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Versions: 00 01                                                         
OPSEC Working Group (proposed)                                  G. Jones
Internet-Draft                                     The MITRE Corporation
Expires: October 20, 2004                                      R. Callon
                                                        Juniper Networks
                                                                 M. Kaeo
                                                    Double Shot Security
                                                          April 21, 2004


     Framework for Operational Security Requirements for IP Network
                             Infrastructure
                     draft-jones-opsec-framework-00

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable
   patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed,
   and any of which I become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with
   RFC 3668.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
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   Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 20, 2004.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This document outlines work to be done and documents to be produced
   by the proposed Operational Security Requirements (OPSEC) Working
   Group.  The goal of the working group is to codify knowledge about
   feature sets that are required to securely deploy and operate managed
   network elements providing transit services at OSI layers 2 and 3,



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   i.e.  switches and routers.  The intent is to provide clear, concise
   documentation of requirements necessary for operating networks
   securely, to assist network operators in communicating their
   requirements to vendors, and to provide vendors with input that is
   useful for building more secure devices.  The working group will
   produce requirements appropriate for large Internet Service Provider
   (ISP) and Enterprise Networks.  This work is intended to refine
   RFCxxxx.

Table of Contents

   1.   Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1  Goals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2  Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.3  Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.4  Intended Audience  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.5  Format and Definition of Requirements  . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.6  Applicability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.7  Intended Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.8  Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.   Documents  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     2.1  Standards Survey  (info) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     2.2  In-Band management requirements (BCP)  . . . . . . . . . .  10
     2.3  Out-of-Band management requirements (BCP)  . . . . . . . .  11
     2.4  Filtering requirements (BCP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     2.5  Event Logging Requirements document (BCP)  . . . . . . . .  11
     2.6  Configuration and Management Interface Requirements
          (BCP)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     2.7  AAA requirements document (BCP)  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     2.8  Documentation and Assurance requirements document (BCP)  .  12
     2.9  Miscellaneous requirements document (BCP)  . . . . . . . .  12
     2.10   Large ISP Operational Security Requirements Profile
            (info) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     2.11   Large Enterprise Operational Security Requirements
            Profile (info) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     2.12   OPSEC Deliberation Summary document (info) . . . . . . .  13
   3.   Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   4.   References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   4.1  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   4.2  Non-normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
        Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   A.   Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
        Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . .  18








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1.  Introduction

1.1  Goals

   The goal of the working group is to provide a clear, concise
   documentation of operational security requirements for the
   infrastructure of large IP networks, including routers and switches,
   to equipment vendors, service providers, and network operators.

   This framework document provides an overview of the work to be done
   by the working group, and describes the documents to be produced in
   this effort.

1.2  Motivation

   Network operators need the appropriate feature sets and tools on
   their infrastructure devices to ensure that they can effectively
   deploy and manage their networks securely while maintaining the
   ability to provide reliable service to their customers.  Vendors need
   guidelines on which security features and functionality are critical
   for operators to be able to reach that goal.

   The threats which network infrastructure devices are most susceptible
   to encompass the following:
   o  unauthorized access to the device which can lead to portions of
      the network infrastructure to be under malicious control
   o  denial of service attacks where the device is rendered incapable
      of performing its intended function
   o  spoofing attacks where malicious packets can lead to network
      traffic rerouting or network down-time

   Many of these threats are described in detail in [RFC2196].
   [RFC3013] recommends security services and procedures for ISPs and
   provides a framework for discussion of security expectations.  The
   documents which will be described in this framework document will
   complement these existing standards and will enumerate features which
   are required to implement many of the policies and procedures
   suggested in both.

1.3  Scope

   The working group will produce requirements appropriate for:

   o  Internet Service Provider (ISP) Networks
   o  Enterprise Networks

   The following classes of devices are excluded from the OPSEC working
   group charter at this time, and are therefore outside of the scope of



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   this document:

   o  Wireless devices
   o  SOHO devices
   o  Security devices (firewalls, IDS, Authentication Servers)
   o  Hosts

   The following are explicitly out of scope:
   o  general purpose hosts that do not transit traffic including
      infrastructure hosts such as name/time/log/AAA servers, etc.,
   o  unmanaged devices,
   o  customer managed devices (e.g.  firewalls, Intrusion Detection
      System, dedicated VPN devices, etc.),
   o  SOHO (Small Office, Home Office) devices (e.g.  personal
      firewalls, Wireless Access Points, Cable Modems, etc.),
   o  confidentiality of customer data,
   o  integrity of customer data,
   o  physical security.
   This means that while the requirements in the minimum profile (and
   others) may apply, additional requirements have not be added to
   account for their unique needs.

