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Versions: 00 01 02                                                      
Internet Engineering Task Force                 Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
INTERNET-DRAFT                                   IIJ Research Laboratory
Expires: August 27, 2001                                      K. Ettikan
                                                   Multimedia University
                                                       February 27, 2001


                      An analysis of IPv6 anycast
               draft-itojun-ipv6-anycast-analysis-02.txt

Status of this Memo


This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all
provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that other groups
may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material
or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.''

To view the list Internet-Draft Shadow Directories, see
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

The internet-draft will expire in 6 months.  The date of expiration will
be August 27, 2001.


Abstract

The memo tries to identify the problems and issues in the use of IPv6
anycast [Hinden, 1998] defined as of today.  The goals of the draft are
(1) to understand the currently-defined IPv6 anycast better, (2) to
provide guidelines for people trying to deploy anycast services, and (3)
to suggest updates to IPv6 anycast protocol specification.

The document was made possible by input from ipngwg DNS discovery design
team.


1.  IPv6 anycast

"Anycast" is a communication model for IP, just like unicast and
multicast are.  RFC1546 [Partridge, 1993] documents IPv4 anycast, and it
defines the term "anycast".



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Anycast can be understood best by comparing with unicast and multicast.
IP unicast allows a source node to transmit IP datagrams to a single
destination node.  The destination node is identified by an unicast
address.  IP multicast allows a source node to transmit IP datagrams to
a group of destination nodes.  The destination nodes are identfied by a
multicast group, and we use a multicast address to identify the
multicast group.

IP anycast allows a source node to transmit IP datagrams to a single
destination node, out of a group of destination nodes.  IP datagram will
reach the closest destination node in the set of destination nodes,
based on routing measure of distance.  The source node does not need to
care about how to pick the closest destination node, as the routing
system will figure it out (in other words, the source node has no
control over the selection).  The set of destionation nodes is
identified by an anycast address.

Anycast was adopted by IPv6 specification suite.  RFC2373 [Hinden, 1998]
defines the IPv6 anycast address, and its constraints in the usage.  The
following sections try to analyze RFC2373 rules, and understand
limitations with them.  At the end of the draft we compile a couple of
suggestions to exisitng proposals, for extending the usage of the IPv6
anycast.


2.  Limitations/properties in the current proposals

2.1.  Identifying anycast destination

For anycast addresses, RFC2373 uses the same address format as unicast
addresses.  Therefore, without other specific configurations, a sender
cannot usually identify if the node is sending a packet to anycast
destination, or unicast destination.  This is different from
experimental IPv4 anycast [Partridge, 1993] , where anycast address is
distinguishable from unicast addresses.

2.2.  Nondeterministic packet delivery

If multiple packets carry an anycast address in IPv6 destionation
address header, these packets may not reach the same destination node,
depending on stability of the routing table.  The property leads to a
couple of interesting symptoms.

If we can assume that the routing table is stable enough during a
protocol exchange, multiple packets (with anycast address in
destination) will reach the same destination node just fine.  However,
there is no guarantee.

If routing table is not stable enough, or you would like to take a more
strict approach, a client can only send one packet with anycast address
in the destination address field.  For example, consider the following
packet exchange.  The following exchange can lead us to failure, as we


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are not sure if the 1st and 2nd anycast packet have reached the same
destination.

     query: client unicast (Cu) -> server anycast (Sa)
     reply: server unicast (Su) -> client unicast (Cu)
     query: client unicast (Cu) -> server anycast (Sa)
              It may reach a different server!
     reply: server unicast (Su) -> client unicast (Cu)

Because of the non-determinism, if we take a strict approach, we can use
no more than 1 packet with anycast destination address, in a set of
protocol exchange.  If we use more than 2 packets, 1st and 2nd packet
may reach different server and may cause unexpected results.  If the
protocol is completely stateless, and we can consider the first
roundtrip and second roundtrip separate, it is okay.  For stateful
protocols, it is suggested to use anycast for the first packet in the
exchange, to discover unicast address of the (nearest) server.  After we
have discovered the unicast address of the server, we should use the
server's unicast address for the protocol exchange.

Also because of non-determinism, if we are to assign an IPv6 anycast
address to servers, those servers must provide uniform services.  For
example, if server A and server B provide different quality of service,
and people wants to differentiate between A and B, we cannot use single
IPv6 anycast address to identify both A and B.

Note that, the property is not a bad thing; the property lets us use
anycast addresses for load balancing.  Also, packets will automatically
be delivered to the nearest node with anycast address assigned.

Here are situations where multiple packets with anycast destination
address can lead us to problems:

o Fragmented IPv6 packets.  Fragments may reach multiple different
  destinations, and will prevent reassembly.

Because the sending node cannot differentiate between anycast addresses
and unicast addresses, it is hard for the sending node to control the
use of fragmentation.

