Transport Area Working Group                                  J. Holland
Internet-Draft                                 Akamai Technologies, Inc.
Intended status: Experimental                             April 21, 2017
Expires: October 23, 2017

     Circuit Breaker Assisted Congestion Control (CBACC): Protocol


   This document specifies Circuit Breaker Assisted Congestion Control
   (CBACC), which provides bandwidth information from senders to
   intermediate network nodes to enable good decisions for fast-trip
   Network Transport Circuit Breaker activity
   ([I-D.ietf-tsvwg-circuit-breaker]) when necessary for network health.
   CBACC is specifically designed to support protocols using IP
   multicast, particularly as a supplement to receiver-driven congestion
   control protocols to help affected networks rapidly detect and
   mitigate the impact of scenarios in which a network is oversubscribed
   to flows which are not responsive to congestion.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 23, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   ( in effect on the date of

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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Protocol Specification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.2.  Packet Header Fields  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       5.2.1.  Bandwidth Advertisement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6  As an IP header option  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6  Field definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.3.  States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       5.3.1.  Interface State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       5.3.2.  Flow State  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.4.  Functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Requirements from other building blocks . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     8.1.  Forged Packets  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     8.2.  Overloading of Slow Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     8.3.  Overloading of State  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Appendix A.  Overjoining  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

1.  Introduction

   This document specifies Circuit Breaker Assisted Congestion Control

   CBACC is a congestion control building block designed for use with IP
   traffic that has a known maximum bandwidth, which does not reduce its
   sending rate in response to congestion.  CBACC is specifically
   designed to supplement protocols using receiver-driven multicast
   congestion control systems that rely on well-behaved receivers to
   achieve congestion control in a very highly scalable system (up to
   millions of receivers) without a feedback path that reduces sending

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   rates by senders.  Examples of congestion control systems fitting
   this description include PLM, RLM, RLC, FLID-DL, SMCC, ESMCC, QIRLM,
   and WEBRC [RFC3738].

   CBACC addresses a vulnerability to "overjoining", a condition in
   which receivers (particularly malicious receivers) subscribe to
   traffic which, from the sending side, is non-responsive to
   congestion.  Overjoining attacks and the challenges they present are
   discussed in more detail in Appendix A.

   A careful reading of the congestion control requirements of UDP Best
   Practices [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis] suggests that a network that
   forwards multicast traffic is required to operate a circuit breaker
   to maintain network health under a persistent overjoining condition,
   at a cost of cutting off some or all multicast traffic across the
   network during high congestion.

   CBACC provides a mechanism for networks to mitigate the impact of
   overjoining within a network by introducing a mechanism for
   communicating the bandwidth of non-responsive flows from the sender
   of the flow to the transit nodes forwarding the flow.  The bandwidth
   information is sufficient to implement a fast-trip circuit breaker
   [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-circuit-breaker] within a single network node which
   can specifically block or police flows when receivers have overjoined
   the network's capacity.

   In conjunction with receiver counts (e.g. via [RFC6807]) such nodes
   can also provide much improved network fairness for circuit breaking
   decisions during an overjoining condition.

   In addition to streams using multicast receiver-driven congestion
   control, CBACC may also be suitable for use with other traffic, both
   unicast and multicast, that does not respond to congestion by
   reducing sending rates, including certain profiles of RTP [RFC3550]
   over either unicast or multicast, as well as several tunneling
   protocols (e.g.  AMT [RFC7450] and GRE [RFC2784]) when they are known
   to carry traffic that would be suitable for CBACC.  A complete
   specification for use of CBACC with unicast protocols and with
   tunneling protocols is out of scope for this document, though the
   security issues section does mention a few special considerations for
   potential unicast usage.