   While the examples given are written with IPv4 in mind, most of the
   requirements are general enough to apply to IPv6.

1.4  Intended Audience

   There are two intended audiences: the network operator who selects,
   purchases, and operates IP network equipment, and the vendors who
   create these devices.

1.5  Format and Definition of Requirements

   A separate document will be created for specific categories of
   requirements.  Each individual requirement will have the following
   element:
   Requirement (what)
      The requirement describes a policy to be supported by the device.
      For example, "The device MUST support secure channels that allow
      in-band access to all management and configuration functions."
      Requirements should not refer to specific technologies.  It is
      expected that requirements will change little over time.
   Justification (why)
      The justification tells why and in what context the requirement is
      important.






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      For example, "Secure channels are important because they insure
      confidentiality, and integrity.  This is important in contexts
      where management is performed in-band over networks with
      potentially hostile users."
      The justification is intended to give operators information needed
      to determine the applicability of a requirement to their local
      environment.
   Examples (how)
      Examples are intended to give examples of technology and standards
      current at the time of writing that meet the requirement.
      Examples of configuration and usage may also be given.
      For example, "SSH provides access to management and configuration
      functions via secure channels.  One way to meet this requirement
      might be to enable SSH for in-band management and to disable all
      insecure in-band management mechanisms (e.g.  telnet, SNMPv1,
      etc.)"
      It is expected that the choice of implementations to meet the
      requirements will change over time.  See [RFC3631] for a list of
      some current mechanisms.
   Warnings (if applicable)
      The warnings list operational concerns, deviation from standards,
      caveats, etc.
      For example, "If SSH is chosen as the mechanism to provide secure
      channels for remote management and configuration, then there are a
      number of issues which must be considered including key
      distribution and known vulnerabilities in various protocol
      versions."

1.6  Applicability

   These requirements are intended to give guidance on how best to
   protect communications infrastructure.  Service Providers, Network
   Operators, and Equipment Suppliers are encouraged to study these
   requirements, and prioritize the extent and manner in which they may
   implement and/or deploy equipment supporting these requirements.

   Decisions of whether or not to support a specific requirement are
   intended to be left with the responsible organization (e.g., Service
   Provider, Network Operator, or Equipment Supplier).  Due to the
   continuously evolving nature of security threats to networks, and due
   to significant variations in the specific security threats and
   requirements in different network environments, it is not appropriate
   to mandate implementation of these requirements through legislation
   or regulation, nor would any mandate be consistent with their intent.

1.7  Intended Use

   It is anticipated that the requirements in these documents will be



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   used for the following purposes:
   o  as a checklist when evaluating networked products,
   o  to create profiles of different subsets of the requirements which
      describe the needs of different devices, organizations, and
      operating environments,
   o  to assist operators in clearly communicating their security
      requirements,
   o  as high level guidance for the creation of detailed test plans.
   o  as guidance for vendors to make appropriate decisions for
      engineering feature roadmaps.

1.8  Definitions
   NOTE: THE FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS NEED TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE WORKING
   GROUP
   BCP [XXX Discuss @ Working Group]
      Should we work on refining the definitions of "Current" and
      "Practice" ?  Does "current" mean that it's widely implemented,
      that at least one vendor implements, other ???   Does "Practice"
      mean "requirement".  See [RFC2026].
   Requirement [XXX Discuss @ Working Group]
      See Section 1.5 for a definition and example of the term
      "Requirement" as it is used in this document.
   RFC 2119 Keywords [XXX Discuss @ Working Group]
      The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
      NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL"
      in this document are to be interpreted as described in  [RFC2119].
   NOTE: THE FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS WERE COPIED DIRECTLY FROM THE OPSEC
   DRAFT AND IN SUBSEQUENT DRAFTS OF THE FRAMEWORK THEY MAY MOVE TO THE
   SPECIFIC DRAFT THAT DEALS WITH THE TERM DEFINED.  THEY ARE LEFT HERE
   NOW TO INDICATE THAT THESE ARE AREAS THAT ARE  LIKELY TO NEED
   DISCUSSION AND DEFINITION IN THE SUBSEQUENT EFFORTS OF THE WORKING
   GROUP.
   Bogon.
      A "Bogon" (plural: "bogons") is a packet with an IP source address
      in an address block not yet allocated by IANA or the Regional
      Internet Registries (ARIN, RIPE, APNIC...)  as well as all
      addresses reserved for private or special use by RFCs.  See
      [RFC3330] and [RFC1918].
   CLI.
      Several requirements refer to a Command Line Interface (CLI).
      While this refers at present to a classic text oriented command
      interface, it is not intended to preclude other mechanisms which
      may meet all the requirements that reference "CLI".
   Console.
      Several requirements refer to a "Console".  The model for this is
      the classic RS232 serial port which has, for the past 30 or more
      years, provided a simple, stable, reliable, well-understood and
      nearly ubiquitous management interface to network devices.  Again,



