Internet Engineering Task Force J. Durand
Internet-Draft CISCO Systems, Inc.
Intended status: BCP I. Pepelnjak
Expires: September 3, 2012 NIL
G. Doering
SpaceNet
March 2, 2012
BGP operations and security
draft-jdurand-bgp-security-00.txt
Abstract
This documents describes best current practices to manage securely
BGP in a network. It will explain the basic policies ones should
configure on BGP peerings to keep an healthy BGP table. This
document will only focus on unicast and multicast tables (SAFI 1 and
2) for IPv4 and IPv6.
Foreword
A placeholder to list general observations about this document.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 3, 2012.
Copyright Notice
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Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Protection of BGP sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. MD5 passwords on BGP peerings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. BGP TTL security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Prefix filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Definition of prefix filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1.1. Prefixes that are not routable by definition . . . . . 4
4.1.2. Prefixes not allocated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1.3. Prefixes too specific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.4. Anti-spoofing filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.5. Exchange point LAN prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.6. Default route . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Prefix filtering recommendations in full routing
networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2.1. Filters with internet peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2.2. Filters with customers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2.3. Filters with upstream providers . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3. Prefix filtering recommendations for leaf networks . . . . 11
4.3.1. Ingress filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3.2. Egress filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. BGP route flap dampening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Maximum prefixes on a peering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. AS-path filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. BGP community scrubbing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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1. Introduction
BGP [6] is the protocol used in the internet to exchange routing
information between network domains. This protocol does not directly
include mechanisms that control that routes exchanged conform to the
various rules defined by the Internet community. This document
intends to summarize most common existing rules and help network
administrators applying simply coherent BGP policies.
2. Definitions
o BGP peering: any TCP BGP connection on the Internet.
3. Protection of BGP sessions
3.1. MD5 passwords on BGP peerings
BGP sessions can be secured with MD5 passwords [8], to protect
against attacks that could bring down the session (by sending spoofed
TCP RST packets) or possibly insert packets into the TCP stream
(routing attacks).
The drawback of TCP/MD5 is additional management overhead for
password maintenance. MD5 protection is recommended when peerings
are established over shared networks where spoofing can be done (like
internet exchanges, IXPs).
You should block spoofed packets (packets with source IP address
belonging to your IP address space) at all edges of your network,
making TCP/MD5 protection of BGP sessions unnecessary on iBGP session
or EBGP sessions run over point-to-point links.
3.2. BGP TTL security
BGP sessions can be made harder to spoof with the TTL security -
instead of sending TCP packets with TTL value = 1, the routers send
the TCP packets with TTL value = 255 and the receiver checks that the
TTL value equals 255. Since it's impossible to send an IP packet
with TTL = 255 to a non-directly-connected IP host, BGP TTL security
effectively prevents all spoofing attacks coming from third parties
not directly connected to the same subnet as the BGP-speaking
routers.
Note: Like MD5 protection, TTL security has to be configured on both
ends of a BGP session.
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4. Prefix filtering
The main aspect of securing BGP resides in controlling the prefixes
that are received/advertised on the BGP peerings. Prefixes exchanged
between BGP peers are controlled with inbound and outbound filters
that can match on IP prefixes (prefix filters, Section 4), AS paths
(as-path filters, Section 7) or any other attributes of a BGP prefix
(for example, BGP communities, Section 8).
4.1. Definition of prefix filters
This section list the most commonly used prefix filters. Following
sections will clarify where these filters should be applied.
4.1.1. Prefixes that are not routable by definition
4.1.1.1. IPv4
RFC3330 [12] clarifies "special" IPv4 prefixes and their status in
the Internet. Following prefixes MUST NOT cross network boundaries
(ie. ASN) and therefore MUST be filtered:
o 10.0.0.0/8 and more specific - private use
o 169.254.0.0/16 and more specific - link-local
o 172.0.0.0/8 and more specific - loopbacks
o 172.16.0.0/12 and more specific - private use
o 192.0.2.0/24 and more specific- documentation
o 192.168.0.0/16 and more specific - private use
o 224.0.0.0/4 and more specific - multicast
o 240.0.0.0/4 and more specific - reserved
4.1.1.2. IPv6
There is no equivalent of RFC3300 for IPv6. This document recalls
the prefixes that MUST not cross network boundaries and therefore
MUST be filtered:
o 2001:DB8::/32 and more specific - documentation [13]
o Prefixes more specific than 2002::/16 - 6to4 [3]
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o 3FFE::/16 and more specific - was initially used for the 6Bone
(worldwide IPv6 test network) and returned to IANA.
