Virtual World Region Agent T. Chu
Protocol Linden Research, Inc.
Internet-Draft M. Hamrick
Intended status: Standards Track M. Lentczner
Expires: January 6, 2011 July 5, 2010
VWRAP Trust Model and User Authentication
draft-ietf-vwrap-authentication-00
Abstract
Authentication in the Virtual World Region Agent Protocol establishes
an application layer association between a client application and a
remote service responsible for managing the end user's identity. The
objective of authentication is to verify the user of a client
application possesses appropriate credentials before granting
capabilities sufficient to assert control over the user's agent and
digital assets.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 6, 2011.
Copyright Notice
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document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Agent Login (Resource Class) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1.1. The Account identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.2. Flexible Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Service Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3.1. Account Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3.2. Hashed Password Authenticator . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3.3. Challenge-Response Authenticator . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3.4. PKCS#5 PBKDF2 Authenticator . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4. Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4.1. Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4.2. Maintenance Deferred Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4.3. Authentication Non-Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5. Errors and Exceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5.1. Authentication Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5.2. User Intervention Required Failure . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5.3. Non Specific Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.6. Preconditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.6.1. Client Preconditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.6.2. Authentication Service Preconditions . . . . . . . . . 8
2.7. Postconditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.7.1. Client Postconditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.7.2. Authentication Service Postconditions . . . . . . . . 8
2.8. Side Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.9. Sequence of Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.10. Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. Login-Time Maintenance (Resource Class) . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1. Service Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2. Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3. Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.4. Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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1. Introduction
Authentication is the first step in associating a client application
with virtual world services. The authentication service may have a
trust relationship with other services; before a client application
may interact with them, it must authenticate itself by presenting
credentials demonstrating its right to control the agent.
Authentication is the process of presenting a credential to the
authentication service and receiving a seed capability or an
actionable error description.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Agent Login (Resource Class)
2.1. Introduction
Authentication begins by requesting the agent_login resource; that
is, sending a message to a well-known URL containing a message
constructed using rules defined using a supported serialization
scheme for use with the abstract type system
[I-D.ietf-vwrap-type-system]. The authentication service managing
this resource then makes an access control decision based on the
verity of the credential and the state of the service.
The authentication process results in one of seven classes of
response from the authentication service:
o success
o deferred success due to maintenance
o authentication non-success due to missing secret
o authentication failure
o "user intervention required" failure, and
o "non-specified" failure.
Responses to authentication requests are successes, non-successes and
failures. A "success" indicates the client application should have
enough information to progress past the authentication phase and
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begin using the service. A "deferred success" implies use of the
system will continue after a "short" period. In either case, the
authentication service does not expect the client application to re-
submit the agent_login request. Authentication "non-success" results
from a client requesting authentication parameters. After sending a
"non-success", the authentication service expects the client to
resubmit the agent_login request "shortly." Failures of all type
indicate the authentication service believes a condition exists
requiring explicit user intervention. In the case of an
authentication failure, the user should either retry the
authentication request or recover their password. A failure due to
"user intervention required" indicates the authentication service
believes the user's account is in a state requiring "out of band"
recovery. Reading and accepting the authentication service's Terms
of Service or Critical Messages are examples of recovering from "user
intervention required" failures. Non-Specified failures indicate a
non-recoverable problem that is not defined in this specification.
The section below on Processing Expectations provides more guidance.
2.1.1. The Account identifier
Client applications encode user credentials using an "Account
Identifier." An "account" is an administrative object holding
information about the user: shared secret, a reference to an avatar
shape, a collection of owned virtual items, etc.
Please note this document does not imply a structure to the account
identifier. Though an authentication service may use an email
address as an account identifier, the protocol does not require it
and treats the identifier simply as an opaque sequence of octets.
2.1.2. Flexible Authentication
This revision of the Virtual World Region Agent Protocol defines, but
does not require the use of, three authentication schemes: hashed
password, challenge-response and PKCS#5 Key Derivation 2.
