Network Working Group E. Rescorla
Internet-Draft RTFM, Inc.
Obsoletes: 5077, 5246, 5746 (if September 22, 2016
approved)
Updates: 4492, 5705, 6066, 6961 (if
approved)
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: March 26, 2017
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3
draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16
Abstract
This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security
(TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate
over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
tampering, and message forgery.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on March 26, 2017.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2. Major Differences from TLS 1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3. Updates Affecting TLS 1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1. Incorrect DHE Share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2. Resumption and Pre-Shared Key (PSK) . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3. Zero-RTT Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3. Presentation Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1. Basic Block Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2. Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.3. Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.4. Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.5. Enumerateds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.6. Constructed Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.6.1. Variants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.7. Constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.8. Decoding Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4. Handshake Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1. Key Exchange Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.1.1. Cryptographic Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.1.2. Client Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.1.3. Server Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.1.4. Hello Retry Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.2. Hello Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.2.1. Supported Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.2.2. Cookie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.2.3. Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.2.4. Negotiated Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.2.5. Key Share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
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4.2.6. Pre-Shared Key Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.2.7. Early Data Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2.8. OCSP Status Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3. Server Parameters Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3.1. Encrypted Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3.2. Certificate Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.4. Authentication Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.4.1. Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.4.2. Certificate Verify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4.3. Finished . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.5. Post-Handshake Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.5.1. New Session Ticket Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.5.2. Post-Handshake Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.5.3. Key and IV Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.6. Handshake Layer and Key Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5. Record Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.1. Record Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.2. Record Payload Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.3. Per-Record Nonce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.4. Record Padding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.5. Limits on Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6. Alert Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6.1. Closure Alerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
6.2. Error Alerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
7. Cryptographic Computations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
7.1. Key Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
7.2. Updating Traffic Keys and IVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
7.3. Traffic Key Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
7.3.1. Diffie-Hellman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
7.3.2. Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
7.3.3. Exporters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
8. Compliance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
8.1. MTI Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
8.2. MTI Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Appendix A. Protocol Data Structures and Constant Values . . . . 93
A.1. Record Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
A.2. Alert Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
A.3. Handshake Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
A.3.1. Key Exchange Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
A.3.2. Server Parameters Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
A.3.3. Authentication Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
A.3.4. Ticket Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
A.3.5. Updating Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
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A.4. Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Appendix B. Implementation Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B.1. API considerations for 0-RTT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B.2. Random Number Generation and Seeding . . . . . . . . . . 102
B.3. Certificates and Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
B.4. Cipher Suite Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
B.5. Implementation Pitfalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
B.6. Client Tracking Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
B.7. Unauthenticated Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Appendix C. Backward Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
C.1. Negotiating with an older server . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
C.2. Negotiating with an older client . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
C.3. Zero-RTT backwards compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
C.4. Backwards Compatibility Security Restrictions . . . . . . 108
Appendix D. Overview of Security Properties . . . . . . . . . . 109
D.1. Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
D.2. Record Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Appendix E. Working Group Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Appendix F. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
1. Introduction
DISCLAIMER: This is a WIP draft of TLS 1.3 and has not yet seen
significant security analysis.
RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH The source for this
draft is maintained in GitHub. Suggested changes should be submitted
as pull requests at https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec.
Instructions are on that page as well. Editorial changes can be
managed in GitHub, but any substantive change should be discussed on
the TLS mailing list.
The primary goal of TLS is to provide a secure channel between two
communicating peers. Specifically, the channel should provide the
following properties:
- Authentication: The server side of the channel is always
authenticated; the client side is optionally authenticated.
Authentication can happen via asymmetric cryptography (e.g., RSA
[RSA], ECDSA [ECDSA]) or a pre-shared symmetric key.
- Confidentiality: Data sent over the channel is not visible to
attackers.
- Integrity: Data sent over the channel cannot be modified by
attackers.
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These properties should be true even in the face of an attacker who
has complete control of the network, as described in [RFC3552]. See
Appendix D for a more complete statement of the relevant security
properties.
TLS consists of two primary components:
- A handshake protocol (Section 4) that authenticates the
communicating parties, negotiates cryptographic modes and
parameters, and establishes shared keying material. The handshake
protocol is designed to resist tampering; an active attacker
should not be able to force the peers to negotiate different
parameters than they would if the connection were not under
attack.
- A record protocol (Section 5) that uses the parameters established
by the handshake protocol to protect traffic between the
communicating peers. The record protocol divides traffic up into
a series of records, each of which is independently protected
using the traffic keys.
TLS is application protocol independent; higher-level protocols can
layer on top of TLS transparently. The TLS standard, however, does
not specify how protocols add security with TLS; how to initiate TLS
handshaking and how to interpret the authentication certificates
exchanged are left to the judgment of the designers and implementors
of protocols that run on top of TLS.
This document defines TLS version 1.3. While TLS 1.3 is not directly
compatible with previous versions, all versions of TLS incorporate a
versioning mechanism which allows clients and servers to
interoperably negotiate a common version if one is supported.
1.1. Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
2119 [RFC2119].
The following terms are used:
client: The endpoint initiating the TLS connection.
connection: A transport-layer connection between two endpoints.
endpoint: Either the client or server of the connection.
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handshake: An initial negotiation between client and server that
establishes the parameters of their transactions.
peer: An endpoint. When discussing a particular endpoint, "peer"
refers to the endpoint that is remote to the primary subject of
discussion.
receiver: An endpoint that is receiving records.
sender: An endpoint that is transmitting records.
session: An association between a client and a server resulting from
a handshake.
server: The endpoint which did not initiate the TLS connection.
1.2. Major Differences from TLS 1.2
(*) indicates changes to the wire protocol which may require
implementations to update.
draft-16
- Change RSASSA-PSS and EdDSA SignatureScheme codepoints for better
backwards compatibility (*)
- Move HelloRetryRequest.selected_group to an extension (*)
- Clarify the behavior of no exporter context and make it the same
as an empty context.(*)
- New KeyUpdate format that allows for requesting/not-requesting an
answer (*)
- New certificate_required alert (*)
- Forbid CertificateRequest with 0-RTT and PSK.
- Relax requirement to check SNI for 0-RTT.
draft-15
- New negotiation syntax as discussed in Berlin (*)
- Require CertificateRequest.context to be empty during handshake
(*)
- Forbid empty tickets (*)
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- Forbid application data messages in between post-handshake
messages from the same flight (*)
- Clean up alert guidance (*)
- Clearer guidance on what is needed for TLS 1.2.
- Guidance on 0-RTT time windows.
- Rename a bunch of fields.
- Remove old PRNG text.
- Explicitly require checking that handshake records not span key
changes.
draft-14
- Allow cookies to be longer (*)
- Remove the "context" from EarlyDataIndication as it was undefined
and nobody used it (*)
- Remove 0-RTT EncryptedExtensions and replace the ticket_age
extension with an obfuscated version. Also necessitates a change
to NewSessionTicket (*).
- Move the downgrade sentinel to the end of ServerHello.Random to
accomodate tlsdate (*).
- Define ecdsa_sha1 (*).
- Allow resumption even after fatal alerts. This matches current
practice.
- Remove non-closure warning alerts. Require treating unknown
alerts as fatal.
- Make the rules for accepting 0-RTT less restrictive.
- Clarify 0-RTT backward-compatibility rules.
- Clarify how 0-RTT and PSK identities interact.
- Add a section describing the data limits for each cipher.
- Major editorial restructuring.
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- Replace the Security Analysis section with a WIP draft.
draft-13
- Allow server to send SupportedGroups.
- Remove 0-RTT client authentication
- Remove (EC)DHE 0-RTT.
- Flesh out 0-RTT PSK mode and shrink EarlyDataIndication
- Turn PSK-resumption response into an index to save room
- Move CertificateStatus to an extension
- Extra fields in NewSessionTicket.
- Restructure key schedule and add a resumption_context value.
- Require DH public keys and secrets to be zero-padded to the size
of the group.
- Remove the redundant length fields in KeyShareEntry.
- Define a cookie field for HRR.
draft-12
- Provide a list of the PSK cipher suites.
- Remove the ability for the ServerHello to have no extensions (this
aligns the syntax with the text).
- Clarify that the server can send application data after its first
flight (0.5 RTT data)
- Revise signature algorithm negotiation to group hash, signature
algorithm, and curve together. This is backwards compatible.
- Make ticket lifetime mandatory and limit it to a week.
- Make the purpose strings lower-case. This matches how people are
implementing for interop.
- Define exporters.
- Editorial cleanup
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draft-11
- Port the CFRG curves & signatures work from RFC4492bis.
- Remove sequence number and version from additional_data, which is
now empty.
- Reorder values in HkdfLabel.
- Add support for version anti-downgrade mechanism.
- Update IANA considerations section and relax some of the policies.
- Unify authentication modes. Add post-handshake client
authentication.
- Remove early_handshake content type. Terminate 0-RTT data with an
alert.
- Reset sequence number upon key change (as proposed by Fournet et
al.)
draft-10
- Remove ClientCertificateTypes field from CertificateRequest and
add extensions.
- Merge client and server key shares into a single extension.
draft-09
- Change to RSA-PSS signatures for handshake messages.
- Remove support for DSA.
- Update key schedule per suggestions by Hugo, Hoeteck, and Bjoern
Tackmann.
- Add support for per-record padding.
- Switch to encrypted record ContentType.
- Change HKDF labeling to include protocol version and value
lengths.
- Shift the final decision to abort a handshake due to incompatible
certificates to the client rather than having servers abort early.
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- Deprecate SHA-1 with signatures.
- Add MTI algorithms.
draft-08
- Remove support for weak and lesser used named curves.
- Remove support for MD5 and SHA-224 hashes with signatures.
- Update lists of available AEAD cipher suites and error alerts.
- Reduce maximum permitted record expansion for AEAD from 2048 to
256 octets.
- Require digital signatures even when a previous configuration is
used.
- Merge EarlyDataIndication and KnownConfiguration.
- Change code point for server_configuration to avoid collision with
server_hello_done.
- Relax certificate_list ordering requirement to match current
practice.
draft-07
- Integration of semi-ephemeral DH proposal.
- Add initial 0-RTT support.
- Remove resumption and replace with PSK + tickets.
- Move ClientKeyShare into an extension.
- Move to HKDF.
draft-06
- Prohibit RC4 negotiation for backwards compatibility.
- Freeze & deprecate record layer version field.
- Update format of signatures with context.
- Remove explicit IV.
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draft-05
- Prohibit SSL negotiation for backwards compatibility.
- Fix which MS is used for exporters.
draft-04
- Modify key computations to include session hash.
- Remove ChangeCipherSpec.
- Renumber the new handshake messages to be somewhat more consistent
with existing convention and to remove a duplicate registration.
- Remove renegotiation.
- Remove point format negotiation.
draft-03
- Remove GMT time.
- Merge in support for ECC from RFC 4492 but without explicit
curves.
- Remove the unnecessary length field from the AD input to AEAD
ciphers.
- Rename {Client,Server}KeyExchange to {Client,Server}KeyShare.
- Add an explicit HelloRetryRequest to reject the client's.
draft-02
- Increment version number.
- Rework handshake to provide 1-RTT mode.
- Remove custom DHE groups.
- Remove support for compression.
- Remove support for static RSA and DH key exchange.
- Remove support for non-AEAD ciphers.
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1.3. Updates Affecting TLS 1.2
This document defines several changes that optionally affect
implementations of TLS 1.2:
- A version downgrade protection mechanism is described in
Section 4.1.3.
- RSASSA-PSS signature schemes are defined in Section 4.2.3.
An implementation of TLS 1.3 that also supports TLS 1.2 might need to
include changes to support these changes even when TLS 1.3 is not in
use. See the referenced sections for more details.
2. Protocol Overview
The cryptographic parameters of the session state are produced by the
TLS handshake protocol, which a TLS client and server use when first
communicating to agree on a protocol version, select cryptographic
algorithms, optionally authenticate each other, and establish shared
secret keying material. Once the handshake is complete, the peers
use the established keys to protect application layer traffic.
A failure of the handshake or other protocol error triggers the
termination of the connection, optionally preceded by an alert
message (Section 6).
TLS supports three basic key exchange modes:
- Diffie-Hellman (both the finite field and elliptic curve
varieties),
- A pre-shared symmetric key (PSK), and
- A combination of a symmetric key and Diffie-Hellman.
Figure 1 below shows the basic full TLS handshake:
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Client Server
Key ^ ClientHello
Exch | + key_share*
v + pre_shared_key* -------->
ServerHello ^ Key
+ key_share* | Exch
+ pre_shared_key* v
{EncryptedExtensions} ^ Server
{CertificateRequest*} v Params
{Certificate*} ^
{CertificateVerify*} | Auth
{Finished} v
<-------- [Application Data*]
^ {Certificate*}
Auth | {CertificateVerify*}
v {Finished} -------->
[Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
+ Indicates extensions sent in the
previously noted message.
* Indicates optional or situation-dependent
messages that are not always sent.
{} Indicates messages protected using keys
derived from handshake_traffic_secret.
[] Indicates messages protected using keys
derived from traffic_secret_N
Figure 1: Message flow for full TLS Handshake
The handshake can be thought of as having three phases (indicated in
the diagram above):
- Key Exchange: Establish shared keying material and select the
cryptographic parameters. Everything after this phase is
encrypted.
- Server Parameters: Establish other handshake parameters (whether
the client is authenticated, application layer protocol support,
etc.).
- Authentication: Authenticate the server (and optionally the
client) and provide key confirmation and handshake integrity.
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In the Key Exchange phase, the client sends the ClientHello
(Section 4.1.2) message, which contains a random nonce
(ClientHello.random); its offered protocol versions; a list of
symmetric cipher/HKDF hash pairs; some set of Diffie-Hellman key
shares (in the "key_share" extension Section 4.2.5), one or more pre-
shared key labels (in the "pre_shared_key" extension Section 4.2.6),
or both; and potentially some other extensions.
The server processes the ClientHello and determines the appropriate
cryptographic parameters for the connection. It then responds with
its own ServerHello, which indicates the negotiated connection
parameters. [Section 4.1.3]. The combination of the ClientHello and
the ServerHello determines the shared keys. If (EC)DHE key
establishment is in use, then the ServerHello contains a "key_share"
extension with the server's ephemeral Diffie-Hellman share which MUST
be in the same group as one of the client's shares. If PSK key
establishment is in use, then the ServerHello contains a
"pre_shared_key" extension indicating which of the client's offered
PSKs was selected. Note that implementations can use (EC)DHE and PSK
together, in which case both extensions will be supplied.
The server then sends two messages to establish the Server
Parameters:
EncryptedExtensions. responses to any extensions that are not
required to determine the cryptographic parameters.
[Section 4.3.1]
CertificateRequest. if certificate-based client authentication is
desired, the desired parameters for that certificate. This
message is omitted if client authentication is not desired.
[Section 4.3.2]
Finally, the client and server exchange Authentication messages. TLS
uses the same set of messages every time that authentication is
needed. Specifically:
Certificate. the certificate of the endpoint. This message is
omitted if the server is not authenticating with a certificate.
Note that if raw public keys [RFC7250] or the cached information
extension [RFC7924] are in use, then this message will not contain
a certificate but rather some other value corresponding to the
server's long-term key. [Section 4.4.1]
CertificateVerify. a signature over the entire handshake using the
public key in the Certificate message. This message is omitted if
the server is not authenticating via a certificate.
[Section 4.4.2]
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Finished. a MAC (Message Authentication Code) over the entire
handshake. This message provides key confirmation, binds the
endpoint's identity to the exchanged keys, and in PSK mode also
authenticates the handshake. [Section 4.4.3]
Upon receiving the server's messages, the client responds with its
Authentication messages, namely Certificate and CertificateVerify (if
requested), and Finished.
At this point, the handshake is complete, and the client and server
may exchange application layer data. Application data MUST NOT be
sent prior to sending the Finished message. Note that while the
server may send application data prior to receiving the client's
Authentication messages, any data sent at that point is, of course,
being sent to an unauthenticated peer.
2.1. Incorrect DHE Share
If the client has not provided a sufficient "key_share" extension
(e.g., it includes only DHE or ECDHE groups unacceptable or
unsupported by the server), the server corrects the mismatch with a
HelloRetryRequest and the client needs to restart the handshake with
an appropriate "key_share" extension, as shown in Figure 2. If no
common cryptographic parameters can be negotiated, the server MUST
abort the handshake with an appropriate alert.
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Client Server
ClientHello
+ key_share -------->
<-------- HelloRetryRequest
ClientHello
+ key_share -------->
ServerHello
+ key_share
{EncryptedExtensions}
{CertificateRequest*}
{Certificate*}
{CertificateVerify*}
{Finished}
<-------- [Application Data*]
{Certificate*}
{CertificateVerify*}
{Finished} -------->
[Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
Figure 2: Message flow for a full handshake with mismatched
parameters
Note: The handshake transcript includes the initial ClientHello/
HelloRetryRequest exchange; it is not reset with the new ClientHello.
TLS also allows several optimized variants of the basic handshake, as
described in the following sections.
2.2. Resumption and Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
Although TLS PSKs can be established out of band, PSKs can also be
established in a previous session and then reused ("session
resumption"). Once a handshake has completed, the server can send
the client a PSK identity that corresponds to a key derived from the
initial handshake (see Section 4.5.1). The client can then use that
PSK identity in future handshakes to negotiate use of the PSK. If
the server accepts it, then the security context of the new
connection is tied to the original connection. In TLS 1.2 and below,
this functionality was provided by "session IDs" and "session
tickets" [RFC5077]. Both mechanisms are obsoleted in TLS 1.3.
PSKs can be used with (EC)DHE exchange in order to provide forward
secrecy in combination with shared keys, or can be used alone, at the
cost of losing forward secrecy.
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Figure 3 shows a pair of handshakes in which the first establishes a
PSK and the second uses it:
Client Server
Initial Handshake:
ClientHello
+ key_share -------->
ServerHello
+ key_share
{EncryptedExtensions}
{CertificateRequest*}
{Certificate*}
{CertificateVerify*}
{Finished}
<-------- [Application Data*]
{Certificate*}
{CertificateVerify*}
{Finished} -------->
<-------- [NewSessionTicket]
[Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
Subsequent Handshake:
ClientHello
+ pre_shared_key
+ key_share* -------->
ServerHello
+ pre_shared_key
+ key_share*
{EncryptedExtensions}
{Finished}
<-------- [Application Data*]
{Finished} -------->
[Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
Figure 3: Message flow for resumption and PSK
As the server is authenticating via a PSK, it does not send a
Certificate or a CertificateVerify message. When a client offers
resumption via PSK, it SHOULD also supply a "key_share" extension to
the server as well to allow the server to decline resumption and fall
back to a full handshake, if needed. The server responds with a
"pre_shared_key" extension to negotiate use of PSK key establishment
and can (as shown here) respond with a "key_share" extension to do
(EC)DHE key establishment, thus providing forward secrecy.
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2.3. Zero-RTT Data
When resuming via a PSK with an appropriate ticket (i.e., one with
the "early_data_info" extension), clients can also send data on their
first flight ("early data"). This data is encrypted solely under
keys derived using the first offered PSK as the static secret. As
shown in Figure 4, the Zero-RTT data is just added to the 1-RTT
handshake in the first flight. The rest of the handshake uses the
same messages as with a 1-RTT handshake with PSK resumption.
Client Server
ClientHello
+ early_data
+ pre_shared_key
+ key_share*
(Finished)
(Application Data*)
(end_of_early_data) -------->
ServerHello
+ early_data
+ pre_shared_key
+ key_share*
{EncryptedExtensions}
{Finished}
<-------- [Application Data*]
{Finished} -------->
[Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
* Indicates optional or situation-dependent
messages that are not always sent.
() Indicates messages protected using keys
derived from client_early_traffic_secret.
{} Indicates messages protected using keys
derived from handshake_traffic_secret.
[] Indicates messages protected using keys
derived from traffic_secret_N
Figure 4: Message flow for a zero round trip handshake
[[OPEN ISSUE: Should it be possible to combine 0-RTT with the server
authenticating via a signature https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/
issues/443]]
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IMPORTANT NOTE: The security properties for 0-RTT data are weaker
than those for other kinds of TLS data. Specifically:
1. This data is not forward secret, because it is encrypted solely
with the PSK.
2. There are no guarantees of non-replay between connections.
Unless the server takes special measures outside those provided
by TLS, the server has no guarantee that the same 0-RTT data was
not transmitted on multiple 0-RTT connections (See
Section 4.2.7.2 for more details). This is especially relevant
if the data is authenticated either with TLS client
authentication or inside the application layer protocol.
However, 0-RTT data cannot be duplicated within a connection
(i.e., the server will not process the same data twice for the
same connection) and an attacker will not be able to make 0-RTT
data appear to be 1-RTT data (because it is protected with
different keys.)
