TSVWG                                                       G. Fairhurst
Internet-Draft                                    University of Aberdeen
Intended status: Informational                                C. Perkins
Expires: August 22, 2019                           University of Glasgow
                                                       February 18, 2019

The Impact of Transport Header Confidentiality on Network Operation and
                       Evolution of the Internet


   This document describes implications of applying end-to-end
   encryption at the transport layer.  It identifies in-network uses of
   transport layer header information.  It then reviews the implications
   of developing end-to-end transport protocols that use authentication
   to protect the integrity of transport information or encryption to
   provide confidentiality of the transport protocol header and expected
   implications of transport protocol design and network operation.
   Since transport measurement and analysis of the impact of network
   characteristics have been important to the design of current
   transport protocols, it also considers the impact on transport and
   application evolution.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 22, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Context and Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Current uses of Transport Headers within the Network  . . . .  10
     3.1.  Observing Transport Information in the Network  . . . . .  10
     3.2.  Transport Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     3.3.  Use for Network Diagnostics and Troubleshooting . . . . .  20
     3.4.  Header Compression  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   4.  Encryption and Authentication of Transport Headers  . . . . .  21
   5.  Addition of Transport Information to Network-Layer Protocol
       Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   6.  Implications of Protecting the Transport Headers  . . . . . .  26
     6.1.  Independent Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     6.2.  Characterising "Unknown" Network Traffic  . . . . . . . .  28
     6.3.  Accountability and Internet Transport Protocols . . . . .  28
     6.4.  Impact on Operational Cost  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     6.5.  Impact on Research, Development and Deployment  . . . . .  30
   7.  Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
   11. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
   Appendix A.  Revision information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43

1.  Introduction

   There is increased interest in, and deployment of, new protocols that
   employ end-to-end encryption at the transport layer, including the
   transport layer headers.  An example of such a transport is the QUIC
   transport protocol [I-D.ietf-quic-transport], currently being
   standardised in the IETF.  Encryption of transport layer headers and
   payload data has many benefits in terms of protecting user privacy.
   These benefits have been widely discussed [RFC7258], [RFC7624], and
   this document strongly supports the increased use of encryption in
   transport protocols.  There are also, however, some costs, in that
   the widespread use of transport encryption requires changes to

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   network operations, and complicates network measurement for research,
   operational, and standardisation purposes.

   This document discusses some consequences of applying end-to-end
   encryption at the transport layer.  It reviews the implications of
   developing end-to-end transport protocols that use encryption to
   provide confidentiality of the transport protocol header, and
   considers the effect of such changes on transport protocol design and
   network operations.  It also considers anticipated implications on
   transport and application evolution.

   Transports are increasingly encrypting and authenticating the payload
   (i.e., the application data carried within the transport connection)
   end-to-end.  Such protection is encouraged, and the implications are
   not further discussed in this memo.

2.  Context and Rationale

   The transport layer provides end-to-end interactions between
   endpoints (processes) using an Internet path.  Transport protocols
   layer directly over the network-layer service and are sent in the
   payload of network-layer packets.  They support end-to-end
   communication between applications, supported by higher-layer
   protocols, running on the end systems (or transport endpoints).  This
   simple architectural view hides one of the core functions of the
   transport, however, to discover and adapt to the properties of the
   Internet path that is currently being used.  The design of Internet
   transport protocols is as much about trying to avoid the unwanted
   side effects of congestion on a flow and other capacity-sharing
   flows, avoiding congestion collapse, adapting to changes in the path
   characteristics, etc., as it is about end-to-end feature negotiation,
   flow control and optimising for performance of a specific

   To achieve stable Internet operations the IETF transport community
   has to date relied heavily on measurement and insights of the network
   operations community to understand the trade-offs, and to inform
   selection of appropriate mechanisms, to ensure a safe, reliable, and
   robust Internet (e.g., [RFC1273]).  In turn, the network operations
   community relies on being able to understand the pattern and
   requirements of traffic passing over the Internet, both in aggregate
   and at the flow level.

   There are many motivations for deploying encrypted transports
   [RFC7624] (i.e., transport protocols that use encryption to provide
   confidentiality of some or all of the transport-layer header
   information), and encryption of transport payloads (i.e.
   Confidentiality of the payload data).  The increasing public concerns

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   about interference with Internet traffic have led to a rapidly
   expanding deployment of encryption to protect end-user privacy, e.g.,
   QUIC [I-D.ietf-quic-transport].  Encryption is also expected to form
   a basis of future transport protocol designs.

   Some network operators and access providers have come to rely on the
   in-network measurement of transport properties and the functionality
   provided by middleboxes to both support network operations and
   enhance performance.  There can therefore be implications when
   working with encrypted transport protocols that hide transport header
   information from the network.  These present architectural challenges
   and considerations in the way transport protocols are designed, and
   ability to characterise and compare different transport solutions
   [Measure].  Implementations of network devices are encouraged to
   avoid side-effects when protocols are updated.  Introducing
   cryptographic integrity checks to header fields can also prevent
   undetected manipulation of the field by network devices, or
   undetected addition of information to a packet.  However, this does
   not prevent inspection of the information by a device on path, and it
   is possible that such devices could develop mechanisms that rely on
   the presence of such a field, or a known value in the field.

   Reliance on the presence and semantics of specific header information
   leads to ossification.  An endpoint could be required to supply a
   specific header to receive the network service that it desires.  In
   some cases, this could be benign or advantageous to the protocol
   (e.g., recognising the start of a connection, or explicitly exposing
   protocol information can be expected to provide more consistent
   decisions by on-path devices than the use of diverse methods to infer
   semantics from other flow properties); in other cases this is not
   beneficial (e.g., a mechanism implemented in a network device, such
   as a firewall, that required a header field to have only a specific
   known set of values could prevent the device from forwarding packets
   using a different version of a protocol that introduces a new feature
   that changes the value present in this field, preventing evolution of
   the protocol).  Experience developing Transport Layer Security
   [RFC8446], required a design that recognised that deployed
   middleboxes relied on the exposed information in TLS 1.2

   Examples of the impact of ossification on transport protocol design
   and ease of deployment can be seen in the case of Multipath TCP
   (MPTCP) and the TCP Fast Open option.  The design of MPTCP had to be
   revised to account for middleboxes, so called "TCP Normalizers", that
   monitor the evolution of the window advertised in the TCP headers and
   that reset connections if the window does not grow as expected.
   Similarly, TCP Fast Open has had issues with middleboxes that remove
   unknown TCP options, that drop segments with unknown TCP options,
   that drop segments that contain data and have the SYN bit set, that

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   drop packets with SYN/ACK that acknowledge data, or that disrupt
   connections that send data before the three-way handshake completes.
   In both cases, the issue was caused by middleboxes that had a hard-
   coded understanding of transport behaviour, and that interacted
   poorly with transports that tried to change that behaviour.  Other
   examples have included middleboxes that rewrite TCP sequence and
   acknowledgement numbers but are unaware of the (newer) SACK option
   and don't correctly rewrite selective acknowledgements to match the
   changes made to the fixed TCP header.

   A protocol design that uses header encryption can provide
   confidentiality of some or all of the protocol header information.
   Encryption with secure key distribution prevents an on-path device
   from observing the header field.  It therefore prevents mechanisms
   being built that directly rely on the information or seek to infer
   semantics of an exposed header field.  Using encryption to provide
   confidentiality of the transport layer brings some well-known privacy
   and security benefits and can therefore help reduce ossification of
   the transport layer.  In particular, it is important that protocols
   either do not expose information where the usage could change in
   future protocols, or that methods that utilise the information are
   robust to potential changes as protocols evolve over time.  To avoid
   unwanted inspection, a protocol could also intentionally vary the
   format and/or value of header fields (sometimes known as Greasing
   [I-D.thomson-quic-grease]).  However, while encryption hides the
   protocol header information, it does not prevent ossification of the
   network service.  People seeking understanding of network traffic
   could come to rely on pattern inferences and other heuristics as the
   basis for network decision and to derive measurement data, creating
   new dependencies on the transport protocol.

   Specification of non-encrypted transport header fields explicitly
   allows protocol designers to make specific header information
   observable in the network.  This supports other uses of this
   information by on-path devices, and at the same time this can be
   expected to lead to ossification of the transport header, because
   network forwarding could evolve to depend on the presence and/or
   value of these fields.  The decision about which transport headers
   fields are made observable offers trade-offs around authentication
   and confidentiality versus observability, network operations and
   management, and ossification.  For example, a design that provides
   confidentiality of protocol header information can impact the
   following activities that rely on measurement and analysis of traffic

   Network Operations and Research:  Observable transport headers enable
      both operators and the research community to explicitly measure

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      and analyse protocol performance, network anomalies, and failure

      This information can help inform capacity planning, and assist in
      determining the need for equipment and/or configuration changes by
      network operators.

      The data can also inform Internet engineering research, and help
      in the development of new protocols, methodologies, and
      procedures.  Concealing the transport protocol header information
      makes the stream performance unavailable to passive observers
      along the path, and likely leads to the development of alternative
      methods to collect or infer that data (for example heuristics
      based on analysis of traffic patterns).

      Providing confidentiality of the transport payload, but leaving
      some, or all, of the transport headers unencrypted, possibly with
      authentication, can provide many of the privacy and security
      benefits while supporting operations and research, but at the cost
      of ossifying the transport headers.

   Protection from Denial of Service:  Observable transport headers
      currently provide useful input to classify traffic and detect
      anomalous events (e.g., changes in application behaviour,
      distributed denial of service attacks).  To be effective, this
      protection needs to be able to uniquely disambiguate unwanted
      traffic.  An inability to separate this traffic using packet
      header information could result in less-efficient identification
      of unwanted traffic or development of different methods (e.g.
      rate-limiting of uncharacterised traffic).

   Network Troubleshooting and Diagnostics:   Encrypting transport
      header information eliminates the incentive for operators to
      troubleshoot since they cannot interpret the data.  A flow
      experiencing packet loss or jitter looks like an unaffected flow
      when only observing network layer headers (if transport sequence
      numbers and flow identifiers are obscured).  This limits
      understanding of the impact of packet loss or latency on the
      flows, or even localizing the network segment causing the packet
      loss or latency.  Encrypted traffic could imply "don't touch" to
      some, and could limit a trouble-shooting response to "can't help,
      no trouble found".  Additional mechanisms will need to be
      introduced to help reconstruct or replace transport-level metrics
      to support troubleshooting and diagnostics, but these add
      complexity and operational costs (e.g., in deploying additional
      functions in equipment or adding traffic overhead).