   CBACC-compliant senders transmit Bandwidth Advertisements through the
   same transport path as the data traffic, so that circuit breakers can
   make informed decisions about how flows should be prioritized for
   circuit breaking.  Additionally, CBACC-compliant circuit breakers
   transmit information to receivers about flows which have been or
   might soon be circuit-broken, to encourage CBACC-aware applications

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   to use alternate methods to retrieve equivalent (though probably
   lower-quality and possibly less efficient) data when possible.

   This document describes a building block as defined in [RFC3048].
   This document describes a congestion control building block that
   conforms to [RFC2357].  This document follows the general guidelines
   provided in [RFC3269], in addition to the requirements on RFCs from
   [RFC5226] and [RFC3552].

2.  Terminology

   |     Term     |                     Definition                     |
   |   circuit    |        See [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-circuit-breaker]        |
   |   breaker    |                                                    |
   |  controlled  |    See [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis] Section 3.6     |
   | environment  |                                                    |
   |   general    |    See [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis] Section 3.6     |
   |   internet   |                                                    |
   |     flow     | traffic for a single (source,destination) IP pair, |
   |              |  including destinations that are group addresses   |
   |   upstream   | along a network topology path in the direction of  |
   |              |                  a flow's sender                   |
   |  downstream  | along a network topology path in the direction of  |
   |              |                 a flow's receiver                  |
   |   ingress    |  the (single) upstream interface for a flow in a   |
   |  interface   |                  circuit breaker                   |
   |    egress    |   a downstream interface for a flow in a circuit   |
   |  interface   |                      breaker                       |

                                  Table 1

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3.  Rationale

   CBACC is defined as an independent congestion control building block
   because it would be a useful supplement a wide variety of receiver-
   driven multicast congestion control schemes, such as [PLM] or other
   methods based on receiver-driven conformance to a measurement of
   available network bandwidth or congestion.

   CBACC is also potentially valuable, even without other congestion
   control systems, in controlled environments where congestion control

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   may not be required (e.g. for certain profiles of RTP [RFC3550]),
   since CBACC can provide protection for such a network against
   congestion due to sender or network mis-configuration.

   CBACC provides a new form of communication between senders and
   network transit nodes to facilitate fast-trip circuit breakers as
   described in section 5.1 of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-circuit-breaker] which
   are not available via previously existing methods.  When used in
   conjunction with compatible circuit breakers, CBACC can greatly
   improve the safety of a network that accepts and delivers interdomain
   massively scalable multicast traffic to potentially untrusted

4.  Applicability

   CBACC relies on the presence of CBACC-aware circuit breakers on a
   flow's transit path in order to provide congestion control in a
   network.  In the absence of any CBACC-aware circuit breakers on a
   network path, CBACC constitutes a small extra overhead to a flow
   without providing any additional value.

   CBACC provides a form of congestion control for massively scalable
   protocols using the IP multicast service.  CBACC is best used in
   conjunction with another receiver-driven multicast congestion
   control, but it is also suitable for use even without another
   congestion control mechanism, or when presence of another congestion
   control mechanism is unproven, such as when accepting multicast joins
   from untrusted receivers.

5.  Protocol Specification

5.1.  Overview

   CBACC senders send Bandwidth Advertisement packets to advertise the
   maximum sending bandwidth along the data path for a flow through a

   CBACC bandwidth information is monitored by CBACC circuit breakers
   along the network path, which may block the forwarding of traffic for
   some flows in order to maintain network health.  When a flow is
   blocked, a CBACC circuit breaker sets a bit in Bandwidth
   Advertisement packets before they're forwarded downstream that
   indicates to subscribed receivers of that flow that traffic has been

   The protocol also defines a way to notify downstream receivers when a
   flow is in danger of being circuit broken in the near future.  A
   CBACC-capable transport node SHOULD send this information when it is

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   known, as described in section [TBD].  This gives applications an
   opportunity to gracefully shift to a lower-bandwidth version of the
   same content, when possible, providing an early warning system for
   avoiding congestion more smoothly.

