Network Working Group A. Biryukov
Internet-Draft D. Dinu
Intended status: Informational D. Khovratovich
Expires: September 21, 2016 University of Luxembourg
S. Josefsson
SJD AB
March 20, 2016
The memory-hard Argon2 password hash and proof-of-work function
draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2-00
Abstract
This document describes the Argon2 memory-hard function for password
hashing and proof-of-work applications. We provide an implementer
oriented description together with sample code and test vectors. The
purpose is to simplify adoption of Argon2 for Internet protocols.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 21, 2016.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Argon2 Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Argon2 Inputs and Outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Argon2 Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Variable-length hash function H' . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Indexing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4.1. Getting the 32-bit integers J_1 and J_2 . . . . . . . 7
3.4.2. Mapping J_1 and J_2 to (i',j') . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5. Compression function G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.6. Permutation P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Parameter Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Example Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.1. Argon2d Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.2. Argon2i Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1. Introduction
This document describes the Argon2 memory-hard function for password
hashing and proof-of-work applications. We provide an implementer
oriented description together with sample code and test vectors. The
purpose is to simplify adoption of Argon2 for Internet protocols.
This document corresponds to version 1.3 of the Argon2 hash function.
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Argon2 summarizes the state of the art in the design of memory-hard
functions. It is a streamlined and simple design. It aims at the
highest memory filling rate and effective use of multiple computing
units, while still providing defense against tradeoff attacks.
Argon2 is optimized for the x86 architecture and exploits the cache
and memory organization of the recent Intel and AMD processors.
Argon2 has two variants: Argon2d and Argon2i. Argon2d is faster and
uses data-depending memory access, which makes it suitable for
cryptocurrencies and proof-of-work applications with no threats from
side-channel timing attacks. Argon2i uses data-independent memory
access, which is preferred for password hashing and password-based
key derivation. Argon2i is slower as it makes more passes over the
memory to protect from tradeoff attacks.
For further background and discussion, see the Argon2 paper [ARGON2].
2. Notation and Conventions
x**y --- x multiplied by itself y times
a*b --- multiplication of a and b
c-d --- substraction of c with d
E_f --- variable E with subscript index f
g / h --- g divided by h
I(j) --- function I evaluated on parameter j
K || L --- string K concatenated with string L
a ^ b --- bitwise exclusive-or between a and b
a mod b --- remainder of a modulo b, always in range [0, b-1]
a >>> n --- rotation of a to the right by n bits
trunc(a) --- the 64-bit value a truncated to the 32 least significant
bits
|A| --- the number of elements in set A
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3. Argon2 Algorithm
3.1. Argon2 Inputs and Outputs
Argon2 has the following input parameters:
o Message string P, which is a password for password hashing
applications. MAY have any length from 0 to 2**32 - 1 bytes.
o Nonce S, which is a salt for password hashing applications. May
have any length from 8 to 2**32-1 bytes. 16 bytes is recommended
for password hashing. Salt MUST be unique for each password.
o Degree of parallelism p determines how many independent (but
synchronizing) computational chains (lanes) can be run. It MAY
take any integer value from 1 to 2**24-1.
o Tag length T MAY be any integer number of bytes from 4 to 2**32-1.
o Memory size m MAY be any integer number of kibibytes from 8*p to
2**32-1. The actual number of blocks is m', which is m rounded
down to the nearest multiple of 4*p.
o Number of iterations t (used to tune the running time
independently of the memory size) MAY be any integer number from 1
to 2**32-1.
o Version number v MUST be one byte 0x13.
o Secret value K (serves as key if necessary, but we do not assume
any key use by default) MAY have any length from 0 to 32 bytes.
o Associated data X MAY have any length from 0 to 2**32-1 bytes.
o Type y of Argon2: 0 for Argon2d, 1 for Argon2i.
The Argon2 output MUST be a T-length string.
3.2. Argon2 Operation
Argon2 uses an internal compression function G with two 1024-byte
inputs and a 1024-byte output, and an internal hash function H. Here
H is the BLAKE2b [I-D.saarinen-blake2] hash function, and the
compression function G is based on its internal permutation. A
variable-length hash function H' built upon H is also used. G and H'
are described in later section.
The Argon2 operation is as follows.
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1. Establish H_0 as the 64-bit value as shown in the figure below.
