IPSECME Working Group S. Kampati
Internet-Draft M. Bharath
Intended status: Standards Track W. Pan
Expires: September 8, 2021 Huawei
March 07, 2021
IKEv2 Optional SA&TS Payloads in Child Exchange
draft-kampati-ipsecme-ikev2-sa-ts-payloads-opt-03
Abstract
This document describes a method for reducing the size of the
Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) exchanges at time of rekeying
IKE SAs and Child SAs by removing or making optional of SA & TS
payloads. Reducing size of IKEv2 exchanges is desirable for low
power consumption battery powered devices. It also helps to avoid IP
fragmentation of IKEv2 messages.
Status of This Memo
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Negotiation of Support for Optimizing Optional Payload at
Rekeying IKE SAs and Child SAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Payload Optimization at Rekeying IKE SAs . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.1. Rekeying IKE SAs When No Change of Initiator and
Responder's Cryptographic Suites . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.2. Rekeying IKE SAs When Responder's Cryptographic
Suites Changed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Payload Optimization at Rekeying Child SAs . . . . . . . 7
3.3.1. Rekeying Child SAs When No Change of Initiator and
Responder's Cryptographic Suites and ACL
Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3.2. Rekeying Child SAs When Responder's Cryptographic
Suites or ACL Configuration Changed . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Payload Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. MINIMAL_REKEY_SUPPORTED Notification . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. SA_UNCHANGED Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3. SA_TS_UNCHANGED Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction
The Internet Key Exchange protocol version 2 (IKEv2) specified in
[RFC7296] is used in the IP Security (IPsec) architecture for the
purposes of Security Association (SA) parameters negotiation and
authenticated key exchange. The protocol uses UDP as the transport
for its messages, which size varies from less than one hundred bytes
to several kilobytes.
According to [RFC7296], the secret keys used by IKE/IPSec SAs should
be used only for a limited amount of time and to protect a limited
amount of data. When the lifetime of an SA expires or is about to
expire, the peers can rekey the SA to reestablish a new SA to take
the place of the old one.
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For security gateways/ePDG in 4G networks and cRAN/Cloud in 5G
networks, they will support more than 100,000 IKE/IPSEC tunnels. So
on an average, for every second there may be hundreds or thousands of
IKE SAs and Child SAs that are rekeying. This takes huge amount of
bandwidth, packet fragmentation and more processing resources. For
these devices, these problems can be solved by introducing the
solution described in this document.
This is also useful in Internet of Things (IoT) devices which
utilizing lower power consumption technology. The appendix A of
[I-D.mglt-6lo-diet-esp-requirements] gives some estimate data. For
these devices, reducing the length of IKE/Child SA rekeying messages
can save the bandwidth consumption. At the same time, it can also
save the computing processes by less payload are included.
Most devices don't prefer to change cryptographic suites frequently.
By taking this advantage the SA and TS payloads can be made optional
at the time of rekeying IKE SAs and Child SAs. In such situation,
only a new SPI value is needed to create the new IKE SA and Child SA.
So a new Notify payload which contains the needed SPI value can be
sent instead of the SA and TS payloads.
In case of rekeying IKE SAs, the SA payloads can be optimized if
there is no change of cryptographic suites. In case of rekeying
Child SAs, the SA and TS payloads can be optimized if there is no
change of cryptographic suites and ACL configuration.
2. Conventions Used in This Document
2.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Protocol Details
This section provides protocol details and contains the normative
parts.
Before using this new optimization, the IPSec implementation who
supports it has to know that the peer also supports it. Without the
support on both sides, the optimized rekeying messages sent by one
peer may be unrecognizable for the other peer. To stop this failure
from happening, the first step is to negotiate the support of this
optimization between the two peers. There are two specific rekeying
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SAs cases: rekeying IKE SAs and rekeying Child SAs. After the
negotiation, it's up to the initiator to decide at which case to
optimize the rekeying messages. The initiator can optimize the
rekeying message payloads in both cases, or just in one case. The
responder can react based on the received rekeying message.
3.1. Negotiation of Support for Optimizing Optional Payload at Rekeying
IKE SAs and Child SAs
The initiator indicates its support for optimizing optional payloads
at rekeying IKE SAs and Child SAs by including a Notify payload of
type MINIMAL_REKEY_SUPPORTED in the IKE_AUTH request message. By
observing the MINIMAL_REKEY_SUPPORTED notification in the received
message, the responder can deduce the initiator's support of this
extension. If the responder also supports this extension, it
includes the MINIMAL_REKEY_SUPPORTED notification in the
corresponding response message. After receiving the response
message, the initiator can also know the support of this extension of
the responder side.
