INTERNET-DRAFT                                                M.Nakatani
Intended Status: Informational                                 JPCERT/CC
Expires: April 12, 2015                                      Y.Kitaguchi
                                                     Kanazawa University
                                                                K.Nagami
                                                                M.Kosugi
                                                                R.Hiromi
                                                              INTEC Inc.
                                                         October 9, 2014


          Introducing IPv6 vulnerability test program in Japan
                draft-jpcert-ipv6vullnerability-check-01


Abstract

     Japan Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center, known
   as JPCERT/CC have been researching about vulnerability in use of IPv6
   and provided the information toward vendors in Japan.  They also
   verified to occur the security incident with several products.

     In 2013, JPCERT/CC called for vendors to participate their IPv6
   security program.  JPCERT/CC collects the results of equipments and
   open to the public for an user reference of procurement.

     In this document we describe about the program to share the
   experimental activity.


Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as
   Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html




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   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html


Copyright and License Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors. All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document. Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.



Table of Contents

   1  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3  IPv6 Vulnerability Test Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.1  Test Concept and requirement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.2  Test Items and its Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.3  Providing Test Tools and Manual . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.4  Handling results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4  Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   7  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   8  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     8.1  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     8.2  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   Appendix A: IPv6 vulnerability reference RFCs and i-Ds . . . . . . 10
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15











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1  Introduction

     JPCERT/CC started "The IPv6 Security Test" in Japan in 2013.  The
   target equipments are routers and to verify their ability for the
   protection of vulnerabilities which are pointed out in RFC or
   Internet-Drafts.  JPCERT/CC focuses exclusively on the possible
   attacks coming from the Internet.  Providing test materials(tool and
   document), JPCERT/CC collects the results from vendors and published
   IPv6 Security Test respondent product List.  This list is keeping to
   be up to date.  In this document we describe about the program to
   share the experimental activity.


1.1  Requirements Language

      Take careful note: Unlike other IETF documents, the key words
   "MUST",   "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
   "SHOULD NOT",   "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document
   are not used as   described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].  This document
   uses these keywords   not strictly for the purpose of
   interoperability, but rather for the   purpose of establishing
   industry-common baseline functionality.  As   such, the document
   points to several other specifications (preferable   in RFC or stable
   form) to provide additional guidance to implementers   regarding any
   protocol implementation required to produce a   successful CE router
   that interoperates successfully with a   particular subset of
   currently deploying and planned common IPv6   access networks.

2  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].


















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3  IPv6 Vulnerability Test Program

3.1  Test Concept and requirement

   This test program is focused on exclusively on the inbound attacks
   which possibly caused at WAN port(then through LAN port). JPCERT/CC
   narrowed down 15 items out of 80[Appendix.A]. Fig.1 shows basic
   network topology. In this test.  Basically test packets sent to both
   LAN and WAN then confirm the robustness.

                    Figure.1  Basic Network Topology


                      +---------------+
                      | IPv6 Attacker |
                      +---------------+
                                |
                                |
         +--------------- IPv6 Internet ----------------------+
                                |
                                |
                        +----@--------+
                        | User Router |
                        +----@--------+
                                |
                                |
         +----------------  /64 prefix segment ---------------+
                      |         |        |        |
                      |         |        |        |
                   +------+ +------+ +------+ +------+
                   |Client| |Client| |Client| |Client|
                   +------+ +------+ +------+ +------+


3.2  Test Items and its Criteria

   Here is 15 test items.

   [01] Disabling type 0 routing header processing
   [02] Protection for a DoS attack on the router by hop-by-hop option
        header
   [03] Protection for unexpected jumbo packet by extra large payload
        option
   [04] Corresponding completely overwrite packet information by
        unauthorized fragment header(overlap-first-zero fragmentation)
   [05] Corresponding completely overwrite packet information by
        unauthorized fragment header(overlap-last-zero fragmentation)
   [06] Corresponding partially overwrite packet information by



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        unauthorized fragment header(overlap-first-hop fragmentation)
   [07] Corresponding partially overwrite packet information by
        unauthorized fragment header(overlap-last-hop fragmentation)
   [08] Detection of a DoS attack by tiny fragment header
   [09] Protection for tiny fragment of a DoS attack with a large
        amount of using the small fragment header
   [10] Protection for a DoS attack by transmitting the first
        fragmented packet only
   [11] Protection for a DoS attack by single fragmented packet
        using atomic fragment
   [12] Protection for a DoS attack by single fragmented packet
        with a large amount of atomic fragments
   [13] Protection for an attack from the off-path attacker by fragment
        ID prediction
   [14] Protection for a DoS attack to the router using the neighbor
        discovery service
   [15] Protection for a DoS attack by sending a large number of
        broken packets to the router