H is BLAKE2b and the non-strings p, T, m, t, v, y, length(P),
length(S), length(K), and length(X) are treated as a 32-bit
little-endian encoding of the integer.
H_0 = H(p, T, m, t, v, y, length(P), P, length(S), S,
length(K), K, length(X), X)
2. Allocate the memory as m' 1024-byte blocks where m' is derived
as:
m' = 4 * p * floor (m / 4p)
For p lanes, the memory is organized in a matrix B[i][j] of
blocks with p rows (lanes) and q = m' / p columns.
3. Compute B[i][0] for all i ranging from (and including) 0 to (not
including) p.
B[i][0] = H'(H_0, 0, i)
Here integers are padded to 4 bytes and encoded in little endian.
4. Compute B[i][1] for all i ranging from (and including) 0 to (not
including) p.
B[i][1] = H'(H_0, 1, i)
Here integers are padded to 4 bytes and encoded in little endian.
5. Compute B[i][j] for all i ranging from (and including) 0 to (not
including) p, and for all j ranging from (and including) 2) to
(not including) q. The block indices i' and j' are determined
differently for Argon2d and Argon2i (see section ``Indexing'').
B[i][j] = G(B[i][j-1], B[i'][j'])
6. If the number of iterations t is larger than 1, we repeat the
steps however replacing the computations with the following
expression:
B[i][0] = G(B[i][q-1], B[i'][j'])
B[i][j] = G(B[i][j-1], B[i'][j'])
7. After t steps have been iterated, the final block C is computed
as the XOR of the last column:
C = B[0][q-1] XOR B[1][q-1] XOR ... XOR B[p-1][q-1]
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8. The output tag is computed as H'(C).
3.3. Variable-length hash function H'
Let H_x be a hash function with x-byte output (in our case H_x is
BLAKE2b, which supports x between 1 and 64 inclusive). Let V_i be a
64-byte block, and A_i be its first 32 bytes, and T < 2**32 be the
tag length in bytes, encoded in little-endian as 32-bit integer.
Then we define:
if T <= 64
H'(X) = H_T(T||X)
else
r = ceil(T/32)-2
V_1 = H_64(T||X)
V_2 = H_64(V_1)
...
V_r = H_64(V_{r-1})
V_{r+1} = H_{T-32*r}(V_{r})
H'(X) = A_1 || A_2 || ... || A_r || V_{r+1}
3.4. Indexing
The memory matrix is partitioned into S = 4 vertical slices. The
intersection of a slice and a lane is a segment of length q/S.
Segments of the same slice are computed in parallel and may not
reference blocks from each other. All other blocks can be
referenced.
slice 0 slice 1 slice 2 slice 3
___/\___ ___/\___ ___/\___ ___/\___
/ \ / \ / \ / \
+----------+----------+----------+----------+
| | | | | > lane 0
+----------+----------+----------+----------+
| | | | | > lane 1
+----------+----------+----------+----------+
| | | | | > lane 2
+----------+----------+----------+----------+
| ... ... ... | ...
+----------+----------+----------+----------+
| | | | | > lane p - 1
+----------+----------+----------+----------+
Single-pass Argon2 with p lanes and 4 slices
For each block B[i][j] at pass p we determine the index [i'][j'],
which determines the block B[i'][j'] taken as input to G to compute
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B[i][j]. The pair (i',j') is determined by B[i][j-1] and tuple
(i,j,p) as follows.
3.4.1. Getting the 32-bit integers J_1 and J_2
3.4.1.1. Argon2d
J_1 is given by the first 32 bits of block B[i][j-1], treated as
little endian. while J_2 is given by the next 32-bits of block
B[i][j-1], treated as little endian.
3.4.1.2. Argon2i
For each segment of q blocks we compose a full-zero block X and
w=ceil(q/128) blocks Y_1,Y_2,...,Y_w. application of the 2-round
compression function G in the counter mode gives 128 64-bit values
J_1 || J_2. The first input is the all zero block and the second
input is constructed as follows:
Y_i=( r || l || s || m' || t || y || i || 0 ), where
r -- the pass number, starting from 0
l -- the lane number, starting from 0
s -- the slice number, starting from 0
m' -- the total number of memory blocks, defined above
t -- the total number of passes
y -- the Argon2 type (0 for Argon2d and 1 for Argon2i)
i -- the counter (starts from 1 in each segment)
The values r, l, s, m', t, y, i are represented on 8 bytes in little-
endian. 0 stands for 968 zero bytes. Then we compute Z_i for i from
1 to w inclusive as Z_i = G(X,G(X,Y_i)). The sequence
Z_1||Z_2||...||Z_w is partitioned into w*128 pairs of 8-byte values
(J_1,J_2).