The remainder of this document provides a detailed description of
TLS.
3. Presentation Language
This document deals with the formatting of data in an external
representation. The following very basic and somewhat casually
defined presentation syntax will be used. The syntax draws from
several sources in its structure. Although it resembles the
programming language "C" in its syntax and XDR [RFC4506] in both its
syntax and intent, it would be risky to draw too many parallels. The
purpose of this presentation language is to document TLS only; it has
no general application beyond that particular goal.
3.1. Basic Block Size
The representation of all data items is explicitly specified. The
basic data block size is one byte (i.e., 8 bits). Multiple byte data
items are concatenations of bytes, from left to right, from top to
bottom. From the byte stream, a multi-byte item (a numeric in the
example) is formed (using C notation) by:
value = (byte[0] << 8*(n-1)) | (byte[1] << 8*(n-2)) |
... | byte[n-1];
This byte ordering for multi-byte values is the commonplace network
byte order or big-endian format.
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3.2. Miscellaneous
Comments begin with "/*" and end with "*/".
Optional components are denoted by enclosing them in "[[ ]]" double
brackets.
Single-byte entities containing uninterpreted data are of type
opaque.
3.3. Vectors
A vector (single-dimensioned array) is a stream of homogeneous data
elements. The size of the vector may be specified at documentation
time or left unspecified until runtime. In either case, the length
declares the number of bytes, not the number of elements, in the
vector. The syntax for specifying a new type, T', that is a fixed-
length vector of type T is
T T'[n];
Here, T' occupies n bytes in the data stream, where n is a multiple
of the size of T. The length of the vector is not included in the
encoded stream.
In the following example, Datum is defined to be three consecutive
bytes that the protocol does not interpret, while Data is three
consecutive Datum, consuming a total of nine bytes.
opaque Datum[3]; /* three uninterpreted bytes */
Datum Data[9]; /* 3 consecutive 3 byte vectors */
Variable-length vectors are defined by specifying a subrange of legal
lengths, inclusively, using the notation <floor..ceiling>. When
these are encoded, the actual length precedes the vector's contents
in the byte stream. The length will be in the form of a number
consuming as many bytes as required to hold the vector's specified
maximum (ceiling) length. A variable-length vector with an actual
length field of zero is referred to as an empty vector.
T T'<floor..ceiling>;
In the following example, mandatory is a vector that must contain
between 300 and 400 bytes of type opaque. It can never be empty.
The actual length field consumes two bytes, a uint16, which is
sufficient to represent the value 400 (see Section 3.4). On the
other hand, longer can represent up to 800 bytes of data, or 400
uint16 elements, and it may be empty. Its encoding will include a
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two-byte actual length field prepended to the vector. The length of
an encoded vector must be an exact multiple of the length of a single
element (e.g., a 17-byte vector of uint16 would be illegal).
opaque mandatory<300..400>;
/* length field is 2 bytes, cannot be empty */
uint16 longer<0..800>;
/* zero to 400 16-bit unsigned integers */
3.4. Numbers
The basic numeric data type is an unsigned byte (uint8). All larger
numeric data types are formed from fixed-length series of bytes
concatenated as described in Section 3.1 and are also unsigned. The
following numeric types are predefined.
uint8 uint16[2];
uint8 uint24[3];
uint8 uint32[4];
uint8 uint64[8];
All values, here and elsewhere in the specification, are stored in
network byte (big-endian) order; the uint32 represented by the hex
bytes 01 02 03 04 is equivalent to the decimal value 16909060.
3.5. Enumerateds
An additional sparse data type is available called enum. A field of
type enum can only assume the values declared in the definition.
Each definition is a different type. Only enumerateds of the same
type may be assigned or compared. Every element of an enumerated
must be assigned a value, as demonstrated in the following example.
Since the elements of the enumerated are not ordered, they can be
assigned any unique value, in any order.
enum { e1(v1), e2(v2), ... , en(vn) [[, (n)]] } Te;
An enumerated occupies as much space in the byte stream as would its
maximal defined ordinal value. The following definition would cause
one byte to be used to carry fields of type Color.
enum { red(3), blue(5), white(7) } Color;
One may optionally specify a value without its associated tag to
force the width definition without defining a superfluous element.
In the following example, Taste will consume two bytes in the data
stream but can only assume the values 1, 2, or 4.
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enum { sweet(1), sour(2), bitter(4), (32000) } Taste;
The names of the elements of an enumeration are scoped within the
defined type. In the first example, a fully qualified reference to
the second element of the enumeration would be Color.blue. Such
qualification is not required if the target of the assignment is well
specified.
Color color = Color.blue; /* overspecified, legal */
Color color = blue; /* correct, type implicit */
For enumerateds that are never converted to external representation,
the numerical information may be omitted.
enum { low, medium, high } Amount;
3.6. Constructed Types
Structure types may be constructed from primitive types for
convenience. Each specification declares a new, unique type. The
syntax for definition is much like that of C.
struct {
T1 f1;
T2 f2;
...
Tn fn;
} [[T]];
The fields within a structure may be qualified using the type's name,
with a syntax much like that available for enumerateds. For example,
T.f2 refers to the second field of the previous declaration.
Structure definitions may be embedded.
3.6.1. Variants
Defined structures may have variants based on some knowledge that is
available within the environment. The selector must be an enumerated
type that defines the possible variants the structure defines. There
must be a case arm for every element of the enumeration declared in
the select. Case arms have limited fall-through: if two case arms
follow in immediate succession with no fields in between, then they
both contain the same fields. Thus, in the example below, "orange"
and "banana" both contain V2. Note that this piece of syntax was
added in TLS 1.2 [RFC5246].
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The body of the variant structure may be given a label for reference.
The mechanism by which the variant is selected at runtime is not
prescribed by the presentation language.
struct {
T1 f1;
T2 f2;
....
Tn fn;
select (E) {
case e1: Te1;
case e2: Te2;
case e3: case e4: Te3;
....
case en: Ten;
} [[fv]];
} [[Tv]];
For example:
enum { apple, orange, banana } VariantTag;
struct {
uint16 number;
opaque string<0..10>; /* variable length */
} V1;
struct {
uint32 number;
opaque string[10]; /* fixed length */
} V2;
struct {
select (VariantTag) { /* value of selector is implicit */
case apple:
V1; /* VariantBody, tag = apple */
case orange:
case banana:
V2; /* VariantBody, tag = orange or banana */
} variant_body; /* optional label on variant */
} VariantRecord;
3.7. Constants
Typed constants can be defined for purposes of specification by
declaring a symbol of the desired type and assigning values to it.
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Under-specified types (opaque, variable-length vectors, and
structures that contain opaque) cannot be assigned values. No fields
of a multi-element structure or vector may be omitted.
For example:
struct {
uint8 f1;
uint8 f2;
} Example1;
Example1 ex1 = {1, 4}; /* assigns f1 = 1, f2 = 4 */
3.8. Decoding Errors
TLS defines two generic alerts (see Section 6) to use upon failure to
parse a message. Peers which receive a message which cannot be
parsed according to the syntax (e.g., have a length extending beyond
the message boundary or contain an out-of-range length) MUST
terminate the connection with a "decoding_error" alert. Peers which
receive a message which is syntactically correct but semantically
invalid (e.g., a DHE share of p - 1) MUST terminate the connection
with an "illegal_parameter" alert.
4. Handshake Protocol
The handshake protocol is used to negotiate the secure attributes of
a session. Handshake messages are supplied to the TLS record layer,
where they are encapsulated within one or more TLSPlaintext or
TLSCiphertext structures, which are processed and transmitted as
specified by the current active session state.
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enum {
client_hello(1),
server_hello(2),
new_session_ticket(4),
hello_retry_request(6),
encrypted_extensions(8),
certificate(11),
certificate_request(13),
certificate_verify(15),
finished(20),
key_update(24),
(255)
} HandshakeType;
struct {
HandshakeType msg_type; /* handshake type */
uint24 length; /* bytes in message */
select (Handshake.msg_type) {
case client_hello: ClientHello;
case server_hello: ServerHello;
case hello_retry_request: HelloRetryRequest;
case encrypted_extensions: EncryptedExtensions;
case certificate_request: CertificateRequest;
case certificate: Certificate;
case certificate_verify: CertificateVerify;
case finished: Finished;
case new_session_ticket: NewSessionTicket;
case key_update: KeyUpdate;
} body;
} Handshake;
Protocol messages MUST be sent in the order defined below (and shown
in the diagrams in Section 2). A peer which receives a handshake
message in an unexpected order MUST abort the handshake with an
"unexpected_message" alert. results in an "unexpected_message" fatal
error. Unneeded handshake messages are omitted, however.
New handshake message types are assigned by IANA as described in
Section 10.
4.1. Key Exchange Messages
The key exchange messages are used to exchange security capabilities
between the client and server and to establish the traffic keys used
to protect the handshake and data.
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4.1.1. Cryptographic Negotiation
TLS cryptographic negotiation proceeds by the client offering the
following four sets of options in its ClientHello:
- A list of cipher suites which indicates the AEAD algorithm/HKDF
hash pairs which the client supports.
- A "supported_group" (Section 4.2.4) extension which indicates the
(EC)DHE groups which the client supports and a "key_share"
(Section 4.2.5) extension which contains (EC)DHE shares for some
or all of these groups.
- A "signature_algorithms" (Section 4.2.3) extension which indicates
the signature algorithms which the client can accept.
- A "pre_shared_key" (Section 4.2.6) extension which contains the
identities of symmetric keys known to the client and the key
exchange modes which each PSK supports.
If the server does not select a PSK, then the first three of these
options are entirely orthogonal: the server independently selects a
cipher suite, an (EC)DHE group and key share for key establishment,
and a signature algorithm/certificate pair to authenticate itself to
the client. If there is overlap in the "supported_group" extension
but the client did not offer a compatible "key_share" extension, then
the server will respond with a HelloRetryRequest (Section 4.1.4)
message.
If the server selects a PSK, then the PSK will indicate which key
establishment modes it can be used with (PSK alone or with (EC)DHE)
and which authentication modes it can be used with (PSK alone or PSK
with signatures). The server can then select those key establishment
and authentication parameters to be consistent both with the PSK and
the other extensions supplied by the client. Note that if the PSK
can be used without (EC)DHE or without signatures, then non-overlap
in either of these parameters need not be fatal.
The server indicates its selected parameters in the ServerHello as
follows:
- If PSK is being used then the server will send a "pre_shared_key"
extension indicating the selected key.
- If PSK is not being used, then (EC)DHE and certificate-based
authentication are always used.
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- When (EC)DHE is in use, the server will also provide a "key_share"
extension.
- When authenticating via a certificate, the server will send an
empty "signature_algorithms" extension in the ServerHello and will
subsequently send Certificate (Section 4.4.1) and
CertificateVerify (Section 4.4.2) messages.
If the server is unable to negotiate a supported set of parameters
(i.e., there is no overlap between the client and server parameters),
it MUST abort the handshake and and SHOULD send either a
"handshake_failure" or "insufficient_security" fatal alert (see
Section 6).
4.1.2. Client Hello
When this message will be sent:
When a client first connects to a server, it is REQUIRED to send
the ClientHello as its first message. The client will also send a
ClientHello when the server has responded to its ClientHello with
a HelloRetryRequest. In that case, the client MUST send the same
ClientHello (without modification) except:
- Including a new KeyShareEntry as the lowest priority share (i.e.,
appended to the list of shares in the "key_share" extension).
- Removing the "early_data" extension (Section 4.2.7) if one was
present. Early data is not permitted after HelloRetryRequest.
- Including a "cookie" extension if one was provided in the
HelloRetryRequest.
Because TLS 1.3 forbids renegotiation, if a server receives a
ClientHello at any other time, it MUST terminate the connection.
If a server established a TLS connection with a previous version of
TLS and receives a TLS 1.3 ClientHello in a renegotiation, it MUST
retain the previous protocol version. In particular, it MUST NOT
negotiate TLS 1.3. A client that receives a TLS 1.3 ServerHello
during renegotiation MUST abort the handshake with a
"protocol_version" alert.
Structure of this message:
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struct {
uint8 major;
uint8 minor;
} ProtocolVersion;
struct {
opaque random_bytes[32];
} Random;
uint8 CipherSuite[2]; /* Cryptographic suite selector */
struct {
ProtocolVersion legacy_version = { 3, 3 }; /* TLS v1.2 */
Random random;
opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>;
CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>;
opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} ClientHello;
TLS allows extensions to follow the compression_methods field in an
extensions block. The presence of extensions can be detected by
determining whether there are bytes following the compression_methods
at the end of the ClientHello. Note that this method of detecting
optional data differs from the normal TLS method of having a
variable-length field, but it is used for compatibility with TLS
before extensions were defined. As of TLS 1.3, all clients and
servers will send at least one extension (at least "key_share" or
"pre_shared_key").
legacy_version In previous versions of TLS, this field was used for
version negotiation and represented the highest version number
supported by the client. Experience has shown that many servers
do not properly implement version negotiation, leading to "version
intolerance" in which the server rejects an otherwise acceptable
ClientHello with a version number higher than it supports.
In TLS 1.3, the client indicates its version preferences in the
"suported_versions" extension (Section 4.2.1) and this field MUST
be set to {3, 3}, which was the version number for TLS 1.2. (See
Appendix C for details about backward compatibility.)
random 32 bytes generated by a secure random number generator. See
Appendix B for additional information.
legacy_session_id Versions of TLS before TLS 1.3 supported a session
resumption feature which has been merged with Pre-Shared Keys in
this version (see Section 2.2). This field MUST be ignored by a
server negotiating TLS 1.3 and SHOULD be set as a zero length
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vector (i.e., a single zero byte length field) by clients which do
not have a cached session ID set by a pre-TLS 1.3 server.
cipher_suites This is a list of the symmetric cipher options
supported by the client, specifically the record protection
algorithm (including secret key length) and a hash to be used with
HKDF, in descending order of client preference. If the list
contains cipher suites the server does not recognize, support, or
wish to use, the server MUST ignore those cipher suites, and
process the remaining ones as usual. Values are defined in
Appendix A.4.
legacy_compression_methods Versions of TLS before 1.3 supported
compression with the list of supported compression methods being
sent in this field. For every TLS 1.3 ClientHello, this vector
MUST contain exactly one byte set to zero, which corresponds to
the "null" compression method in prior versions of TLS. If a TLS
1.3 ClientHello is received with any other value in this field,
the server MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter"
alert. Note that TLS 1.3 servers might receive TLS 1.2 or prior
ClientHellos which contain other compression methods and MUST
follow the procedures for the appropriate prior version of TLS.
extensions Clients request extended functionality from servers by
sending data in the extensions field. The actual "Extension"
format is defined in Section 4.2.
In the event that a client requests additional functionality using
extensions, and this functionality is not supplied by the server, the
client MAY abort the handshake. Note that TLS 1.3 ClientHello
messages MUST always contain extensions, and a TLS 1.3 server MUST
respond to any TLS 1.3 ClientHello without extensions or with data
following the extensions block with a "decode_error" alert. TLS 1.3
servers may receive TLS 1.2 ClientHello messages without extensions.
If negotiating TLS 1.2, a server MUST check that the message either
contains no data after legacy_compression_methods or that it contains
a valid extensions block with no data following. If not, then it
MUST abort the handshake with a "decode_error" alert.
After sending the ClientHello message, the client waits for a
ServerHello or HelloRetryRequest message.
4.1.3. Server Hello
When this message will be sent:
The server will send this message in response to a ClientHello
message when it was able to find an acceptable set of algorithms
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and the client's "key_share" extension was acceptable. If it is
not able to find an acceptable set of parameters, the server will
respond with a "handshake_failure" fatal alert.
Structure of this message:
struct {
ProtocolVersion version;
Random random;
CipherSuite cipher_suite;
Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} ServerHello;
version This field contains the version of TLS negotiated for this
session. Servers MUST select the lower of the highest supported
server version and the version offered by the client in the
ClientHello. In particular, servers MUST accept ClientHello
messages with versions higher than those supported and negotiate
the highest mutually supported version. For this version of the
specification, the version is { 3, 4 }. (See Appendix C for
details about backward compatibility.)
random This structure is generated by the server and MUST be
generated independently of the ClientHello.random.
cipher_suite The single cipher suite selected by the server from the
list in ClientHello.cipher_suites. A client which receives a
cipher suite that was not offered MUST abort the handshake.
extensions A list of extensions. Note that only extensions offered
by the client can appear in the server's list. In TLS 1.3, as
opposed to previous versions of TLS, the server's extensions are
split between the ServerHello and the EncryptedExtensions
Section 4.3.1 message. The ServerHello MUST only include
extensions which are required to establish the cryptographic
context. Currently the only such extensions are "key_share",
"pre_shared_key", and "signature_algorithms". Clients MUST check
the ServerHello for the presence of any forbidden extensions and
if any are found MUST abort the handshake with a
"illegal_parameter" alert. In prior versions of TLS, the
extensions field could be omitted entirely if not needed, similar
to ClientHello. As of TLS 1.3, all clients and servers will send
at least one extension (at least "key_share" or "pre_shared_key").
TLS 1.3 has a downgrade protection mechanism embedded in the server's
random value. TLS 1.3 server implementations which respond to a
ClientHello indicating only support for TLS 1.2 or below MUST set the
last eight bytes of their Random value to the bytes:
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44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 01
TLS 1.3 server implementations which respond to a ClientHello
indicating only support for TLS 1.1 or below SHOULD set the last
eight bytes of their Random value to the bytes:
44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 00
TLS 1.3 clients receiving a TLS 1.2 or below ServerHello MUST check
that the last eight octets are not equal to either of these values.
TLS 1.2 clients SHOULD also perform this check if the ServerHello
indicates TLS 1.1 or below. If a match is found, the client MUST
abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. This
mechanism provides limited protection against downgrade attacks over
and above that provided by the Finished exchange: because the
ServerKeyExchange includes a signature over both random values, it is
not possible for an active attacker to modify the randoms without
detection as long as ephemeral ciphers are used. It does not provide
downgrade protection when static RSA is used.
Note: This is an update to TLS 1.2 so in practice many TLS 1.2
clients and servers will not behave as specified above.
RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH Implementations of
draft versions (see Section 4.2.1.1) of this specification SHOULD NOT
implement this mechanism on either client and server. A pre-RFC
client connecting to RFC servers, or vice versa, will appear to
downgrade to TLS 1.2. With the mechanism enabled, this will cause an
interoperability failure.
4.1.4. Hello Retry Request
When this message will be sent:
Servers send this message in response to a ClientHello message if
they were able to find an acceptable set of algorithms and groups
that are mutually supported, but the client's ClientHello did not
contain sufficient information to proceed with the handshake. If
a server cannot successfully select algorithms, it MUST abort the
handshake with a "handshake_failure" alert.
Structure of this message:
struct {
ProtocolVersion server_version;
Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>;
} HelloRetryRequest;
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The version and extensions fields have the same meanings as their
corresponding values in the ServerHello. The server SHOULD send only
the extensions necessary for the client to generate a correct
ClientHello pair (currently no such extensions exist). As with
ServerHello, a HelloRetryRequest MUST NOT contain any extensions that
were not first offered by the client in its ClientHello, with the
exception of optionally the "cookie" (see Section 4.2.2) extension.
Upon receipt of a HelloRetryRequest, the client MUST verify that the
extensions block is not empty and otherwise MUST abort the handshake
with a "decode_error" alert. Clients SHOULD also abort the handshake
with an "unexpected_message" alert in response to any second
HelloRetryRequest which was sent in the same connection (i.e., where
the ClientHello was itself in response to a HelloRetryRequest).
Otherwise, the client MUST process all extensions in the
HelloRetryRequest and send a second updated ClientHello. The
HelloRetryRequest extensions defined in this specification are:
- cookie (see Section 4.2.2)
- key_share (see Section 4.2.5)
Note that HelloRetryRequest extensions are defined such that the
original ClientHello may be computed from the new one, given minimal
state about which HelloRetryRequest extensions were sent. For
example, the key_share extension causes the new KeyShareEntry to be
appended to the client_shares field, rather than replacing it.
4.2. Hello Extensions
The extension format is:
struct {
ExtensionType extension_type;
opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>;
} Extension;
enum {
supported_groups(10),
signature_algorithms(13),
key_share(40),
pre_shared_key(41),
early_data(42),
supported_versions(43),
cookie(44),
(65535)
} ExtensionType;
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Here:
- "extension_type" identifies the particular extension type.
- "extension_data" contains information specific to the particular
extension type.
The initial set of extensions is defined in [RFC6066]. The list of
extension types is maintained by IANA as described in Section 10.
