uta                                                           Y. Sheffer
Internet-Draft                                                  Porticor
Intended status: Informational                                   R. Holz
Expires: April 26, 2015                                              TUM
                                                          P. Saint-Andre
                                                        October 23, 2014

               Summarizing Known Attacks on TLS and DTLS


   Over the last few years there have been several serious attacks on
   Transport Layer Security (TLS), including attacks on its most
   commonly used ciphers and modes of operation.  This document
   summarizes these attacks, with the goal of motivating generic and
   protocol-specific recommendations on the usage of TLS and Datagram
   TLS (DTLS).

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 26, 2015.

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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Attacks on TLS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.1.  SSL Stripping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.2.  STARTTLS Command Injection Attack (CVE-2011-0411) . . . . .   3
   2.3.  BEAST (CVE-2011-3389) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.4.  Padding Oracle Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.5.  Attacks on RC4  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.6.  Compression Attacks: CRIME, TIME and BREACH . . . . . . . .   5
   2.7.  Certificate and RSA-Related Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.8.  Theft of RSA Private Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.9.  Diffie-Hellman Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.10. Renegotiation (CVE-2009-3555) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.11. Triple Handshake (CVE-2014-1295)  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.12. Virtual Host Confusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   2.13. Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   2.14. Implementation Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   2.15. Usability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Applicability to DTLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix A.  Appendix: Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   A.1.  draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   A.2.  draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   A.3.  draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   A.4.  draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   A.5.  draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   A.6.  draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   Over the last few years there have been several major attacks on
   Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246], including attacks on its
   most commonly used ciphers and modes of operation.  Details are given
   in Section 2, but a quick summary is that both AES-CBC and RC4, which
   together make up for most current usage, have been seriously attacked
   in the context of TLS.

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   This situation was one of the motivations for the creation of the UTA
   working group, which was tasked with the creation of generic and
   protocol-specific recommendations for the use of TLS along with
   Datagram TLS (DTLS) [RFC6347] (unless otherwise noted under
   Section 3, all of the information provided in this document applies
   to DTLS).

   "Attacks always get better; they never get worse" (ironically, this
   saying is attributed to the U.S.  National Security Agency, the NSA).
   This attacks summarized in this document reflect our knowledge as of
   this writing.  It seems likely that new attacks will be discovered in
   the future.

   For a more detailed discussion of the attacks listed here, the
   interested reader is referred to [Attacks-iSec].

2.  Attacks on TLS

   This section lists the attacks that motivated the current
   recommendations in [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp].  This list is not intended
   to be an extensive survey of the security of TLS.

   While there are widely deployed mitigations for some of the attacks
   listed below, we believe that their root causes necessitate a more
   systematic solution, which we have attempted to develop in

   When an identifier exists for an attack, we have included its CVE
   (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) ID.  CVE [CVE] is an
   extensive, industry-wide database of software vulnerabilities.

2.1.  SSL Stripping

   Various attacks attempt to remove the use of SSL/TLS altogether, by
   modifying unencrypted protocols that request the use of TLS,
   specifically modifying HTTP traffic and HTML pages as they pass on
   the wire.  These attacks are known collectively as SSL Stripping (a
   form of the more generic "downgrade attack") and were first
   introduced by Moxie Marlinspike [SSL-Stripping].  In the context of
   Web traffic, these attacks are only effective if the client initially
   accesses a Web server using HTTP.  A commonly used mitigation is HTTP
   Strict Transport Security (HSTS) [RFC6797].

2.2.  STARTTLS Command Injection Attack (CVE-2011-0411)

   Similarly, there are attacks on the transition between unprotected
   and TLS-protected traffic.  A number of IETF application protocols
   have used an application-level command, usually STARTTLS, to upgrade

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   a clear-text connection to use TLS.  Multiple implementations of
   STARTTLS had a flaw where an application-layer input buffer retained
   commands that were pipelined with the STARTTLS command, such that
   commands received prior to TLS negotiation are executed after TLS
   negotiation.  This problem is resolved by requiring the application-
   level command input buffer to be empty before negotiating TLS.  Note
   that this flaw lives in the application layer code and does not
   impact the TLS protocol directly.