3.4.2. Mapping J_1 and J_2 to (i',j')
The value of i' = J_2 mod p gives the index of the lane from which
the block will be taken. For the first pass (r=0) and the first
slice (s=0) then i' MUST be equal to the current lane index.
The set R contains the indices that can be referenced according to
the following rules:
1. If i' is the current lane index, then R includes the indices of
all blocks computed in this lane that are not overwritten yet,
excluding B[i'][j-1] and all blocks from the current segment not
overwritten in this pass.
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2. If i' is not the current lane index, then R includes the indices
of all blocks in the last S - 1 = 3 segments computed and
finished in lane i'. If B[i][j] is the first block of a segment,
then the very last index from R is excluded.
We are going to take a block from R with a non-uniform distribution
over [0, |R|):
x = floor(J_1**2 / 2**32);
y = floor((|R| * x) / 2**32);
z = |R| - 1 - y;
Let [i'][j''] be the index of the block computed chronologically
first among the blocks in R. Then we define j' = j''+z (mod q).
3.5. Compression function G
Compression function G is built upon the BLAKE2b round function P. P
operates on the 128-byte input, which can be viewed as 8 16-byte
registers:
P(A_0, A_1, ... ,A_7) = (B_0, B_1, ... ,B_7)
Compression function G(X, Y) operates on two 1024-byte blocks X and
Y. It first computes R = X XOR Y. Then R is viewed as a 8x8 matrix
of 16-byte registers R_0, R_1, ... , R_63. Then P is first applied
rowwise, and then columnwise to get Z:
( Q_0, Q_1, Q_2, ... , Q_7) <- P( R_0, R_1, R_2, ... , R_7)
( Q_8, Q_9, Q_10, ... , Q_15) <- P( R_8, R_9, R_10, ... , R_15)
...
(Q_56, Q_57, Q_58, ... , Q_63) <- P(R_56, R_57, R_58, ... , R_63)
( Z_0, Z_8, Z_16, ... , Z_56) <- P( Q_0, Q_8, Q_16, ... , Q_56)
( Z_1, Z_9, Z_17, ... , Z_57) <- P( Q_1, Q_9, Q_17, ... , Q_57)
...
( Z_7, Z_15, Z 23, ... , Z_63) <- P( Q_7, Q_15, Q_23, ... , Q_63)
Finally, G outputs Z XOR R:
G: (X, Y) -> R = X XOR Y -P-> Q -P-> Z -P-> Z XOR R
+---+ +---+
| X | | Y |
+---+ +---+
| |
---->XOR<----
--------|
| \ /
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| +---+
| | R |
| +---+
| |
| \ /
| P rowwise
| |
| \ /
| +---+
| | Q |
| +---+
| |
| \ /
| P columnwise
| |
| \ /
| +---+
| | Z |
| +---+
| |
| \ /
------>XOR
|
\ /
Argon2 compression function G.
3.6. Permutation P
Permutation P is based on the round function of BLAKE2b. The 8
16-byte inputs S_0, S_1, ... , S_7 are viewed as a 4x4 matrix of
64-bit words, where S_i = (v_{2*i+1} || v_{2*i}):
v_0 v_1 v_2 v_3
v_4 v_5 v_6 v_7
v_8 v_9 v_10 v_11
v_12 v_13 v_14 v_15
It works as follows:
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G(v_0, v_4, v_8, v_12)
G(v_1, v_5, v_9, v_13)
G(v_2, v_6, v_10, v_14)
G(v_3, v_7, v_11, v_15)
G(v_0, v_5, v_10, v_15)
G(v_1, v_6, v_11, v_12)
G(v_2, v_7, v_8, v_13)
G(v_3, v_4, v_9, v_14)
G(a, b, c, d) is defined as follows:
a <- (a + b + 2 * trunc(a) * trunc(b)) mod 2**64
d <- (d ^ a) >>> 32
c <- (c + d + 2 * trunc(c) * trunc(d)) mod 2**64
b <- (b ^ c) >>> 24
a <- (a + b + 2 * trunc(a) * trunc(b)) mod 2**64
d <- (d ^ a) >>> 16
c <- (c + d + 2 * trunc(c) * trunc(d)) mod 2**64
b <- (b ^ c) >>> 63
The modular additions in G are combined with 64-bit multiplications.