An extension type MUST NOT appear in the ServerHello or
HelloRetryRequest unless the same extension type appeared in the
corresponding ClientHello. If a client receives an extension type in
ServerHello or HelloRetryRequest that it did not request in the
associated ClientHello, it MUST abort the handshake with an
"unsupported_extension" fatal alert.
Nonetheless, "server-oriented" extensions may be provided within this
framework. Such an extension (say, of type x) would require the
client to first send an extension of type x in a ClientHello with
empty extension_data to indicate that it supports the extension type.
In this case, the client is offering the capability to understand the
extension type, and the server is taking the client up on its offer.
When multiple extensions of different types are present in the
ClientHello or ServerHello messages, the extensions MAY appear in any
order. There MUST NOT be more than one extension of the same type.
Finally, note that extensions can be sent both when starting a new
session and when in resumption-PSK mode. A client that requests
session resumption does not in general know whether the server will
accept this request, and therefore it SHOULD send the same extensions
as it would send normally.
In general, the specification of each extension type needs to
describe the effect of the extension both during full handshake and
session resumption. Most current TLS extensions are relevant only
when a session is initiated: when an older session is resumed, the
server does not process these extensions in ClientHello, and does not
include them in ServerHello. However, some extensions may specify
different behavior during session resumption. [[TODO: update this
and the previous paragraph to cover PSK-based resumption.]]
There are subtle (and not so subtle) interactions that may occur in
this protocol between new features and existing features which may
result in a significant reduction in overall security. The following
considerations should be taken into account when designing new
extensions:
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- Some cases where a server does not agree to an extension are error
conditions, and some are simply refusals to support particular
features. In general, error alerts should be used for the former,
and a field in the server extension response for the latter.
- Extensions should, as far as possible, be designed to prevent any
attack that forces use (or non-use) of a particular feature by
manipulation of handshake messages. This principle should be
followed regardless of whether the feature is believed to cause a
security problem. Often the fact that the extension fields are
included in the inputs to the Finished message hashes will be
sufficient, but extreme care is needed when the extension changes
the meaning of messages sent in the handshake phase. Designers
and implementors should be aware of the fact that until the
handshake has been authenticated, active attackers can modify
messages and insert, remove, or replace extensions.
4.2.1. Supported Versions
struct {
ProtocolVersion versions<2..254>;
} SupportedVersions;
The "supported_versions" extension is used by the client to indicate
which versions of TLS it supports. The extension contains a list of
supported versions in preference order, with the most preferred
version first. Implementations of this specification MUST send this
extension containing all versions of TLS which they are prepared to
negotiate (for this specification, that means minimally {3, 4}, but
if previous versions of TLS are supported, they MUST be present as
well).
Servers which are compliant with this specification MUST use only the
"supported_versions" extension, if present, to determine client
preferences and MUST only select a version of TLS present in that
extension. They MUST ignore any unknown versions. If the extension
is not present, they MUST negotiate TLS 1.2 or prior as specified in
[RFC5246], even if ClientHello.legacy_version is {3, 4} or later.
The server MUST NOT send the "supported_versions" extension. The
server's selected version is contained in the ServerHello.version
field as in previous versions of TLS.
4.2.1.1. Draft Version Indicator
RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS SECTION
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While the eventual version indicator for the RFC version of TLS 1.3
will be {3, 4}, implementations of draft versions of this
specification SHOULD instead advertise {0x7f, [draft-version]} in
their "supported_versions" extension, in ServerHello.version, and
HelloRetryRequest.server_version. This allows pre-RFC
implementations to safely negotiate with each other, even if they
would otherwise be incompatible.
4.2.2. Cookie
struct {
opaque cookie<0..2^16-1>;
} Cookie;
Cookies serve two primary purposes:
- Allowing the server to force the client to demonstrate
reachability at their apparent network address (thus providing a
measure of DoS protection). This is primarily useful for non-
connection-oriented transports (see [RFC6347] for an example of
this).
- Allowing the server to offload state to the client, thus allowing
it to send a HelloRetryRequest without storing any state. The
server does this by pickling that post-ClientHello hash state into
the cookie (protected with some suitable integrity algorithm).
When sending a HelloRetryRequest, the server MAY provide a "cookie"
extension to the client (this is an exception to the usual rule that
the only extensions that may be sent are those that appear in the
ClientHello). When sending the new ClientHello, the client MUST echo
the value of the extension. Clients MUST NOT use cookies in
subsequent connections.
4.2.3. Signature Algorithms
The client uses the "signature_algorithms" extension to indicate to
the server which signature algorithms may be used in digital
signatures. Clients which desire the server to authenticate via a
certificate MUST send this extension. If a server is authenticating
via a certificate and the client has not sent a
"signature_algorithms" extension then the server MUST abort the
handshake with a "missing_extension" alert (see Section 8.2).
Servers which are authenticating via a certificate MUST indicate so
by sending the client an empty "signature_algorithms" extension.
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The "extension_data" field of this extension in a ClientHello
contains a "supported_signature_algorithms" value:
enum {
/* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms */
rsa_pkcs1_sha1 (0x0201),
rsa_pkcs1_sha256 (0x0401),
rsa_pkcs1_sha384 (0x0501),
rsa_pkcs1_sha512 (0x0601),
/* ECDSA algorithms */
ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 (0x0403),
ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 (0x0503),
ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 (0x0603),
/* RSASSA-PSS algorithms */
rsa_pss_sha256 (0x0804),
rsa_pss_sha384 (0x0805),
rsa_pss_sha512 (0x0806),
/* EdDSA algorithms */
ed25519 (0x0807),
ed448 (0x0808),
/* Reserved Code Points */
private_use (0xFE00..0xFFFF),
(0xFFFF)
} SignatureScheme;
SignatureScheme supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
Note: This enum is named "SignatureScheme" because there is already a
"SignatureAlgorithm" type in TLS 1.2, which this replaces. We use
the term "signature algorithm" throughout the text.
Each SignatureScheme value lists a single signature algorithm that
the client is willing to verify. The values are indicated in
descending order of preference. Note that a signature algorithm
takes as input an arbitrary-length message, rather than a digest.
Algorithms which traditionally act on a digest should be defined in
TLS to first hash the input with a specified hash algorithm and then
proceed as usual. The code point groups listed above have the
following meanings:
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms Indicates a signature algorithm using
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 [RFC3447] with the corresponding hash algorithm
as defined in [SHS]. These values refer solely to signatures
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which appear in certificates (see Section 4.4.1.1) and are not
defined for use in signed TLS handshake messages.
ECDSA algorithms Indicates a signature algorithm using ECDSA
[ECDSA], the corresponding curve as defined in ANSI X9.62 [X962]
and FIPS 186-4 [DSS], and the corresponding hash algorithm as
defined in [SHS]. The signature is represented as a DER-encoded
[X690] ECDSA-Sig-Value structure.
RSASSA-PSS algorithms Indicates a signature algorithm using RSASSA-
PSS [RFC3447] with MGF1. The digest used in the mask generation
function and the digest being signed are both the corresponding
hash algorithm as defined in [SHS]. When used in signed TLS
handshake messages, the length of the salt MUST be equal to the
length of the digest output. This codepoint is defined for use
with TLS 1.2 as well as TLS 1.3.
EdDSA algorithms Indicates a signature algorithm using EdDSA as
defined in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa] or its successors. Note that
these correspond to the "PureEdDSA" algorithms and not the
"prehash" variants.
rsa_pkcs1_sha1, dsa_sha1, and ecdsa_sha1 SHOULD NOT be offered.
Clients offering these values for backwards compatibility MUST list
them as the lowest priority (listed after all other algorithms in the
supported_signature_algorithms vector). TLS 1.3 servers MUST NOT
offer a SHA-1 signed certificate unless no valid certificate chain
can be produced without it (see Section 4.4.1.1).
The signatures on certificates that are self-signed or certificates
that are trust anchors are not validated since they begin a
certification path (see [RFC5280], Section 3.2). A certificate that
begins a certification path MAY use a signature algorithm that is not
advertised as being supported in the "signature_algorithms"
extension.
Note that TLS 1.2 defines this extension differently. TLS 1.3
implementations willing to negotiate TLS 1.2 MUST behave in
accordance with the requirements of [RFC5246] when negotiating that
version. In particular:
- TLS 1.2 ClientHellos MAY omit this extension.
- In TLS 1.2, the extension contained hash/signature pairs. The
pairs are encoded in two octets, so SignatureScheme values have
been allocated to align with TLS 1.2's encoding. Some legacy
pairs are left unallocated. These algorithms are deprecated as of
TLS 1.3. They MUST NOT be offered or negotiated by any
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implementation. In particular, MD5 [SLOTH] and SHA-224 MUST NOT
be used.
- ECDSA signature schemes align with TLS 1.2's ECDSA hash/signature
pairs. However, the old semantics did not constrain the signing
curve. If TLS 1.2 is negotiated, implementations MUST be prepared
to accept a signature that uses any curve that they advertised in
the "supported_groups" extension.
- Implementations that advertise support for RSASSA-PSS (which is
mandatory in TLS 1.3), MUST be prepared to accept a signature
using that scheme even when TLS 1.2 is negotiated. In TLS 1.2,
RSASSA-PSS is used with RSA cipher suites.
4.2.4. Negotiated Groups
When sent by the client, the "supported_groups" extension indicates
the named groups which the client supports for key exchange, ordered
from most preferred to least preferred.
Note: In versions of TLS prior to TLS 1.3, this extension was named
"elliptic_curves" and only contained elliptic curve groups. See
[RFC4492] and [RFC7919]. This extension was also used to negotiate
ECDSA curves. Signature algorithms are now negotiated independently
(see Section 4.2.3).
The "extension_data" field of this extension contains a
"NamedGroupList" value:
enum {
/* Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE) */
secp256r1 (23), secp384r1 (24), secp521r1 (25),
x25519 (29), x448 (30),
/* Finite Field Groups (DHE) */
ffdhe2048 (256), ffdhe3072 (257), ffdhe4096 (258),
ffdhe6144 (259), ffdhe8192 (260),
/* Reserved Code Points */
ffdhe_private_use (0x01FC..0x01FF),
ecdhe_private_use (0xFE00..0xFEFF),
(0xFFFF)
} NamedGroup;
struct {
NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1>;
} NamedGroupList;
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Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE) Indicates support of the corresponding
named curve. Note that some curves are also recommended in ANSI
X9.62 [X962] and FIPS 186-4 [DSS]. Others are recommended in
[RFC7748]. Values 0xFE00 through 0xFEFF are reserved for private
use.
Finite Field Groups (DHE) Indicates support of the corresponding
finite field group, defined in [RFC7919]. Values 0x01FC through
0x01FF are reserved for private use.
Items in named_group_list are ordered according to the client's
preferences (most preferred choice first).
As of TLS 1.3, servers are permitted to send the "supported_groups"
extension to the client. If the server has a group it prefers to the
ones in the "key_share" extension but is still willing to accept the
ClientHello, it SHOULD send "supported_groups" to update the client's
view of its preferences; this extension SHOULD contain all groups the
server supports, regardless of whether they are currently supported
by the client. Clients MUST NOT act upon any information found in
"supported_groups" prior to successful completion of the handshake,
but MAY use the information learned from a successfully completed
handshake to change what groups they offer to a server in subsequent
connections.
4.2.5. Key Share
The "key_share" extension contains the endpoint's cryptographic
parameters.
Clients MAY send an empty client_shares vector in order to request
group selection from the server at the cost of an additional round
trip. (see Section 4.1.4)
struct {
NamedGroup group;
opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
} KeyShareEntry;
group The named group for the key being exchanged. Finite Field
Diffie-Hellman [DH] parameters are described in Section 4.2.5.1;
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman parameters are described in
Section 4.2.5.2.
key_exchange Key exchange information. The contents of this field
are determined by the specified group and its corresponding
definition. Endpoints MUST NOT send empty or otherwise invalid
key_exchange values for any reason.
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The "extension_data" field of this extension contains a "KeyShare"
value:
struct {
select (Handshake.msg_type) {
case client_hello:
KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1>;
case hello_retry_request:
NamedGroup selected_group;
case server_hello:
KeyShareEntry server_share;
};
} KeyShare;
client_shares A list of offered KeyShareEntry values in descending
order of client preference. This vector MAY be empty if the
client is requesting a HelloRetryRequest. The ordering of values
here SHOULD match that of the ordering of offered support in the
"supported_groups" extension.
selected_group The mutually supported group the server intends to
negotiate and is requesting a retried ClientHello/KeyShare for.
server_share A single KeyShareEntry value that is in the same group
as one of the client's shares.
Clients offer an arbitrary number of KeyShareEntry values, each
representing a single set of key exchange parameters. For instance,
a client might offer shares for several elliptic curves or multiple
FFDHE groups. The key_exchange values for each KeyShareEntry MUST be
generated independently. Clients MUST NOT offer multiple
KeyShareEntry values for the same group. Clients MUST NOT offer any
KeyShareEntry values for groups not listed in the client's
"supported_groups" extension. Servers MAY check for violations of
these rules and and MAY abort the handshake with an
"illegal_parameter" alert if one is violated.
Upon receipt of this extension in a HelloRetryRequest, the client
MUST first verify that the selected_group field corresponds to a
group which was provided in the "supported_groups" extension in the
original ClientHello. It MUST then verify that the selected_group
field does not correspond to a group which was provided in the
"key_share" extension in the original ClientHello. If either of
these checks fails, then the client MUST abort the handshake with an
"illegal_parameter" alert. Otherwise, when sending the new
ClientHello, the client MUST append a new KeyShareEntry for the group
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indicated in the selected_group field to the groups in its original
KeyShare. The remaining KeyShareEntry values MUST be preserved.
Note that a HelloRetryRequest might not include the "key_share"
extension if other extensions are sent, such as if the server is only
sending a cookie.
If using (EC)DHE key establishment, servers offer exactly one
KeyShareEntry in the ServerHello. This value MUST correspond to the
KeyShareEntry value offered by the client that the server has
selected for the negotiated key exchange. Servers MUST NOT send a
KeyShareEntry for any group not indicated in the "supported_groups"
extension. If a HelloRetryRequest was received, the client MUST
verify that the selected NamedGroup matches that supplied in the
selected_group field and MUST abort the connection with an
"illegal_parameter" alert if it does not.
[[TODO: Recommendation about what the client offers. Presumably
which integer DH groups and which curves.]]
4.2.5.1. Diffie-Hellman Parameters
Diffie-Hellman [DH] parameters for both clients and servers are
encoded in the opaque key_exchange field of a KeyShareEntry in a
KeyShare structure. The opaque value contains the Diffie-Hellman
public value (Y = g^X mod p), encoded as a big-endian integer, padded
with zeros to the size of p in bytes.
Note: For a given Diffie-Hellman group, the padding results in all
public keys having the same length.
Peers SHOULD validate each other's public key Y by ensuring that 1 <
Y < p-1. This check ensures that the remote peer is properly behaved
and isn't forcing the local system into a small subgroup.
4.2.5.2. ECDHE Parameters
ECDHE parameters for both clients and servers are encoded in the the
opaque key_exchange field of a KeyShareEntry in a KeyShare structure.
For secp256r1, secp384r1 and secp521r1, the contents are the byte
string representation of an elliptic curve public value following the
conversion routine in Section 4.3.6 of ANSI X9.62 [X962].
Although X9.62 supports multiple point formats, any given curve MUST
specify only a single point format. All curves currently specified
in this document MUST only be used with the uncompressed point format
(the format for all ECDH functions is considered uncompressed).
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For x25519 and x448, the contents are the byte string inputs and
outputs of the corresponding functions defined in [RFC7748], 32 bytes
for x25519 and 56 bytes for x448.
Note: Versions of TLS prior to 1.3 permitted point format
negotiation; TLS 1.3 removes this feature in favor of a single point
format for each curve.
4.2.6. Pre-Shared Key Extension
The "pre_shared_key" extension is used to indicate the identity of
the pre-shared key to be used with a given handshake in association
with PSK key establishment (see [RFC4279] for background).
The "extension_data" field of this extension contains a
"PreSharedKeyExtension" value:
enum { psk_ke(0), psk_dhe_ke(1), (255) } PskKeyExchangeMode;
enum { psk_auth(0), psk_sign_auth(1), (255) } PskAuthenticationMode;
struct {
PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255>;
PskAuthenticationMode auth_modes<1..255>;
opaque identity<0..2^16-1>;
} PskIdentity;
struct {
select (Handshake.msg_type) {
case client_hello:
PskIdentity identities<6..2^16-1>;
case server_hello:
uint16 selected_identity;
};
} PreSharedKeyExtension;
identities A list of the identities (labels for keys) that the
client is willing to negotiate with the server. If sent alongside
the "early_data" extension (see Section 4.2.7), the first identity
is the one used for 0-RTT data.
selected_identity The server's chosen identity expressed as a
(0-based) index into the identities in the client's list.
Each PSK offered by the client also indicates the authentication and
key exchange modes with which the server can use it, with each list
being in the order of the client's preference, with most preferred
first. Any PSK MUST only be used with a single HKDF hash algorithm.
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This restriction is automatically enforced for PSKs established via
NewSessionTicket (Section 4.5.1) but any externally-established PSKs
MUST also follow this rule.
PskKeyExchangeMode values have the following meanings:
psk_ke PSK-only key establishment. In this mode, the server MUST
not supply a "key_share" value.
psk_dhe_ke PSK key establishment with (EC)DHE key establishment. In
this mode, the client and servers MUST supply "key_share" values
as described in Section 4.2.5.
PskAuthenticationMode values have the following meanings:
psk_auth PSK-only authentication. In this mode, the server MUST NOT
supply either a Certificate or CertificateVerify message. [TODO:
Add a signing mode.]
In order to accept PSK key establishment, the server sends a
"pre_shared_key" extension with the selected identity. Clients MUST
verify that the server's selected_identity is within the range
supplied by the client and that the "key_share" and
"signature_algorithms" extensions are consistent with the indicated
ke_modes and auth_modes values. If these values are not consistent,
the client MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter"
alert.
If the server supplies an "early_data" extension, the client MUST
verify that the server selected the first offered identity. If any
other value is returned, the client MUST abort the handshake with an
"unknown_psk_identity" alert.
Note that although 0-RTT data is encrypted with the first PSK
identity, the server MAY fall back to 1-RTT and select a different
PSK identity if multiple identities are offered.
4.2.7. Early Data Indication
When PSK resumption is used, the client can send application data in
its first flight of messages. If the client opts to do so, it MUST
supply an "early_data" extension as well as the "pre_shared_key"
extension.
The "extension_data" field of this extension contains an
"EarlyDataIndication" value:
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struct {
select (Handshake.msg_type) {
case client_hello:
uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age;
case server_hello:
struct {};
};
} EarlyDataIndication;
obfuscated_ticket_age The time since the client learned about the
server configuration that it is using, in milliseconds. This
value is added modulo 2^32 to with the "ticket_age_add" value that
was included with the ticket, see Section 4.5.1. This addition
prevents passive observers from correlating sessions unless
tickets are reused. Note: because ticket lifetimes are restricted
to a week, 32 bits is enough to represent any plausible age, even
in milliseconds.
A server MUST validate that the ticket_age is within a small
tolerance of the time since the ticket was issued (see
Section 4.2.7.2). If it is not, the server SHOULD proceed with the
handshake but reject 0-RTT.
The parameters for the 0-RTT data (symmetric cipher suite, ALPN,
etc.) are the same as those which were negotiated in the connection
which established the PSK. The PSK used to encrypt the early data
MUST be the first PSK listed in the client's "pre_shared_key"
extension.
0-RTT messages sent in the first flight have the same content types
as their corresponding messages sent in other flights (handshake,
application_data, and alert respectively) but are protected under
different keys. After all the 0-RTT application data messages (if
any) have been sent, an "end_of_early_data" alert of type "warning"
is sent to indicate the end of the flight. 0-RTT MUST always be
followed by an "end_of_early_data" alert, which will be encrypted
with the 0-RTT traffic keys.
A server which receives an "early_data" extension can behave in one
of two ways:
- Ignore the extension and return no response. This indicates that
the server has ignored any early data and an ordinary 1-RTT
handshake is required.
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- Return an empty extension, indicating that it intends to process
the early data. It is not possible for the server to accept only
a subset of the early data messages.
- Request that the client send another ClientHello by responding
with a HelloRetryRequest. A client MUST NOT include the
"early_data" extension in its followup ClientHello.
In order to accept early data, the server server MUST have accepted a
PSK cipher suite and selected the the first key offered in the
client's "pre_shared_key" extension. In addition, it MUST verify
that the following values are consistent with those negotiated in the
connection during which the ticket was established.
- The TLS version number, AEAD algorithm, and the hash for HKDF.