        Table.1  Type of Attack and Criteria for the evaluation

   +----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
   |No. |Type of Attack          |Criteria                             |
   +----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
   |01  |DoS Attack              |comply the DoS resistance policy(*)  |
   |    |packet filtering evasion|discard packet or error reply        |
   +----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
   |02  |DoS Attack              |comply the DoS resistance policy(*)  |
   +----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
   |03  |DoS Attack              |comply the DoS resistance policy(*)  |
   +----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
   |04  |packet filtering evasion|discard packet or error reply        |
   +----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
   |05  |packet filtering evasion|discard packet or error reply        |
   +----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
   |06  |packet filtering evasion|discard packet or error reply        |
   +----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
   |07  |packet filtering evasion|discard packet or error reply        |
   +----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
   |08  |DoS Attack              |comply the DoS resistance policy(*)  |
   +----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
   |09  |DoS Attack              |comply the DoS resistance policy(*)  |
   +----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
   |10  |DoS Attack              |comply the DoS resistance policy(*)  |
   +----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
   |11  |DoS Attack              |comply the DoS resistance policy(*)  |
   +----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+



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   |12  |DoS Attack              |comply the DoS resistance policy(*)  |
   +----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
   |13  |DoS Attack              |comply the DoS resistance policy(*)  |
   +----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
   |14  |DoS Attack              |comply the DoS resistance policy(*)  |
   +----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
   |15  |DoS Attack              |comply the DoS resistance policy(*)  |
   +----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+

   (*) the DoS resistance policy

    Router that "PASSED" this test has ability with all the result
    in the below.

      1. do not reboot
      2. do not hung-up
         (slow-down will be acceptable)
      3. return to the original condition after DoS attack stopped
         (to see the condition of the router, ping to the router
          from a connected node)

3.3  Providing Test Tools and Manual

    JPCERT/CC provides a testing tool to an applicant developer due to
   execute these test at same procedure and methodology.  Prior to the
   open up this test program JPCERT/CC examined test cases itself and
   test tool with open source software then combined some software into
   a distribution tool.

    Current test tool includes these software ; - THC IPv6 Toolkit
   2.3THC IPv6 Toolkit 2.3 - SI6 Networks IPv6 ToolKit v1.4.1 - nmap
   6.40 - WireShark Version 1.2.15 - minicom

    slight modification was made to the software to fix for the test
   cases.

    JPCERT/CC also provides a technical guide and an manual.  The
   technical guide is can be downloaded from their Web page[WEB] for the
   general test guide to public.

3.4  Handling results

    JPCERT/CC asks for the result of the test from associate
   participants. Results are listed and released in the JPCERT/CC's web
   site[WEB] under an agreement.  JPCERT/CC updates the list continually
   when they gets new information.





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4  Conclusion

    IPv6 is in the way of universal deployment.  In Japan, an
   organization named JPCERT/CC started to provide a IPv6 related
   security evaluation program.  After one year of the activity,
   JPCERT/CC also publish the result of test.  End users of small and
   mid-sized companies or SIers can refer the list for an procurement
   even if they have lack of knowledge about IPv6 and its security
   consideration.  For the vendors, they can develop IPv6 secure
   appraisal product that suited for targeted companies in base line.

    The benefit of this activity is;

    (1) developer and JPCERT/CC
        JPCERT/CC is able to informed possible threats to vendors
        proactively.  Vendors are able to create more safer products
        in advance.  This scheme changes incident-first to
        information-first approach.

    (2) customer
        Especially for a small and mid-sized companies, they are
        going to start to adopt IPv6 easier if they don't have much
        knowledge.

    Currently JPCERT/CC defined 15 items for the test case. Beyond
   controversy they will review and enhance the test program from time
   to time.
























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5  Security Considerations

   Possible security threats are same as what pointed out in original
   protocols and technologies referred in this document.

6  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

7  Acknowledgements

   Thanks for the following vendors/organizations with the contribution
   of this activity.

   IPv6 Promotion Council, Brocade Communications Systems Inc., NEC
   Platforms, Ltd., Furukawa Electric Co., Ltd.,Hitachi Metals, Ltd,
   CENTURY SYSTEMS Co.,Ltd and Codenomicon.


