Multiplications are the only difference to the original BLAKE2b
design. This choice is done to increase the circuit depth and thus
the running time of ASIC implementations, while having roughly the
same running time on CPUs thanks to parallelism and pipelining.
4. Parameter Choice
Argon2d is optimized for settings where the adversary does not get
regular access to system memory or CPU, i.e. he can not run side-
channel attacks based on the timing information, nor he can recover
the password much faster using garbage collection. These settings
are more typical for backend servers and cryptocurrency minings. For
practice we suggest the following settings:
o Cryptocurrency mining, that takes 0.1 seconds on a 2 Ghz CPU using
1 core -\u002D Argon2d with 2 lanes and 250 MB of RAM.
o Backend server authentication, that takes 0.5 seconds on a 2 GHz
CPU using 4 cores -\u002D Argon2d with 8 lanes and 4 GB of RAM.
Argon2i is optimized for more realistic settings, where the adversary
possibly can access the same machine, use its CPU or mount cold-boot
attacks. We use three passes to get rid entirely of the password in
the memory. We suggest the following settings:
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o Key derivation for hard-drive encryption, that takes 3 seconds on
a 2 GHz CPU using 2 cores - Argon2i with 4 lanes and 6 GB of RAM.
o Frontend server authentication, that takes 0.5 seconds on a 2 GHz
CPU using 2 cores - Argon2i with 4 lanes and 1 GB of RAM.
We recommend the following procedure to select the type and the
parameters for practical use of Argon2.
1. Select the type y. If you do not know the difference between them
or you consider side-channel attacks as viable threat, choose
Argon2i.
2. Figure out the maximum number h of threads that can be initiated
by each call to Argon2.
3. Figure out the maximum amount m of memory that each call can
afford.
4. Figure out the maximum amount x of time (in seconds) that each
call can afford.
5. Select the salt length. 128 bits is sufficient for all
applications, but can be reduced to 64 bits in the case of space
constraints.
6. Select the tag length. 128 bits is sufficient for most
applications, including key derivation. If longer keys are
needed, select longer tags.
7. If side-channel attacks is a viable threat, enable the memory
wiping option in the library call.
8. Run the scheme of type y, memory m and h lanes and threads, using
different number of passes t. Figure out the maximum t such that
the running time does not exceed x. If it exceeds x even for t =
1, reduce m accordingly.
9. Hash all the passwords with the just determined values m, h, and
t.
5. Example Code
void fill_block(const block *prev_block,
const block *ref_block,
block *next_block) {
block blockR, block_tmp;
unsigned i;
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copy_block(&blockR, ref_block);
xor_block(&blockR, prev_block);
copy_block(&block_tmp, &blockR);
/* Now blockR = ref_block + prev_block and bloc_tmp = ref_block +
prev_block */
/* Apply Blake2 on columns of 64-bit words: (0,1,...,15),
then (16,17,..31)... finally (112,113,...127) */
for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
BLAKE2_ROUND_NOMSG(
blockR.v[16 * i], blockR.v[16 * i + 1],
blockR.v[16 * i + 2], blockR.v[16 * i + 3],
blockR.v[16 * i + 4], blockR.v[16 * i + 5],
blockR.v[16 * i + 6], blockR.v[16 * i + 7],
blockR.v[16 * i + 8], blockR.v[16 * i + 9],
blockR.v[16 * i + 10], blockR.v[16 * i + 11],
blockR.v[16 * i + 12], blockR.v[16 * i + 13],
blockR.v[16 * i + 14], blockR.v[16 * i + 15]);
}
/* Apply Blake2 on rows of 64-bit words: (0,1,16,17,...112,113),
then (2,3,18,19,...,114,115), ... and finally
(14,15,30,31,...,126,127) */
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
