Network Working Group Reiner Ludwig
INTERNET-DRAFT Ericsson Research
Expires: September 2003 Andrei Gurtov
Sonera Corporation
March, 2003
The Eifel Response Algorithm for TCP
<draft-ietf-tsvwg-tcp-eifel-response-03.txt>
Status of this memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
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Abstract
The Eifel response algorithm requires a detection algorithm to detect
a posteriori whether the TCP sender has entered loss recovery
unnecessarily. In response to a spurious timeout it adapts the
retransmission timer to avoid further spurious timeouts, and can
avoid - depending on the detection algorithm - the often unnecessary
go-back-N retransmits that would otherwise be sent. Likewise, it
adapts the duplicate acknowledgement threshold in response to a
spurious fast retransmit. In both cases, the Eifel response algorithm
restores the congestion control state in such a way that packet
bursts are avoided.
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Terminology
The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD,
SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this
document, are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
We refer to the first-time transmission of an octet as the 'original
transmit'. A subsequent transmission of the same octet is referred to
as a 'retransmit'. In most cases this terminology can likewise be
applied to data segments as opposed to octets. However, when
repacketization occurs, a segment can contain both first-time
transmissions and retransmissions of octets. In that case this
terminology is only consistent when applied to octets. For the Eifel
detection and response algorithms this makes no difference as they
also operate correctly when repacketization occurs.
We use the term 'acceptable ACK' as defined in [RFC793]. That is an
ACK that acknowledges previously unacknowledged data. We use the term
'duplicate ACK', and the variable 'dupacks' as defined in [WS95]. The
variable 'dupacks' is a counter of duplicate ACKs that have already
been received by the TCP sender before the fast retransmit is sent.
We use the variable 'DupThresh' to refer to the so-called duplicate
acknowledgement threshold, i.e., the number of duplicate ACKs that
need to arrive at the TCP sender to trigger a fast retransmit.
Currently, DupThresh is specified as a fixed value of three
[RFC2581].
Furthermore, we use the TCP sender state variables 'SND.UNA' and
'SND.NXT' as defined in [RFC793]. SND.UNA holds the segment sequence
number of the oldest outstanding segment. SND.NXT holds the segment
sequence number of the next segment the TCP sender will
(re-)transmit. In addition, we define as 'SND.MAX' the segment
sequence number of the next original transmit to be sent. The
definition of SND.MAX is equivalent to the definition of snd_max in
[WS95].
We use the TCP sender state variables 'cwnd' (congestion window), and
'ssthresh' (slow start threshold), and the terms 'SMSS',
'FlightSize', and 'Initial Window (IW)' as defined in [RFC2581].
FlightSize is the amount of outstanding data in the network, or
alternatively, the difference between SND.MAX and SND.UNA at a given
point in time. The IW is the size of the sender's congestion window
after the three-way handshake is completed. We use the TCP sender
state variables 'SRTT' and 'RTTVAR', and the term 'RTO' as defined in
[RFC2988]. In addition, we assume that the TCP sender maintains in
the variable 'RTT-SAMPLE' the value of the latest round-trip time
(RTT) measurement.
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1. Introduction
The Eifel response algorithm relies on a detection algorithm such as
the Eifel detection algorithm defined in [RFC***B]. That document
discusses the relevant background and motivation that also applies to
this document. Hence, the reader is expected to be familiar with
[RFC***B]. Note that alternative response algorithms have been
proposed [BDA03] that could also rely on the Eifel detection
algorithm, and vice versa alternative detection algorithms have been
proposed [BA02b], [SK03] that could work together with the Eifel
response algorithm.
The Eifel response algorithm requires a detection algorithm to detect
a posteriori whether the TCP sender has entered loss recovery
unnecessarily. In response to a spurious timeout it adapts the
retransmission timer to avoid further spurious timeouts, and can
avoid - depending on the detection algorithm - the often unnecessary
go-back-N retransmits that would otherwise be sent. Likewise, it
adapts the duplicate acknowledgement threshold in response to a
spurious fast retransmit. In both cases, the Eifel response algorithm
restores the congestion control state in such a way that packet
bursts are avoided.
