Network Working Group S. Kanno
Internet-Draft NTT Software Corporation
Intended status: Informational M. Kanda
Expires: August 8, 2011 NTT
February 4, 2011
Addition of the Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)
draft-kanno-tls-camellia-00
Abstract
This document specifies forty-two cipher suites for the Transport
Security Layer (TLS) protocol to additional support the Camellia
encryption algorithm as a block cipher.
Status of this Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 8, 2011.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Proposed Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. HMAC based Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Galois Counter Mode(GCM) based Cipher Suites . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Pre-Shared Key (PSK) based Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Cipher Suite Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. PRFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. PSK cipher suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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1. Introduction
This document proposes the addition of new cipher suites to the
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [6] protocol to support the Camellia
[2] encryption algorithm as a block cipher algorithm. The proposed
cipher suites include variants using SHA-2 family of cryptographic
hash functions and Galois counter mode (GCM) [11]. Elliptic curve
cipher suites and pre-shared key (PSK) cipher suites are also
included.
The Camellia algorithm and its properties are described in [2].
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [1].
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2. Proposed Cipher Suites
2.1. HMAC based Cipher Suites
The eight cipher suites use Camellia [2] in Cipher Block Chaining
(CBC) [2] mode with a SHA-2 family HMAC using elliptic curves
encryption:
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
2.2. Galois Counter Mode(GCM) based Cipher Suites
The twenty cipher suites use the same asymmetric key algorithms as
those in the previous section but use the authenticated encryption
modes defined in TLS 1.2 [6] with the Camellia in GCM [11].
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
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2.3. Pre-Shared Key (PSK) based Cipher Suites
The fourteen cipher suites describe pre-shared key cipher suites.
The first six cipher suites use Camellia with GCM and the next eight
cipher suites use the Camellia with SHA-2 family HMAC using
asymmetric key encryption or elliptic curves encryption.
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
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3. Cipher Suite Definitions
3.1. Key Exchange
The RSA, DHE_RSA, DH_RSA, DHE_DSS, DH_DSS, ECDH, DH_anon, and ECDHE
key exchanges are performed as defined in RFC5246 [6].
3.2. Cipher
The CAMELLIA_128_CBC cipher suites use Camellia [2] in CBC mode with
a 128-bit key and 128-bit IV; the CAMELLIA_256_CBC cipher suites use
a 256-bit key and 128-bit IV.
AES authenticated encryption with additional data algorithms,
AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM are described in RFC5116 [5].
And AES GCM cipher suites for TLS are described in RFC5288 [7]. AES
and Camellia share common characteristics including key sizes and
block length. CAMELLIA_128_GCM and CAMELLIA_256_GCM are defined
according as those of AES.
The hash algorithms and PRF algorithms for TLS 1.2 SHALL be as
follows:
a) The cipher suites ending with _SHA256 use HMAC-SHA-256 as the MAC
algorithm, The PRF is the TLS PRF [6] with SHA-256 as the hash
function,
b) The cipher suites ending with _SHA384 use HMAC-SHA-384 as the MAC
algorithm, The PRF is the TLS PRF [6] with SHA-384 as the hash
function.
When used with TLS versions prior to 1.2, the PRF is calculated as
specified in the appropriate version of the TLS specification.
3.4. PSK cipher suites
Pre-shared key cipher suites for TLS are described in RFC4279 [3],
RFC4785 [4], RFC5487 [9], and RFC5489 [10].
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4. Security Considerations
At the time of writing this document there are no known weak keys for
Camellia. And no security problem has been found on Camellia (see
NESSIE [12], CRYPTREC [13], and LNCS 5867[14]).
The security considerations in previous RFCs (RFC4279 [3], RFC4785
[4], RFC5116 [5], RFC5288 [7], RFC5289 [8], RFC5487 [9]), and GCM
[11] apply to this document as well.
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5. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to allocate (has allocated) the following numbers
in the TLS Cipher Suite Registry:
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
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6. References
6.1. Normative References
[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[2] Matsui, M., Nakajima, J., and S. Moriai, "A Description of the
Camellia Encryption Algorithm", RFC 3713, April 2004.
[3] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279, December 2005.
[4] Blumenthal, U. and P. Goel, "Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Ciphersuites
with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4785, January 2007.
[5] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008.
[6] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[7] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois Counter
Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288, August 2008.
[8] Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/
384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)", RFC 5289, August 2008.
[9] Badra, M., "Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/
384 and AES Galois Counter Mode", RFC 5487, March 2009.
[10] Badra, M. and I. Hajjeh, "ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5489, March 2009.
[11] Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for Confidentiality and
Authentication", April 2006, <http://csrc.nist.gov/
publications/drafts/Draft-NIST_SP800-38D_Public_Comment.pdf>.
6.2. Informative References
[12] "The NESSIE project (New European Schemes for Signatures,
Integrity and Encryption)",
<http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/nessie/>.
[13] Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), "Cryptography
Research and Evaluation Committees",
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<http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/enc/CRYPTREC/index-e.html>.
[14] Mala, H., Shakiba, M., and M. Dakhil-alian, "New Results on
Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round
Camellia-128", November 2009,
<http://www.springerlink.com/content/e55783u422436g77/>.
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Authors' Addresses
Satoru Kanno
NTT Software Corporation
Phone: +81-45-212-9803
Fax: +81-45-212-9800
Email: kanno.satoru@po.ntts.co.jp
Masayuki Kanda
NTT
Phone: +81-422-59-3456
Fax: +81-422-59-4015
Email: kanda.masayuki@lab.ntt.co.jp
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