QIRG C. Wang
Internet-Draft A. Rahman
Intended status: Informational InterDigital Communications, LLC
Expires: July 26, 2021 R. Li
NICT
M. Aelmans
Juniper Networks
January 22, 2021
Applications and Use Cases for the Quantum Internet
draft-irtf-qirg-quantum-internet-use-cases-04
Abstract
The Quantum Internet has the potential to improve application
functionality by incorporating quantum information technology into
the infrastructure of the overall Internet. This document provide an
overview of some applications expected to be used on the Quantum
Internet, and then categorize them using various classification
schemes. Some general requirements for the Quantum Internet are also
discussed. The intent of this document is to provide a common
understanding, framework of applications and use cases for the
Quantum Internet.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Terms and Acronyms List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Quantum Internet Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Classification by Application Usage . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.1. Quantum Cryptography Applications . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.2. Quantum Sensor Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.3. Quantum Computing Applications . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Control vs Data Plane Classification . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Selected Quantum Internet Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Secure Communication Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. Secure Quantum Computing with Privacy Preservation . . . 12
5.3. Distributed Quantum Computing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. General Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.2. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
11. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1. Introduction
The Classical Internet has been constantly growing since it first
became commercially popular in the early 1990's. It essentially
consists of a large number of end-nodes (e.g., laptops, smart phones,
network servers) connected by routers and clustered in Autonomous
Systems. The end-nodes may run applications that provide service for
the end-users such as processing and transmission of voice, video or
data. The connections between the various nodes in the Internet
include Digital Subscriber Lines (DSLs), fiber optics, coax cable and
wireless that include Bluetooth, WiFi, cellular (e.g., 3G, 4G, 5G),
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satellite, etc. Bits are transmitted across the Classical Internet
in packets.
Research and experiments have picked up over the last few years for
developing the Quantum Internet [Wehner]. It is anticipated that the
Quantum Internet will provide intrinsic benefits such as improved
end-to-end and network security. End-nodes will also be part of the
Quantum Internet, in that cased called quantum end-nodes that may be
connected by quantum repeaters/routers. These quantum end-nodes will
also run value-added applications which will be discussed later.
The connections between the various nodes in the Quantum Internet are
expected to be primarily optical fiber and free-space optical.
Photonic connections are particularly useful because light (photons)
is very suitable for physically realizing qubits. Unlike the
Classical Internet, qubits (and not classical bits or packets) are
expected to be transmitted across the Quantum Internet. The Quantum
Internet will operate according to unique physical principles such as
quantum superposition and entanglement [I-D.irtf-qirg-principles].
The Quantum Internet is not anticipated to replace, but more to
enhance the Classical Internet. For instance, quantum key
distribution can improve the security of the Classical Internet; the
powerful computation capability from quantum computing can expedite
and optimize computation-intensive tasks (e.g., routing modelling) in
the Classical Internet. The Quantum Internet will run in conjunction
with the Classical Internet to form a new Hybrid Internet. The
process of integrating the Quantum Internet with the Classical
Internet is similar to, but with more profound implications, as the
process of introducing any new communication and networking paradigm
into the existing Internet. The intent of this document is to
provide a common understanding and framework of applications and use
cases for the Quantum Internet.
2. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Terms and Acronyms List
This document assumes that the reader is familiar with the quantum
information technology related terms and concepts that are described
in [I-D.irtf-qirg-principles]. In addition, the following terms and
acronyms are defined here for clarity:
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o Bit - Binary Digit (i.e., fundamental unit of information in a
classical computer).
o Classical Internet - The existing, deployed Internet (circa 2020)
where bits are transmitted in packets between nodes to convey
information. The Classical Internet supports applications which
may be enhanced by the Quantum Internet. For example, the end-to-
end security of a Classical Internet application may be improved
by secure communication setup using a quantum application.
o Fast Byzantine Negotiation - A Quantum-based method for fast
agreement in Byzantine negotiations [Fitzi].
o Hybrid Internet - The "new" or evolved Internet to be formed due
to a merger of the Classical Internet and the Quantum Internet.
o Local Operations and Classical Communication (LOCC) - A method
where nodes communicate in rounds, in which (1) they can send any
classical information to each other; (2) they can perform local
quantum operations individually; and (3) the actions performed in
each round can depend on the results from previous rounds.
o Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) - NISQ was defined in
[Preskill] to represent a near-term era in quantum technology.