   STARTLS and similar mechanisms are vulnerable to downgrade attacks
   whereby the attacker simply removes the STARTTLS indication from the
   (unprotected) request.  This cannot be mitigated unless HSTS-like
   solutions are added.

2.3.  BEAST (CVE-2011-3389)

   The BEAST attack [BEAST] uses issues with the TLS 1.0 implementation
   of CBC (that is, the predictable initialization vector) to decrypt
   parts of a packet, and specifically to decrypt HTTP cookies when HTTP
   is run over TLS.

2.4.  Padding Oracle Attacks

   A consequence of the MAC-then-encrypt design in all current versions
   of TLS is the existence of padding oracle attacks [Padding-Oracle].
   A recent incarnation of these attacks is the Lucky Thirteen attack
   (CVE-2013-0169) [CBC-Attack], a timing side-channel attack that
   allows the attacker to decrypt arbitrary ciphertext.

   The Lucky Thirteen attack can be mitigated by using authenticated
   encryption like AES-GCM [RFC5288] or encrypt-then-mac
   [I-D.ietf-tls-encrypt-then-mac] instead of the TLS default of MAC-

   An even newer variant of the padding oracle attack, one that does not
   use timing information, is the POODLE attack (CVE-2014-3566) [POODLE]
   on SSL 3.0.  This attack has no known mitigation.

2.5.  Attacks on RC4

   The RC4 algorithm [RC4] has been used with TLS (and previously, SSL)
   for many years.  RC4 has long been known to have a variety of
   cryptographic weaknesses, e.g.  [RC4-Attack-Pau], [RC4-Attack-Man],
   [RC4-Attack-FMS].  Recent cryptanalysis results [RC4-Attack-AlF]
   exploit biases in the RC4 keystream to recover repeatedly encrypted

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   These recent results are on the verge of becoming practically
   exploitable; currently they require 2^26 sessions or 13x2^30
   encryptions.  As a result, RC4 can no longer be seen as providing a
   sufficient level of security for TLS sessions.  For further details,
   the reader is referred to [I-D.ietf-tls-prohibiting-rc4] and the
   references it cites.

2.6.  Compression Attacks: CRIME, TIME and BREACH

   The CRIME attack [CRIME] (CVE-2012-4929) allows an active attacker to
   decrypt ciphertext (specifically, cookies) when TLS is used with TLS
   level compression.

   The TIME attack [TIME] and the later BREACH attack [BREACH] (CVE-
   2013-3587, though the number has not been officially allocated) both
   make similar use of HTTP-level compression to decrypt secret data
   passed in the HTTP response.  We note that compression of the HTTP
   message body is much more prevalent than compression at the TLS

   The former attack can be mitigated by disabling TLS compression.  We
   are not aware of mitigations at the TLS protocol level to the latter
   attack, and so application-level mitigations are needed (see
   [BREACH]).  For example, implementations of HTTP that use CSRF tokens
   will need to randomize them.  Even the best practices and
   recommendations from [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp] are insufficient to
   thwart this attack.

2.7.  Certificate and RSA-Related Attacks

   There have been several practical attacks on TLS when used with RSA
   certificates (the most common use case).  These include
   [Bleichenbacher98] and [Klima03].  While the Bleichenbacher attack
   has been mitigated in TLS 1.0, the Klima attack relies on a version-
   check oracle is only mitigated by TLS 1.1.

   The use of RSA certificates often involves exploitable timing issues
   [Brumley03] (CVE-2003-0147), unless the implementation takes care to
   explicitly eliminate them.

   A recent certificate fuzzing tool [Brubaker2014using] uncovered
   numerous vulnerabilities in different TLS libraries, related to
   certificate validation.

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2.8.  Theft of RSA Private Keys

   When TLS is used with most non-Diffie Hellman cipher suites, it is
   sufficient to obtain the server's private key in order to decrypt any
   sessions (past and future) that were initiated with that server.
   This technique is used, for example, by the popular Wireshark network
   sniffer to inspect TLS-protected connections.