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      these requirements are intended primarily to codify the benefits
      provided by that venerable interface, not to preclude other
      mechanisms that meet all the same requirements.
   Filter.
      In this document, a "filter" is defined as a group of one or more
      rules where each rule specifies one or more match criteria.
   In-Band management.
      "In-Band management" is defined as any management done over the
      same channels and interfaces used for user/customer data.
      Examples would include using SSH for management via customer or
      Internet facing network interfaces.
   High Resolution Time.
      "High resolution time" is defined in this document as "time having
      a resolution greater than one second" (e.g.  milliseconds).
   IP.
      Unless otherwise indicated, "IP" refers to IPv4.
   Management.
      This document uses a broad definition of the term "management".
      In this document, "management" refers to any authorized
      interaction with the device intended to change its operational
      state or configuration.  Data/Forwarding plane functions (e.g.
      the transit of customer traffic) are not considered management.
      Control plane functions such as routing, signaling and link
      management protocols and management plane functions such as remote
      access, configuration and authentication are considered to be
      management.
   Martian.

      Per [RFC1208] "Martian: Humorous term applied to packets that turn
      up unexpectedly on the wrong network because of bogus routing
      entries.  Also used as a name for a packet which has an altogether
      bogus (non-registered or ill-formed) Internet address."  For the
      purposes of this document Martians are defined as "packets having
      a source address that, by application of the current forwarding
      tables, would not have its return traffic routed back to the
      sender."  "Spoofed packets" are a common source of martians.
      Note that in some cases, the traffic may be asymmetric, and a
      simple forwarding table check might produce false positives.  See
      [RFC3704]
   Out-of-Band (OoB) management.
      "Out-of-Band management" is defined as any management done over
      channels and interfaces that are separate from those used for
      user/customer data.  Examples would include a serial console
      interface or a network interface connected to a dedicated
      management network that is not used to carry customer traffic.






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   Open Review.
      "Open review" refers to processes designed to generate public
      discussion and review of technical solutions such as data
      communications protocols and cryptographic algorithms with the
      goals of improving and building confidence in the final solutions.
      For the purposes of this document "open review" is defined by
      [RFC2026].  All standards track documents are considered to have
      been through an open review process.
      It should be noted that organizations may have local requirements
      that define what they view as acceptable "open review".  For
      example, they may be required to adhere to certain national or
      international standards.  Such modifications of the definition of
      the term "open review", while important, are considered local
      issues that should be discussed between the organization and the
      vendor.
      It should also be noted that section 7 of [RFC2026] permits
      standards track documents to incorporate other "external standards
      and specifications".
   Service.
      A number of requirements refer to "services".  For the purposes of
      this document a "service" is defined as "any process or protocol
      running in the control or management planes to which non-transit
      packets may be delivered".  Examples might include an SSH server,
      a BGP process or an NTP server.  It would also include the
      transport, network and link layer protocols since, for example, a
      TCP packet addressed to a port on which no service is listening
      will be "delivered" to the IP stack, and possibly result in an
      ICMP message being sent back.
   Secure Channel.
      A "secure channel" is a mechanism that ensures end-to-end
      integrity and confidentiality of communications.  Examples include
      TLS [RFC2246] and IPsec [RFC2401].  Connecting a terminal to a
      console port using physically secure, shielded cable would provide
      confidentiality but possibly not integrity.
   Single-Homed Network.
      A "single-homed network" is defined as one for which
      *  There is only one upstream connection
      *  Routing is symmetric.
      See [RFC3704] for a discussion of related issues and mechanisms
      for multihomed networks.
   Spoofed Packet.
      A "spoofed packet" is defined as a packet that has a source
      address that does not correspond to any address assigned to the
      system which sent the packet.  Spoofed packets are often "bogons"
      or "martians".






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   Secure Network
      For the purposes of these documents, a secure network is one in
      which:
      *  The network keeps passing legitimate customer traffic
         (availability).
      *  Traffic goes where it is supposed to go, and only where it is
         supposed to go (availability, confidentiality).
      *  The network elements remain manageable (availability).
      *  Only authorized users can manage network elements
         (authorization).
      *  There is a record of all security related events
         (accountability).
      *  The network operator has the necessary tools to detect and
         respond to illegitimate traffic.





