o FC00::/7 and more specific - ULA (Unique Local Addresses) [5]
o FE80::/10 and more specific - link-local addresses [7]
o FEC0::/10 and more specific - initially reserved for unicast site-
local addresses [4]. As some networks may still use it for
private addressing it is worth considering it when filtering
private prefixes.
o FF00::/8 and more specific - multicast
The list of IPv6 prefixes that MUST not cross network boundaries can
be simplified as follows:
o 2001:DB8::/32 and more specific - documentation [13]
o Prefixes more specific than 2002::/16 - 6to4 [3]
o All prefixes that are outside 2000::/3 prefix
4.1.2. Prefixes not allocated
IANA allocates prefixes to RIRs which in turn allocate prefixes to
LIRs. It is wise not to accept in the routing table prefixes that
are not allocated. This could mean allocation made by IANA and/or
allocations done by RIRs. This section details the options for
building list of allocated prefixes at every level.
4.1.2.1. IANA allocated prefixes filters
IANA has allocated all the IPv4 available space. Therefore there is
no reason why one would keep checking prefixes are in the IANA
allocated address space [19]. No specific filter need to be put in
place by administrators who want to make sure that IPv4 prefixes they
receive have been allocated by IANA.
For IPv6, given the size of the address space, it can be seen as wise
accepting only prefixes derived from those allocated by IANA.
Administrators can dynamically build this list from the IANA
allocated IPv6 space [20]. As IANA keeps allocating prefixes to
RIRs, the aforementioned list should be checked regularly against
changes and if they occur, prefix filter should be computed and
pushed on network devices. As there is delay between the time a RIR
receives a new prefix and the moment it starts allocating portions of
it to its LIRs, there is no need doing this step quickly and
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frequently. At least process in place should make sure there is no
more than one month between the time the IANA IPv6 allocated prefix
list changes and the moment all IPv6 prefix filters have been
updated.
4.1.2.2. RIR allocated prefixes filters
A more precise check can be performed as one would like to make sure
that prefixes they receive are being originated by the autonomous
system which actually own the prefix. It has been observed in the
past that one could easily advertise someone else's prefix (or more
specific prefixes) and create black holes or security threats. To
overcome that risk, administrators would need to make sure BGP
advertisements correspond to information located in the existing
registries. At this stage 2 options can be considered (short and
long term options). They are described in the following subsections.
4.1.2.3. Prefix filters creation from RIR database
This option consists in using RIR database information for building
for a given BGP neighbor a list of prefixes and the list of prefix
with corresponding originating autonomous system. This can be done
relatively easily using scripts and existing tools capable of
retrieving this information in the registries. This approach is
exactly the same for both IPv4 and IPv6.
The macro-algorithm for the script is described as follows. For the
peer that is considered, the distant network administrator has
provided the autonomous system and may be able to provide an AS-SET
object (aka AS-MACRO). An AS-SET is an object which contains AS
numbers or other AS-SET's. An operator may create an AS-SET defining
all the AS numbers of its customers. A tier 1 transit provider might
create an AS-SET describing the AS-SET of connected operators, which
in turn describe the AS numbers of their customers. Using recursion,
it is possible to retrieve from an AS-SET the complete list of AS
numbers that the peer is susceptible to announce. For each of these
AS numbers, it is also easy to check in the corresponding RIR
database all associated prefixes. With these 2 mechanisms a script
can build for a given peer the list of allowed prefixes and the AS
number from which they should be originated.
As prefixes, AS numbers and AS-SET's may not all be under the same
RIR authority, a difficulty resides choosing for each object the
appropriate database to poll. Some registries have been created and
are not restricted to a given region or authoritative RIR. They
allow RIRs to publish their information in a common place. They also
make it possible for any subscriber (probably under contract) to
publish information too. When doing requests inside such a database,
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it is possible to specify the source of information in order to have
the most reliable data. One could check the central registry and
only check that the source is one of the 5 RIRs. The probably most
famous registry of that kind is the RADB [21] (Routing Assets
Database).
As objects in RIRs DB may quickly vary over time, it is important
that prefix filters computed using this mechanism are refreshed
regularly. A daily basis could even been considered as some routing
changes must be done sometimes in a certain emergency and registries
may be updated at the very last moment. It has to be noted that this
approach significantly increases the complexity of the router
configurations as it can quickly add more than ten thousands
configuration lines for some important peers.