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   Network Traffic Analysis:  Hiding transport protocol header
      information can make it harder to determine which transport
      protocols and features are being used across a network segment and
      to measure trends in the pattern of usage.  This could impact the
      ability for an operator to anticipate the need for network
      upgrades and roll-out.  It can also impact the on-going traffic
      engineering activities performed by operators (such as determining
      which parts of the path contribute delay, jitter or loss).  While
      the impact could, in many cases, be small there are scenarios
      where operators directly support particular services (e.g., to
      troubleshoot issues relating to Quality of Service, QoS; the
      ability to perform fast re-routing of critical traffic, or support
      to mitigate the characteristics of specific radio links).  The
      more complex the underlying infrastructure the more important this

   Open and Verifiable Network Data:   Hiding transport protocol header
      information can reduce the range of actors that can capture useful
      measurement data.  This limits the information sources available
      to the Internet community to understand the operation of new
      transport protocols, so preventing access to the information
      necessary to inform design decisions and standardisation of the
      new protocols and related operational practices.

      The cooperating dependence of network, application, and host to
      provide communication performance on the Internet is uncertain
      when only endpoints (i.e., at user devices and within service
      platforms) can observe performance, and when performance cannot be
      independently verified by all parties.  The ability of other
      stakeholders to review transport header traces can help develop
      deeper insight into performance.  In the heterogeneous Internet,
      this helps extend the range of topologies, vendor equipment, and
      traffic patterns that are evaluated.

      Independently captured data is important to help ensure the health
      of the research and development communities.  It can provide input
      and test scenarios to support development of new transport
      protocol mechanisms, especially when this analysis can be based on
      the behaviour experienced in a diversity of deployed networks.

      Independently verifiable performance metrics might also be
      utilised to demonstrate regulatory compliance in some
      jurisdictions, and to provide a basis for informing design

   The last point leads us to consider the impact of hiding transport
   headers in the specification and development of protocols and
   standards.  This has potential impact on:

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   o  Understanding Feature Interactions: An appropriate vantage point,
      coupled with timing information about traffic flows, provides a
      valuable tool for benchmarking equipment, functions, and/or
      configurations, and to understand complex feature interactions.
      An inability to observe transport protocol information can limit
      the ability to diagnose and explore interactions between features
      at different protocol layers, a side-effect of not allowing a
      choice of vantage point from which this information is observed.

   o  Supporting Common Specifications: Transmission Control Protocol
      (TCP) is currently the predominant transport protocol used over
      Internet paths.  Its many variants have broadly consistent
      approaches to avoiding congestion collapse, and to ensuring the
      stability of the Internet.  Increased use of transport layer
      encryption can overcome ossification, allowing deployment of new
      transports and different types of congestion control.  This
      flexibility can be beneficial, but it can come at the cost of
      fragmenting the ecosystem.  There is little doubt that developers
      will try to produce high quality transports for their intended
      target uses, but it is not clear there are sufficient incentives
      to ensure good practice that benefits the wide diversity of
      requirements for the Internet community as a whole.  Increased
      diversity, and the ability to innovate without public scrutiny,
      risks point solutions that optimise for specific needs, but
      accidentally disrupt operations of/in different parts of the
      network.  The social contract that maintains the stability of the
      Internet relies on accepting common specifications.

   o  Operational Practice: The network operations community relies on
      being able to understand the pattern and requirements of traffic
      passing over the Internet, both in aggregate and at the flow
      level.  These operational practices have developed based on the
      information available from unencrypted transport headers.  If this
      information is only carried in encrypted transport headers,
      operators will not be able to use this information directly.  If
      operators still wish to use these practices, they may turn to more
      ambitious ways of discovering this information.  For example, if
      an operator wants to know that traffic is audio traffic, and no
      longer has access to Session Description Protocol (SDP) session
      descriptions that would explicitly say a flow "is audio", the
      operator might use heuristics to guess that short UDP packets with
      regular spacing are carrying audio traffic.  Operational practices
      aimed at guessing transport parameters are out of scope for this
      document, and are only mentioned here to recognize that encryption
      may not prevent operators from attempting to apply the same
      practices they used with unencrypted transport headers.

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   o  Compliance: Published transport specifications allow operators and
      regulators to check compliance.  This can bring assurance to those
      operating networks, often avoiding the need to deploy complex
      techniques that routinely monitor and manage TCP/IP traffic flows
      (e.g., avoiding the capital and operational costs of deploying
      flow rate-limiting and network circuit-breaker methods [RFC8084]).
      When it is not possible to observe transport header information,
      methods are still needed to confirm that the traffic produced
      conforms to the expectations of the operator or developer.

   o  Restricting research and development: Hiding transport information
      can impede independent research into new mechanisms, measurement
      of behaviour, and development initiatives.  Experience shows that
      transport protocols are complicated to design and complex to
      deploy, and that individual mechanisms need to be evaluated while
      considering other mechanisms, across a broad range of network
      topologies and with attention to the impact on traffic sharing the
      capacity.  If this results in reduced availability of open data,
      it could eliminate the independent self-checks to the
      standardisation process that have previously been in place from
      research and academic contributors (e.g., the role of the IRTF
      Internet Congestion Control Research Groups (ICCRG) and research
      publications in reviewing new transport mechanisms and assessing
      the impact of their experimental deployment)

   In summary, there are trade-offs.  On the one hand, transport
   protocol designers have often ignored the implications of whether the
   information in transport header fields can or will be used by in-
   network devices, and the implications this places on protocol
   evolution.  This motivates a design that provides confidentiality of
   the header information.  On the other hand, it can be expected that a
   lack of visibility of transport header information can impact the
   ways that protocols are deployed, standardised, and their operational

   To achieve stable Internet operations the IETF transport community
   has to date relied heavily on measurement and insights of the network
   operations community to understand the trade-offs, and to inform
   selection of appropriate mechanisms, to ensure a safe, reliable, and
   robust Internet (e.g., [RFC1273],[RFC2914]).

   The choice of whether future transport protocols encrypt their
   protocol headers therefore needs to be taken based not solely on
   security and privacy considerations, but also taking into account the
   impact on operations, standards, and research.  As [RFC7258] notes:
   "Making networks unmanageable to mitigate [pervasive monitoring] is
   not an acceptable outcome, but ignoring [pervasive monitoring] would
   go against the consensus documented here.  An appropriate balance

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   will emerge over time as real instances of this tension are
   considered."  This balance between information exposed and
   information concealed ought to be carefully considered when
   specifying new transport protocols.

3.  Current uses of Transport Headers within the Network

   Despite transport headers having end-to-end meaning, some of these
   transport headers have come to be used in various ways within the
   Internet.  In response to pervasive monitoring [RFC7624] revelations
   and the IETF consensus that "Pervasive Monitoring is an Attack"
   [RFC7258], efforts are underway to increase encryption of Internet
   traffic,.  Applying confidentiality to transport header fields would
   affect how protocol information is used [RFC8404].  To understand
   these implications, it is first necessary to understand how transport
   layer headers are currently observed and/or modified by middleboxes
   within the network.

   Transport protocols can be designed to encrypt or authenticate
   transport header fields.  Authentication at the transport layer can
   be used to detect any changes to an immutable header field that were
   made by a network device along a path.  The intentional modification
   of transport headers by middleboxes (such as Network Address
   Translation, NAT, or Firewalls) is not considered.  Common issues
   concerning IP address sharing are described in [RFC6269].

3.1.  Observing Transport Information in the Network

   If in-network observation of transport protocol headers is needed,
   this requires knowledge of the format of the transport header:

   o  Flows need to be identified at the level required to perform the

   o  The protocol and version of the header need to be visible, e.g.,
      by defining the wire image [I-D.trammell-wire-image].  As
      protocols evolve over time and there could be a need to introduce
      new transport headers.  This could require interpretation of
      protocol version information or connection setup information;

   o  The location and syntax of any observed transport headers needs to
      be known.  IETF transport protocols can specify this information.

   The following subsections describe various ways that observable
   transport information has been utilised.

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3.1.1.  Flow Identification

   Transport protocol header information (together with information in
   the network header), has been used to identify a flow and the
   connection state of the flow, together with the protocol options
   being used.  In some usages, a low-numbered (well-known) transport
   port number has been used to identify a protocol (although port
   information alone is not sufficient to guarantee identification of a
   protocol, since applications can use arbitrary ports, multiple
   sessions can be multiplexed on a single port, and ports can be re-
   used by subsequent sessions).

   Transport protocols, such as TCP and the Stream Control Transport
   Protocol (SCTP) specify a standard base header that includes sequence
   number information and other data, with the possibility to negotiate
   additional headers at connection setup, identified by an option
   number in the transport header.  UDP-based protocols can use, but
   sometimes do not use, well-known port numbers.  Some flows can
   instead be identified by observing signalling protocol data (e.g.,
   [RFC3261], [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview]) or through the use of magic
   numbers placed in the first byte(s) of the datagram payload

   Flow identification is a common function.  For example, performed by
   measurement activities, QoS classification, firewalls, Denial of
   Service, DOS, prevention.  It becomes more complex and less easily
   achieved when multiplexing is used at or above the transport layer.

3.1.2.  Metrics derived from Transport Layer Headers

   Some actors manage their portion of the Internet by characterizing
   the performance of link/network segments.  Passive monitoring can
   observe traffic that does not encrypt the transport header
   information to make inferences from transport headers to derive these
   performance metrics.  A variety of open source and commercial tools
   have been deployed that utilise this information.  The following
   metrics can be derived from transport header information:

   Traffic Rate and Volume:  Header information (e.g., sequence number
      and packet size) allows derivation of volume measures per-
      application, to characterise the traffic that uses a network
      segment or the pattern of network usage.  This can be measured per
      endpoint or for an aggregate of endpoints (e.g., by an operator to
      assess subscriber usage).  It can also be used to trigger
      measurement-based traffic shaping and to implement QoS support
      within the network and lower layers.  Volume measures can be
      valuable for capacity planning and providing detail of trends,
      rather than the volume per subscriber.

