
greater than the highest version supported by the server, it MUST
reply according to the highest version supported by the server.
Some legacy server implementations are known to not implement the TLS
specification properly and might abort connections upon encountering
TLS extensions or versions which it is not aware of.
Interoperability with buggy servers is a complex topic beyond the
scope of this document. Multiple connection attempts may be required
in order to negotiate a backwards compatible connection, however this
practice is vulnerable to downgrade attacks and is NOT RECOMMENDED.
C.2. Negotiating with an older client
A TLS server can also receive a ClientHello containing a version
number smaller than the highest supported version. If the server
wishes to negotiate with old clients, it will proceed as appropriate
for the highest version supported by the server that is not greater
than ClientHello.client_version. For example, if the server supports
TLS 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2, and client_version is TLS 1.0, the server will
proceed with a TLS 1.0 ServerHello. If the server only supports
versions greater than client_version, it MUST send a
"protocol_version" alert message and close the connection.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 106]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
Note that earlier versions of TLS did not clearly specify the record
layer version number value in all cases
(TLSPlaintext.record_version). Servers will receive various TLS 1.x
versions in this field, however its value MUST always be ignored.
C.3. Zero-RTT backwards compatibility
0-RTT data is not compatible with older servers. An older server
will respond to the ClientHello with an older ServerHello, but it
will not correctly skip the 0-RTT data and fail to complete the
handshake. This can cause issues when a client attempts to use
0-RTT, particularly against multi-server deployments. For example, a
deployment could deploy TLS 1.3 gradually with some servers
implementing TLS 1.3 and some implementing TLS 1.2, or a TLS 1.3
deployment could be downgraded to TLS 1.2.
A client that attempts to send 0-RTT data MUST fail a connection if
it receives a ServerHello with TLS 1.2 or older. A client that
attempts to repair this error SHOULD NOT send a TLS 1.2 ClientHello,
but instead send a TLS 1.3 ClientHello without 0-RTT data.
To avoid this error condition, multi-server deployments SHOULD ensure
a uniform and stable deployment of TLS 1.3 without 0-RTT prior to
enabling 0-RTT.
C.4. Backwards Compatibility Security Restrictions
If an implementation negotiates use of TLS 1.2, then negotiation of
cipher suites also supported by TLS 1.3 SHOULD be preferred, if
available.
The security of RC4 cipher suites is considered insufficient for the
reasons cited in [RFC7465]. Implementations MUST NOT offer or
negotiate RC4 cipher suites for any version of TLS for any reason.
Old versions of TLS permitted the use of very low strength ciphers.
Ciphers with a strength less than 112 bits MUST NOT be offered or
negotiated for any version of TLS for any reason.
The security of SSL 2.0 [SSL2] is considered insufficient for the
reasons enumerated in [RFC6176], and MUST NOT be negotiated for any
reason.
Implementations MUST NOT send an SSL version 2.0 compatible CLIENT-
HELLO. Implementations MUST NOT negotiate TLS 1.3 or later using an
SSL version 2.0 compatible CLIENT-HELLO. Implementations are NOT
RECOMMENDED to accept an SSL version 2.0 compatible CLIENT-HELLO in
order to negotiate older versions of TLS.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 107]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
Implementations MUST NOT send or accept any records with a version
less than { 3, 0 }.
The security of SSL 3.0 [SSL3] is considered insufficient for the
reasons enumerated in [RFC7568], and MUST NOT be negotiated for any
reason.
Implementations MUST NOT send a ClientHello.client_version or
ServerHello.server_version set to { 3, 0 } or less. Any endpoint
receiving a Hello message with ClientHello.client_version or
ServerHello.server_version set to { 3, 0 } MUST respond with a
"protocol_version" alert message and close the connection.
Implementations MUST NOT use the Truncated HMAC extension, defined in
Section 7 of [RFC6066], as it is not applicable to AEAD ciphers and
has been shown to be insecure in some scenarios.
Appendix D. Overview of Security Properties
[[TODO: This section is still a WIP and needs a bunch more work.]]
A complete security analysis of TLS is outside the scope of this
document. In this section, we provide an informal description the
desired properties as well as references to more detailed work in the
research literature which provides more formal definitions.
We cover properties of the handshake separately from those of the
record layer.
D.1. Handshake
The TLS handshake is an Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocol
which is intended to provide both one-way authenticated (server-only)
and mutually authenticated (client and server) functionality. At the
completion of the handshake, each side outputs its view on the
following values:
- A "session key" (the master secret) from which can be derived a
set of working keys.
- A set of cryptographic parameters (algorithms, etc.)
- The identities of the communicating parties.
We assume that the attacker has complete control of the network in
between the parties [RFC3552]. Even under these conditions, the
handshake should provide the properties listed below. Note that
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 108]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
these properties are not necessarily independent, but reflect the
protocol consumers' needs.