BLAKE2_ROUND_NOMSG(
blockR.v[2 * i], blockR.v[2 * i + 1],
blockR.v[2 * i + 16], blockR.v[2 * i + 17],
blockR.v[2 * i + 32], blockR.v[2 * i + 33],
blockR.v[2 * i + 48], blockR.v[2 * i + 49],
blockR.v[2 * i + 64], blockR.v[2 * i + 65],
blockR.v[2 * i + 80], blockR.v[2 * i + 81],
blockR.v[2 * i + 96], blockR.v[2 * i + 97],
blockR.v[2 * i + 112], blockR.v[2 * i + 113]);
}
copy_block(next_block, &block_tmp);
xor_block(next_block, &blockR);
}
void fill_block_with_xor(const block *prev_block,
const block *ref_block,
block *next_block) {
block blockR, block_tmp;
unsigned i;
copy_block(&blockR, ref_block);
xor_block(&blockR, prev_block);
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copy_block(&block_tmp, &blockR);
/* Saving the next block contents for XOR over */
xor_block(&block_tmp, next_block);
/* Now blockR = ref_block + prev_block and bloc_tmp = ref_block +
prev_block + next_block*/
/* Apply Blake2 on columns of 64-bit words: (0,1,...,15) , then
(16,17,..31),... and finally (112,113,...127) */
for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
BLAKE2_ROUND_NOMSG(
blockR.v[16 * i], blockR.v[16 * i + 1],
blockR.v[16 * i + 2], blockR.v[16 * i + 3],
blockR.v[16 * i + 4], blockR.v[16 * i + 5],
blockR.v[16 * i + 6], blockR.v[16 * i + 7],
blockR.v[16 * i + 8], blockR.v[16 * i + 9],
blockR.v[16 * i + 10], blockR.v[16 * i + 11],
blockR.v[16 * i + 12], blockR.v[16 * i + 13],
blockR.v[16 * i + 14], blockR.v[16 * i + 15]);
}
/* Apply Blake2 on rows of 64-bit words:
(0,1,16,17,...112,113), then
(2,3,18,19,...,114,115), ... and finally
(14,15,30,31,...,126,127) */
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
BLAKE2_ROUND_NOMSG(
blockR.v[2 * i], blockR.v[2 * i + 1],
blockR.v[2 * i + 16], blockR.v[2 * i + 17],
blockR.v[2 * i + 32], blockR.v[2 * i + 33],
blockR.v[2 * i + 48], blockR.v[2 * i + 49],
blockR.v[2 * i + 64], blockR.v[2 * i + 65],
blockR.v[2 * i + 80], blockR.v[2 * i + 81],
blockR.v[2 * i + 96], blockR.v[2 * i + 97],
blockR.v[2 * i + 112], blockR.v[2 * i + 113]);
}
copy_block(next_block, &block_tmp);
xor_block(next_block, &blockR);
}
void generate_addresses(const argon2_instance_t *instance,
const argon2_position_t *position,
uint64_t *pseudo_rands) {
block zero_block, input_block, address_block,tmp_block;
uint32_t i;
init_block_value(&zero_block, 0);
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init_block_value(&input_block, 0);
if (instance != NULL && position != NULL) {
input_block.v[0] = position->pass;
input_block.v[1] = position->lane;
input_block.v[2] = position->slice;
input_block.v[3] = instance->memory_blocks;
input_block.v[4] = instance->passes;
input_block.v[5] = instance->type;
for (i = 0; i < instance->segment_length; ++i) {
if (i % ARGON2_ADDRESSES_IN_BLOCK == 0) {
input_block.v[6]++;
init_block_value(&tmp_block, 0);
init_block_value(&address_block, 0);
fill_block_with_xor(&zero_block, &input_block, &tmp_block);
fill_block_with_xor(&zero_block, &tmp_block, &address_block);
}
pseudo_rands[i] = address_block.v[i % ARGON2_ADDRESSES_IN_BLOCK];
}
}
void fill_segment(const argon2_instance_t *instance,
argon2_position_t position) {
block *ref_block = NULL, *curr_block = NULL;
uint64_t pseudo_rand, ref_index, ref_lane;
uint32_t prev_offset, curr_offset;
uint32_t starting_index;
uint32_t i;
int data_independent_addressing;
/* Pseudo-random values that determine the reference block
position */
uint64_t *pseudo_rands = NULL;
if (instance == NULL) {
return;
}
data_independent_addressing = (instance->type == Argon2_i);
pseudo_rands = (uint64_t *)malloc(sizeof(uint64_t) *
(instance->segment_length));
if (pseudo_rands == NULL) {
return;
}
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if (data_independent_addressing) {