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2.  Documents

   The following is a list of documents to be produced by OPSEC working
   group.  Each document is intended to cover an area important to
   secure operation of large network infrastructure.

2.1  Standards Survey  (info)
   Overview
      This document provides an overview of other efforts in developing
      standards, guidelines, best practices, or other information
      intended to facilitate improvement in network security.  Any
      effort which is known, such as the ANSI T1.276, the NRIC V "Best
      Practices", ITU-T M.3016 and X.805, the T1S1 effort on securing
      signalling will be included.  The intent is to provide a clear
      understanding of which efforts are complementary and/or
      contradictory such that any efforts of future cross-certification
      of standards may be facilitated.
   Security Considerations
      Any contradictory security requirements from varying standards
      bodies would seriously impact operator or vendor understanding of
      which features and functionalities are the most effective to
      deploy and operate secure networks.  This documented survey will
      help to ensure that there is a consistent set of product
      requirements to follow.

2.2  In-Band management requirements (BCP)
   Overview
      Although there are known security issues with in-band management,
      there are many situations where in-band management makes sense, is
      used, and/or is the only option.  The features recommended in this
      document will provide for a more secure means of using any in-band
      management functionality.
   Security Considerations
      Although in-band  management has the advantage of lower cost (no
      extra interfaces or lines), it has significant security
      disadvantages:
      *  Saturation of customer lines or interfaces can make the device
         unmanageable unless out-of-band management resources have been
         reserved
      *  Since public interfaces/channels are used, it is possible for
         attackers to directly address and reach the device and to
         attempt management functions.
      *  In-band management traffic on public interfaces may be
         intercepted, however this would typically require a significant
         compromise in the routing system.
      *  Public interfaces used for in-band management may become
         unavailable due to bugs (e.g.  buffer overflows being
         exploited) while out-of-band interfaces (such as a serial



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         console device) remain available
      The requirements from this document are meant to provide the means
      of securing in-band management traffic.

2.3  Out-of-Band management requirements (BCP)
   Overview
      This document will describe requirements related to out of band
      management of networked devices.
   Security Considerations
      Out-of-band management often provides a more secure means of
      managing networked devices.  To ensure that all devices have the
      appropriate support, this document will set requirements as to
      what functionality is needed to effectively use out-of-band
      management.

2.4  Filtering requirements (BCP)
   Overview
      This document will describe requirements related to stateless
      filtering requirements for network elements providing transit
      service at OSI layers 2 and 3.
   Security Considerations
      Filtering is an important security functionality to permit or deny
      forwarding of traffic, or to specify special treatment of packets,
      depending on layer 2 or layer 3 header and forwarding information.
      It provides a basic means of implementing policies, such as
      policies that specify which traffic is allowed and which is not,
      and policies which specify special treatment such as setting CoS,
      rate limiting, or packet copying.  It also provides a basic tool
      for responding to malicious traffic.

2.5  Event Logging Requirements document (BCP)
   Overview
      [Ed.  The basic questions here are "what gets logged", "how does
      it get logged", "what are the security issues".  There is work in
      progress (syslog) for the last two that can be cited.  The "what
      gets logged" question needs work]
      This document will describe the recommended features when logging
      network device traffic and anomalies.  The goal is to make it
      possible to correlate logging information from varying systems and
      making sure that logged information is useful and effective.
   Security Considerations
      Logging data provides a means for detecting malicious behavior.
      The logged information can also be used as evidence in legal
      prosecution cases against illegal network access and device
      compromises.  Ineffective logging practices due to inconsistent
      functionality in many devices make it hard to get effective data.
      This document will help provide consistent logging functionality
      for more effective auditing.  It will also point to privacy or



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      legal considerations when logging/monitoring user activity.

2.6  Configuration and Management Interface Requirements (BCP)
   Overview
      This document lists the security requirements for interfaces which
      allow for configuring and managing the network device.  In most
      cases, this currently involves some sort of command line interface
      (CLI) and configuration files.  It may be possible to meet these
      requirements with other mechanisms, for instance SNMP or a
      script-able HTML interface that provides full access to management
      and configuration functions.  In the future, there may be others
      (e.g.  XML based configuration).
   Security Considerations
      The interfaces used to manage and configure network elements need
      to be effectively secured to avoid a malicious user from being
      able to logically gain illegal access.  In the past, many security
      vulnerabilities have been discovered, especially with SNMP and
      HTTP access to devices.  These recommendations will help the user
      and vendor community mitigate any known risks in this area.