- The selected ALPN [RFC7443] value, if any.
Future extensions MUST define their interaction with 0-RTT.
If any of these checks fail, the server MUST NOT respond with the
extension and must discard all the remaining first flight data (thus
falling back to 1-RTT). If the client attempts a 0-RTT handshake but
the server rejects it, it will generally not have the 0-RTT record
protection keys and must instead trial decrypt each record with the
1-RTT handshake keys until it finds one that decrypts properly, and
then pick up the handshake from that point.
If the server chooses to accept the "early_data" extension, then it
MUST comply with the same error handling requirements specified for
all records when processing early data records. Specifically, if the
server fails to decrypt any 0-RTT record following an accepted
"early_data" extension it MUST terminate the connection with a
"bad_record_mac" alert as per Section 5.2.
If the server rejects the "early_data" extension, the client
application MAY opt to retransmit the data once the handshake has
been completed. TLS stacks SHOULD not do this automatically and
client applications MUST take care that the negotiated parameters are
consistent with those it expected. For example, if the ALPN value
has changed, it is likely unsafe to retransmit the original
application layer data.
4.2.7.1. Processing Order
Clients are permitted to "stream" 0-RTT data until they receive the
server's Finished, only then sending the "end_of_early_data" alert.
In order to avoid deadlock, when accepting "early_data", servers MUST
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process the client's Finished and then immediately send the
ServerHello, rather than waiting for the client's "end_of_early_data"
alert.
4.2.7.2. Replay Properties
As noted in Section 2.3, TLS provides a limited mechanism for replay
protection for data sent by the client in the first flight.
The "obfuscated_ticket_age" parameter in the client's "early_data"
extension SHOULD be used by servers to limit the time over which the
first flight might be replayed. A server can store the time at which
it sends a session ticket to the client, or encode the time in the
ticket. Then, each time it receives an "early_data" extension, it
can subtract the base value and check to see if the value used by the
client matches its expectations.
The ticket age (the value with "ticket_age_add" subtracted) provided
by the client will be shorter than the actual time elapsed on the
server by a single round trip time. This difference is comprised of
the delay in sending the NewSessionTicket message to the client, plus
the time taken to send the ClientHello to the server. For this
reason, a server SHOULD measure the round trip time prior to sending
the NewSessionTicket message and account for that in the value it
saves.
To properly validate the ticket age, a server needs to save at least
two items:
- The time that the server generated the session ticket and the
estimated round trip time can be added together to form a baseline
time.
- The "ticket_age_add" parameter from the NewSessionTicket is needed
to recover the ticket age from the "obfuscated_ticket_age"
parameter.
There are several potential sources of error that make an exact
measurement of time difficult. Variations in client and server
clocks are likely to be minimal, outside of gross time corrections.
Network propagation delays are most likely causes of a mismatch in
legitimate values for elapsed time. Both the NewSessionTicket and
ClientHello messages might be retransmitted and therefore delayed,
which might be hidden by TCP.
A small allowance for errors in clocks and variations in measurements
is advisable. However, any allowance also increases the opportunity
for replay. In this case, it is better to reject early data and fall
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back to a full 1-RTT handshake than to risk greater exposure to
replay attacks. In common network topologies for browser clients,
small allowances on the order of ten seconds are reasonable. Clock
skew distributions are not symmetric, so the optimal tradeoff may
involve an asymmetric replay window.
4.2.8. OCSP Status Extensions
[RFC6066] and [RFC6961] provide extensions to negotiate the server
sending OCSP responses to the client. In TLS 1.2 and below, the
server sends an empty extension to indicate negotiation of this
extension and the OCSP information is carried in a CertificateStatus
message. In TLS 1.3, the server's OCSP information is carried in an
extension in EncryptedExtensions. Specifically: The body of the
"status_request" or "status_request_v2" extension from the server
MUST be a CertificateStatus structure as defined in [RFC6066] and
[RFC6961] respectively.
Note: This means that the certificate status appears prior to the
certificates it applies to. This is slightly anomalous but matches
the existing behavior for SignedCertificateTimestamps [RFC6962], and
is more easily extensible in the handshake state machine.
4.3. Server Parameters Messages
The next two messages from the server, EncryptedExtensions and
CertificateRequest, contain encrypted information from the server
that determines the rest of the handshake.
4.3.1. Encrypted Extensions
When this message will be sent:
In all handshakes, the server MUST send the EncryptedExtensions
message immediately after the ServerHello message. This is the
first message that is encrypted under keys derived from
handshake_traffic_secret.
Meaning of this message:
The EncryptedExtensions message contains any extensions which
should be protected, i.e., any which are not needed to establish
the cryptographic context.
The same extension types MUST NOT appear in both the ServerHello and
EncryptedExtensions. All server-sent extensions other than those
explicitly listed in Section 4.1.3 or designated in the IANA registry
MUST only appear in EncryptedExtensions. Extensions which are
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designated to appear in ServerHello MUST NOT appear in
EncryptedExtensions. Clients MUST check EncryptedExtensions for the
presence of any forbidden extensions and if any are found MUST abort
the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.
Structure of this message:
struct {
Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} EncryptedExtensions;
extensions A list of extensions.
4.3.2. Certificate Request
When this message will be sent:
A server which is authenticating with a certificate can optionally
request a certificate from the client. This message, if sent,
will follow EncryptedExtensions.
Structure of this message:
opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
struct {
opaque certificate_extension_oid<1..2^8-1>;
opaque certificate_extension_values<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateExtension;
struct {
opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
SignatureScheme
supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
CertificateExtension certificate_extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateRequest;
certificate_request_context An opaque string which identifies the
certificate request and which will be echoed in the client's
Certificate message. The certificate_request_context MUST be
unique within the scope of this connection (thus preventing replay
of client CertificateVerify messages). Within the handshake, this
field MUST be empty.
supported_signature_algorithms A list of the signature algorithms
that the server is able to verify, listed in descending order of
preference. Any certificates provided by the client MUST be
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signed using a signature algorithm found in
supported_signature_algorithms.
certificate_authorities A list of the distinguished names [X501] of
acceptable certificate_authorities, represented in DER-encoded
[X690] format. These distinguished names may specify a desired
distinguished name for a root CA or for a subordinate CA; thus,
this message can be used to describe known roots as well as a
desired authorization space. If the certificate_authorities list
is empty, then the client MAY send any certificate that meets the
rest of the selection criteria in the CertificateRequest, unless
there is some external arrangement to the contrary.
certificate_extensions A list of certificate extension OIDs
[RFC5280] with their allowed values, represented in DER-encoded
[X690] format. Some certificate extension OIDs allow multiple
values (e.g. Extended Key Usage). If the server has included a
non-empty certificate_extensions list, the client certificate MUST
contain all of the specified extension OIDs that the client
recognizes. For each extension OID recognized by the client, all
of the specified values MUST be present in the client certificate
(but the certificate MAY have other values as well). However, the
client MUST ignore and skip any unrecognized certificate extension
OIDs. If the client has ignored some of the required certificate
extension OIDs, and supplied a certificate that does not satisfy
the request, the server MAY at its discretion either continue the
session without client authentication, or abort the handshake with
an "unsupported_certificate" alert. PKIX RFCs define a variety of
certificate extension OIDs and their corresponding value types.
Depending on the type, matching certificate extension values are
not necessarily bitwise-equal. It is expected that TLS
implementations will rely on their PKI libraries to perform
certificate selection using certificate extension OIDs. This
document defines matching rules for two standard certificate
extensions defined in [RFC5280]:
o The Key Usage extension in a certificate matches the request
when all key usage bits asserted in the request are also
asserted in the Key Usage certificate extension.
o The Extended Key Usage extension in a certificate matches the
request when all key purpose OIDs present in the request are
also found in the Extended Key Usage certificate extension.
The special anyExtendedKeyUsage OID MUST NOT be used in the
request.
Separate specifications may define matching rules for other
certificate extensions.
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Servers which are authenticating with a PSK MUST not send the
CertificateRequest message.
4.4. Authentication Messages
As discussed in Section 2, TLS uses a common set of messages for
authentication, key confirmation, and handshake integrity:
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finished. These messages are
always sent as the last messages in their handshake flight. The
Certificate and CertificateVerify messages are only sent under
certain circumstances, as defined below. The Finished message is
always sent as part of the Authentication block.
The computations for the Authentication messages all uniformly take
the following inputs:
- The certificate and signing key to be used.
- A Handshake Context based on the hash of the handshake messages
- A base key to be used to compute a MAC key.
Based on these inputs, the messages then contain:
Certificate The certificate to be used for authentication and any
supporting certificates in the chain. Note that certificate-based
client authentication is not available in the 0-RTT case.
CertificateVerify A signature over the value Hash(Handshake Context
+ Certificate) + Hash(resumption_context) See Section 4.5.1 for
the definition of resumption_context.
Finished A MAC over the value Hash(Handshake Context + Certificate +
CertificateVerify) + Hash(resumption_context) using a MAC key
derived from the base key.
Because the CertificateVerify signs the Handshake Context +
Certificate and the Finished MACs the Handshake Context + Certificate
+ CertificateVerify, this is mostly equivalent to keeping a running
hash of the handshake messages (exactly so in the pure 1-RTT cases).
Note, however, that subsequent post-handshake authentications do not
include each other, just the messages through the end of the main
handshake.
The following table defines the Handshake Context and MAC Base Key
for each scenario:
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+-----------+-----------------------------+-------------------------+
| Mode | Handshake Context | Base Key |
+-----------+-----------------------------+-------------------------+
| 0-RTT | ClientHello | client_early_traffic_se |
| | | cret |
| | | |
| 1-RTT | ClientHello ... later of En | [sender]_handshake_traf |
| (Server) | cryptedExtensions/Certifica | fic_secret |
| | teRequest | |
| | | |
| 1-RTT | ClientHello ... | [sender]_handshake_traf |
| (Client) | ServerFinished | fic_secret |
| | | |
| Post- | ClientHello ... | [sender]_traffic_secret |
| Handshake | ClientFinished + | _N |
| | CertificateRequest | |
+-----------+-----------------------------+-------------------------+
The [sender] in this table denotes the sending side.
Note: The Handshake Context for the last three rows does not include
any 0-RTT handshake messages, regardless of whether 0-RTT is used.
4.4.1. Certificate
When this message will be sent:
The server MUST send a Certificate message whenever the agreed-
upon key exchange method uses certificates for authentication
(this includes all key exchange methods defined in this document
except PSK).
The client MUST send a Certificate message if and only if server
has requested client authentication via a CertificateRequest
message (Section 4.3.2). If the server requests client
authentication but no suitable certificate is available, the
client MUST send a Certificate message containing no certificates
(i.e., with the "certificate_list" field having length 0).
Meaning of this message:
This message conveys the endpoint's certificate chain to the peer.
Structure of this message:
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opaque ASN1Cert<1..2^24-1>;
struct {
opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
ASN1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
} Certificate;
certificate_request_context If this message is in response to a
CertificateRequest, the value of certificate_request_context in
that message. Otherwise, in the case of server authentication
this field SHALL be zero length.
certificate_list This is a sequence (chain) of certificates. The
sender's certificate MUST come first in the list. Each following
certificate SHOULD directly certify one preceding it. Because
certificate validation requires that trust anchors be distributed
independently, a certificate that specifies a trust anchor MAY be
omitted from the chain, provided that supported peers are known to
possess any omitted certificates.
Note: Prior to TLS 1.3, "certificate_list" ordering required each
certificate to certify the one immediately preceding it, however some
implementations allowed some flexibility. Servers sometimes send
both a current and deprecated intermediate for transitional purposes,
and others are simply configured incorrectly, but these cases can
nonetheless be validated properly. For maximum compatibility, all
implementations SHOULD be prepared to handle potentially extraneous
certificates and arbitrary orderings from any TLS version, with the
exception of the end-entity certificate which MUST be first.
The server's certificate list MUST always be non-empty. A client
will send an empty certificate list if it does not have an
appropriate certificate to send in response to the server's
authentication request.
4.4.1.1. Server Certificate Selection
The following rules apply to the certificates sent by the server:
- The certificate type MUST be X.509v3 [RFC5280], unless explicitly
negotiated otherwise (e.g., [RFC5081]).
- The server's end-entity certificate's public key (and associated
restrictions) MUST be compatible with the selected authentication
algorithm (currently RSA or ECDSA).
- The certificate MUST allow the key to be used for signing (i.e.,
the digitalSignature bit MUST be set if the Key Usage extension is
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present) with a signature scheme indicated in the client's
"signature_algorithms" extension.
- The "server_name" and "trusted_ca_keys" extensions [RFC6066] are
used to guide certificate selection. As servers MAY require the
presence of the "server_name" extension, clients SHOULD send this
extension, when applicable.
All certificates provided by the server MUST be signed by a signature
algorithm that appears in the "signature_algorithms" extension
provided by the client, if they are able to provide such a chain (see
Section 4.2.3). Certificates that are self-signed or certificates
that are expected to be trust anchors are not validated as part of
the chain and therefore MAY be signed with any algorithm.
If the server cannot produce a certificate chain that is signed only
via the indicated supported algorithms, then it SHOULD continue the
handshake by sending the client a certificate chain of its choice
that may include algorithms that are not known to be supported by the
client. This fallback chain MAY use the deprecated SHA-1 hash
algorithm only if the "signature_algorithms" extension provided by
the client permits it. If the client cannot construct an acceptable
chain using the provided certificates and decides to abort the
handshake, then it MUST abort the handshake with an
"unsupported_certificate" alert.
If the server has multiple certificates, it chooses one of them based
on the above-mentioned criteria (in addition to other criteria, such
as transport layer endpoint, local configuration and preferences).
4.4.1.2. Client Certificate Selection
The following rules apply to certificates sent by the client:
In particular:
- The certificate type MUST be X.509v3 [RFC5280], unless explicitly
negotiated otherwise (e.g., [RFC5081]).
- If the certificate_authorities list in the certificate request
message was non-empty, one of the certificates in the certificate
chain SHOULD be issued by one of the listed CAs.
- The certificates MUST be signed using an acceptable signature
algorithm, as described in Section 4.3.2. Note that this relaxes
the constraints on certificate-signing algorithms found in prior
versions of TLS.
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- If the certificate_extensions list in the certificate request
message was non-empty, the end-entity certificate MUST match the
extension OIDs recognized by the client, as described in
Section 4.3.2.
Note that, as with the server certificate, there are certificates
that use algorithm combinations that cannot be currently used with
TLS.
4.4.1.3. Receiving a Certificate Message
In general, detailed certificate validation procedures are out of
scope for TLS (see [RFC5280]). This section provides TLS-specific
requirements.
If the server supplies an empty Certificate message, the client MUST
abort the handshake with a "decode_error" alert.
If the client does not send any certificates, the server MAY at its
discretion either continue the handshake without client
authentication, or abort the handshake with a "certificate_required"
alert. Also, if some aspect of the certificate chain was
unacceptable (e.g., it was not signed by a known, trusted CA), the
server MAY at its discretion either continue the handshake
(considering the client unauthenticated) or abort the handshake.
Any endpoint receiving any certificate signed using any signature
algorithm using an MD5 hash MUST abort the handshake with a
"bad_certificate" alert. SHA-1 is deprecated and it is RECOMMENDED
that any endpoint receiving any certificate signed using any
signature algorithm using a SHA-1 hash abort the handshake with a
"bad_certificate" alert. All endpoints are RECOMMENDED to transition
to SHA-256 or better as soon as possible to maintain interoperability
with implementations currently in the process of phasing out SHA-1
support.
Note that a certificate containing a key for one signature algorithm
MAY be signed using a different signature algorithm (for instance, an
RSA key signed with an ECDSA key).
4.4.2. Certificate Verify
When this message will be sent:
This message is used to provide explicit proof that an endpoint
possesses the private key corresponding to its certificate and
also provides integrity for the handshake up to this point.
Servers MUST send this message when authenticating via a
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certificate. Clients MUST send this message whenever
authenticating via a Certificate (i.e., when the Certificate
message is non-empty). When sent, this message MUST appear
immediately after the Certificate Message and immediately prior to
the Finished message.
Structure of this message:
struct {
SignatureScheme algorithm;
opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateVerify;
The algorithm field specifies the signature algorithm used (see
Section 4.2.3 for the definition of this field). The signature is a
digital signature using that algorithm that covers the hash output
described in Section 4.4 namely:
Hash(Handshake Context + Certificate) + Hash(resumption_context)
In TLS 1.3, the digital signature process takes as input:
- A signing key
- A context string
- The actual content to be signed
The digital signature is then computed using the signing key over the
concatenation of:
- 64 bytes of octet 32
- The context string
- A single 0 byte which servers as the separator
- The content to be signed
This structure is intended to prevent an attack on previous versions
of previous versions of TLS in which the ServerKeyExchange format
meant that attackers could obtain a signature of a message with a
chosen, 32-byte prefix. The initial 64 byte pad clears that prefix.
The context string for a server signature is "TLS 1.3, server
CertificateVerify" and for a client signature is "TLS 1.3, client
CertificateVerify".
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For example, if Hash(Handshake Context + Certificate) was 32 bytes of
01 and Hash(resumption_context) was 32 bytes of 02 (these lengths
would make sense for SHA-256, the input to the final signing process
for a server CertificateVerify would be:
2020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020
2020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020
544c5320312e332c207365727665722043657274696669636174655665726966
79
00
0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101
0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202
If sent by a server, the signature algorithm MUST be one offered in
the client's "signature_algorithms" extension unless no valid
certificate chain can be produced without unsupported algorithms (see
Section 4.2.3).
If sent by a client, the signature algorithm used in the signature
MUST be one of those present in the supported_signature_algorithms
field of the CertificateRequest message.
In addition, the signature algorithm MUST be compatible with the key
in the sender's end-entity certificate. RSA signatures MUST use an
RSASSA-PSS algorithm, regardless of whether RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
algorithms appear in "signature_algorithms". SHA-1 MUST NOT be used
in any signatures in CertificateVerify. All SHA-1 signature
algorithms in this specification are defined solely for use in legacy
certificates, and are not valid for CertificateVerify signatures.
Note: When used with non-certificate-based handshakes (e.g., PSK),
the client's signature does not cover the server's certificate
directly, although it does cover the server's Finished message, which
transitively includes the server's certificate when the PSK derives
from a certificate-authenticated handshake. [PSK-FINISHED] describes
a concrete attack on this mode if the Finished is omitted from the
signature. It is unsafe to use certificate-based client
authentication when the client might potentially share the same PSK/
key-id pair with two different endpoints. In order to ensure this,
implementations MUST NOT mix certificate-based client authentication
with PSK.
4.4.3. Finished
When this message will be sent:
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The Finished message is the final message in the authentication
block. It is essential for providing authentication of the
handshake and of the computed keys.
Meaning of this message:
Recipients of Finished messages MUST verify that the contents are
correct. Once a side has sent its Finished message and received
and validated the Finished message from its peer, it may begin to
send and receive application data over the connection.
The key used to compute the finished message is computed from the
Base key defined in Section 4.4 using HKDF (see Section 7.1).
Specifically:
finished_key =
HKDF-Expand-Label(BaseKey, "finished", "", Hash.length)
Structure of this message:
struct {
opaque verify_data[Hash.length];
} Finished;
The verify_data value is computed as follows:
verify_data =
HMAC(finished_key, Hash(
Handshake Context +
Certificate* +
CertificateVerify*
) +
Hash(resumption_context)
)
* Only included if present.
Where HMAC [RFC2104] uses the Hash algorithm for the handshake. As
noted above, the HMAC input can generally be implemented by a running
hash, i.e., just the handshake hash at this point.
In previous versions of TLS, the verify_data was always 12 octets
long. In the current version of TLS, it is the size of the HMAC
output for the Hash used for the handshake.
Note: Alerts and any other record types are not handshake messages
and are not included in the hash computations.
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Any records following a 1-RTT Finished message MUST be encrypted
under the application traffic key. In particular, this includes any
alerts sent by the server in response to client Certificate and
CertificateVerify messages.
4.5. Post-Handshake Messages
TLS also allows other messages to be sent after the main handshake.
These messages use a handshake content type and are encrypted under
the application traffic key.
Handshake messages sent after the handshake MUST NOT be interleaved
with other record types. That is, if a message is split over two or
more handshake records, there MUST NOT be any other records between
them.
