Network Working Group A. Kato
Internet-Draft NTT Software Corporation
Intended status: Standards Track M. Kanda
Expires: August 28, 2008 Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
Corporation
T. Iwata
Nagoya University
February 25, 2008
The Camellia-CMAC-96 and Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 Algorithms and Its Use
with IPsec
draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-cmac96and128-02
Status of this Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
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Abstract
This memo specifies two new algorithms. One is the usage of Cipher-
based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) with Camellia block cipher
on the authentication mechanism of the IPsec Encapsulating Security
Payload and Authentication Header protocols. This algorithm is
called Camellia-CMAC-96. Latter is pseudo-random function based on
CMAC with Camellia block cipher for Internet Key Exchange. This
algorithm is called Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Camellia-CMAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Camellia-CMAC-96 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. Camellia-CMAC-96 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.2. Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10.1. Normative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10.2. Informative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 22
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1. Introduction
This memo specifies two new algorithms. One is the usage of CMAC
based on Camellia block cipher on the authentication mechanism of the
IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [7] and Authentication
Header protocols (AH) [6]. This algorithm is called
Camellia-CMAC-96. Latter is Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) based on
CMAC with Camellia block cipher for Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2)
[8]. This algorithm is called Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128.
Camellia is a symmetric cipher with a Feistel structure. Camellia
was developed jointly by NTT and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation in
2000. It was designed to withstand all known cryptanalytic attacks,
and it has been scrutinized by worldwide cryptographic experts.
Camellia is suitable for implementation in software and hardware,
offering encryption speed in software and hardware implementations
that is comparable to Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [13].
Camellia supports 128-bit block size and 128-, 192-, and 256-bit key
lengths, i.e., the same interface specifications as the AES.
Therefore developers can implement Camellia based algorithms without
large amount of modification by replacing AES block of AES based
algorithms to Camellia block.
Camellia is adopted as IETF and several international standardization
organizations. Camellia is already adopted as IPSec [12], TLS [11],
S/MIME [5] and XML [9]. Camellia is adopted for the one of three
ISO/IEC international standard cipher [16] as 128bit block cipher
(Camellia AES and SEED). Camellia was selected as a recommended
cryptographic primitive by the EU NESSIE (New European Schemes for
Signatures, Integrity and Encryption) project [14] and was included
in the list of cryptographic techniques for Japanese e-Government
systems that was selected by the Japan CRYPTREC (Cryptography
Research Evaluation Committees) [15].
Since optimized source code is provided by several open source
lisences [17], Camellia is also adopted by several open source
projects (Openssl, FreeBSD, Linux and Gran Paradiso).
The algorithm specification and object identifiers are described in
[3].
The Camellia homepage [18] contains a wealth of information about
Camellia, including detailed specification, security analysis,
performance figures, reference implementation, optimized
implementation, test vectors, and intellectual property information.
This document specifies the usage of CMAC with Camellia Block cipher
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on the authentication mechanism of the IPsec Encapsulating Security
Payload [7] and Authentication Header [6] protocols. This new
algorithm is named Camellia-CMAC-96.
NIST CMAC specification document [1] describes a method to use the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as a Message Authentication Code
(MAC) that has a 128-bit output length. The 128-bit output is useful
as a long-lived PRF. This document also specifies a PRF based on
CMAC with Camellia block cipher that supports fixed and variable key
sizes for IKEv2 [8] Key Derivation Function (KDF) and authentication.
This new algorithm is named Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128. For further
information on IKE, AH and ESP, refer to [8], [6], [7] and [4].
This document does not cover implementation details of CMAC. Those
details can be found in [1].
1.1. Terminology
The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" that
appear in this document are to be interpreted as described in [2].
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2. Definitions
CBC
Cipher Block Chaining mode of operation for message
authentication code.
MAC
Message Authentication Code. A bit string of a fixed
length, computed by the MAC generation algorithm, that is
used to establish the authority and, hence, the integrity
of a message.
CMAC
Cipher-based MAC based on a symmetric key block cipher.
Key (K)
128-bit (16-octet) key for Camellia cipher block. Denoted
by K.