generate_addresses(instance, &position, pseudo_rands);
}
starting_index = 0;
if ((0 == position.pass) && (0 == position.slice)) {
/* we have already generated the first two blocks */
starting_index = 2;
}
/* Offset of the current block */
curr_offset = position.lane * instance->lane_length +
position.slice * instance->segment_length +
starting_index;
if (0 == curr_offset % instance->lane_length) {
/* Last block in this lane */
prev_offset = curr_offset + instance->lane_length - 1;
} else {
/* Previous block */
prev_offset = curr_offset - 1;
}
for (i = starting_index; i < instance->segment_length;
++i, ++curr_offset, ++prev_offset) {
/*1.1 Rotating prev_offset if needed */
if (curr_offset % instance->lane_length == 1) {
prev_offset = curr_offset - 1;
}
/* 1.2 Computing the index of the reference block */
/* 1.2.1 Taking pseudo-random value from the previous block */
if (data_independent_addressing) {
pseudo_rand = pseudo_rands[i];
} else {
pseudo_rand = instance->memory[prev_offset].v[0];
}
/* 1.2.2 Computing the lane of the reference block */
ref_lane = ((pseudo_rand >> 32)) % instance->lanes;
if ((position.pass == 0) && (position.slice == 0)) {
/* Can not reference other lanes yet */
ref_lane = position.lane;
}
/* 1.2.3 Computing the number of possible reference block
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within the lane. */
position.index = i;
ref_index = index_alpha(instance, &position,
pseudo_rand & 0xFFFFFFFF,
ref_lane == position.lane);
/* 2 Creating a new block */
ref_block = instance->memory +
instance->lane_length * ref_lane + ref_index;
curr_block = instance->memory + curr_offset;
if (instance->version == ARGON2_OLD_VERSION_NUMBER) {
/* version 1.2.1 and earlier: overwrite, not XOR */
fill_block(instance->memory + prev_offset, ref_block,
curr_block);
} else {
if(0 == position.pass) {
fill_block(instance->memory + prev_offset, ref_block,
curr_block);
} else {
fill_block_with_xor(instance->memory + prev_offset,
ref_block, curr_block);
}
}
}
free(pseudo_rands);
}
uint32_t index_alpha(const argon2_instance_t *instance,
const argon2_position_t *position,
uint32_t pseudo_rand,
int same_lane) {
/*
* Pass 0:
* This lane : all already finished segments plus already
* constructed blocks in this segment
* Other lanes : all already finished segments
* Pass 1+:
* This lane : (SYNC_POINTS - 1) last segments plus
* already constructed blocks in this segment
* Other lanes : (SYNC_POINTS - 1) last segments
*/
uint32_t reference_area_size;
uint64_t relative_position;
uint32_t start_position, absolute_position;
if (0 == position->pass) {
/* First pass */
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if (0 == position->slice) {
/* First slice */
reference_area_size =
position->index - 1; /* all but the previous */
} else {
if (same_lane) {
/* The same lane => add current segment */
reference_area_size = position->slice *
instance->segment_length +
position->index - 1;
} else {
reference_area_size = position->slice *
instance->segment_length +
((position->index == 0) ? (-1) : 0);
}
}
} else {
/* Second pass */
if (same_lane) {
reference_area_size = instance->lane_length -
instance->segment_length +
position->index - 1;
} else {
reference_area_size = instance->lane_length -
instance->segment_length +
((position->index == 0) ? (-1) : 0);
}
}
/* 1.2.4. Mapping pseudo_rand to 0..<reference_area_size-1>
and produce relative position */
relative_position = pseudo_rand;
relative_position = relative_position * relative_position >> 32;
relative_position = reference_area_size - 1 -
(reference_area_size * relative_position >> 32);
/* 1.2.5 Computing starting position */
start_position = 0;
if (0 != position->pass) {