   A Bandwidth Advertisement packet constitutes an "ingress meter" as
   described in section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-circuit-breaker].  The
   configured bandwidth caps of egress interfaces likewise constitute
   "egress meters".  However, the diagram in the referenced document is
   simplified by running the ingress and egress on the same network
   node.  At the CBACC-aware circuit breaker, the CBACC node has both
   pieces of information as soon as a Bandwidth Advertisement is
   received, and can trip the circuit breaker if the aggregate
   advertised CBACC bandwidth exceeds the actual bandwidth available on
   any egress interfaces.

5.2.  Packet Header Fields

5.2.1.  Bandwidth Advertisement  As an IP header option

   Bandwidth advertisements can appear as either an IPv4 header option
   (as in Section 3.1 of [RFC0791]) or as an IPv6 extension header
   option (as in section 4.2 of [RFC2460]).  They have the same layout:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   |     Type      |     Length    |B|D|P|   Res   |   Priority    |
   |                           Bandwidth                           |

                                 Figure 1

   Bandwidth advertisements sent as IPv4 header options use option value
   [TBD], with the "copied" bit set and the option class "control", as
   specified in [RFC0791] section 3.1.  Until and unless IANA assigns a
   value, this will be option number 158 as described in section 8 of
   [RFC4727] for experiments using IPv4 Option types.  The length field
   is 8.

   Bandwidth advertisements sent as IPv6 header options use option value
   [TBD], with the "action" bits set to "skip" and the "change" bit set
   to 1, as specified in [RFC2460] section 4.2.  Until and unless IANA
   assigns a value, this will be option number 0x3e as described in

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   section 8 of [RFC4727] for experiments using IPv6 Option Types.  The
   length field is 6.

   Using an IP header option has the benefit of exposing the bandwidth
   to all CBACC-compatible routers, in much the same way the IP Router
   Alert option would, but without being processed or causing undue load
   in non-CBACC routers.

   The IP Header encapsulations DO work with IPSEC.  As described in
   Appendix A of [RFC4302], the IP header fields are properly treated as
   mutable and zeroed for the IPSEC ICV calculations.  CBACC circuit
   breakers MAY change bits in transit.  The Bandwidth Advertisement
   header itself IS NOT protected by IPSEC security services, but
   protection of other parts of the packet remain unchanged.  Field definitions  Bandwidth

   As in several other protocols sending bandwidth values such as OSPF-
   TE [RFC3630], the bandwidth is expressed in bytes per second (not
   bits), in IEEE floating point format.  For quick reference, this
   format is as follows:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   |S|    Exponent   |                  Fraction                   |

                                 Figure 2

   S is the sign, Exponent is the exponent base 2 in "excess 127"
   notation, and Fraction is the mantissa - 1, with an implied binary
   point in front of it.  Thus, the above represents the value:

   (-1)**(S) * 2**(Exponent-127) * (1 + Fraction)

                For more details, refer to [IEEE.754.1985].

                                 Figure 3  B (Blocked) bit

   Indicates that the flow has been circuit-broken.

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   Indicates that the flow is in danger of being circuit-broken.  P (Police) bit

   Indicates that the flow should be policed instead of blocked.  Flows
   marked for policing by the sender should have traffic proportionally
   dropped when bandwidth is needed, according to their priority.  [TBD]
   Flesh this concept out, and decide whether it's actually viable.
   This was my attempt at addressing a suggestion from Bob Briscoe at
   IETF 97 in ICCRG at the mic, IIRC.  It probably requires more state,
   such as total desired policable bandwidth, total current policed
   bandwidth, and current policing bandwidth per-flow, plus some
   definition of how to decide between cutting off some flows and
   policing others.  This may not be worth the hassle, but there are
   some use cases such as FEC repair traffic which might actually be
   nicer this way.  However, it might also be possible to get the same
   effect by assigning priority to those repair flows.  Things like
   video enhancement layers of course are probably better done as a
   complete cutoff.  Res (Reserved bits)

   The sender MUST set all reserved bits to 0 when sending a CBACC
   control packet.  Receivers and CBACC-capable transit nodes MUST
   accept any value in the reserved bits.  Priority

   The sender MAY indicate relative priorities of different streams from
   the same sender with this field.  This is an 8-bit unsigned integer,
   and higher values are kept preferentially over other traffic from the
   same sender with lower priority values, so all flows with a lower
   priority value are circuit-broken before any flows with a higher
   priority value.  Among multiple flows from the same sender with the
   same priority, the highest bandwidth flows are circuit- broken first.