Variable-length Key (VK)
Variable-length key for Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128, denoted by
VK.
Message (M)
Message to be authenticated. Denoted by M.
Length (len)
The length of message M in octets. Denoted by len. The
minimum value is 0. The maximum value is not specified in
this document.
VKlen
The length of VK in octets.
truncate(T,l)
Truncate T (MAC) in most-significant-bit-first (MSB-first)
order to a length of l octets.
T
The output of Camellia-CMAC.
Camellia-CMAC
CMAC generation function based on Camellia block cipher
with 128-bit key.
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Camellia-CMAC-96
IPsec AH and ESP MAC generation function based on Camellia-
CMAC, which truncates the 96 most significant bits of the
128-bit output.
Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128
IPsec AH and ESP PRF based on Camellia-CMAC, which removes
128-bit key length restriction.
SKEYSEED Seed of shared key calculated from the nonces exchanged
during the IKE_SA_INIT exchange and the Diffie-Hellman
shared secret in IKEv2 specification.
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3. Camellia-CMAC
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has
recently specified the Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
(CMAC). CMAC [1] is a keyed hash function that is based on a
symmetric key block cipher, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard
[13]. The CMAC algorithm provides a framework for inserting various
block cipher algorithm.
Camellia-CMAC uses the Camellia block cipher [3] as a building block
in CMAC [1]. To generate a MAC, Camellia-CMAC(K, M, len) takes a
secret key 'K', a message of variable length 'M', and the length of
the message in octets 'len' as inputs and returns a fixed-bit string.
In this specification, Camellia-CMAC is always used with 128-bit
length key.
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4. Camellia-CMAC-96
For IPsec message authentication on AH and ESP, Camellia-CMAC-96 MAY
be used. Camellia-CMAC-96 is a Camellia-CMAC with 96-bit truncated
output in MSB-first order. The output is a 96-bit MAC that will meet
the default authenticator length as specified in [6]. The result of
truncation is taken in MSB-first order.
Figure 1 describes Camellia-CMAC-96 algorithm:
In step 1, Camellia-CMAC is applied to the message M in length len
with key K.
In step 2, the output block T is truncated to 12 octets in MSB-first
order, and Truncated T (TT) is returned.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ Algorithm Camellia-CMAC-96 +
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ +
+ Input : K (128-bit Key) +
+ : M (message to be authenticated) +
+ : len (length of message in octets) +
+ Output : Truncated T (truncated output to length 12 octets) +
+ +
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
+ +
+ Step 1. T := Camellia-CMAC (K,M,len); +
+ Step 2. TT := truncate (T, 12); +
+ return TT; +
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Figure 1: Algorithm Camellia-CMAC-96
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5. Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128
The Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 algorithm is identical to Camellia-CMAC
except that the 128-bit key length restriction is removed.
IKEv2 [8] uses PRFs for multiple purposes, most notably for
generating keying material and authentication of the IKE_SA.
When using Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 as the PRF described in IKEv2,
Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 is considered to take variable key length in
all places, and the number of bits of keying material generated when
new keys are generated is 128 bits (i.e. preferred key length when
generating keying material of SK_d, SK_pi, and SK_pr is 128 bits).
When generating SKEYSEED the full of Ni and Nr are used as key for
the PRF.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 +
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ +
+ Input : VK (Variable-length key) +
+ : M (Message, i.e., the input data of the PRF) +
+ : VKlen (length of VK in octets) +
+ : len (length of M in octets) +
+ Output : PRV (128-bit Pseudo-Random Variable) +
+ +
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
+ Variable: K (128-bit key for Camellia-CMAC) +
+ +
+ Step 1. If VKlen is equal to 16 +
+ Step 1a. then +
+ K := VK; +
+ Step 1b. else +
+ K := Camellia-CMAC(0^128, VK, VKlen); +
+ Step 2. PRV := Camellia-CMAC(K, M, len); +
+ return PRV; +
+ +
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Figure 2: Algorithm Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128
In step 1, the 128-bit key, K, for Camellia-CMAC is derived as
follows:
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o If the key, VK, is exactly 128 bits, then we use it as-is.
o If it is longer or shorter than 128 bits, then we derive the key,
K, by applying the Camellia-CMAC algorithm using the 128-bit all-
zero string as the key and VK as the input message. This step is
described in step 1b.