   It is known that stolen (or otherwise obtained) private keys have
   been used as part of large-scale monitoring [RFC7258] of certain

   Such attacks can be mitigated by better protecting the private key,
   e.g. using OS protections or dedicated hardware.  Even more effective
   is the use of cipher suites that offer "forward secrecy", the
   property that revealing a secret such as a private key does not
   expose past or future sessions to a passive attacker.

2.9.  Diffie-Hellman Parameters

   TLS allows the definition of ephemeral Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic
   Curve Diffie-Hellman parameters in its respective key exchange modes.
   This results in an attack detailed in [Cross-Protocol].  Using
   predefined DH groups, as proposed in
   [I-D.ietf-tls-negotiated-ff-dhe], would mitigate this attack.

   In addition, clients that do not properly verify the received
   parameters are exposed to man in the middle (MITM) attacks.
   Unfortunately the TLS protocol does not mandate this verification
   (see [RFC6989] for analogous information for IPsec).

2.10.  Renegotiation (CVE-2009-3555)

   A major attack on the TLS renegotiation mechanism applies to all
   current versions of the protocol.  The attack and the TLS extension
   that resolves it are described in [RFC5746].

2.11.  Triple Handshake (CVE-2014-1295)

   The triple handshake attack [BhargavanDFPS14] enables the attacker to
   cause two TLS connections to share keying material.  This leads to a
   multitude of attacks, e.g.  Man-in-the-Middle, breaking safe
   renegotiation, and breaking channel binding via TLS Exporter
   [RFC5705] or "tls-unique" [RFC5929].

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2.12.  Virtual Host Confusion

   A recent article [Delignat14] describes a security issue whereby
   SSLv3 fallback and improper handling of session caches on the server
   side can be abused by an attacker to establish a malicious connection
   to a virtual host other than the one originally intended and approved
   by the server.  This attack is especially serious in performance
   critical environments where sharing of SSLv3 session caches is very

2.13.  Denial of Service

   Server CPU power has progressed over the years so that TLS can now be
   turned on by default.  However, the risk of malicious clients and
   coordinated groups of clients ("botnets") mounting denial of service
   attacks is still very real.  TLS adds another vector for
   computational attacks, since a client can easily (with little
   computational effort) force the server to expend relatively large
   computational work.  It is known that such attacks have in fact been

2.14.  Implementation Issues

   Even when the protocol is properly specified, this does not guarantee
   the security of implementations.  In fact there are very common
   issues that often plague TLS implementations.  In particular, when
   integrating into higher-level protocols, TLS and its PKI-based
   authentication are sometimes the source of misunderstandings and
   implementation "shortcuts".  An extensive survey of these issues can
   be found in [Georgiev2012].

   o  Implementations might omit validation of the server certificate
      altogether.  For example, this is true of the default
      implementation of HTTP client libraries in Python 2 (see e.g.

   o  Implementations might not validate the server identity.  This
      validation typically amounts to matching the protocol-level server
      name with the certificate's Subject Alternative Name field.  Note:
      this same information is often also found in the Common Name part
      of the Distinguished Name, and some validators incorrectly
      retrieve it from there instead of from the Subject Alternative

   o  Implementations might validate the certificate chain incorrectly
      or not at all, or use an incorrect or outdated trust anchor list.

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   An implementation attack of a different kind, one that exploits a
   simple coding mistake (bounds check), is the Heartbleed attack (CVE-
   2014-0160) that affected a wide swath of the Internet when it was
   discovered in April 2014.

2.15.  Usability

   Many TLS endpoints, such as browsers and mail clients, allow the user
   to explicitly accept an invalid server certificate.  This often takes
   the form of a UI dialog (e.g., "do you accept this server?") and
   users have been conditioned to respond in the affirmative in order to
   allow the connection to take place.