5.3.  States

5.3.1.  Interface State

   A CBACC circuit breaker holds the following state for each interface,
   for both the inbound and outbound directions on that interface:

   o  aggregate bandwidth:  The sum of the bandwidths of all non-
       circuit-broken CBACC flows which transit this interface in this

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   o  bandwidth limit:  The maximum aggregate CBACC advertised bandwidth
       allowed, not including circuit-broken flows.  This may depend on
       administrative configuration and congestion measurements for the
       network, whether from this node or other nodes.  It's out of
       scope for this document to define such congestion measurements.
       Network operators should carefully consider that this bandwidth
       limit applies to flows that are unresponsive to congestion.

       When reducing the bandwidth limit due to congestion, the circuit
       breaker MUST NOT reduce the limit by more than half its value in
       10 seconds, and SHOULD use a smoothing function to reduce the
       limit gradually over time.

       It is RECOMMENDED that no more than half the capacity for a link
       be allocated to CBACC flows if the link might be shared with TCP
       or other traffic that is responsive to congestion.

       Depending on administrative configuration and the physical
       characteristics of the interface, the bandwidth limit may be
       either shared between upstream and downstream traffic, or it may
       be separate.  Either a single shared value should be used, or two
       separate independent values should be used for the inbound and
       outbound directions for an interface.

   o  CBACC bandwidth warning threshold:  A soft bandwidth threshold.
       When the aggregate CBACC advertised bandwidth exceeds this
       threshold, flows that would have been circuit-broken with a
       bandwidth limit at this threshold MUST have the Danger bit set in
       the Bandwidth Advertisement packets that are forwarded by this
       circuit breaker.  This threshold SHOULD be configurable as a
       proportion of the bandwidth limit, and MUST remain at or below
       the bandwidth limit when the bandwidth limit changes.  The
       recommended proportion value is .75, but specific networks may
       use a different value if deemed useful by the network operators.

5.3.2.  Flow State

   The following state is kept for flows that are joined from at least
   one downstream interface and for which at least one CBACC Bandwidth
   Advertisement packet has been received:

   o  bandwidth:  The bandwidth from the most receintly received
       Bandwidth Advertisement.

   o  ingress status:  One of the following values:

          * 'subscribed'

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          Indicates that the circuit breaker is subscribed upstream to
          the flow and forwarding data and control packets through zero
          or more egress interfaces.

          * 'pruned'
          Indicates that the flow has been circuit-broken.  A request to
          unsubscribe from the flow has been sent upstream, e.g. a PIM
          prune (section 3.5 of [RFC7761]) or a "leave" operation via
          IGMP, MLD, or another appropriate group membership protocol.

          * 'probing'
          Indicates that the flow was circuit-broken previously, and is
          currently joined upstream to refresh the most recent Bandwidth
          Advertisement in order to evaluate reinstating the flow.

   o  probe timer:  Used to periodically probe a flow in the 'pruned'
       state, to evaluate returning to 'forwarding'.

   Flows additionally have a per-interface state for egress interfaces:

   o  egress status:  One of the following values:

          * 'forwarding'
          Indicates that the flow is a non-circuit-broken flow in steady
          state, forwarding data and control packets downstream.

          * 'blocked'
          Indicates that data packets for this flow are NOT forwarded
          downstream via this interface.  Bandwidth Advertisements are
          still forwarded, each with the 'Blocked' bit set to 1.  All
          other flow traffic MUST be dropped.