2. Interworking with Detection Algorithms
If the Eifel response algorithm is implemented at the TCP sender, it
MUST be implemented together with a detection algorithm that is
specified in an RFC.
Designers of detection algorithms who want to offer the possibility
that their detection algorithms can work together with the Eifel
response algorithm MUST reuse the variable SpuriousRecovery with the
semantics and defined values as specified in [RFC***B]. In addition,
we define LATE_SPUR_TO (equal -1) as another possible value of the
variable SpuriousRecovery. Detection algorithms must set the value of
SpuriousRecovery to LATE_SPUR_TO if the detection is based upon
receiving the ACK for the retransmit. For example, this applies to
detection algorithms that are based on the DSACK option.
3. The Eifel Response Algorithm
The complete algorithm is specified in section 2.1. In sections 2.2
to 2.4, we motivate the different steps of the algorithm.
3.1. The Algorithm
Given that a TCP sender has enabled a detection algorithm that
complies with the requirements set in Section 2, a TCP sender MAY use
the Eifel response algorithm as defined in this subsection.
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If the Eifel response algorithm is used, the following steps MUST be
taken by the TCP sender, but only upon initiation of loss recovery,
i.e., when either the timeout-based retransmit or the fast retransmit
is sent. Note: The algorithm MUST NOT be reinitiated after loss
recovery has already started. In particular, it may not be
reinitiated upon subsequent timeouts for the same segment, and not
upon retransmitting segments other than the oldest outstanding
segment.
(0) Before the variables cwnd and ssthresh get updated when
loss recovery is initiated, set a "pipe_prev" variable as
follows:
pipe_prev <- max (FlightSize, ssthresh)
(DTCT) This is a placeholder for a detection algorithm that must
be executed at this point. In case [RFC***B] is used as
the detection algorithm, steps (1) - (6) of that algorithm
go here.
(RESP) If SpuriousRecovery equals FALSE, then proceed to step
(DONE),
else if SpuriousRecovery equals SPUR_TO, then proceed to
step (STO.1),
else if SpuriousRecovery equals LATE_SPUR_TO, then proceed
to step (STO.2),
else (spurious fast retransmit) proceed to step (SFR).
(STO.1) Resume transmission off the top:
Set
SND.NXT <- SND.MAX
(STO.2) Adapt the Conservativeness of the Retransmission Timer:
If the retransmission timer is implemented according to
[RFC2988], then change the calculation of SRTT to
SRTT <- SRTT + 1/FlightSize * (RTT-SAMPLE - SRTT)
and set
SRTT <- RTT-SAMPLE
RTTVAR <- RTT-SAMPLE/2,
recalculate the RTO, and restart the retransmission timer,
Note: Even after changing the calculation of SRTT, the
retransmission timer is considered as being
implemented according to [RFC2988].
else adapt the conservativeness of the retransmission
timer.
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Proceed to step (ReCC).
(SFR) Adapt the duplicate acknowledgement threshold:
Set
DupThresh <- max (DupThresh, SpuriousRecovery)
Proceed to step (ReCC).
(ReCC) Revert the congestion control state:
If the acceptable ACK has the ECN-Echo flag [RFC3168] set
OR the TCP sender has already taken more than three
timeouts for the oldest outstanding segment, then proceed
to step (DONE),
else set
cwnd <- min (pipe_prev, (FlightSize + IW))
ssthresh <- pipe_prev
Proceed to step (DONE).
(DONE) No further processing.
3.2 Responding to Spurious Timeouts
3.2.1 Suppressing the Unnecessary go-back-N Retransmits (step STO.1)
Without the use of the TCP timestamps option, the TCP sender suffers
from the retransmission ambiguity problem [Zh86], [KP87]. This means
that when the first acceptable ACK arrives after a spurious timeout,
the TCP sender must believe that that ACK was sent in response to the
retransmit when in fact it was sent in response to the original
transmit. Furthermore, the TCP sender must also believe that all
other segments outstanding at that point were lost.