2.3.  Anycast address assignment to hosts

RFC2373 suggests to assign anycast addresses to a node, only when the
node is a router.  This is to avoid injecting host routes for anycast
address, into the IPv6 routing system.  If no hosts have anycast address
on them, it is easier for us to route an IP datagram to anycast
destination.  We just need to follow existing routing entries, and we
will eventually hit a router that has the anycast address.  If we follow
RFC2373 restriction strictly, we could only place anycast addresses onto
routers.




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2.4.  Anycast address in source address

Under RFC2373, anycast address IPv6 anycast address can not be put into
IPv6 source address.  This is basically because an IPv6 anycast address
does not identify single source node.

2.5.  IPsec

IPsec and IKE identify nodes by using source/destination address pairs.
Due to the combination of issues presented above, it is very hard to use
IPsec on packets with anycast address in source address, destination
address, or both.

Even with manual keying, IPsec trust model with anycast address is
confusing.  As IPsec uses IPv6 destination address to identify which
IPsec key to be used, we need to use the same IPsec key for all of the
anycast destinations that share an anycast address.

Dynamic IPsec key exchange (like IKE) is almost impossible.  First of
all, to run IKE session between two nodes, the two nodes need to be able
to communicate with each other.  With nondeterministic packet delivery
provided by anycast, it is not quite easy.  Even if we could circumvent
the issue with IKE, we have exactly the same problem as manual keying
case for actual communication.


3.  Possible improvements and protocol changes

3.1.  Assigning anycast address to hosts (non-router nodes)

Under RFC2373 rule, we can only assign anycast addresses to routers, not
to hosts.  The restriction was put into the RFC because it was felt
insecure to permit hosts to inject host routes to anycast address.

If we try to ease the restriction and assign anycast addresses to IPv6
hosts (non-routers), we would need to inject host routes for the anycast
addresses, with prefix length set to /128, into the IPv6 routing system.
We will inject host routes from each of the nodes with anycast
addresses, to make packets routed to a topologically-closest node.  Or,
we may be able to inject host routes from routers adjacent to the
servers (not from the servers themselvers).

Here are possible ways to allow anycast addresses to be assigned to
hosts.  We would need to diagnose each of the following proposals
carefully, as they have different pros and cons.  The most serious issue
would be the security issue with service blackhole attack (malicious
party can blackhole packets toward anycast addresses, by making false
advertisement).

o Let the host with anycast address to participate into routing
  information exchange.  The host does not need to fully participate; it
  only needs to announce the anycast address to the routing system.  To


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  secure routing exchange, administrators need to configure secret
  information that protects the routing exchange to the host, as well as
  other routers.

o Develop a protocol for a router, to discover hosts with anycast
  address on the same link.  The router will then advertise the anycast
  address to the routing system.  This could be done by an extension to
  IPv6 Neighbor Discovery or an extension to IPv6 Multicast Listener
  Discovery [Haberman, 2001] .

The impact of host routes depends on the scope of the anycast address
usage.  For example, if we use site-local anycast address to identify a
set of servers, the propagation of host route is limited inside the
site.  If the site administration policy permits it, and the site
routers can handle the additional routing entries, the additional host
routes are okay.  So, we can safely assign anycast address to non-router
nodes (hosts), and inject host route for the anycast address, into the
site IPv6 routing system.  It is still questionable to inject host
routes into worldwide IPv6 routing system, as it has problems in terms
of scalability.  Also, because of IPv6 route aggregation rules [Rockell,
2000] it is normally impossible to propagate IPv6 host routes worldwide.

3.2.  Anycast address in destination address

With anycast, it is hard to identify a single node out of nodes that
share an anycast address.  Suppose a client C would like to communicate
a specific server with anycast address, Si.  Si shares the same anyast
address with other servers, S1 to Sn.  It is hard for C to selectively
communicate with Si.

One possible workaround is to use IPv6 routing header.  By specifying an
unicast address of Si as an intermediate hop, C can deliver the packet
to Si, not to other Sn.

Note that we now have lost the robustness provided by the use of anycast
address.  If Si goes down, the communication between C and Si will be
lost.  C cannot enjoy the failure resistance provided by redundant
servers, S1 to Sn.  Designers should carefully diagnose if any state is
managed by C and/or Si, and decide if it is a good idea to use the
workaround presented here.

3.3.  Anycast address in source address

Under RFC2373 rule, anycast address cannot be put into source address.
Here is a possible workaround, however, it could not win a consensus in
the past ipngwg meetings:

o When we try to use anycast address in the source address, use an (non-
  anycast) unicast address as the IPv6 source address, and attach home
  address option with anycast address.  In ipngwg discussions, however,
  there seem to be a consensus that the home address option should have
  the same semantics as the source address in the IPv6 header, so we


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  cannot put anycast address into the home address option.