In step 2, we apply the Camellia-CMAC algorithm using K as the key
and M as the input message. The output of this algorithm is
returned.
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6. Test Vectors
6.1. Camellia-CMAC-96
This section contains four test vectors(TV), which can be used to
confirm that an implementation has correctly implemented Camellia-
CMAC-96.
----------------
K 2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c
Mlen = 0
M <empty string>
T ba925782 aaa1f5d9 a00f8964
----------------
K 2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c
Mlen = 16
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
T 6d962854 a3b9fda5 6d7d45a9
----------------
K 2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c
Mlen = 40
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
30c81c46 a35ce411
T 5c18d119 ccd67661 44ac1866
----------------
K 2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c
Mlen = 64
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
30c81c46 a35ce411 e5fbc119 1a0a52ef
f69f2445 df4f9b17 ad2b417b e66c3710
T c2699a6e ba55ce9d 939a8a4e
6.2. Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128
This section contains twelve test vectors(TV), which can be used to
confirm that an implementation has correctly implemented Camellia-
CMAC-PRF-128. The first four test vectors use 128 bit VK; the next
four test vectors use 192 bit VK; and the last four test vectors use
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256 bit VK.
VKlen = 16
----------------
VK 2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c
Mlen = 0
M <empty string>
T ba925782 aaa1f5d9 a00f8964 8094fc71
----------------
VK 2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c
Mlen = 16
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
T 6d962854 a3b9fda5 6d7d45a9 5ee17993
----------------
VK 2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c
Mlen = 40
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
30c81c46 a35ce411
T 5c18d119 ccd67661 44ac1866 131d9f22
----------------
VK 2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c
Mlen = 64
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
30c81c46 a35ce411 e5fbc119 1a0a52ef
f69f2445 df4f9b17 ad2b417b e66c3710
T c2699a6e ba55ce9d 939a8a4e 19466ee9
------------------------------------------------------------
VKlen = 24
----------------
VK 8e73b0f7 da0e6452 c810f32b 809079e5
62f8ead2 522c6b7b
K abddaa68 e8b9f0af 2fb4db53 41cf1d91
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Mlen = 0
M <empty string>
T f4739892 c70bd23e 891f66c0 5fefbf27
----------------
VK 8e73b0f7 da0e6452 c810f32b 809079e5
62f8ead2 522c6b7b
K abddaa68 e8b9f0af 2fb4db53 41cf1d91
Mlen = 16
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
T 60a33814 53babaed 1a11dfd3 d24c1410
----------------
VK 8e73b0f7 da0e6452 c810f32b 809079e5
62f8ead2 522c6b7b
K abddaa68 e8b9f0af 2fb4db53 41cf1d91
Mlen = 40
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
30c81c46 a35ce411
T 42b9d47f 4f58bc29 85b6f82c 23b121cb
----------------
VK 8e73b0f7 da0e6452 c810f32b 809079e5
62f8ead2 522c6b7b
K abddaa68 e8b9f0af 2fb4db53 41cf1d91
Mlen = 64
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
30c81c46 a35ce411 e5fbc119 1a0a52ef
f69f2445 df4f9b17 ad2b417b e66c3710
T d078729f dcae9abc ff1ea4d6 18ed4501
------------------------------------------------------------
VKlen = 32
----------------
VK 603deb10 15ca71be 2b73aef0 857d7781
1f352c07 3b6108d7 2d9810a3 0914dff4
K b5aeeae9 2c23bed7 167af194 2e831597
Mlen = 0
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M <empty string>
T c96d7d40 d4aaab78 ac906b91 c82bd690
----------------
VK 603deb10 15ca71be 2b73aef0 857d7781
1f352c07 3b6108d7 2d9810a3 0914dff4
K b5aeeae9 2c23bed7 167af194 2e831597
Mlen = 16
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
T 104de4b9 0da6baf1 fa73945b e614f032
----------------
VK 603deb10 15ca71be 2b73aef0 857d7781
1f352c07 3b6108d7 2d9810a3 0914dff4
K b5aeeae9 2c23bed7 167af194 2e831597
Mlen = 40
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
30c81c46 a35ce411
T 2d3684e9 1cb1b303 a7db8648 f25ee16c
----------------
VK 603deb10 15ca71be 2b73aef0 857d7781
1f352c07 3b6108d7 2d9810a3 0914dff4
K b5aeeae9 2c23bed7 167af194 2e831597
Mlen = 64
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
30c81c46 a35ce411 e5fbc119 1a0a52ef
f69f2445 df4f9b17 ad2b417b e66c3710
T d6b0f1b7 dda2b62a eca6d51d da63fdda
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7. Security Considerations
The security provided by Camellia-CMAC-96 Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 is
built on the strong cryptographic algorithm Camellia and CMAC. At
the time of this writing, there are no known practical cryptographic
attacks against Camellia or CMAC.