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   Loss Rate and Loss Pattern:  Flow loss rate can be derived (e.g.,
      from transport sequence numbers) and has been used as a metric for
      performance assessment and to characterise transport behaviour.
      Understanding the location and root cause of loss can help an
      operator determine whether this requires corrective action.
      Network operators have used the variation in patterns of loss as a
      key performance metric, utilising this to detect changes in the
      offered service.

      There are various causes of loss, including corruption of link
      frames (e.g., interference on a radio link), buffer overflow
      (e.g., due to congestion), policing (traffic management), buffer
      management (e.g., Active Queue Management, AQM [RFC7567]), and
      inadequate provision of traffic pre-emption.  Understanding flow
      loss rate requires either maintaining per flow packet counters or
      by observing sequence numbers in transport headers.  Loss can be
      monitored at the interface level by devices in the network.  It is
      often valuable to understand the conditions under which packet
      loss occurs.  This usually requires relating loss to the traffic
      flowing on the network node/segment at the time of loss.

      Observation of transport feedback information (e.g., RTP Control
      Protocol (RTCP) reception reports [RFC3550], TCP SACK blocks) can
      increase understanding of the impact of loss and help identify
      cases where loss could have been wrongly identified, or the
      transport did not require the lost packet.  It is sometimes more
      helpful to understand the pattern of loss, than the loss rate,
      because losses can often occur as bursts, rather than randomly-
      timed events.

   Throughput and Goodput:  The throughput achieved by a flow can be
      determined even when a flow is encrypted, providing the individual
      flow can be identified.  Goodput [RFC7928] is a measure of useful
      data exchanged (the ratio of useful/total volume of traffic sent
      by a flow).  This requires ability to differentiate loss and
      retransmission of packets (e.g., by observing packet sequence
      numbers in the TCP or the Real-time Transport Protocol, RTP,
      headers [RFC3550]).

   Latency:  Latency is a key performance metric that impacts
      application response time and user-perceived response time.  It
      often indirectly impacts throughput and flow completion time.
      Latency determines the reaction time of the transport protocol
      itself, impacting flow setup, congestion control, loss recovery,
      and other transport mechanisms.  The observed latency can have
      many components [Latency].  Of these, unnecessary/unwanted queuing
      in network buffers has often been observed as a significant factor

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      [bufferbloat].  Once the cause of unwanted latency has been
      identified, this can often be eliminated.

      To measure latency across a part of a path, an observation point
      can measure the experienced round trip time (RTT) using packet
      sequence numbers, and acknowledgements, or by observing header
      timestamp information.  Such information allows an observation
      point in the network to determine not only the path RTT, but also
      to measure the upstream and downstream contribution to the RTT.
      This could be used to locate a source of latency, e.g., by
      observing cases where the median RTT is much greater than the
      minimum RTT for a part of a path.

      The service offered by network operators can benefit from latency
      information to understand the impact of deployment and tune
      deployed services.  Latency metrics are key to evaluating and
      deploying AQM [RFC7567], DiffServ [RFC2474], and Explicit
      Congestion Notification (ECN) [RFC3168] [RFC8087].  Measurements
      could identify excessively large buffers, indicating where to
      deploy or configure AQM.  An AQM method is often deployed in
      combination with other techniques, such as scheduling [RFC7567]
      [RFC8290] and although parameter-less methods are desired
      [RFC7567], current methods [RFC8290] [RFC8289] [RFC8033] often
      cannot scale across all possible deployment scenarios.

   Variation in delay:  Some network applications are sensitive to small
      changes in packet timing (jitter).  Short and long-term delay
      variation can impact on the latency of a flow and the hence the
      perceived quality of applications using the network (e.g., jitter
      metrics are often cited when characterising paths supporting real-
      time traffic).  To assess the performance of such applications, it
      can be necessary to measure the variation in delay observed along
      a portion of the path [RFC3393] [RFC5481].  The requirements
      resemble those for the measurement of latency.

   Flow Reordering:  Significant packet reordering within a flow can
      impact time-critical applications and can be interpreted as loss
      by reliable transports.  Many transport protocol techniques are
      impacted by reordering (e.g., triggering TCP retransmission, or
      re-buffering of real-time applications).  Packet reordering can
      occur for many reasons, from equipment design to misconfiguration
      of forwarding rules.  Since this impacts transport performance,
      network tools are needed to detect and measure unwanted/excessive

      There have been initiatives in the IETF transport area to reduce
      the impact of reordering within a transport flow, possibly leading
      to a reduction in the requirements for preserving ordering.  These

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      have promise to simplify network equipment design as well as the
      potential to improve robustness of the transport service.
      Measurements of reordering can help understand the present level
      of reordering within deployed infrastructure, and inform decisions
      about how to progress such mechanisms.  Key performance indicators
      are retransmission rate, packet drop rate, sector utilisation
      level, a measure of reordering, peak rate, the ECN congestion
      experienced (CE) marking rate, etc.

      Metrics have been defined that evaluate whether a network has
      maintained packet order on a packet-by-packet basis [RFC4737] and

      Techniques for measuring reordering typically observe packet
      sequence numbers.  Some protocols provide in-built monitoring and
      reporting functions.  Transport fields in the RTP header [RFC3550]
      [RFC4585] can be observed to derive traffic volume measurements
      and provide information on the progress and quality of a session
      using RTP.  As with other measurement, metadata is often needed to
      understand the context under which the data was collected,
      including the time, observation point, and way in which metrics
      were accumulated.  The RTCP protocol directly reports some of this
      information in a form that can be directly visible in the network.
      A user of summary measurement data needs to trust the source of
      this data and the method used to generate the summary information.

   The above passively monitor transport protocol headers to derive
   metrics about network layer performance useful for operation and
   management of a network.

3.1.3.  Transport use of Network Layer Header Fields

   Information from the transport protocol can be used by a multi-field
   classifier as a part of policy framework.  Policies are commonly used
   for management of the QoS or Quality of Experience (QoE) in resource-
   constrained networks and by firewalls that use the information to
   implement access rules (see also section 2.2.2 of [RFC8404]).
   Network-layer classification methods that rely on a multi-field
   classifier (e.g.  Inferring QoS from the 5-tuple or choice of
   application protocol) are incompatible with transport protocols that
   encrypt the transport information.  Traffic that cannot be
   classified, will typically receive a default treatment.

   Transport information can also be explicitly set in network-layer
   header fields that are not encrypted.  This can provide information
   to enable a different forwarding treatment by the network, even when
   a transport employs encryption to protect other header information.

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   On the one hand, the user of a transport that multiplexes multiple
   sub-flows could wish to hide the presence and characteristics of
   these sub-flows.  On the other hand, an encrypted transport could set
   the network-layer information to indicate the presence of sub-flows
   and to reflect the network needs of individual sub-flows.  There are
   several ways this could be done:

   IP Address:  Applications expose the addresses used by endpoints, and
      this is used in the forwarding decisions in network devices.
      Address and other protocol information can be used by a Multi-
      Field (MF) classifier to determine how traffic is treated
      [RFC2475], and hence the quality of experience for a flow.

   Using the IPv6 Network-Layer Flow Label:  A number of Standards Track
      and Best Current Practice RFCs (e.g., [RFC8085], [RFC6437],
      [RFC6438]) encourage endpoints to set the IPv6 Flow label field of
      the network-layer header.  IPv6 "source nodes SHOULD assign each
      unrelated transport connection and application data stream to a
      new flow" [RFC6437].  A multiplexing transport could choose to use
      multiple Flow labels to allow the network to independently forward
      subflows.  RFC6437 provides further guidance on choosing a flow
      label value, stating these "should be chosen such that their bits
      exhibit a high degree of variability", and chosen so that "third
      parties should be unlikely to be able to guess the next value that
      a source of flow labels will choose".  To promote privacy, the
      Flow Label assignment needs to avoid introducing linkability that
      a network device may observe.  Once set, a label can provide
      information that can help inform network-layer queuing and
      forwarding [RFC6438](e.g. for Equal Cost Multi-Path, ECMP,
      routing, and Link Aggregation, LAG) [RFC6294].  [RFC6438] includes
      describes considerations when used with IPsec.

   Using the Network-Layer Differentiated Services Code Point:
      Applications can expose their delivery expectations to the network
      by setting the Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) field of
      IPv4 and IPv6 packets [RFC2474].  For example, WebRTC applications
      identify different forwarding treatments for individual sub-flows
      (audio vs. video) based on the value of the DSCP field
      [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rtcweb-qos]).  This provides explicit information
      to inform network-layer queuing and forwarding, rather than an
      operator inferring traffic requirements from transport and
      application headers via a multi-field classifier.

      Since the DSCP value can impact the quality of experience for a
      flow, observations of service performance need to consider this
      field when a network path has support for differentiated service

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   Using Explicit Congestion Marking:  ECN [RFC3168] is a transport
      mechanism that utilises the ECN field in the network-layer header.
      Use of ECN explicitly informs the network-layer that a transport
      is ECN-capable, and requests ECN treatment of the flows packets.
      An ECN-capable transport can offer benefits when used over a path
      with equipment that implements an AQM method with Congestion
      Experienced (CE) marking of IP packets [RFC8087], since it can
      react to congestion without also having to recover from lost

      ECN exposes the presence of congestion.  The reception of CE-
      marked packets can be used to estimate the level of incipient
      congestion on the upstream portion of the path from the point of
      observation (Section 2.5 of [RFC8087]).  Interpreting the marking
      behaviour (i.e., assessing congestion and diagnosing faults)
      requires context from the transport layer (such as path RTT).

      AQM and ECN offer a range of algorithms and configuration options.
      Tools therefore need to be available to network operators and
      researchers to understand the implication of configuration choices
      and transport behaviour as use of ECN increases and new methods
      emerge [RFC7567].