4.1.2.4. SIDR - Secure Inter Domain Routing
IETF has created a working group called SIDR (Secure Inter-Domain
Routing) in order to create an architecture to secure internet
advertisements. At the time this document is written, many document
has been published and a framework is proposed so that advertisements
can be checked against signed routing objects in RIR routing
registries. Implementing mechanisms proposed by this working group
is the solution that will solve at a longer term the BGP routing
security. But as it may take time objects are signed and deployments
are done such a solution will need to be combined at the time being
with other mechanisms proposed in this document. The rest of this
section assumes the reader understands all technologies associated
with SIDR.
Each received route on a router should be checked against the RPKI
data set: if a corresponding ROA is found and is valid then the
prefix should be accepted. It the ROA is found and is INVALID then
the prefix should be discarded. If an ROA is not found then the
prefix should be accepted but corresponding route should be given a
low preference.
4.1.3. Prefixes too specific
4.1.3.1. IPv4
Prefixes longer than /24 are usually not announced in the IPv4
internet [16]
4.1.3.2. IPv6
Prefixes longer than /48 are usually not announced in the IPv6
internet [17]
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4.1.4. Anti-spoofing filters
Filtering its own prefixes on peerings with all peers (ingress
direction) is a protection against spoofing attacks. Such filters
must be defined with caution as they can break existing redundancy
mechanisms. For example in case an operator has a multihomed
customer, it should keep accepting the customer prefix from its peers
and upstreams. This will make it possible for the customer to keep
accessing its operator network (and other customers) via the internet
in case the BGP peering between the customer and the operator is
down.
4.1.5. Exchange point LAN prefixes
When a network is present on an exchange point, it must make sure it
doesn't receive exchange point LAN prefix and more specifics from any
of its BGP peers.
4.1.6. Default route
4.1.6.1. IPv4
0.0.0.0/0 prefix MUST NOT be announced on the Internet but it is
usually exchanged on upstream/customer peerings.
4.1.6.2. IPv6
::/0 prefix MUST NOT be announced on the Internet but it is usually
exchanged on upstream/customer peerings.
4.2. Prefix filtering recommendations in full routing networks
For networks that have the full internet BGP table, some policies
should be applied on each BGP peer for received and advertised
routes. It is recommended that each autonomous filter configures
rules for advertised and received routes at all its borders as this
will protect the network and its peer even in case of
misconfiguration. The most commonly used filtering policy is
proposed in this section.
4.2.1. Filters with internet peers
4.2.1.1. Ingress filtering
There are basically 2 options, the loose one where no check will be
done against RIR allocations and the strict one where it will be
verified that announcements strictly conform to what is declared in
routing registries.
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4.2.1.1.1. Ingress filtering loose option
In that case, the following prefixes received from a BGP peer will be
filtered:
o Prefixes not routable (Section 4.1.1)
o Prefixes not allocated by IANA (IPv6 only) (Section 4.1.2.1)
o Routes too specific (Section 4.1.3)
o Self prefixes (Section 4.1.4)
o Exchange points LAN prefixes (Section 4.1.5)
o Default route (Section 4.1.6)
4.2.1.1.2. Ingress filtering strict option
In that case, filters are applied to make sure advertisements
strictly conform to what is declared in routing registries
Section 4.1.2.2. It must be checked that in case of script failure
all routes are rejected.
In addition to this, one could apply following filters beforehand in
case routing registry used as source of information by the script is
not fully trusted:
o Prefixes not routable (Section 4.1.1)
o Routes too specific (Section 4.1.3)
o Self prefixes (Section 4.1.4)
o Exchange points LAN prefixes (Section 4.1.5)
o Default route (Section 4.1.6)
4.2.1.2. Egress filtering
Configuration in place will make sure that only appropriate prefixes
are sent. These can be for example prefixes belonging to the
considered networks and those of its customers. This can be done
using BGP communities or many other solution. Whatever scenario
considered, it can be desirable that following filters are positioned
before to avoid unwanted route announcement due to bad configuration:
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o Prefixes not routable (Section 4.1.1)
o Routes too specific (Section 4.1.3)
o Exchange points LAN prefixes (Section 4.1.5)
o Default route (Section 4.1.6)
In case it is possible to list the prefixes to be advertised, then
just configuring the list of allowed prefixes and denying the rest is
sufficient.