According to this definition, NISQ computers have two salient
features: (1) The size of NISQ computers range from 50 to a few
hundred qubits (i.e., intermediate-scale); and (2) Qubits in NISQ
computers have inherent errors and the control over them is
imperfect (i.e., noisy).
o Packet - Formatted unit of multiple related bits. The bits
contained in a packet may be classical bits, or the measured state
of qubits.
o Prepare-and-Measure - A set of Quantum Internet scenarios where
quantum nodes only support simple quantum functionalities (i.e.,
prepare qubits and measure qubits). For example, BB84 [BB84] is a
prepare-and-measure quantum key distribution protocol.
o Quantum End-node - An end-node hosts user applications and
interfaces with the rest of the Internet. Typically, an end-node
may serve in a client, server, or peer-to-peer role as part of the
application. If the end-node is part of a Quantum Network (i.e,
is a quantum end-node), it must be able to generate/transmit and
receive/process qubits. A quantum end-node must also be able to
interface to the Classical Internet for control purposes and thus
also be able to receive, process, and transmit classical bits/
packets.
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o Quantum Computer (QC) - A quantum end-node that also has quantum
memory and quantum computing capabilities is regarded as a full-
fledged quantum computer.
o Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) - A method that leverages quantum
mechanics such as no-cloning theorem to securely distribute
security keys from a sender to a receiver.
o Quantum Network - A new type of network enabled by quantum
information technology where qubits are transmitted between nodes
to convey information. (Note: qubits must be sent individually
and not in packets). The Quantum Network will use both quantum
channels, and classical channels provided by the Classical
Internet.
o Quantum Internet - A network of Quantum Networks. The Quantum
Internet will be merged into the Classical Internet to form a new
Hybrid Internet. The Quantum Internet may either improve
classical applications or may enable new quantum applications.
o Qubit - Quantum Bit (i.e., fundamental unit of information in a
quantum computer). It is similar to a classic bit in that the
state of a qubit is either "0" or "1" after it is measured and is
denoted as its basis state |0> or |1>. However, the qubit is
different than a classic bit in that the qubit can be in a linear
combination of both states before it is measured and termed to be
in superposition. The Degrees of Freedom (DOF) of a photon (e.g.,
polarization) or an electron (e.g., spin) can be used to encode a
qubit.
4. Quantum Internet Applications
4.1. Overview
The Quantum Internet is expected to be extremely beneficial for a
subset of existing and new applications. The expected applications
using Quantum Internet are still being developed as we are in the
formative stages of the Quantum Internet [Castelvecchi] [Wehner].
However, an initial (and non-exhaustive) list of the applications to
be supported on the Quantum Internet can be identified and classified
using two different schemes. Note, this document does not include
quantum computing applications that are purely local to a given node
(e.g., quantum random number generator).
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4.2. Classification by Application Usage
Applications may also be grouped by the usage that they serve into a
tripartite classification. Specifically, applications may be
classified according to the following usages:
o Quantum cryptography applications - Refers to the use of quantum
information technology to ensure secure communications (e.g.,
QKD).
o Quantum sensors applications - Refers to the use of quantum
information technology for supporting distributed sensors or
Internet of Things (IoT) devices (e.g., clock synchronization).
o Quantum computing applications - Refers to the use of quantum
information technology for supporting remote quantum computing
facilities (e.g., distributed quantum computing).
This scheme can be easily understood by both a technical and non-
technical audience. The next sections describe the scheme in more
detail.
4.2.1. Quantum Cryptography Applications
Examples of quantum cryptography applications include quantum-based
secure communication setup and fast Byzantine negotiation.
1. Secure communication setup - Refers to secure cryptographic key
distribution between two or more end-nodes. The most well-known
method is referred to as Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [Renner],
which have been mathematically proven to be unbreakable.
2. Fast Byzantine negotiation - Refers to a Quantum-based method for
fast agreement in Byzantine negotiations [Fitzi], for example, to
reduce the number of expected communication rounds and in turn
achieve faster agreement, in contrast to classical Byzantine
negotiations. This can be used for improving consensus protocols
such as practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance(pBFT), as well as
other distributed computing features which use Byzantine
negotiations.
4.2.2. Quantum Sensor Applications
Example of quantum sensor applications include network clock
synchronization, high sensitivity sensing, etc. These applications
mainly leverage a network of entangled quantum sensors (i.e. quantum
sensor networks) for high-precision multi-parameter estimation
[Proctor].
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1. Network clock synchronization - Refers to a world wide set of
atomic clocks connected by the Quantum Internet to achieve an
ultra precise clock signal [Komar] with fundamental precision
limits set by quantum theory.
2. High sensitivity sensing - Refers to applications that leverage
quantum phenomena to achieve reliable nanoscale sensing of
physical magnitudes. For example, [Guo] uses an entangled
quantum network for measuring the average phase shift among
multiple distributed nodes, to achieve high-sensitivity and
distributed quantum sensing.