Note: Except for certain cases where original ACKs were lost, that
first acceptable ACK cannot carry any DSACK option [RFC2883].
Consequently, once the TCP sender's state has been updated after the
first acceptable ACK has arrived, SND.NXT equals SND.UNA. This is
what causes the often unnecessary go-back-N retransmits. Now every
arriving acceptable ACK that was sent in response to an original
transmit will advance SND.NXT. But as long as SND.NXT is smaller than
the value that SND.MAX had when the timeout occurred, those ACKs will
clock out retransmits; whether those segments were lost or not.
In fact, during this phase the TCP sender breaks 'packet
conservation' [Jac88]. This is because the go-back-N retransmits are
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sent during slow start. I.e., for each original transmit leaving the
network, two retransmits are sent into the network as long as SND.NXT
does not equal SND.MAX (see [LK00] for more detail).
The use of the TCP timestamps option reliably eliminates the
retransmission ambiguity problem. Thus, once the Eifel detection
algorithm detected that a timeout was spurious, it is therefore safe
to let the TCP sender resume the transmission with new data. Thus,
the Eifel response algorithm changes the TCP sender's state by
setting SND.NXT to SND.MAX in that case.
3.2.2 Adapting the Retransmission Timer (step STO.2)
There is currently only one retransmission timer standardized for TCP
[RFC2988]. We therefore only address that timer explicitly. Future
standards that might define alternatives to [RFC2988] should propose
similar measures to adapt the conservativeness of the retransmission
timer.
Since the timeout was spurious, the TCP sender's RTT estimators are
likely to be off. However, since timestamps are being used, a new and
valid RTT measurement (RTT-SAMPLE) can be derived from the acceptable
ACK. It is therefore suggested to reinitialize the RTT estimators
from RTT-SAMPLE. Note that this RTT-SAMPLE will be relatively large
since it will include the delay spike that caused the spurious
timeout in the first place. To have the new RTO become effective, the
retransmission timer needs to be restarted. This is consistent with
[RFC2988] which recommends restarting the retransmission timer with
the arrival of an acceptable ACK.
When the path's RTT varies largely, it is recommended to take RTT
samples more frequently than only once per RTT. This allows the TCP
sender to track changes in the RTT more closely. In particular, a TCP
sender can react more quickly to sudden increases of the RTT by
sooner updating the RTO to a more conservative value. The TCP
Timestamps option [RFC1323] provides this capability, allowing the
TCP sender to sample the RTT from every segment that is acknowledged.
Using timestamps across such paths leads to a more conservative TCP
retransmission timer and reduces the risk of triggering spurious
timeouts [IMLGK02].
On the other hand, it is known that executing the RTO calculation
defined in [RFC2988] more often than once per RTT leads to an RTO
that decays too quickly, i.e., that converges to the RTT too quickly.
This is because of the fixed gains (1/8 and 1/4) of RFC2988's RTT
estimators. When timing every segment these gains are increasingly
too large with an increasing FlightSize. This leads to the effect
that the RTT estimators "lose" their memory too soon. This is a known
conflict between [RFC2988] and [RFC1323]. Especially, a large RTO
resulting from an RTT spike will decay within one or two RTTs (e.g.,
see [LS00]). Hence, simply reinitializing RFC2988's RTT estimators
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from RTT-SAMPLE is probably not enough to make the retransmission
timer sufficiently conservative for at least the next couple of RTTs.
A solution for the case when every segment is timed according to
[RFC1323] is to make the gains adaptive to the FlightSize [LS00]. We
suggest to adopt this solution for at least the SRTT.
3.3 Responding to Spurious Fast Retransmits (step SFR)
The assumption behind the fast retransmit algorithm [RFC2581] is that
a segment was lost if as many duplicate ACKs have arrived at the TCP
sender as indicated by DupThresh. Currently, DupThresh is specified
as a fixed value of three [RFC2581]. That value is assumed to be
sufficiently conservative so that packet reordering and/or packet
duplication does not falsely trigger the fast retransmit algorithm.