5.4.  Functionality

   The CBACC building block on a sender MUST have access to the maximum
   bandwidth that may be sent at any time in the following 3 seconds.  A
   CBACC sender MUST send this value in a Bandwidth Advertisement packet
   once per second.  The end result of the traffic sent on the wire for
   a particular flow MUST honor this maximum bandwidth commitment, such
   that bandwidth measurements taken over any sliding window one-second
   period MUST NOT exceed any of prior 3 maximum Bandwidth
   Advertisements (or any of them, if fewer than 3 have been sent).

   A CBACC circuit breaker MUST order its monitored flows based on per-
   flow estimates of network fairness and preferentially circuit break
   less fair flows when bandwidth limits are exceeded.  A normative
   method to determine network fairness for a flow is out of scope for
   this document, but CBACC circuit breaker implementations SHOULD

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   provide a capability for network operators to configure
   administrative biases for specific sets of flows, and network
   operators SHOULD consider fairness concerns as expressed in [RFC2914]
   section 3.2 and other relevant documents describing best practices.

   In particular, fairness metrics SHOULD favor multicast flows with
   many receivers over multicast flows with few receivers and flows with
   low bandwidth over flows with high bandwidth.  When receiver counts
   are known (for example via the experimental PIM extension specified
   in [RFC6807]) a RECOMMENDED metric is (bandwidth/receiver count),
   though other metrics MAY be used where deemed appropriate by network
   operators following internet best practices, or when receiver counts
   can't be determined.

   A CBACC sender MUST send Bandwidth Advertisements once per second.
   (Implementation-specific jitter in timer implementations not
   exceeding .1s is acceptable.)

   If a circuit breaker receives more than 5 Bandwidth Advertisement
   packets for a flow in two seconds, the circuit breaker SHOULD set the
   flow to "pruned" and leave the upstream channel, and MUST drop
   Bandwidth Advertisement packets in excess of one per second.

   Flows which are currently circuit-broken on an egress interface are
   set to "blocked".  When a flow on an egress interface is in blocked
   state, Bandwidth Advertisement packets MUST be forwarded except as
   described in the preceding paragraph, the "Blocked" bit MUST be set
   to 1 before forwarding, and other traffic for that flow MUST NOT be
   forwarded along that interface.

   When a flow is blocked or pruned, the circuit breaker MAY truncate
   the Bandwidth Advertisement packet, keeping only the headers of the
   packet containing the Bandwidth Advertisement before forwarding.

   When a flow is pruned, the circuit-breaker MUST generate and forward
   a Bandwidth Advertisement packet once per second with the "Blocked"
   bit set when there are still downstream receivers connected.

   In flows which are not circuit-broken but which would be circuit-
   broken if the bandwidth warning threshold were the bandwidth limit,
   the Danger bit MUST be set to 1 before forwarding.  Both data and
   control packets are forwarded for flows in this situation.  The
   "Danger" bit MAY be used by receivers to take early action to avoid
   getting circuit-broken by shifting to a lower-bandwidth
   representation, if available.

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   When a flow is in the "blocked" state on every egress interface, the
   circuit breaker MAY set the flow to "pruned" on the ingress interface
   and leave the channel upstream.

   In addition to monitoring the advertised bandwidth, a CBACC circuit
   breaker or other assisting nodes in the network SHOULD monitor the
   observed bandwidth per flow, and SHOULD circuit break "overactive"
   flows, defined as those which exceed their CBACC maximum bandwidth
   commitment.  A circuit breaker MAY perform constant monitoring on all
   flows, or MAY use load sharing techniques such as random selection or
   round robin to monitor only a certain subset of flows at a time.

   When detecting overactive flows, circuit breakers MUST use techniques
   to avoid false positives due to transient upstream network conditions
   such as packet compression or occasional packet duplication.  For
   example, using an average of bandwidth measurements over the prior 3
   seconds would qualify, where a half-second window would not.  (A full
   listing of reasonable false-positive avoidance techniques is out of
   scope for this document.)