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8  References

8.1  Normative References



              TBD

8.2  Informative References


   [WEB] JPCERT/CC, IPv6 Security Test Appraisal List, September 2014,
              <https://www.jpcert.or.jp/research/ipv6product_list.html>.






































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Appendix A: IPv6 vulnerability reference RFCs and i-Ds

    Here is possible threats list and related RFC and internet-drafts.

   1. Basic Header/Extension Header definition

    1-1 Access filtering policy evasion using by Type 0 Routing Header,
        RFC4942;RFC5095;RFC5871
    1-2 DoS attack caused by Type 0 Routing Header,
        RFC4942;RFC5095;RFC5871
    1-3 DoS attack caused by Hop by Hop Option Header,
        RFC4942
    1-4 Handling problem and resource management problem of jumbogram,
        RFC4942
    1-5 Packet overwrite by unauthorized fragment header,
        RFC4942;RFC5722
    1-6 DoS attack caused by tiny fragmented packets,
        RFC7112
    1-7 Abuse by receiving a lot of first fragment packets
    1-8 DoS attack caused by atomic fragment header,
        RFC6946
    1-9 DoS attack caused by prediction of fragment identification
        values,
        draft-ietf-6man-predictable-fragment-id-01
    1-10 Distinctiveness on firewall implementation for packet
         reassembly,
         RFC4942;RFC7112;RFC5722
    1-11 Implementation problems in processing extension
         header chain;
         RFC4942;RFC7112;RFC5722
    1-12 Implementation problems in Unknown Headers/Destination Options,
         RFC4942;RFC6564
    1-13 Abuse using by Pad1 and PadN Options in Hop-by-Hop and
         Destination option headers,
         RFC4942
    1-14 DoS attack using by old specification of Flow Label,
         RFC3697;RFC6437
    1-15 Covert Channel using by Flow Label,
         RFC6437;draft-gont-6man-flowlabel-security-03
    1-16 Information Leaking by Flow Label,
         RFC6437;draft-gont-6man-flowlabel-security-03

   2. NDP (link layer address resolution)

    2-1 Neighbor Solicitation/Advertisement Spoofing,
        RFC3756;RFC6980
    2-2 Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD) failure,
        RFC3756;RFC6980



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    2-3 Duplicate Address Detection DoS Attack,
        RFC3756;RFC6980;draft-ietf-6man-enhanced-dad-06
    2-4 Neighbor Discovery DoS Attack,
        RFC3756;RFC4942
    2-5 Abuse on Neighbor cache table,
        RFC3756;RFC4942

   3. NDP (address auto-configuration)

    3-1 Juggled default route,
        RFC3756;RFC6104;RFC6105;RFC7113
    3-2 Juggled prefixes,
        RFC3756;RFC6104;RFC6105;RFC7113
    3-3 Juggled DNS server information,
        RFC3756;RFC6104;RFC6105;RFC6106;draft-gont-6man-slaac-dns-
        config-issues-00
    3-4 Sniffing caused by following old specification of on-link
        assumption,
        RFC3756;RFC4943;RFC6104;RFC6105;RFC6583;RFC7113
    3-5 Parameter Spoofing,
        RFC3756;RFC6104;RFC6105;RFC7113
    3-6 DoS attack caused by Router Advertisement,
        RFC3756;RFC6104;RFC6105;RFC7113
    3-7 Filtering Policy Evasion by fragment packets
        RFC7113;RFC5722

   4. ICMPv6

    4-1 Spoofed Redirect Message,
        RFC3756;draft-gont-opsec-ipv6-nd-shield-00;RFC6980
    4-2 DoS attack to Upper-layer protocol by crafted ICMPv6 error
        messages,
        RFC4942;RFC5927
    4-3 Covert conversation through the payload of ICMPv6 error
        messages,
        RFC4942
    4-4 DoS attack by unprocessable packets to router,
        RFC4942;RFC5927

   5. IP Address definition

    5-1 Anycast Traffic Identification,
        RFC4942;RFC4291
    5-2 Site Local Address as well-known DNS server addresses,
        draft-ietf-ipngwg-dns-discovery-03;RFC6586
    5-3 Malicious use of IPv6 addressing scheme,
        RFC4942;RFC5157;draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning-04
    5-4 Dynamic DNS and secure updates,