   This user behavior is used by (arguably legitimate) "SSL proxies"
   that decrypt and re-encrypt the TLS connection in order to enforce
   local security policy.  It is also abused by attackers whose goal is
   to gain access to the encrypted information.

   Mitigation is complex and will probably involve a combination of
   protocol mechanisms (HSTS, certificate pinning
   [I-D.ietf-websec-key-pinning]) and very careful UI design.

3.  Applicability to DTLS

   DTLS [RFC4347] [RFC6347] is an adaptation of TLS for UDP.

   With respect to the attacks described in the current document, DTLS
   1.0 is equivalent to TLS 1.1.  The only exception is RC4, which is
   disallowed in DTLS.  DTLS 1.2 is equivalent to TLS 1.2.

4.  IANA Considerations

   This document requires no IANA actions.  [Note to RFC Editor: please
   remove this whole section before publication.]

5.  Security Considerations

   This document describes protocol attacks in an informational manner,
   and in itself does not have any security implications.  Its companion
   documents, especially [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp], certainly do.

6.  Acknowledgments

   We would like to thank Stephen Farrell, Simon Josefsson, John
   Mattsson, Yoav Nir, Kenny Paterson, Patrick Pelletier, Tom Ritter,
   Rich Salz and Meral Shirazipour for their feedback on this document.
   We thank Andrei Popov for contributing text on RC4, Kohei Kasamatsu
   for text on Lucky13, Ilari Liusvaara for text on attacks and on DTLS,

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   Aaron Zauner for text on virtual host confusion, and Chris Newman for
   text on STARTTLS command injection.

   During IESG review, Richard Barnes, Barry Leiba, and Kathleen
   Moriarty caught several issues that needed to be addressed.

   The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Leif Johansson
   and Orit Levin as the working group chairs and Pete Resnick as the
   sponsoring Area Director.

   The document was prepared using the lyx2rfc tool, created by Nico

7.  Informative References

   [RFC4347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security", RFC 4347, April 2006.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

   [RFC5288]  Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois
              Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288,
              August 2008.

   [RFC5705]  Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, March 2010.

   [RFC5746]  Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
              "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
              Extension", RFC 5746, February 2010.

   [RFC5929]  Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings
              for TLS", RFC 5929, July 2010.

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.

   [RFC6797]  Hodges, J., Jackson, C., and A. Barth, "HTTP Strict
              Transport Security (HSTS)", RFC 6797, November 2012.

   [RFC6989]  Sheffer, Y. and S. Fluhrer, "Additional Diffie-Hellman
              Tests for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
              (IKEv2)", RFC 6989, July 2013.

   [RFC7258]  Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
              Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, May 2014.

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              Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
              "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS", draft-
              ietf-uta-tls-bcp-05 (work in progress), October 2014.

              Popov, A., "Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites", draft-ietf-
              tls-prohibiting-rc4-00 (work in progress), July 2014.

              Gutmann, P., "Encrypt-then-MAC for TLS and DTLS", draft-
              ietf-tls-encrypt-then-mac-03 (work in progress), July

              Gillmor, D., "Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman
              Ephemeral Parameters for TLS", draft-ietf-tls-negotiated-
              ff-dhe-02 (work in progress), October 2014.

              Evans, C., Palmer, C., and R. Sleevi, "Public Key Pinning
              Extension for HTTP", draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-21
              (work in progress), October 2014.

   [CVE]      MITRE, , "Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures",

              AlFardan, N. and K. Paterson, "Lucky Thirteen: Breaking
              the TLS and DTLS Record Protocols", IEEE Symposium on
              Security and Privacy , 2013.

   [BEAST]    Rizzo, J. and T. Duong, "Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS",
              2011, <http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/105499/

   [POODLE]   Moeller, B., Duong, T., and K. Kotowicz, "This POODLE
              Bites:Exploiting the SSL 3.0 Fallback", 2014,

   [CRIME]    Rizzo, J. and T. Duong, "The CRIME Attack", EKOparty
              Security Conference 2012, 2012.