   [TBD: examples with network diagrams and bandwidths?]  [TBD: some
   internal structure on this section. "wall of text" was some feedback]

6.  Requirements from other building blocks

   The sender needs to know the bandwidth, including any upcoming
   changes, at least 3 seconds in advance.  There is no requirement on
   how building blocks define this functionality except on the packets
   on the wire--the advance knowledge might, for example, be implemented
   by buffering and pacing on the sending machine.  Specifics of the
   sending bandwidth implementations are out of scope for this document,
   as it's intended to provide requirements that will be applicable to a
   broad range of possible implementations, including RTP and WEBRC.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This draft requests IANA to allocate an IPv6 packet header option
   number with the "action" bits set to "skip" and the "change" bit set
   to 1, as specified in [RFC2460] section 4.2.  [TO BE REMOVED: This
   registration should take place at the following location:

   This draft also requests IANA to allocate an IPv4 packet header
   option number with the "copied" bit set and the option class
   "control", as specified in [RFC0791] section 3.1.  [TO BE REMOVED:
   This registration should take place at the following location:

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   If those are deemed unacceptable, as an alternative with some
   compromises described in Section 5.2.1, this draft instead requests
   IANA to allocate a UDP destination port number.  [TO BE REMOVED: This
   registration should take place at the following location:

8.  Security Considerations

8.1.  Forged Packets

   Forged Bandwidth Advertisement packets that get accepted by CBACC
   circuit breakers which dramatically over-report or under-report the
   correct bandwidth would present a potential DoS against a CBACC flow,
   by making the circuit breaker believe the flow exceeds the node's
   capacity when over-reporting, or by letting the node notice an
   apparent violation of the commitment to remain under the advertised
   bandwidth when under-reporting.

   Similarly, it is possible to forge a CBACC Bandwidth Advertisement
   for a non-CBACC flow, which likewise may constitute a DoS against
   that flow.

   For multicast, attacker would have to be on-path in order to deliver
   a forged packet to a CBACC circuit breaker, because the join's
   reverse path propagation will only reach the sender on a legitimate
   network path to its source address.

   For unicast, it's a bigger problem, because ANY sender along path
   that doesn't have RPF check BCP 38 [RFC2827] permits attack on the
   flow via forged packet that substantially under-reports or over-
   reports bandwidth.

   For AMT tunnels, when RPF checks along a path to the gateway are not
   present, nothing stops forged packets from being forwarded by the
   gateway.  If these packets contain CBACC control packets, it's
   possible to inject a forged packet into the network downstream from
   the gateway, combining the unicast hole with the multicast hole.
   This is a vulnerability that should probably be addressed by a new
   AMT version with some defense against forgery of data.

   For IPSEC, since the Bandwidth Advertisement IP header option is
   mutable, it's not protected by the IPSEC security services, so the
   Bandwidth Advertisement can be forged for consumption by the circuit
   breakers, even though the packet will be rejected by the end host

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   with the security association.  This could mount a DoS via the
   intermediate circuit-breakers by over-reporting or under-reporting
   flow bandwidth, when processing CBACC traffic through untrusted
   network paths.

   The unicast vulnerabilities would be much mitigated by RPF checks as
   recommended by BCP 38 [RFC2827] at every hop, or otherwise maintained
   by the network.  Absent such checks, cheap DoS vulnerabilities may be
   present from any permissive network locations.

8.2.  Overloading of Slow Paths

   CBACC control packets are sent as part of the data stream so that
   they traverse the same intermediate network nodes as the rest of the
   data, but they also carry control information that must be processed
   by certain nodes along that path.