   Careful use of the network layer features can therefore help address
   some of the reasons why the network inspects transport protocol

3.2.  Transport Measurement

   The common language between network operators and application/content
   providers/users is packet transfer performance at a layer that all
   can view and analyse.  For most packets, this has been the transport
   layer, until the emergence of QUIC, with the obvious exception of
   Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and IPsec.

   When encryption conceals more layers in each packet, people seeking
   understanding of the network operation rely more on pattern
   inferences and other heuristics reliance on pattern inferences and
   accuracy suffers.  For example, the traffic patterns between server
   and browser are dependent on browser supplier and version, even when
   the sessions use the same server application (e.g., web e-mail
   access).  It remains to be seen whether more complex inferences can
   be mastered to produce the same monitoring accuracy (see section
   2.1.1 of [RFC8404]).

   When measurement datasets are made available by servers or client
   endpoints, additional metadata, such as the state of the network, is
   often required to interpret this data.  Collecting and coordinating

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   such metadata is more difficult when the observation point is at a
   different location to the bottleneck/device under evaluation.

   Packet sampling techniques can be used to scale the processing
   involved in observing packets on high rate links.  This exports only
   the packet header information of (randomly) selected packets.  The
   utility of these measurements depends on the type of bearer and
   number of mechanisms used by network devices.  Simple routers are
   relatively easy to manage, a device with more complexity demands
   understanding of the choice of many system parameters.  This level of
   complexity exists when several network methods are combined.

   This section discusses topics concerning observation of transport
   flows, with a focus on transport measurement.

3.2.1.  Point of Observation

   On-path measurements are particularly useful for locating the source
   of problems, or to assess the performance of a network segment or a
   particular device configuration.  Often issues can only be understood
   in the context of the other flows that share a particular path,
   common network device, interface port, etc.  A simple example is
   monitoring of a network device that uses a scheduler or active queue
   management technique [RFC7567], where it could be desirable to
   understand whether the algorithms are correctly controlling latency,
   or if overload protection is working.  This understanding implies
   knowledge of how traffic is assigned to any sub-queues used for flow
   scheduling, but can also require information about how the traffic
   dynamics impact active queue management, starvation prevention
   mechanisms, and circuit-breakers.

   Sometimes multiple on-path observation points are needed.  By
   correlating observations of headers at multiple points along the path
   (e.g., at the ingress and egress of a network segment), an observer
   can determine the contribution of a portion of the path to an
   observed metric, to locate a source of delay, jitter, loss,
   reordering, congestion marking, etc.

3.2.2.  Use by Operators to Plan and Provision Networks

   Traffic measurements (e.g., traffic volume, loss, latency) is used by
   operators to help plan deployment of new equipment and configurations
   in their networks.  Data is also valuable to equipment vendors who
   want to understand traffic trends and patterns of usage as inputs to
   decisions about planning products and provisioning for new
   deployments.  This measurement information can also be correlated
   with billing information when this is also collected by an operator.

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   A network operator supporting traffic that uses transport header
   encryption might not have access to per-flow measurement data.
   Trends in aggregate traffic can be observed and can be related to the
   endpoint addresses being used, but it may be impossible to correlate
   patterns in measurements with changes in transport protocols (e.g.,
   the impact of changes in introducing a new transport protocol
   mechanism).  This increases the dependency on other indirect sources
   of information to inform planning and provisioning.

3.2.3.  Service Performance Measurement

   Traffic measurements (e.g., traffic volume, loss, latency) can be
   used by various actors to help analyse the performance offered to the
   users of a network segment, and to inform operational practice.

   While active measurements may be used within a network, passive
   measurements can have advantages in terms of eliminating unproductive
   test traffic, reducing the influence of test traffic on the overall
   traffic mix, and the ability to choose the point of observation (see
   Section 3.2.1).  However, passive measurements can rely on observing
   transport headers which is not possible if those headers are

3.2.4.  Measuring Transport to Support Network Operations

   Information provided by tools observing transport headers can help
   determine whether mechanisms are needed in the network to prevent
   flows from acquiring excessive network capacity.  Operators can
   implement operational practices to manage traffic flows (e.g., to
   prevent flows from acquiring excessive network capacity under severe
   congestion) by deploying rate-limiters, traffic shaping or network
   transport circuit breakers [RFC8084].

   Congestion Control Compliance of Traffic:  Congestion control is a
      key transport function [RFC2914].  Many network operators
      implicitly accept that TCP traffic complies with a behaviour that
      is acceptable for use in the shared Internet.  TCP algorithms have
      been continuously improved over decades, and they have reached a
      level of efficiency and correctness that custom application-layer
      mechanisms will struggle to easily duplicate [RFC8085].

      A standards-compliant TCP stack provides congestion control that
      may therefore be judged safe for use across the Internet.
      Applications developed on top of well-designed transports can be
      expected to appropriately control their network usage, reacting
      when the network experiences congestion, by back-off and reduce
      the load placed on the network.  This is the normal expected
      behaviour for IETF-specified transport (e.g., TCP and SCTP).

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      However, when anomalies are detected, tools can interpret the
      transport protocol header information to help understand the
      impact of specific transport protocols (or protocol mechanisms) on
      the other traffic that shares a network.  An observation in the
      network can gain understanding of the dynamics of a flow and its
      congestion control behaviour.  Analysing observed flows can help
      to build confidence that an application flow backs-off its share
      of the network load in the face of persistent congestion, and
      hence to understand whether the behaviour is appropriate for
      sharing limited network capacity.  For example, it is common to
      visualise plots of TCP sequence numbers versus time for a flow to
      understand how a flow shares available capacity, deduce its
      dynamics in response to congestion, etc.  The ability to identify
      sources that contribute excessive congestion is important to safe
      operation of network infrastructure, and mechanisms can inform
      configuration of network devices to complement the endpoint
      congestion avoidance mechanisms [RFC7567] [RFC8084] to avoid a
      portion of the network being driven into congestion collapse

   Congestion Control Compliance for UDP traffic:  UDP provides a
      minimal message-passing datagram transport that has no inherent
      congestion control mechanisms.  Because congestion control is
      critical to the stable operation of the Internet, applications and
      other protocols that choose to use UDP as a transport are required
      to employ mechanisms to prevent congestion collapse, avoid
      unacceptable contributions to jitter/latency, and to establish an
      acceptable share of capacity with concurrent traffic [RFC8085].

      A network operator needs tools to understand if datagram flows
      comply with congestion control expectations and therefore whether
      there is a need to deploy methods such as rate-limiters, transport
      circuit breakers or other methods to enforce acceptable usage for
      the offered service.

      UDP flows that expose a well-known header by specifying the format
      of header fields can allow information to be observed to gain
      understanding of the dynamics of a flow and its congestion control
      behaviour.  For example, tools exist to monitor various aspects of
      the RTP and RTCP header information of real-time flows (see
      Section 3.1.2, and the Secure RTP extensions [RFC3711] were
      explicitly designed to expose header information to enable such

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3.3.  Use for Network Diagnostics and Troubleshooting

   Transport header information can be useful for a variety of
   operational tasks [RFC8404]: to diagnose network problems, assess
   network provider performance, evaluate equipment/protocol
   performance, capacity planning, management of security threats
   (including denial of service), and responding to user performance
   questions.  Sections 3.1.2 and 5 of [RFC8404] provide further
   examples.  These tasks seldom involve the need to determine the
   contents of the transport payload, or other application details.

   A network operator supporting traffic that uses transport header
   encryption can see only encrypted transport headers.  This prevents
   deployment of performance measurement tools that rely on transport
   protocol information.  Choosing to encrypt all the information
   reduces the ability of an operator to observe transport performance,
   and could limit the ability of network operators to trace problems,
   make appropriate QoS decisions, or response to other queries about
   the network service.  For some this will be blessing, for others it
   may be a curse.  For example, operational performance data about
   encrypted flows needs to be determined by traffic pattern analysis,
   rather than relying on traditional tools.  This can impact the
   ability of the operator to respond to faults, it could require
   reliance on endpoint diagnostic tools or user involvement in
   diagnosing and troubleshooting unusual use cases or non-trivial
   problems.  A key need here is for tools to provide useful information
   during network anomalies (e.g., significant reordering, high or
   intermittent loss).

   Measurements can be used to monitor the health of a portion of the
   Internet, to provide early warning of the need to take action.  They
   can assist in debugging and diagnosing the root causes of faults that
   concern a particular user's traffic.  They can also be used to
   support post-mortem investigation after an anomaly to determine the
   root cause of a problem.

   In some case, measurements may involve active injection of test
   traffic to perform a measurement.  However, most operators do not
   have access to user equipment, therefore the point of test is
   normally different from the transport endpoint.  Injection of test
   traffic can incur an additional costs in running such tests (e.g.,
   the implications of capacity tests in a mobile network are obvious).
   Some active measurements (e.g., response under load or particular
   workloads) perturb other traffic, and could require dedicated access
   to the network segment.  An alternative approach is to use in-network
   techniques that observe transport packet headers added while traffic
   traverses an operational networks to make the measurements.  These
   measurements do not require the cooperation of an endpoint.

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   In other cases, measurement involves dissecting network traffic
   flows.  The observed transport layer information can help identify
   whether the link/network tuning is effective and alert to potential
   problems that can be hard to derive from link or device measurements
   alone.  The design trade-offs for radio networks are often very
   different to those of wired networks.  A radio-based network (e.g.,
   cellular mobile, enterprise WiFi, satellite access/back-haul, point-
   to-point radio) has the complexity of a subsystem that performs radio
   resource management,s with direct impact on the available capacity,
   and potentially loss/reordering of packets.  The impact of the
   pattern of loss and congestion, differs for different traffic types,
   correlation with propagation and interference can all have
   significant impact on the cost and performance of a provided service.
   The need for this type of information is expected to increase as
   operators bring together heterogeneous types of network equipment and
   seek to deploy opportunistic methods to access radio spectrum.

3.4.  Header Compression

   Header compression saves link bandwidth by compressing network and
   transport protocol headers on a per-hop basis.  It was widely used
   with low bandwidth dial-up access links, and still finds application
   on wireless links that are subject to capacity constraints.  Header
   compression has been specified for use with TCP/IP and RTP/UDP/IP
   flows [RFC2507], [RFC2508], [RFC4995].