4.2.3. Quantum Computing Applications
Examples of quantum computing include distributed quantum computing
and secure quantum computing with privacy preservation, which can
enable new types of cloud computing.
1. Distributed quantum computing - Refers to a collection of remote
small capacity quantum computers (i.e., each supporting a few
qubits) that are connected and working together in a coordinated
fashion so as to simulate a virtual large capacity quantum
computer [Wehner].
2. Secure quantum computing with privacy preservation - Refers to
private, or blind, quantum computation, which provides a way for
a client to delegate a computation task to one or more remote
quantum computers without disclosing the source data to be
computed over [Fitzsimons].
4.3. Control vs Data Plane Classification
The majority of routers currently used in the Classical Internet
separate control plane functionality and data plane functionality
for, amongst other reasons, stability, capacity and security. In
order to classify applications for the Quantum Internet, a somewhat
similar distinction can be made. Specifically some applications can
be classified as being responsible for initiating sessions and
performing other control plane functionality. Other applications
carry application or user data and can be classified as data plane
functionality.
Some examples of what may be called control plane applications in the
Classical Internet are Domain Name Server (DNS), Session Information
Protocol (SIP), and Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP).
Furthermore, examples of data plane applications are E-mail, web
browsing, and video streaming. Note that some applications may
require both control plane and data plane functionality. For
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example, a Voice over IP (VoIP) application may use SIP to set up the
call and then transmit the VoIP user packets over the data plane to
the other party.
Similarly, nodes in the Quantum Internet applications may also use
the classification paradigm of control plane functionality versus
data plane functionality where:
o Control Plane - Network functions and processes that operate on
(1) control bits/packets or qubits (e.g., to setup up end-user
encryption); or (2) management bits/packets or qubits (e.g., to
configure nodes). For example, a quantum ping could be
implemented as a control plane application to test and verify if
there is a quantum connection between two quantum nodes. Another
example is quantum superdense coding (which is used to transmit
two classical bits by sending only one qubit). This approach does
not need classical channels. Quantum superdense coding can be
leveraged to implement a secret sharing application to share
secrets between two parties. This secret sharing application
based on quantum superdense encoding can be classified as control
plane functionality.
o Data Plane - Network functions and processes that operate on end-
user application bits/packets or qubits (e.g., voice, video,
data). Sometimes also referred to as the user plane. For
example, a data plane application can be video conferencing, which
uses QKD-based secure communication setup (which is a control
plane function) to share a secret key for encrypting and
decrypting video frames.
As shown in the table in Figure 1, control and data plane
applications vary for different types of networks. For a standalone
Quantum Network (i.e., that is not integrated into the Internet),
entangled qubits are its "data" and thus entanglement distribution
can be regarded as its data plane application, while the signalling
for controlling entanglement distribution be considered as control
plane. But looking at Quantum Internet, QKD-based secure
communication setup, which may be based on and leverage entanglement
distribution, is in fact a control plane application, while video
conference using QKD-based secure communication setup is a data plane
application. In the future, two data planes may exist, respectively
for Quantum Internet and Classical Internet, while one control plane
can be leveraged for both Quantum Internet and Classical Internet.
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+----------+-----------+----------------+----------------------+
| | | | |
| | Classical | Quantum | Hybrid |
| | Internet | Internet | Internet |
| | Examples | Examples | Examples |
+----------+-----------+----------------+----------------------+
| Control | ICMP; | Quantum ping; | QKD-based secure |
| Plane | DNS | Signalling for | communication |
| | | controlling | setup |
| | | entanglement | |
| | | distribution; | |
---------------------------------------------------------------|
| Data | Video | QKD; | Video conference |
| Plane | conference| Entanglement | using QKD-based |
| | | distribution | secure communication |
| | | | setup |
+--------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 1: Examples of Control vs Data Plane Classification
5. Selected Quantum Internet Use Cases
The Quantum Internet will support a variety of applications and
deployment configurations. This section details a few key use cases
which illustrates the benefits of the Quantum Internet. In system
engineering, a use case is typically made up of a set of possible
sequences of interactions between nodes and users in a particular
environment and related to a particular goal. This will be the
definition that we use in this section.