   This creates potential problems very similar to the problems with the
   Router Alert IP option discussed in Section 3 of [RFC6398], where a
   circuit-breaker might have a "fast path" for forwarding that can
   handle a much higher traffic volume than the "slow path" necessary to
   process CBACC control packets, which is potentially vulnerable to

   If a CBACC-compatible circuit breaker receives a high rate of CBACC
   control packets, the circuit breaker MUST maintain network health for
   other flows.  A circuit-breaker MAY drop all packets, including all
   CBACC control packets, for a flow in which more than 5 CBACC control
   packets were received in less than a second.  (This number is
   intended to allow for moderate IP packet duplication and packet
   compression by upstream routers, while still being slow enough for
   handling of packets on the slow path.)

8.3.  Overloading of State

   Since CBACC flows require state, it may be possible for a set of
   receivers and/or senders, possibly acting in concert, to generate
   many flows in an attempt to overflow the circuit breakers' state

   It is permissible for a network node to behave as a CBACC circuit
   breaker for some CBACC flows while treating other CBACC flows as non-
   CBACC, as part of a load balancing strategy for the network as a
   whole, or simply as defense against this concern when the number of
   monitored flows exceeds some threshold.

   The same techniques described in section 3.1 of [RFC4609] can be used
   to help mitigate this attack, for much the same reasons.  It is

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   RECOMMENDED that network operators implement measures to mitigate
   such attacks.

9.  Acknowledgements

   Many thanks to Devin Anderson and Ben Kaduk for detailed reviews and
   many great suggestions.  Thanks also to Cheng Jin, Scott Brown,
   Miroslav Kaduk, and Bob Briscoe for their thoughtful contributions.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

              Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
              "Standard for Binary Floating-Point Arithmetic",
              IEEE Standard 754, August 1985.

   [RFC0791]  Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981,

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

   [RFC2460]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
              (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460,
              December 1998, <>.

   [RFC3048]  Whetten, B., Vicisano, L., Kermode, R., Handley, M.,
              Floyd, S., and M. Luby, "Reliable Multicast Transport
              Building Blocks for One-to-Many Bulk-Data Transfer",
              RFC 3048, DOI 10.17487/RFC3048, January 2001,

   [RFC3738]  Luby, M. and V. Goyal, "Wave and Equation Based Rate
              Control (WEBRC) Building Block", RFC 3738,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3738, April 2004,

   [RFC4302]  Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4302, December 2005,

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   [RFC4727]  Fenner, B., "Experimental Values In IPv4, IPv6, ICMPv4,
              ICMPv6, UDP, and TCP Headers", RFC 4727,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4727, November 2006,

   [RFC7761]  Fenner, B., Handley, M., Holbrook, H., Kouvelas, I.,
              Parekh, R., Zhang, Z., and L. Zheng, "Protocol Independent
              Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM): Protocol Specification
              (Revised)", STD 83, RFC 7761, DOI 10.17487/RFC7761, March
              2016, <>.

10.2.  Informative References

              Fairhurst, G., "Network Transport Circuit Breakers",
              draft-ietf-tsvwg-circuit-breaker-15 (work in progress),
              April 2016.

              Eggert, L., Fairhurst, G., and G. Shepherd, "UDP Usage
              Guidelines", draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-19 (work in
              progress), October 2016.

   [PLM]      A.Legout, E.W.Biersack, Institut EURECOM, "Fast
              Convergence for Cumulative Layered Multicast Transmission
              Schemes", 1999.

   [RFC2357]  Mankin, A., Romanow, A., Bradner, S., and V. Paxson, "IETF
              Criteria for Evaluating Reliable Multicast Transport and
              Application Protocols", RFC 2357, DOI 10.17487/RFC2357,
              June 1998, <>.

   [RFC2784]  Farinacci, D., Li, T., Hanks, S., Meyer, D., and P.
              Traina, "Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)", RFC 2784,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2784, March 2000,

   [RFC2827]  Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
              Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
              Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, DOI 10.17487/RFC2827,
              May 2000, <>.