   While it is possible to compress only the network layer headers,
   significant bandwidth savings can be made if both the network and
   transport layer headers are compressed together as a single unit.
   The Secure RTP extensions [RFC3711] were explicitly designed to leave
   the transport protocol headers unencrypted, but authenticated, since
   support for header compression was considered important.  Encrypting
   the transport protocol headers does not break such header
   compression, but does cause it to fall back to compressing only the
   network layer headers, with a significant reduction in efficiency.
   This may have operational impact.

4.  Encryption and Authentication of Transport Headers

   End-to-end encryption can be applied at various protocol layers.  It
   can be applied above the transport to encrypt the transport payload.
   Encryption methods can hide information from an eavesdropper in the
   network.  Encryption can also help protect the privacy of a user, by
   hiding data relating to user/device identity or location.  Neither an
   integrity check nor encryption methods prevent traffic analysis, and
   usage needs to reflect that profiling of users, identification of
   location and fingerprinting of behaviour can take place even on
   encrypted traffic flows.  Any header information that has a clear

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   definition in the protocol's message format(s), or is implied by that
   definition, and is not cryptographically confidentiality-protected
   can be unambiguously interpreted by on-path observers

   There are several motivations:

   o  One motive to use encryption is a response to perceptions that the
      network has become ossified by over-reliance on middleboxes that
      prevent new protocols and mechanisms from being deployed.  This
      has lead to a perception that there is too much "manipulation" of
      protocol headers within the network, and that designing to deploy
      in such networks is preventing transport evolution.  In the light
      of this, a method that authenticates transport headers may help
      improve the pace of transport development, by eliminating the need
      to always consider deployed middleboxes
      [I-D.trammell-plus-abstract-mech], or potentially to only
      explicitly enable middlebox use for particular paths with
      particular middleboxes that are deliberately deployed to realise a
      useful function for the network and/or users[RFC3135].

   o  Another motivation stems from increased concerns about privacy and
      surveillance.  Some Internet users have valued the ability to
      protect identity, user location, and defend against traffic
      analysis, and have used methods such as IPsec Encapsulated
      Security Payload (ESP), Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and other
      encrypted tunnel technologies.  Revelations about the use of
      pervasive surveillance [RFC7624] have, to some extent, eroded
      trust in the service offered by network operators, and following
      the Snowden revelation in the USA in 2013 has led to an increased
      desire for people to employ encryption to avoid unwanted
      "eavesdropping" on their communications.  Concerns have also been
      voiced about the addition of information to packets by third
      parties to provide analytics, customization, advertising, cross-
      site tracking of users, to bill the customer, or to selectively
      allow or block content.  Whatever the reasons, there are now
      activities in the IETF to design new protocols that could include
      some form of transport header encryption (e.g., QUIC

   Authentication methods (that provide integrity checks of protocols
   fields) have also been specified at the network layer, and this also
   protects transport header fields.  The network layer itself carries
   protocol header fields that are increasingly used to help forwarding
   decisions reflect the need of transport protocols, such as the IPv6
   Flow Label [RFC6437], DSCP, and ECN fields.

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   The use of transport layer authentication and encryption exposes a
   tussle between middlebox vendors, operators, applications developers
   and users.

   o  On the one hand, future Internet protocols that enable large-scale
      encryption assist in the restoration of the end-to-end nature of
      the Internet by returning complex processing to the endpoints,
      since middleboxes cannot modify what they cannot see.

   o  On the other hand, encryption of transport layer header
      information has implications for people who are responsible for
      operating networks and researchers and analysts seeking to
      understand the dynamics of protocols and traffic patterns.

   Whatever the motives, a decision to use pervasive transport header
   encryption will have implications on the way in which design and
   evaluation is performed, and which can in turn impact the direction
   of evolution of the transport protocol stack.  While the IETF can
   specify protocols, the success in actual deployment is often
   determined by many factors [RFC5218] that are not always clear at the
   time when protocols are being defined.

   The following briefly reviews some security design options for
   transport protocols.  A Survey of Transport Security Protocols
   [I-D.ietf-taps-transport-security] provides more details concerning
   commonly used encryption methods at the transport layer.

   Authenticating the Transport Protocol Header:  Transport layer header
      information can be authenticated.  An integrity check that
      protects the immutable transport header fields, but can still
      expose the transport protocol header information in the clear,
      allowing in-network devices to observe these fields.  An integrity
      check can not prevent in-network modification, but can prevent a
      receiving from accepting changes and avoid impact on the transport
      protocol operation.

      An example transport authentication mechanism is TCP-
      Authentication (TCP-AO) [RFC5925].  This TCP option authenticates
      the IP pseudo header, TCP header, and TCP data.  TCP-AO protects
      the transport layer, preventing attacks from disabling the TCP
      connection itself and provides replay protection.  TCP-AO may
      interact with middleboxes, depending on their behaviour [RFC3234].

      The IPsec Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302] was designed to
      work at the network layer and authenticate the IP payload.  This
      approach authenticates all transport headers, and verifies their
      integrity at the receiver, preventing in-network modification.

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      Secure RTP [RFC3711] is another example of a transport protocol
      that allows header authentication.

   Greasing:  Transport layer header information that is observable can
      be observed in the network.  Protocols often provide extensibility
      features, reserving fields or values for use by future versions of
      a specification.  The specification of receivers has traditionally
      ignored unspecified values, however in-network devices have
      emerged that ossify to require a certain value in a field, or re-
      use a field for another purpose.  When the specification is later
      updated, it is impossible to deploy the new use of the field, and
      forwarding of the protocol could even become conditional on a
      specific header field value.

      A protocol can intentionally vary the value, format, and/or
      presence of observable transport header fields.  This behaviour,
      known as GREASE (Generate Random Extensions And Sustain
      Extensibility), is designed to avoid a network device ossifying
      the use of a specific observable field.  Greasing seeks to ease
      deployment of new methods.  It can be designed to prevent in-
      network devices utilising the information in a transport header,
      or can make an observation robust to a set of changing values,
      rather than a specific set of values.

   Encrypting the Transport Payload:  The transport layer payload can be
      encrypted to protect the content of transport segments.  This
      leaves transport protocol header information in the clear.  The
      integrity of immutable transport header fields could be protected
      by combining this with an integrity check.

      Examples of encrypting the payload include Transport Layer
      Security (TLS) over TCP [RFC8446] [RFC7525], Datagram TLS (DTLS)
      over UDP [RFC6347] [RFC7525], Secure RTP [RFC3711], and TCPcrypt
      [I-D.ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt] which permits opportunistic encryption
      of the TCP transport payload.

   Encrypting the Transport Headers and Payload:  The network layer
      payload could be encrypted (including the entire transport header
      and the payload).  This method provides confidentiality of the
      entire transport packet.  It therefore does not expose any
      transport information to devices in the network, which also
      prevents modification along a network path.

      One example of encryption at the network layer is use of IPsec
      Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [RFC4303] in tunnel mode.
      This encrypts and authenticates all transport headers, preventing
      visibility of the transport headers by in-network devices.  Some
      Virtual Private Network (VPN) methods also encrypt these headers.

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   Selectively Encrypting Transport Headers and Payload:  A transport
      protocol design can encrypt selected header fields, while also
      choosing to authenticate the entire transport header.  This allows
      specific transport header fields to be made observable by network
      devices.  End-to end integrity checks can prevent an endpoint from
      undetected modification of the immutable transport headers.

      Mutable fields in the transport header provide opportunities for
      middleboxes to modify the transport behaviour (e.g., the extended
      headers described in [I-D.trammell-plus-abstract-mech]).  This
      considers only immutable fields in the transport headers, that is,
      fields that can be authenticated End-to-End across a path.

      An example of a method that encrypts some, but not all, transport
      information is GRE-in-UDP [RFC8086] when used with GRE encryption.

   Optional Encryption of Header Information:  There are implications to
      the use of optional header encryption in the design of a transport
      protocol, where support of optional mechanisms can increase the
      complexity of the protocol and its implementation and in the
      management decisions that are required to use variable format
      fields.  Instead, fields of a specific type ought to always be
      sent with the same level of confidentiality or integrity

   As seen, different transports use encryption to protect their header
   information to varying degrees.  There is, however, a trend towards
   increased protection with newer transport protocols.

5.  Addition of Transport Information to Network-Layer Protocol Headers

   Some measurements can be made by adding additional protocol headers
   carrying operations, administration and management (OAM) information
   to packets at the ingress to a maintenance domain (e.g., an Ethernet
   protocol header with timestamps and sequence number information using
   a method such as 802.11ag or in-situ OAM [I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data])
   and removing the additional header at the egress of the maintenance
   domain.  This approach enables some types of measurements, but does
   not cover the entire range of measurements described in this
   document.  In some cases, it can be difficult to position measurement
   tools at the required segments/nodes and there can be challenges in
   correlating the downsream/upstream information when in-band OAM data
   is inserted by an on-path device.  This has the advantage that a
   single header can support all transport protocols, but there could
   also be less desirable implications of separating the operation of
   the transport protocol from the measurement framework.

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   Another example of a network-layer approach is the IPv6 Performance
   and Diagnostic Metrics (PDM) Destination Option [RFC8250].  This
   allows a sender to optionally include a destination option that
   caries header fields that can be used to observe timestamps and
   packet sequence numbers.  This information could be authenticated by
   receiving transport endpoints when the information is added at the
   sender and visible at the receiving endpoint, although methods to do
   this have not currently been proposed.  This method needs to be
   explicitly enabled at the sender.

   Current measurements suggest it can be undesirable to rely on methods
   requiring the presence of network options or extension headers.  IPv4
   network options are often not supported (or are carried on a slower
   processing path) and some IPv6 networks are also known to drop
   packets that set an IPv6 header extension (e.g., [RFC7872]).  Another
   disadvantage is that protocols that separately expose header
   information do not necessarily have an advantage to expose the
   information that is utilised by the protocol itself, and could
   manipulate this header information to gain an advantage from the

6.  Implications of Protecting the Transport Headers

   The choice of which fields to expose and which to encrypt is a design
   choice for the transport protocol.  Any selective encryption method
   requires trading two conflicting goals for a transport protocol
   designer to decide which header fields to encrypt.  Security work
   typically employs a design technique that seeks to expose only what
   is needed.  This approach provides incentives to not reveal any
   information that is not necessary for the end-to-end communication.
   However, there can be performance and operational benefits in
   exposing selected information to network tools.