5.1. Secure Communication Setup
In this scenario, two banks (i.e., Bank #1 and Bank #2) need to have
secure communications for transmitting important financial
transaction records (see Figure 2). For this purpose, they first
need to securely exchange a classic secret cryptographic key (i.e., a
sequence of classical bits), which is triggered by an end-user banker
at Bank #1. This results in a source quantum node A at Bank #1 to
securely send a classic secret key to a destination quantum node B at
Bank #2. This is referred to as a secure communication setup. Note
that the quantum node A and B may be either a bare-bone quantum end-
node or a full-fledged quantum computer. This use case shows that
the Quantum Internet can be leveraged to improve the security of
Classical Internet applications of which the financial application
shown in Figure 2 is an example.
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One requirement for this secure communication setup process is that
it should not be vulnerable to any classical or quantum computing
attack. This can be realized using QKD [ETSI-QKD-Interfaces]. QKD
can securely establish a secret key between two quantum nodes,
without physically transmitting it through the network and thus
achieving the required security. QKD is the most mature feature of
the quantum information technology, and has been commercially
deployed in small-scale and short-distance deployments. More QKD use
cases are described in ETSI documents [ETSI-QKD-UseCases].
In general, QKD (e.g., [BB84]) without using entanglement works as
follows:
1. The source quantum node A transforms the secret key to qubits.
Basically, for each classical bit in the secret key, the source
quantum node A randomly selects one out of two bases and uses the
selected basis to prepare/generate a qubit for the classical bit.
2. The source quantum node A sends qubits to the destination quantum
node B via quantum channel.
3. The destination quantum node receives qubits and measures each of
them in one of the two bases at random.
4. The destination quantum node informs the source node of its
choice of basis for each qubit.
5. The source quantum node informs the destination node which random
quantum basis is correct.
6. Both nodes discard any measurement bit under different quantum
basis and remaining bits could be used as the secret key. Before
generating the final secret key, there is a post-processing. For
example, both nodes usually employ a part of the remaining bits
to check if there were any errors and/or if there were an
eavesdrop; another part of the remaining bits could be taken as
the secret key. Basically, if an eavesdropper tries to intercept
and read qubits sent from node A to node B, the eavesdropper will
be detected due to the no-cloning theorem of quantum mechanics.
As a part of the post-processing, both nodes usually also perform
information reconciliation [Elkouss] for efficient error
correction and/or conduct privacy amplification [BTang] for
generating the final information-theoretical secure keys.
It is worth noting that:
1. There are some entanglement-based QKD protocols such as
[Treiber], which work differently than above steps. The
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entanglement-based schemes, where entangled states are prepared
externally to the source quantum node and the destination quantum
node, are not normally considered "prepare-and-measure" as
defined in [Wehner]; other entanglement-based schemes, where
entanglement is generated within the source quantum node can
still be considered "prepare-and-measure"; send-and-return
schemes can still be "prepare-and-measure", if the information
content, from which keys will be derived, is prepared within the
source quantum node the source quantum node before being sent to
the destination quantum node for measurement.
2. There are many enhanced QKD protocols based on [BB84]. For
example, a series of loopholes have been identified due to the
imperfections of measurement devices; there are several solutions
to take into account these attacks such as measurement-device-
independent QKD [PZhang]. These enhanced QKD protocol can work
differently than the steps of BB84 protocol [BB84].
3. For large-scale QKD, QKD Networks (QKDN) are required, which can
be regarded as a subset of a Quantum Internet. A QKDN may
consist of a QKD application layer, a QKD network layer, and a
QKD link layer [Qin]. One or multiple trusted QKD relays
[QZhang] may exist between the source quantum node A and the
destination quantum node B, which are connected by a QKDN.
Alternatively, a QKDN may rely on entanglement distribution and
entanglement-based QKD protocols; as a result, quantum-repeaters/
routers instead of trusted QKD relays are needed for large-scale
QKD.
4. Although the addresses of Source Quantum Node A and Destination
Quantum Node B could be identified and exposed, the identity of
users, who will use the secret cryptographic key for secure
communications, will not necessarily be exposed during QKD
process. In other words, there is no direct mapping from the
addresses of quantum nodes to the user identity; as a result, QKD
protocols do not disclose user identities.
As a result, the Quantum Internet in Figure 2 contains quantum
channels. And in order to support secure communication setup
especially in large-scale deployment, it also requires entanglement
generation and entanglement distribution
[I-D.van-meter-qirg-quantum-connection-setup], quantum repeaters/
routers, and/or trusted QKD relays.