Implementers should also note that the authenticator is not required.
If an authenticator is not present in the agent_login request, the
authentication service SHOULD make a best-effort attempt to
authenticate the request from context. In some cases, the absence of
the authenticator will imply the authentication has already taken
place with OAuth or OpenID as described in the "Client Application
Launch Message" [I-D.ietf-vwrap-launch] document. In other
situations, the authentication service SHOULD examine the security
parameters of the transport.
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2.2. Service Location
Each authentication service MUST have a service URL that is
communicated to the client application before authentication begins.
Some services will deploy a fixed, well-known URL while others may
choose to locate the agent_login resource behind a cryptographically
unguessable web capability.[I-D.ietf-vwrap-launch]
2.3. Inputs
2.3.1. Account Identifier
The account_name key in the credential provided to the authentication
service is used to identify the account. This is the opaque sequence
of octets used by the authentication service to identify the user.
2.3.2. Hashed Password Authenticator
When a hashed password is used as an authenticator, the string '$1$'
is prepended to the UTF-8 encoding of the password and processed with
the MD5 cryptographic hash function. [RFC1321] This revision of the
Virtual World Region Agent Protocol specification requires the use of
MD5 with the hashed password authenticator. It also requires the
presence of the algorithm key, and that the value of this key be the
string 'md5'. Note that future versions of this specification may
ALLOW or REQUIRE the use of other cryptographic hash functions.
2.3.3. Challenge-Response Authenticator
The Challenge-Response scheme allows the authentication service to
select a session specific "Salt" to be used in conjunction with the
user's password to generate an authenticator. In this scheme the
authenticator is the hash of the salt prepended to the hash of '$1$'
prepended to the password. This revision of the Virtual World Region
Agent Protocol specification requires the use of SHA256 with the
challenge-response authenticator. [sha256] It also requires the
presence of the algorithm key, and that the value of this key be the
string 'sha256'. Note that future versions of this specification may
ALLOW or REQUIRE the use of other cryptographic hash functions.
To retrieve a session specific salt for use with the Challenge-
Response authentication scheme from the authentication service, the
client application sends a login request with a Challenge-Response
authenticator without the secret item. If the agent domain supports
this authenticator, it MUST respond with a 'key' condition including
a salt and MAY include a duration in the response. If the duration
is present, it denotes the number of seconds for which the salt will
be valid.
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2.3.4. PKCS#5 PBKDF2 Authenticator
The PKCS#5 PBKDF2 authenticator is an implementation of RSA Labs'
Public Key Cryptographic Standards #5 v2.1 Password Based Key
Derivation Function #2. [pkcs5] In this scheme, the string '$1$' is
prepended to the password is used in conjunction with a salt,
iteration count and hash function to generate an authenticator. This
revision of the Virtual World Region Agent Protocol specification
requires the use of SHA256 with the PKCS#5 PBKDS2 authenticator. It
also requires the presence of the algorithm key, and that the value
of this key be the string 'sha256'. Note that future versions of
this specification may ALLOW or REQUIRE the use of other
cryptographic hash functions.
As with the Challenge-Response authenticator, the authentication
service MUST include the salt and iteration count in its response to
an authentication request that is made without a secret item.
Conforming authentication services may include a duration in their
response indicating the number of seconds for which the salt and
iteration count will be valid.
2.4. Response
The response to the agent login message is notice of one of seven
"conditions":
o authentication success
o maintenance deferred success
o authentication non-success
o authentication failure
o "user intervention required" failure, and
o "non-specific" failure.
The specification recognizes three "non-failure" responses:
2.4.1. Success
Upon success, the authentication service will respond with a message
containing the "Agent Seed Capability". Receipt of this capability
indicates authentication was successful. This capability is then
used for further interactions with the system.