4.5.1. New Session Ticket Message
At any time after the server has received the client Finished
message, it MAY send a NewSessionTicket message. This message
creates a pre-shared key (PSK) binding between the ticket value and
the following two values derived from the resumption master secret:
resumption_psk = HKDF-Expand-Label(
resumption_secret,
"resumption psk", "", Hash.length)
resumption_context = HKDF-Expand-Label(
resumption_secret,
"resumption context", "", Hash.length)
The client MAY use this PSK for future handshakes by including the
ticket value in the "pre_shared_key" extension in its ClientHello
(Section 4.2.6). Servers MAY send multiple tickets on a single
connection, either immediately after each other or after specific
events. For instance, the server might send a new ticket after post-
handshake authentication in order to encapsulate the additional
client authentication state. Clients SHOULD attempt to use each
ticket no more than once, with more recent tickets being used first.
For handshakes that do not use a resumption_psk, the
resumption_context is a string of Hash.length zeroes. [[Note: this
will not be safe if/when we add additional server signatures with
PSK: OPEN ISSUE https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/558]]
Any ticket MUST only be resumed with a cipher suite that is identical
to that negotiated connection where the ticket was established.
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enum { ticket_early_data_info(1), (65535) } TicketExtensionType;
struct {
TicketExtensionType extension_type;
opaque extension_data<1..2^16-1>;
} TicketExtension;
struct {
uint32 ticket_lifetime;
PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255>;
PskAuthenticationMode auth_modes<1..255>;
opaque ticket<1..2^16-1>;
TicketExtension extensions<0..2^16-2>;
} NewSessionTicket;
ke_modes The key exchange modes with which this ticket can be used
in descending order of server preference.
auth_modes The authentication modes with which this ticket can be
used in descending order of server preference.
ticket_lifetime Indicates the lifetime in seconds as a 32-bit
unsigned integer in network byte order from the time of ticket
issuance. Servers MUST NOT use any value more than 604800 seconds
(7 days). The value of zero indicates that the ticket should be
discarded immediately. Clients MUST NOT cache session tickets for
longer than 7 days, regardless of the ticket_lifetime. It MAY
delete the ticket earlier based on local policy. A server MAY
treat a ticket as valid for a shorter period of time than what is
stated in the ticket_lifetime.
ticket The value of the ticket to be used as the PSK identifier.
The ticket itself is an opaque label. It MAY either be a database
lookup key or a self-encrypted and self-authenticated value.
Section 4 of [RFC5077] describes a recommended ticket construction
mechanism.
ticket_extensions A set of extension values for the ticket. Clients
MUST ignore unrecognized extensions.
This document defines one ticket extension, "ticket_early_data_info"
struct {
uint32 ticket_age_add;
} TicketEarlyDataInfo;
This extension indicates that the ticket may be used to send 0-RTT
data (Section 4.2.7)). It contains one value:
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ticket_age_add A randomly generated 32-bit value that is used to
obscure the age of the ticket that the client includes in the
"early_data" extension. The client-side ticket age is added to
this value modulo 2^32 to obtain the value that is transmitted by
the client.
4.5.2. Post-Handshake Authentication
The server is permitted to request client authentication at any time
after the handshake has completed by sending a CertificateRequest
message. The client SHOULD respond with the appropriate
Authentication messages. If the client chooses to authenticate, it
MUST send Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finished. If it
declines, it MUST send a Certificate message containing no
certificates followed by Finished.
Note: Because client authentication may require prompting the user,
servers MUST be prepared for some delay, including receiving an
arbitrary number of other messages between sending the
CertificateRequest and receiving a response. In addition, clients
which receive multiple CertificateRequests in close succession MAY
respond to them in a different order than they were received (the
certificate_request_context value allows the server to disambiguate
the responses).
4.5.3. Key and IV Update
enum { update_not_requested(0), update_requested(1), (255)
} KeyUpdateRequest;
struct {
KeyUpdateRequest request_update;
} KeyUpdate;
request_update Indicates that the recipient of the KeyUpdate should
respond with its own KeyUpdate. If an implementation receives any
other value, it MUST terminate the connection with an
"illegal_parameter" alert.
The KeyUpdate handshake message is used to indicate that the sender
is updating its sending cryptographic keys. This message can be sent
by the server after sending its first flight and the client after
sending its second flight. Implementations that receive a KeyUpdate
message prior to receiving a Finished message as part of the 1-RTT
handshake MUST terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message"
alert. After sending a KeyUpdate message, the sender SHALL send all
its traffic using the next generation of keys, computed as described
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in Section 7.2. Upon receiving a KeyUpdate, the receiver MUST update
its receiving keys.
If the request_udate field is set to "update_requested" then the
receiver MUST send a KeyUpdate of its own with request_update set to
"update_not_requested" prior to sending its next application data
record. This mechanism allows either side to force an update to the
entire connection, but causes an implementation which receives
multiple KeyUpdates while it is silent to respond with a single
update. Note that implementations may receive an arbitrary number of
messages between sending a KeyUpdate and receiving the peer's
KeyUpdate because those messages may already be in flight. However,
because send and receive keys are derived from independent traffic
secrets, retaining the receive traffic secret does not threaten the
forward secrecy of data sent before the sender changed keys.
If implementations independently send their own KeyUpdates with
request_update set to "update_requested", and they cross in flight,
then each side will also send a response, with the result that each
side increments by two generations.
Both sender and receiver MUST encrypt their KeyUpdate messages with
the old keys. Additionally, both sides MUST enforce that a KeyUpdate
with the old key is received before accepting any messages encrypted
with the new key. Failure to do so may allow message truncation
attacks.
4.6. Handshake Layer and Key Changes
Handshake messages MUST NOT span key changes. Because the
ServerHello, Finished, and KeyUpdate messages signal a key change,
upon receiving these messages a receiver MUST verify that the end of
these messages aligns with a record boundary; if not, then it MUST
terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.
5. Record Protocol
The TLS record protocol takes messages to be transmitted, fragments
the data into manageable blocks, protects the records, and transmits
the result. Received data is decrypted and verified, reassembled,
and then delivered to higher-level clients.
TLS records are typed, which allows multiple higher level protocols
to be multiplexed over the same record layer. This document
specifies three content types: handshake, application data, and
alert. Implementations MUST NOT send record types not defined in
this document unless negotiated by some extension. If a TLS
implementation receives an unexpected record type, it MUST terminate
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the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert. New record
content type values are assigned by IANA in the TLS Content Type
Registry as described in Section 10.
Application data messages are carried by the record layer and are
fragmented and encrypted as described below. The messages are
treated as transparent data to the record layer.
5.1. Record Layer
The TLS record layer receives uninterpreted data from higher layers
in non-empty blocks of arbitrary size.
The record layer fragments information blocks into TLSPlaintext
records carrying data in chunks of 2^14 bytes or less. Message
boundaries are not preserved in the record layer (i.e., multiple
messages of the same ContentType MAY be coalesced into a single
TLSPlaintext record, or a single message MAY be fragmented across
several records). Alert messages (Section 6) MUST NOT be fragmented
across records.
enum {
alert(21),
handshake(22),
application_data(23),
(255)
} ContentType;
struct {
ContentType type;
ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version = { 3, 1 }; /* TLS v1.x */
uint16 length;
opaque fragment[TLSPlaintext.length];
} TLSPlaintext;
type The higher-level protocol used to process the enclosed
fragment.
legacy_record_version This value MUST be set to { 3, 1 } for all
records. This field is deprecated and MUST be ignored for all
purposes.
length The length (in bytes) of the following TLSPlaintext.fragment.
The length MUST NOT exceed 2^14.
fragment The data being transmitted. This value transparent and
treated as an independent block to be dealt with by the higher-
level protocol specified by the type field.
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This document describes TLS Version 1.3, which uses the version { 3,
4 }. The version value 3.4 is historical, deriving from the use of {
3, 1 } for TLS 1.0 and { 3, 0 } for SSL 3.0. In order to maximize
backwards compatibility, the record layer version identifies as
simply TLS 1.0. Endpoints supporting other versions negotiate the
version to use by following the procedure and requirements in
Appendix C.
Implementations MUST NOT send zero-length fragments of Handshake or
Alert types, even if those fragments contain padding. Zero-length
fragments of Application data MAY be sent as they are potentially
useful as a traffic analysis countermeasure.
When record protection has not yet been engaged, TLSPlaintext
structures are written directly onto the wire. Once record
protection has started, TLSPlaintext records are protected and sent
as described in the following section.
5.2. Record Payload Protection
The record protection functions translate a TLSPlaintext structure
into a TLSCiphertext. The deprotection functions reverse the
process. In TLS 1.3 as opposed to previous versions of TLS, all
ciphers are modeled as "Authenticated Encryption with Additional
Data" (AEAD) [RFC5116]. AEAD functions provide a unified encryption
and authentication operation which turns plaintext into authenticated
ciphertext and back again. Each encrypted record consists of a
plaintext header followed by an encrypted body, which itself contains
a type and optional padding.
struct {
opaque content[TLSPlaintext.length];
ContentType type;
uint8 zeros[length_of_padding];
} TLSInnerPlaintext;
struct {
ContentType opaque_type = application_data(23); /* see TLSInnerPlaintext.type */
ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version = { 3, 1 }; /* TLS v1.x */
uint16 length;
opaque encrypted_record[length];
} TLSCiphertext;
content The cleartext of TLSPlaintext.fragment.
type The content type of the record.
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zeros An arbitrary-length run of zero-valued bytes may appear in the
cleartext after the type field. This provides an opportunity for
senders to pad any TLS record by a chosen amount as long as the
total stays within record size limits. See Section 5.4 for more
details.
opaque_type The outer opaque_type field of a TLSCiphertext record is
always set to the value 23 (application_data) for outward
compatibility with middleboxes accustomed to parsing previous
versions of TLS. The actual content type of the record is found
in TLSInnerPlaintext.type after decryption.
legacy_record_version The legacy_record_version field is identical
to TLSPlaintext.legacy_record_version and is always { 3, 1 }.
Note that the handshake protocol including the ClientHello and
ServerHello messages authenticates the protocol version, so this
value is redundant.
length The length (in bytes) of the following
TLSCiphertext.fragment, which is the sum of the lengths of the
content and the padding, plus one for the inner content type. The
length MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + 256. An endpoint that receives a
record that exceeds this length MUST terminate the connection with
a "record_overflow" alert.
encrypted_record The AEAD encrypted form of the serialized
TLSInnerPlaintext structure.
AEAD algorithms take as input a single key, a nonce, a plaintext, and
"additional data" to be included in the authentication check, as
described in Section 2.1 of [RFC5116]. The key is either the
client_write_key or the server_write_key, the nonce is derived from
the sequence number (see Section 5.3) and the client_write_iv or
server_write_iv, and the additional data input is empty (zero
length). Derivation of traffic keys is defined in Section 7.3.
The plaintext is the concatenation of TLSPlaintext.fragment,
TLSPlaintext.type, and any padding bytes (zeros).
The AEAD output consists of the ciphertext output by the AEAD
encryption operation. The length of the plaintext is greater than
TLSPlaintext.length due to the inclusion of TLSPlaintext.type and
however much padding is supplied by the sender. The length of the
AEAD output will generally be larger than the plaintext, but by an
amount that varies with the AEAD algorithm. Since the ciphers might
incorporate padding, the amount of overhead could vary with different
lengths of plaintext. Symbolically,
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AEADEncrypted =
AEAD-Encrypt(write_key, nonce, plaintext of fragment)
In order to decrypt and verify, the cipher takes as input the key,
nonce, and the AEADEncrypted value. The output is either the
plaintext or an error indicating that the decryption failed. There
is no separate integrity check. That is:
plaintext of fragment =
AEAD-Decrypt(write_key, nonce, AEADEncrypted)
If the decryption fails, the receiver MUST terminate the connection
with a "bad_record_mac" alert.
An AEAD algorithm used in TLS 1.3 MUST NOT produce an expansion of
greater than 255 bytes. An endpoint that receives a record from its
peer with TLSCipherText.length larger than 2^14 + 256 octets MUST
terminate the connection with a "record_overflow" alert. This limit
is derived from the maximum TLSPlaintext length of 2^14 octets + 1
octet for ContentType + the maximum AEAD expansion of 255 octets.
5.3. Per-Record Nonce
A 64-bit sequence number is maintained separately for reading and
writing records. Each sequence number is set to zero at the
beginning of a connection and whenever the key is changed.
The sequence number is incremented after reading or writing each
record. The first record transmitted under a particular set of
traffic keys record key MUST use sequence number 0.
Sequence numbers do not wrap. If a TLS implementation would need to
wrap a sequence number, it MUST either rekey (Section 4.5.3) or
terminate the connection.
The length of the per-record nonce (iv_length) is set to max(8 bytes,
N_MIN) for the AEAD algorithm (see [RFC5116] Section 4). An AEAD
algorithm where N_MAX is less than 8 bytes MUST NOT be used with TLS.
The per-record nonce for the AEAD construction is formed as follows:
1. The 64-bit record sequence number is padded to the left with
zeroes to iv_length.
2. The padded sequence number is XORed with the static
client_write_iv or server_write_iv, depending on the role.
The resulting quantity (of length iv_length) is used as the per-
record nonce.
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Note: This is a different construction from that in TLS 1.2, which
specified a partially explicit nonce.
5.4. Record Padding
All encrypted TLS records can be padded to inflate the size of the
TLSCipherText. This allows the sender to hide the size of the
traffic from an observer.
When generating a TLSCiphertext record, implementations MAY choose to
pad. An unpadded record is just a record with a padding length of
zero. Padding is a string of zero-valued bytes appended to the
ContentType field before encryption. Implementations MUST set the
padding octets to all zeros before encrypting.
Application Data records may contain a zero-length
TLSInnerPlaintext.content if the sender desires. This permits
generation of plausibly-sized cover traffic in contexts where the
presence or absence of activity may be sensitive. Implementations
MUST NOT send Handshake or Alert records that have a zero-length
TLSInnerPlaintext.content.
The padding sent is automatically verified by the record protection
mechanism: Upon successful decryption of a TLSCiphertext.fragment,
the receiving implementation scans the field from the end toward the
beginning until it finds a non-zero octet. This non-zero octet is
the content type of the message. This padding scheme was selected
because it allows padding of any encrypted TLS record by an arbitrary
size (from zero up to TLS record size limits) without introducing new
content types. The design also enforces all-zero padding octets,
which allows for quick detection of padding errors.
Implementations MUST limit their scanning to the cleartext returned
from the AEAD decryption. If a receiving implementation does not
find a non-zero octet in the cleartext, it MUST terminate the
connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.
The presence of padding does not change the overall record size
limitations - the full fragment plaintext may not exceed 2^14 octets.
Selecting a padding policy that suggests when and how much to pad is
a complex topic, and is beyond the scope of this specification. If
the application layer protocol atop TLS has its own padding, it may
be preferable to pad application_data TLS records within the
application layer. Padding for encrypted handshake and alert TLS
records must still be handled at the TLS layer, though. Later
documents may define padding selection algorithms, or define a
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padding policy request mechanism through TLS extensions or some other
means.
5.5. Limits on Key Usage
There are cryptographic limits on the amount of plaintext which can
be safely encrypted under a given set of keys. [AEAD-LIMITS]
provides an analysis of these limits under the assumption that the
underlying primitive (AES or ChaCha20) has no weaknesses.
Implementations SHOULD do a key update Section 4.5.3 prior to
reaching these limits.
For AES-GCM, up to 2^24.5 full-size records (about 24 million) may be
encrypted on a given connection while keeping a safety margin of
approximately 2^-57 for Authenticated Encryption (AE) security. For
ChaCha20/Poly1305, the record sequence number would wrap before the
safety limit is reached.
6. Alert Protocol
One of the content types supported by the TLS record layer is the
alert type. Like other messages, alert messages are encrypted as
specified by the current connection state.
Alert messages convey the severity of the message (warning or fatal)
and a description of the alert. Warning-level messages are used to
indicate orderly closure of the connection (see Section 6.1). Upon
receiving a warning-level alert, the TLS implementation SHOULD
indicate end-of-data to the application and, if appropriate for the
alert type, send a closure alert in response.
Fatal-level messages are used to indicate abortive closure of the
connection (See Section 6.2). Upon receiving a fatal-level alert,
the TLS implementation SHOULD indicate an error to the application
and MUST NOT allow any further data to be sent or received on the
connection. Servers and clients MUST forget keys and secrets
associated with a failed connection. Stateful implementations of
session tickets (as in many clients) SHOULD discard tickets
associated with failed connections.
All the alerts listed in Section 6.2 MUST be sent as fatal and MUST
be treated as fatal regardless of the AlertLevel in the message.
Unknown alert types MUST be treated as fatal.
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enum { warning(1), fatal(2), (255) } AlertLevel;
enum {
close_notify(0),
end_of_early_data(1),
unexpected_message(10),
bad_record_mac(20),
record_overflow(22),
handshake_failure(40),
bad_certificate(42),
unsupported_certificate(43),
certificate_revoked(44),
certificate_expired(45),
certificate_unknown(46),
illegal_parameter(47),
unknown_ca(48),
access_denied(49),
decode_error(50),
decrypt_error(51),
protocol_version(70),
insufficient_security(71),
internal_error(80),
inappropriate_fallback(86),
user_canceled(90),
missing_extension(109),
unsupported_extension(110),
certificate_unobtainable(111),
unrecognized_name(112),
bad_certificate_status_response(113),
bad_certificate_hash_value(114),
unknown_psk_identity(115),
certificate_required(116),
(255)
} AlertDescription;
struct {
AlertLevel level;
AlertDescription description;
} Alert;
6.1. Closure Alerts
The client and the server must share knowledge that the connection is
ending in order to avoid a truncation attack. Failure to properly
close a connection does not prohibit a session from being resumed.
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close_notify This alert notifies the recipient that the sender will
not send any more messages on this connection. Any data received
after a closure MUST be ignored.
end_of_early_data This alert is sent by the client to indicate that
all 0-RTT application_data messages have been transmitted (or none
will be sent at all) and that this is the end of the flight. This
alert MUST be at the warning level. Servers MUST NOT send this
alert and clients receiving it MUST terminate the connection with
an "unexpected_message" alert.
user_canceled This alert notifies the recipient that the sender is
canceling the handshake for some reason unrelated to a protocol
failure. If a user cancels an operation after the handshake is
complete, just closing the connection by sending a "close_notify"
is more appropriate. This alert SHOULD be followed by a
"close_notify". This alert is generally a warning.
Either party MAY initiate a close by sending a "close_notify" alert.
Any data received after a closure alert is ignored. If a transport-
level close is received prior to a "close_notify", the receiver
cannot know that all the data that was sent has been received.
Each party MUST send a "close_notify" alert before closing the write
side of the connection, unless some other fatal alert has been
transmitted. The other party MUST respond with a "close_notify"
alert of its own and close down the connection immediately,
discarding any pending writes. The initiator of the close need not
wait for the responding "close_notify" alert before closing the read
side of the connection.
If the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be
carried over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is
closed, the TLS implementation must receive the responding
"close_notify" alert before indicating to the application layer that
the TLS connection has ended. If the application protocol will not
transfer any additional data, but will only close the underlying
transport connection, then the implementation MAY choose to close the
transport without waiting for the responding "close_notify". No part
of this standard should be taken to dictate the manner in which a
usage profile for TLS manages its data transport, including when
connections are opened or closed.
Note: It is assumed that closing a connection reliably delivers
pending data before destroying the transport.
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6.2. Error Alerts
Error handling in the TLS Handshake Protocol is very simple. When an
error is detected, the detecting party sends a message to its peer.
Upon transmission or receipt of a fatal alert message, both parties
immediately close the connection.
Whenever an implementation encounters a fatal error condition, it
SHOULD send an appropriate fatal alert and MUST close the connection
without sending or receiving any additional data. In the rest of
this specification, the phrase "{terminate the connection, abort the
handshake}" is used without a specific alert means that the
implementation SHOULD send the alert indicated by the descriptions
below. The phrase "{terminate the connection, abort the handshake}
with a X alert" MUST send alert X if it sends any alert. All alerts
defined in this section below, as well as all unknown alerts are
universally considered fatal as of TLS 1.3 (see Section 6).
The following error alerts are defined:
unexpected_message An inappropriate message (e.g., the wrong
handshake message, premature application data, etc.) was received.
This alert should never be observed in communication between
proper implementations.
bad_record_mac This alert is returned if a record is received which
cannot be deprotected. Because AEAD algorithms combine decryption
and verification, this alert is used for all deprotection
failures. This alert should never be observed in communication
between proper implementations, except when messages were
corrupted in the network.
record_overflow A TLSCiphertext record was received that had a
length more than 2^14 + 256 bytes, or a record decrypted to a
TLSPlaintext record with more than 2^14 bytes. This alert should
never be observed in communication between proper implementations,
except when messages were corrupted in the network.
handshake_failure Reception of a "handshake_failure" alert message
indicates that the sender was unable to negotiate an acceptable
set of security parameters given the options available.
bad_certificate A certificate was corrupt, contained signatures that
did not verify correctly, etc.
unsupported_certificate A certificate was of an unsupported type.
certificate_revoked A certificate was revoked by its signer.