The IKE_AUTH message exchange in this case is shown below:
Initiator Responder
--------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR, SK {IDi, [CERT,] [CERTREQ,]
[IDr,] AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr,
N(MINIMAL_REKEY_SUPPORTED)} -->
<-- HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] AUTH,
SAr2, TSi, TSr,
N(MINIMAL_REKEY_SUPPORTED)}
If the responder doesn't support this extension, it MUST ignore the
MINIMAL_REKEY_SUPPORTED notification sent by the initiator and MUST
NOT respond error to the initiator. With no MINIMAL_REKEY_SUPPORTED
notification in the response message, the initiator can deduce that
the responder doesn't support this extension. In this case, the IKE
SAs and Child SAs rekeyings happen as the usual way without the
optimizations defined in this document.
The IKE_AUTH message exchange in this case is shown below:
Initiator Responder
--------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR, SK {IDi, [CERT,] [CERTREQ,]
[IDr,] AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr,
N(MINIMAL_REKEY_SUPPORTED)} -->
<-- HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] AUTH,
SAr2, TSi, TSr}
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3.2. Payload Optimization at Rekeying IKE SAs
The payload optimization at rekeying IKE SAs MUST NOT be used unless
both peers have indicated their support of this extension by using
the negotiation method described in Section 3.1. If the initiator
decides to optimize the payloads at the time of rekeying IKE SAs,
then it includes the SA_UNCHANGED notification in its CREATE_CHILD_SA
exchange message. If the initiator decides not to do the
optimization, then it just sends the rekeying request message as the
original way, the rekeying is conducted as [RFC7296] defined.
3.2.1. Rekeying IKE SAs When No Change of Initiator and Responder's
Cryptographic Suites
At the time of rekeying an IKE SA, when the initiator determines
there is no change on its cryptographic suites since this IKE SA was
created or last rekeyed, it MAY send the SA_UNCHANGED notification
payload instead of the SA payloads in the rekeying request message.
In this SA_UNCHANGED notification, it contains the initiator's new
Security Parameter Index (SPI) used for creating the new IKE SA.
After receiving the initiator's rekeying request message with the
SA_UNCHANGED notification and no SA payloads, the responder knows
that the initiator wants to optimize the rekeying payload. Then when
it determines that there is also no change in its cryptographic
suites, the responder MAY send the rekeying respond message to the
initiator with the SA_UNCHANGED notification payload instead of the
SA payloads. In this SA_UNCHANGED notification, it contains the
responder's new SPI used for creating the new IKE SA.
According to the initiator's new SPI and the responder's new SPI, the
initiator and the responder can rekey the IKE SA on both sides.
The CREATE_CHILD_SA message exchange in this case is shown below:
Initiator Responder
--------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR, SK {N(SA_UNCHANGED), Ni, KEi} -->
<-- HDR, SK {N(SA_UNCHANGED), Nr, KEr}
The initiator sends a SA_UNCHANGED notification payload, a Nonce
payload and a Diffie-Hellman value in the KEi payload. A new
initiator SPI is supplied in the SPI field of the SA_UNCHANGED
notification payload.
The responder replies (using the same Message ID to respond) with a
SA_UNCHANGED notification payload, a Nonce payload and a Diffie-
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Hellman value in the KEr payload. A new responder SPI is supplied in
the SPI field of the SA_UNCHANGED notification payload.
This SA_UNCHANGED notification MUST be included in a CREATE_CHILD_SA
exchange message when there is no SA payloads included. When the
SA_UNCHANGED notification payload is included, the SA payload MUST
NOT be included.
3.2.2. Rekeying IKE SAs When Responder's Cryptographic Suites Changed
At the time of or before rekeying IKE SAs, the responder's
cryptographic suites may be changed while there is no change of
initiator's cryptographic suites. New cryptographic suites may be
added to the responder, or some outdated cryptographic suites may be
deleted from the responder. In this situation, the initiator MAY
send the SA_UNCHANGED notification payload instead of the SA payloads
in the CREATE_CHILD_SA request message at the time of rekeying IKE
SAs.
If the responder decides to continue using the previously negotiated
cryptographic suite to rekey the IKE SA, it MAY send the SA_UNCHANGED
notification payload in the CREATE_CHILD_SA response message, then
the rekeying is conducted like the way described in Section 3.2.1.