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2.4.2. Maintenance Deferred Success
This condition indicates per-agent (or per-account) login-time
maintenance is being performed. It is not an error. The response
includes a maintenance cap the client application should use to get
information about currently executing maintenance. For more
information about maintenance, see the Maintenance section below.
2.4.3. Authentication Non-Success
Authentication Non-Success is the response given when a client
queries the agent domain for agent-specific or account-specific
authentication parameters. In that it is the expected response to
such a query, it is not an error or exception. But it is not an
indication of successful authentication.
2.5. Errors and Exceptions
2.5.1. Authentication Failure
An authentication failure indicates the client application did not
provide enough information to authenticate the account or the agent.
2.5.2. User Intervention Required Failure
This error indicates that the authentication service cannot
authenticate the user for non-technical reasons. The protocol does
not attempt to describe why, or imply recovery from this error. But
an authentication service that returns this response MUST provide a
URL containing a message describing the condition leading to the
error and remediation, if known.
2.5.3. Non Specific Failure
This error indicates some other error exists which does not fall into
one of the previous conditions.
2.6. Preconditions
2.6.1. Client Preconditions
It is generally assumed that before a user attempts to log into an
authentication service, they will not be actively connected to that
service.
It is also assumed that the user has registered their account; user
registration is outside the scope of this specification.
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The client application SHOULD present the authentication service's
Terms of Service and Critical Messages and allow a user to accept or
decline them prior to attempting to authenticate.
2.6.2. Authentication Service Preconditions
If the authentication service requires users to read and agree to the
Terms of Service or acknowledge receipt of Critical Messages prior to
authentication, it must maintain a record of which accounts and
agents have accepted and acknowledged these items.
Authentication services that support the concept of "suspension" or
"disablement" should also maintain a record of which accounts and
agents are suspended or disabled.
2.7. Postconditions
2.7.1. Client Postconditions
Following successful authentication, the client application SHOULD
note that the agent has been authenticated to the authentication
service. The Virtual World Region Agent Protocol is NOT stateless.
2.7.2. Authentication Service Postconditions
After an account is authenticated, a seed capability is allocated for
the agent. The authentication service SHOULD maintain the
association between the account and the seed capability so it may be
re-used if the client attempts to re-authenticate the user before the
capability expires.
2.8. Side Effects
The authentication service SHOULD maintain the "presence" state of an
agent. This state should include the agent's seed capability. If a
previously authenticated and "present" agent re-authenticates
successfully, the authentication service MAY return the same seed
capability.
After successful authentication, it is expected the client will issue
a request on the seed capability. To defend against potential Denial
of Service attacks against the authentication service, the
authentication service MAY define a timeout period for the seed
capability. If the timeout period expires without a request being
made against the seed capability, that seed capability will expire.
Successful authentication of an agent who is "not present" has the
effect of starting this timer.
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The Challenge-Response Authenticator is intended to be used with a
new, randomly generated salt for each authentication request. If the
authentication service supports the Challenge-Response authentication
scheme, it must maintain the "most recently generated salt" for some
period of time (generally until the expiration of the duration period
given in the authentication non-success response.)
After the salt has "timed out" following an unsuccessful Challenge-
Response authentication request, the authentication service MUST NOT
allow the use of a previous or fixed salt value. That is, it is not
correct, after the salt has expired, to use a null, fixed or previous
salt. The authentication service MUST generate a new salt and return
it to the client application. An unsuccessful authentication request
with the Challenge-Response scheme also has the side effect of
starting the salt duration timer. When this timer expires, the
authentication service MUST NOT allow authentication with previously
generated salts.
2.9. Sequence of Events
It is possible for an authentication request to occur in conditions
where multiple errors or exceptions COULD be returned. As the
protocol does not support reporting multiple failure conditions, the
following sequence is provided to determine the priority of failure
conditions. This sequence of events is motivated by the following
principles:
o The authentication service should leak no account status
information to an unauthenticated user.
o Maintenance should occur after successful authentication and
before account status checking in case maintenance involves the
representation of these states by the authentication service.
o The authentication service should check for "administrative
issues" after maintenance is complete.
