Internet Engineering Task Force                            S. Hollenbeck
Internet-Draft                                             Verisign Labs
Intended status: Standards Track                                 N. Kong
Expires: March 23, 2013                                            CNNIC
                                                      September 19, 2012


      Security Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol
                     draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec-00

Abstract

   The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web
   services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and
   regional internet registries.  This document describes information
   security services and their application to RDAP.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 23, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.



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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     2.1.  Acronyms and Abbreviations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Information Security Services and RDAP  . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     3.1.  Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     3.2.  Availability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
     3.3.  Data Confidentiality  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
     3.4.  Data Integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     3.5.  Non-repudiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   Appendix A.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
































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1.  Introduction

   The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) core is specified in two
   documents: "Unified Registration Data Access Protocol Query Format"
   [I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query] and "JSON Responses for the Registry
   Data Access Protocol" [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response].  One goal of
   RDAP is to provide security services that do not exist in the WHOIS
   [RFC3912] protocol, including authentication, availability, data
   confidentiality, data integrity, and non-repudiation (note: some of
   these might be a stretch).

   This document describes each of these security services from the
   perspective of RDAP requirements and applicability.  Where
   applicable, informational references to requirements for a WHOIS
   replacement service [RFC3707] are noted.


2.  Conventions Used in This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2.1.  Acronyms and Abbreviations

      DNR: Domain Name Registry

      RDAP: Registration Data Access Protocol

      RIR: Regional Internet Registry


3.  Information Security Services and RDAP

   RDAP itself does not include native security services.  Instead, RDAP
   relies on features that are available in other protocol layers to
   provide needed security services including authentication,
   availability, data confidentiality, data integrity, and non-
   repudiation.  A description of each of these security services can be
   found in RFC 4949 [RFC4949].

3.1.  Authentication

   WHOIS does not provide features to identify and authenticate clients.
   As noted in section 3.1.4.2 of RFC 3707 [RFC3707], there is utility
   in allowing server operators to offer "varying degrees of access
   depending on policy and need".  Clients have to be identified and
   authenticated to provide that utility.



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   There are multiple ways to identify and authenticate RDAP clients.
   Candidate technologies include:

   -  HTTP Basic Authentication [RFC2617]: The "basic" scheme can be
      used to send a client's user name and password to a server in
      plaintext, based64-encoded form.  If this scheme is used another
      protocol (such as HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818]) MUST be used to protect
      the client's credentials from disclosure while in transit.

   -  HTTP Digest Authentication [RFC2617]: The "digest" scheme can be
      used to authenticate a client without exposing the client's
      plaintext password.

   -  X.509 Digital Certificates [RFC5280]: The Transport Layer Security
      Protocol [RFC5246] includes an option to identify and authenticate
      clients who possess and present a valid X.509 digital certificate.
      Web clients do not typically possess digital certificates so this
      option is likely impractical.

   -  OAuth [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]: The OAuth authorization framework
      describes a method for clients to access protected web resources
      using access tokens issued by a third party authorization server
      with the permission of the resource owner.  If widely deployed it
      would permit clients to access servers without having to manage
      credentials on a per-server basis.

   -  (What else?)

3.2.  Availability

   An RDAP service has to be available to be useful (need to talk about
   denial of service, anycasting, and anything else that addresses
   availability).

3.3.  Data Confidentiality

   WHOIS does not provide the ability to encrypt data while in transit
   to protect it from inadvertent disclosure.  Web services commonly use
   HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] to provide that protection.  Examples of data
   confidentiality utility include:

   -  Encryption to protect plaintext passwords exchanged when using the
      HTTP "basic" authentication scheme.








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   -  Encryption to protect personal or otherwise sensitive data
      returned in response to RDAP queries.

   -  (What else?)

   If data confidentiality is useful, we should also plan to review the
   JSON Web Encryption draft [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-encryption].

3.4.  Data Integrity

   TBD: is there value in signed responses?  If so, the work being done
   in the JOSE working group (such as what's described in the JSON Web
   Signature draft [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-signature]) may be useful.
   There's no mention of a "signed response" requirement in RFC 3707.

3.5.  Non-repudiation

   TBD: does it make sense to talk about proof of integrity and data
   origin authentication for responses?  It might in the context of law
   enforcement actions.  Again, there's no requirement mentioned in RFC
   3707.


4.  IANA Considerations

   This document does not specify any IANA actions.


5.  Security Considerations

   TBD


6.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to acknowledge the following individuals for
   their contributions to this document: Andrew Newton.


7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response]
              Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the
              Registy Data Access Protocol (RDAP)",
              draft-ietf-weirds-json-response-00 (work in progress),
              September 2012.



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   [I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query]
              Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Unified Registration Data
              Access Protocol Query Format",
              draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-query-00 (work in progress),
              September 2012.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2617]  Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
              Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
              Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
              RFC 2617, June 1999.

   [RFC2818]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-encryption]
              Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web
              Encryption (JWE)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-05
              (work in progress), July 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-signature]
              Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-05
              (work in progress), July 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]
              Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
              draft-ietf-oauth-v2-31 (work in progress), August 2012.

   [RFC3707]  Newton, A., "Cross Registry Internet Service Protocol
              (CRISP) Requirements", RFC 3707, February 2004.

   [RFC3912]  Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912,
              September 2004.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              RFC 4949, August 2007.



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Appendix A.  Change Log

   Initial -00:  Adopted as working group document.


Authors' Addresses

   Scott Hollenbeck
   Verisign Labs
   12061 Bluemont Way
   Reston, VA  20190
   US

   Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com
   URI:   http://www.verisignlabs.com/


   Ning Kong
   China Internet Network Information Center
   4 South 4th Street, Zhongguancun, Haidian District
   Beijing  100190
   China

   Phone: +86 10 5881 3147
   Email: nkong@cnnic.cn


























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