   This section explores key implications of working with encrypted
   transport protocols.

6.1.  Independent Measurement

   Independent observation by multiple actors is important for
   scientific analysis.  Encrypting transport header encryption changes
   the ability for other actors to collect and independently analyse
   data.  Internet transport protocols employ a set of mechanisms.  Some
   of these need to work in cooperation with the network layer - loss
   detection and recovery, congestion detection and congestion control,
   some of these need to work only end-to-end (e.g., parameter
   negotiation, flow-control).

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   The majority of present Internet applications use two well-known
   transport protocols, TCP and UDP.  Although TCP represents the
   majority of current traffic, some real-time applications use UDP, and
   much of this traffic utilises RTP format headers in the payload of
   the UDP datagram.  Since these protocol headers have been fixed for
   decades, a range of tools and analysis methods have became common and

   Protocols that expose the state information used by the transport
   protocol in their header information (e.g., timestamps used to
   calculate the RTT, packet numbers used to asses congestion and
   requests for retransmission) provide an incentive for the sending
   endpoint to provide correct information, increasing confidence that
   the observer understands the transport interaction with the network.
   For example, when TCP is used over an unencrypted network path (i.e.,
   one that does not use IPsec or other encryption below the transport),
   it implicitly exposes header information that can be used for
   measurement at any point along the path.  This information is
   necessary for the protocol's correct operation, therefore there is no
   incentive for a TCP implementation to put incorrect information in
   this transport header.  A network device can have confidence that the
   well-known (and ossified) transport information represents the actual
   state of the endpoints.

   When encryption is used to conceal some or all of the transport
   headers, the transport protocol choose what information to reveal to
   the network about its internal state, what information to leave
   encrypted, and what fields to grease to protect against future
   ossification.  Such a transport could be designed, for example, to
   provide summary data regarding its performance, congestion control
   state, etc., or to make an explicit measurement signal available.
   For example, a QUIC endpoint could set the spin bit to reflect to
   explicitly reveal a session's RTT [I-D.ietf-quic-spin-exp]).

   When providing or using such information, it becomes important to
   consider the privacy of the user and their incentive for providing
   accurate and detailed information.  Protocols that selectively reveal
   some transport state or measurement signals are choosing to establish
   a trust relationship with the network operators.  There is no
   protocol mechanism that can guarantee that the information provided
   represents the actual transport state of the endpoints, since those
   endpoints can always send additional information in the encrypted
   part of the header, to update to replace whatever they reveal.  This
   reduces the ability to independently measure and verify that a
   protocol is behaving as expected.  Some operational uses need the
   information to contain sufficient detail to understand, and possibly
   reconstruct, the network traffic pattern for further testing; such

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   operators must gain the trust of transport protocol implementers if
   they are to correctly reveal such information.

   For some usage a standardised endpoint-based logging format (e.g.,
   based onQuic-Trace [Quic-Trace]) could offer an alternative to in-
   network measurement.  Such information will have a diversity of uses
   - examples include developers wishing to debug/understand the
   transport/applictaion protocols with which they work, to researchers
   seeking to spot trends, anomalies and to characterise variants of
   protocols.  This use will need to establish the validity and
   provenance of the logging information (e.g., to establish how and
   when traces were captured).

   However, endpoint logs do not provide equivalent information to in-
   network measurements.  In particular, endpoint logs contain only a
   part of the information needed to understand the operation of network
   devices and identify issues such as link performance or capacity
   sharing between multiple flows.  Additional information is needed to
   determine which equipment/links are used and the configuration of
   equipment along the network paths being measured.

6.2.  Characterising "Unknown" Network Traffic

   The patterns and types of traffic that share Internet capacity change
   over time as networked applications, usage patterns and protocols
   continue to evolve.

   If "unknown" or "uncharacterised" traffic patterns form a small part
   of the traffic aggregate passing through a network device or segment
   of the network the path, the dynamics of the uncharacterised traffic
   may not have a significant collateral impact on the performance of
   other traffic that shares this network segment.  Once the proportion
   of this traffic increases, the need to monitor the traffic and
   determine if appropriate safety measures need to be put in place.

   Tracking the impact of new mechanisms and protocols requires traffic
   volume to be measured and new transport behaviours to be identified.
   This is especially true of protocols operating over a UDP substrate.
   The level and style of encryption needs to be considered in
   determining how this activity is performed.  On a shorter timescale,
   information may also need to be collected to manage denial of service
   attacks against the infrastructure.

6.3.  Accountability and Internet Transport Protocols

   Information provided by tools observing transport headers can be used
   to classify traffic, and to limit the network capacity used by
   certain flows, as discussed in Section 3.2.4).  Equally, operators

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   could use analysis of transport headers and transport flow state to
   demonstrate that they are not providing differential treatment to
   certain flows.  Obfuscating or hiding this information using
   encryption may lead operators and maintainers of middleboxes
   (firewalls, etc.) to seek other methods to classify, and potentially
   other mechanisms to condition, network traffic.

   A lack of data that reduces the level of precision with which flows
   can be classified also reduces the design space for conditioning
   mechanisms (e.g., rate limiting, circuit breaker techniques
   [RFC8084], or blocking of uncharacterised traffic), and this needs to
   be considered when evaluating the impact of designs for transport
   encryption [RFC5218].

6.4.  Impact on Operational Cost

   Many network operators currently utilise observed transport
   information as a part of their operational practice, and have
   developed tools and operational practices based around currently
   deployed transports and their applications.  Encryption of the
   transport information prevents tools from directly observing this
   information.  A variety of open source and commercial tools have been
   deployed that utilise this information for a variety of short and
   long term measurements.

   The network will not break just because transport headers are
   encrypted, although alternative diagnostic and troubleshooting tools
   would need to be developed and deployed.  Introducing a new protocol
   or application can require these tool chains and practice to be
   updated, and may in turn impact operational mechanisms, and policies.
   Each change can introduce associated costs, including the cost of
   collecting data, and the tooling needed to handle multiple formats
   (possibly as these co-exist in the network, when measurements need to
   span time periods during which changes are deployed, or to compare
   with historical data).  These costs are incurred by an operator to
   manage the service and debug network issues.

   At the time of writing, the additional operational cost of using
   encrypted transports is not yet well understood.  Design trade-offs
   could mitigate these costs by explicitly choosing to expose selected
   information (e.g., header invariants and the spin-bit in
   QUIC[I-D.ietf-quic-transport]), the specification of common log
   formats and development of alternative approaches.

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6.5.  Impact on Research, Development and Deployment

   Measurement has a critical role in the design of transport protocol
   mechanisms and their acceptance by the wider community (e.g., as a
   method to judge the safety for Internet deployment) and is
   increasingly being used to inform design decisions in networking
   research, during development of new mechanisms and protocols and in
   standardisation.  Observation of pathologies are also important in
   understanding the interactions between cooperating protocols and
   network mechanism, the implications of sharing capacity with other
   traffic and the impact of different patterns of usage.

   Evolution and the ability to understand (measure) the impact need to
   proceed hand-in-hand.  Attention needs to be paid to the expected
   scale of deployment of new protocols and protocol mechanisms.
   Whatever the mechanism, experience has shown that it is often
   difficult to correctly implement combination of mechanisms [RFC8085].
   These mechanisms therefore typically evolve as a protocol matures, or
   in response to changes in network conditions, changes in network
   traffic or changes to application usage.

   New transport protocol formats are expected to facilitate an
   increased pace of transport evolution, and with it the possibility to
   experiment with and deploy a wide range of protocol mechanisms.
   There has been recent interest in a wide range of new transport
   methods, e.g., Larger Initial Window, Proportional Rate Reduction
   (PRR), congestion control methods based on measuring bottleneck
   bandwidth and round-trip propagation time, the introduction of AQM
   techniques and new forms of ECN response (e.g., Data Centre TCP,
   DCTP, and methods proposed for L4S).The growth and diversity of
   applications and protocols using the Internet also continues to
   expand.  For each new method or application it is desirable to build
   a body of data reflecting its behaviour under a wide range of
   deployment scenarios, traffic load, and interactions with other
   deployed/candidate methods.

   Open standards motivate a desire for this evaluation to include
   independent observation and evaluation of performance data, which in
   turn suggests control over where and when measurement samples are
   collected.  This requires consideration of the appropriate balance
   between encrypting all and no transport information.

7.  Conclusions

   Confidentiality and strong integrity checks have properties that are
   being incorporated into new protocols and that have important
   benefits.  The pace of development of transports using the WebRTC
   data channel and the rapid deployment of QUIC transport protocol can

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   both be attributed to using the combination of UDP as a substrate
   while providing confidentiality and authentication of the
   encapsulated transport headers and payload.

   The traffic that can be observed by on-path network devices is a
   function of transport protocol design/options, network use,
   applications, and user characteristics.  In general, when only a
   small proportion of the traffic has a specific (different)
   characteristic, such traffic seldom leads to operational concern,
   although the ability to measure and monitor it is less.  The desire
   to understand the traffic and protocol interactions typically grows
   as the proportion of traffic increases in volume.  The challenges
   increase when multiple instances of an evolving protocol contribute
   to the traffic that share network capacity.

   An increased pace of evolution therefore needs to be accompanied by
   methods that can be successfully deployed and used across operational
   networks.  This leads to a need for network operators (at various
   level (ISPs, enterprises, firewall maintainer, etc) to identify
   appropriate operational support functions and procedures.

   Protocols that change their transport header format (wire format) or
   their behaviour (e.g., algorithms that are needed to classify and
   characterise the protocol), will require new tooling to be developed
   to catch-up with the changes.  If the currently deployed tools and
   methods are no longer relevant then it may no longer be possible to
   correctly measure performance.  This can increase the response-time
   after faults, and can impact the ability to manage the network
   resulting in traffic causing traffic to be treated inappropriately
   (e.g., rate limiting because of being incorrectly classified/

   There are benefits in exposing consistent information to the network
   that avoids traffic being mis-classified and then receiving a default
   treatment by the network.  The flow label and DSCP fields provide
   examples of how transport information can be made available for
   network-layer decisions.  Extension headers could also be used to
   carry transport information that can inform network-layer decisions.