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        RFC4942;RFC4472
    5-5 Complexity on plural address operating by IPv4-mapped address,
        RFC4942
    5-6 Filtering policy evasion using by IPv4-mapped address
        RFC4942
    5-7 Firewalls cannot perform deep packet inspection and filtering
        with IPSec,
        RFC4942
    5-8 IPv6 tunnels break IPv4 network security policy,
        RFC4942
   6. Multicast

    6-1 DoS attack by hijacked multicast router,
        RFC3810
    6-2 DoS attack by forged Report message in MLD,
        RFC3810;RFC2710
    6-3 Extra processing on the network equipment by forged Done
        messages in MLD,
        RFC3810;RFC2710
    6-4 DoS attack over multicast network with ICMPv6 error messages,
        RFC4942
    6-5 Abuse in multicast distribution tree on PIM-DM with
        temporary addresses,
        RFC3973
    6-6 Denial-of-Service Attack on the Link,
        RFC5294

   7. Mobile IPv6

    7-1 Attacks against Binding Update Protocols,
        RFC4225

    7-2 Filtering Policy evasion due to not support type 2 routing
        header,
        RFC4225;RFC6275

   8. Tunneling

    8-1 Filtering Policy evasion occurred in IPv6 transition/coexistence
        technologies on "IPv4-only" networks,
        RFC4942;RFC6169;RFC7123
    8-2 Source Routing after the Tunnel Client combined with old
        specification of Routing Header 0,
        RFC6169;RFC5095;RFC7123
    8-3 Attacks by malicious use of NDP may go to 6to4 Router/6to4
        Relay Router/6rd Border Router,
        RFC3964;RFC4942;RFC5969;RFC7123
    8-4 Attack toward IPv6 clients from IPv4 network via



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        6to4 Router/6to4 Relay Router,
        RFC3964;RFC6169RFC5969;RFC7123
    8-5 Attack toward 6to4 clients from IPv4 network via
        6to4 Router/6to4 Relay Router,
        RFC3964;RFC6169RFC5969;RFC7123
    8-6 IPv4 broadcast attack via 6to4 Router/6to4 Relay Router,
        RFC3964;RFC6169RFC5969;RFC7123
    8-7 Sniffing at 6to4 Router/6to4 Relay Router,
        RFC3964;RFC6169;RFC5969;RFC7123
    8-8 Routing Loop Attack Using IPv6 Automatic Tunnels,
        RFC6324
    8-9 Filtering bypass by Teredo,
        RFC6169;RFC7123
    8-10 Port exposure with Teredo,
         RFC6169;RFC5991;RFC7123
    8-11 Teredo Tunnel Address Concerns,
         RFC6119
    8-12 Sniffing at Teredo Router/Teredo Relay Router,
         RFC3964;RFC6169;RFC5969;RFC7123

   9. Translation

    9-1 Address Spoofing used by IPv4-embedded IPv6 address,
        RFC6052;RFC6145;RFC6889
    9-2 Concerns of using DNS64,
        RFC6147;RFC6889

   10. DNS

    10-1 Dual stack operation bring overloading to name servers,
         RFC4472;RFC4942;draft-ietf-dnsop-respsize-15
    10-2 Operational difficulty of reverse zones and concerns,
         RFC4472;RFC4942
    10-3 Rogue DHCPv6 Servers,
         draft-ietf-opsec-dhcpv6-shield-04

   11. Other Operational concerns

    11-1 Network segment violation by leakage of NDP in VLAN networks
    11-2 RFC5952 text representation compliance for safer operation,
         RFC5952
    11-3 Dual stack nodes in IPv4 only network without supervision









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Authors' Addresses



   Masayuki Nakatani
   Japan Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center
   3-17, Kanda Nishiki-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo,
   Japan

   EMail: ww-info@jpcert.or.jp

   Yoshiaki Kitaguchi
   Kanazawa University
   Kakuma-machi, Kanazawa, Ishikawa,
   Japan

   EMail: kitaguchi@imc.kanazawa-u.ac.jp

   Kenichi Nagami
   INTEC Inc.
   1-3-3, Shinsuna, Koto-ku, Tokyo,
   Japan

   EMail: nagami@inetcore.com

   Masataka Kosugi
   INTEC Inc.
   626-1, Kyoda, Takaoka-City, Toyama,
   Japan

   EMail: kosugi_masataka@intec.co.jp

   Ruri Hiromi
   INTEC Inc.
   1-1-25, Shin Urashima-cho, Kanagawa-ku, Yokohama,
   Japan

   EMail: hiromi@inetcore.com













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