2.7  AAA requirements document (BCP)
   Overview
      This document will list the requirements for centralized
      authentication, authorization and accounting functionality.
   Security Considerations
      Keeping track of who has access to network devices is critical to
      any secure infrastructure.  Mechanisms to provide authorized
      access upon successful authentication and also keeping track of
      what was done can provide important information in case of a
      device compromise.

2.8  Documentation and Assurance requirements document (BCP)
   Overview
      These requirements will list information which should be
      documented that will assist operators in evaluating and securely
      operating a device.
   Security Considerations
      Devices many times have default behavior which can cause a severe
      security vulnerability.  Knowing which services are enabled by
      default or which commands impact other default behavior is
      essential knowledge that is necessary to effectively mitigate
      security risks.

2.9  Miscellaneous requirements document (BCP)
   Overview






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      This document will describe requirements which do not fit into any
      of the other documents, and which are brief enough that they don't
      justify their own document, but which are important enough that
      they should be documented.

2.10  Large ISP Operational Security Requirements Profile (info)
   Overview
      This document will provide a profile specifying which of the
      requirements outlined in the set of documents described above are
      most applicable to large Internet Service Providers offering
      transit service.

2.11  Large Enterprise Operational Security Requirements Profile (info)
   Overview
      This document will provide a profile specifying which of the
      requirements outlined in the set of documents described above are
      most applicable to large Enterprise networks.

2.12  OPSEC Deliberation Summary document (info)
   Overview
      This document will provide a summary of discussions that have
      taken place within the OPsec working group.  The intent is to
      document ideas that were "left on the cutting room floor" in order
      to provide a possible starting point for future work.



























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3.  Security Considerations

   Security is the entire focus of this document.
















































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4.  References

4.1  Normative References

   [RFC1208]  Jacobsen, O. and D. Lynch, "Glossary of networking terms",
              RFC 1208, March 1991.

   [RFC1812]  Baker, F., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers", RFC
              1812, June 1995.

   [RFC1918]  Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G. and
              E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", BCP
              5, RFC 1918, February 1996.

   [RFC2026]  Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision
              3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, October 1996.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2196]  Fraser, B., "Site Security Handbook", RFC 2196, September
              1997.

   [RFC2246]  Dierks, T., Allen, C., Treese, W., Karlton, P., Freier, A.
              and P. Kocher, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC 2246,
              January 1999.

   [RFC2401]  Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.

   [RFC3013]  Killalea, T., "Recommended Internet Service Provider
              Security Services and Procedures", BCP 46, RFC 3013,
              November 2000.

   [RFC3330]  IANA, "Special-Use IPv4 Addresses", RFC 3330, September
              2002.

   [RFC3631]  Bellovin, S. and J. Schiller, "Security Mechanisms for the
              Internet", RFC 3631, December 2003.

   [RFC3704]  Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
              Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, March 2004.

4.2  Non-normative References

   [I-D.savola-bcp38-multihoming-update]
              Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
              Networks", draft-savola-bcp38-multihoming-update-03 (work



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              in progress), December 2003.

   [Schneier]
              Schneier, B., "Applied Crytography, 2nd Ed., Publisher
              John Wiley & Sons, Inc.", 1996.


Authors' Addresses

   George M. Jones
   The MITRE Corporation
   7515 Colshire Drive, M/S WEST
   McLean, Virginia  22102-7508
   U.S.A.

   Phone: +1 703 488 9740
   EMail: gmjones@mitre.org


   Ross Callon
   Juniper Networks
   10 Technology Park Drive
   Westford, MA  01886
   U.S.A.

   Phone: +1 978 692 6724
   EMail: rcallon@juniper.net


   Merike Kaeo
   Double Shot Security
   520 Washington Blvd. #363
   Marina Del Rey, CA  90292
   U.S.A.

   Phone: +1 310 866 0165
   EMail: kaeo@merike.com














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Appendix A.  Acknowledgments

   The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of:
   o  Acknowledgments to be determined.
   o  The MITRE Corporation for supporting development of this document.
      NOTE: The author's affiliation with The MITRE Corporation is
      provided for identification purposes only, and is not intended to
      convey or imply MITRE's concurrence with, or support for, the
      positions, opinions or viewpoints expressed by the editor.
   o  This listing is intended to acknowledge contributions, not to
      imply that the individual or organizations approve the content of
      this document.
   o  Apologies to those who commented on/contributed to the document
      and were not listed.





































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