4.2.2. Filters with customers
4.2.2.1. Ingress filtering
Ingress policy with end customers is pretty straightforward: only
customers prefixes must be accepted, all others should be discarded.
The list of accepted prefixes can be manually specified, after having
verified that they are valid. This validation can be done with the
appropriate IP address management authorities. For example one will
not accept a prefix if it is in a PA (Provider Aggregateable) block.
Same rules apply in case the customer is also a network connecting
other customers (for example a tier 1 transit provider connecting
service providers). An exception can be envisaged in case it is
known that the customer network applies strict ingress/egress
filtering, and the number of prefixes announced by that network is
too large to list them in the router configuration. In that case
filters as in Section 4.2.1.1 can be applied.
4.2.2.2. Egress filtering
Egress policy with customers may vary according to the routes
customer wants to receive. In the simplest possible scenario,
customer wants to receive only the default route, which can be done
easily by applying a filter with the default route only.
In case the customer wants to receive the full routing (in case it is
multihomed or if wants to have a view on the internet table), the
following filters can be simply applied on the BGP peering:
o Prefixes not routable (Section 4.1.1)
o Routes too specific (Section 4.1.3)
o Default route (Section 4.1.6)
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There can be a difference for the default route that can be announced
to the customer in addition to the full BGP table. This can be done
simply by removing the filter for the default route. As the default
route may not be present in the routing table, one may decide to
originate it only for peerings where it has to be advertised.
4.2.3. Filters with upstream providers
4.2.3.1. Ingress filtering
In case the full routing table is desired from the upstream, the
prefix filtering to apply is more or less the same than the one for
peers Section 4.2.1.1. There can be a difference for the default
route that can be desired from an upstream provider even if it
advertises the full BGP table. In case the upstream provider is
supposed to announce only the default route, a simple filter will be
applied to accept only the default prefix and nothing else.
4.2.3.2. Egress filtering
The filters to be applied should not differ from the ones applied for
internet peers (Section 4.2.1.2).
4.3. Prefix filtering recommendations for leaf networks
4.3.1. Ingress filtering
The leaf network will position the filters corresponding to the
routes it is requesting from its upstream. In case a default route
is requested, simple inbound filter will be applied to accept only
that default route (Section 4.1.6). In case the leaf network is not
capable of listing the prefix because the amount is too large (for
example if it requires the full internet routing table) then it
should configure filters to avoid receiving bad announcements from
its upstream:
o Prefixes not routable (Section 4.1.1)
o Routes too specific (Section 4.1.3)
o Self prefixes (Section 4.1.4)
o Default route (Section 4.1.6) depending if the route is requested
or not
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4.3.2. Egress filtering
A leaf network will most likely have a very straightforward policy:
it will only announce its local routes. It can also configure the
following prefixes filters described in Section 4.2.1.2 to avoid
announcing invalid routes to its upstream provider.
5. BGP route flap dampening
BGP route flap dampening mechanism makes it possible to give
penalties to routes each time they change in the BGP routing table.
Initially this mechanism was created to protect the entire internet
from multiple events impacting a single network. RIPE community now
recommends not using BGP route flap dampening [15]. Author of this
document proposes to follow the proposal of the RIPE community.
6. Maximum prefixes on a peering
It is recommended to configure a limit on the number of routes to be
accepted from a peer. Following rules are generally recommended:
o From peers, it is recommended to have a limit lower than the
number of routes in the internet. This will shut down the BGP
peering if the peer suddenly advertises the full table. One can
also configure different limits for each peer, according to the
number of routes they are supposed to advertise.
o From upstreams which provide full routing, it is recommended to
have a limit much higher than the number of routes in the
internet. A limit is still useful in order to protect the network
(and in particular the routers' memory) if too many routes are
sent by the upstream. The limit should be chosen according to the
number of routes that can actually be handled by routers.
It is important to review regularly the limits that are configured as
the internet can quickly change over time. Some vendors propose
mechanisms to have 2 thresholds: while the higher number specified
will shutdown the peering, the first threshold will only trigger a
log and can be used to passively adjust limits based on observations
made on the network.
7. AS-path filtering
The following rules should be applied on BGP AS-paths:
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o Do not accept anything other than customer's AS number from the
customer. Alternatively, only accept AS-paths with a single AS
number (potentially repeated several times) from your customers.