Clearly, this assumption does not hold for a particular TCP
connection once the TCP sender detects that the last fast retransmit
was spurious. It is therefore suggested to dynamically adapt
DupThresh to the reordering characteristics observed over the course
of a particular connection.
At the beginning of a connection DupThresh is initialized with three.
Then for each spurious fast retransmit that is detected, DupThresh is
set to the maximum of the previous DupThresh, and the lowest value
that would have avoided that last spurious fast retransmit. Note that
the Eifel detection algorithm records the latter value in
SpuriousRecovery. This strategy ensures that the TCP sender is able
to cope with the longest reordering length seen on a particular
connection so far. However, the strategy may lead to fast timeouts
[RFC***B], i.e., an event where the retransmission timer expires
before the TCP sender receives the duplicate ACK that would trigger a
fast retransmit of the oldest outstanding segment.
Also, we believe that this strategy should be implemented together
with an advanced version of the Limited Transmit algorithm [RFC3042].
That is for each duplicate ACK that arrives until DupThresh is
reached, the TCP sender should sent a new data segment if allowed by
the TCP receiver's advertised window, and if new data is available.
Although, the current Limited Transmit algorithm only allows this for
the first two duplicate ACKs, we believe that such an advanced
limited transmit strategy is safe. It is already implemented in
widely deployed TCPs [SK02].
Other alternatives for responding to spurious fast retransmits are
discussed in [BA02a].
3.4 Reverting Congestion Control State (step ReCC)
When a TCP sender enters loss recovery, it also assumes that is has
received a congestion indication. In response to that it reduces
cwnd, and ssthresh. However, once the TCP sender detects that the
loss recovery has been falsely triggered, this reduction was
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unnecessary. In fact, no congestion signal has been received. We
therefore believe that it is safe to revert to the previous
congestion control state.
We suggest to restore cwnd to the minimum of the previous FlightSize,
and the current FlightSize plus IW. The latter avoids large packet
bursts that may occur with less careful variants for restoring
congestion control state. For example, the original proposal [LK00]
typically causes large bursts after packet reordering. The current
proposal limits a potential packet burst to IW, which is considered
an acceptable burst size. It is the amount of data that a TCP sender
may send into a yet "unprobed" network at the beginning of a
connection.
In addition, we suggest to restore ssthresh to pipe_prev, i.e., the
maximum of the previous value of ssthresh and the value that
FlightSize had when loss recovery was unnecessarily entered. As a
result, the TCP sender either immediately resumes probing the network
for more bandwidth in congestion avoidance, or it first slow starts
until it has reached its previous share of the available bandwidth.
Clearly, when the acceptable ACK signals congestion through the
ECN-Echo flag [RFC3168], the TCP sender MUST refrain from reverting
congestion control state. The same is true if the TCP sender has
already taken more than three timeouts for the oldest outstanding
segment. Allowing three timeouts while still reverting congestion
control state goes beyond [RFC2581]. That standard recommends setting
cwnd to no more than the restart window (one SMSS) if the TCP sender
has not sent data in an interval exceeding the current RTO. That is
done to restart the ACK clock which is believed to be lost. The case
in step (ReCC) of the Eifel response algorithm is different. Since,
an acceptable ACK corresponding to an original transmit has finally
returned, the TCP has reason to believe that the ACK clock was merely
interrupted but has now resumed "ticking" again.
4. Non-Conservative Advanced Loss Recovery after Spurious Timeouts
A TCP sender MAY implement an optimistic form of advanced loss
recovery after a spurious timeout has been detected as motivated in
this section. Such a scheme MUST be terminated after the highest
sequence number outstanding when the spurious timeout was detected
has been acknowledged.