start_position = (position->slice == ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS - 1)
? 0
: (position->slice + 1) *
instance->segment_length;
}
/* 1.2.6. Computing absolute position */
absolute_position = (start_position + relative_position) %
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instance->lane_length; /* absolute position */
return absolute_position;
}
int fill_memory_blocks(argon2_instance_t *instance) {
uint32_t r, s;
argon2_thread_handle_t *thread = NULL;
argon2_thread_data *thr_data = NULL;
if (instance == NULL || instance->lanes == 0) {
return ARGON2_THREAD_FAIL;
}
/* 1. Allocating space for threads */
thread = calloc(instance->lanes, sizeof(argon2_thread_handle_t));
if (thread == NULL) {
return ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
}
thr_data = calloc(instance->lanes, sizeof(argon2_thread_data));
if (thr_data == NULL) {
free(thread);
return ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
}
for (r = 0; r < instance->passes; ++r) {
for (s = 0; s < ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS; ++s) {
int rc;
uint32_t l;
/* 2. Calling threads */
for (l = 0; l < instance->lanes; ++l) {
argon2_position_t position;
/* 2.1 Join a thread if limit is exceeded */
if (l >= instance->threads) {
rc = argon2_thread_join(thread[l - instance->threads]);
if (rc) {
free(thr_data);
free(thread);
return ARGON2_THREAD_FAIL;
}
}
/* 2.2 Create thread */
position.pass = r;
position.lane = l;
position.slice = (uint8_t)s;
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position.index = 0;
/* preparing the thread input */
thr_data[l].instance_ptr = instance;
memcpy(&(thr_data[l].pos), &position,
sizeof(argon2_position_t));
rc = argon2_thread_create(&thread[l], &fill_segment_thr,
(void *)&thr_data[l]);
if (rc) {
free(thr_data);
free(thread);
return ARGON2_THREAD_FAIL;
}
/* fill_segment(instance, position); */
/*Non-thread equivalent of the lines above */
}
/* 3. Joining remaining threads */
for (l = instance->lanes - instance->threads; l < instance->lanes;
++l) {
rc = argon2_thread_join(thread[l]);
if (rc) {
return ARGON2_THREAD_FAIL;
}
}
}
}
if (thread != NULL) {
free(thread);
}
if (thr_data != NULL) {
free(thr_data);
}
return ARGON2_OK;
}
6. Test Vectors
This section contains test vectors for Argon2.
6.1. Argon2d Test Vectors
=======================================
Argon2d version number 19
=======================================
Memory: 32 KiB
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Iterations: 3
Parallelism: 4 lanes
Tag length: 32 bytes
Password[32]: 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
Salt[16]: 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02
Secret[8]: 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
Associated data[12]: 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04
Pre-hashing digest: b8 81 97 91 a0 35 96 60
bb 77 09 c8 5f a4 8f 04
d5 d8 2c 05 c5 f2 15 cc
db 88 54 91 71 7c f7 57
08 2c 28 b9 51 be 38 14
10 b5 fc 2e b7 27 40 33
b9 fd c7 ae 67 2b ca ac
5d 17 90 97 a4 af 31 09
After pass 0:
Block 0000 [ 0]: db2fea6b2c6f5c8a
Block 0000 [ 1]: 719413be00f82634
Block 0000 [ 2]: a1e3f6dd42aa25cc
Block 0000 [ 3]: 3ea8efd4d55ac0d1
...
Block 0031 [124]: 28d17914aea9734c
Block 0031 [125]: 6a4622176522e398
Block 0031 [126]: 951aa08aeecb2c05
Block 0031 [127]: 6a6c49d2cb75d5b6
After pass 1:
Block 0000 [ 0]: d3801200410f8c0d
Block 0000 [ 1]: 0bf9e8a6e442ba6d
Block 0000 [ 2]: e2ca92fe9c541fcc
Block 0000 [ 3]: 6269fe6db177a388
...
Block 0031 [124]: 9eacfcfbdb3ce0fc
Block 0031 [125]: 07dedaeb0aee71ac
Block 0031 [126]: 074435fad91548f4
Block 0031 [127]: 2dbfff23f31b5883
After pass 2:
Block 0000 [ 0]: 5f047b575c5ff4d2
Block 0000 [ 1]: f06985dbf11c91a8
Block 0000 [ 2]: 89efb2759f9a8964
Block 0000 [ 3]: 7486a73f62f9b142
...