   [RFC2914]  Floyd, S., "Congestion Control Principles", BCP 41,
              RFC 2914, DOI 10.17487/RFC2914, September 2000,

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   [RFC3269]  Kermode, R. and L. Vicisano, "Author Guidelines for
              Reliable Multicast Transport (RMT) Building Blocks and
              Protocol Instantiation documents", RFC 3269,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3269, April 2002,

   [RFC3550]  Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
              Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
              Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, DOI 10.17487/RFC3550,
              July 2003, <>.

   [RFC3552]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
              Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,

   [RFC3630]  Katz, D., Kompella, K., and D. Yeung, "Traffic Engineering
              (TE) Extensions to OSPF Version 2", RFC 3630,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3630, September 2003,

   [RFC4609]  Savola, P., Lehtonen, R., and D. Meyer, "Protocol
              Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM) Multicast
              Routing Security Issues and Enhancements", RFC 4609,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4609, October 2006,

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,

   [RFC6398]  Le Faucheur, F., Ed., "IP Router Alert Considerations and
              Usage", BCP 168, RFC 6398, DOI 10.17487/RFC6398, October
              2011, <>.

   [RFC6807]  Farinacci, D., Shepherd, G., Venaas, S., and Y. Cai,
              "Population Count Extensions to Protocol Independent
              Multicast (PIM)", RFC 6807, DOI 10.17487/RFC6807, December
              2012, <>.

   [RFC7450]  Bumgardner, G., "Automatic Multicast Tunneling", RFC 7450,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7450, February 2015,

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Appendix A.  Overjoining

   [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis] describes several remedies for unicast
   congestion control under UDP, even though UDP does not itself provide
   congestion control.  In general, any network node under congestion
   could in theory collect evidence that a unicast flow's sending rate
   is not responding to congestion, and would then be justified in
   circuit-breaking it.

   With multicast IP, the situation is different, especially in the
   presence of malicious receivers.  A well-behaved sender using a
   receiver-controlled congestion scheme such as WEBRC does not reduce
   its send rate in response to congestion, instead relying on receivers
   to leave the appropriate multicast groups.

   This leads to a situation where, when a network accepts inter-domain
   multicast traffic, as long as there are senders somewhere in the
   world with aggregate bandwidth that exceeds a network's capacity,
   receivers in that network can join the flows and overflow the network
   capacity.  A receiver controlled by an attacker could do this at the
   IGMP/MLD level without running the application layer protocol that
   participates in the receiver-controlled congestion control.

   A network might be able to detect and defend against the most naive
   version of such an attack by blocking end users that try to join too
   many flows at once.  However, an attacker can achieve the same effect
   by joining a few high-bandwidth flows, if those exist anywhere, and
   an attacker that controls a few machines in a network can coordinate
   the receivers so they join disjoint sets of non-responsive sending

   This scenario will produce congestion in a middle node in the network
   that can't be easily detected at the edge where the IGMP/MLD join is
   accepted.  Thus, an attacker with a small set of machines in a target
   network can always trip a circuit breaker if present, or can induce
   excessive congestion among the bandwidth allocated to multicast.
   This problem gets worse as more multicast flows become available.

   This is a significant barrier to multicast adoption because there is
   no present defense which does not itself constitute a denial of
   service attack.

   Although the same can apply to non-responsive unicast traffic,
   network operators can assume that non-responsive sending flows are in
   violation of congestion control best practices, and can therefore cut
   off such flows.  However, non-responsive multicast senders are likely
   to be well-behaved participants in receiver-controlled congestion
   control schemes.

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   However, receiver controlled congestion control schemes also show the
   most promise for efficient massive scale content distribution via
   multicast, provided network health can be ensured.  Therefore,
   mechanisms to mitigate overjoining attacks while still permitting
   receiver-controlled congestion control are necessary.  [TBD: this
   whole section should be expanded and moved to a separate
   informational draft]

   TBD: network diagram

                                 Figure 4

Author's Address

   Jacob Holland
   Akamai Technologies, Inc.
   150 Broadway
   Cambridge, Massachusetts  02142

   Phone: +1 617 444 3000

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