We have studied environments where spurious timeouts and multiple
losses from the same flight of packets often coincide [GL02]. Note
that we refer to the case were the oldest outstanding segment does
arrive at the TCP receiver but one or more packets from the remaining
outstanding flight are lost. We found that in such a case TCP-Reno's
performance can even suffer if the Eifel response algorithm is
operated without an advanced loss recovery scheme such as NewReno
[RFC2582], or SACK-based schemes [2018], [RFC***A]. The reason is
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TCP-Reno's aggressiveness after a spurious timeout. Even though it
breaks 'packet conservation' (see Section 2.2.1) when blindly
retransmitting all outstanding segments, it usually recovers the
back-to-back packet losses within a single round-trip time. On the
contrary, the more conservative TCP-Reno/Eifel was forced into
another (backed-off) timeout in that case.
However, in a more recent study [GL03], we found that the mentioned
advanced loss recovery schemes are often too conservative to compete
against TCP-Reno's blind go-back-N in terms of quickly recovering
multiple losses after a spurious timeout. The problem with the
NewReno scheme is that it does not exploit knowledge (e.g., provided
through SACK options) about which segments were lost. The problem
with the conservative SACK-based scheme [RFC***A] is that it waits
for three SACKs before it retransmits a lost segment. This may often
lead to a second - and in this case genuine - (potentially backed-
off) timeout. In those cases TCP-Reno's loss recovery is often
quicker due the blind go-back-N. This could be viewed as a
disincentive to the deployment of the Eifel response algorithm.
[Making TCP (even) more conservative by fixing a misbehavior in
the name of 'packet conservation' would probably at most result in
credits in the academic world.]
We therefore suggest that a TCP sender MAY implement an optimistic
(non-conservative) form of advanced loss recovery after a spurious
timeout has been detected, if the following guidelines are met:
- Packet Conservation: The TCP sender may not have more segments
(counting both original transmits and retransmits) in flight
than indicated by the congestion window.
- A retransmit may only be sent when a potential loss has been
indicated. For example, a single duplicate ACK is such an
indication; potentially with the corresponding SACK info in case
the SACK option is enabled for the connection.
We have developed and evaluated such a scheme (a variant of NewReno
that exploits SACK info) in [GL03] that shows good results.
5. IPR Considerations
The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed in
regard to some or all of the specification contained in this
document. For more information consult the online list of claimed
rights at http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
Ludwig & Gurtov [Page 9]
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might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the
IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of
claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can
be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
6. Security Considerations
There is a risk that a detection algorithm is fooled by spoofed ACKs
that make genuine retransmits appear to the TCP sender as spurious
retransmits. When such a detection algorithm is run together with the
Eifel response algorithm, this could effectively disable congestion
control at the TCP sender. Should this become a concern, the Eifel
response algorithm SHOULD only be run together with detection
algorithms that are known to be safe against such "ACK spoofing
attacks".
For example, the safe variant of the Eifel detection algorithm
[RFC***B], is a reliable method to protect against this risk.
Acknowledgments
Many thanks to Keith Sklower, Randy Katz, Michael Meyer, Stephan
Baucke, Sally Floyd, Vern Paxson, Mark Allman, Ethan Blanton, Pasi
Sarolahti, and Alexey Kuznetsov for very useful discussions that
contributed to this work.
Normative References
[RFC2581] M. Allman, V. Paxson, W. Stevens, TCP Congestion Control,
RFC 2581, April 1999.
[RFC3042] M. Allman, H. Balakrishnan, S. Floyd, Enhancing TCP's Loss
Recovery Using Limited Transmit, RFC 3042, January 2001.
[RFC2119] S. Bradner, Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2582] S. Floyd, T. Henderson, The NewReno Modification to TCP's
Fast Recovery Algorithm, RFC 2582, April 1999.
[RFC2883] S. Floyd, J. Mahdavi, M. Mathis, M. Podolsky, A. Romanow,
An Extension to the Selective Acknowledgement (SACK) Option
for TCP, RFC 2883, July 2000.
[RFC1323] V. Jacobson, R. Braden, D. Borman, TCP Extensions for High
Performance, RFC 1323, May 1992.