The sequence for authentication is as follows. At the first error,
the system produces an appropriate error response.
1. If the authenticator provided is a Challenge-Response or PKCS#5
PBKDF2 type AND a secret is not included, the system returns an
authentication non-success response.
2. The secret and optional authentication parameters are used to
verify the client is in possession of the shared secret. If
authentication is unsuccessful, an authentication failure
response is returned.
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3. If per-user login-time maintenance must be performed, the
authentication service allocates a maintenance capability and
returns it to the client application as a maintenance deferred
success response.
4. If an "administrative issue" exists such as the user is
suspended, banned, must agree to the terms of service or read
critical messages, the system returns a "user intervention
required" response, providing a URL referencing a web resource
explaining the administrative issue and describing remediation
steps.
5. Check to see if the authenticated agent is associated with an
agent seed capability already. If so, return a success response
referencing that seed capability.
6. Start the seed capability timer. Allocate an agent seed
capability and return it to the client application via a success
response.
2.10. Interface
The following text describes the interface description of the
agent_login messages.[I-D.ietf-vwrap-type-system]
; authenticators
; hashed password authenticator
&authenticator = {
type: 'hash', ; identifies this as "hashed" type
algorithm: 'md5', ;
secret: binary ; hash of salt prepended to the password;
; s = h( '$1$' | pw )
}
; challenge response style authenticator
&authenticator = {
type: 'challenge', ; identifies this as a "challenge response"
algorithm: 'sha256', ;
salt: binary, ; optional - default is 0x24, 0x31, 0x24
secret: binary ; hash of the salt prepended to password
; s = h( salt | h( '$1$' | pw ) )
}
; PKCS#5 PBKDF2 style authenticator
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&authenticator = {
type: 'pkcs5pbkdf2', ; identifies authenticator as PKCS#5 PBKDF2
algorithm: string, ; identifier for hash ('md5' or 'sha256')
salt: binary, ; optional - default is 0x24, 0x31, 0x24
count: int, ; optional - 1 used if not present
secret: binary ; hash of the salt prepended to password
; s = pbkdf2( h('$1$' |pw),salt,count,128)
}
; request
&credential = {
account_name: string,
authenticator: &authenticator ; 'hash' 'challenge' or 'pkcs5pbkdf2'
}
; response
; successful response
&response = {
condition: 'success',
agent_seed_capability: uri ; URL of the agent seed cap
}
; authentication failure
&response = {
condition: 'key',
salt: binary, ; optional - salt for challenge and PKCS5
count: int, ; optional - iteration count for PKCS5
duration: int ; optional - the duration of the validity
; period of salt and count values in
; seconds
}
; maintenance "non success"
&response = {
condition: 'maintenance',
maintenance_capability: uri, ; URL of the maintenance cap
completion: int ; estimate for maintenance duration
; (in seconds)
}
; administrative failure
&response = {
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condition: 'intervention',
message: uri ; a URI with human-readable text
; explaining what the user must do to
; continue
}
; non-specific error
&response = {
condition: 'nonspecific',
message: string ; a string describing the failure
}
; resource definition
%% agent_login
-> &credential
<- &response
3. Login-Time Maintenance (Resource Class)
An authentication service has the option of performing "per-user,
login-time maintenance" as part of the authentication sequence.
Performing maintenance after a user is authenticated and before an
avatar is "rezzed" in a region has several advantages:
o it reduces system-wide downtime
o it distributes maintenance across time, and
o it consumes computational resources only for those agents who use
the system
The authentication service signals it is performing maintenance by
returning a "Maintenance Capability" instead of a seed capability
following successful authentication. The maintenance capability
represents a finite sequence of transactions performed by the agent
domain on the user's behalf. It is expected that maintenance is a
task that will complete in a "tractable" amount of time.