Block 0031 [124]: 57cfb9d20479da49
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Block 0031 [125]: 4099654bc6607f69
Block 0031 [126]: f142a1126075a5c8
Block 0031 [127]: c341b3ca45c10da5
Tag: 51 2b 39 1b 6f 11 62 97
53 71 d3 09 19 73 42 94
f8 68 e3 be 39 84 f3 c1
a1 3a 4d b9 fa be 4a cb
6.2. Argon2i Test Vectors
=======================================
Argon2i version number 19
=======================================
Memory: 32 KiB
Iterations: 3
Parallelism: 4 lanes
Tag length: 32 bytes
Password[32]: 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
Salt[16]: 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02
Secret[8]: 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
Associated data[12]: 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04
Pre-hashing digest: c4 60 65 81 52 76 a0 b3
e7 31 73 1c 90 2f 1f d8
0c f7 76 90 7f bb 7b 6a
5c a7 2e 7b 56 01 1f ee
ca 44 6c 86 dd 75 b9 46
9a 5e 68 79 de c4 b7 2d
08 63 fb 93 9b 98 2e 5f
39 7c c7 d1 64 fd da a9
After pass 0:
Block 0000 [ 0]: f8f9e84545db08f6
Block 0000 [ 1]: 9b073a5c87aa2d97
Block 0000 [ 2]: d1e868d75ca8d8e4
Block 0000 [ 3]: 349634174e1aebcc
...
Block 0031 [124]: 975f596583745e30
Block 0031 [125]: e349bdd7edeb3092
Block 0031 [126]: b751a689b7a83659
Block 0031 [127]: c570f2ab2a86cf00
After pass 1:
Block 0000 [ 0]: b2e4ddfcf76dc85a
Block 0000 [ 1]: 4ffd0626c89a2327
Block 0000 [ 2]: 4af1440fff212980
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Block 0000 [ 3]: 1e77299c7408505b
...
Block 0031 [124]: e4274fd675d1e1d6
Block 0031 [125]: 903fffb7c4a14c98
Block 0031 [126]: 7e5db55def471966
Block 0031 [127]: 421b3c6e9555b79d
After pass 2:
Block 0000 [ 0]: af2a8bd8482c2f11
Block 0000 [ 1]: 785442294fa55e6d
Block 0000 [ 2]: 9256a768529a7f96
Block 0000 [ 3]: 25a1c1f5bb953766
...
Block 0031 [124]: 68cf72fccc7112b9
Block 0031 [125]: 91e8c6f8bb0ad70d
Block 0031 [126]: 4f59c8bd65cbb765
Block 0031 [127]: 71e436f035f30ed0
Tag: c8 14 d9 d1 dc 7f 37 aa
13 f0 d7 7f 24 94 bd a1
c8 de 6b 01 6d d3 88 d2
99 52 a4 c4 67 2b 6c e8
7. IANA Considerations
None.
8. Security Considerations
This document describes the memory-hard Argon2 password hash
function.
The best attacks on the 1-pass and 2-pass Argon2i is the low-storage
attack described in [CBS16], which reduces the time-area product
(using the peak memory value) by the factor of 5. The best attack on
t-pass (t>2) Argon2i is the ranking tradeoff attack, which reduces
the time-area product by the factor of 3.
The best attack on t-pass Argon2d is the ranking tradeoff attack,
which reduces the time-area product by the factor of 1.33.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[I-D.saarinen-blake2]
Saarinen, M. and J. Aumasson, "The BLAKE2 Cryptographic
Hash and MAC", draft-saarinen-blake2-06 (work in
progress), August 2015.
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9.2. Informative References
[ARGON2] Biryukov, A., Dinu, D., and D. Khovratovich, "Argon2: the
memory-hard function for password hashing and other
applications", WWW <https://password-hashing.net/
argon2-specs.pdf>, October 2015.
[CBS16] Corrigan-Gibbs, H., Boneh, D., and S. Schechter, "Balloon
Hashing: Provably Space-Hard Hash Functions with Data-
Independent Access Patterns", WWW <https://eprint.iacr.org
/2016/027.pdf>, January 2016.
Authors' Addresses
Alex Biryukov
University of Luxembourg
Daniel Dinu
University of Luxembourg
Dmitry Khovratovich
University of Luxembourg
Simon Josefsson
SJD AB
Email: simon@josefsson.org
URI: http://josefsson.org/
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