   As a part of its design a new protocol specification therefore needs
   to weigh the benefits of ossifying common headers, versus the
   potential demerits of exposing specific information that could be
   observed along the network path, to provide tools to manage new
   variants of protocols.  This can be done for the entire transport
   header, or by dividing header fields between those that are
   observable and mutable; those that are observable, but immutable; and
   those that are hidden/obfusticated.

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   Several scenarios to illustrate different ways this could evolve are
   provided below:

   o  One scenario is when transport protocols provide consistent
      information to the network by intentionally exposing a part of the
      transport header.  The design fixes the format of this information
      between versions of the protocol.  This ossification of the
      transport header allows an operator to establish tooling and
      procedures that enable it to provide consistent traffic management
      as the protocol evolves.  In contrast to TCP (where all protocol
      information is exposed), evolution of the transport is facilitated
      by providing cryptographic integrity checks of the transport
      header fields (preventing undetected middlebox changes) and
      encryption of other protocol information (preventing observation
      within the network, or providing incentives for the use of the
      exposed information, rather than inferring information from other
      characteristics of the flow traffic).  The exposed transport
      information can be used by operators to provide troubleshooting,
      measurement and any necessary functions appropriate to the class
      of traffic (priority, retransmission, reordering, circuit
      breakers, etc).

   o  An alternative scenario adopts different design goals, with a
      different outcome.  A protocol that encrypts all header
      information forces network operators to act independently from
      apps/transport developments to extract the information they need
      to manage their network.  A range of approaches could proliferate,
      as in current networks.  Some operators can add a shim header to
      each packet as a flow as it crosses the network; other operators/
      managers could develop heuristics and pattern recognition to
      derive information that classifies flows and estimates quality
      metrics for the service being used; some could decide to rate-
      limit or block traffic until new tooling is in place.  In many
      cases, the derived information can be used by operators to provide
      necessary functions appropriate to the class of traffic (priority,
      retransmission, reordering, circuit breakers, etc).
      Troubleshooting, and measurement becomes more difficult, and more
      diverse.  This could require additional information beyond that
      visible in the packet header and when this information is used to
      inform decisions by on-path devices it can lead to dependency on
      other characteristics of the flow.  In some cases, operators might
      need access to keying information to interpret encrypted data that
      they observe.  Some use cases could demand use of transports that
      do not use encryption.

   The direction in which this evolves could have significant
   implications on the way the Internet architecture develops.  It
   exposes a risk that significant actors (e.g., developers and

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   transport designers) achieve more control of the way in which the
   Internet architecture develops.In particular, there is a possibility
   that designs could evolve to significantly benefit of customers for a
   specific vendor, and that communities with very different network,
   applications or platforms could then suffer at the expense of
   benefits to their vendors own customer base.  In such a scenario,
   there could be no incentive to support other applications/products or
   to work in other networks leading to reduced access for new

8.  Security Considerations

   This document is about design and deployment considerations for
   transport protocols.  Issues relating to security are discussed in
   the various sections of the document.

   Authentication, confidentiality protection, and integrity protection
   are identified as Transport Features by [RFC8095].  As currently
   deployed in the Internet, these features are generally provided by a
   protocol or layer on top of the transport protocol

   Confidentiality and strong integrity checks have properties that can
   also be incorporated into the design of a transport protocol.
   Integrity checks can protect an endpoint from undetected modification
   of protocol fields by network devices, whereas encryption and
   obfuscation or greasing can further prevent these headers being
   utilised by network devices.  Hiding headers can therefore provide
   the opportunity for greater freedom to update the protocols and can
   ease experimentation with new techniques and their final deployment
   in endpoints.  A protocol specification needs to weigh the benefits
   of ossifying common headers, versus the potential demerits of
   exposing specific information that could be observed along the
   network path to provide tools to manage new variants of protocols.

   A protocol design that uses header encryption can provide
   confidentiality of some or all of the protocol header information.
   This prevents an on-path device from knowledge of the header field.
   It therefore prevents mechanisms being built that directly rely on
   the information or seeks to infer semantics of an exposed header
   field.  Hiding headers can limit the ability to measure and
   characterise traffic.

   Exposed transport headers are sometimes utilised as a part of the
   information to detect anomalies in network traffic.  This can be used
   as the first line of defence yo identify potential threats from DOS
   or malware and redirect suspect traffic to dedicated nodes
   responsible for DOS analysis, malware detection, or to perform packet

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   "scrubbing" (the normalization of packets so that there are no
   ambiguities in interpretation by the ultimate destination of the
   packet).  These techniques are currently used by some operators to
   also defend from distributed DOS attacks.

   Exposed transport header fields are sometimes also utilised as a part
   of the information used by the receiver of a transport protocol to
   protect the transport layer from data injection by an attacker.  In
   evaluating this use of exposed header information, it is important to
   consider whether it introduces a significant DOS threat.  For
   example, an attacker could construct a DOS attack by sending packets
   with a sequence number that falls within the currently accepted range
   of sequence numbers at the receiving endpoint, this would then
   introduce additional work at the receiving endpoint, even though the
   data in the attacking packet may not finally be delivered by the
   transport layer.  This is sometimes known as a "shadowing attack".
   An attack can, for example, disrupt receiver processing, trigger loss
   and retransmission, or make a receiving endpoint perform unproductive
   decryption of packets that cannot be successfully decrypted (forcing
   a receiver to commit decryption resources, or to update and then
   restore protocol state).

   One mitigation to off-path attack is to deny knowledge of what header
   information is accepted by a receiver or obfuscate the accepted
   header information, e.g., setting a non-predictable initial value for
   a sequence number during a protocol handshake, as in [RFC3550] and
   [RFC6056], or a port value that can not be predicted (see section 5.1
   of [RFC8085]).  A receiver could also require additional information
   to be used as a part of check before accepting packets at the
   transport layer (e.g., utilising a part of the sequence number space
   that is encrypted; or by verifying an encrypted token not visible to
   an attacker).  This would also mitigate on-path attacks.  An
   additional processing cost can be incurred when decryption needs to
   be attempted before a receiver is able to discard injected packets.

   Open standards motivate a desire for this evaluation to include
   independent observation and evaluation of performance data, which in
   turn suggests control over where and when measurement samples are
   collected.  This requires consideration of the appropriate balance
   between encrypting all and no transport information.  Open data, and
   accessibility to tools that can help understand trends in application
   deployment, network traffic and usage patterns can all contribute to
   understanding security challenges.

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9.  IANA Considerations


   This memo includes no request to IANA.

10.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Mohamed Boucadair, Spencer Dawkins,
   Tom Herbert, Jana Iyengar, Mirja Kuehlewind, Kyle Rose, Kathleen
   Moriarty, Al Morton, Chris Seal, Joe Touch, Brian Trammell, Chris
   Wood, and other members of the TSVWG for their comments and feedback.

   This work has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020
   research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 688421.The
   opinions expressed and arguments employed reflect only the authors'
   view.  The European Commission is not responsible for any use that
   may be made of that information.

   This work has received funding from the UK Engineering and Physical
   Sciences Research Council under grant EP/R04144X/1.

11.  Informative References

              Gettys, J. and K. Nichols, "Bufferbloat: dark buffers in
              the Internet. Communications of the ACM, 55(1):57-65",
              January 2012.

              Brockners, F., Bhandari, S., Pignataro, C., Gredler, H.,
              Leddy, J., Youell, S., Mizrahi, T., Mozes, D., Lapukhov,
              P., Chang, R., daniel.bernier@bell.ca, d., and J. Lemon,
              "Data Fields for In-situ OAM", draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-
              data-03 (work in progress), June 2018.

              Trammell, B. and M. Kuehlewind, "The QUIC Latency Spin
              Bit", draft-ietf-quic-spin-exp-01 (work in progress),
              October 2018.

              Iyengar, J. and M. Thomson, "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed
              and Secure Transport", draft-ietf-quic-transport-14 (work
              in progress), August 2018.

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              Alvestrand, H., "Overview: Real Time Protocols for
              Browser-based Applications", draft-ietf-rtcweb-overview-19
              (work in progress), November 2017.

              Pauly, T., Perkins, C., Rose, K., and C. Wood, "A Survey
              of Transport Security Protocols", draft-ietf-taps-
              transport-security-02 (work in progress), June 2018.

              Bittau, A., Giffin, D., Handley, M., Mazieres, D., Slack,
              Q., and E. Smith, "Cryptographic protection of TCP Streams
              (tcpcrypt)", draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt-12 (work in
              progress), June 2018.

              Jones, P., Dhesikan, S., Jennings, C., and D. Druta, "DSCP
              Packet Markings for WebRTC QoS", draft-ietf-tsvwg-rtcweb-
              qos-18 (work in progress), August 2016.

              Thomson, M., "More Apparent Randomization for QUIC",
              draft-thomson-quic-grease-00 (work in progress), December

              Trammell, B., "Abstract Mechanisms for a Cooperative Path
              Layer under Endpoint Control", draft-trammell-plus-
              abstract-mech-00 (work in progress), September 2016.

              Trammell, B. and M. Kuehlewind, "The Wire Image of a
              Network Protocol", draft-trammell-wire-image-04 (work in
              progress), April 2018.

   [Latency]  Briscoe, B., "Reducing Internet Latency: A Survey of
              Techniques and Their Merits, IEEE Comm. Surveys &
              Tutorials. 26;18(3) p2149-2196", November 2014.

   [Measure]  Fairhurst, G., Kuehlewind, M., and D. Lopez, "Measurement-
              based Protocol Design, Eur. Conf. on Networks and
              Communications, Oulu, Finland.", June 2017.

              "https:QUIC trace utilities //github.com/google/quic-

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   [RFC1273]  Schwartz, M., "Measurement Study of Changes in Service-
              Level Reachability in the Global TCP/IP Internet: Goals,
              Experimental Design, Implementation, and Policy
              Considerations", RFC 1273, DOI 10.17487/RFC1273, November
              1991, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1273>.