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certificate_expired A certificate has expired or is not currently
valid.
certificate_unknown Some other (unspecified) issue arose in
processing the certificate, rendering it unacceptable.
illegal_parameter A field in the handshake was incorrect or
inconsistent with other fields. This alert is used for errors
which conform to the formal protocol syntax but are otherwise
incorrect.
unknown_ca A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received,
but the certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate
could not be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted
CA.
access_denied A valid certificate or PSK was received, but when
access control was applied, the sender decided not to proceed with
negotiation.
decode_error A message could not be decoded because some field was
out of the specified range or the length of the message was
incorrect. This alert is used for errors where the message does
not conform to the formal protocol syntax. This alert should
never be observed in communication between proper implementations,
except when messages were corrupted in the network.
decrypt_error A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including
being unable to correctly verify a signature or validate a
Finished message.
protocol_version The protocol version the peer has attempted to
negotiate is recognized but not supported. (see Appendix C)
insufficient_security Returned instead of "handshake_failure" when a
negotiation has failed specifically because the server requires
ciphers more secure than those supported by the client.
internal_error An internal error unrelated to the peer or the
correctness of the protocol (such as a memory allocation failure)
makes it impossible to continue.
inappropriate_fallback Sent by a server in response to an invalid
connection retry attempt from a client. (see [RFC7507])
missing_extension Sent by endpoints that receive a hello message not
containing an extension that is mandatory to send for the offered
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TLS version or other negotiated parameters. [[TODO: IANA
Considerations.]]
unsupported_extension Sent by endpoints receiving any hello message
containing an extension known to be prohibited for inclusion in
the given hello message, including any extensions in a ServerHello
not first offered in the corresponding ClientHello.
certificate_unobtainable Sent by servers when unable to obtain a
certificate from a URL provided by the client via the
"client_certificate_url" extension [RFC6066].
unrecognized_name Sent by servers when no server exists identified
by the name provided by the client via the "server_name" extension
[RFC6066].
bad_certificate_status_response Sent by clients when an invalid or
unacceptable OCSP response is provided by the server via the
"status_request" extension [RFC6066].
bad_certificate_hash_value Sent by servers when a retrieved object
does not have the correct hash provided by the client via the
"client_certificate_url" extension [RFC6066].
unknown_psk_identity Sent by servers when PSK key establishment is
desired but no acceptable PSK identity is provided by the client.
Sending this alert is OPTIONAL; servers MAY instead choose to send
a "decrypt_error" alert to merely indicate an invalid PSK
identity.
certificate_required Sent by servers when a client certificate is
desired but none was provided by the client.
[[TODO: IANA Considerations for new alert values.]]
New Alert values are assigned by IANA as described in Section 10.
7. Cryptographic Computations
In order to begin connection protection, the TLS Record Protocol
requires specification of a suite of algorithms, a master secret, and
the client and server random values.
7.1. Key Schedule
The TLS handshake establishes one or more input secrets which are
combined to create the actual working keying material, as detailed
below. The key derivation process makes use of the HKDF-Extract and
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HKDF-Expand functions as defined for HKDF [RFC5869], as well as the
functions defined below:
HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, HashValue, Length) =
HKDF-Expand(Secret, HkdfLabel, Length)
Where HkdfLabel is specified as:
struct {
uint16 length = Length;
opaque label<9..255> = "TLS 1.3, " + Label;
opaque hash_value<0..255> = HashValue;
} HkdfLabel;
Derive-Secret(Secret, Label, Messages) =
HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label,
Hash(Messages) +
Hash(resumption_context), Hash.length)
The Hash function and the HKDF hash are the cipher suite hash
algorithm. Hash.length is its output length.
Given a set of n InputSecrets, the final "master secret" is computed
by iteratively invoking HKDF-Extract with InputSecret_1,
InputSecret_2, etc. The initial secret is simply a string of zeroes
as long as the size of the Hash that is the basis for the HKDF.
Concretely, for the present version of TLS 1.3, secrets are added in
the following order:
- PSK
- (EC)DHE shared secret
This produces a full key derivation schedule shown in the diagram
below. In this diagram, the following formatting conventions apply:
- HKDF-Extract is drawn as taking the Salt argument from the top and
the IKM argument from the left.
- Derive-Secret's Secret argument is indicated by the arrow coming
in from the left. For instance, the Early Secret is the Secret
for generating the client_early_traffic_secret.
Note that the 0-RTT Finished message is not included in the Derive-
Secret operation.
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0
|
v
PSK -> HKDF-Extract
|
v
Early Secret ---> Derive-Secret(., "client early traffic secret",
| ClientHello)
| = client_early_traffic_secret
v
(EC)DHE -> HKDF-Extract
|
v
Handshake Secret
|
+---------> Derive-Secret(., "client handshake traffic secret",
| ClientHello...ServerHello)
| = client_handshake_traffic_secret
|
+---------> Derive-Secret(., "server handshake traffic secret",
| ClientHello...ServerHello)
| = server_handshake_traffic_secret
|
v
0 -> HKDF-Extract
|
v
Master Secret
|
+---------> Derive-Secret(., "client application traffic secret",
| ClientHello...Server Finished)
| = client_traffic_secret_0
|
+---------> Derive-Secret(., "server application traffic secret",
| ClientHello...Server Finished)
| = server_traffic_secret_0
|
+---------> Derive-Secret(., "exporter master secret",
| ClientHello...Client Finished)
| = exporter_secret
|
+---------> Derive-Secret(., "resumption master secret",
ClientHello...Client Finished)
= resumption_secret
The general pattern here is that the secrets shown down the left side
of the diagram are just raw entropy without context, whereas the
secrets down the right side include handshake context and therefore
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can be used to derive working keys without additional context. Note
that the different calls to Derive-Secret may take different Messages
arguments, even with the same secret. In a 0-RTT exchange, Derive-
Secret is called with four distinct transcripts; in a 1-RTT only
exchange with three distinct transcripts.
If a given secret is not available, then the 0-value consisting of a
string of Hash.length zeroes is used. Note that this does not mean
skipping rounds, so if PSK is not in use Early Secret will still be
HKDF-Extract(0, 0).
7.2. Updating Traffic Keys and IVs
Once the handshake is complete, it is possible for either side to
update its sending traffic keys using the KeyUpdate handshake message
defined in Section 4.5.3. The next generation of traffic keys is
computed by generating client_/server_traffic_secret_N+1 from
client_/server_traffic_secret_N as described in this section then re-
deriving the traffic keys as described in Section 7.3.
The next-generation traffic_secret is computed as:
traffic_secret_N+1 = HKDF-Expand-Label(
traffic_secret_N,
"application traffic secret", "", Hash.length)
Once client/server_traffic_secret_N+1 and its associated traffic keys
have been computed, implementations SHOULD delete client_/
server_traffic_secret_N and its associated traffic keys.
7.3. Traffic Key Calculation
The traffic keying material is generated from the following input
values:
- A secret value
- A phase value indicating the phase of the protocol the keys are
being generated for
- A purpose value indicating the specific value being generated
- The length of the key
The keying material is computed using:
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key = HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret,
phase + ", " + purpose,
"",
key_length)
The following table describes the inputs to the key calculation for
each class of traffic keys:
+-------------+-----------------------------------+-----------------+
| Record Type | Secret | Phase |
+-------------+-----------------------------------+-----------------+
| 0-RTT | client_early_traffic_secret | "early |
| Handshake | | handshake key |
| | | expansion" |
| | | |
| 0-RTT | client_early_traffic_secret | "early |
| Application | | application |
| | | data key |
| | | expansion" |
| | | |
| Handshake | [sender]_handshake_traffic_secret | "handshake key |
| | | expansion" |
| | | |
| Application | [sender]_traffic_secret_N | "application |
| Data | | data key |
| | | expansion" |
+-------------+-----------------------------------+-----------------+
The [sender] in this table denotes the sending side. The following
table indicates the purpose values for each type of key:
+----------+---------+
| Key Type | Purpose |
+----------+---------+
| key | "key" |
| | |
| iv | "iv" |
+----------+---------+
All the traffic keying material is recomputed whenever the underlying
Secret changes (e.g., when changing from the handshake to application
data keys or upon a key update).
7.3.1. Diffie-Hellman
A conventional Diffie-Hellman computation is performed. The
negotiated key (Z) is converted to byte string by encoding in big-
endian, padded with zeros up to the size of the prime. This byte
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string is used as the shared secret, and is used in the key schedule
as specified above.
Note that this construction differs from previous versions of TLS
which remove leading zeros.
7.3.2. Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
For secp256r1, secp384r1 and secp521r1, ECDH calculations (including
parameter and key generation as well as the shared secret
calculation) are performed according to [IEEE1363] using the ECKAS-
DH1 scheme with the identity map as key derivation function (KDF), so
that the shared secret is the x-coordinate of the ECDH shared secret
elliptic curve point represented as an octet string. Note that this
octet string (Z in IEEE 1363 terminology) as output by FE2OSP, the
Field Element to Octet String Conversion Primitive, has constant
length for any given field; leading zeros found in this octet string
MUST NOT be truncated.
(Note that this use of the identity KDF is a technicality. The
complete picture is that ECDH is employed with a non-trivial KDF
because TLS does not directly use this secret for anything other than
for computing other secrets.)
ECDH functions are used as follows:
- The public key to put into the KeyShareEntry.key_exchange
structure is the result of applying the ECDH function to the
secret key of appropriate length (into scalar input) and the
standard public basepoint (into u-coordinate point input).
- The ECDH shared secret is the result of applying ECDH function to
the secret key (into scalar input) and the peer's public key (into
u-coordinate point input). The output is used raw, with no
processing.
For X25519 and X448, see [RFC7748].
7.3.3. Exporters
[RFC5705] defines keying material exporters for TLS in terms of the
TLS PRF. This document replaces the PRF with HKDF, thus requiring a
new construction. The exporter interface remains the same. If
context is provided, the value is computed as:
HKDF-Expand-Label(exporter_secret, label, context_value, key_length)
If no context is provided, the value is computed as:
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HKDF-Expand-Label(exporter_secret, label, "", key_length)
Note that providing no context computes the same value as providing
an empty context. As of this document's publication, no allocated
exporter label is used with both modes. Future specifications MUST
NOT provide an empty context and no context with the same label and
SHOULD provide a context, possibly empty, in all exporter
computations.
8. Compliance Requirements
8.1. MTI Cipher Suites
In the absence of an application profile standard specifying
otherwise, a TLS-compliant application MUST implement the
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 cipher suite and SHOULD implement the
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 and TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 cipher
suites.
A TLS-compliant application MUST support digital signatures with
rsa_pkcs1_sha256 (for certificates), rsa_pss_sha256 (for
CertificateVerify and certificates), and ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256. A
TLS-compliant application MUST support key exchange with secp256r1
(NIST P-256) and SHOULD support key exchange with X25519 [RFC7748].
8.2. MTI Extensions
In the absence of an application profile standard specifying
otherwise, a TLS-compliant application MUST implement the following
TLS extensions:
- Supported Versions ("supported_versions"; Section 4.2.1)
- Signature Algorithms ("signature_algorithms"; Section 4.2.3)
- Negotiated Groups ("supported_groups"; Section 4.2.4)
- Key Share ("key_share"; Section 4.2.5)
- Pre-Shared Key ("pre_shared_key"; Section 4.2.6)
- Server Name Indication ("server_name"; Section 3 of [RFC6066])
- Cookie ("cookie"; Section 4.2.2)
All implementations MUST send and use these extensions when offering
applicable cipher suites:
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- "supported_versions" is REQUIRED for all ClientHello messages.
- "signature_algorithms" is REQUIRED for certificate authenticated
cipher suites.
- "supported_groups" and "key_share" are REQUIRED for DHE or ECDHE
cipher suites.
- "pre_shared_key" is REQUIRED for PSK cipher suites.
- "cookie" is REQUIRED for all cipher suites.
When negotiating use of applicable cipher suites, endpoints MUST
abort the handshake with a "missing_extension" alert if the required
extension was not provided. Any endpoint that receives any invalid
combination of cipher suites and extensions MAY abort the connection
with a "missing_extension" alert, regardless of negotiated
parameters.
Additionally, all implementations MUST support use of the
"server_name" extension with applications capable of using it.
Servers MAY require clients to send a valid "server_name" extension.
Servers requiring this extension SHOULD respond to a ClientHello
lacking a "server_name" extension by terminating the connection with
a "missing_extension" alert.
9. Security Considerations
Security issues are discussed throughout this memo, especially in
Appendices B, C, and D.
10. IANA Considerations
This document uses several registries that were originally created in
[RFC4346]. IANA has updated these to reference this document. The
registries and their allocation policies are below:
- TLS Cipher Suite Registry: Values with the first byte in the range
0-254 (decimal) are assigned via Specification Required [RFC2434].
Values with the first byte 255 (decimal) are reserved for Private
Use [RFC2434].
IANA [SHALL add/has added] the cipher suites listed in
Appendix A.4 to the registry. The "Value" and "Description"
columns are taken from the table. The "DTLS-OK" and "Recommended"
columns are both marked as "Yes" for each new cipher suite.
[[This assumes [I-D.sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates] has been
applied.]]
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- TLS ContentType Registry: Future values are allocated via
Standards Action [RFC2434].
- TLS Alert Registry: Future values are allocated via Standards
Action [RFC2434].
- TLS HandshakeType Registry: Future values are allocated via
Standards Action [RFC2434]. IANA [SHALL update/has updated] this
registry to rename item 4 from "NewSessionTicket" to
"new_session_ticket".
This document also uses a registry originally created in [RFC4366].
IANA has updated it to reference this document. The registry and its
allocation policy is listed below:
- TLS ExtensionType Registry: Values with the first byte in the
range 0-254 (decimal) are assigned via Specification Required
[RFC2434]. Values with the first byte 255 (decimal) are reserved
for Private Use [RFC2434]. IANA [SHALL update/has updated] this
registry to include the "key_share", "pre_shared_key", and
"early_data" extensions as defined in this document.
IANA [shall update/has updated] this registry to add a
"Recommended" column. IANA [shall/has] initially populated this
column with the values in the table below. This table has been
generated by marking Standards Track RFCs as "Yes" and all others
as "No".
IANA [shall update/has updated] this registry to include a "TLS
1.3" column with the following four values: "Client", indicating
that the server shall not send them. "Clear", indicating that
they shall be in the ServerHello. "Encrypted", indicating that
they shall be in the EncryptedExtensions block, and "No"
indicating that they are not used in TLS 1.3. This column [shall
be/has been] initially populated with the values in this document.
IANA [shall update/has updated] this registry to include a
"HelloRetryRequest" column with the following two values: "Yes",
indicating it may be sent in HelloRetryRequest, and "No",
indicating it may not be sent in HelloRetryRequest. This column
[shall be/has been] initially populated with the values in this
document.
+------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------+
| Extension | Recommen | TLS 1.3 | HelloRetryReq |
| | ded | | uest |
+------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------+
| server_name [RFC6066] | Yes | Encrypt | No |
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| | | ed | |
| | | | |
| max_fragment_length | Yes | Encrypt | No |
| [RFC6066] | | ed | |
| | | | |
| client_certificate_url | Yes | Encrypt | No |
| [RFC6066] | | ed | |
| | | | |
| trusted_ca_keys [RFC6066] | Yes | Encrypt | No |
| | | ed | |
| | | | |
| truncated_hmac [RFC6066] | Yes | No | No |
| | | | |
| status_request [RFC6066] | Yes | Encrypt | No |
| | | ed | |
| | | | |
| user_mapping [RFC4681] | Yes | Encrypt | No |
| | | ed | |
| | | | |
| client_authz [RFC5878] | No | No | No |
| | | | |
| server_authz [RFC5878] | No | No | No |
| | | | |
| cert_type [RFC6091] | Yes | Encrypt | No |
| | | ed | |
| | | | |
| supported_groups [RFC7919] | Yes | Encrypt | No |
| | | ed | |
| | | | |
| ec_point_formats [RFC4492] | Yes | No | No |
| | | | |
| srp [RFC5054] | No | No | No |
| | | | |
| signature_algorithms | Yes | Clear | No |
| [RFC5246] | | | |
| | | | |
| use_srtp [RFC5764] | Yes | Encrypt | No |
| | | ed | |
| | | | |
| heartbeat [RFC6520] | Yes | Encrypt | No |
| | | ed | |
| | | | |
| application_layer_protocol_n | Yes | Encrypt | No |
| egotiation [RFC7301] | | ed | |
| | | | |
| status_request_v2 [RFC6961] | Yes | Encrypt | No |
| | | ed | |
| | | | |
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| signed_certificate_timestamp | No | Encrypt | No |
| [RFC6962] | | ed | |
| | | | |
| client_certificate_type | Yes | Encrypt | No |
| [RFC7250] | | ed | |
| | | | |
| server_certificate_type | Yes | Encrypt | No |
| [RFC7250] | | ed | |
| | | | |
| padding [RFC7685] | Yes | Client | No |
| | | | |
| encrypt_then_mac [RFC7366] | Yes | No | No |
| | | | |
| extended_master_secret | Yes | No | No |
| [RFC7627] | | | |
| | | | |
| SessionTicket TLS [RFC4507] | Yes | No | No |
| | | | |
| renegotiation_info [RFC5746] | Yes | No | No |
| | | | |
| key_share [[this document]] | Yes | Clear | Yes |
| | | | |
| pre_shared_key [[this | Yes | Clear | No |
| document]] | | | |
| | | | |
| early_data [[this document]] | Yes | Encrypt | No |
| | | ed | |
| | | | |
| cookie [[this document]] | Yes | Client | Yes |
| | | | |
| supported_versions [[this | Yes | Client | No |
| document]] | | | |
+------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------+
In addition, this document defines two new registries to be
maintained by IANA
- TLS SignatureScheme Registry: Values with the first byte in the
range 0-254 (decimal) are assigned via Specification Required
[RFC2434]. Values with the first byte 255 (decimal) are reserved
for Private Use [RFC2434]. Values with the first byte in the
range 0-6 or with the second byte in the range 0-3 that are not
currently allocated are reserved for backwards compatibility.
This registry SHALL have a "Recommended" column. The registry
[shall be/ has been] initially populated with the values described
in Section 4.2.3. The following values SHALL be marked as
"Recommended": ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
rsa_pss_sha256, rsa_pss_sha384, rsa_pss_sha512, ed25519.
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Finally, this document obsoletes the TLS HashAlgorithm Registry and
the TLS SignatureAlgorithm Registry, both originally created in
[RFC5246]. IANA [SHALL update/has updated] the TLS HashAlgorithm
Registry to list values 7-223 as "Reserved" and the TLS
SignatureAlgorithm Registry to list values 4-233 as "Reserved".
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES)", NIST FIPS 197, November 2001.
[DH] Diffie, W. and M. Hellman, "New Directions in
Cryptography", IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
V.IT-22 n.6 , June 1977.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa]
Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", draft-irtf-cfrg-eddsa-08
(work in progress), August 2016.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 2434,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2434, October 1998,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2434>.
[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.1", RFC 3447, DOI 10.17487/RFC3447, February
2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3447>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
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[RFC5288] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois
Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5288, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5288>.
[RFC5289] Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-
256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)", RFC 5289,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5289, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5289>.
[RFC5487] Badra, M., "Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-
256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode", RFC 5487,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5487, March 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5487>.
[RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
March 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
[RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>.
[RFC6209] Kim, W., Lee, J., Park, J., and D. Kwon, "Addition of the
ARIA Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 6209, DOI 10.17487/RFC6209, April 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6209>.
[RFC6367] Kanno, S. and M. Kanda, "Addition of the Camellia Cipher
Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6367,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6367, September 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6367>.
[RFC6655] McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6655, July 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6655>.
[RFC6961] Pettersen, Y., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Multiple Certificate Status Request Extension", RFC 6961,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6961, June 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6961>.
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[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.
[RFC7251] McGrew, D., Bailey, D., Campagna, M., and R. Dugal, "AES-
CCM Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
TLS", RFC 7251, DOI 10.17487/RFC7251, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7251>.
[RFC7443] Patil, P., Reddy, T., Salgueiro, G., and M. Petit-
Huguenin, "Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN)
Labels for Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)
Usages", RFC 7443, DOI 10.17487/RFC7443, January 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7443>.
[RFC7539] Nir, Y. and A. Langley, "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF
Protocols", RFC 7539, DOI 10.17487/RFC7539, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7539>.
[RFC7748] Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748>.