However, as is true with any cryptographic algorithm, part of its
strength lies in the secret key, K, and the correctness of the
implementation in all of the participating systems. If the secret
key is compromised or inappropriately shared, it guarantees neither
authentication nor integrity of message at all. The secret key shall
be generated in a way that meets the pseudo randomness requirement of
RFC 4086 [10] and should be kept safe. If and only if
Camellia-CMAC-96 Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 are used properly it provides
the authentication and integrity that meet the best current practice
of message authentication.
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8. IANA Considerations
The IANA has allocated value <TBD1> for IKEv2 Transform Type 3
(Integrity Algorithm) to the AUTH_CAMELLIA_CMAC_96 algorithm, and has
allocated a value of <TBD2> for IKEv2 Transform Type 2 (Pseudo-Random
Function) to the PRF_CAMELLIA128_CMAC algorithm.
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9. Acknowledgements
We thank Tim Polk and Tero Kivinen for their initial review of this
document.
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10. References
10.1. Normative
[1] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Recommendation
for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:The CMAC Mode for
Authentication", Special Publication 800-38B, May 2005.
[2] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[3] Matsui, M., Nakajima, J., and S. Moriai, "A Description of the
Camellia Encryption Algorithm", RFC 3713, April 2004.
10.2. Informative
[4] Thayer, R., Doraswamy, N., and R. Glenn, "IP Security Document
Roadmap", RFC 2411, November 1998.
[5] Moriai, S. and A. Kato, "Use of the Camellia Encryption
Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3657,
January 2004.
[6] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302, December 2005.
[7] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 4303,
December 2005.
[8] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., and P. Eronen, "Internet Key Exchange
Protocol: IKEv2", draft-hoffman-ikev2bis-02 (work in progress),
November 2007.
[9] Eastlake, D., "Additional XML Security Uniform Resource
Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 4051, April 2005.
[10] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
[11] Moriai, S., Kato, A., and M. Kanda, "Addition of Camellia
Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4132,
July 2005.
[12] Kato, A., Moriai, S., and M. Kanda, "The Camellia Cipher
Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec", RFC 4312, December 2005.
[13] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197, November 2001,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf>.
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[14] "The NESSIE project (New European Schemes for Signatures,
Integrity and Encryption)",
<http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/nessie/>.
[15] Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), "Cryptography
Research and Evaluation Committees",
<http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/enc/CRYPTREC/index-e.html>.
[16] International Organization for Standardization, "Information
technology - Security techniques - Encryption algorithms - Part
3: Block ciphers", ISO/IEC 18033-3, July 2005.
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URIs
[17] <http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/source.html>
[18] <http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/camellia/>
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Authors' Addresses
Akihiro Kato
NTT Software Corporation
Phone: +81-45-212-7577
Fax: +81-45-212-9800
Email: akato@po.ntts.co.jp
Masayuki Kanda
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
Phone: +81-422-59-3456
Fax: +81-422-59-4015
Email: kanda.masayuki@lab.ntt.co.jp
Tetsu Iwata
Nagoya University
Email: iwata@cse.nagoya-u.ac.jp
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Kato, et al. Expires August 28, 2008 [Page 22]