If the responder decides to re-negotiate the cryptographic suite, it
MUST send NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN notification payload in the
CREATE_CHILD_SA response message. After receiving this error
notification, the initiator MUST retry the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange
with the SA payloads. Then the rekeying is conducted in the original
way defined in [RFC7296]. The CREATE_CHILD_SA message exchange in
this case is shown below:
Initiator Responder
--------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR, SK {N(SA_UNCHANGED), Ni, KEi} -->
<-- HDR, SK {N(NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN),
Nr, KEr}
HDR, SK {SA, Ni, KEi} -->
<-- HDR, SK {SA, Ni, KEi}
Besides, if the responder only supports the Child SA rekeying
optimization and doesn't support the IKE SA rekeying optimization, it
can also follow the way described above, i.e., it MUST send
NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN notification payload in the CREATE_CHILD_SA
response message when receiving the SA_UNCHANGED notification at the
time of rekeying IKE SAs.
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3.3. Payload Optimization at Rekeying Child SAs
The payload optimization at rekeying Child SAs MUST NOT be used
unless both peers have indicated their support of this extension by
using the negotiation method described in Section 3.1. If the
initiator decides to optimize the payloads at the time of rekeying
Child SAs, then it includes the SA_TS_UNCHANGED notification in its
CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange message. If the initiator decides not to do
the optimization, then it just sends the rekeying request message as
the original way, the rekeying is conducted as [RFC7296] defined.
This SA_TS_UNCHANGED notification MUST be included in a
CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange message when there is no SA and TS payloads
included. The new Child SA is created with the SPI value in the
SA_TS_UNCHANGED notification.
3.3.1. Rekeying Child SAs When No Change of Initiator and Responder's
Cryptographic Suites and ACL Configuration
At the time of rekeying Child SAs, the initiator MAY send the
SA_TS_UNCHANGED notification payload instead of the SA and TS
payloads when there is no change in its cryptographic suites and ACL
configuration since last negotiation. After receiving the
initiator's request message with the SA_TS_UNCHANGED notification,
the responder MAY respond to the initiator with the SA_TS_UNCHANGED
notification payload instead of the SA and TS payloads if there is
also no change in its cryptographic suites and ACL configuration
since last negotiation.
At the time of rekeying a Child SA, when the initiator determines
there is no change in its cryptographic suites and ACL configuration
since this Child SA was created or last rekeyed, it MAY send the
SA_TS_UNCHANGED notification payload instead of the SA and TS
payloads in the rekeying request message. In this SA_TS_UNCHANGED
notification, it contains the initiator's new Security Parameter
Index (SPI) used for creating the new Child SA.
After receiving the initiator's rekeying request message with the
SA_TS_UNCHANGED notification and no SA and TS payloads, the responder
knows that the initiator wants to optimize the rekeying payload.
Then when it determines that there is also no change in its
cryptographic suites and ACL configuration, the responder MAY send
the rekeying respond message to the initiator with the
SA_TS_UNCHANGED notification payload instead of the SA and TS
payloads. In this SA_TS_UNCHANGED notification, it contains the
responder's new SPI used for creating the new Child SA.
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According to the initiator's new SPI and the responder's new SPI, the
initiator and the responder can rekey the Child SA on both sides.
The CREATE_CHILD_SA message exchange in this case is shown below:
Initiator Responder
--------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR, SK {N(REKEY_SA), N(SA_TS_UNCHANGED),
Ni, [KEi,]} -->
<-- HDR, SK {N(SA_TS_UNCHANGED),
Nr, [KEr,]}
This SA_TS_UNCHANGED notification MUST be included in a
CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange message when there is no SA and TS payloads
included at the time of rekeying Child SAs. When the SA_TS_UNCHANGED
notification payload is included, the SA and TS payloads MUST NOT be
included.
3.3.2. Rekeying Child SAs When Responder's Cryptographic Suites or ACL
Configuration Changed
At the time of or before rekeying Child SAs, the responder's
cryptographic suites or ACL configuration may be changed while there
is no change of initiator's cryptographic suites and ACL
configuration. In this situation, the initiator MAY send the
SA_TS_UNCHANGED notification payload instead of the SA and TS
payloads in the CREATE_CHILD_SA request message at the time of
rekeying Child SAs.
If the responder decides to continue using the previously negotiated
cryptographic suite and Traffic Selectors to rekey the Child SA, it
MAY send the SA_TS_UNCHANGED notification payload in the
CREATE_CHILD_SA response message, then the rekeying is conducted like
Section 3.3.1.