   [RFC2474]  Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F., and D. Black,
              "Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS
              Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers", RFC 2474,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2474, December 1998,

   [RFC2475]  Blake, S., Black, D., Carlson, M., Davies, E., Wang, Z.,
              and W. Weiss, "An Architecture for Differentiated
              Services", RFC 2475, DOI 10.17487/RFC2475, December 1998,

   [RFC2507]  Degermark, M., Nordgren, B., and S. Pink, "IP Header
              Compression", RFC 2507, DOI 10.17487/RFC2507, February
              1999, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2507>.

   [RFC2508]  Casner, S. and V. Jacobson, "Compressing IP/UDP/RTP
              Headers for Low-Speed Serial Links", RFC 2508,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2508, February 1999,

   [RFC2914]  Floyd, S., "Congestion Control Principles", BCP 41,
              RFC 2914, DOI 10.17487/RFC2914, September 2000,

   [RFC3135]  Border, J., Kojo, M., Griner, J., Montenegro, G., and Z.
              Shelby, "Performance Enhancing Proxies Intended to
              Mitigate Link-Related Degradations", RFC 3135,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3135, June 2001,

   [RFC3168]  Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition
              of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP",
              RFC 3168, DOI 10.17487/RFC3168, September 2001,

   [RFC3234]  Carpenter, B. and S. Brim, "Middleboxes: Taxonomy and
              Issues", RFC 3234, DOI 10.17487/RFC3234, February 2002,

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   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,

   [RFC3393]  Demichelis, C. and P. Chimento, "IP Packet Delay Variation
              Metric for IP Performance Metrics (IPPM)", RFC 3393,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3393, November 2002,

   [RFC3550]  Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
              Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
              Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, DOI 10.17487/RFC3550,
              July 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3550>.

   [RFC3711]  Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
              Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
              RFC 3711, DOI 10.17487/RFC3711, March 2004,

   [RFC4302]  Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4302, December 2005,

   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,

   [RFC4585]  Ott, J., Wenger, S., Sato, N., Burmeister, C., and J. Rey,
              "Extended RTP Profile for Real-time Transport Control
              Protocol (RTCP)-Based Feedback (RTP/AVPF)", RFC 4585,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4585, July 2006,

   [RFC4737]  Morton, A., Ciavattone, L., Ramachandran, G., Shalunov,
              S., and J. Perser, "Packet Reordering Metrics", RFC 4737,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4737, November 2006,

   [RFC4995]  Jonsson, L-E., Pelletier, G., and K. Sandlund, "The RObust
              Header Compression (ROHC) Framework", RFC 4995,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4995, July 2007,

   [RFC5218]  Thaler, D. and B. Aboba, "What Makes for a Successful
              Protocol?", RFC 5218, DOI 10.17487/RFC5218, July 2008,

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   [RFC5236]  Jayasumana, A., Piratla, N., Banka, T., Bare, A., and R.
              Whitner, "Improved Packet Reordering Metrics", RFC 5236,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5236, June 2008,

   [RFC5481]  Morton, A. and B. Claise, "Packet Delay Variation
              Applicability Statement", RFC 5481, DOI 10.17487/RFC5481,
              March 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5481>.

   [RFC5925]  Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
              Authentication Option", RFC 5925, DOI 10.17487/RFC5925,
              June 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5925>.

   [RFC6056]  Larsen, M. and F. Gont, "Recommendations for Transport-
              Protocol Port Randomization", BCP 156, RFC 6056,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6056, January 2011,

   [RFC6269]  Ford, M., Ed., Boucadair, M., Durand, A., Levis, P., and
              P. Roberts, "Issues with IP Address Sharing", RFC 6269,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6269, June 2011,

   [RFC6294]  Hu, Q. and B. Carpenter, "Survey of Proposed Use Cases for
              the IPv6 Flow Label", RFC 6294, DOI 10.17487/RFC6294, June
              2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6294>.

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
              January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.

   [RFC6437]  Amante, S., Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and J. Rajahalme,
              "IPv6 Flow Label Specification", RFC 6437,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6437, November 2011,

   [RFC6438]  Carpenter, B. and S. Amante, "Using the IPv6 Flow Label
              for Equal Cost Multipath Routing and Link Aggregation in
              Tunnels", RFC 6438, DOI 10.17487/RFC6438, November 2011,

   [RFC7258]  Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
              Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.

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   [RFC7525]  Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
              "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
              (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.

   [RFC7567]  Baker, F., Ed. and G. Fairhurst, Ed., "IETF
              Recommendations Regarding Active Queue Management",
              BCP 197, RFC 7567, DOI 10.17487/RFC7567, July 2015,

   [RFC7624]  Barnes, R., Schneier, B., Jennings, C., Hardie, T.,
              Trammell, B., Huitema, C., and D. Borkmann,
              "Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance: A
              Threat Model and Problem Statement", RFC 7624,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7624, August 2015,

   [RFC7872]  Gont, F., Linkova, J., Chown, T., and W. Liu,
              "Observations on the Dropping of Packets with IPv6
              Extension Headers in the Real World", RFC 7872,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7872, June 2016,

   [RFC7928]  Kuhn, N., Ed., Natarajan, P., Ed., Khademi, N., Ed., and
              D. Ros, "Characterization Guidelines for Active Queue
              Management (AQM)", RFC 7928, DOI 10.17487/RFC7928, July
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7928>.

   [RFC7983]  Petit-Huguenin, M. and G. Salgueiro, "Multiplexing Scheme
              Updates for Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)
              Extension for Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)",
              RFC 7983, DOI 10.17487/RFC7983, September 2016,

   [RFC8033]  Pan, R., Natarajan, P., Baker, F., and G. White,
              "Proportional Integral Controller Enhanced (PIE): A
              Lightweight Control Scheme to Address the Bufferbloat
              Problem", RFC 8033, DOI 10.17487/RFC8033, February 2017,

   [RFC8084]  Fairhurst, G., "Network Transport Circuit Breakers",
              BCP 208, RFC 8084, DOI 10.17487/RFC8084, March 2017,

   [RFC8085]  Eggert, L., Fairhurst, G., and G. Shepherd, "UDP Usage
              Guidelines", BCP 145, RFC 8085, DOI 10.17487/RFC8085,
              March 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8085>.

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   [RFC8086]  Yong, L., Ed., Crabbe, E., Xu, X., and T. Herbert, "GRE-
              in-UDP Encapsulation", RFC 8086, DOI 10.17487/RFC8086,
              March 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8086>.

   [RFC8087]  Fairhurst, G. and M. Welzl, "The Benefits of Using
              Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN)", RFC 8087,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8087, March 2017,

   [RFC8095]  Fairhurst, G., Ed., Trammell, B., Ed., and M. Kuehlewind,
              Ed., "Services Provided by IETF Transport Protocols and
              Congestion Control Mechanisms", RFC 8095,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8095, March 2017,

   [RFC8250]  Elkins, N., Hamilton, R., and M. Ackermann, "IPv6
              Performance and Diagnostic Metrics (PDM) Destination
              Option", RFC 8250, DOI 10.17487/RFC8250, September 2017,

   [RFC8289]  Nichols, K., Jacobson, V., McGregor, A., Ed., and J.
              Iyengar, Ed., "Controlled Delay Active Queue Management",
              RFC 8289, DOI 10.17487/RFC8289, January 2018,

   [RFC8290]  Hoeiland-Joergensen, T., McKenney, P., Taht, D., Gettys,
              J., and E. Dumazet, "The Flow Queue CoDel Packet Scheduler
              and Active Queue Management Algorithm", RFC 8290,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8290, January 2018,

   [RFC8404]  Moriarty, K., Ed. and A. Morton, Ed., "Effects of
              Pervasive Encryption on Operators", RFC 8404,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8404, July 2018,

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,

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Appendix A.  Revision information

   -00 This is an individual draft for the IETF community.

   -01 This draft was a result of walking away from the text for a few
   days and then reorganising the content.

   -02 This draft fixes textual errors.

   -03 This draft follows feedback from people reading this draft.

   -04 This adds an additional contributor and includes significant
   reworking to ready this for review by the wider IETF community Colin
   Perkins joined the author list.

   Comments from the community are welcome on the text and

   -05 Corrections received and helpful inputs from Mohamed Boucadair.

   -06 Updated following comments from Stephen Farrell, and feedback via
   email.  Added a draft conclusion section to sketch some strawman
   scenarios that could emerge.

   -07 Updated following comments from Al Morton, Chris Seal, and other
   feedback via email.

   -08 Updated to address comments sent to the TSVWG mailing list by
   Kathleen Moriarty (on 08/05/2018 and 17/05/2018), Joe Touch on
   11/05/2018, and Spencer Dawkins.

   -09 Updated security considerations.

   -10 Updated references, split the Introduction, and added a paragraph
   giving some examples of why ossification has been an issue.

   -01 This resolved some reference issues.  Updated section on
   observation by devices on the path.

   -02 Comments received from Kyle Rose, Spencer Dawkins and Tom
   Herbert.  The network-layer information has also been re-organised
   after comments at IETF-103.

   -03 Added a section on header compression and rewriting of sections
   referring to RTP transport.  This version contains author editorial
   work and removed duplicate section.

   -04 Revised following SecDir Review

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   o  Added some text on TLS story (additional input sought on relevant

   o  Section 2, paragraph 8 - changed to be clearer, in particular,
      added "Encryption with secure key distribution prevents"

   o  Flow label description rewritten based on PDS/BCP RFCs.

   o  Clarify requirements from RFCs concerning the IPv6 flow label and
      highlight ways it can be used with encryption. (section 3.1.3)

   o  Add text on the explicit spin-bit work in the QUIC DT.  Added
      greasing of spin-bit.  (Section 6.1)

   o  Updated section 6 and added more explanation of impact on

   o  Other comments addressed.

Authors' Addresses

   Godred Fairhurst
   University of Aberdeen
   Department of Engineering
   Fraser Noble Building
   Aberdeen  AB24 3UE

   EMail: gorry@erg.abdn.ac.uk
   URI:   http://www.erg.abdn.ac.uk/

   Colin Perkins
   University of Glasgow
   School of Computing Science
   Glasgow  G12 8QQ

   EMail: csp@csperkins.org
   URI:   https://csperkins.org//

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