3.4.  IPsec with static key configuration

TBD

3.5.  IPsec with dynamic key exchange

TBD


4.  Upper layer protocol issus

4.1.  Use of UDP with anycast

Many of the UDP-based protocols use source and destination address pair
to identify the traffic.  One example would be DNS over UDP; most of the
DNS client implementation checks if the source address of the reply is
the same as the destination address of the query, in the fear of the
fabricated reply from bad guy.

     query: client unicast (Cu) -> server unicast (Su*)
     reply: server unicast (Su*) -> client unicast (Cu)

     addresses marked with (*) must be equal.

If we use server's anycast address as the destination of the query, we
cannot meet the requirement due to RFC2373 restriction (anycast address
cannot be used as the source address of packets).  Effectively, client
will consider the reply is fabricated (hijack attempt), and drops the
packet.

     query: client unicast (Cu) -> server anycast (Sa)
     reply: server unicast (Su) -> client unicast (Cu)

Note that, however, bad guys can still inject fabricated results to the
client, even if the client checks the source address of the reply.  The
check does not improve security of the exchange at all.  So, regarding
to this issue, we conclude as follows:

o To use anycast address on the UDP protocol exchange, client side
  should not check the source address of the incoming packet.  Packet
  pairs must be identified by using UDP port numbers or upper-layer
  protocol mechanisms (like cookies).  The source address check itself
  has no real protection.

o If you need to secure UDP protocol exchange, it is suggested to verify
  the authenticity of the reply, by using upper-layer security
  mechanisms like DNSSEC (note that we cannot use IPsec with anycast).





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4.2.  Use of TCP with anycast

We cannot simply use anycast for TCP exchanges, as we identify a TCP
connection by using address/port pair for the source/destination node.
It is desired to implement some of the following, to enable the use of
IPv6 anycast in TCP.  Note, however, security requirement is rather
complicated for the following protocol modifications.

o Define a TCP option which lets us to switch peer's address from IPv6
  anycast address, to IPv6 unicast address.  There are couple of
  proposals in the past.

o Define an additional connection setup protocol that resolves IPv6
  unicast address from IPv6 anycast address.  We first resolve IPv6
  unicast address using the new protocol, and then, make a TCP
  connection using the IPv6 unicast address.  IPv6 node information
  query/reply [Crawford, 2000] could be used for this.


5.  Summary

The draft tried to diagnose the limitation in currntly-specified IPv6
anycast, and explored couple of ways to extend its use.  Some of the
proposed changes affects IPv6 anycast in general, some are useful in
certain use of IPv6 anycast.  To take advantage of anycast addresses,
protocol designers would need to diagnose their requirements to anycast
address, and introduce some of the tricks described in the draft.

Use of IPsec with anycast address still needs a great amount of
analysis.


6.  Security consideration

The document should introduce no new security issues.

For secure anycast operation, we may need to enable security mechanisms
in other protocols.  For example, if we were to inject /128 routes from
end hosts by using a routing protocol, we may need to configure the
routing protocol to exchange routes securely, to prevent malicious
parties from injecting bogus routes.  With anycast, it is very important
to prevent malicious parties from injecting bogus routes, as it allows
them to effectively suck all traffic torward anycast address.


References

Hinden, 1998.
R. Hinden and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture" in
RFC2373 (July 1998). ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2373.txt.




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Partridge, 1993.
C. Partridge, T. Mendez, and W. Milliken, "Host Anycasting Service" in
RFC1546 (November 1993). ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1546.txt.

Haberman, 2001.
B. Haberman and D. Thaler, "Host-based Anycast using MLD," internet
draft (February 2001). work in progress material.

Rockell, 2000.
Rob Rockell and Bob Fink, "6Bone Backbone Routing Guidelines" in RFC2772
(February 2000). ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2772.txt.

Crawford, 2000.
Matt Crawford, "IPv6 Node Information Queries," internet draft (August
2000). work in progress material.


Change history

00 -> 01
     Improve security considerations section.  Remove an invalid use of
     home address option from UDP section.  Improve wording on IPsec.

01 -> 02
     Split sections for current status analysis, and future protocol
     design suggestions.


Authors' address

     Jun-ichiro itojun HAGINO
     Research Laboratory, Internet Initiative Japan Inc.
     Takebashi Yasuda Bldg.,
     3-13 Kanda Nishiki-cho,
     Chiyoda-ku,Tokyo 101-0054, JAPAN
     Tel: +81-3-5259-6350
     Fax: +81-3-5259-6351
     Email: itojun@iijlab.net

     K. Ettikan
     Faculty of Information Technology, Multimedia University (MMU)
     Jalan Multimedia
     63100 Cyberjaya Selangor, Malaysia
     Tel: +60-3-8312-5403
     Fax: +60-3-8312-5264
     Email: ettikan@mmu.edu.my








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