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+---------------+
| End User |
|(e.g., Banking |
| Application) |
+---------------+
^
| User Interface
| (e.g., GUI)
V
+-----------------+ /--------\ +-----------------+
| |--->( Quantum )--->| |
| Source | ( Internet ) | Destination |
| Quantum | \--------/ | Quantum |
| Node A | | Node B |
| (e.g., Bank #1) | /--------\ | (e.g., Bank #2) |
| | ( Classical) | |
| |<-->( Internet )<-->| |
+-----------------+ \--------/ +-----------------+
Figure 2: Secure Communication Setup
5.2. Secure Quantum Computing with Privacy Preservation
Secure computation with privacy preservation refers to the following
scenario:
1. A client node with source data delegates the computation of the
source data to a remote computation node (i.e. a server).
2. Furthermore, the client node does not want to disclose any source
data to the remote computation node and thus preserve the source
data privacy.
3. Note that there is no assumption or guarantee that the remote
computation node is a trusted entity from the source data privacy
perspective.
As an example illustrated in Figure 3, a terminal node such as a home
gateway has collected lots of data and needs to perform computation
on the data. The terminal node could be a classical node without any
quantum capability, a bare-bone quantum end-node or a full-fledged
quantum computer. The terminal node has insufficient computing power
and needs to offload data computation to some remote nodes. Although
the terminal node can upload the data to the cloud to leverage cloud
computing without introducing local computing overhead, to upload the
data to the cloud can cause privacy concerns. In this particular
case, there is no privacy concern since the source data will not be
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sent to the remote computation node which could be compromised. Many
protocols as described in [Fitzsimons] for delegated quantum
computing or Blind Quantum Computation (BQC) can be leveraged to
realize secure delegated computation and guarantee privacy
preservation simultaneously.
As a new client/server computation model, BQC generally enables: 1)
The client delegates a computation function to the server; 2) The
client does not send original qubits to the server, but send
transformed qubits to the server; 3) The computation function is
performed at the server on the transformed qubits to generate
temporary result qubits, which could be quantum-circuit-based
computation or measurement-based quantum computation. The server
sends the temporary result qubits to the client; 4) The client
receives the temporary result qubits and transform them to the final
result qubits. During this process, the server can not figure out
the original qubits from the transformed qubits. Also, it will not
take too much efforts on the client side to transform the original
qubits to the transformed qubits, or transform the temporary result
qubits to the final result qubits. One of the very first BQC
protocols such as [Childs] follows this process, although the client
needs some basic quantum features such as quantum memory, qubit
preparation and measurement, and qubit transmission. Measurement-
based quantum computation is out of the scope of this document and
more details about it can be found in [Jozsa].
It is worth noting that:
1. The BQC protocol in [Childs] is a circuit-based BQC model, where
the client only performs simple quantum circuit for qubit
transformation, while the server performs a sequence of quantum
logic gates. Qubits are transmitted back and forth between the
client and the server.
2. Universal BQC in [Broadbent] is a measurement-based BQC model,
which is based on measurement-based quantum computing leveraging
entangled states. The principle in UBQC is based on the fact the
quantum teleportation plus a rotated Bell measurement realizes a
quantum computation, which can be repeated multiple times to
realize a sequence of quantum computation. In this approach, the
client first prepares transformed qubits and send them to the
server and the server needs first to prepare entangled states
from all received qubits. Then, multiple interaction and
measurement rounds happen between the client and the server. For
each round, the client computes and sends new measurement
instructions or measurement adaptations to the server; then, the
server performs the measurement according to the received
measurement instructions to generate measurement results (qubits
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or in classic bits); the client receives the measurement results
and transform them to the final results.
3. A hybrid universal BQC is proposed in [XZhang], where the server
performs both quantum circuits like [Childs] and quantum
measurements like [Broadbent] to reduce the number of required
entangled states in [Broadbent]. Also, the client is much
simpler than the client in [Childs]. This hybrid BQC is a
combination of circuit-based BQC model and measurement-based BQC
model.
4. It will be ideal if the client in BQC is a purely classical
client, which only needs to interact with the server using
classical channel and communications. [HHuang] demonstrates such
an approach, where a classical client leverages two entangled
servers to perform BQC, with the assumption that both servers can
not communicate with each other; otherwise, the blindness or
privacy of the client can not be guaranteed. The scenario as
demonstrated in [HHuang] is essentially an example of BQC with
multiple servers.
5. How to verify that the server will perform what the client
requests or expects is an important issue in many BQC protocols,
referred to as verifiable BQC. [Fitzsimons] discusses this issue
and compares it in various BQC protocols.
6. Measurement-based quantum computation is out of the scope of this
document. [Jozsa] provides a good introduction of measurement-
based quantum computation.
In Figure 3, the Quantum Internet contains quantum channels and
quantum repeaters/routers for long-distance qubits transmission
[I-D.irtf-qirg-principles].