The maintenance capability may be queried to retrieve information
about the transactions that are occurring, including:
o a textual description of the maintenance being performed
o an estimate for how long the maintenance will take to complete
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3.1. Service Location
The authentication service may provide a maintenance capability to
the client application in response to successful authentication.
This capability is communicated as an URL to a web based service that
accepts network queries.
'maintenance' capability from
3.2. Inputs
There are no parameters to a maintenance capability request.
3.3. Response
There are three responses to a maintenance capability: a description
of ongoing maintenance, a new maintenance capability describing
another sequence of maintenance transactions, or a seed capability.
These responses are identified with the condition items: 'ongoing',
'next' and 'complete'.
The 'ongoing' response to a maintenance capability request includes a
simple textual description of the maintenance performed, an estimate
for how long the maintenance is expected to take, and a validity
duration for the capability. The estimate for how long maintenance
will take is provided so client applications may provide feedback to
the user. The validity duration gives the viewer a minimum time
period the authentication service will maintain the maintenance
capability.
When the authentication service returns a 'next' response, it
indicates that the current maintenance is complete, but a new
maintenance must be performed before the agent may be placed into a
region. The 'next' response includes the URL of the next maintenance
capability as well as an integer describing the minimum time period
the authentication service will maintain the maintenance capability.
When an authentication service returns a 'complete' response, it
indicates that all maintenance is complete. The response includes
the agent seed capability that may be used to place the user's avatar
in a region. It also includes an item describing the validity period
for the current maintenance capability.
3.4. Interface
The following text describes the interface description of the
agent_login messages.
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&response = {
condition: 'ongoing',
description: string,
duration: int, ; seconds 'til maintenance is complete
validity: int ; seconds 'til this capability expires
}
&response = {
condition: 'next',
description: string,
maintenance_capability: uri, ; URL for the next maintenance cap.
validity: int ; seconds 'til this capability expires
}
&response = {
condition: 'complete',
agent_seed_capability: uri, ; the agent's seed cap
validity: int ; seconds 'til this capability expires
}
%% maintenance
<<response
4. Security Considerations
RFC 3552 [RFC3552] describes several aspects to use when evaluating
the security of a specification or implementation. We believe most
common security concerns users of this specification will encounter
are more appropriately considered as transport, network or link layer
issues. However, the following "application security" issues should
be considered.
The MD5 cryptographic hash functions has been deprecated and SHOULD
be used only for compatibility with older applications.
The use of the hashed password authenticator could result in a replay
attack if not used in conjunction with an appropriate confidentiality
preserving transport. Implementations using the hashed password
authenticator SHOULD utilize appropriate encryption schemes such as
TLS [RFC5246] or S/MIME [RFC3851].
5. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
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6. References
6.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-vwrap-type-system]
Brashears, A., Hamrick, M., and M. Lentczner, "VWRAP :
Abstract Type System for the Transmission of Dynamic
Structured Data", July 2010.
[RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
April 1992.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[pkcs5] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography
Specification Version 2.0".
[sha256] United States National Institute of Standards and
Technology, "Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 180-2 (+ Change Notice to include SHA-224)",
August 2002.
6.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-vwrap-launch]
Hamrick, M. and J. Hurliman, "VWRAP : Client Application
Launch Message", draft-ietf-vwrap-launch-00 (work in
progress), July 2010.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
July 2003.
[RFC3851] Ramsdell, B., "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.1 Message Specification",
RFC 3851, July 2004.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
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Authors' Addresses
Tess Chu
Linden Research, Inc.
945 Battery St.
San Francisco, CA 94111
US
Phone: +1 415 243 9000
Email: tess@lindenlab.com
Meadhbh Siobhan Hamrick
P.O. Box 783
Boulder Creek, CA 95006
US
Phone: +1 650 283 0344
Email: OhMeadhbh@gmail.com
Mark Lentczner
Email: mark@glyphic.com
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