Establishing the same session key. The handshake needs to output the
same session key on both sides of the handshake, provided that it
completes successfully on each endpoint (See [CK01]; defn 1, part
1).
Secrecy of the session key. The shared session key should be known
only to the communicating parties, not to the attacker (See
[CK01]; defn 1, part 2). Note that in a unilaterally
authenticated connection, the attacker can establish its own
session keys with the server, but those session keys are distinct
from those established by the client.
Peer Authentication. The client's view of the peer identity should
reflect the server's identity. If the client is authenticated,
the server's view of the peer identity should match the client's
identity.
Uniqueness of the session key: Any two distinct handshakes should
produce distinct, unrelated session keys
Downgrade protection. The cryptographic parameters should be the
same on both sides and should be the same as if the peers had been
communicating in the absence of an attack (See [BBFKZG16]; defns 8
and 9}).
Forward secret If the long-term keying material (in this case the
signature keys in certificate-based authentication modes or the
PSK in PSK-(EC)DHE modes) are compromised after the handshake is
complete, this does not compromise the security of the session key
(See [DOW92]).
Protection of endpoint identities. The server's identity
(certificate) should be protected against passive attackers. The
client's identity should be protected against both passive and
active attackers.
Informally, the signature-based modes of TLS 1.3 provide for the
establishment of a unique, secret, shared, key established by an
(EC)DHE key exchange and authenticated by the server's signature over
the handshake transcript, as well as tied to the server's identity by
a MAC. If the client is authenticated by a certificate, it also
signs over the handshake transcript and provides a MAC tied to both
identities. [SIGMA] describes the analysis of this type of key
exchange protocol. If fresh (EC)DHE keys are used for each
connection, then the output keys are forward secret.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 109]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
The PSK and resumption-PSK modes bootstrap from a long-term shared
secret into a unique per-connection short-term session key. This
secret may have been established in a previous handshake. If
PSK-(EC)DHE modes are used, this session key will also be forward
secret. The resumption-PSK mode has been designed so that the
resumption master secret computed by connection N and needed to form
connection N+1 is separate from the traffic keys used by connection
N, thus providing forward secrecy between the connections.
For all handshake modes, the Finished MAC (and where present, the
signature), prevents downgrade attacks. In addition, the use of
certain bytes in the random nonces as described in Section 4.1.2
allows the detection of downgrade to previous TLS versions.
As soon as the client and the server have exchanged enough
information to establish shared keys, the remainder of the handshake
is encrypted, thus providing protection against passive attackers.
Because the server authenticates before the client, the client can
ensure that it only reveals its identity to an authenticated server.
Note that implementations must use the provided record padding
mechanism during the handshake to avoid leaking information about the
identities due to length.
The 0-RTT mode of operation generally provides the same security
properties as 1-RTT data, with the two exceptions that the 0-RTT
encryption keys do not provide full forward secrecy and that the the
server is not able to guarantee full uniqueness of the handshake
(non-replayability) without keeping potentially undue amounts of
state. See Section 4.2.6 for one mechanism to limit the exposure to
replay.
The reader should refer to the following references for analysis of
the TLS handshake [CHSV16] [FGSW16] [LXZFH16].
D.2. Record Layer
The record layer depends on the handshake producing a strong session
key which can be used to derive bidirectional traffic keys and
nonces. Assuming that is true, and the keys are used for no more
data than indicated in Section 5.5 then the record layer should
provide the following guarantees:
Confidentiality. An attacker should not be able to determine the
plaintext contents of a given record.
Integrity. An attacker should not be able to craft a new record
which is different from an existing record which will be accepted
by the receiver.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 110]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
Order protection/non-replayability An attacker should not be able to
cause the receiver to accept a record which it has already
accepted or cause the receiver to accept record N+1 without having
first processed record N. [[TODO: If we merge in DTLS to this
document, we will need to update this guarantee.]]
Length concealment. Given a record with a given external length, the
attacker should not be able to determine the amount of the record
that is content versus padding.
Forward security after key change. If the traffic key update
mechanism described in Section 4.4.3 has been used and the
previous generation key is deleted, an attacker who compromises
the endpoint should not be able to decrypt traffic encrypted with
the old key.
Informally, TLS 1.3 provides these properties by AEAD-protecting the
plaintext with a strong key. AEAD encryption [RFC5116] provides
confidentiality and integrity for the data. Non-replayability is
provided by using a separate nonce for each record, with the nonce
being derived from the record sequence number (Section 5.3), with the
sequence number being maintained independently at both sides thus
records which are delivered out of order result in AEAD deprotection
failures.
The plaintext protected by the AEAD function consists of content plus
variable-length padding. Because the padding is also encrypted, the
attacker cannot directly determine the length of the padding, but may
be able to measure it indirectly by the use of timing channels
exposed during record processing (i.e., seeing how long it takes to
process a record). In general, it is not known how to remove this
type of channel because even a constant time padding removal function
will then feed the content into data-dependent functions.