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[RFC***B] R. Ludwig, M. Meyer, The Eifel Detection Algorithm for TCP,
RFC***B, March 2003.
[RFC2018] M. Mathis, J. Mahdavi, S. Floyd, A. Romanow, TCP Selective
Acknowledgement Options, RFC 2018, October 1996.
[RFC2988] V. Paxson, M. Allman, Computing TCP's Retransmission Timer,
RFC 2988, November 2000.
[RFC793] J. Postel, Transmission Control Protocol, RFC793, September
1981.
[RFC3168] K. Ramakrishnan, S. Floyd, D. Black, The Addition of
Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP, RFC 3168,
September 2001
Informative References
[BA02a] E. Blanton, M. Allman, On Making TCP More Robust to Packet
Reordering, ACM Computer Communication Review, Vol. 32,
No. 1, January 2002.
[BA02b] E. Blanton, M. Allman, Using TCP DSACKs and SCTP Duplicate
TSNs to Detect Spurious Retransmissions, draft-blanton-
dsack-use-02.txt (work in progress), October 2002.
[BDA03] E. Blanton, R. Dimond, M. Allman. Practices for TCP Senders
in the Face of Segment Reordering, draft-blanton-tcp-
reordering-00.txt (work in progress), February 2003..
[RFC***A] E. Blanton, M. Allman, K. Fall, L. Wang, A Conservative
SACK-based Loss Recovery Algorithm for TCP, RFC***A,
March 2003.
[Gu01] A. Gurtov, Effect of Delays on TCP Performance, In
Proceedings of IFIP Personal Wireless Conference,
August 2001.
[GL02] A. Gurtov, R. Ludwig, Evaluating the Eifel Algorithm for
TCP in a GPRS Network, In Proceedings of the European
Wireless Conference, February 2002.
[GL03] A. Gurtov, R. Ludwig, Responding to Spurious Timeouts in
TCP, In Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM 03, .
[RFC3481] H. Inamura, G. Montenegro, R. Ludwig, A. Gurtov,
F. Khafizov, TCP over Second (2.5G) and Third (3G)
Generation Wireless Networks, RFC3481, February 2003.
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[KP87] P. Karn, C. Partridge, Improving Round-Trip Time Estimates
in Reliable Transport Protocols, In Proceedings of ACM
SIGCOMM 87.
[LK00] R. Ludwig, R. H. Katz, The Eifel Algorithm: Making TCP
Robust Against Spurious Retransmissions, ACM Computer
Communication Review, Vol. 30, No. 1, January 2000.
[LS00] R. Ludwig, K. Sklower, The Eifel Retransmission Timer, ACM
Computer Communication Review, Vol. 30, No. 3, July 2000.
[SK02] P. Sarolahti, A. Kuznetsov, Congestion Control in Linux
TCP, In Proceedings of USENIX, June 2002.
[SK03] P. Sarolahti, M. Kojo, F-RTO: A TCP RTO Recovery Algorithm
for Avoiding Unnecessary Retransmissions, draft-sarolahti-
tsvwg-tcp-frto-03.txt (work in progress), January 2003.
[WS95] G. R. Wright, W. R. Stevens, TCP/IP Illustrated, Volume 2
(The Implementation), Addison Wesley, January 1995.
[Zh86] L. Zhang, Why TCP Timers Don't Work Well, In Proceedings of
ACM SIGCOMM 88.
Author's Address
Reiner Ludwig
Ericsson Research (EED)
Ericsson Allee 1
52134 Herzogenrath, Germany
Email: Reiner.Ludwig@ericsson.com
Andrei Gurtov
Cellular Systems Development
P.O. Box 970, FIN-00051 Sonera
Helsinki, Finland
Phone: +358(0)20401
Fax: +358(0)204064365
Email: andrei.gurtov@sonera.com
Homepage: http://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/gurtov
This Internet-Draft expires in September 2003.
Ludwig & Gurtov [Page 12]