[RFC7905] Langley, A., Chang, W., Mavrogiannopoulos, N.,
Strombergson, J., and S. Josefsson, "ChaCha20-Poly1305
Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 7905, DOI 10.17487/RFC7905, June 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7905>.
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
Department of Commerce, "Secure Hash Standard", NIST FIPS
PUB 180-4, March 2012.
[X690] ITU-T, "Information technology - ASN.1 encoding Rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002, 2002.
[X962] ANSI, "Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services
Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA)", ANSI X9.62, 1998.
11.2. Informative References
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[AEAD-LIMITS]
Luykx, A. and K. Paterson, "Limits on Authenticated
Encryption Use in TLS", 2016,
<http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/TLS-AEbounds.pdf>.
[BBFKZG16]
Bhargavan, K., Brzuska, C., Fournet, C., Kohlweiss, M.,
Zanella-Beguelin, S., and M. Green, "Downgrade Resilience
in Key-Exchange Protocols", Proceedings of IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy (Oakland) 2016 , 2016.
[CHSV16] Cremers, C., Horvat, M., Scott, S., and T. van der Merwe,
"Automated Analysis and Verification of TLS 1.3: 0-RTT,
Resumption and Delayed Authentication", Proceedings of
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland) 2016 ,
2016.
[CK01] Canetti, R. and H. Krawczyk, "Analysis of Key-Exchange
Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels",
Proceedings of Eurocrypt 2001 , 2001.
[DOW92] Diffie, W., van Oorschot, P., and M. Wiener,
""Authentication and authenticated key exchanges"",
Designs, Codes and Cryptography , n.d..
[DSS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
Department of Commerce, "Digital Signature Standard,
version 4", NIST FIPS PUB 186-4, 2013.
[ECDSA] American National Standards Institute, "Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)",
ANSI ANS X9.62-2005, November 2005.
[FGSW16] Fischlin, M., Guenther, F., Schmidt, B., and B. Warinschi,
"Key Confirmation in Key Exchange: A Formal Treatment and
Implications for TLS 1.3", Proceedings of IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy (Oakland) 2016 , 2016.
[FI06] Finney, H., "Bleichenbacher's RSA signature forgery based
on implementation error", August 2006,
<https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/openpgp/current/
msg00999.html>.
[GCM] Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC",
NIST Special Publication 800-38D, November 2007.
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[I-D.sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates]
Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "D/TLS IANA Registry Updates",
draft-sandj-tls-iana-registry-updates-00 (work in
progress), September 2016.
[IEEE1363]
IEEE, "Standard Specifications for Public Key
Cryptography", IEEE 1363 , 2000.
[LXZFH16] Li, X., Xu, J., Feng, D., Zhang, Z., and H. Hu, "Multiple
Handshakes Security of TLS 1.3 Candidates", Proceedings of
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland) 2016 ,
2016.
[PKCS6] RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #6: RSA Extended Certificate
Syntax Standard, version 1.5", November 1993.
[PKCS7] RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #7: RSA Cryptographic Message
Syntax Standard, version 1.5", November 1993.
[PSK-FINISHED]
Cremers, C., Horvat, M., van der Merwe, T., and S. Scott,
"Revision 10: possible attack if client authentication is
allowed during PSK", 2015, <https://www.ietf.org/mail-
archive/web/tls/current/msg18215.html>.
[RFC0793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc793>.
[RFC1948] Bellovin, S., "Defending Against Sequence Number Attacks",
RFC 1948, DOI 10.17487/RFC1948, May 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1948>.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC4279] Eronen, P., Ed. and H. Tschofenig, Ed., "Pre-Shared Key
Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4279, DOI 10.17487/RFC4279, December 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4279>.
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[RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4302, December 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4302>.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.
[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4346, April 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4346>.
[RFC4366] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J.,
and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions", RFC 4366, DOI 10.17487/RFC4366, April 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4366>.
[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4492, May 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4492>.
[RFC4506] Eisler, M., Ed., "XDR: External Data Representation
Standard", STD 67, RFC 4506, DOI 10.17487/RFC4506, May
2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4506>.
[RFC4507] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
Server-Side State", RFC 4507, DOI 10.17487/RFC4507, May
2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4507>.
[RFC4681] Santesson, S., Medvinsky, A., and J. Ball, "TLS User
Mapping Extension", RFC 4681, DOI 10.17487/RFC4681,
October 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4681>.
[RFC5054] Taylor, D., Wu, T., Mavrogiannopoulos, N., and T. Perrin,
"Using the Secure Remote Password (SRP) Protocol for TLS
Authentication", RFC 5054, DOI 10.17487/RFC5054, November
2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5054>.
[RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
Server-Side State", RFC 5077, DOI 10.17487/RFC5077,
January 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5077>.
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[RFC5081] Mavrogiannopoulos, N., "Using OpenPGP Keys for Transport
Layer Security (TLS) Authentication", RFC 5081,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5081, November 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5081>.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5746] Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
Extension", RFC 5746, DOI 10.17487/RFC5746, February 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5746>.
[RFC5763] Fischl, J., Tschofenig, H., and E. Rescorla, "Framework
for Establishing a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol
(SRTP) Security Context Using Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS)", RFC 5763, DOI 10.17487/RFC5763, May
2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5763>.
[RFC5764] McGrew, D. and E. Rescorla, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys for the Secure
Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 5764,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5764, May 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5764>.
[RFC5878] Brown, M. and R. Housley, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Authorization Extensions", RFC 5878, DOI 10.17487/RFC5878,
May 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5878>.
[RFC5929] Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings
for TLS", RFC 5929, DOI 10.17487/RFC5929, July 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5929>.
[RFC6091] Mavrogiannopoulos, N. and D. Gillmor, "Using OpenPGP Keys
for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authentication",
RFC 6091, DOI 10.17487/RFC6091, February 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6091>.
[RFC6176] Turner, S. and T. Polk, "Prohibiting Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) Version 2.0", RFC 6176, DOI 10.17487/RFC6176, March
2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6176>.
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[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
[RFC6520] Seggelmann, R., Tuexen, M., and M. Williams, "Transport
Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS) Heartbeat Extension", RFC 6520,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6520, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6520>.
[RFC6962] Laurie, B., Langley, A., and E. Kasper, "Certificate
Transparency", RFC 6962, DOI 10.17487/RFC6962, June 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6962>.
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J.,
Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 7250, DOI 10.17487/RFC7250,
June 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7250>.
[RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
July 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.
[RFC7366] Gutmann, P., "Encrypt-then-MAC for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", RFC 7366, DOI 10.17487/RFC7366, September 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7366>.
[RFC7465] Popov, A., "Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites", RFC 7465,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7465, February 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7465>.
[RFC7568] Barnes, R., Thomson, M., Pironti, A., and A. Langley,
"Deprecating Secure Sockets Layer Version 3.0", RFC 7568,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7568, June 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7568>.
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[RFC7627] Bhargavan, K., Ed., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A.,
Langley, A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension",
RFC 7627, DOI 10.17487/RFC7627, September 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7627>.
[RFC7685] Langley, A., "A Transport Layer Security (TLS) ClientHello
Padding Extension", RFC 7685, DOI 10.17487/RFC7685,
October 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7685>.
[RFC7919] Gillmor, D., "Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman
Ephemeral Parameters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 7919, DOI 10.17487/RFC7919, August 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7919>.
[RFC7924] Santesson, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Cached Information Extension", RFC 7924,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7924, July 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7924>.
[RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and L. Adleman, "A Method for
Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key
Cryptosystems", Communications of the ACM v. 21, n. 2, pp.
120-126., February 1978.
[SIGMA] Krawczyk, H., "SIGMA: the 'SIGn-and-MAc' approach to
authenticated Di e-Hellman and its use in the IKE
protocols", Proceedings of CRYPTO 2003 , 2003.
[SLOTH] Bhargavan, K. and G. Leurent, "Transcript Collision
Attacks: Breaking Authentication in TLS, IKE, and SSH",
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS
2016) , 2016.
[SSL2] Hickman, K., "The SSL Protocol", February 1995.
[SSL3] Freier, A., Karlton, P., and P. Kocher, "The SSL 3.0
Protocol", November 1996.
[TIMING] Boneh, D. and D. Brumley, "Remote timing attacks are
practical", USENIX Security Symposium, 2003.
[X501] "Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
The Directory: Models", ITU-T X.501, 1993.
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11.3. URIs
[1] mailto:tls@ietf.org
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Appendix A. Protocol Data Structures and Constant Values
This section describes protocol types and constants. Values listed
as _RESERVED were used in previous versions of TLS and are listed
here for completeness. TLS 1.3 implementations MUST NOT send them
but might receive them from older TLS implementations.
A.1. Record Layer
enum {
invalid_RESERVED(0),
change_cipher_spec_RESERVED(20),
alert(21),
handshake(22),
application_data(23),
(255)
} ContentType;
struct {
ContentType type;
ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version = { 3, 1 }; /* TLS v1.x */
uint16 length;
opaque fragment[TLSPlaintext.length];
} TLSPlaintext;
struct {
opaque content[TLSPlaintext.length];
ContentType type;
uint8 zeros[length_of_padding];
} TLSInnerPlaintext;
struct {
ContentType opaque_type = application_data(23); /* see TLSInnerPlaintext.type */
ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version = { 3, 1 }; /* TLS v1.x */
uint16 length;
opaque encrypted_record[length];
} TLSCiphertext;
A.2. Alert Messages
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enum { warning(1), fatal(2), (255) } AlertLevel;
enum {
close_notify(0),
end_of_early_data(1),
unexpected_message(10),
bad_record_mac(20),
decryption_failed_RESERVED(21),
record_overflow(22),
decompression_failure_RESERVED(30),
handshake_failure(40),
no_certificate_RESERVED(41),
bad_certificate(42),
unsupported_certificate(43),
certificate_revoked(44),
certificate_expired(45),
certificate_unknown(46),
illegal_parameter(47),
unknown_ca(48),
access_denied(49),
decode_error(50),
decrypt_error(51),
export_restriction_RESERVED(60),
protocol_version(70),
insufficient_security(71),
internal_error(80),
inappropriate_fallback(86),
user_canceled(90),
no_renegotiation_RESERVED(100),
missing_extension(109),
unsupported_extension(110),
certificate_unobtainable(111),
unrecognized_name(112),
bad_certificate_status_response(113),
bad_certificate_hash_value(114),
unknown_psk_identity(115),
certificate_required(116),
(255)
} AlertDescription;
struct {
AlertLevel level;
AlertDescription description;
} Alert;
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A.3. Handshake Protocol
enum {
hello_request_RESERVED(0),
client_hello(1),
server_hello(2),
new_session_ticket(4),
hello_retry_request(6),
encrypted_extensions(8),
certificate(11),
server_key_exchange_RESERVED(12),
certificate_request(13),
server_hello_done_RESERVED(14),
certificate_verify(15),
client_key_exchange_RESERVED(16),
finished(20),
key_update(24),
(255)
} HandshakeType;
struct {
HandshakeType msg_type; /* handshake type */
uint24 length; /* bytes in message */
select (Handshake.msg_type) {
case client_hello: ClientHello;
case server_hello: ServerHello;
case hello_retry_request: HelloRetryRequest;
case encrypted_extensions: EncryptedExtensions;
case certificate_request: CertificateRequest;
case certificate: Certificate;
case certificate_verify: CertificateVerify;
case finished: Finished;
case new_session_ticket: NewSessionTicket;
case key_update: KeyUpdate;
} body;
} Handshake;
A.3.1. Key Exchange Messages
struct {
uint8 major;
uint8 minor;
} ProtocolVersion;
struct {
opaque random_bytes[32];
} Random;
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uint8 CipherSuite[2]; /* Cryptographic suite selector */
struct {
ProtocolVersion legacy_version = { 3, 3 }; /* TLS v1.2 */
Random random;
opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>;
CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>;
opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} ClientHello;
struct {
ProtocolVersion version;
Random random;
CipherSuite cipher_suite;
Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} ServerHello;
struct {
ProtocolVersion server_version;
Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>;
} HelloRetryRequest;
struct {
ExtensionType extension_type;
opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>;
} Extension;
enum {
supported_groups(10),
signature_algorithms(13),
key_share(40),
pre_shared_key(41),
early_data(42),
supported_versions(43),
cookie(44),
(65535)
} ExtensionType;
struct {
NamedGroup group;
opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
} KeyShareEntry;
struct {
select (Handshake.msg_type) {
case client_hello:
KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1>;
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case hello_retry_request:
NamedGroup selected_group;
case server_hello:
KeyShareEntry server_share;
};
} KeyShare;
enum { psk_ke(0), psk_dhe_ke(1), (255) } PskKeyExchangeMode;
enum { psk_auth(0), psk_sign_auth(1), (255) } PskAuthenticationMode;
struct {
PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255>;
PskAuthenticationMode auth_modes<1..255>;
opaque identity<0..2^16-1>;
} PskIdentity;
struct {
select (Handshake.msg_type) {
case client_hello:
PskIdentity identities<6..2^16-1>;
case server_hello:
uint16 selected_identity;
};
} PreSharedKeyExtension;
struct {
select (Handshake.msg_type) {
case client_hello:
uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age;
case server_hello:
struct {};
};
} EarlyDataIndication;
A.3.1.1. Version Extension
struct {
ProtocolVersion versions<2..254>;
} SupportedVersions;
A.3.1.2. Cookie Extension
struct {
opaque cookie<0..2^16-1>;
} Cookie;
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A.3.1.3. Signature Algorithm Extension
enum {
/* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms */
rsa_pkcs1_sha1 (0x0201),
rsa_pkcs1_sha256 (0x0401),
rsa_pkcs1_sha384 (0x0501),
rsa_pkcs1_sha512 (0x0601),
/* ECDSA algorithms */
ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 (0x0403),
ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 (0x0503),
ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 (0x0603),
/* RSASSA-PSS algorithms */
rsa_pss_sha256 (0x0804),
rsa_pss_sha384 (0x0805),
rsa_pss_sha512 (0x0806),
/* EdDSA algorithms */
ed25519 (0x0807),
ed448 (0x0808),
/* Reserved Code Points */
dsa_sha1_RESERVED (0x0202),
dsa_sha256_RESERVED (0x0402),
dsa_sha384_RESERVED (0x0502),
dsa_sha512_RESERVED (0x0602),
ecdsa_sha1_RESERVED (0x0203),
obsolete_RESERVED (0x0000..0x0200),
obsolete_RESERVED (0x0204..0x0400),
obsolete_RESERVED (0x0404..0x0500),
obsolete_RESERVED (0x0504..0x0600),
obsolete_RESERVED (0x0604..0x06FF),
private_use (0xFE00..0xFFFF),
(0xFFFF)
} SignatureScheme;
SignatureScheme supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
A.3.1.4. Supported Groups Extension
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enum {
/* Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE) */
obsolete_RESERVED (1..22),
secp256r1 (23), secp384r1 (24), secp521r1 (25),
obsolete_RESERVED (26..28),
x25519 (29), x448 (30),
/* Finite Field Groups (DHE) */
ffdhe2048 (256), ffdhe3072 (257), ffdhe4096 (258),
ffdhe6144 (259), ffdhe8192 (260),
/* Reserved Code Points */
ffdhe_private_use (0x01FC..0x01FF),
ecdhe_private_use (0xFE00..0xFEFF),
obsolete_RESERVED (0xFF01..0xFF02),
(0xFFFF)
} NamedGroup;
struct {
NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1>;
} NamedGroupList;
Values within "obsolete_RESERVED" ranges were used in previous
versions of TLS and MUST NOT be offered or negotiated by TLS 1.3
implementations. The obsolete curves have various known/theoretical
weaknesses or have had very little usage, in some cases only due to
unintentional server configuration issues. They are no longer
considered appropriate for general use and should be assumed to be
potentially unsafe. The set of curves specified here is sufficient
for interoperability with all currently deployed and properly
configured TLS implementations.
A.3.1.5. Deprecated Extensions
The following extensions are no longer applicable to TLS 1.3,
although TLS 1.3 clients MAY send them if they are willing to
negotiate them with prior versions of TLS. TLS 1.3 servers MUST
ignore these extensions if they are negotiating TLS 1.3:
truncated_hmac [RFC6066], srp [RFC5054], encrypt_then_mac [RFC7366],
extended_master_secret [RFC7627], SessionTicket [RFC5077], and
renegotiation_info [RFC5746].
A.3.2. Server Parameters Messages
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struct {
Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} EncryptedExtensions;
opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
struct {
opaque certificate_extension_oid<1..2^8-1>;
opaque certificate_extension_values<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateExtension;
struct {
opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
SignatureScheme
supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
CertificateExtension certificate_extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateRequest;
A.3.3. Authentication Messages
opaque ASN1Cert<1..2^24-1>;
struct {
opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
ASN1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
} Certificate;
struct {
SignatureScheme algorithm;
opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateVerify;
struct {
opaque verify_data[Hash.length];
} Finished;
A.3.4. Ticket Establishment
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enum { ticket_early_data_info(1), (65535) } TicketExtensionType;
struct {
TicketExtensionType extension_type;
opaque extension_data<1..2^16-1>;
} TicketExtension;
struct {
uint32 ticket_lifetime;
PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255>;
PskAuthenticationMode auth_modes<1..255>;
opaque ticket<1..2^16-1>;
TicketExtension extensions<0..2^16-2>;
} NewSessionTicket;
A.3.5. Updating Keys
enum { update_not_requested(0), update_requested(1), (255)
} KeyUpdateRequest;
struct {
KeyUpdateRequest request_update;
} KeyUpdate;
A.4. Cipher Suites
A symmetric cipher suite defines the pair of the AEAD algorithm and
hash algorithm to be used with HKDF. Cipher suite names follow the
naming convention:
CipherSuite TLS_AEAD_HASH = VALUE;
+-----------+------------------------------------------------+
| Component | Contents |
+-----------+------------------------------------------------+
| TLS | The string "TLS" |
| | |
| AEAD | The AEAD algorithm used for record protection |
| | |
| HASH | The hash algorithm used with HKDF |
| | |
| VALUE | The two byte ID assigned for this cipher suite |
+-----------+------------------------------------------------+
This specification defines the following cipher suites for use with
TLS 1.3.
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+------------------------------+-------------+
| Description | Value |
+------------------------------+-------------+
| TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | {0x13,0x01} |
| | |
| TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | {0x13,0x02} |
| | |
| TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | {0x13,0x03} |
| | |
| TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 | {0x13,0x04} |
| | |
| TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 | {0x13,0x05} |
+------------------------------+-------------+
The corresponding AEAD algorithms AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM,
and AEAD_AES_128_CCM are defined in [RFC5116].
AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 is defined in [RFC7539]. AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8
is defined in [RFC6655]. The corresponding hash algorithms are
defined in [SHS].
Although TLS 1.3 uses the same cipher suite space as previous
versions of TLS, TLS 1.3 cipher suites are defined differently, only
specifying the symmetric ciphers, and cannot it be used for TLS 1.2.
Similarly, TLS 1.2 and lower cipher suites cannot be used with TLS
1.3.
New cipher suite values are assigned by IANA as described in
Section 10.
Appendix B. Implementation Notes
The TLS protocol cannot prevent many common security mistakes. This
section provides several recommendations to assist implementors.
B.1. API considerations for 0-RTT
0-RTT data has very different security properties from data
transmitted after a completed handshake: it can be replayed.
Implementations SHOULD provide different functions for reading and
writing 0-RTT data and data transmitted after the handshake, and
SHOULD NOT automatically resend 0-RTT data if it is rejected by the
server.
B.2. Random Number Generation and Seeding
TLS requires a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator
(PRNG). In most cases, the operating system provides an appropriate
facility such as /dev/urandom, which should be used absent other
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(performance) concerns. It is generally preferable to use an
existing PRNG implementation in preference to crafting a new one, and
many adequate cryptographic libraries are already available under
favorable license terms. Should those prove unsatisfactory,
[RFC4086] provides guidance on the generation of random values.
B.3. Certificates and Authentication
Implementations are responsible for verifying the integrity of
certificates and should generally support certificate revocation
messages. Certificates should always be verified to ensure proper
signing by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA). The selection and
addition of trusted CAs should be done very carefully. Users should
be able to view information about the certificate and root CA.
B.4. Cipher Suite Support
TLS supports a range of key sizes and security levels, including some
that provide no or minimal security. A proper implementation will
probably not support many cipher suites. Applications SHOULD also
enforce minimum and maximum key sizes. For example, certification
paths containing keys or signatures weaker than 2048-bit RSA or
224-bit ECDSA are not appropriate for secure applications. See also
Appendix C.4.
B.5. Implementation Pitfalls
Implementation experience has shown that certain parts of earlier TLS
specifications are not easy to understand, and have been a source of
interoperability and security problems. Many of these areas have
been clarified in this document, but this appendix contains a short
list of the most important things that require special attention from
implementors.