Generation N+1 keys are derived from generation N keys via a key
derivation function Section 7.2. As long as this function is truly
one way, it is not possible to compute the previous keys after a key
change (forward secrecy). However, TLS does not provide security for
data which is sent after the traffic secret is compromised, even afer
a key update (backward secrecy); systems which want backward secrecy
must do a fresh handshake and establish a new session key with an
(EC)DHE exchange.
The reader should refer to the following references for analysis of
the TLS record layer.
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 111]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
Appendix E. Working Group Information
The discussion list for the IETF TLS working group is located at the
e-mail address tls@ietf.org [1]. Information on the group and
information on how to subscribe to the list is at
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
Archives of the list can be found at: https://www.ietf.org/mail-
archive/web/tls/current/index.html
Appendix F. Contributors
- Martin Abadi
University of California, Santa Cruz
abadi@cs.ucsc.edu
- Christopher Allen (co-editor of TLS 1.0)
Alacrity Ventures
ChristopherA@AlacrityManagement.com
- Steven M. Bellovin
Columbia University
smb@cs.columbia.edu
- David Benjamin
Google
davidben@google.com
- Benjamin Beurdouche
- Karthikeyan Bhargavan (co-author of [RFC7627])
INRIA
karthikeyan.bhargavan@inria.fr
- Simon Blake-Wilson (co-author of [RFC4492])
BCI
sblakewilson@bcisse.com
- Nelson Bolyard (co-author of [RFC4492])
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
nelson@bolyard.com
- Ran Canetti
IBM
canetti@watson.ibm.com
- Pete Chown
Skygate Technology Ltd
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 112]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
pc@skygate.co.uk
- Antoine Delignat-Lavaud (co-author of [RFC7627])
INRIA
antoine.delignat-lavaud@inria.fr
- Tim Dierks (co-editor of TLS 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2)
Independent
tim@dierks.org
- Taher Elgamal
Securify
taher@securify.com
- Pasi Eronen
Nokia
pasi.eronen@nokia.com
- Cedric Fournet
Microsoft
fournet@microsoft.com
- Anil Gangolli
anil@busybuddha.org
- David M. Garrett
- Vipul Gupta (co-author of [RFC4492])
Sun Microsystems Laboratories
vipul.gupta@sun.com
- Chris Hawk (co-author of [RFC4492])
Corriente Networks LLC
chris@corriente.net
- Kipp Hickman
- Alfred Hoenes
- David Hopwood
Independent Consultant
david.hopwood@blueyonder.co.uk
- Subodh Iyengar
Facebook
subodh@fb.com
- Daniel Kahn Gillmor
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 113]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
ACLU
dkg@fifthhorseman.net
- Phil Karlton (co-author of SSL 3.0)
- Paul Kocher (co-author of SSL 3.0)
Cryptography Research
paul@cryptography.com
- Hugo Krawczyk
IBM
hugo@ee.technion.ac.il
- Adam Langley (co-author of [RFC7627])
Google
agl@google.com
- Ilari Liusvaara
Independent
ilariliusvaara@welho.com
- Jan Mikkelsen
Transactionware
janm@transactionware.com
- Bodo Moeller (co-author of [RFC4492])
Google
bodo@openssl.org
- Erik Nygren
Akamai Technologies
erik+ietf@nygren.org
- Magnus Nystrom
RSA Security
magnus@rsasecurity.com
- Alfredo Pironti (co-author of [RFC7627])
INRIA
alfredo.pironti@inria.fr
- Andrei Popov
Microsoft
andrei.popov@microsoft.com
- Marsh Ray (co-author of [RFC7627])
Microsoft
maray@microsoft.com
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 114]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
- Robert Relyea
Netscape Communications
relyea@netscape.com
- Kyle Rose
Akamai Technologies
krose@krose.org
- Jim Roskind
Netscape Communications
jar@netscape.com
- Michael Sabin
- Dan Simon
Microsoft, Inc.
dansimon@microsoft.com
- Nick Sullivan
CloudFlare Inc.
nick@cloudflare.com
- Bjoern Tackmann
University of California, San Diego
btackmann@eng.ucsd.edu
- Martin Thomson
Mozilla
mt@mozilla.com
- Filippo Valsorda
CloudFlare Inc.
filippo@cloudflare.com
- Tom Weinstein
- Hoeteck Wee
Ecole Normale Superieure, Paris
hoeteck@alum.mit.edu
- Tim Wright
Vodafone
timothy.wright@vodafone.com
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 115]
Internet-Draft TLS July 2016
Author's Address
Eric Rescorla
RTFM, Inc.
EMail: ekr@rtfm.com
Rescorla Expires January 12, 2017 [Page 116]