The latter option is easier to configure than per-customer AS-path
filters: the default BGP logic will make sure in that case that
the first AS number in the AS-path is the one of the peer.
o Do not accept overly long AS path prepending from the customer.
o Do not accept more than two distinct AS path numbers in the AS
path if your customer is an ISP with customers. This rule becomes
useless in case prefix filters are built from registries as
described in Section 4.1.2.3.
o Do not advertise prefixes with non-empty AS-path if you're not
transit.
o Do not advertise prefixes with upstream AS numbers in the AS path
to your peering AS.
o Do not accept private AS numbers except from customers
o Do not advertise private AS numbers. Exception: Customers using
BGP without having their own AS number must use private AS numbers
to advertise their prefixes to their upstream. The private AS
number is usually provided by the upstream.
o Do not accept prefixes when the first AS number in the AS-path is
not the one of the peer. In case the peering is done toward a BGP
route-server [23] (connection on an Internet eXchange Point - IXP)
with transparent AS path handling, this verification needs to be
de-activated as the first AS number will be the one of an IXP
member whereas the peer AS number will be the one of the BGP
route-server.
8. BGP community scrubbing
Optionally we can consider the following rules on BGP AS-paths:
o Scrub inbound communities with your AS number in the high-order
bits - allow only those communities that customers/peers can use
as a signaling mechanism
o Do not remove other communities: your customers might need them to
communicate with upstream providers. In particular do not
(generally) remove the no-export community as it is usually
announced by your peer for a certain purpose.
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9. Acknowledgements
A placeholder to acknowledge contributors.
10. IANA Considerations
This memo includes no request to IANA.
11. Security Considerations
This document is entirely about BGP operational security.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997,
<http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/html/rfc2119.html>.
[2] Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629,
June 1999.
[3] Carpenter, B. and K. Moore, "Connection of IPv6 Domains via
IPv4 Clouds", RFC 3056, February 2001.
[4] Huitema, C. and B. Carpenter, "Deprecating Site Local
Addresses", RFC 3879, September 2004.
[5] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
Addresses", RFC 4193, October 2005.
[6] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway Protocol 4
(BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[7] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.
[8] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP Authentication
Option", RFC 5925, June 2010.
12.2. Informative References
[9] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and E.
Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", BCP 5,
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RFC 1918, February 1996.
[10] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997.
[11] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.
[12] IANA, "Special-Use IPv4 Addresses", RFC 3330, September 2002.
[13] Huston, G., Lord, A., and P. Smith, "IPv6 Address Prefix
Reserved for Documentation", RFC 3849, July 2004.
[14] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", RFC 4234, October 2005.
[15] Smith, P. and C. Panigl, "RIPE-378 - RIPE Routing Working Group
Recommendations On Route-flap Damping", May 2006.
[16] Smith, P., Evans, R., and M. Hughes, "RIPE-399 - RIPE Routing
Working Group Recommendations on Route Aggregation",
December 2006.
[17] Smith, P. and R. Evans, "RIPE-532 - RIPE Routing Working Group
Recommendations on IPv6 Route Aggregation", November 2011.
[18] Doering, G., "IPv6 BGP Filter Recommendations", November 2009,
<http://www.space.net/~gert/RIPE/ipv6-filters.html>.
[19] "IANA IPv4 Address Space Registry", <http://www.iana.org/
assignments/ipv4-address-space/ipv4-address-space.xml>.
[20] "IANA IPv6 Address Space Registry", <http://www.iana.org/
assignments/ipv6-unicast-address-assignments/
ipv6-unicast-address-assignments.xml>.
[21] "Routing Assets Database", <http://www.radb.net>.
[22] "Secure Inter-Domain Routing IETF working group",
<http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/sidr/>.
[23] "Internet Exchange Route Server", <http://tools.ietf.org/id/
draft-jasinska-ix-bgp-route-server-03.txt>.
Durand, et al. Expires September 3, 2012 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft BGP OPSEC March 2012
Authors' Addresses
Jerome Durand
CISCO Systems, Inc.
11 rue Camille Desmoulins
Issy-les-Moulineaux 92782 CEDEX
FR
Email: jerduran@cisco.com
Ivan Pepelnjak
NIL Data Communications
Tivolska 48
Ljubljana 1000
Slovenia
Email: ip@nil.com
Gert Doering
SpaceNet AG
Joseph-Dollinger-Bogen 14
Muenchen D-80807
Germany
Email: gert@space.net
Durand, et al. Expires September 3, 2012 [Page 16]