+----------------+ /--------\ +----------------+
| |--->( Quantum )--->| |
| | ( Internet ) | Remote |
| Terminal | \--------/ | Computation |
| Node | | Node |
| (e.g., Home | /--------\ | (e.g., QC |
| Gateway) | ( Classical) | in Cloud) |
| |<-->( Internet )<-->| |
+----------------+ \--------/ +----------------+
Figure 3: Secure Quantum Computing with Privacy Preservation
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5.3. Distributed Quantum Computing
There can be two types of distributed quantum computing [Denchev]:
1. Leverage quantum mechanics to enhance classical distributed
computing problems. For example, entangled quantum states can be
exploited to improve leader election in classical distributed
computing, by simply measuring the entangled quantum states at
each party (e.g., a node or a device) without introducing any
classical communications among distributed parties [Pal].
Normally, pre-shared entanglement needs first be established
among distributed parties, followed by LOCC operations at each
party. And it generally does not need to transmit qubits among
distributed parties.
2. Distribute quantum computing functions to distributed quantum
computers. A quantum computing task or function (e.g., quantum
gates) is split and distributed to multiple physically separate
quantum computers. And it may or may not need to transmit qubits
(either inputs or outputs) among those distributed quantum
computers. Pre-shared entangled states may be needed to transmit
quantum states among distributed quantum computers without using
quantum communications, similar to quantum teleportation. For
example, [Yimsiriwattana] has proved that a CNOT gate can be
realized jointly by and distributed to multiple quantum
computers. The rest of this section focuses on this type of
distributed quantum computing.
As a scenario for the second type of distributed quantum computing,
Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) computers distributed in
different locations are available for sharing. According to the
definition in [Preskill], a NISQ computer can only realize a small
number of qubits and has limited quantum error correction. In order
to gain higher computation power before fully-fledged quantum
computers become available, NISQ computers can be connected via
classic and quantum channels. This scenario is referred to as
distributed quantum computing [Caleffi] [Cacciapuoti01]
[Cacciapuoti02]. This use case reflects the vastly increased
computing power which quantum computers as a part of the Quantum
Internet can bring, in contrast to classical computers in the
Classical Internet, in the context of distributed quantum computing
ecosystem [Cuomo]. According to [Cuomo], quantum teleportation
enables a new communication paradigm, referred to as teledata
[VanMeter01], which moves quantum states among qubits to distributed
quantum computers. In addition, distributed quantum computation also
needs the capability of remotely performing quantum computation on
qubits on distributed quantum computers, which can be enabled by the
technique called telegate [VanMeter02].
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As an example, scientists can leverage these connected NISQ computer
to solve highly complex scientific computation problems such as
analysis of chemical interactions for medical drug development [Cao]
(see Figure 4). In this case, qubits will be transmitted among
connected quantum computers via quantum channels, while classic
control messages will be transmitted among them via classical
channels for coordination and control purpose. Another example of
distributed quantum computing is secure Multi-Party Quantum
Computation (MPQC) [Crepeau], which can be regarded as a quantum
version of classical secure Multi-Party Computing (MPC). In secure
MPQC, multiple participants jointly perform quantum computation on a
set of input quantum states, which are prepared and provided by
different participants. One of primary aims of secure MPQC is to
guarantee that each participant will not know input quantum states
provided by other participants. Secure MPQC relies on verifiable
quantum secret sharing [Lipinska].
For the example shown in Figure 4, qubits from one NISQ computer to
another NISQ computer are very sensitive and should not be lost. For
this purpose, quantum teleportation can be leveraged to teleport
sensitive data qubits from one quantum computer A to another quantum
computer B. Note that Figure 4 does not cover measurement-based
distributed quantum computing, where quantum teleportation may not be
required. When quantum teleportation is employed, the following
steps happen between A and B. In fact, LOCC [Chitambar] operations
are conducted at the quantum computer A and B in order to achieve
quantum teleportation as illustrated in Figure 4.
1. The quantum computer A locally generates some sensitive data
qubits to be teleported to the quantum computer B.
2. A shared entanglement is established between the quantum computer
A and the quantum computer B (i.e., there are two entangled
qubits: |q1> at A and |q2> at B). For example, the quantum
computer A can generate two entangled qubits (i.e., |q1>
and |q2>) and sends |q2> to the quantum computer B via quantum
communications.
3. Then, the quantum computer A performs a Bell measurement of the
entangled qubit |q1> and the sensitive data qubit.
4. The result from this Bell measurement will be encoded in two
classical bits, which will be physically transmitted via a
classical channel to the quantum computer B.
5. Based on the received two classical bits, the quantum computer B
modifies the state of the entangled qubit |q2> in the way to
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generate a new qubit identical to the sensitive data qubit at the
quantum computer A.