TLS protocol issues:
- Do you correctly handle handshake messages that are fragmented to
multiple TLS records (see Section 5.1)? Including corner cases
like a ClientHello that is split to several small fragments? Do
you fragment handshake messages that exceed the maximum fragment
size? In particular, the certificate and certificate request
handshake messages can be large enough to require fragmentation.
- Do you ignore the TLS record layer version number in all TLS
records? (see Appendix C)
- Have you ensured that all support for SSL, RC4, EXPORT ciphers,
and MD5 (via the "signature_algorithm" extension) is completely
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removed from all possible configurations that support TLS 1.3 or
later, and that attempts to use these obsolete capabilities fail
correctly? (see Appendix C)
- Do you handle TLS extensions in ClientHello correctly, including
unknown extensions.
- When the server has requested a client certificate, but no
suitable certificate is available, do you correctly send an empty
Certificate message, instead of omitting the whole message (see
Section 4.4.1.2)?
- When processing the plaintext fragment produced by AEAD-Decrypt
and scanning from the end for the ContentType, do you avoid
scanning past the start of the cleartext in the event that the
peer has sent a malformed plaintext of all-zeros?
- When processing a ClientHello containing a version of { 3, 5 } or
higher, do you respond with the highest common version of TLS
rather than requiring an exact match? Have you ensured this
continues to be true with arbitrarily higher version numbers?
(e.g. { 4, 0 }, { 9, 9 }, { 255, 255 })
- Do you properly ignore unrecognized cipher suites (Section 4.1.2),
hello extensions (Section 4.2), named groups (Section 4.2.4), and
signature algorithms (Section 4.2.3)?
Cryptographic details:
- What countermeasures do you use to prevent timing attacks
[TIMING]?
- When verifying RSA signatures, do you accept both NULL and missing
parameters? Do you verify that the RSA padding doesn't have
additional data after the hash value? [FI06]
- When using Diffie-Hellman key exchange, do you correctly preserve
leading zero bytes in the negotiated key (see Section 7.3.1)?
- Does your TLS client check that the Diffie-Hellman parameters sent
by the server are acceptable, (see Section 4.2.5.1)?
- Do you use a strong and, most importantly, properly seeded random
number generator (see Appendix B.2) when generating Diffie-Hellman
private values, the ECDSA "k" parameter, and other security-
critical values? It is RECOMMENDED that implementations implement
"deterministic ECDSA" as specified in [RFC6979].
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- Do you zero-pad Diffie-Hellman public key values to the group size
(see Section 4.2.5.1)?
B.6. Client Tracking Prevention
Clients SHOULD NOT reuse a session ticket for multiple connections.
Reuse of a session ticket allows passive observers to correlate
different connections. Servers that issue session tickets SHOULD
offer at least as many session tickets as the number of connections
that a client might use; for example, a web browser using HTTP/1.1
[RFC7230] might open six connections to a server. Servers SHOULD
issue new session tickets with every connection. This ensures that
clients are always able to use a new session ticket when creating a
new connection.
B.7. Unauthenticated Operation
Previous versions of TLS offered explicitly unauthenticated cipher
suites based on anonymous Diffie-Hellman. These modes have been
deprecated in TLS 1.3. However, it is still possible to negotiate
parameters that do not provide verifiable server authentication by
several methods, including:
- Raw public keys [RFC7250].
- Using a public key contained in a certificate but without
validation of the certificate chain or any of its contents.
Either technique used alone is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle
attacks and therefore unsafe for general use. However, it is also
possible to bind such connections to an external authentication
mechanism via out-of-band validation of the server's public key,
trust on first use, or channel bindings [RFC5929]. [[NOTE: TLS 1.3
needs a new channel binding definition that has not yet been
defined.]] If no such mechanism is used, then the connection has no
protection against active man-in-the-middle attack; applications MUST
NOT use TLS in such a way absent explicit configuration or a specific
application profile.
Appendix C. Backward Compatibility
The TLS protocol provides a built-in mechanism for version
negotiation between endpoints potentially supporting different
versions of TLS.
TLS 1.x and SSL 3.0 use compatible ClientHello messages. Servers can
also handle clients trying to use future versions of TLS as long as
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the ClientHello format remains compatible and the client supports the
highest protocol version available in the server.
Prior versions of TLS used the record layer version number for
various purposes. (TLSPlaintext.legacy_record_version &
TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version) As of TLS 1.3, this field is
deprecated and its value MUST be ignored by all implementations.
Version negotiation is performed using only the handshake versions.
(ClientHello.legacy_version, ClientHello "supported_versions"
extension & ServerHello.version) In order to maximize
interoperability with older endpoints, implementations that negotiate
the use of TLS 1.0-1.2 SHOULD set the record layer version number to
the negotiated version for the ServerHello and all records
thereafter.
For maximum compatibility with previously non-standard behavior and
misconfigured deployments, all implementations SHOULD support
validation of certification paths based on the expectations in this
document, even when handling prior TLS versions' handshakes. (see
Section 4.4.1.1)
TLS 1.2 and prior supported an "Extended Master Secret" [RFC7627]
extension which digested large parts of the handshake transcript into
the master secret. Because TLS 1.3 always hashes in the transcript
up to the server CertificateVerify, implementations which support
both TLS 1.3 and earlier versions SHOULD indicate the use of the
Extended Master Secret extension in their APIs whenever TLS 1.3 is
used.
C.1. Negotiating with an older server
A TLS 1.3 client who wishes to negotiate with such older servers will
send a normal TLS 1.3 ClientHello containing { 3, 3 } (TLS 1.2) in
ClientHello.legacy_version but with the correct version in the
"supported_versions" extension. If the server does not support TLS
1.3 it will respond with a ServerHello containing an older version
number. If the client agrees to use this version, the negotiation
will proceed as appropriate for the negotiated protocol. A client
resuming a session SHOULD initiate the connection using the version
that was previously negotiated.
Note that 0-RTT data is not compatible with older servers. See
Appendix C.3.
If the version chosen by the server is not supported by the client
(or not acceptable), the client MUST abort the handshake with a
"protocol_version" alert.
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If a TLS server receives a ClientHello containing a version number
greater than the highest version supported by the server, it MUST
reply according to the highest version supported by the server.
Some legacy server implementations are known to not implement the TLS
specification properly and might abort connections upon encountering
TLS extensions or versions which it is not aware of.
Interoperability with buggy servers is a complex topic beyond the
scope of this document. Multiple connection attempts may be required
in order to negotiate a backwards compatible connection, however this
practice is vulnerable to downgrade attacks and is NOT RECOMMENDED.
C.2. Negotiating with an older client
A TLS server can also receive a ClientHello indicating a version
number smaller than its highest supported version. If the
"supported_versions" extension is present, the server MUST negotiate
the highest server-supported version found in that extension. If the
"supported_versions" extension is not present, the server MUST
negotiate the minimum of ClientHello.legacy_version and TLS 1.2.For
example, if the server supports TLS 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2, and
legacy_version is TLS 1.0, the server will proceed with a TLS 1.0
ServerHello. If the server only supports versions greater than
ClientHello.legacy_version, it MUST abort the handshake with a
"protocol_version" alert.
Note that earlier versions of TLS did not clearly specify the record
layer version number value in all cases
(TLSPlaintext.legacy_record_version). Servers will receive various
TLS 1.x versions in this field, however its value MUST always be
ignored.
C.3. Zero-RTT backwards compatibility
0-RTT data is not compatible with older servers. An older server
will respond to the ClientHello with an older ServerHello, but it
will not correctly skip the 0-RTT data and fail to complete the
handshake. This can cause issues when a client attempts to use
0-RTT, particularly against multi-server deployments. For example, a
deployment could deploy TLS 1.3 gradually with some servers
implementing TLS 1.3 and some implementing TLS 1.2, or a TLS 1.3
deployment could be downgraded to TLS 1.2.
A client that attempts to send 0-RTT data MUST fail a connection if
it receives a ServerHello with TLS 1.2 or older. A client that
attempts to repair this error SHOULD NOT send a TLS 1.2 ClientHello,
but instead send a TLS 1.3 ClientHello without 0-RTT data.
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To avoid this error condition, multi-server deployments SHOULD ensure
a uniform and stable deployment of TLS 1.3 without 0-RTT prior to
enabling 0-RTT.
C.4. Backwards Compatibility Security Restrictions
If an implementation negotiates use of TLS 1.2, then negotiation of
cipher suites also supported by TLS 1.3 SHOULD be preferred, if
available.
The security of RC4 cipher suites is considered insufficient for the
reasons cited in [RFC7465]. Implementations MUST NOT offer or
negotiate RC4 cipher suites for any version of TLS for any reason.
Old versions of TLS permitted the use of very low strength ciphers.
Ciphers with a strength less than 112 bits MUST NOT be offered or
negotiated for any version of TLS for any reason.
The security of SSL 2.0 [SSL2] is considered insufficient for the
reasons enumerated in [RFC6176], and MUST NOT be negotiated for any
reason.
Implementations MUST NOT send an SSL version 2.0 compatible CLIENT-
HELLO. Implementations MUST NOT negotiate TLS 1.3 or later using an
SSL version 2.0 compatible CLIENT-HELLO. Implementations are NOT
RECOMMENDED to accept an SSL version 2.0 compatible CLIENT-HELLO in
order to negotiate older versions of TLS.
Implementations MUST NOT send or accept any records with a version
less than { 3, 0 }.
The security of SSL 3.0 [SSL3] is considered insufficient for the
reasons enumerated in [RFC7568], and MUST NOT be negotiated for any
reason.
Implementations MUST NOT send a ClientHello.legacy_version or
ServerHello.version set to { 3, 0 } or less. Any endpoint receiving
a Hello message with ClientHello.legacy_version or
ServerHello.version set to { 3, 0 } MUST abort the handshake with a
"protocol_version" alert.
Implementations MUST NOT use the Truncated HMAC extension, defined in
Section 7 of [RFC6066], as it is not applicable to AEAD algorithms
and has been shown to be insecure in some scenarios.
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Appendix D. Overview of Security Properties
[[TODO: This section is still a WIP and needs a bunch more work.]]
A complete security analysis of TLS is outside the scope of this
document. In this section, we provide an informal description the
desired properties as well as references to more detailed work in the
research literature which provides more formal definitions.
We cover properties of the handshake separately from those of the
record layer.
D.1. Handshake
The TLS handshake is an Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocol
which is intended to provide both one-way authenticated (server-only)
and mutually authenticated (client and server) functionality. At the
completion of the handshake, each side outputs its view on the
following values:
- A "session key" (the master secret) from which can be derived a
set of working keys.
- A set of cryptographic parameters (algorithms, etc.)
- The identities of the communicating parties.
We assume that the attacker has complete control of the network in
between the parties [RFC3552]. Even under these conditions, the
handshake should provide the properties listed below. Note that
these properties are not necessarily independent, but reflect the
protocol consumers' needs.
Establishing the same session key. The handshake needs to output the
same session key on both sides of the handshake, provided that it
completes successfully on each endpoint (See [CK01]; defn 1, part
1).
Secrecy of the session key. The shared session key should be known
only to the communicating parties, not to the attacker (See
[CK01]; defn 1, part 2). Note that in a unilaterally
authenticated connection, the attacker can establish its own
session keys with the server, but those session keys are distinct
from those established by the client.
Peer Authentication. The client's view of the peer identity should
reflect the server's identity. If the client is authenticated,
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the server's view of the peer identity should match the client's
identity.
Uniqueness of the session key: Any two distinct handshakes should
produce distinct, unrelated session keys
Downgrade protection. The cryptographic parameters should be the
same on both sides and should be the same as if the peers had been
communicating in the absence of an attack (See [BBFKZG16]; defns 8
and 9}).
Forward secret If the long-term keying material (in this case the
signature keys in certificate-based authentication modes or the
PSK in PSK-(EC)DHE modes) are compromised after the handshake is
complete, this does not compromise the security of the session key
(See [DOW92]).
Protection of endpoint identities. The server's identity
(certificate) should be protected against passive attackers. The
client's identity should be protected against both passive and
active attackers.
Informally, the signature-based modes of TLS 1.3 provide for the
establishment of a unique, secret, shared, key established by an
(EC)DHE key exchange and authenticated by the server's signature over
the handshake transcript, as well as tied to the server's identity by
a MAC. If the client is authenticated by a certificate, it also
signs over the handshake transcript and provides a MAC tied to both
identities. [SIGMA] describes the analysis of this type of key
exchange protocol. If fresh (EC)DHE keys are used for each
connection, then the output keys are forward secret.
The PSK and resumption-PSK modes bootstrap from a long-term shared
secret into a unique per-connection short-term session key. This
secret may have been established in a previous handshake. If
PSK-(EC)DHE modes are used, this session key will also be forward
secret. The resumption-PSK mode has been designed so that the
resumption master secret computed by connection N and needed to form
connection N+1 is separate from the traffic keys used by connection
N, thus providing forward secrecy between the connections.
If an exporter is used, then it produces values which are unique and
secret (because they are generated from a unique session key).
Exporters computed with different labels and contexts are
computationally independent, so it is not feasible to compute one
from another or the session secret from the exported value. Note:
exporters can produce arbitrary-length values. If exporters are to
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be used as channel bindings, the exported value MUST be large enough
to provide collision resistance.
For all handshake modes, the Finished MAC (and where present, the
signature), prevents downgrade attacks. In addition, the use of
certain bytes in the random nonces as described in Section 4.1.3
allows the detection of downgrade to previous TLS versions.
As soon as the client and the server have exchanged enough
information to establish shared keys, the remainder of the handshake
is encrypted, thus providing protection against passive attackers.
Because the server authenticates before the client, the client can
ensure that it only reveals its identity to an authenticated server.
Note that implementations must use the provided record padding
mechanism during the handshake to avoid leaking information about the
identities due to length.
The 0-RTT mode of operation generally provides the same security
properties as 1-RTT data, with the two exceptions that the 0-RTT
encryption keys do not provide full forward secrecy and that the the
server is not able to guarantee full uniqueness of the handshake
(non-replayability) without keeping potentially undue amounts of
state. See Section 4.2.7 for one mechanism to limit the exposure to
replay.
The reader should refer to the following references for analysis of
the TLS handshake [CHSV16] [FGSW16] [LXZFH16].
D.2. Record Layer
The record layer depends on the handshake producing a strong session
key which can be used to derive bidirectional traffic keys and
nonces. Assuming that is true, and the keys are used for no more
data than indicated in Section 5.5 then the record layer should
provide the following guarantees:
Confidentiality. An attacker should not be able to determine the
plaintext contents of a given record.
Integrity. An attacker should not be able to craft a new record
which is different from an existing record which will be accepted
by the receiver.
Order protection/non-replayability An attacker should not be able to
cause the receiver to accept a record which it has already
accepted or cause the receiver to accept record N+1 without having
first processed record N. [[TODO: If we merge in DTLS to this
document, we will need to update this guarantee.]]
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Length concealment. Given a record with a given external length, the
attacker should not be able to determine the amount of the record
that is content versus padding.
Forward security after key change. If the traffic key update
mechanism described in Section 4.5.3 has been used and the
previous generation key is deleted, an attacker who compromises
the endpoint should not be able to decrypt traffic encrypted with
the old key.
Informally, TLS 1.3 provides these properties by AEAD-protecting the
plaintext with a strong key. AEAD encryption [RFC5116] provides
confidentiality and integrity for the data. Non-replayability is
provided by using a separate nonce for each record, with the nonce
being derived from the record sequence number (Section 5.3), with the
sequence number being maintained independently at both sides thus
records which are delivered out of order result in AEAD deprotection
failures.
The plaintext protected by the AEAD function consists of content plus
variable-length padding. Because the padding is also encrypted, the
attacker cannot directly determine the length of the padding, but may
be able to measure it indirectly by the use of timing channels
exposed during record processing (i.e., seeing how long it takes to
process a record). In general, it is not known how to remove this
type of channel because even a constant time padding removal function
will then feed the content into data-dependent functions.
Generation N+1 keys are derived from generation N keys via a key
derivation function Section 7.2. As long as this function is truly
one way, it is not possible to compute the previous keys after a key
change (forward secrecy). However, TLS does not provide security for
data which is sent after the traffic secret is compromised, even afer
a key update (backward secrecy); systems which want backward secrecy
must do a fresh handshake and establish a new session key with an
(EC)DHE exchange.
The reader should refer to the following references for analysis of
the TLS record layer.
Appendix E. Working Group Information
The discussion list for the IETF TLS working group is located at the
e-mail address tls@ietf.org [1]. Information on the group and
information on how to subscribe to the list is at
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
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Archives of the list can be found at: https://www.ietf.org/mail-
archive/web/tls/current/index.html
Appendix F. Contributors
- Martin Abadi
University of California, Santa Cruz
abadi@cs.ucsc.edu
- Christopher Allen (co-editor of TLS 1.0)
Alacrity Ventures
ChristopherA@AlacrityManagement.com
- Steven M. Bellovin
Columbia University
smb@cs.columbia.edu
- David Benjamin
Google
davidben@google.com
- Benjamin Beurdouche
- Karthikeyan Bhargavan (co-author of [RFC7627])
INRIA
karthikeyan.bhargavan@inria.fr
- Simon Blake-Wilson (co-author of [RFC4492])
BCI
sblakewilson@bcisse.com
- Nelson Bolyard (co-author of [RFC4492])
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
nelson@bolyard.com
- Ran Canetti
IBM
canetti@watson.ibm.com
- Pete Chown
Skygate Technology Ltd
pc@skygate.co.uk
- Antoine Delignat-Lavaud (co-author of [RFC7627])
INRIA
antoine.delignat-lavaud@inria.fr
- Tim Dierks (co-editor of TLS 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2)
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Independent
tim@dierks.org
- Taher Elgamal
Securify
taher@securify.com
- Pasi Eronen
Nokia
pasi.eronen@nokia.com
- Cedric Fournet
Microsoft
fournet@microsoft.com
- Anil Gangolli
anil@busybuddha.org
- David M. Garrett
- Vipul Gupta (co-author of [RFC4492])
Sun Microsystems Laboratories
vipul.gupta@sun.com
- Chris Hawk (co-author of [RFC4492])
Corriente Networks LLC
chris@corriente.net
- Kipp Hickman
- Alfred Hoenes
- David Hopwood
Independent Consultant
david.hopwood@blueyonder.co.uk
- Subodh Iyengar
Facebook
subodh@fb.com
- Daniel Kahn Gillmor
ACLU
dkg@fifthhorseman.net
- Hubert Kario
Red Hat Inc.
hkario@redhat.com
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- Phil Karlton (co-author of SSL 3.0)
- Paul Kocher (co-author of SSL 3.0)
Cryptography Research
paul@cryptography.com
- Hugo Krawczyk
IBM
hugo@ee.technion.ac.il
- Adam Langley (co-author of [RFC7627])
Google
agl@google.com
- Xiaoyin Liu
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
xiaoyin.l@outlook.com
- Ilari Liusvaara
Independent
ilariliusvaara@welho.com
- Jan Mikkelsen
Transactionware
janm@transactionware.com
- Bodo Moeller (co-author of [RFC4492])
Google
bodo@openssl.org
- Erik Nygren
Akamai Technologies
erik+ietf@nygren.org
- Magnus Nystrom
Microsoft
mnystrom@microsoft.com
- Alfredo Pironti (co-author of [RFC7627])
INRIA
alfredo.pironti@inria.fr
- Andrei Popov
Microsoft
andrei.popov@microsoft.com
- Marsh Ray (co-author of [RFC7627])
Microsoft
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maray@microsoft.com
- Robert Relyea
Netscape Communications
relyea@netscape.com
- Kyle Rose
Akamai Technologies
krose@krose.org
- Jim Roskind
Netscape Communications
jar@netscape.com
- Michael Sabin
- Dan Simon
Microsoft, Inc.
dansimon@microsoft.com
- Nick Sullivan
CloudFlare Inc.
nick@cloudflare.com
- Bjoern Tackmann
University of California, San Diego
btackmann@eng.ucsd.edu
- Martin Thomson
Mozilla
mt@mozilla.com
- Filippo Valsorda
CloudFlare Inc.
filippo@cloudflare.com
- Tom Weinstein
- Hoeteck Wee
Ecole Normale Superieure, Paris
hoeteck@alum.mit.edu
- Tim Wright
Vodafone
timothy.wright@vodafone.com
- Kazu Yamamoto
Internet Initiative Japan Inc.
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kazu@iij.ad.jp
Author's Address
Eric Rescorla
RTFM, Inc.
EMail: ekr@rtfm.com
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