   [BREACH]   Prado, A., Harris, N., and Y. Gluck, "The BREACH Attack",
              2013, <http://breachattack.com/>.

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   [TIME]     Be'ery, T. and A. Shulman, "A Perfect CRIME? Only TIME
              Will Tell", Black Hat Europe 2013, 2013,

   [RC4]      Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography: Protocols,
              Algorithms, and Source Code in C, 2nd Ed.", 1996.

              Fluhrer, S., Mantin, I., and A. Shamir, "Weaknesses in the
              Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4", Selected Areas in
              Cryptography , 2001.

              AlFardan, N., Bernstein, D., Paterson, K., Poettering, B.,
              and J. Schuldt, "On the Security of RC4 in TLS", Usenix
              Security Symposium 2013, 2013,

              Georgiev, M., Iyengar, S., Jana, S., Anubhai, R., Boneh,
              D., and V. Shmatikov, "The most dangerous code in the
              world: validating SSL certificates in non-browser
              software", 2012,

              Sarkar, P. and S. Fitzgerald, "Attacks on SSL, a
              comprehensive study of BEAST, CRIME, TIME, BREACH, Lucky13
              and RC4 biases", 8 2013,

              Vaudenay, S., "Security Flaws Induced by CBC Padding
              Applications to SSL, IPSEC, WTLS...", EUROCRYPT 2002,
              2002, <http://www.iacr.org/cryptodb/archive/2002/

              Mavrogiannopoulos, N., Vercauteren, F., Velichkov, V., and
              B. Preneel, "A cross-protocol attack on the TLS protocol",
              2012, <http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2382196.2382206>.

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              Paul, G. and S. Maitra, "Permutation after RC4 key
              scheduling reveals the secret key.", 2007,

              Mantin, I. and A. Shamir, "A practical attack on broadcast
              RC4", 2001.

              Marlinspike, M., "SSL Stripping", February 2009,

              Bleichenbacher, D., "Chosen ciphertext attacks against
              protocols based on the RSA encryption standard pkcs1",

   [Klima03]  Klima, V., Pokorny, O., and T. Rosa, "Attacking RSA-based
              sessions in SSL/TLS", 2003.

              Brumley, D. and D. Boneh, "Remote timing attacks are
              practical", 2003.

              Brubaker, C., Jana, S., Ray, B., Khurshid, S., and V.
              Shmatikov, "Using frankencerts for automated adversarial
              testing of certificate validation in SSL/TLS
              implementations", 2014.

              Delignat-Lavaud, A. and K. Bhargavan, "Virtual Host
              Confusion: Weaknesses and Exploits", Black Hat 2014, 2014.

              Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Pironti,
              A., and P. Strub, "Triple handshakes and cookie cutters:
              breaking and fixing authentication over tls", 2014,

Appendix A.  Appendix: Change Log

   Note to RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication.

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A.1.  draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-05

   o  Implemented Gen-ART and IESG reviews.

A.2.  draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-04

   o  Implemented AD review comments.

A.3.  draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-03

   o  Implemented WG Last Call comments.

   o  Virtual host confusion.

   o  STARTTLS command injection.

   o  Added CVE numbers.

A.4.  draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-02

   o  Added implementation issues ("most dangerous code"),
      renegotiation, triple handshake.

   o  Added text re: mitigation of Lucky13.

   o  Added applicability to DTLS.

A.5.  draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-01

   o  Added SSL Stripping, attacks related to certificates, Diffie
      Hellman parameters and denial of service.

   o  Expanded on RC4 attacks, thanks to Andrei Popov.

A.6.  draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-00

   o  Initial version, extracted from draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-01.

Authors' Addresses

   Yaron Sheffer
   29 HaHarash St.
   Hod HaSharon  4501303

   Email: yaronf.ietf@gmail.com

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   Ralph Holz
   Technische Universitaet Muenchen
   Boltzmannstr. 3
   Garching  85748

   Email: holz@net.in.tum.de

   Peter Saint-Andre

   Email: peter@andyet.com
   URI:   https://andyet.com/

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