In Figure 4, the Quantum Internet contains quantum channels and
quantum repeaters/routers [I-D.irtf-qirg-principles]. This use case
needs to support entanglement generation and entanglement
distribution (or quantum connection) setup
[I-D.van-meter-qirg-quantum-connection-setup] in order to support
quantum teleportation.
+-----------------+
| End-User |
|(e.g., Scientist)|
+-----------------+
^
|User Interface (e.g. GUI)
|
+------------------+-------------------+
| |
| |
V V
+----------------+ /--------\ +----------------+
| |--->( Quantum )--->| |
| | ( Internet ) | |
| Quantum | \--------/ | Quantum |
| Computer A | | Computer B |
| (e.g., Site #1)| /--------\ | (e.g., Site #2)|
| | ( Classical) | |
| |<-->( Internet )<-->| |
+----------------+ \--------/ +----------------+
Figure 4: Distributed Quantum Computing
6. General Requirements
6.1. Background
Quantum technologies are steadily evolving and improving. Therefore,
it is hard to predict the timeline and future milestones of quantum
technologies as pointed out in [Grumbling] for quantum computing.
Currently, a NISQ computer can achieve fifty to hundreds of qubits
with some given error rate. In fact, the error rates of two-qubit
quantum gates have decreased nearly in half every 1.5 years (for
trapped ion gates) to 2 years (for superconducting gates). The error
rate also increases as the number of qubits increases. For example,
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a current 20-qubit machine has a total error rate which is close to
the total error rate of a 7 year old two-qubit machine [Grumbling].
On the network level, six stages of Quantum Internet development are
described in [Wehner] as follows:
1. Trusted repeater networks (Stage-1)
2. Prepare and measure networks (Stage-2)
3. Entanglement distribution networks (Stage-3)
4. Quantum memory networks (Stage-4)
5. Fault-tolerant few qubit networks (Stage-5)
6. Quantum computing networks (Stage-6)
The first stage are simple trusted repeater networks, while the final
stage are quantum computing networks where the full-blown Quantum
Internet will be achieved. Each intermediate stage brings with it
new functionality, new applications, and new characteristics.
Figure 5 illustrates Quantum Internet use cases as described in this
document mapped to the Quantum Internet stages described in [Wehner].
For example, secure communication setup can be supported in Stage-1,
Stage-2, or Stage-3, but with different QKD solutions. More
specifically:
In Stage-1, basic and short-distance QKD is possible and can be
leveraged to support secure communication setup but trusted nodes are
required to provide end-to-end security. The primary requirement is
trusted nodes.
In Stage-2, end-to-end security without relying on trusted nodes is
possible to support secure communication setup too. The primary
requirement is long-distance qubit transmission to enable long-
distance QKD.
In Stage-3, end-to-end security can be enabled based on quantum
repeaters and entanglement distribution, to support the same secure
communication setup application. The primary requirement is
entanglement distribution to enable long-distance QKD.
In Stage-4, Secure quantum computing with privacy-preservation can be
enabled since it needs quantum memory for multiple rounds of quantum
computation.
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Finally, in Stage-6, distributed quantum computing relaying more
qubits can be supported.
+---------+---------------------------+------------------------+
| Quantum | Example Quantum | |
| Internet| Internet Use | Characteristic |
| Stage | Cases | |
+---------+---------------------------+------------------------+
| Stage-1 | Secure Comm Setup | Trusted Nodes |
| | with Basic QKD | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| Stage-2 | Secure Comm Setup | Long-distance qubit |
| | with Long-Distance QKD | transmission |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| Stage-3 | Secure Comm Setup | Entanglement |
| | with Long-Distance QKD | distribution |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| Stage-4 | Secure/Blind Quantum | Quantum memory |
| | Computing | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| Stage-5 | Higher-accuracy clock | Fault tolerance |
| | synchronization | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| Stage-6 | Distributed quantum | More qubits |
| | computing | |
+--------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 5: Example Use Cases in Different Quantum Internet Stages
6.2. Requirements
Some general and functional requirements on the Quantum Internet from
the networking perspective, based on the above applications and use
cases, are identified as follows:
1. Methods for facilitating quantum applications to interact
efficiently with entanglement qubits are necessary in order for
them to trigger distribution of designated entangled qubits to
potentially any other quantum node residing in the Quantum
Internet. To accomplish this specific operations must be
performed on entangled qubits (e.g., entanglement swapping,
entanglement distillation). Quantum nodes may be quantum end-
nodes, quantum repeaters/routers, and/or quantum computers.