If the responder decides to re-negotiate the cryptographic suite or
Traffic Selectors, it MUST send NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN notification
payload in the CREATE_CHILD_SA response message. After receiving
this error notification, the initiator MUST retry the CREATE_CHILD_SA
exchange with the SA and TS payloads. Then the rekeying is conducted
in the original way defined in [RFC7296]. The CREATE_CHILD_SA
message exchange in this case is shown below:
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Initiator Responder
--------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR, SK {N(SA_TS_UNCHANGED), Ni, KEi} -->
<-- HDR, SK {N(NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN),
Nr, KEr}
HDR, SK {N(REKEY_SA), SA, Ni, [KEi,]
TSi, TSr} -->
<-- HDR, SK {SA, Nr, [KEr,]
TSi, TSr}
Besides, if the responder only supports the IKE SA rekeying
optimization and doesn't support the Child SA rekeying optimization,
it can also follow the way described above, i.e., it MUST send
NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN notification payload in the CREATE_CHILD_SA
response message when receiving the SA_TS_UNCHANGED notification at
the time of rekeying Child SAs.
4. Payload Formats
4.1. MINIMAL_REKEY_SUPPORTED Notification
The MINIMAL_REKEY_SUPPORTED notification is used by the initiator and
responder to inform their ability of optimizing optional payload at
the time of rekeying IKE SAs and Child SAs to the peers. It is
formatted as follows:
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Payload |C| RESERVED | Payload Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Protocol ID(=0)| SPI Size (=0) | Notify Message Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
o Protocol ID (1 octet) - MUST be 0.
o SPI Size (1 octet) - MUST be 0, meaning no SPI is present.
o Notify Message Type (2 octets) - MUST be <Need to get value from
IANA>, the value assigned for the MINIMAL_REKEY_SUPPORTED
notification.
This notification contains no data.
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4.2. SA_UNCHANGED Notification
The SA_UNCHANGED notification is used to replace the SA payloads at
the time of rekeying IKE SAs when there is no change of cryptographic
suites in initiator or responder. It is formatted as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Payload |C| RESERVED | Payload Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Protocol ID | SPI Size (=8) | Notify Message Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Security Parameter Index (SPI) |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
o Protocol ID (1 octet) - MUST be 1.
o SPI Size (1 octet) - MUST be 8.
o Notify Message Type (2 octets) - MUST be <Need to get value from
IANA>, the value assigned for the SA_UNCHANGED notification.
o SPI (8 octets) - Security Parameter Index. The initiator sends
initiator SPI. The responder sends responder SPI.
4.3. SA_TS_UNCHANGED Notification
The SA_TS_UNCHANGED notification is used to replace the SA payloads
and TS payloads at the time of rekeying Child SAs when there is no
change of cryptographic suites and ACL configuration in initiator or
responder. It is formatted as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Payload |C| RESERVED | Payload Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Protocol ID | SPI Size (=4) | Notify Message Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Security Parameter Index (SPI) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
o Protocol ID (1 octet) - MUST be either (2) to indicate AH or (3)
to indicate ESP.
o SPI Size (1 octet) - MUST be 4.
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o Notify Message Type (2 octets) - MUST be <Need to get value from
IANA>, the value assigned for the SA_TS_UNCHANGED notification.
o SPI (4 octets) - Security Parameter Index. The initiator sends
initiator SPI. The responder sends responder SPI.
5. IANA Considerations
This document defines two new Notify Message Types in the "IKEv2
Notify Message Types - Status Types" registry. IANA is requested to
assign codepoints in this registry.
NOTIFY messages: status types Value
----------------------------------------------------------
MINIMAL_REKEY_SUPPORTED TBD
SA_UNCHANGED TBD
SA_TS_UNCHANGED TBD
6. Security Considerations
TBD
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
7.2. Informative References
[I-D.mglt-6lo-diet-esp-requirements]
Migault, D., Guggemos, T., and C. Bormann, "Requirements
for Diet-ESP the IPsec/ESP protocol for IoT", draft-mglt-
6lo-diet-esp-requirements-02 (work in progress), July
2016.
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Authors' Addresses
Sandeep Kampati
Huawei Technologies
Divyashree Techno Park, Whitefield
Bangalore, Karnataka 560066
India
Email: sandeepkampati@huawei.com
Meduri S S Bharath
Huawei Technologies
Divyashree Techno Park, Whitefield
Bangalore, Karnataka 560066
India
Email: MeduriS.Bharath@huawei.com
Wei Pan
Huawei Technologies
101 Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District
Nanjing, Jiangsu
China
Email: william.panwei@huawei.com
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