2. Quantum repeaters/routers should support robust and efficient
entanglement distribution in order to extend and establish
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entanglement connection between two quantum nodes. For achieving
this, it is required to first generate an entangled pair on each
hop of the path between these two nodes.
3. Quantum end-nodes must send additional information on classical
channels to aid in transmission of qubits across quantum
repeaters/receivers. This is because qubits are transmitted
individually and do not have any associated packet overhead which
can help in transmission of the qubit. Any extra information to
aid in routing, identification, etc., of the qubit(s) must be
sent via classical channels.
4. Methods for managing and controlling the Quantum Internet
including quantum nodes and their quantum resources are
necessary. The resources of a quantum node may include quantum
memory, quantum channels, qubits, established quantum
connections, etc. Such management methods can be used to monitor
network status of the Quantum Internet, diagnose and identify
potential issues (e.g. quantum connections), and configure
quantum nodes with new actions and/or policies (e.g. to perform a
new entanglement swapping operation). New management information
model for the Quantum Internet may need to be developed.
7. Conclusion
This document provides an overview of some expected applications for
the Quantum Internet, and then details selected use cases. The
applications are first grouped by their usage which is a natural and
easy to understand classification scheme. The applications are then
classified as either control plane or data plane functionality as
typical for the classical Internet. This set of applications may, of
course, naturally expand over time as the Quantum Internet matures.
Finally, some general requirements for the Quantum Internet are also
provided.
This document can also serve as an introductory text to persons
interested in learning about the practical uses of the Quantum
Internet. Finally, it is hoped that this document will help guide
further research and development of the specific Quantum Internet
functionality required to implement the applications and uses cases
described herein. To this end, a few key requirements for the
Quantum Internet are specified.
8. IANA Considerations
This document requests no IANA actions.
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9. Security Considerations
This document does not define an architecture nor a specific protocol
for the Quantum Internet. It focuses instead on detailing use cases,
requirements, and describing typical Quantum Internet applications.
However, some useful observations can be made regarding security as
follows.
It has been clearly identified that once large-scale quantum
computing becomes reality it will be able to theoretically break many
of the public-key (i.e., asymmetric) cryptosystems currently in use
because of the exponential increase of computing power with quantum
computing. This would negatively affect many of the security
mechanisms currently in use on the classic Internet. This has given
strong impetus for starting development of new cryptographic systems
that are secure against quantum computing attacks [NISTIR8240].
Paradoxically, development of the Quantum Internet will also mitigate
the threats posed by quantum computing attacks against public-key
cryptosystems. Specifically, the secure communication setup feature
of the Quantum Internet as described in Section 5.1 will be strongly
resistant to both classical and quantum computing attacks against
public-key cryptosystems.
A key additional threat consideration for the Quantum Internet is
pointed to by [RFC7258], which warns of the dangers of pervasive
monitoring as a widespread attack on privacy. Pervasive monitoring
is defined as a widespread, and usually covert, surveillance through
intrusive gathering of application content or protocol metadata such
as headers. This can be accomplished through active or passive
wiretaps, traffic analysis, or subverting the cryptographic keys used
to secure communications.
Once again, the secure communication setup feature of the Quantum
Internet as described in Section 5.1 will be strongly resistant to
pervasive monitoring. In addition, the intrinsic property of qubits
to decohere if they are observed, albeit covertly, will allow
detection of the pervasive monitoring if it somehow did occur. In
addition, Section 5.2 provides a method to perform remote quantum
computing while preserving the privacy of the source data thus making
it resistant to pervasive monitoring.
10. Acknowledgments
The authors want to thank Mathias Van Den Bossche, Xavier de Foy,
Patrick Gelard, Alvaro Gomez Inesta, Wojciech Kozlowski, Rodney Van
Meter, Joey Salazar, and Joseph Touch, and the rest of the QIRG
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community as a whole for their very useful reviews and comments to
the document.
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Authors' Addresses
Chonggang Wang
InterDigital Communications, LLC
1001 E Hector St
Conshohocken 19428
USA
Email: Chonggang.Wang@InterDigital.com
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Akbar Rahman
InterDigital Communications, LLC
1000 Sherbrooke Street West
Montreal H3A 3G4
Canada
Email: rahmansakbar@yahoo.com
Ruidong Li
NICT
4-2-1 Nukui-Kitamachi
Koganei, Tokyo 184-8795
Japan
Email: lrd@nict.go.jp
Melchior Aelmans
Juniper Networks
Boeing Avenue 240
Schiphol-Rijk 1119 PZ
The Netherlands
Email: maelmans@juniper.net
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